Section 1

Substantive Due Process

United States v. Toribio (carabao slaughterhouse) 1910
1. Respondent Toribio is an owner of carabao, residing in the town of Carmen in the province of Bohol.
2. The trial court of Bohol found that the respondent slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered a carabao without a permit from the
municipal treasurer of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act
regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of Large Cattle.
3. The act prohibits the slaughter of large cattle fit for agricultural work or other draft purposes for human consumption.
4. The respondent counters by stating that what the Act is (1) prohibiting is the slaughter of large cattle in the municipal slaughter
house without a permit given by the municipal treasurer.
5. Furthermore, he contends that the municipality of Carmen has no slaughter house and that he slaughtered his carabao in his
dwelling, (2) the act constitutes a taking of property for public use in the exercise of the right of eminent domain without
providing for the compensation of owners, and it is an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power of the state for it
deprives them of the enjoyment of their private property.
Issue: Whether or not Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle, is an undue and
unauthorized exercise of police power.
RULING: NOOOOOOOOOo. It is valid.
1. Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction should be adopted which
will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted,
and a construction should be rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the
object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment
2. The Supreme Court also said that if they will follow the contention of Toribio it will defeat the purpose of the law.
3. The police power rests upon necessity and the right of self-protection and if ever the invasion of private property by police
regulation can be justified, The Supreme Court think that the reasonable restriction placed upon the use of carabaos by the
provision of the law under discussion must be held to be authorized as a reasonable and proper exercise of that power.
4. The Supreme Court cited events that happen in the Philippines like an epidemic that wiped 70-100% of the population of
carabaos.
5. Agriculture being the principal occupation of the people, and the carabao being the work animal almost exclusively in use in the
fields as well as for draft purposes, the ravages of the disease with which they were infected struck an almost vital blow at the
material welfare of the country. large areas of productive land lay waste for years, and the production of rice, the staple food of
the inhabitants of the Islands, fell off to such an extent that the impoverished people were compelled to spend many millions of
pesos in its importation, notwithstanding the fact that with sufficient work animals to cultivate the fields the arable rice lands of
the country could easily be made to produce a supply more that sufficient for its own needs.
6. The drain upon the resources of the Islands was such that famine soon began to make itself felt, hope sank in the breast of the
people, and in many provinces the energies of the breadwinners seemed to be paralyzed by the apparently hopeless struggle
for existence with which they were confronted.
7. To meet these conditions, large sums of money were expended by the Government in relieving the immediate needs of the
starving people, three millions of dollars were voted by the Congress of the United States as a relief or famine fund, public
works were undertaken to furnish employment in the provinces where the need was most pressing, and every effort made to
alleviate the suffering incident to the widespread failure of the crops throughout the Islands, due in large measure to the lack of
animals fit for agricultural work and draft purposes.
8. The Supreme Court also said that these animals are vested with public interest for they are fundamental use for the production
of crops.
9. These reasons satisfy the requisites of a valid exercise of police power.
10. The Supreme court finally said that article 1147 is not an exercise of the inherent power of eminent domain.
11. The said law does not constitute the taking of caraboes for public purpose; it just serve as a mere regulation for the
consumption of these private properties for the protection of general welfare and public interest.

Churchill v. Rafferty collector of internal revenue (billboards as nuisance) 1915

1. The judgment appealed from in this case perpetually restrains and prohibits the defendant and his deputies from collecting and
enforcing against the plaintiffs and their property the annual tax mentioned and described in subsection (b) of section 100 of Act
No. 2339, effective July 1, 1914, and from destroying or removing any sign, signboard, or billboard, the property of the plaintiffs,
for the sole reason that such sign, signboard, or billboard is, or may be, offensive to the sight; and decrees the cancellation of the
bond given by the plaintiffs to secure the issuance of the preliminary injunction granted soon after the commencement of this
action.
ISSUE: Are the provisions of sub-section 100 of Act No. 2339 conferring power upon the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove sign,
signboard, or billboard upon the ground that the same is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance, valid exercise of police
power?
RULING: YEEEEEEEEEssss but for the present case, decision was reversed (in connection with the destroying and removing of
billboards. But we are of the opinion, as above indicated, that unsightly advertisements or signs, signboards, or billboards which are
offensive to the sight, are not disassociated from the general welfare of the public.
1. The plaintiffs allege that the billboards here in question "in no sense constitute a nuisance and are not deleterious to the health,
morals, or general welfare of the community, or of any persons."
2. The defendant denies these allegations in his answer and claims that after due investigation made upon the complaints of the
British and German Consuls, he "decided that the billboard complained of was and still is offensive to the sight, and is otherwise
a nuisance."
3. The plaintiffs proved by Mr. Churchill that the "billboards were quite a distance from the road and that they were strongly built,
not dangerous to the safety of the people, and contained no advertising matter which is filthy, indecent, or deleterious to the
morals of the community."
4. The Attorney-General, on behalf of the defendant, says: "The question which the case presents under this head for determination,
resolves itself into this inquiry: Is the suppression of advertising signs displayed or exposed to public view, which are admittedly
offensive to the sight, conducive to the public interest?"
5. And counsel for the plaintiffs states the question thus: "We contend that that portion of section 100 of Act No. 2339, empowering
the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove billboards as nuisances, if objectionable to the sight, is unconstitutional, as
constituting a deprivation of property without due process of law."
6. But we apprehend that in point of fact they have little bearing upon the health of the normal person, but a great deal to do with
his physical comfort and convenience and not a little to do with his peace of mind.
7. Without entering into the realm of psychology, we think it quite demonstrable that sight is as valuable to a human being as any
of his other senses, and that the proper ministration to this sense conduces as much to his contentment as the care bestowed
upon the senses of hearing or smell, and probably as much as both together.
8. Objects may be offensive to the eye as well as to the nose or ear.
9. Man's esthetic feelings are constantly being appealed to through his sense of sight.
10. Why, then, should the Government not interpose to protect from annoyance this most valuable of man's senses as readily as
to protect him from offensive noises and smells?
11. Ostensibly located on private property, the real and sole value of the billboard is its proximity to the public thoroughfares.
Hence, we conceive that the regulation of billboards and their restriction is not so much a regulation of private property as it
is a regulation of the use of the streets and other public thoroughfares.
12. The police power cannot interfere with private property rights for purely esthetic purposes.
13. The courts, taking this view, rest their decisions upon the proposition that the esthetic sense is disassociated entirely from any
relation to the public health, morals, comfort, or general welfare and is, therefore, beyond the police power of the state.
14. But we are of the opinion, as above indicated, that unsightly advertisements or signs, signboards, or billboards which are offensive
to the sight, are not disassociated from the general welfare of the public. This is not establishing a new principle, but carrying a
well recognized principle to further application. (Fruend on Police Power, p. 166.)

People v. Fajardo (not allowed to build on his lot as it covers the view from plaza) 1958
1. Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur convicting defendants-appellants Juan F. Fajardo and
Pedro Babilonia of a violation of Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, for having
constructed without a permit from the municipal mayor a building that destroys the view of the public plaza.
2. It appears that on August 15, 1950, during the incumbency of defendant-appellant Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of the municipality
of Baao, Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed the ordinance in question providing as follows:
a. SECTION 1. Any person or persons who will construct or repair a building should, before constructing or repairing,
obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor.
b. SEC. 2. A fee of not less than P2.00 should be charged for each building permit and P1.00 for each repair permit issued.
c. SEC. 3. PENALTY — Any violation of the provisions of the above, this ordinance, shall make the violation liable to pay a
fine of not less than P25 nor more than P50 or imprisonment of not less than 12 days nor more than 24 days or both, at
the discretion of the court. If said building destroys the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any public property, it shall
be removed at the expense of the owner of the building or house.
3. Four years later, after the term of appellant Fajardo as mayor had expired, he and his son in-law, appellant Babilonia, filed a
written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on
a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a
creek (Exh. D).
4. On January 16, 1954, the request was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view
or beauty of the public plaza (Exh. E).
5. On January 18, 1954, defendants reiterated their request for a building permit (Exh. 3), but again the request was turned down
by the mayor.
6. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of
residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased
property.
7. On February 26, 1954, appellants were charged before and convicted by the justice of the peace court of Baao, Camarines Sur,
for violation of the ordinance in question.
8. Defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance, which affirmed the conviction
ISSUE: W/N the conviction should stand
RULING: NOOOOOOOooooooooo
1. A first objection to the validity of the ordinance in question is that under it the mayor has absolute discretion to issue or deny a
permit.
2. The ordinance fails to state any policy, or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action.
3. No purpose to be attained by requiring the permit is expressed; no conditions for its grant or refusal are enumerated.
4. It is not merely a case of deficient standards; standards are entirely lacking.
5. The ordinance thus confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits,
and it is a settled rule that such an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity, per se lawful, is
invalid
6. It is contended, on the other hand, that the mayor can refuse a permit solely in case that the proposed building "destroys the
view of the public plaza or occupies any public property" (as stated in its section 3); and in fact, the refusal of the Mayor of Baao
to issue a building permit to the appellant was predicated on the ground that the proposed building would "destroy the view of
the public plaza" by preventing its being seen from the public highway.
7. Even thus interpreted, the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of
the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellants
property without just compensation.
8. We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and
happiness of residents.
9. But while property may be regulated in the interest of the general welfare, and in its pursuit, the State may prohibit
structures offensive to the sight the State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the
beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the
community.
10. As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands
condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway.
11. The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is
best suited, being urban in character.
12. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard.
13. SEC. 2243. To establish fire limits in populous centers, prescribe the kinds of buildings that may be constructed or repaired
within them, and issue permits for the creation or repair thereof, charging a fee which shall be determined by the municipal
council and which shall not be less than two pesos for each building permit and one peso for each repair permit issued. The fees
collected under the provisions of this subsection shall accrue to the municipal school fund.
14. As there is absolutely no showing in this case that the municipal council had either established fire limits within the
municipality or set standards for the kind or kinds of buildings to be constructed or repaired within them before it passed the
ordinance in question, it is clear that said ordinance was not conceived and promulgated under the express authority of sec.
2243 (c) aforequoted.

Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operator v. City of Manila (curb immorality; license fee)
1. Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members Hotel del Mar Inc. petitioned for the prohibition
of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be applicable in the city of Manila.
2. They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City Board to regulate due to the fact that hotels were not
part of its regulatory powers.
3. They also asserted that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance was unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative
of due process insofar because it would impose P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second
class motels; there was also the requirement that the guests would fill up a form specifying their personal information.
4. There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection
from city authorites.
5. They claimed this to be violative of due process for being vague.
6. The law also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels
such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry.
7. The petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on this for being arbitrary.
8. It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours.
9. There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.
10. The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license of the hotels that violated the ordinance.
11. The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.
12. Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.

Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause?

Held: NOOOOOOOooooooooooo. Judgment reversed.

1. "The presumption is towards the validity of a law.”

2. However, the Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property
rights under the guise of police regulation.
3. There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public
morals, particularly fornication and prostitution.
4. Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose
other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government."
5. Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general
welfare of the people.
6. In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the
power must not be unreasonable or violative of due process..
7. Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances," decisions
based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due
process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrase.
8. Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinance’s nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process requirement.
9. On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every 24 hours- It was not violative of due
process.
10. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.'
11. Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society
and the general well-being.
12. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even
in contractual relations affected with public interest.
13. What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the
validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of
property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.
14. Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process ground by invoking the principles of vagueness or
uncertainty. It would appear from a recital in the petition itself that what seems to be the gravamen of the alleged grievance is
that the provisions are too detailed and specific rather than vague or uncertain.
15. Petitioners, however, point to the requirement that a guest should give the name, relationship, age and sex of the companion or
companions as indefinite and uncertain in view of the necessity for determining whether the companion or companions
referred to are those arriving with the customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering the room With him at about the
same time or coming at any indefinite time later to join him
16. A citation from Justice Holmes would prove illuminating: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with
what they omit but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."35

Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court (transport of carabao) 1987

1. It is this cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.
2. The President Marcos has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos
not complying with the requirements of Executive Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age
3. WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage to circumvent the prohibition against
inter-provincial movement of carabaos by transporting carabeef instead; and
4. SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical
condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another.
5. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and
forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the
National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the
Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
6. The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure.
7. The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
8. the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of
the bond.
9. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and
also for its presumed validity. 2
10. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial court, ** and he has now
come before us in this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: W/N EO 626-A valid
RULING: NOOOOOOOOOOOOo
1. The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead
of merely implementing an existing law.
2. It was issued by President Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise of
his legislative authority under Amendment No. 6.
3. As there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that extraordinary power then, the petitioner has reason,
indeed, to question the validity of the executive order.
4. For the nonce, we confine ourselves to the more fundamental question of due process.
5. The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by
due process.
6. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the
general welfare. 18
7. By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and
the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain.
8. It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in
Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions.
9. The original measure was issued for the reason, as expressed in one of its Whereases, that "present conditions demand that the
carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs."
10. We affirm at the outset the need for such a measure. In the face of the worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence
of our farms on these traditional beasts of burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if it had not taken steps to
protect and preserve them.
11. In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to speak,
has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626.
12. The method chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-cited doctrine.
13. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years old if male and
eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm
work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion.
14. But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot say
with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method.
15. We note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of
the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and
no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another."
16. The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to
be achieved by the questioned measure is missing
17. We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter,
considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another.
18. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to
another province will make it easier to kill them there.
19. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the
court after trial and conviction of the accused.
20. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately
impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.
21. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner
only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated
upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court.
22. In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment.
23. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why
the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being
accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution.
24. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should
have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the
prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.
25. We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the
questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and
other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and
to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis
supplied.)
26. The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous
opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption.
27. To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive.
28. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is
immediately condemned and punished
Balacuit v. CFI (discount to children in movie house)
1. Petitioners, theater owners, assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of
Butuan
2. This called for a reduction to ½ of the ticket price given to minors from 7-12 years old.
3. There was a fine from 200-600 pesos or a 2-6 month imprisonment
4. The complaint was issued in the trial court.
5. A TRO was then issued to prevent the law from being enforced.
6. The respondent court entered its decision declaring the law valid.
7. Petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 on the grounds that it is ultra vires and an invalid exercise
of police power.
8. Petitioners contend that Ordinance No. 640 is not within the power of' the Municipal Board to enact as provided for in Section
15(n) of Republic Act No. 523 where it states that the Muncipal board can only fix license fees for theaters and not admission
rates.
9. The respondent attempts to justify the enactment of the ordinance by invoking the general welfare clause embodied in Section
15 (nn) of the cited law.

Issue: W/N the ordinance is valid

RULING: NOOOOOOoooooooooooo
1. In this jurisdiction, it is already settled that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and other places of public exhibition are
subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of delegated police power by the local government.
2. The City of Butuan, apparently realizing that it has no authority to enact the ordinance in question under its power to regulate
embodied in Section 15(n), now invokes the police power as delegated to it under the general welfare clause to justify the
enactment of said ordinance
3. To invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest of the public generally requires an interference
with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals.
4. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose
unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations.
5. In other words, the determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police power is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the
supervision of the courts.
6. Petitioners maintain that Ordinance No. 640 violates the due process clause of the Constitution for being oppressive, unfair,
unjust, confiscatory, and an undue restraint of trade, and violative of the right of persons to enter into contracts, considering that
the theater owners are bound under a contract with the film owners for just admission prices for general admission, balcony and
lodge.
7. Constitution still limits such power
8. The court agreed with petitioners that the ordinance is not justified by any necessity for the public interest.
9. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between
purposes and means.
10. The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of cost on the part of parents who have to shell out the same
amount of money for the admission of their children, as they would for themselves.
11. A reduction in the price of admission would mean corresponding savings for the parents; however, the petitioners are the ones
made to bear the cost of these savings.
12. The ordinance does not only make the petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it likewise penalizes them for failure to comply
with it.
13. Furthermore, as petitioners point out, there will be difficulty in its implementation because as already experienced by petitioners
since the effectivity of the ordinance, children over 12 years of age tried to pass off their age as below 12 years in order to avail
of the benefit of the ordinance.
14. The ordinance does not provide a safeguard against this undesirable practice and as such, the respondent City of Butuan now
suggests that birth certificates be exhibited by movie house patrons to prove the age of children.
15. This is, however, not at all practicable.
16. We can see that the ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressive upon the business of petitioners. Moreover, there
is no discernible relation between the ordinance and the promotion of public health, safety, morals and the general welfare.
17. We fail to see how the children are exploited if they pay the full price of admission.
18. Moreover, as a logical consequence of the ordinance, movie house and theater operators will be discouraged from exhibiting
wholesome movies for general patronage, much less children's pictures if only to avoid compliance with the ordinance and still
earn profits for themselves.
19. Such ticket, therefore, represents a right, Positive or conditional, as the case may be, according to the terms of the original contract
of sale.
20. This right is clearly a right of property. The ticket which represents that right is also, necessarily, a species of property.
21. As such, the owner thereof, in the absence of any condition to the contrary in the contract by which he obtained it, has the clear
right to dispose of it, to sell it to whom he pleases and at such price as he can obtain.
22. In no sense could theaters be considered public utilities.
23. The State has not found it appropriate as a national policy to interfere with the admission prices to these performances. While it
is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is,
the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference
with the business or calling subject of regulation.
24. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police
power.
25. A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business should not encroach upon the legitimate
and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights.
26. The right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself
and, as such, within the protection of the due process clause.
27. Although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or reasonableness of the ordinance, such presumption must
nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance itself or is established by
proper evidence

Magtajas v. Pryce Properties (local ordinance against PAGCOR)

1. The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to
Cagayan de Oro City.
2. To this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc.\
3. The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile.
4. ORDINANCE NO. 3353: AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF BUSINESS PERMIT AND CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESS
PERMIT TO ANY ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE USING AND ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS PREMISES OR PORTION THEREOF FOR THE
OPERATION OF CASINO.
5. ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93: AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF CASINO AND PROVIDING PENALTY FOR VIOLATION
THEREFOR.
6. PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on
land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.
7. Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the
Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause
8. The petitioners argue that by virtue of these provisions, the Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos
because they involve games of chance, which are detrimental to the people.
a. Gambling is not allowed by general law and even by the Constitution itself.
b. The legislative power conferred upon local government units may be exercised over all kinds of gambling and not only over
"illegal gambling" as the respondents erroneously argue.
c. Even if the operation of casinos may have been permitted under P.D. 1869, the government of Cagayan de Oro City has the
authority to prohibit them within its territory pursuant to the authority entrusted to it by the Local Government Code.
9. The adoption of the Local Government Code, it is pointed out, had the effect of modifying the charter of the PAGCOR.
10. Finally, the petitioners also attack gambling as intrinsically harmful and cite various provisions of the Constitution and several
decisions of this Court expressive of the general and official disapprobation of the vice.
ISSUE: W/N the ordinances are valid
RULING: NOOOOOOooo
1. The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue.
2. Gambling is not illegal per se.
3. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically
proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all.
4. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit.
5. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicibility of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may
be resolved only by the legislative and executive departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of government.
6. The tests of a valid ordinance are well established.
a. It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
b. It must not be unfair or oppressive.
c. It must not be partial or discriminatory.
 d. It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
e. It must be general and consistent with public policy.
f. It must not be unreasonable.
7. We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or
suppress, among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance."
8. Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law.
9. Accordingly, we conclude that since the word "gambling" is associated with "and other prohibited games of chance," the word
should be read as referring to only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or
suppressed..
10. The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 and the public policy embodied therein
insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan de Oro City.
11. Under this construction, PAGCOR will have no more games of chance to regulate or centralize as they must all be prohibited by
the local government units pursuant to the mandatory duty imposed upon them by the Code.
12. In this situation, PAGCOR cannot continue to exist except only as a toothless tiger or a white elephant and will no longer be able
to exercise its powers as a prime source of government revenue through the operation of casinos.
13. It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. (f) of the repealing clause, conveniently discarding the rest of the
provision which painstakingly mentions the specific laws or the parts thereof which are repealed (or modified) by the Code.
Significantly, P.D. 1869 is not one of them.
14. We hold that the power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, remains unimpaired.
15. P.D. 1869 has not been modified by the Local Government Code, which empowers the local government units to prevent or
suppress only those forms of gambling prohibited by law.

Bennies v. Michigan (confiscated car)

1. Petitioner, was a joint owner, with her husband of a car in which her husband engaged in sexual activity with a prostitute
2. Petitioner’s husband was convicted of gross indecency and the car was abated under Michigan’s Compiled Laws.
3. A Michigan court, Wayne County Circuit Court (probably like RTC in Ph) ordered the car forfeited as a public nuisance,
notwithstanding her lack of knowledge of her husband’s activity.
4. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the decision of WCCC and held that the car cannot be abated in absent of proof that
she knew to what end the car would be used.
5. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the Michigan Court of Appeals and reinstated the abatement, ordered by
WCCC, completely.
6. Michigan Compiled Laws 600.3801 “Any building, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or place used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation
or prostitution or gambling, or used by, or kept for the use of prostitutes or other disorderly persons, … is declared a nuisance,
… and all ... nuisances shall be enjoined and abated as provided in this act and as provided in the court rules.
7. Any person or his or her servant, agent, or employee who owns, leases, conducts, or maintains any building, vehicle, or place
used for any of the purposes or acts set forth in this section is guilty of a nuisance.”
8. Position of Petitioners: Petitioner’s defense was that she did not know that her husband would use the car to violate Michigan’s
indecency law.
9. Position of Respondents: According to jurisprudence, Michigan does not need to prove that the owner knew or agreed that her
vehicle would be used in a manner prescribed by 600.3801 when she entrusted it to another user.
ISSUE: W/N Michigan’s abatement scheme has deprived petitioner of her interest in the forfeited car without due process, in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment?
RULING: NO.
1. Wayne County Circuit Court took into consideration the fact that the petitioners had another car to use in case the car in
question is declared a public nuisance.
2. According to jurisprudence, owner’s interest in a property may be forfeited even though the owner did not know that it was
used as such and this is not a violation of the due process clause.
3. Court held that a long line of cases upheld a State's right to seize instruments of criminal activity, even though the owner was
innocent of any crime or wrong doing.
4. The acts of the possessors bind the interest of owner whether he be innocent or guilty
5. The dissent of this case argues that contrabands should be treated differently from instrumentalities used to convey
contrabands like cars.
6. However, the court’s precedents have never made due process inquiry depend on whether the use for which the
instrumentality was forfeited was for principal use.
7. Forfeiture of property serves as a deterrent purpose.
8. It prevents illegal use both by preventing further illicit use of property and imposing economic penalty.
9. Also, the car taken away from the petitioner was by virtue of this case and not by virtue of State’s exercise of eminent domain.
Thus there is no just compensation needed.

Cruzan v. Dir. Missouri (informed euthanasia)

1. Petitioner Nancy Cruzan sustained severe injuries as a result of a car accident on January 11, 1983.
2. She remained in a coma for 3 weeks, during which feeding tubes were inserted with her husband’s consent.
3. Her condition progressed into an unconscious state and she now (as of time of case) lies in a Missouri state hospital in a
‘persistent vegetative state’ (no indication of cognitive function), with the State of Missouri bearing the cost of her care. After it
had become apparent to Cruzan’s parents that recovery of mental faculties is virtually nil, they requested termination of life
support – which would no doubt cause Cruzan’s death.
4. This was refused by hospital employees, absent a showing of court approval.
5. The parents went to the Missouri State Trial Court to request termination.
6. The Trial Court granted the request and recognized that a vegetative person has rights protected by State and Federal
Constitutions, ‘to refuse or direct the withdrawal of death-prolonging procedures’ (right to refuse treatment). Additionally, the
court found that at 25 years old, Nancy expressed that she would not wish to continue her life unless she could “live at least
halfway normally” to her roommate.
7. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the State Trial Court’s ruling.
8. While it recognized a person’s right to refuse treatment as embodied in the common law doctrine of Informed Consent, it
expressed doubt on its applicability on the case at bar,
9. It rejected the argument that Cruzan’s parents were entitled to order the termination of life support, absent the formalities
under Missouri’s “Living Will statue (document which list end-of-life preferences should the patient be unable to
communicate),
10. This statute requires clear and convincing evidence of the incompetent’s will to terminate life support.
11. The court found that Cruzan's statements to her roommate regarding her desire to live or die under certain conditions were
unreliable for the purpose of determining her intent.
12. The question interposed to the court is if the U.S. Constitution grants the ‘right to die’
ISSUE: Whether or not Nancy Cruzan, being in a vegetative state, has rights under the U.S. Constitution, which would require the
hospital to withdraw life support
RULING: NO
1. ‘Bodily integrity’ (right and control of own person) is carefully guarded under US Common Law.
2. This is embodied in the Doctrine of Informed Consent, where every person has a right to determine what shall be done with is
own body.
3. Logically, with this comes the right NOT to consent, or to refuse medical treatment.
4. Jurisprudence has demonstrated that this doctrine encompasses the right of a competent individual to refuse medical
treatment.
5. The Fourteenth Amendment states that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
6. US Jurisprudence involving the right to refuse life support has established an incompetent person retains the same rights as a
competent individual.
7. The right of self-determination is not lost merely because an individual is unable to sense a violation of it.
8. The right to terminate life-sustaining treatment of an incompetent, if it is to be exercised, must be done for such incompetent
by a surrogate.
9. Missouri’s interest in the preservation of life is unquestionably a valid State interest.

ISSUE: Whether or not Missouri State’s procedural requirement of clear and convincing evidence violates U.S. Constitution
RULING: NOOOOOOOOoooooo
1. Individual rights must be balanced by compelling state interest.
2. To see if this procedural requirement by Missouri is in consonance with the U.S. Constitution, the State interest sought to be
protected must be established.
3. The Due Process Clause seeks to protect and preserve human life.
4. This Court believes that Missouri may advance the protection of this interest by intruding in the deeply personal choice of ‘the
right to die, through the imposition of heighted evidentiary requirements.
5. This standard of evidence protects the State interest to preserve human life, as not all incompetent patients will have loved
ones available as surrogate decision-makers.
6. It seeks to protect those who may have family members who do not act to protect a patient. The State is entitled to guard
against abuse in such situations.
7. This is also precaution against the risk of erroneous decisions of surrogates seeking to terminate an incompetent person’s life.
8. The finality and irrevocability of the end result of a decision to discontinue life support warrants the quantum of proof required
in a proceeding to end artificial nutrition and hydration procedures.
9. In sum, the Court concludes that the State may apply a ‘clear and convincing’ standard of evidence in proceedings where a
guardian seeks to discontinue life support in patients under a persistent vegetative state.
10. In the case at bar, Nancy Cruzan’s parents are required to present evidence of such a standard (ex. Via will) before the State can
assent to their request.

ISSUE: Whether Missouri must accept the ‘substituted judgment’ of close family members, absent substantial proof that their views
reflect the views of the patient.
RULING: NOOOOOOOOOO
1. The Due Process Clause does not require the State to place judgment on matters such as the case at bar with the incompetent’s
guardians.
2. There is no automatic guarantee that the view of close family members will reflect the patients.
3. Moreover, even when available, family members will not always act in the best interests of a patient. The State is entitled to
safeguard against such abuses.

Chavez v Romulo (right to bear arms)

1. In January 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo delivered a speech before the members of the PNP stressing the need for a
nationwide gun ban in all public places to avert the rising crime incidents.
2. She directed the then PNP Chief, respondent Ebdane, to suspend the issuance of Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence
(PTCFOR), thus:
3. THERE IS ALSO NEED TO FOCUS ON THE HIGH PROFILE CRIMES THAT TEND TO DISTURB THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PERIMETERS OF
THE COMMUNITY THE LATEST BEING THE KILLING OF FORMER NPA LEADER ROLLY KINTANAR.
4. THE NPA WILL FIND IT MORE DIFFICULT TO CARRY OUT THEIR PLOTS IF OUR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES CAN RID
THEMSELVES OF RASCALS IN UNIFORM, AND ALSO IF WE ENFORCE A GUN BAN IN PUBLIC PLACES.
5. THUS, I AM DIRECTING THE PNP CHIEF TO SUSPEND INDEFINITELY THE ISSUANCE OF PERMIT TO CARRY FIREARMS IN PUBLIC
PLACES. THE ISSUANCE OF PERMITS WILL NOW BE LIMITED ONLY TO OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF GUNS AND NOT TO
CARRYING THEM IN PUBLIC PLACES.
6. The firearm must not be displayed or exposed to public view, except those authorized in uniform and in the performance of
their official duties.
7. The firearm shall not be brought inside public drinking and amusement places, and all other commercial or public
establishments.
8. Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been issued, requested the Department of Interior
and Local Government (DILG) to reconsider the implementation of the assailed Guidelines.
9. However, his request was denied. Thus, he filed the present petition
ISSUE: W/N PNP Chief is authorized to issue assailed guidelines
RULING: YEeeeesss
1. The rule which forbids the delegation of legislative power, however, is not absolute and inflexible.
2. An exception sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the legislative body to delegate its licensing power to certain persons,
municipal corporations, towns, boards, councils, commissions, commissioners, auditors, bureaus and directors. [7]
3. Such licensing power includes the power to promulgate necessary rules and regulations. [8]
4. By virtue of Republic Act No. 6975,[21] the Philippine National Police (PNP) absorbed the Philippine Constabulary
(PC). Consequently, the PNP Chief succeeded the Chief of the Constabulary and, therefore, assumed the latters licensing
authority.
5. It must be emphasized that President Arroyos speech was just an expression of her policy and a directive to her subordinate.
6. It cannot, therefore, be argued that President Arroyo enacted a law through a mere speech.
ISSUE: W/N the right to bear arms is a consti right
RULING: NOOOOOooooooooo
1. Evidently, possession of firearms by the citizens in the Philippines is the exception, not the rule.
2. The right to bear arms is a mere statutory privilege, not a constitutional right. It is a mere statutory creation.
3. Being a mere statutory creation, the right to bear arms cannot be considered an inalienable or absolute right.
ISSUE: W/N the revocation of petitioners PTCFOR pursuant to the assailed Guidelines is a violation of his right to property?
RULING: NOoooooooooooooooo
1. In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be whether life, liberty or property interest
exists.[32]
2. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property
right.
3. Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property
right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.
4. In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR.
5. This is evident from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which state that the Chief of
Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful
holders of firearms to carry them outside of residence.
ISSUE: Whether the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is a valid exercise of police power?
RULING:
1. At any rate, assuming that petitioners PTCFOR constitutes a property right protected by the Constitution, the same cannot be
considered as absolute as to be placed beyond the reach of the States police power.
2. All property in the state is held subject to its general regulations, necessary to the common good and general welfare.
3. In a number of cases, we laid down the test to determine the validity of a police measure, thus:
a. The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of the police
power; and
b. The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.
4. It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its issuance was the need for peace and order in the society. Owing
to the proliferation of crimes, particularly those committed by the New Peoples Army (NPA), which tends to disturb the peace of
the community, President Arroyo deemed it best to impose a nationwide gun ban.
5. Undeniably, the motivating factor in the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is the interest of the public in general.
6. What they proscribe is merely the carrying of firearms outside of residence. However, those who wish to carry their firearms
outside of their residences may re-apply for a new PTCFOR.
7. This we believe is a reasonable regulation.
8. It is also not an ex-post facto law

GSIS v. Montescarlos (survivorship pension claim)

1. Sangguniang Bayan member Nicolas Montesclaros (Nicolas) married Milagros Orbiso (Milagros)
2. Nicolas was a 72- year old widower when he married Milagros who was then 43 years old.
3. Nicolas filed with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) an application for retirement benefits effective 18 February
1985 under Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977 (PD 1146).
4. In his retirement application, Nicolas designated his wife Milagros as his sole beneficiary. [4]
5. GSIS approved Nicolas application for retirement granting a lump sum payment of annuity for the first five years and a monthly
annuity thereafter.[6]
6. Nicolas died on 22 April 1992. Milagros filed with GSIS a claim for survivorship pension under PD 1146.
7. GSIS denied the claim because under Section 18 of PD 1146, the surviving spouse has no right to survivorship pension if the
surviving spouse contracted the marriage with the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the
pension.[7]
8. According to GSIS, Nicolas wed Milagros on 10 July 1983, less than one year from his date of retirement on 17 February 1984.
9. RTC in favor of Milagros
10. CA affirmed
11.
In the meantime, in a letter dated 10 January 2003, Milagros informed the Court that she has accepted GSIS decision
disqualifying her from receiving survivorship pension and that she is no longer interested in pursuing the case.[10]
12.
Commenting on Milagros letter, GSIS asserts that the Court must decide the case on the merits. [11]
13. The Court will resolve the issue despite the manifestation of Milagros.
ISSUE: W/N the proviso disqualifying Milagros from getting the pension unconsti
RULING: YEeeesssssss
1. We hold that the proviso, which was the sole basis for the rejection by GSIS of Milagros claim, is unconstitutional because it
violates the due process clause.
2. The proviso is also discriminatory and denies equal protection of the law.
3. Considering the mandatory salary deductions from the government employee, the government pensions do not constitute mere
gratuity but form part of compensation.
4. Thus, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that is protected
by the due process clause.[20]
5. Retirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-existing law.[21]
6. Thus, a pensioner acquires a vested right to benefits that have become due as provided under the terms of the public
employees pension statute.[22]
7.
No law can deprive such person of his pension rights without due process of law, that is, without notice and opportunity to be
heard.[23]
8.
A widows right to receive pension following the demise of her husband is also part of the husbands contractual
compensation.[24]
9. The proviso is contrary to Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that [n]o person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
10. The proviso is unduly oppressive in outrightly denying a dependent spouses claim for survivorship pension if the dependent
spouse contracted marriage to the pensioner within the three-year prohibited period.
11. There is outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without giving the surviving spouse an opportunity to be
heard.

Chavez v. COMELEC (candidate billboards)

Petitioner Chavez, on various dates, entered into formal agreements with certain establishments to endorse their products.
Petitioner also signed Endorsement Agreements with Konka International Plastics Manufacturing Corporation and another
corporation involved in the amusement and video games business, G-Box.
Pursuant to these agreements, three billboards were set up showing petitioner promoting the products of said establishments.
On December 30, 2003, however, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Senator.
Petitioner was directed to comply with the said provision by the COMELEC's Law Department.
He replied, by requesting the COMELEC that he be informed as to how he may have violated the assailed provision.
He sent another letter, this time asking the COMELEC that he be exempted from the application of Section 32, considering that the
billboards adverted to are mere product endorsements and cannot be construed as paraphernalia for premature campaigning under
the rules.
The COMELEC, however, ordered him to remove or cause the removal of the billboards, or to cover them from public view pending
the approval of his request.

Feeling aggrieved, petitioner Chavez filed a petition for prohibition with the SC, asking that the COMELEC be enjoined from enforcing
the assailed provision.
He urges the Court to declare the assailed provision unconstitutional as the same is allegedly (1) a gross violation of the non-
impairment clause; (2) an invalid exercise of police power; (3) in the nature of an ex-post facto law; (4) contrary to the Fair Elections
Act; and (5) invalid due to overbreadth.

Issue: Is Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 unconstitutional?

Held: NOOOOOOOOooooooo
1. Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order, or safety, and the general welfare of the people.
2. To determine the validity of a police measure, two questions must be asked:
(1) Does the interest of the public in general, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of police
power?
(2) Are the means employed reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals?
3. A close examination of the assailed provision reveals that its primary objectives are to prohibit premature campaigning and to
level the playing field for candidates of public office, to equalize the situation between popular or rich candidates, on one hand,
and lesser-known or poorer candidates,
4. Under the Omnibus Election Code, election campaign or partisan political activity is defined as an act designed to promote the
election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office.
5. It includes directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.
6. It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts or agreements to endorse certain products, he acted as a private
individual and had all the right to lend his name and image to these products.
7. However, when he filed his certificate of candidacy for Senator, the billboards featuring his name and image assumed partisan
political character because the same indirectly promoted his candidacy.
8. Non-impairment of contract: The State has the duty to enact and implement rules to safeguard this interest.
9. Time and again, this Court has said that contracts affecting public interest contain an implied reservation of the police power as
a postulate of the existing legal order.
10. This power can be activated at anytime to change the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion
or protection of the general welfare.
11. Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the paramount police power.
12. Fair Elections Act: Next, petitioner urges that Section 32 is a violation of the Fair Elections Act.
13. According to him, under this law, billboards are already permitted as lawful election propaganda.
14. He claims, therefore, that the COMELEC, in effectively prohibiting the use of billboards as a form of election propaganda through
the assailed provision, violated the Fair Elections Act.
15. Petitioners argument is not tenable.
16. The Solicitor General rightly points out that the assailed provision does not prohibit billboards as lawful election propaganda.
17. It only regulates their use to prevent premature campaigning and to equalize, as much as practicable, the situation of all
candidates by preventing popular and rich candidates from gaining undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their
resources and popularity.
18. Overbreadth: A statute or regulation is considered void for overbreadth when it offends the constitutional principle that a
governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to State regulations may not be achieved by means
that sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
19. The provision in question is limited in its operation both as to time and scope.
20. It only disallows the continued display of a persons propaganda materials and advertisements after he has filed a certificate of
candidacy and before the start of the campaign period.
21. Said materials and advertisements must also show his name and image.

Lucena Grand Terminal v. JAC Liner (exclusive franchise)

1. Respondent, JAC Liner, Inc., a common carrier operating buses which ply various routes to and from Lucena City, assailed, via a
petition for prohibition and injunction[1] against the City of Lucena, its Mayor, and the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City, City Ordinance Nos. 1631 and 1778
2. Ordinance No. 1631: AN ORDINANCE GRANTING THE LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., A FRANCHISE TO CONSTRUCT,
FINANCE, ESTABLISH, OPERATE AND MAINTAIN A COMMON BUS-JEEPNEY TERMINAL FACILITY IN THE CITY OF LUCENA
3. SECTION 2. This franchise shall continue for a period of twenty-five years
4. SECTION 4. Responsibilities and Obligations of the City Government of Lucena. During the existence of the franchise, the City
Government of Lucena shall have the following responsibilities and obligations:
5. (c) It shall not grant any third party any privilege and/or concession to operate a bus, mini-bus and/or jeepney terminal.
6. Ordinance No. 1778: AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ENTRANCE TO THE CITY OF LUCENA OF ALL BUSES, MINI-BUSES AND
OUT-OF-TOWN PASSENGER JEEPNEYS
7. SECTION 1. The entrance to the City of Lucena of all buses, mini-buses and out-of-town passenger jeepneys is hereby regulated
as follows:
(a) All buses, mini-buses and out-of-town passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited from entering the city and are hereby
directed to proceed to the common terminal, for picking-up and/or dropping of their passengers.
(b) All temporary terminals in the City of Lucena are hereby declared inoperable starting from the effectivity of this
ordinance.
8. These ordinances, by granting an exclusive franchise for twenty five years, renewable for another twenty five years, to one
entity for the construction and operation of one common bus and jeepney terminal facility in Lucena City, to be located outside
the city proper, were professedly aimed towards alleviating the traffic congestion
9. Lucena RTC rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
(a) Declaring City Ordinance No. 1631 as valid
(b) But however, declaring the provision of Sec. 4(c) of Ordinance No. 1631 to the effect that the City Government shall
not grant any third party any privilege and/or concession to operate a bus, mini-bus and/or jeepney terminal, as illegal
and ultra vires because it contravenes the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local
Government Code;
(c) Ordering the issuance of a Writ of Prohibition and/or Injunction directing the respondents public officials, the City
Mayor and the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Lucena, to cease and desist from implementing Ordinance No. 1778
insofar as said ordinance prohibits or curtails petitioner from maintaining and operating its own bus terminal
10. Appellate court dismissed the petition
ISSUE: W/N the appellate court erred
RULING: NOOOOOOOOOooooooooooo
1. Respecting the issue of whether police power was properly exercised when the subject ordinances were enacted:
2. As with the State, the local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police power only if the following
requisites are met:
a. the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and
b. the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.
3. Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method.[18]
4. That traffic congestion is a public, not merely a private, concern, cannot be gainsaid.
5. The first requisite for the proper exercise of police power is thus present.
6. A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a more careful formulation of solutions to societal problems.
7. From the memorandum[33] filed before this Court by petitioner, it is gathered that the Sangguniang Panlungsod had identified
the cause of traffic congestion to be the indiscriminate loading and unloading of passengers by buses on the streets of the city
proper, hence, the conclusion that the terminals contributed to the proliferation of buses obstructing traffic on the city streets.
8. Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic.
9. How the outright proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to petitioner, can be considered
as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, this Court has not been enlightened.
10. If terminals lack adequate space such that bus drivers are compelled to load and unload passengers on the streets instead of
inside the terminals, then reasonable specifications for the size of terminals could be instituted, with permits to operate the
same denied those which are unable to meet the specifications.
11. In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so broad that even
entities which might be able to provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating at all.
12. Neither are terminals public nuisances as petitioner argues. For their operation is a legitimate business which, by itself, cannot be
said to be injurious to the rights of property, health, or comfort of the community.
13. As for petitioners claim that the challenged ordinances have actually been proven effective in easing traffic congestion: Whether
an ordinance is effective is an issue different from whether it is reasonably necessary.
14. It is its reasonableness, not its effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality.

City of Manila v. Laguio (sauna, massage parlors, night clubs)

1. Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating
hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses.
2. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the DOT as a hotel.
3. MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared
invalid and unconstitutional.
4. Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor, the said Ordinance is entitled–AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING
THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT,
SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
ISSUE: WON the ordinance is unconstitutional.
RULING: YEeeeeeeeeeeeeeessssss
1. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause.
The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general
laws.
Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.
2. Requisites for the valid exercise of Police Power are not met
3. It must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work.
4. A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
5. Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private
rights a violation of the due process clause.
6. The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the community.
7. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City Council’s police powers,
the means employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
8. The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the community’s social ills can be achieved through means less
restrictive of private rights;
9. It can be attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition.
10. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses “allowed” under the Ordinance have no
reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes.
11. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote the social and moral
welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it
arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.
12. While a motel may be used as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that reason alone be punished.
13. It cannot be classified as a house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a naked assumption.
14. If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it can instead impose reasonable
regulations such as:
15. daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses or permits;
16. it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations; and
17. it may even impose increased license fees. In other words, there are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end.
18. Modality employed is unlawful taking
19. It is an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes
beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation.78
20. It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals.
21. There are two different types of taking that can be identified.
a. A “possessory” taking occurs when the government confiscates or physically occupies property.
b. A “regulatory” taking occurs when the government’s regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the
property.
22. The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the “prohibited” establishments three (3) months from its approval within
which to “wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses
to other kinds of business allowable within the area.”
23. The directive to “wind up business operations” amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation of
property, and is practically confiscatory.
24. It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with
reasonable expectations for use.
The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or to convert into allowed
businessesare confiscatory as well.
25. The penalty of permanent closure in cases of subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the Ordinance is also equivalent to a
“taking” of private property.
26. A zoning ordinance, although a valid exercise of police power, which limits a “wholesome” property to a use which can not
reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such property without just compensation.
27. Further, The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down establishments
28. Similarly, the Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments “tend to disturb the community,”
“annoy the inhabitants,” and “adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community.”
29. The Ordinance violates Equal Protection Clause: No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels,
lodging houses or other similar establishments.
30. The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code (Sec 458) as the latter merely empowers local government units to regulate, and
not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.
31. Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. As correctly argued by
MTDC, the statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area.

Bayan v. Ermita (no permit, no rally)

1. Rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005 is at issue.
2. BAYAN’s rally was violently dispersed.
3. 26 petitioners were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they was preempted and violently dispersed by
the police.
4. KMU asserts that the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of “Calibrated
Preemptive Response” (CPR) being followed to implement it. KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-
sponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and
forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their members.
5. They further allege that on October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed
along España Avenue in front of the UST and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street
and prevented them from proceeding further.
6. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them. Three other rallyists were arrested.
All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880 The Public Assembly Act of 1985, some of them in toto and others only Sections 4,
5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR.
7. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the “no permit, no rally” policy and the CPR policy announced on Sept. 21,
2005.
Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that BP 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory.
They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of
a clear and present danger.
8. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public
assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought.
9. KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and therefore B.P. No. 880 cannot put the prior
requirement of securing a permit.
10. And even assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right, the limits provided are unreasonable:
a. First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too
comprehensive.
b. Second, the five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain events require instant public assembly,
otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane.
11. As to the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action even before the rallyists can perform
their act, and that no law, ordinance or executive order supports the policy.
12. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling
effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.

Respondents argued that petitioners have no standing. BP 880 entails traffic re-routing to prevent grave public inconvenience
and serious or undue interference in the free flow of commerce and trade.
13. It is content-neutral regulation of the time, place and manner of holding public assemblies. According to Atienza RA. 7160 gives
the Mayor power to deny a permit independently of B.P. No. 880. and that the permit is for the use of a public place and not for
the exercise of rights; and that B.P. No. 880 is not a content-based regulation because it covers all rallies.

Issue: Whether or Not BP 880 and the CPR Policy unconstitutional.

RULING: noooooooooooooo

1. The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of
the press, is a right that enjoys dominance in the sphere of constitutional protection. For this rights represent the very basis of a
functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected.
2. However, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute.
3. It may be regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights
of the community or society.
4. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign “police power,” which is the
power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of
the people.
5. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is
directly affected by B.P. No. 880.
6. B.P. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the
assemblies.
7. It refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places.
8. The reference to “lawful cause” does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes,
otherwise they would not be “peaceable” and entitled to protection.
9. Maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the
rally.
10. There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation.
The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness
that shrouds freedom.
11. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses.
12. Insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, this was declared null and void.
The Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance
with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or
plaza in every city and municipality of the country.
13. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required
to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or plazas of a city or municipality that has not yet
complied with Section 15 of the law.

KMU v. Dir. Gen (uniform ID system)

1. On 13 April 2005, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 420, directing all government agencies and
government-owned and controlled corporations to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their existing identification (ID)
systems.
2. Need to streamline and integrate the processes and issuance of identification cards in government to reduce costs and to provide
greater convenience for those transacting business with government;
3. Unified identification system will facilitate private businesses, enhance the integrity and reliability of government-issued
identification cards in private transactions, and prevent violations of laws involving false names and identities.
4. Section 3. Data requirement for the unified ID system The data to be collected and recorded by the participating agencies shall
be limited to the following:
a. Name i. Names of Parents
b. Home Address j. Height
c. Sex k. Weight
d. Picture l. Two index fingers and two thumbmarks
e. Signature m. Any prominent distinguishing features like
f. Date of Birth moles and others
g. Place of Birth n. Tax Identification Number (TIN)
h. Marital Status

ISSUE: W/N EO 420 is an usurpation of legislative power

RULING:NOOOOOOoooooooooo
1. Section 2 of EO 420 provides: Coverage “All government agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations issuing ID
cards to their members or constituents shall be covered by this executive order.
2. EO 420 applies only to government entities that issue ID cards as part of their functions under existing laws.
3. These government entities have already been issuing ID cards even prior to EO 420.
4. Examples of these government entities are the GSIS, SSS, Philhealth, Mayor’s Office, LTO, PRC, and similar government entities.
5. Section 1 of EO 420 directs these government entities to adopt a unified multi-purpose ID system.
6. Thus, all government entities that issue IDs as part of their functions under existing laws are required to adopt a uniform data
collection and format for their IDs.
7. There is no dispute that government entities can individually limit the collection and recording of their data to the 14 specific
items in Section 3 of EO 420.
8. A unified ID system for all these government entities can be achieved in either of two ways.
9. First, the heads of these existing government entities can enter into a memorandum of agreement making their systems uniform.
10. Second, the President may by executive or administrative order direct the government entities under the Executive department
to adopt a uniform ID data collection and format.
11. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus
and offices
12. The same Section also mandates the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
13. The act of issuing ID cards and collecting the necessary personal data for imprinting on the ID card does not require legislation.
14. What require legislation are three aspects of a government maintained ID card system.
a. First, when the implementation of an ID card system requires a special appropriation because there is no existing
appropriation for such purpose.
b. Second, when the ID card system is compulsory on all branches of government, including the independent constitutional
commissions, as well as compulsory on all citizens whether they have a use for the ID card or not.
c. Third, when the ID card system requires the collection and recording of personal data beyond what is routinely or usually
required for such purpose, such that the citizen’s right to privacy is infringed.
15. In the present case, EO 420 does not require any special appropriation because the existing ID card systems of government entities
covered by EO 420 have the proper appropriation or funding.
16. EO 420 is not compulsory on all branches of government and is not compulsory on all citizens.
17. In fact, the data collected and recorded under EO 420 are far less than the data collected and recorded under the ID systems
existing prior to EO 420.
ISSUE: W/N EO 420 infringes on the right to privacy
RULING: NOOooooooooooooooooo
1. The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government entities.
2. All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other government entities have been issuing ID cards in the performance of
their governmental functions.
3. There have been no complaints from citizens that the ID cards of these government entities violate their right to privacy.
4. In fact, petitioners in the present cases do not claim that the ID systems of government entities prior to EO 420 violate their right
to privacy.
5. Prior to EO 420, government entities had a free hand in determining the kind, nature and extent of data to be collected and stored
for their ID systems.
6. Under EO 420, government entities can collect and record only the 14 specific data mentioned in Section 3 of EO 420.
7. In addition, government entities can show in their ID cards only eight of these specific data, seven less data than what the
Supreme Court’s ID shows.
8. On its face, EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it even narrowly limits the data that can be collected, recorded and
shown compared to the existing ID systems of government entities.
9. EO 420 further provides strict safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the data collected, in contrast to the prior ID systems
which are bereft of strict administrative safeguards.

Mirasol v. DPWH (motorcycle prohibition)

1. Pursuant to its mandate under Republic Act 2000 (Limited Access Highway Act), the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) issued Department Order No. 215, declaring the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway as a limited-access
facility.
2. Petitioners filed a Petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, seeking the nullification of the following administrative
issuances for being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act 2000 (Limited Highway Access Act) enacted in 1957:
3. The RTC issued an Order granting a preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of the total ban on motorcycles along the
entire breadth of the North and South Luzon Expressways and the Costal Road Toll Expressway under Department Order (DO)
215.
4. The DPWH, acting through the TRB, issued DO 123, allowing motorcycles having an engine displacement of 400 cubic
centimeters inside limited-access facilities (tollways).

ISSUE: W/N DPWH had authority to issue DO 74 and DO 215

RULING: NOoooooooooooooo thus void
1. President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Executive Order (EO) 546 splitting the Ministry of Public Works and Communications
into the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of Transportation and Communications.
2. Marcos issued EO 710, by which the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of Public Highways were merged to form what
came to be known as the Ministry of Public Works and Highways.
3. Upon the ratification of the present Constitution, the former Ministry of Public Works and Highways became the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH), while the former Ministry of Transportation and Communications became what is now
known as the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC).
4. The question in the present case was, “which of these two agencies was now authorized to regulate, restrict, or prohibit access
to limited-access facilities?”
5. Clearly, when the functions of the then Department of Public Works and Communications were split, the authority to regulate
limited-access highways devolved to the Department of Transportation and Communications.
6. The authority to administer and enforce all laws, rules and regulations relative to transportation went to the DOTC, not to the
DPWH.
7. Thus, DO 74 and DO 215 were void, because the DPWH had no authority to declare certain expressways as limited-access
facilities.
8. And since it had no authority to regulate activities relative to transportation, the TRB could not derive from the DPWH the
power to issue regulations governing limited-access facilities.
9. Furthermore, since those Orders were void, it followed that the rules implementing them were likewise void.

ISSUE: W/N AO 1 and DO123 are consti

RULING: AO 1 consti but DO 123 unconsti
1. DO 123 - Administrative Order No. 1 dated February 19, 1968, issued by the Secretary of the then Department of Public Works
and Communications, is hereby amended by deleting the word "motorcycles" mentioned in Section 3(h) thereof.
Therefore, motorcycles are hereby allowed to operate inside the toll roads and limited access highways, subject to the
following:
2. Motorcycles shall have an engine displacement of at least 400 cubic centimeters (cc)
3. AO 1 - Section 3. On limited access highways, it is unlawful for any person or group of persons to: Drive any bicycle, tricycle,
pedicab, motorcycle or any vehicle (not motorized);
4. Petitioners assail the DPWH’s failure to provide "scientific" and "objective" data on the danger of having motorcycles plying our
highways.
5. They attack this exercise of police power as baseless and unwarranted.
6. Petitioners belabor the fact that there are studies that provide proof that motorcycles are safe modes of transport. They also
claim that AO 1 introduces an unreasonable classification by singling-out motorcycles from other motorized modes of transport.
Finally, petitioners argue that AO 1 violates their right to travel.
7. The Court emphasized that the secretary of the then Department of Public Works and Communications had issued AO 1 in
February 1968, as authorized under Section 3 of Republic Act 2000, prior to the splitting of the department and the eventual
devolution of its powers to the DOTC.
8. Because administrative issuances had the force and effect of law, AO 1 enjoyed the presumption of validity and
constitutionality.
9. The burden to prove its unconstitutionality rested on the party assailing it, more so when police power was at issue and
passed the test of reasonableness.
10. The Administrative Order was not oppressive, as it did not impose unreasonable restrictions or deprive petitioners of their right
to use the facilities.
11. It merely set rules to ensure public safety and the uninhibited flow of traffic within those limited-access facilities.
12. The right to travel did not mean the right to choose any vehicle in traversing a tollway.
13. Consider Section 3(g) of AO 1, which prohibits the conduct of rallies inside toll ways. 38
14. The regulation affects the right to peaceably assemble.
15. The exercise of police power involves restriction, restriction being implicit in the power itself.
16. Thus, the test of constitutionality of a police power measure is limited to an inquiry on whether the restriction imposed on
constitutional rights is reasonable, and not whether it imposes a restriction on those rights.
17. Arguably, prohibiting the use of motorcycles in toll ways may not be the "best" measure to ensure the safety and comfort of
those who ply the toll ways.
18. However, the means by which the government chooses to act is not judged in terms of what is "best," rather, on simply whether
the act is reasonable.
19. Amongst all types of motorized transport, it is obvious, even to a child, that a motorcycle is quite different from a car, a bus or a
truck.
20. The most obvious and troubling difference would be that a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a
four-wheeled vehicle.
21. The right to travel does not mean the right to choose any vehicle in traversing a toll way. The right to travel refers to the right to
move from one place to another.
22. Finally, petitioners assert that their possession of a driver’s license from the Land Transportation Office (LTO) and the fact that
their vehicles are registered with that office entitle them to use all kinds of roads in the countryThere was no absolute right to
drive; on the contrary, this privilege was heavily regulated.
White Light v. City of Manila (wash up rates)
1. The City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim enacted another ordinance entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting
2. Short-time Admission Rates and Wash-up Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, and Similar Establishments in the
City of Manila”
3. The intention of to curtail prostitution, adultery and fornication in these establishments, nevertheless, the prohibition on
wash-up rates and short-time admission which is believed to curtail the activities of others whose liberty is constitutionally
guaranteed.
4. The Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO)
5. MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared
invalid and unconstitutional.
6. White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation filed a motion to
intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business
interests as operators of drive-in- hotels and motels in Manila.
7. RTC rendered the Ordinance null and void.
8. CA declared consti.
9. However, the three hotels filed a petition for certiorari contending that the assailed Ordinance is an invalid exercise of police
power while the City contended that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power pursuant to the Local Government Code
and Revised Manila Charter.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ordinance is constitutional

RULING: NO.
1. Say the six rules on the constitutionality of ordinance: CUPPUG
2. The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely:
a. wash rate admissions and
b. renting out a room more than twice a day.
3. The due process guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure.
4. Even corporations and partnerships are protected by the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned.
5. The Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business
ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure.
6. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference
with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive of private rights.
7. Some people really use the wash up rates for legitimate purposes such as travelers
8. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work.
9. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already
prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws.
10. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be
more effective in easing the situation.

Parreno v. COA (pension banned for US citizen)

1. Salvador Parreo (petitioner) served in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for 32 years.
2. He retired from the Philippine Constabulary with the rank of 2nd Lieutenant.
3. Petitioner availed, and received payment, of a lump sum pension equivalent to three years pay.
4. In 1985, petitioner started receiving his monthly pension amounting to P13,680.
5. Petitioner migrated to Hawaii and became a naturalized American citizen.
6. In January 2001, the AFP stopped petitioners monthly pension in accordance with Section 27 of Presidential Decree No. 1638
(PD 1638), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1650. Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, provides that a retiree who loses
his Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits terminated upon loss of Filipino
citizenship.
7. Petitioner requested for reconsideration but the Judge Advocate General of the AFP denied the request.
8. Petitioner filed a claim before the COA for the continuance of his monthly pension.
Issues: Whether or not there was a vested right to retirement benefits which would equate to deprivation of property and due
process.
RULING: NOOOOOOOOoooooooo
1. During the enactment of the assailed decree and after its amendment, the petitioner was still in active service, thus the
pensions and retirement benefits were only future benefits and not a vested right.
2. It was only then when the petitioner retired did he have a vested right to demand (Retirees enjoy a protected property interest
whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment) the pensions and retirement benefits provided that the conditions of
eligibility are present.
3. Secondly, retirement benefits compared to pensions which come in the form of compensations by mandatorily shelling out a
portion of the income which is a vested property right, are purely gratuitous in nature.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 27 of PD 1638 discriminates against AFP retirees who have changed their nationality.
RULING: NOOOOOOOOoooooo.
1. The Constitutional right to equal protection of the laws is not absolute but is subject to reasonable classification.
2. One of the standards is that the classification must be based on substantial distinctions.
3. The petitioner having been naturalized into an American Citizen, loses his Filipino Citizenship when he renounced his allegiance
to the state.
4. The substantial distinction of a retired Filipino citizen and one who has been naturalized, is that the latter cannot be
compelled to anymore to render military services when the need arises which is imposed not only to private citizens but also
to those who have retired.
5. The Supreme Court noted however, that this is not without remedy, as the petitioner may avail of the retirement benefits once
he once again take the Country’s oath of allegiance and become a Filipino citizen.

St. Lukes v. NLRC (regulation of profession)

1. Petitioner Santos was hired as X-Ray technician in the Radiology Dep’t of Saint Luke’s Medical
2. Center (SLMC) on Oct. 13, 1984.
3. On Apr. 22, 1992, Congress passed and enacted RA 7431 “Radiologic Technology Act of 1992”.
4. Said law requires that no person shall practice or offer to practice as radiology and/or x-ray technologist in the PH without
having obtained the proper certificate of registration from the Board of Radiologic Technology.
5. Assistant Executive Director-Ancillary Services and HR Director of SLMC issued a final notice to all practitioners of Radiologic
Technology to comply with RA 7431 by Dec. 31 1995; otherwise, the unlicensed employee will be transferred to an area w/c
does not require a license to practice if a slot is available
6. After repeated notices to comply with RA 7431 to assure petitioner her continued employment at
7. SLMC and even an early retirement proposal due to persistent failure to comply with RA 7431, which petitioner also refused, the
Personnel Manager of SLMC, Ms. Judith Betita, again issued a “Notice of Separation from the Company” to petitioner effective
Feb. 5, 1999 after the latter failed to present/submit her appeal for rechecking to the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC)
of the recent board examination which she took and failed.
8. Santos filed a complaint against SLMC for illegal dismissal and nonpayment of salaries, allowances and other monetary benefits.
9. Labor Arbiter came out with a decision ordering SLMC to pay petitioner the amount of Php 115,000 as her separation pay.
10. All other claims of petitioner were dismissed for lack of merit.
11. Dissatisfied, petitioner perfected an appeal with the public respondent NLRC, which affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
12. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied.
13. Petitioner thereafter filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, which affirmed the decision of the NLRC.
Issue: W/N petitioner Santos was illegally dismissed
RULING: NOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOoo
1. It is significant to note that petitioners expressly concede that the sole cause for petitioner Santos’ separation from work is her
failure to pass the board licensure exam for X-ray technicians, a precondition for obtaining the certificate of registration from
the Board.
2. It is argued though that despite this failure, it does not constitute just cause for termination as it violated her constitutional right
to security of tenure.
3. This contention is untenable.
4. While the right of workers to security of tenure is guaranteed by the Constitution, its exercise may be reasonably regulated
pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety and the general welfare
of the people.
5. Consequently, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be
required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers.
6. The most concrete example of this would be in the field of Medicine, the practice of which in all its branches has been closely
regulated by the State.
7. It has long been recognized that the regulation of this field is a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the
public to protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who would practice
medicine.
8. The same rationale applies in the regulation of the practice of radiologic and x-ray technology.
9. The clear and unmistakable intention of the legislature in prescribing guidelines for persons seeking to practice in this field is
embodied in Section 2 in the law which seeks to upgrade the practice of radiologic technology in the Philippines to protect the
public from the hazards posed by radiation and to ensure safe and proper diagnosis treatment and research.
10. While our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and protection of labor, it does not mean that
every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes that management has rights, which are also
entitled to respect andenforcement in the interest of fair play.
11. The employer is free to determine, using its own discretion and business judgment, all elements of employment, “from hiring to
firing” except in cases of unlawful discrimination or those provided by law. None of these exceptions is present in the instant
case.

MMDA v. Viron (power of MMDA)

1. President Gloria Arroyo issued E.O.179, "Providing for the Establishment of Greater Manila
2. Mass Transport System”.
3. Pursuant to this E.O., the Metro Manila Council (MMC), issued Resolution No. 03-07 series of 2003 expressing support for the
project.
4. They cited the need to remove the bus terminals located along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila and recommended a plan
to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares which plan is
referred to under the E.O. as the Greater Manila Mass Transport System Project (the Project).
5. The same E.O. also in section 3 thereof designates the MMDA as the implementing agency for the project.
6. The provincial bus operators on the on the other hand assert that such E.O would deprive them of the use of their property
which is beyond the MMDA’s authority.
7. Thus respondents ask the court to declare the E.O. unconstitutional and illegal for transgressing the possessory rights of owners
and operators of public lan transportation units over their respective terminals.
Issue: WON EO 179 is unconstitutional.
RULING: YEEEEEeeeeesss
1. E.O. No. 125, as amended, that the President, then possessed of and exercising legislative powers, mandated the DOTC to be
the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and administrative entity to promote,
develop and regulate networks of transportation and communications.
2. The grant of authority to the DOTC includes the power to establish and administer comprehensive and integrated programs for
transportation and communications.
3. As may be seen further, the Minister (now Secretary) of the DOTC is vested with the authority and responsibility to exercise the
mandate given to the department.
4. Accordingly, the DOTC Secretary is authorized to issue such orders, rules, regulations and other issuances as may be necessary
to ensure the effective implementation of the law.
5. Since, under the law, the DOTC is authorized to establish and administer programs and projects for transportation, it follows
that the President may exercise the same power and authority to order the implementation of the Project, which admittedly is
one for transportation.
6. Such authority springs from the President’s power of control over all executive departments as well as the obligation for the
faithful execution of the laws under Article VII, Section 17 of the Constitution
7. The authority of the President to order the implementation of the Project notwithstanding, the designation of the MMDA as the
implementing agency for the Project may not be sustained.
8. It is ultra vires, there being no legal basis therefor.
9. It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized
to establish and implement a project such as the one subject of the cases at bar.
10. Thus, the President, although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority
through the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion,
development and regulation of networks of transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and implement a project
such as the Project in question.
11. By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits of the
authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires.
12. Even assuming arguendo that police power was delegated to the MMDA, its exercise of such power does not satisfy the two
tests of a valid police power measure.
13. As in Lucena, this Court fails to see how the prohibition against the existence of respondents’ terminals can be considered a
reasonable necessity to ease traffic congestion in the metropolis.
14. On the contrary, the elimination of respondents’ bus terminals brings forth the distinct possibility and the equally harrowing
reality of traffic congestion in the common parking areas, a case of transference from one site to another.
15. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of "colorum" buses, vans and taxis entering Metro Manila and using
the streets for parking and passenger pick-up points, as respondents suggest, might even be more effective in easing the traffic
situation.
16. So would the strict enforcement of traffic rules and the removal of obstructions from major thoroughfares.
17. Even then, the MMDA cannot order the closure of respondents’ terminals not only because no authority to implement the
Project has been granted nor legislative or police power been delegated to it, but also because the elimination of the terminals
does not satisfy the standards of a valid police power measure.

Sec. of DND v. Manalo (amparo)

1. On February 14, 2006, respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted from Bulacan by armed soldiers, repeatedly
tortured and detained for eighteen months before their escape on August 13, 2007.
2. Reynaldo executed an affidavit affirming the contents of Raymond’s affidavit insofar as they are related to matters they
witnessed together.
3. Contained in the affidavits were the names of the soldiers respondents got acquainted with, as well as the details of the tortures
that they have endured, which was corroborated by Dr. Benito Molino, M.D.
4. His findings showed that the scars borne by respondents were consistent with their account of physical injuries inflicted upon
them.
5. Petitioners dispute respondents’ account of their alleged abduction and torture through a Return of the Write of Amparo,
admitting the abduction, but denying any involvement therein.
6. Attached was the affidavit of the Secretary of National Defense, which attested that he assumed office only on August 8, 2007,
and was thus unaware of the Manalo brothers’ alleged abduction.
7. The AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit attesting that he received the directive of the Secretary of National
Defense and that he acted on this directive by causing an immediate investigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents have the right to the privilege of the Writ of Amparo
RULING: YESSSSSSSsssssssssssssss.
1. While respondents admit that they are no longer in detention and are physically free, they assert that they are not “free in
every sense of the word” as their “movements continue to be restricted for fear that people they have named in their Judicial
Affidavits and testified against are still at large and have not been held accountable in any way.
2. These people are directly connected to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and are, thus, in a position to threaten respondents’
right to life, liberty and security.
3. Respondents claim that they are under the threat of being once again abducted, kept captive or even killed, which constitute a
direct violation of their right to security of person.
4. First, the right to security of person is “freedom from fear”, as indicated in the “whereas” clauses of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR).
5. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also provides for the right to security of person.
6. The Philippines is a signatory to both.
7. In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, “freedom from fear” is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or
security is the actionable wrong.
8. Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security.
a. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or
invasion of the body.
b. Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily integrity.
c. When employed to vitiate the free will such as to force the victim to admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating information, it
constitutes an invasion of both bodily and psychological integrity as the dignity of the human person includes the exercise
of free will.
d. Article III Sec. 12 guarantees freedom from dehumanizing abuses of persons under investigation for the commission of an
offense.
e. Victims of enforced disappearances who are not even under such investigation should all the more be protected from these
degradations.
9. Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one’s rights by the government.
a. Since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and protection by private citizens because of the threat to
their life, liberty and security.
b. The threat vitiates their free will as they are forced to limit their movements or activities.
c. The circumstances of respondents’ abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is
an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed.
d. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo.
e. Apart from the failure of military elements to provide protection to respondents by themselves perpetrating the abduction,
detention and torture, they also miserably failed in conducting an effective investigation of respondents’ abduction as
revealed by the testimony and investigation report of petitioners’ own witness, Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall of
the 7th Infantry Division.
f. As such, the court held that the respondents’ right to security as “freedom from threat” is violated by the apparent threat
to their life, liberty and security of person. Their right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government is likewise
violated by the ineffective investigation and protection on the part of the military.
Roxas v. Macapagal Arroyo (writ of amparo/habeas corpus)
1) Melissa C Roxas is an American citizen of Filipino descent who volunteered to join in conducting an initial health survey in Tarlac
for the future medical mission.
2) After doing survey work, petitioner and her companions decided to rest in the house of one Mr. Paolo, but were afterwards
startled by the loud sounds of someone banging at the front door and a voice demanding that they open up.
3) They were then forcibly dragged into a van and she was informed that she is being detained for being a member of the CPP-
NPA. From there, they were brought to what she inferred was the military camp of Fort Magsaysay in Nueva Ecija.
4) What followed was 5 straight days of interrogation coupled with torture to convince petitioner to’ abandon her communist
beliefs in favor of returning to “the fold”.’
5) One of her interrogators, RC, even told petitioner that those who tortured her came from the ‘Special Operations Group’, and
that she was abducted because her name is included in the “Order of Battle.”
6) Petitioner was finally released and returned to her Uncle’s house but was given a cellular phone with a sim card, sternly warning
her not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or something untoward will happen to her and her family.
7) Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well as the suppression of any existing government files or records
linking her to the communist movement, petitioner filed a petition for the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data before the Court.

ISSUE: WON the doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in an amparo petition

RULING: NO
1) Command responsibility as justification in impleading respondents is legally inaccurate – The use of the doctrine of command
responsibility as justification in impleading the respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not incorrect.
2) Such doctrine is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead
a party-respondent in an amparo petition.
3) The Writ of Amparo as a protective remedy – As held in the case of Rubrico v. Arroyo, the writ of amparo is a protective remedy
aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court,
in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security.
4) It does not fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the
applicable substantive law.
5) Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-
blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding.
6) However, the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility does not preclude impleading military or police
commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence.
7) In which case, commanders may be impleaded — not actually on the basis of command responsibility—but rather on the ground
of their responsibility, or at least accountability.
ISSUE: WON circumstantial evidence with regard to the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators is enough ground for the
issuance of the privilege of the writ of amparo
RULING: NOOoooooooooooo
1) In amparo proceedings, direct evidence of identity must be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence – In amparo
proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence of military involvement depends largely on
the availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence that has the potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation
of the perpetrators.
2) Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and
similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators.
ISSUE: WON substantial evidence to prove actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the
victim is necessary before the privilege of the writ may be extended
RULING: YESSssssssssssss
1) Substantial evidence of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim is an
indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended –
2) An indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended is the showing, at least by substantial evidence,
of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim.
3) In the case at bar, Roxas failed to show that there is an actual or threatened violation of such right.
4) Hence, until such time that any of the respondents were found to be actually responsible for the abduction and torture of Roxas,
any inference regarding the existence of reports being kept in violation of the petitioner’s right to privacy becomes farfetched,
and premature. The Court must, at least in the meantime, strike down the grant of the privilege of the writ of habeas data.

Marcelo v. Lim (writ of habeas data)

1) Respondent Lim was transferred by the administration of MERALCO Bulacan after having received an anonymous letter that put
a question on the respondent’s safety.
2) Respondent was promptly assigned to MERALCO Alabang.
3) Lim wrote a letter of deferment.
4) Receiving no reply, she filed for a Writ of Habeas Data before the Bulacan RTC.
5) She contends that the information pertaining to her transfer is withheld against her.
6) Such failure to disclose is unlawful and against due process because it violates her basic rights.
Issues: W/N The Writ of Habes Data is the proper remedy
RULING: NOOoooooooooooooo.
1) The writ of Habeas Data is particular in its elements.
2) “A Writ of Habeas Data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated by an
unlawful act or omission of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person…”
3) Two elements can be identified –
a. There is a person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is being threatened/violated and
b. Such violation comes from an individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of data or information
regarding the person.
4) While the first element may be present, the second is blatantly absent in the case at hand.
5) The Writ of Habeas Data is out of order. Habeas Data does not cover employment (which is considered a property right).

Remman Enterprises v. Professional Regulatory Board (real estate developer’s right to dispose property)
1) R.A. No. 9646, otherwise known as the "Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines" was signed into law on June 29, 2009 by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
2) It aims to professionalize the real estate service sector under a regulatory scheme of licensing, registration and supervision of real
estate service practitioners (real estate brokers, appraisers, assessors, consultants and salespersons) in the country.
3) On December 7, 2010, herein petitioners Remman Enterprises, Inc. (REI) and the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’ Association
(CREBA) instituted a case in the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
4) Petitioners sought to declare as void and unconstitutional the following provisions of R.A. No. 9646 entitled:
a. SEC. 28. Exemptions from the Acts Constituting the Practice of Real Estate Service
b. SEC. 29. Prohibition Against the Unauthorized Practice of Real Estate Service
c. SEC. 32. Corporate Practice of the Real Estate Service

Issue: Whether Sections 28(a), 29, and 32 of [R.A. No. 9646], insofar as they affect the rights of real estate developers, are
unconstitutional for violating substantive due process.
RULING: NOOOoooooooooo
1) Petitioners contend that the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9646 are unduly oppressive and infringe the constitutional rule against
deprivation of property without due process of law.
2) There is no deprivation of property as no restriction on their use and enjoyment of property is caused by the implementation of
R.A. No. 9646.
3) If petitioners as property owners feel burdened by the new requirement of engaging the services of only licensed real estate
professionals in the sale and marketing of their properties, such is an unavoidable consequence of a reasonable regulatory
measure.
4) The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object.
5) The lawful purpose of R.A. 9646 is to professionalize the real estate service and increase its standards.
6) The law recognizes the role of real estate practitioners in spearheading the continuous flow of capital, in boosting investor
confidence, and in promoting national progress.
7) The requirement of employing a duly licensed real estate broker for transactions is reasonable as it merely regulates the
conduct of business, and does not curtail the exercise of petitioners’ ownership rights.
8) For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of
police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.
ISSUE: Whether Section 28(a), which treats real estate developers differently from other natural or juridical persons who directly
perform acts of real estate service with reference to their own property, is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause.
RULING: NOOOOOOOOoooooo
1) R.A. No. 9646 was intended to provide institutionalized government support for the development of "a corps of highly respected,
technically competent, and disciplined real estate service practitioners, knowledgeable of internationally accepted standards and
practice of the profession."
2) To protect the interest of home and lot buyers from fraudulent acts and manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision
and condominium sellers and operators, P.D. No. 957 was issued to strictly regulate housing and real estate development projects.
3) Hence, in approving R.A. No. 9646, the legislature rightfully recognized the necessity of imposing the new licensure requirements
to all real estate service practitioners, including and more importantly, those real estate service practitioners working for real
estate developers.
4) Unlike individuals or entities having isolated transactions over their own property, real estate developers sell lots, houses and
condominium units in the ordinary course of business, a business which is highly regulated by the State to ensure the health
and safety of home and lot buyers.
5) The foregoing shows that substantial distinctions do exist between ordinary property owners exempted under Section 28(a) and
real estate developers like petitioners, and the classification enshrined in R.A. No. 9646 is reasonable and relevant to its legitimate
purpose.

Disini v. Secretary of Justice (Cybercrime Law)

1) Petitioners sought to declare several provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012,
unconstitutional and void.
2) Cyberspace is a system that accommodates millions and billions of simultaneous and ongoing individual accesses to and uses of
the internet.
3) The cyberspace is a boon to the need of the current generation for greater information and facility of communication.
4) But all is not well with the system since it could not filter out a number of persons of ill will who would want to use cyberspace
technology for mischiefs and crimes.
5) One of them can, for instance, avail himself of the system to unjustly ruin the reputation of another or bully the latter by posting
defamatory statements against him that people can read.
6) The government certainly has the duty and the right to prevent these tomfooleries from happening and punish their
perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime Prevention Act.

Assailed Section of Cybercrime law Petitioners’ Contention Ruling and Holding

Section 4(a)(1) 1. Fails to meet strict scrutiny standard
Illegal Access required by laws that interfere with the
fundamental rights of the people.
2. How about Ethical Hackers who
evaluate the target system’s security and
report back to the owners?
1. Nothing in this section that calls for the
application of the strict scrutiny since no
fundamental freedom like speech is
involved.
2. Ethical hackers are not included since
there was prior permission from the
client.

Section 4(b)(3)
Data Interference – intentional or
reckless alteration of computer data,
electronic document without right
including the introduction of viruses.
1. Suffers from OVERBREADTH since it
intrudes into the area protected speech
and expression creating a chilling effect
CONSTITUTIONAL
1. Does NOT encroach on these freedoms
at all since it simply punishes what
essentially is a form of VADALISM. There
is NO freedom to destroy other people’s
computer systems

Section 4(a)(6)
Cyber-squatting – the acquisition of
domain name over the internet in bad
faith to profit, mislead, destroy the
reputation and deprive others from
registering the same
Section 4(b)(3)
Identity Theft
1. Violates equal protection clause will
cause a user using his real name to suffer
the same fate as those who use aliases or
take the name of another in satire.
Hypothetical example: My real name is
Rodrigo Duterte and I mock the president
then another uses the name it to mock
him, we both will be punished under this
section when in fact I should be punished
using another law (if there is)
1. violates due process and right to
privacy and correspondence and freedom
of the press
CONSTITUTIONAL
1. Baseless because there is always a
determination if there is BAD FAITH in the
taking of the name or trademark.
CONSTITUTIONAL
1. Petitioners fail to show how
government effort to curb computer-
related identity theft violates these rights.
Clearly this section regulates specific
actions: the acquisition, use, misuse or
deletion of personal identifying data of

Section 4(c)(1)
CyberSEX
Section 4(c)(2)
Child Pornography
Section 4(c)(3)
Unsolicited Commercial
Communications or the ever famous
SPAM (Yummerzzzz! Joke Ma Ling for life
<3 )
The term referred to a Monty Python’s
Flying Circus Scene in which actors would
keep saying Spam when reading options
from the menu (tandaan niyo yan
tinanong ni madam yan nung fake class
sesh natin)
RPC 353 and Section 4(c)4
Libel
Section 5
Aiding and Abetting in the commission
of Cybercrime and Attempt in the
Commission of Cybercrime
Section 6
If crimes in Revised Penal Code
committed using information and
communications tech, penalty will be 1
year higher
1. Violates freedom of expression.
Cybersex between husband and wife will
be punished.
1. A person who merely doodles on paper
and imagines a sexual abuse of a 16-year-
old is not criminally liable for producing
child pornography but one who
formulates the idea on his laptop would
be.
1. Would deny a person the right to read
his emails even unsolicited commercial
ads addressed to him.
1. The libel provisions of cybercrime law
carry with them the requirement of
presumed malice even when the latest
jurisprudence already replaces it with the
higher standard of ACTUAL MALICE.
2. Infringes on freedom of expression
3. Against International Covenant of Civil
and Political Rights and General
Comment 34 of UN Human Rights
Committee
1. Suffers from Overbreadth creating a
chilling and deterrent effect on protected
expression
Microblogging (twitter) and liking,
sharing and commenting feelings about a
certain post would constitute aiding and
abetting.
another. There is NO fundamental right to
ACQUIRE another’s personal data.
CONSTITUTIONAL
1. This section only is concerned with
CYBER PROTSITUTION. (buti na lang kung
hindi madaming mahuhuli sa inyo mga
mahilig magskype dyan. CHAROT!)
CONSTITUTIONAL
1. Merely expands Anti-Child
Pornography Act of 2009. Nothing
prevent the government from invoking
the ACPA
CONSTITUTIONAL
1. Government presents no basis for
holding that unsolicited electronic ads
reduce the efficiency of computers.
Unsolicited advertisements are
LEGITIMATE forms of EXPRESSION.
UNCONSTI!!!
1. Libel is not a constitutionally protected
speech
CONSTITUTIONAL
1. The terms aiding and abetting
constitute broad sweep that generates
chilling effect on those who express
themselves through cyberspace posts.
UNCONSTITUTINAL with respect to Child
Pornography, Spam and Libel.
BUT!!!! Constitutional in relation to other
crimes such as system interference,
cyber-squatting, computer-related fraud
and other except those mentioned
above!!!
1. In using tech, the offender often
evades identification and is able to reach
far more victims or cause greater harm.
The distinction therefore creates a basis
for higher penalties.

Section 7
A prosecution under this act shall be
without prejudice to any liability for
violation of other provisions and laws.
Section 8
Penalties
Section 12
Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data
Section 13
Preservation of Computer Data – content
data shall be preserved for 6 months. Law
enforcement authorities may order an
extension of 6 months if going to be used
in a case.
Section 14
Disclosure of Computer Data – upon
securing court warrant shall issue an
order requiring disclosure of data from
service provider or any person
Section 15
Search, Seizure and Examination of
Computer Data
Section 17
Destruction of Computer Data
Section 19
Restricting or Blocking Access to
Computer Data – when data is prima facie
found to be in violation of this ACT, the
DOJ shall issue an order to restrict or block
access to such data.
Section 20
Noncompliance
1. Curtail civil liberties or provide
opportunities for official abuse
2. Affects right to privacy
1. Deprivation of the right to property
1. Deprivation of property without due
process of law
1. Stifles freedom of expression and right
against unreasonable search and seizures
1. Bill of atainder
CONSTITUTIONAL
1. Does not cover crimes of online libel
and online child pornography because
not a new crime but only a repetition of
those enunciated in RPC and ACPA
respectively.
LEAVE THE DETERMINATION of the
correct application of Section 7 that
authorizes prosecution of the offender
under both the RPC and Cybercrime law
to ACTUAL CASES with the exceptions of
libel and child porno.
1. Judiciary can only interpret the law.
Court should not encroach on the
prerogative of the lawmaking body.
1. With enough traffic data, analysts may
be able to determine a person’s close
associations, religious beliefs, political
affiliations and even sexual preferences.
Such would inflict RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Section 12 empowers law enforcement
authorities with DUE CAUSE but this term
is too sweeping.
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
1. The data that service providers
preserve on orders of law enforcement
authorities are not made inaccessible to
use by reason of the issuance of others.
The process of preservation of data will
not unduly hamper the normal
transmission or use of the same.
CONSTITUTIONAL
1. Merely the enforcement of duly
issued court warrant
CONSITUTITONAL
1. Merely enumerates the duties of law
enforcement
CONSTITUTIONAL
1. No right to order service provider to
keep data exclusively for him.
CONSTITUTIONAL
1. No search warrant shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the JUDGE.
UNCONSTITUINAL
1. The act of non-compliance for it to be
punishable must still be done knowingly
 or willfully. There must still be a judicial
determination of guilt

CONSTITUINAL
Section 24 and 26(a) SEE MAIN ISSUE
ABOVE

Imbong v. Ochoa (RH Law void for vagueness)

1) Assailed in this landmark case is R.A. No. 10354 otherwise known as the Responsible
2) Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law) which was enacted to provide
3) Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access and information to the full range of modern family planning methods,
and to ensure that its objective to provide for the people’s right to reproductive health is achieved.
4) Shortly after the President signed the law, challengers from various sectors of the society immediately assailed the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 10354 on various grounds.
5) Among the many contentions of the petitioners against the RH Law is that the said law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the
due process clause of the Constitution.
6) They claim that:
a. Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service provider" among those who may be held punishable but does not
define who is a "private health care service provider." They argue that confusion further results since Section 7 only
makes reference to a "private health care institution;"
b. Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals operated by religious groups from rendering reproductive health
service and modern family planning methods but it is unclear if these institutions are also exempt from giving
reproductive health information under Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering reproductive health procedures under
Section 23(a)(2); and
c. RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of incorrect information, but at the same time fails to
define "incorrect information."
Issue: Whether or not the RH Law suffers from vagueness and thus violates the due process clause of the Constitution insofar as the
petitioners’ contentions are concerned
RULING: NOOOOOooooooo
1) The Court held that in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must not only be taken in accordance
with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute.
2) Insofar as the first contention is concerned, the Court said that in determining the definition of "private health care service
provider," reference must be made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health service provider" as:
a. public health care institution, which is duly licensed and accredited and devoted primarily to the maintenance and
operation of facilities for health promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of individuals suffering
from illness, disease, injury, disability or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical and nursing care;
b. public health care professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midwife;
c. public health worker engaged in the delivery of health care services; or
d. barangay health worker who has undergone training programs under any accredited government and NGO and who
voluntarily renders primarily health care services in the community after having been accredited to function as such by
the local health board in accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH) .
3) It also held that the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of "private health care
service provider," should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason that they are used synonymously.
4) Insofar as the second contention is concerned, the Court ruled that the right to be exempt from being obligated to render
reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to give
reproductive health information and to render reproductive health procedures.
5) It said that the terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough to include the providing of information and the rendering of
medical procedures.
6) Finally, concerning the third contention, the Court held that the word "incorrect" in Sec. 23(a)(1) denotes failing to agree with a
copy or model or with established rules; inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of duty, morality or
propriety; and failing to coincide with the truth.
7) The Court also held that the word “incorrect” and "knowingly,” both found within the same paragraph connote a sense of
malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on
reproductive health.
B. Substantive Issues
1. Right to Life – Article 2 Section 12
-RH has express terms prohibiting abortion under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code
Petitioners -> Section 4 (a) RH Law -> abortifacient -contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother’s womb
-sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after fertilization is unconsti
-> Section 9 RH law -> allows only ‘non-abortifacient’ supplies but medical research shows that contraceptive use results in abortion
as they operate to kill the fertilized ovum
Respondents -> The framers of consti was simply the prohibition of abortion
-WHO shows that life begins from the implantation of the fertilized ovum
-Rh law is consti since the law specifically provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation of the fertilized
ovum are allowed
Court -> Section 1 Article III -> life, liberty and property
-Principle of NO-ABORTION and NON-COERCION for population programs
-strong view that life begins at fertilization
-consti affords protection to the unborn from conception Section 12 Article 2
-petitioners says conception = fertilization
-respondents say that conception = implantation
-PRINCIPLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION – language employed in consti must be given their ordinary meaning:
1. It is assumed that the words express the objective sought
2. Consti is document of people not lawyers
-Verba Legis non est recedendum – from the words of a statute there should be no departure
- Traditional meaning of conception = fertilization
- Framers of consti says that conception = fertilization
- Biology -> fertilized ovum is alive bc:
1. takes in nutrients which it processes by itself
2. nutrients makes it grow from within
3. multiplies at a geometric rate by cell division
- Genetics -> fertilized ovum is HUMAN bc 23 chromosomes from ovum and 23 chromosomes from the sperm making 46
-Medicine -> conception = fertilization
-Decision -> contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed abortive and contraceptives that prevent union
of sperm and egg be deemed non-abortive thus constitutionally permissible
-intra-uterine device is unconsti because stop fertilized ovum to be implanted
-tubal litigiation, vasectomy and condoms are not abortifacient
RH Law and Abortifacients
Section 4 of RH Law-Abortifacient:
1. Induces abortion
2. Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb
3. Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb upon determination of the FDA
-Contrary to the assertions made by petitioners, the court finds RH law CONSISTENT with Consti bc the law recognizes that the
fertilized ovum already has life and that the state has a bounden duty to protect it.
-RH law prohibits any drug that is abortifacient
Section 9 of RH Law -> any product must have certification from FDA that it is non-abortifacient
RH-IRR -> redefined abortifacient and contraceptive with the word ‘PRIMARILY’ induces – Section 3.01 (A) and (G) respectively
-Court says THIS CANNOT BE DONE as it contravenes section 4 of RH law
2. The Right to Health
Petitioners-> risks of developing breast cancer and cervical cancer, thromboembolism
Respondent OSG -> Section 15 Article II -> is not self-executory -> state to promote the right to health
-respondent posits that medical authorities refute the claim that contraceptives pose danger
Article XIII -> the state shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development
Article XVI Section 9 -> protect consumers from trade malpractices and substandard or hazardous products
Court -> these provisions are self-executory -> Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS
-Agrees with Lagman that effectivity of RH law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives-need licensed
physician
-Sale of contraceptives is governed by RA 4729, RA 5921
Section 10 of RH Law -> DOH coordinates with LGUs in distribution
-court says congress cannot legislate hormonal contraceptives and intra-urine devices as safe -> FDA needed as section 9 says
3. Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
Petitioners -> contraceptives are evil
-the expenditure of their taxes violates their religious freedom
-violates conscientious objectors bc they have to refer patients
-Section 23 (a) (3) – allows conscientious objector
Section 23 (a) (1) and (2) – no escape is afforded the conscientious objector if they do not refer
-They add that compelling them to do the act against their will violates the DOCTRINE of BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY
-Rh law does not show compelling state interest to justify regulation of religious freedom bc no immediate risk
Section 15 of RH -> requires would-be couples to attend family planning
Respondents -> RH does not provide that a specific mode or type of contraceptives be used -> neither imposes nor sanction any type
of religion
-RH is in line with the State’s duty to bring to reality the social justice health guarantees of the consti
-by seeking the declaration that Rh is unconsti, petitioners are asking that the court recognize only the Catholic Church’s sanctioned
natural family planning
-Section 7 and 23 (a) (3) -> sufficient accommodation to the right to freely exercise one’s religion without unnecessarily infringing on
the rights of others
-whatever burden is placed on the petitioner’s religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is limited in:
1. Duration
2. Location
3. Impact
Section 15 Rh law – couples are free to reject any info given
The Church and the State
Preamble – state recognized the influence of religion
Article II Section 6 – Separation of the Church and State -> cannot favor one religion
Article III Section 5 and Article VI Section 29 (2) –no religious test shall be require for the exercise of civil or political rights; no public
money be used in favor of one sect
-The constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees:
1. The Establishment Clause - state cannot sponsor one religion
2. Free Exercise Clause – inviolability of the human conscience
-Religious freedom is comprised is comprised of two parts:
1. Freedom to Believe - absolute
2. Freedom to act on one’s belief – limited and subject to the awesome power of the state
-In case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State -> Court adheres to DOCTRINE OF BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY ->
allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance
Philippine Jurisprudence articulates test to determine limits of exercise of religion:
1. Compelling State Interest Test – to ascertain the limits of the exercise of religious freedom ; the notion that free exercise is
a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be subject to strict scrutiny
2. Clear and Present Danger Test
3. Immediate and Grave Danger Test
-in determining which shall prevail between state’s interest and religious liberty, REASONABLENESS shall be the guide
Court -> At first blush, Rh law appears to recognize religion and religious beliefs with certain provisions inside it
-petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the state cannot enhance its population control program just bc of their religious
beliefs
-one cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply bc it will cloud his conscience
-Section 7, 23 and 24 of RH -> commonly mandate for conscientious objectors to refer despite beliefs
-When exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government legislation or practice, the compelling state test and doctrine of
benevolent neutrality finds application
-court then finds obligation to refer violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector -> violative of PRINCIPLE
OF NON-COERCION
-Bernas-> free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of human conscience
-Section 7, section 23 a1, a2, a3 and section 24 -> must be struck down
Section 5.24 of RH IRR -> public health professionals cannot be considered conscientious objectors -> violates equal protection
clause
-If there is conflict between the IRR and the law-> THE LAW MUST PREVAIL
-Freedom of religion means freedom to act or not to act according to what one believes
-if government fails to show the immediacy of threat, state intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable -> respondents fail to show this
-> assistant SG said that the threat was 15 maternal death per day and hundreds and thousands of unintended pregnancies -> fail to
be substantiate
-IF there is LIFE THREATENING CASE -> right to life of mother must be given preference
PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE-EFFECT -> intentional harms on the life of either the mother or the child is never justified to bring about a
good effect -> save one if impossible to save both as long as no direct harm is intended to the other
4. The Family and the Right to Privacy
Petitioner -> Section 23 a2i -> bars the husband or the father from participating in the decision making process regarding their
common future progeny likewise the parents of their authority over their minor daughter simple bc she is already a parent or
suffered a miscarriage -> cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the family rather than promote its solidarity and total
development
Court -> AGRESS with the petitioners
-Magna carta on other have promote EQUAL rights to decision making
Section 7 -> minors will not be allowed to access to modern methods of family planning without written consent from their parents
or guardians excepts when the minor is already a parent or has a miscarriage
-> Court says section 7 should be struck down because without a compelling state interest, state cannot take the role of the parents
EXCEPTIONS:
1. Access to Information
2. Life Threatening cases
-Section 23 a2ii -> limiting the requirement of parental consent to only in elective surgical procedures -> it denies the parents their
right of parental authority
5. Academic Freedom
-Section 14 -> mandates the teaching of Age-and-Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education -> attack on this is
premature because DepEd has no curriculum yet
6. Due Process
Petitioners-> Rh law is vague thus violates due process
-does not define who is a private health care service provider
-failed to define incorrect information
Court -> arguments fail to persuade
-A statue suffers vagueness thus violates due process if:
1. Failure to accord persons, especially the arties targeted by it fair notice of the conduct to avoid
2. It leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
government muscle
7. Equal Protection
Petitioners-> RH discriminates against the poor
-There is valid and reasonableness of classification if:
1. Substantial distinctions
2. Germane to the purpose of the law
3. It is not limited to existing condition only
4. It applies to all members of the same class
Court -> RH not violate equal protection clause
-> Rh even pursuant to Article XIII Section 11 -> address the need of the underprivileged
8. Involuntary Servitude
Petitioner -> Section 17 of RH -> 48 pro bona services is violating constitutional prohibition against Involuntary Servitude
Respondent -> OSG says health care providers have the discretion on when to render them
Court -> agrees with respondent but there should still be the consideration of conscientious objectors and private and Non-
government healthcare providers are not forced
9. Delegation of Authority to the FDA
Court -> No wrong with the delegation -> the function and powers of the FDA are specific to enable the agency to carry out the
mandates of the law
10. Autonomy of Local Gov’ts and ARMM
Section 17 of Local Government Code -> nationally funded projects under the annual GAA and other special laws, pertinent EOs and
those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources are NOT covered under this section
-the essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that unless an LGU is particularly designated as the
implementing agency, it has no power over a program
Organic Act of ARMM – autonomy is also not absolute -> Constitution reject the notion of imperium et imperio (empire within an
empire)
11. Natural Law
-our only guidepost is the constitution not really natural law
-natural law is to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving inherent rights to man where no law is
applicable
DECISION
RH as Constitutional
The following provisions are unconstitutional:
1. Section 7 -> private health care providers and hospitals operated by religious groups to refer patients
-allow minor parents or minors who had a miscarriage access to contraceptives without written consent
2. Section 23 a1 (Section 5.24 of IRR) -> disseminate info regardless of religious beliefs
3. Section 23 a2i – married individual to decide without consent of spouse
4. Section 23 a2ii – limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures
5. Section 23 a3 (Section 5.24 of IRR) -> failure to refer patients
6. Section 23 b 9Section 5.24 of IRR) -> punish any public officer who refuses to support RH programs
7. Section 17 – pro bona service in order to secure PhilHealth
8. Section 3.01a and 3.01g of RH IRR – adds the word ‘primarily’ -> contravene Section 4a of RH and Section 12 Article II
Garcia v. Drilon
1) Private respondent, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia, filed for the issuance of a TPO against her husband, Jesus Garcia pursuant to RA 9262.
2) She claims to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on
the part of her petitioner husband, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support.
3) The affair was between her husband and the godmother of her children who is a manager of Robinsons Bank
4) The RTC of Bacolod City granted her the TPO upon finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence
against the private respondent and her children exists or is about to recur.
5) Even upon the issuance of said TPO, petitioner still continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to faithfully comply
with the TPO; and committed new acts of harassment against Rosalie and their children.
6) Rosalie filed for another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte.
7) Petitioner contests the constitutionality of RA 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 for
being violative of the equal protection clause.
ISSUE/S: Whether RA 9262 is constitutional.
RULING: YEEEeeeeessssss
1) The guaranty of equal protection is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state.
2) The Court finds that RA 9262 did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over as victims of violence and
abuse to whom the State extends its protection.
3) According to the Philippine Commission on Women, violence against women is deemed to be closely linked with the unequal
power relationship between men and women otherwise known as “gender-based violence.”
4) This was affirmed by the United Nations when they stated that “violence against women is a manifestation of historically
unequal power relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by
men and to the prevention of the full advancement of women, and that the violence against women is one of the crucial social
mechanisms by which women are forced into subordinate positions, compared with men.”
5) Then Chief Justice Reynato Puno traced the historical and social context of gender-based violence and developments in the
advocacies to eradicate violence against women.
6) His study reveals that we have long history rooted in patriarchy.
7) Also, women are the “usual” and “most likely” victims of violence. While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and
abused perpetrated against men in the Philippines, the same cannot render RA 9262 invalid.
8) Upon its proposal, a finding was made that female violence comprised more than 90% of all forms of abuse and violence and
more than 90% of these reported cases were committed by the women’s intimate partners.
9) More so, the distinction between men and women to the purpose of RA 9262, which is to address violence committed against
women and children.
10) It is also not limited to the existing conditions when it was promulgated.
11) Therefore, RA 9262 is constitutional and not violative of the equal protection clause.

Caram v. Segui (adoption not subject to amparo)

1) Petitioner Ma. Christina Yusay Caram had an amorous relationship with Marcelino Gicano Constantino III and eventually became
pregnant with the latter’s child without the benefit of marriage.
2) Christina mislead Marcelino into thinking that she had an abortion.
3) When Christina gave birth to Baby Julian, she voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment to
the DSWD.
4) When Marcelino died, Christina disclosed to Marcelino’s family that she had a son with him.
5) Marcelino’s family sympathized with her and vowed to help her recover and raise the baby.
6) However, the DSWD had already issued a certificate declaring Baby Julian as “Legally Available for Adoption” and had
“matched” him with the Media Spouses.
7) The DSWD thus informed Christina that the certificate had attained finality three months after she signed the Deed of Voluntary
Commitment, which terminated her parental authority and made Baby Julian a ward of the State.
8) The RTC dismissed Christina’s petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo despite her allegations of “blackmailing” and
misrepresentations on the part of DSWD for her to surrender her child.
Issue: W/N a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental authority and custody of a minor child
RULING: NOOOOOOOoooooooooooo

1) The writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof.
2) Christina’s allegation of a supposed “enforced separation” is without basis.
3) The respondent DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian’s whereabouts.
4) In fact, Christina obtained the DSWD’s memorandum explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina
Spouses. She even admitted in her petition for review that the DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC.
5) Clearly, she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody over him.

Mison v. Gallegos (writ of amparo)

1) Special Prosecutor Maria Antonette Bucasas-Mangrobang charged Ku for being a risk to public interest pursuant to
2) On the same day BI officers, with the assistance of the Manila Police District-Warrant and Subpoena Section, arrested Ku.
3) Upon arrival at the BI detention center, Ku was detained. 13
4) Republic of Korea voided Ku’s passport.14
5) Ku filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with Interim Remedies
6) Finding said supple mental petition to be sufficient in form and substance, Judge Gallegos, issued a Writ of Amparo.
7) Ku filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO). 18
8) Judge Gallegos issued the first assailed Order granting the motion for issuance of TPO, entrusting Ku’s custody to the Philippine
National Red Cross to protect Ku and his immediate family.24
9) Judge Gallegos issued the second assailed Order directing the transfer of custody and protection of Ku to the PNP-PSPG.25
10) Petitioner challenged these orders before the Court via a Petition for Certiorari 26 docketed as G.R. No. 210759.
11) In issuing this resolution, the Court intimated the possibility of misuse by Ku of the writ of amparo given that he was validly
arrested and placed under the jurisdiction and custody of the BI; thus the case cannot be categorized as one of extralegal
killing or enforced disappearance.28
12) Judge Gallegos still issued the assailed Resolution granting the privilege of the writ of amparo,
13) Court issued a TRO enjoining the RTC from enforcing the Order dated 18 February 2014 and from further proceeding with the
case.34
14) OP granted Ku provisional liberty only until 31 August 2014 or until his appeal was resolved, whichever came first.35
ISSUE: Whether or not the privilege of the writ of amparo was properly granted in the case at bar.
RULING NOOOoooooooooo
1) Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) 39 provides:
2) SECTION 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity.
3) The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
4) On 25 September 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in light of the prevalence of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances."
5) It was an exercise for the first time of the Court’s expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our people’ s constitutional
rights, which made its maiden appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law
regime.
6) As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its
coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof.
7) "Extralegal killings" are ‘killings committed without due process of law,
8) On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics:
a. an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting
with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government;
b. the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or where about s of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law." 40
9) As to what constitutes "enforced disappearance," the Court in Navia v. Pardico 42 enumerated the elements constituting
"enforced disappearances" as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9851, 43 to wit:
10) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
11) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;
12) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts
of the person subject of the amparo petition; and
13) that the intention for such refusal is to remove the subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of
time.44
14) As clarified in Navia, with the enactment of R.A. No. 9851, the Amparo Rule is now a procedural law anchored, not only on the
constitutional rights to life, liberty and security, but on a concrete statutory definition as well of what an ‘enforced or
involuntary disappearance’ is.
15) Guided by the parameters of R.A. No. 9851, we can readily discern that Ku’s circumstance does not come under the statutory
definition of an enforced or involuntary disappearance.
16) Indeed, Ku was arrested by agents of the BI, but there was no refusal on the part of the BI to acknowledge such arrest nor was
there any refusal to give information on the whereabouts of Ku.
17) Neither can it be said that the BI had any intention to remove Ku from the protection of the law for a prolonged time.
18) Although Ku claims that he was arbitrarily arrested and detained by agents of the BI, that he was not read his rights under the
constitution and was not informed of the reason for hi s arrest, nor provided a copy of any document leading to his arrest and
detention,46 the arresting officers are all consistent in testifying that, upon Ku’s arrest, they introduced themselves as agents of
the BI, presented to Ku the Warrant of Deportation, and informed him of his constitutional rights as well as the expiration of his
visa.47
19) More importantly, there was no attempt on the part of the BI to conceal Ku or his whereabouts.
20) Within the Bureau, Ku’s arrest and the fact that he was in their custody was not obscured as, in fact, these were well-
documented as evidenced by the Return of Warrant of Deportation dated 20 January 201448 and the After-Mission Report dated
17 January 2014.49
21) These documents and pleading show that there was never any intention on the part of the BI to re move Ku from the protection
of the law for a prolonged time.
22) Section 5 of the Amparo Rule enumerates what an amparo petition should contain,
23) SEC. 5. Contents of Petition. – The petition shall be signed and verified and shall allege the following:
a. The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
b. The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is
unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation;
c. The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed
in supporting affidavits;
d. The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating
authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report;
e. The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the
identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
f. The relief prayed for.

Zarate v. Aquino III (writ of amparo/habeas data)

1) The Government commenced intensified military offensives in Talaingod, Davao del Norte under the rubric of
counterinsurgency.
2) 1,300 Manobos allegedly evacuated to Davao City to escape the effects of said military operations.
3) These evacuees returned to their communities in May 2014. 3
4) Some of the Manobos started going back to Davao City.
5) By July 2015, approximately 700 Manobos were at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP) Haran.
6) Petitioners claimed that these Manobos sought refuge at UCCP Haran due to the persisting militarization of their communities
and their forcible recruitment to the paramilitary group, Alamara. 4
7) Certain Manobos claimed, on the other hand, that they were deceived into going to Davao City; that, upon reaching UCCP
Haran, they were deprived of their freedom of locomotion and were held there against their will
8) They said during this period they were forced to listen to lectures and join rallies;
9) That their repeated pleas to go home fell on deaf ears until a fellow tribe member was found dead, hanging lifeless on a tree,
inside the UCCP Haran compound; and that it was only then that they were allowed to go home with the body of the
deceased. CAIHTE
10) Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) forwarded to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City a complaint
11) To determine who would be charged in the complaint, the complainants were shown "lists" from which they purportedly
identified the defendants.
12) It appears that the photographs of petitioners De Jesus, Mariano, 7 Casiño, and Añover were in the "first list," while the
photographs of petitioners Zarate, Palabay, Balaba, and Ruiz were in the "second list."
13) Petitioners now aver that the inclusion of their names and photographs in the "lists" indicates that they are and have been the
subject of State surveillance. 8
14) Coupled with instances of harassment in the past, attempts to incriminate them in fabricated criminal charges, and insinuations
of their links with the New People's Army (NPA), petitioners argue that their inclusion in the "lists" are threats to their life,
liberty, and security warranting the protection of the writ of amparo. 9
ISSUE: W/N writ of amparo is the right remedy
RULING: NOOOoooooooo
1) The writ of amparo is a "remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity." 11
2) As an additional safeguard, Sections 17 & 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires substantial evidence.
 3) The writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy as it is available not only for violations of life, liberty, and security, but also
against threatened violations of such.
4) But not all threats are protected by the Amparo Rule.
5) As previously elucidated by this Court, "only actual threats, as may be established from all the facts and circumstances of the
case, can qualify as a violation that may be addressed under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo." 14
6) Having these guidelines in mind, we hold that petitioners failed to substantially prove that their life, liberty and security are
threatened with violation.
7) Moreover, as the writ of amparo is sought individually and granted individually, then we should assess the situation of the
petitioners individually.
8) Lumping together the previous and present experiences of petitioners may give off the impression that, indeed, taken
together, petitioners' life, liberty and security are threatened to be violated.
9) But this way of presenting the obtaining situation is misleading.
10) A perusal of their individual circumstances negates the conclusion that they are each entitled to a writ of amparo.
11) Thus, at this point, we cannot say that these are fabricated criminal charges or that they were filed to threaten petitioner
Zarate's life, liberty, and security.
12) As for his membership in the Bayanmuna Party-list, we reiterate our pronouncement that mere membership in such an
organization cannot be considered as an actual threat as to justify the issuance of a writ of amparo.
13) As for petitioner De Jesus, she merely cites her status as the current party-list representative of Gabriela Women's Party.
14) Similarly, petitioner Ruiz cites her position as Executive Director of the CRC.
15) As we have earlier said, however, mere membership in such organizations do not equate to actual threats which will warrant
the issuance of a writ of amparo.
16) Petitioners Mariano and Casiño, on the other hand, cite their previous charge of rebellion, 24 and their earlier implication in a
kidnapping with murder case.
17) The filing of cases, however, cannot be characterized as an unlawful act or omission in the context of the Amparo Rule.
18) Petitioner Palabay points to the labeling of the administrations of Presidents Macapagal-Arroyo and Aquino of KARAPATAN as
"front organization of the CPPA-NPA-NDP," 26 and the death in 2013 of one of their human rights worker who was allegedly
included in the "target list" of the military. 27
19) Again, we emphasize that mere membership in said organization is not an actual threat that entitles one to a writ of amparo.
20) Moreover, the fact of death of one of KARAPATAN's workers, without corroborative evidence that his death was on account
of his membership in KARAPATAN, is not an actual threat that will pass the test of substantial evidence.
21) Of all the petitioners, it is only petitioner Balaba who alleged personal circumstances claiming threatened violations of her
right to life, liberty and security.
22) The next question, then, is whether these allegations constitute substantial evidence as to warrant the issuance of a writ
of amparo.
23) Similarly, in the case at bar, we cannot conclude that petitioner Balaba's inclusion in the "lists" has a direct relation to the
circumstances she experienced
ISSUE: W/N writ of habeas data is the proper remedy
RULING: NOOooooooo
1) The writ of habeas data is a "remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting, or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party." 31
2) The extraordinary writ of habeas data "provides a judicial remedy to protect a person's right to control information regarding
oneself, particularly in instances where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful
ends." 32 ATICcS
3) Similar to the writ of amparo, Section 6 of A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC (Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data) provides that the petition
should aver "the manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of
the aggrieved party." The Habeas Data Rule likewise requires substantial evidence. 33
4) In the present petition, petitioners fail to show how their right to privacy is violated given that the information contained in the
"lists" are only their names, their positions in their respective organizations, and their photographs.
5) All these data are of public knowledge and are readily accessible even to civilians, especially since petitioners are known
personalities who are often featured in news reports.

Lawrence v. Texas (2003)

1) Officers of the Harris County Police Department in Houston, Texas were dispatched in a private residence in response to a
reported weapons disturbance.
2) They entered an apartment where one of the petitioners, John Geddes Lawrence, resided.
3) They observed Lawrence and another man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a sexual act.
4) The complaint was “deviate sexual intercourse, namely anal sex, with a member of the same sex.”
5) The relevant state law provides: “A person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another
individual of the same sex.”
o The statute defines “deviate sexual intercourse” as follows:
a. Any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person; or
b. The penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an object
6. The two petitioners were arrested, held in custody over night, and charged and convicted before a Justice of Peace.
7. The Court of Appeals affirmed their convictions. Hence, certiorari.

Issue: WoN the petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
RULING: YEEEEEeeessss

 On the ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick

o Bowers discloses the Court's own failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake.
o To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the
individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the
right to have sexual intercourse.
o The laws involved in Bowers and here are statutes that purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act.
Their penalties and purposes, though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private
human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.
o The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the
law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals.

 There is no longstanding history directed at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter.

o Early American sodomy laws were not directed at homosexuals but instead sought to prohibit nonprocreative
sexual activity more generally.
o Laws prohibiting sodomoy do not seem to have been enforced against consenting adults acting in private.
o The longstanding criminal prohibition of homosexual sodomy upon which the Bowers decision placed such reliance
is as consistent with a general condemnation of nonprocreative sex as it is with an established tradition of
prosecuting acts because of their homosexual character.
o The historical premises are overstated.

 On state laws
o The deficiencies in Bowers became even more apparent in the years following its announcement.
o The 25 States with laws prohibiting the relevant conduct referenced in the Bowers decision are reduced now to 13,
of which 4 enforce their laws only against homosexual conduct.
o In those States where sodomy is still proscribed, whether for same-sex or heterosexual conduct, there is a pattern
of non-enforcement with respect to consenting adults acting in private.
o The State of Texas admitted in 1994 that as of that date it had not prosecuted anyone under those circumstances.

 Discrimination
o If protected conduct is made criminal and the law which remains unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma
might remain even if it were not enforceable as drawn for equal protection reasons.
o When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation
to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.
o The stigma this criminal statute imposes, moreover, is not trivial.
o The offense is a class C misdemeanor, a minor offense in the Texas legal system.
o However, it remains a criminal offense with all that imports for the dignity of the persons charged. The petitioners
will bear on their record the history of their criminal convictions.
o The Texas criminal conviction carries with it other collateral consequences, such as notations on job application
forms.

 The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common
to a homosexual lifestyle.
 The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives.
  The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.
 Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention
of the government.
 The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of
the individual.

Obergefell v. Hodges
1) In this case, fourteen same-sex couples were the plaintiffs, and James Obergefell was one of them.
2) The defendant is the Director of the Ohio Department of Health named Richard Hodges.
3) The States of Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee defined marriage as a union between one man and one woman and did
not recognize same-sex marriages.
4) The plaintiffs confronted these laws under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
5) They challenge the constitutionality of those bans on same-sex marriage. They filed lawsuits in federal district court in their home
states.
6) They argued that:
a. The State’s statute violated the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;
b. The Fourteenth Amendment required the States to allow same-sex marriage;
c. The Fourteenth Amendment recognized the validity of such marriages executed in other jurisdictions.
7) The federal district courts ruled in favor of the plaintiffs
8) Court of Appeals consolidated the cases and reversed the rulings consequently the plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court of
the United States.
Issue: Whether or not marriage licenses must be granted to same-sex couples in every State.
RULING: YEeeeeeeeeeeessss
1) The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the States must grant marriage licenses to same-sex couples because same-sex couples
have the right to marry in every State.
2) The Supreme Court reasoned that the history of marriage is manifested by both continuity and change.
3) Changes, for instance the abandonment of the law of coverture and the waning of arranged marriage have affected characteristics
of marriage.
4) These new insights in understanding marriage have fortified it, not destabilized it.
5) Developments and shifts in public attitudes have made it possible for same-sex couples to enjoy more open and public lives.
6) In the 2003, in the case of Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court held that laws that made same-sex intimacy a crime, were
unconstitutional and it humiliated the lives of gay people.
7) It then overruled the 1986 case of Bowers v. Hardwick which had sustained a Georgia law that criminalized homosexual conduct.
8) The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects fundamental liberties including personal choices that are essential
to individual dignity and autonomy which include an individual’s identity and beliefs.
9) The Supreme Court has long held the right to marry is protected by the Constitution.
10) For example, in Loving v. Virginia, the Court nullified bans on interracial marriage.
11) The Court must respect the fundamental reasons for protecting the right to marry in determining whether the same legal
reasoning should apply to same-sex marriage.
12) These analyses directed to the conclusion that same-sex couples must have the right to marry because the right to marry is a
fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person.
13) Same-sex couples should not be deprived of that right and that liberty under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment.