TAMARGO VS CA

G.R. No. 85044 June 3 1992 [Parental Authority]

FACTS:
On October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, a minor, shot and killed Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle.
Jennifer's adopting parent and her natural parents filed civil complaints for damages with the RTC
against Bundoc's natural parents, Victor and Clara Bundoc.

Prior to the incident, on December 1981, spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura filed a petition to
adopt Adelberto. The petition was granted on November 1982.

Adelberto's parents, in their Answer, claimed that the spouses Rapisura were indispensable parties
to the action since parental authority had shifted to them from the moment the petition for adoption
was decree.

Article 36 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code

. . . a decree of adoption shall be entered, which shall be effective from the date the
original petition was filed. . .

Article 39

The adoption shall dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents, except where the
adopter is the spouse of the surviving natural parent.

Spouses Tamargo contended that since Adelberto was then actually living with his natural parents,
parental authority had not ceased by mere filing and granting of the petition for adoption.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the spouses Rapisura are the indispensable parties to actions committed by
Adelberto.

RULING:
No. In Article 221 of the Family Code states that: "Parents and other persons exercising parental
authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of
their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to
the appropriate defences provided by law." In the case at bar, parental authority over Adelberto
was still lodged with the natural parents at the time the shooting incident happened. It follows that
the natural parents are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.

Under the Civil Code, the basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the
relationship existing between the parents and the minor child living with them and over
whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise supervision and control.

SC held that parental authority had not been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting
parents, at the time the shooting happened. It do not consider that retroactive effect may be given
to the decree of the adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the
time when adopting parents had no actual custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may
be essential if it permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child.

In the instant case, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the
Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not
have foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since they were at the time in
the United States and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair
and unconscionable.

Libi vs. IAC

FACTS:
Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were a sweetheart until the former broke up with the latter
after she found out that Wendell was irresponsible and sadistic. Wendell wanted reconciliation
but was not granted by Julie so it prompted him to resort to threats. One day, there were found
dead from a single gunshot wound each coming from the same gun. The parents of Julie herein
private respondents filed a civil case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages. Trial
court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence but was set aside by CA.
ISSUE:
WON the parents should be held liable for such damages.
HELD:
The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed under Art
2180 of the Civil Code and Art. 101 of Revised Penal Code covered obligations arising from both
quasi-delicts and criminal offenses. The court held that the civil liability of the parents for quasi-
delict of their minor children is primary and not subsidiary and that responsibility shall cease
when the persons can prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. However, Wendell’s mother testified that her husband owns a gun which he
kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of the spouses had their own
key. She likewise admitted that during the incident, the gun was no longer in the safety deposit
box. Wendell could not have gotten hold of the gun unless the key was left negligently lying
around and that he has free access of the mother’s bag where the key was kept. The spouses
failed to observe and exercise the required diligence of a good father to prevent such damage.

CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. VICENTE VASQUEZ,

JR. and LUISA SO VASQUEZ, and CEBU DOCTORS' HOSPITAL,
INC.,respondents.

FACTS:
At around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So Vasquez (son of respondents Vicente
and Luisa Vasquez), was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmeña Rotunda.
He was traveling counter-clockwise, (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without
any protective helmet or goggles. He was also only carrying a Student's Permit to Drive
at the time.

Benjamin ABAD was a manager of petitioner CASTILEX Industrial Corporation, registered

owner of a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no. GBW-794. ABAD drove the said company
car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmeña rotunda he made a short
cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St.

In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of ABAD collided
with each other causing severe injuries to the former. ABAD brought Vasquez
to CEBU DOCTORS' HOSPITAL where he died.

A Criminal Case was filed against ABAD but which was subsequently dismissed for failure
to prosecute. An action for damages was then commenced by respondents against ABAD
and petitioner CASTILEX

Trial court ruled in favor of private respondents and ordered ABAD and to pay jointly and
solidarily respondents

Petitioner CASTILEX and ABAD separately appealed the decision.

Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court holding ABAD and petitioner
CASTILEX liable but held that the liability of the latter is "only vicarious and not solidary"
with the former.
Hence, CASTILEX filed the instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the
negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle.

RULING:

Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code
should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business
or industry. Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling
furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision. Instead, the fourth
paragraph should apply
- SC: Petitioner's interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate. The phrase
"even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry" found in
the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the
employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence
of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task
o DISTINCTION between 4th and 5th paragraph of Art 2180 of CC:
 Both provisions apply to employers: the fourth paragraph, to owners
and managers of an establishment or enterprise; and the fifth
paragraph, to employers in general, whether or not engaged in any
business or industry.
 The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed
either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their
functions, while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of
employees acting within the scope of their assigned task.
 The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage
and acts included.
 Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the employer is
engaged in a business or industry, are covered so long as they were
acting within the scope of their assigned task, even though
committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion
of their functions
o Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any
business or industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed by
employees within the scope of his assigned tasks
 But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship;
once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable,
that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task
when the tort complained of was committed

Whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was
acting within the scope of his assigned tasks.
- ABAD: testified that at the time of the incident, he was driving a company-issued
vehicle, registered under the name of petitioner. He was then leaving the
restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having
done overtime work for the petitioner.
- TC and CA: that the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is
within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and
circumstances.
- SC: do not agree with TC and CA. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service
vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge
petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears
that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment.
- American Jurisprudence on the employer's liability for the injuries inflicted by the
negligence of an employee in the use of an employer's motor vehicle:
o It has been held that an employee who uses his employer's vehicle in going
from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work
 from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in
the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer
o In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a
personal problem or concern of the employee, and not a part of his services
to his employer. Hence, in the absence of some special benefit to the
employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the
place where he is needed, the employee is not acting within the scope of
his employment even though he uses his employer's motor vehicle
o In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a
personal problem or concern of the employee, and not a part of his services
to his employer. Hence, in the absence of some special benefit to the
employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the
place where he is needed, the employee is not acting within the scope of
his employment even though he uses his employer's motor vehicle
o However, even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the
scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employer's
vehicle, the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the
time of the accident, the employee has left the direct route to his
work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own.
o An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the
latter's personal use outside of regular working hours is generally
not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle
during the period of permissive use
o Even where the employee's personal purpose in using the vehicle
has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his
house where the vehicle is normally kept, it has been held that he
has not resumed his employment, and the employer is not liable
for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the
return trip
- In the case, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime work at the petitioner's
office. After, he went to Goldie's Restaurant in Fuente Osmeña, 7km away from
petitioner's place of business. A witness for the private respondents, a
sidewalk vendor, testified that Fuente Osmeña is a "lively place" even at
dawn because Goldie's Restaurant and Back Street were still open and
people were drinking thereat. Moreover, prostitutes, pimps, and drug
addicts littered the place.
- At the Goldie's Restaurant, ABAD took some snacks and had a chat with friends.
It was when ABAD was leaving the restaurant that the incident in question
occurred
- ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal
purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular
accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988, way beyond
the normal working hours. ABAD's working day had ended; his overtime
work had already been completed. His being at a place which, as
petitioner put it, was known as a "haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug
pushers and addicts," had no connection to petitioner's business; neither
had it any relation to his duties as a manager. Rather, using his service
vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one
of the perks attached to his position
- Since no evidence that ABAD was acting within the scope of the functions
entrusted to him, petitioner CASTILEX had no duty to show that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in providing ABAD with a service vehicle.
Thus, petitioner is relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences of
the negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle.
Layugan vs. IAC

Torts- vicarious liability of owner of a truck

G.R. No. 73998 November 14, 1988

Facts:
Pedro T. Layugan filed an action for damages against Godofredo Isidro, alleging that
while at Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, the Plaintiff and a companion were repairing
the tire of their cargo truck which was parked along the right side of the National
Highway; that defendant's truck, driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff,
that as a result, plaintiff was injured and hospitalized where he incurred and will incur
more expenses as he recuperates from said injuries; Plaintiff's right leg was amputated
and that because of said injuries he would be deprived of a lifetime income.
To free themselves from liability, defendants Isidro [owner] and Serrano [driver] averred
that he knows his responsibilities as a driver and further contends that it was the
negligence of plaintiff that was the proximate cause of the accident. They alleged that
plaintiff parked his truck in a manner which occupied a part of the highway and he did
not even put a warning sign.
Subsequently, a third-party complaint was filed by the defendant against his insurer, the
Travellers Multi Indemnity Corporation; that the third-party plaintiff [Isidro], without
admitting his liability to the plaintiff, claimed that the third-party defendant [Travellers]
is liable to the former for contribution, indemnity and subrogation by virtue of their
insurance contract which covers the insurer's liability for damages arising from death,
bodily injuries and damage to property. The Insurance company argued that it is only
liable for the amount agreed in the policy and the complaint was premature since no
claim was made to it.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Petitioners. The CA reversed the decision, stating that it is
the petitioners who were negligent since they did not exercise caution by putting warning
signs that their truck is park on the shoulder of the highway.
Issue:
Whether or not Isidro is liable as employer of Serrano.
Ruling:
Yes.

The SC held that the CA erroneously appreciated the evidence. It was proven that the
petitioner placed a warning sign within 3 to 4 meters from their truck in the form of a
lighted kerosene lamp. The existence of this warning sings was corroborated by Serrano,
respondent's driver, and further stated that when he saw a parked truck, he kept on
stepping on the brake pedal but it did not function. Thus despite this warning signs, the
truck recklessly driven by Serrano and owned by Respondent Isidro bumped the truck of
petitioner.

The private respondent is sued under Art. 2176 in relation to Art. 2180, paragraph 5, of
the Civil Code. In the latter, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or
employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the
part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in
supervision over him after selection, or both. Such presumption is juris tantum and
not juris et de jure and consequently, may be rebutted. If follows necessarily that if the
employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in the selection and in the supervision
he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is
overcome and he is relieved from liability. In disclaiming liability for the incident, the
private respondent stresses that the negligence of his employee has already been
adequately overcome by his driver's statement that he knew his responsibilities as a driver
and that the truck owner used to instruct him to be careful in driving.

We do not agree with the private respondent in his submission. In the first place, it is
clear that the driver did not know his responsibilities because he apparently did not check
his vehicle before he took it on the road. If he did he could have discovered earlier that
the brake fluid pipe on the right was cut, and could have repaired it and thus the accident
could have been avoided. Moveover, to our mind, the fact that the private respondent
used to intruct his driver to be careful in his driving, that the driver was licensed, and the
fact that he had no record of any accident, as found by the respondent court, are not
sufficient to destroy the finding of negligence of the Regional Trial Court given the facts
established at the trial. The private respondent or his mechanic, who must be competent,
should have conducted a thorough inspection of his vehicle before allowing his driver to
drive it.
In the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case, we hold that Isidro failed to prove
that the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of his employees which
would exculpate him from solidary liability with his driver to the petitioner. But even if we
concede that the diligence of a good father of a family was observed by Isidro in the
supervision of his driver, there is not an iota of evidence on record of the observance by
Isidro of the same quantum of diligence in the supervision of his mechanic, if any, who
would be directly in charge in maintaining the road worthiness of his (Isidro's) truck. But
that is not all. There is paucity of proof that Isidro exercised the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection of his driver, Daniel Serrano, as well as in the selection of his
mechanic, if any, in order to insure the safe operation of his truck and thus prevent
damage to others. Accordingly, the responsibility of Isidro as employer treated in Article
2180, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code has not ceased.

ERNESTO MARTIN V. CA AND MERALCO

G.R. No. 82248 January 30, 1992

FACTS:

Ernesto Martin was the owner of a private car bearing license plate No. NPA-930.
At around 2 o’clock in the morning of May 11, 1982, while being driven by Nestor Martin,
it crashed into a Meralco electric post on Valley Golf Road, in Antipolo, Rizal. The car was
wrecked and the pole severely damaged. Meralco subsequently demanded reparation
from Ernesto Martin, but the demand was rejected. It thereupon sued him for damages
in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, alleging that he was liable to it as the employer of
Nestor Martin. The petitioner’s main defense was that Nestor Martin was not his
employee. Meralco did not present any evidence to prove that Nestor Martin was the
employee of Ernesto Martin and Ernesto Martin did not rebut such allegation.

ISSUE:

WON Ernesto Martin can be held liable.

HELD:

NO. Meralco had the burden of proof, or the duty “to present evidence on the fact
in issue necessary to establish his claim” as required by Rule 131, Section 1 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Failure to do this was fatal to its action. As the employment relationship
between Ernesto Martin and Nestor Martin could not be presumed, it was necessary for
the plaintiff to establish it by evidence. It was enough for the defendant to deny the
alleged employment relationship, without more, for he was not under obligation to prove
this negative averment. This Court has consistently applied the rule that “if the plaintiff,
upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory
manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the defendant is under no obligation to
prove his exception or defense.”

Petition was granted.

Maranan vs. Perez

G.R. No. L-22272
Defenses in Carriage of Passenger

Facts:
Rogelio Corachea, a passenger in a taxicab owned and operated by Pascual Perez, was stabbed
and killed by the driver, Simeon Valenzuela. Valenzuela was found guilty for homicide by the Court
of First Instance and was sentenced to suffer Imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the sum of P6000. While pending appeal, mother of deceased filed an action in the
Court of First Instance of Batangas to recover damages from Perez and Valenzuela. Defendant
Perez claimed that the death was a caso fortuito for which the carrier was not liable. The court a
quo, after trial, found for the plaintiff and awarded her P3,000 as damages against defendant
Perez. The claim against defendant Valenzuela was dismissed. From this ruling, both plaintiff and
defendant Perez appealed to this Court, the former asking for more damages and the latter
insisting on non-liability. Defendant-appellant relied solely on the ruling enunciated in Gillaco vs.
Manila Railroad Co. that the carrier is under no absolute liability for assaults of its employees upon
the passengers.

Issue:
Whether or not Perez should be held liable for the death of the passenger?

Held:
Yes. The basis of the carrier's liability for assaults on passengers committed by its drivers rests on
the principle that it is the carrier's implied duty to transport the passenger safely. As between the
carrier and the passenger, the former must bear the risk of wrongful acts or negligence of the
carrier's employees against passengers, since it, and not the passengers, has power to select and
remove them. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of the former’s employees, although such employees may have acted
beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers. The
liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of
a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees. (Art. 1759)

The attendant facts and controlling law of that case and the one at bar were very different. In the
Gillaco case, the passenger was killed outside the scope and the course of duty of the guilty
employee. The Gillaco case was decided under the provisions of the Civil Code of 1889 which,
unlike the present Civil Code, did not impose upon common carriers absolute liability for the safety
of passengers against willfull assaults or negligent acts committed by their employees. The death
of the passenger in the Gillaco case was truly a fortuitous event which exempted the carrier from
liability. It is true that Art. 1105 of the old Civil Code on fortuitous events has been substantially
reproduced in Art. 1174 of the Civil Code of the Philippines but both articles clearly remove from
their exempting effect the case where the law expressly provides for liability in spite of the
occurrence of force majeure. The Civil Code provisions on the subject of Common Carriers are new
and were taken from Anglo-American Law. The basis of the carrier's liability for assaults on
passengers committed by its drivers rested either on the doctrine of respondent superior or the
principle that it was the carrier's implied duty to transport the passenger safely. Under the second
view, upheld by the majority and also by the later cases, it was enough that the assault happens
within the course of the employee's duty. It was no defense for the carrier that the act was done
in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier's orders. The carrier's liability here was
absolute in the sense that it practically secured the passengers from assaults committed by its own
employees.
 Baliwag Transit vs. CA
(GR 116110, 15 May 1996)

FACTS:

On 31 July 1980, Leticia Garcia, and her 5-year old son, Allan Garcia, boarded Baliwag
Transit Bus 2036 bound for Cabanatuan City driven by Jaime Santiago. They took the
seat behind the driver.
At about 7:30 p.m., in Malimba, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, the bus passengers saw a cargo
truck, owned by A & J Trading, parked at the shoulder of the national highway. Its left rear
portion jutted to the outer lane, as the shoulder of the road was too narrow to
accommodate the whole truck. A kerosene lamp appeared at the edge of the road
obviously to serve as a warning device. The truck driver, and his helper were then
replacing a flat tire.
Bus driver Santiago was driving at an inordinately fast speed and failed to notice the truck
and the kerosene lamp at the edge of the road. Santiago’s passengers urged him to slow
down but he paid them no heed. Santiago even carried animated conversations with his
co-employees while driving. When the danger of collision became imminent, the bus
passengers shouted “Babangga tayo!”. Santiago stepped on the brake, but it was too late.
His bus rammed into the stalled cargo truck killing him instantly and the truck’s helper,
and injury to several others among them herein respondents.
Thus, a suit was filed against Baliwag Transit, Inc., A & J Trading and Julio Recontique
for damages in the RTC of Bulacan. After trial, it found Baliwag Transit, Inc. liable for
having failed to deliver Garcia and her son to their point of destination safely in violation
of Garcia’s and Baliwag Transit’s contractual relation; and likewise found A & J and its
truck driver liable for failure to provide its cargo truck with an early warning device in
violation of the Motor Vehicle Law. All were ordered to pay solidarily the Garcia spouses.

On appeal, the CA modified the trial court’s Decision by absolving A & J Trading from
liability.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Baliwag should be held solely liable for the injuries.
HELD:

Yes.

As a common carrier, Baliwag breached its contract of carriage when it failed to deliver
its passengers, Leticia and Allan Garcia to their destination safe and sound. A common
carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard for all the
circumstances. In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier was at
fault or was negligent when a passenger dies or is injured. Unless the presumption is
rebutted, the court need not even make an express finding of fault or negligence on the
part of the common carrier. This statutory presumption may only be overcome by
evidence that the carrier exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733
and 1755 of the Civil Code.
Article 1759 of the Civil Code provides that “Common carriers are liable for the death of
or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willfull acts of the former’s employees,
although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in
violation of the orders of the common carriers. This liability of the common carriers do not
cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection or supervision of their employees.”
Section 34 (g) of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code provides “Lights and reflector
when parked or disabled. — Appropriate parking lights or flares visible one hundred
meters away shall be displayed at the corner of the vehicle whenever such vehicle is
parked on highways or in places that are not well-lighted or, is placed in such manner as
to endanger passing traffic. Furthermore, every motor vehicle shall be provided at all
times with built-in reflectors or other similar warning devices either pasted, painted or
attached at its front and back which shall likewise be visible at night at least one hundred
meters away. No vehicle not provided with any of the requirements mentioned in this
subsection shall be registered. ”
x x x However, the evidence shows that Recontique and Ecala placed a kerosene lamp
or torch at the edge of the road, near the rear portion of the truck to serve as an early
warning device. This substantially complies with Section 34 (g) of the Land Transportation
and Traffic Code. The law clearly allows the use not only of an early warning device of
the triangular reflectorized plates variety but also parking lights or flares visible 100
meters away. Indeed, Col. dela Cruz himself admitted that a kerosene lamp is an
acceptable substitute for the reflectorized plates. No negligence, therefore, may be
imputed to A & J Trading and its driver, Recontique.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CV-31246)
with the modification reducing the actual damages for hospitalization and medical fees to
P5,017.74; without costs.

ERNESTO SYKI vs. SALVADOR BEGASA

FACTS: On June 22, 1992, around 11:20 a.m., near the corner of Araneta and Magsaysay Streets,
Bacolod City, respondent Salvador Begasa and his three companions flagged down a passenger
jeepney driven by Joaquin Espina and owned by Aurora Pisuena. While respondent was boarding
the passenger jeepney (his right foot already inside while his left foot still on the boarding step
of the passenger jeepney), a truck driven by Elizalde Sablayan and owned by petitioner Ernesto
Syki bumped the rear end of the passenger jeepney. Respondent fell and fractured his left thigh
bone (femur).

On October 29, 1992, respondent filed a complaint for damages for breach of common carrier’s
contractual obligations and quasi-delict against Aurora Pisuena, the owner of the passenger
jeepney, herein petitioner Ernesto Syki, the owner of the truck, and Elizalde Sablayan, the driver
of the truck.

After hearing, the trial court dismissed the complaint against Aurora Pisuena, the owner and
operator of the passenger jeepney but ordered petitioner Ernesto Syki and his truck driver,
Elizalde Sablayan, to pay respondent Salvador Begasa, jointly and severally, actual and moral
damages plus attorney’s fees.

Petitioner Syki and his driver appealed to the Court of Appeals. However, the appellate court
found no reversible error in the decision of the trial court and affirmed the same in toto. The
appellate court also denied their motion for reconsideration.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the petitioner has failed to observe the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of his driver.
2. Whether the respondent is guilty of contributory negligence that should mitigate or
decrease the liability of the petitioner.
HELD: Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry. x x x

The responsibility treated in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

From the above provision, when an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, a legal
presumption instantly arises that the employer was negligent in the selection and/or supervision
of said employee. The said presumption may be rebutted only by a clear showing on the part of
the employer that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of his employee. If the employer successfully overcomes the legal presumption of
negligence, he is relieved of liability. In other words, the burden of proof is on the employer.

The employer must not merely present testimonial evidence to prove that he observed the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee, but he
must also support such testimonial evidence with concrete or documentary evidence. The reason
for this is to obviate the biased nature of the employer’s testimony or that of his witnesses.

In this case, petitioner’s evidence consisted entirely of testimonial evidence. He testified that
before he hired Elizalde Sablayan, he required him to submit a police clearance in order to
determine if he was ever involved in any vehicular accident. He also required Sablayan to undergo
a driving test conducted by his mechanic, Esteban Jaca. Petitioner claimed that he, in fact,
accompanied Sablayan during the driving test and that during the test, Sablayan was taught to
read and understand traffic signs like “Do Not Enter,” “One Way,” “Left Turn” and “Right Turn.”

Petitioner’s mechanic, Esteban Jaca, on the other hand, testified that Sablayan passed the driving
test and never figured in any vehicular accident except the one in question. He also testified that
he maintained in good condition all the trucks of petitioner by checking the brakes, horns and
tires thereof before providing hauling services.

Petitioner, however, never presented the alleged police clearance given to him by Sablayan nor
the results of Sablayan’s driving test. Petitioner also did not present records of the regular
inspections that his mechanic allegedly conducted. The unsubstantiated and self-serving
testimonies of petitioner and his mechanic were, without doubt, insufficient to overcome the
legal presumption that petitioner was negligent in the selection and supervision of his driver.
Accordingly, we affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is liable for the injuries
suffered by respondent.

It should be emphasized that the legal obligation of employers to observe due diligence in the
selection and supervision of their employees provided in Article 2180 of the Civil Code is not an
empty provision or a mere formalism since the non-observance thereof actually becomes the
basis of the employers’ vicarious liability. Employers should thus seriously observe such adegree
of diligence (and prove it in court by sufficient and concrete evidence) that would exculpate them
from liability.
Petitioner next contends that, even if he is liable, the award of damages given to respondent
should be decreased or mitigated because respondent was guilty of contributory negligence.
Petitioner claims that his driver was allegedly caught unaware when the passenger jeepney
hailed by respondent suddenly stopped at the intersection of a national highway. Petitioner
argues that, had respondent flagged down the passenger jeepney at the proper place, the
accident could have been avoided.

Petitioner’s contention has no merit.

Article 2179 provides:

When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

The underlying precept of the above article on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is
partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must
bear the consequences of his own negligence. The defendant must thus be held liable only for
the damages actually caused by his negligence.

In the present case, was respondent partly negligent and thus, should not recover the full amount
of the damages awarded by the trial court? We rule in the negative.

There was no evidence that respondent Begasa and his three companions flagged down the
passenger jeepney in a prohibited area. All the facts showed was that the passenger jeepney was
near the corner of Araneta and Magsaysay Streets, Bacolod City when petitioner’s driver bumped
it from the rear. No city resolution, traffic regulation or DPWH memorandum was presented to
show that the passenger jeepney picked up respondent and his three companions in a prohibited
area. In fact, the trial court dismissed the case against the driver and owner of the passenger
jeepney on the ground that they were not liable, meaning, that no negligence could be attributed
to them. The trial court also found no negligence on the part of respondent Begasa. This factual
finding was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.

It must be emphasized that petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court should deal only with questions of law. The factual conclusions of the Court of Appeals are
given great weight and even finality by the Supreme Court, specially when, as in the present case,
the appellate court upholds the findings of fact of the trial court. The factual findings of the Court
of Appeals can only be overturned if it is shown that such findings are obviously whimsical,
capricious and arbitrary, or contrary to the factual findings of the trial court. In this case, we find
no reason to overturn the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. Thus, we affirm the appellate
court’s finding that there was no contributory negligence on the part of respondent.

In sum, the sole and proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of petitioner’s driver
who, as found by the lower courts, did not slow down even when he was already approaching a
busy intersection within the city proper. The passenger jeepney had long stopped to pick up
respondent and his three companions and, in fact, respondent was already partly inside the
jeepney when petitioner’s driver rear-ended it. The impact was so strong that respondent fell
and fractured his left thigh bone (femur), and suffered severe wounds in his left knee and leg. No
doubt petitioner’s driver was reckless.
Since the negligence of petitioner’s driver was the sole and proximate cause of the accident,
petitioner is liable, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, to pay damages to respondent Begasa
for the injuries sustained by him.

SANITARY STEAM LAUNDRY, INC vs COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: on August 31, 1980, a Mercedes Benz panel truck of petitioner Sanitary Steam Laundry
collided with a Cimarron which caused the death of three persons and the injuries of several
others. The passengers of the Cimarron were mostly employees of the Project Management
Consultants, Inc. (PMCI). The Cimarron was owned by Salvador
Salenga, father of one of the employees of PMCI. Driving the vehicle was Rolando Hernandez.
The driver of the truck claimed that a jeepney in front of him suddenly stopped. He said he
stepped on the brakes to avoid hitting the jeepney and that this caused his vehicle to swerve to
the left and encroach on a portion of the opposite lane. As a result, his panel truck collided with
the Cimarron on the north-bound lane.

RTC: Rendered judgment for private respondents.

CA: Affirmed the decision of the RTC

ISSUE: Whether or not the driver of Cimarron was guilty of contributory negligence.

SC: First of all, it has not been shown how the alleged negligence of the Cimarron driver
contributed to the collision between the vehicles. Indeed, petitioner has the burden of showing
a causal connection between the injury received and the violation of the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code. He must show that the violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause of
the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or in part,
of violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a
contributing cause of the injury. Petitioner says that “driving an overloaded vehicle with only one
functioning headlight during nighttime certainly increases the risk of accident,” that because the
Cimarron had only one headlight, there was “decreased visibility,” and that the fact that the
vehicle was overloaded and its front seat overcrowded “decreased [its] maneuverability.”
However, mere allegations such as these are not sufficient to discharge its burden of proving
clearly that such alleged negligence was the contributing cause of the injury.

Furthermore, based on the evidence in this case, there was no way either driver could have
avoided the collision.

Filamer v. IAC
GR No. 75112 August 17, 1992

Facts: Funtecha was a working student of Filamer Christian Institute. Being a part-time
janitor and a scholar of petitioner Filamer, he was considered an employee even
if he was assigned to clean the premises for just 2 hours every day.

Allan Masa, the son of Filamer’s president Mr. Agustin Masa, was the official driver
of the school’s vehicle. Since Funtecha and Allan lived in the same house,
Funtecha, holder of a student driver’s license, requested Allan to take over the
vehicle and drive it home. Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to Funtecha only
 after driving down a road, negotiating a sharp dangerous curb, and viewing that
the road was clear. A fast moving truck with glaring lights nearly hit them so they
swerved to the right to avoid collision. Upon swerving, they heard a sound as if
something had bumped against the vehicle, but they did not stop to check.
Unfortunately, their jeep swerved towards the pedestrian, Potenciano Kapunan
who was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic, and hit him.

The heirs of Kapunan filed an action against Filamer for damages. In its defense,
Filamer alleged that Funtecha acted outside of his scope of his authority.
Therefore, it was only Funtecha who was liable and not Filamer.

Issue: Whether or not Filamer Christian Institute is liable for the acts of Funtecha

Held: Yes, Filamer is liable for the acts of Funtecha.

Ratio: In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan's
house, Funtecha definitely was not having a joy ride. Funtecha was not driving for
the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but ultimately, for the
service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school. Therefore, the
Court is constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking over the steering
wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-
school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the
scope of his janitorial duties. He need not have an official appointment for a driver's
position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly
negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident
was for the benefit of the petitioner. Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the
school driver or was not acting within the scope of his janitorial duties does
not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption that
there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or
employee, or in the supervision over him. The petitioner has failed to show
proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over
its employees Funtecha and Allan.

What does supervision of employee include?

It includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of its
employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of
the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his
employees.

Was there any showing that Filamer provided rules and regulations?

None.

Therefore:

Petitioner Filamer has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the
unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle. The liability of Filamer is
primary and solidary. It has, however, recourse against the negligent employee for
whatever damages it has paid.

Jose Amadora vs Court of Appeals

In April 1972, while the high school students of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos were in
the school auditorium, a certain Pablito Daffon fired a gun. The stray bullet hit Alfredo
Amadora. Alfredo died. Daffon was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide. The parents of Alfredo sued the school for damages under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code because of the school’s negligence.
The trial court ruled in favor of Amadora. The trial court ruled that the principal, the dean
of boys, as well as the teacher-in-charge are all civilly liable. The school appealed as it
averred that when the incident happened, the school year has already ended. Amadora
argued that even though the semester has already ended, his son was there in school to
complete a school requirement in his Physics subject. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor
of the school. The CA ruled that under the last paragraph of Article 2180, only schools of
arts and trades (vocational schools) are liable not academic schools like Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos.
ISSUE: Whether or not Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, an academic school, is liable
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the tortuous act of its students.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court made a re-examination of the provision on the last
paragraph of Article 2180 which provides:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody.
The Supreme Court said that it is time to update the interpretation of the above law due
to the changing times where there is hardly a distinction between schools of arts and
trade and academic schools. That being said, the Supreme Court ruled that ALL schools,
academic or not, may be held liable under the said provision of Article 2180.
The Supreme Court however clarified that the school, whether academic or not, should
not be held directly liable. Its liability is only subsidiary.
For non-academic schools, it would be the principal or head of school who should be
directly liable for the tortuous act of its students. This is because historically, in non-
academic schools, the head of school exercised a closer administration over their
students than heads of academic schools. In short, they are more hands on to their
students.
For academic schools, it would be the teacher-in-charge who would be directly liable for
the tortuous act of the students and not the dean or the head of school.
The Supreme Court also ruled that such liability does not cease when the school year
ends or when the semester ends. Liability applies whenever the student is in the custody
of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school
and within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended at
the time of the happening of the incident. As long as it can be shown that the student is
in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a
legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even
in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school
authorities over the student continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing
more than relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and friends and
enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody and
subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.
At any rate, the REMEDY of the teacher, to avoid direct liability, and for the school, to
avoid subsidiary liability, is to show proof that he, the teacher, exercised the necessary
precautions to prevent the injury complained of, and the school exercised the diligence of
a bonus pater familias.
In this case however, the Physics teacher in charge was not properly named, and there
was no sufficient evidence presented to make the said teacher-in-charge liable. Absent
the direct liability of the teachers because of the foregoing reason, the school cannot be
held subsidiarily liable too.

St. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpitanos

G.R. No. 143363 February 6, 2002

Facts: Defendant-appellant St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment

drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation
of schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Mary’s
Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group.
Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding
in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan
Elementary School, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years
old and a student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless
manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the
injuries he sustained from the accident. The parents of Sherwin filed a case against
James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner,
Vivencio Villanueva and St. Mary’s Academy before the RTC of Dipolog City and claimed
for damages.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner St. Mary’s Academy is liable for damages for the
death of Sherwin Carpitanos.

HELD:
CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article 218 and 219 of the Family
Code where it was pointed that they were negligent in allowing a minor to drive and not
having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep. However, for them to be
held liable, the act or omission to be considered negligent must be the proximate cause
of the injury caused thus, negligence needs to have a causal connection to the
accident. It must be direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by any efficient
intervening causes. The parents of the victim failed to show such negligence on the part
of the petitioner. The spouses Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the
accident was not the reckless driving of James but the detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep. Futhermore, there was no evidence that petitioner allowed the minor
to drive the jeep of Villanueva. The mechanical defect was an event over which the
school has no control hence they may not be held liable for the death resulting from such
accident.

The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily
be responsible to the public or to 3rd persons for injuries caused while it is being driven
on the road. It is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held
responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin. Case was remanded to the trial court
for determination of the liability of the defendants excluding herein petitioner.

PSBA V. CA (G.R. NO. 84698)

Facts:
Private respondents sought to adjudge petitioner PSBA and its officers liable for the death of
Carlitos Bautista, a third year commerce student who was stabbed while on the premises of PSBA
by elements from outside the school. Private respondents are suing under the law on quasi-delicts
alleging the school and its officers’ negligence, recklessness and lack of safety precautions before,
during, and after the attack on the victim. Petitioners moved to dismiss the suit but were denied by
the trial court. CA affirmed.

Issue:
Whether or not PSBA may be held liable under quasi-delicts.

Ruling:
NO.

Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and
Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows
that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise
only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established
a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply
with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would
presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or
a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school’s academic
requirements and observe its rules and regulations. Necessarily, the school must ensure that
adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent
the breakdown thereof.

In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the
contract between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former’s negligence in
providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if
there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual
obligation only.