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ANNOTATION

SPEEDY TRIAL: A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT CONCEIVED

AND CRAFTED FOR ACCUSED
By
*
ROGELIO E. SUBONG

§ I. Introduction, p. 526
§ II. Due Process and the Nature of the Right to Speedy
Trial, p. 528

a) Right to Speedy Trial is a legitimate Progeny of Due

Process, p. 528
b) Right to speedy trial is inferable from the procedural
requisites of due process, p. 529

§ III. Speedy Trial Defined, p. 530

a) Dean Vicente G. Sinco’s definition, p. 530

b) Definitions from decisions of the Supreme Court, p. 530

§ IV. Brief History and Rationale of the Right to Speedy

Trial, p. 531

a) Right to Speedy Trial has its origins from the Magna Carta
of England, p. 531
b) Right to Speedy Trial in our jurisdiction, p. 531
c) Right to Speedy Trial: Rationale, p. 532
d) Right to Speedy Trial should also benefit the offended
party, p. 533

§ V. Speedy Trial Act—The Law, p. 534

1) Salient features of the Speedy Trial Act, p. 534

2) Circular No. 98-38 of the Supreme Court Implementing the
Speedy Trial Act, p. 536

_______________
 * A.B. ‘62 (UP) LL.B. ‘66 (UP).

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§ VI. The Case Under Annotation, Solar Team

Entertainment, Inc. vs. Hon. How, et al., Supra, and
Some Observations, p. 537

a) Outline of the facts, p. 537

Observations—

1. The petition was an uphill battle even from the start, p. 538
2. It seems odd that the trial court was allowed to wait
indefinitely for DOJ resolution yet it can discard the same,
p. 539
3. Pendency of appeal with the DOJ is not clearly
comprehended under Sec. 10, par (f) which was relied upon
as a justification for the delay in the arraignment, p. 540
4. Providing in an implementing circular an additional ground
for delay in the trial is an exercise of rule-making power by
the Supreme Court which may be beyond its parameters
under the Constitution, p, 541
5. DOJ Circular providing a self-imposed limit of 75 days for
its review of the resolutions of public prosecutors could
have provided a basis for determination of abuse of
discretion, p. 543

§ VII. Significance of the Case Under Annotation and

Conclusion, p. 543

a) The right to speedy trial was conceived and crafted for the
accused, p. 543
b) By origin and nature, it is more appropriate for the accused
to invoke the right to speedy trial, p. 544

_______________

§ I. Introduction

There must be something about the side of the accused in a criminal

prosecution that under a system that claims to put premium upon
human rights and freedom his rights are so well defined and
enshrined in the Constitution, the laws and jurisprudence. He is
viewed as a romantic figure arrayed against the awesome powers of
the State. Prof. Alan M. Dershowitz of Harvard Law School, noted
that: “Even the rich (accused) are relatively powerless—less so, of
course, than the poor—when confronting the resources of a
government.” (“The Best Defense,” Random House, Inc., 1983 Ed.,
p. 415). Perhaps, this recurring underdog image of

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the accused and the ethos of fair-play in a democratic society

contribute to a large degree to the urge to even-up the match by
investing upon the former all sorts of rights under the Constitution
and the laws in our jurisdiction.
However, the legal protection accorded the accused seems to be a
bit overdone that the common complaint now is that public
complainant (People of the Philippines) and private complainant (the
offended party) are not getting a fair shake. The public complainant
or people of the Philippines in whose name the criminal action is
brought under the concept that a crime is an outrage upon the
national community which makes the State an aggrieved party is
“hurt” but only in a nebulous sort of way. On the other hand, behind
this legal fiction, there is the harsh reality of the truly grieving
aggrieved real party—the private complainant, particularly in
offenses against persons. For example, in a prosecution for murder
or rape, when the accused walks, so to speak because of certain
technicalities, the People is “diminished” in a manner of speaking,
but that is all. On the other hand, the heirs of the murdered victim or
the violated woman are often devastated throughout their lives.
Thus the common complaint nowadays is that people proselytize
with zeal about the rights of the accused—but hardly any peep about
the rights of the offended party. The basic postulate of criminal
jurisprudence is anchored upon the Constitutionally guaranteed
presumption of innocence of the accused until the contrary is
proved. (Art. III, Sec. 14 [2]), and also upon the dictum that criminal
laws should always be construed against the State and in favor of the
accused. In the prosecution of the accused, his guilt must be proven
not by substantial evidence, nor by preponderance of evidence, but
by proof beyond reasonable doubt—a tough hurdle to surmount. The
Bill of Rights, a rock-solid cornerstone of our Constitution as well as
those of other republican states, is virtually a litany of rights of the
accused against the powerful arm of the State. The Revised Penal
Code defines crimes and enumerates their elements which may be
viewed to also favor the accused. An act which does not constitute a
crime under this Code absolves the accused. A crime of which not
all the elements are duly proved after trial, either entitles the accused
to an acquittal or to a conviction for a lesser offense. Criminal
Procedure in the Rules of Court
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is also a set of rules which mainly delineates the proper steps in the
prosecution of a person accused of crime with due regard for his
rights under the Constitution and the laws. Non-observance of this
procedure may be a ground for quashal of the information, dismissal
of the same after trial or reversal of conviction on appeal. The Rules
of Evidence in the Rules of Court is also replete with exclusionary
rules to prevent presentation of inadmissible testamentary and
documentary evidence.
As if those numerous legal guarantees in favor of the accused
were not enough, a law has been recently passed which again aims
at adding further legal benefits to the accused. This is Rep. Act No.
8493 which under its Sec. 1 is titled “Speedy Trial Act of 1998.”
The case of Solar Entertainment, Inc. vs. Hon. How, et al., G.R No.
140863, promulgated August 22, 2000, brought this new law to
judicial scrutiny by the Supreme Court. This case provided the
occasion to test one of its provisions as invoked by the offended
party but the efforts proved unavailing. It would seem that this is yet
another law conceived for the accused with the offended party far
from the mind of legislators up to the drafting of the same. In any
case, let us discuss this law and this first case that expounded on one
of its provisions.

§ II. Due Process and the Nature of the Right to Speedy Trial

a) Right to speedy trial is a legitimate progeny of due process

Due process encompasses a wide array of rights for those who are
under threat of losing life, liberty or property. The due process
guarantee has been in all our fundamental laws particularly, from the
1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. The language of this guarantee
as set forth in the 1987 Constitution has been virtually unchanged
through the two previous charters: “No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law x x x” (Sec. 1,
Art. III, Constitution of 1987). The terse due process warning in the
Constitution is a cornucopia of rights of which the rest of the Bill of
Rights and related rights embodied in our laws and expounded in
our jurisprudence are mere footnotes or elabora-

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tions thereof. Thus the right to counsel on the part of the accused as
well as the rest of the Miranda warnings, e.g., the right to be
informed of the charges against him, the right to confront the
witnesses face to face, the right to be accorded time to prepare for
trial, etc. are part of the guarantees of due process.
In this regard, the right to speedy trial is also a right that could be
comprehended within the due process guarantee. Indeed, it is a fair
inference that from certain elements of due process, the right to
speedy trial is also a logical offshoot or a legitimate progeny. It is
specifically provided in the 1987 Constitution that: “No person shall
be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law”
(Sec. 14 [1], Art. III). Due process simply implies fundamental
fairness or the sporting idea of fair play in the conduct of
proceedings whether civil or criminal. Thus fairness in a criminal
proceeding includes dispatch in the trial of the accused so that he is
not made to languish in jail while awaiting trial if under detention,
which undermines his capacity to mount an appropriate defense.
Sometimes, an accused turned out to have served time even double
the maximum penalty for the crime charged. Even if the accused
were on bail, the agonizing ordeal of being a criminal defendant
with the possibility of conviction foisted upon him for so long a time
could disorient and psychologically scar him for the rest of his life.

b) Right to speedy trial is inferable from the procedural requisites of

due process
Furthermore, the right to speedy trial could be also inferred from the
procedural requisites of due process as enumerated by that foremost
Filipino Constitutionalist, Dr. Vicente G. Sinco, former President of
the University of the Philippines and Dean of its College of Law:
“(1) Notice to the parties, (2) opportunity to be heard, (3) an
impartial and competent tribunal, and (4) an orderly course of
procedure” (“Philippine Political Law,” Second Revised Edition, p.
464). Speedy trial could be comprehended within requisite No. 4 “an
orderly course of procedure” which presupposes hearing with
reasonable dispatch as may be warranted by the circumstances. A
trial which is delayed for an unreasonable length of time for causes
not attributable to the accused cannot qualify as proceedings
conducted under “an orderly course of procedure.”

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This right to speedy trial is however waivable by the accused. That

is why we emphasized that the delay to be violative to the right to
speedy trial of the accused should not be attributable to him or to his
defense representation. Such delay caused by the accused could be
interpreted as waiver on his part and accordingly, he cannot invoke
this right to speedy trial.
§ III. Speedy Trial Defined

a) Dean Vicente G. Sinco’s definition

What then is speedy trial? Does a trial conducted from arraignment
to finish without let up as if the offended party were a foreign tourist
with a limited sojourn in the country, satisfy the right to speedy trial?
In medicine, fat does not necessarily mean healthy. In law, fast trial
does not necessarily mean speedy trial as guaranteed under the
Constitution. If a trial is held continuously from morning till noon or
evening every day without affording the accused an opportunity to
prepare and to avail of compulsory process to secure the attendance
of witnesses in his behalf, then it is merely fast but not the
Constitutionally guaranteed speedy trial. Thus we go back to Dean
Vicente G. Sinco with his appropriate definition of speedy trial:

“By speedy trial is meant one which is conducted with reasonable

promptness consistent with due course of justice. It does not mean undue
haste. As expressed in a court decision:

‘The right to speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is consistent with delays and
depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to a defendant. It does not preclude the
right of public justice.’ “ (“Philippine Political Law,” Second Revised Edition, p.
611, citing Beavers vs. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87).

b) Definitions from decisions of the Supreme Court

The implication of the Dean Sinco definition is that it allows delays
but those that are warranted by the demands of justice. While speed
in the conduct of the proceedings is a commendable goal, it should
not be stigmatized as undue haste or haste which is pursued as an
end in itself without consideration of valid delays

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that are sometimes inevitable in judicial proceedings. In the earlier

case of Mercado vs. CFI, et al., 66 Phil. 215 (1938) Justice Jose P.
Laurel without directly defining speedy trial hinted its features by
way of describing the duty of the fiscal—”to see that criminal cases
are heard without vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays so that
the courts of justice may dispose of them on the merits and
determine whether the accused is guilty or not.” Then in Acebedo
vs. Sarmiento, 36 SCRA 247 (1970) the High Court echoed Justice
Laurel when it held that the right to speedy trial “means one free
from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.” Finally, in the
case decided in 1991, the High Court also came out with another
brief definition of speedy trial—”one that can be had as soon after
indictment is filed as the prosecution can with reasonable diligence
prepare for trial” (People vs. Gines, 197 SCRA 481; 1991 citing
Mercado vs. CFI, supra.).

§ IV. Brief History and Rationale of the Right to Speedy Trial

a) Right to speedy trial has its origins from the Magna Carta of
England
The right to speedy trial appears to have its origin from a provision
of the Magna Carta of England as interpreted by Sir Edward Coke,
an English jurist. It found its way into the Virginia Declaration of
Rights of 1776 coached in about the same language in the Magna
Carta. Then this was finally embodied in the Sixth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution which was one of the first ten amendments
ratified on December 15, 1791: “In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial x x x.” This
guarantee also appears in several State constitutions of the United
States of America.

b) Right to speedy trial in our jurisdiction

We are fortunate that Justice Jose P. Laurel gave us a brief historical
background of this guarantee of speedy trial in our jurisdiction, in
Mercado vs. CFI, et al., 66 Phil. 215 (1938), a case decided before
the last War but after the passage of the 1935 Constitution. In this
oft-cited ponencia, this noted jurist, reproduced from the

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1935 Constitution the same guarantee of speedy trial which used

about the same words as the provision in the American Constitution
(Amendment 6): “In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall x x x
x x x x x x have a speedy and public trial x x x (Art. III, Sec. 1, par.
17). He noted that the same provision was also included in the
President’s Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission, the
Philippine Bill of 1902 (Sec. 5, par. 2) and the Jones Act of 1916. It
will be recalled that these three documents served as our
fundamental laws prior to the 1935 Constitution. In fact, according
to Justice Laurel in this decision, a similar provision even appeared
in the Malolos Constitution (Art. 8, Title IV). This goes to show that
even before the American Regime, the framers of our organic law
saw the importance of the right to speedy trial in our criminal justice
system. Finally, under the 1987 Constitution, the same guarantee
appears: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused x x x shall enjoy
the right x x x x x x x x x to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial
x x x (Art. III, Sec. 14 [2])”
c) Right to speedy trial: Rationale
Since the right to speedy trial appears to have the accused mainly in
mind, the rationale necessarily deals with his legal protection. The
bottom-line of the guarantee of speedy trial is the time-honored
maxim that: Justice delayed is justice denied. The assumption is that
a criminal proceeding basically works to the ultimate disadvantage
and prejudice of the accused. The long and protracted proceedings
would exact a heavy toll upon him and his family especially if he is
under detention and he happens to be the breadwinner of the family.
Sometimes an acquittal after long years of agony would be nothing
short of a pyrrhic vindication. As stated above, the damage wrought
by being stigmatized as an accused could seize him with constant
Kafkaesque fear of possible conviction. We hasten to add however,
that there are times that a snailpaced trial may be purposely sought
by the accused because of his awareness of his guilt for which he
hopes that time or delay may work to his advantage, as when it
would result in loss of enthusiasm to prosecute, death or
unavailability of private complainant and his witnesses, assignment
of the case to a more sympathetic judge, etc. Under these
circumstances, he cannot invoke the bene-

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fits of right to speedy trial e.g., to move for the dismissal of the case
for having pended for so long.
In American jurisdiction, the right to speedy trial is regarded as
“an important safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive
incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety and concern
accompanying public accusation and to limit the possibility that long
delay will impair the ability of the accused to defend himself
[(United States vs. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966). See also Klofer
vs. North Carolina, 383 U.S. 213, 221-22 (1967), Smith v. Hooey,
393 U.S. 374, 377-379 (1969); Dickey vs. Florida, 389 U.S. 30, 37-
38 (1970) cited in “Right to A Speedy and Public Trial,” Main
Index: Cases and Codes: US Constitution: Sixth Amendment; From
the Internet on the topic: “Speedy trial”)]. In our jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court declared that the rationale of the right to speedy trial
is “to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety
and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt
determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the
presentation and consideration of whatever legitimate defense he
may interpose” (Acebedo vs. Sarmiento, 36 SCRA 247 [1970]).

d) Right to speedy trial should also benefit the offended party

Thus the offended party, either the public complainant (People) or
the private complainant (aggrieved individual) appears to have been
forgotten in the rationale of this guarantee. It is not surprising
because as stated above, the right to speedy trial was formulated
with the accused in mind. It is doubtful if the offended party was
ever taken into consideration at all. Yet as early as the turn of 20th
century, there was a hint that somehow the public respondent should
also benefit from the same. In Beavers vs. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87
(1905) a US case cited by Justice Jose P. Laurel in Mercado vs. CFI,
et al., supra as well as by Dean Vicente G. Sinco in his book,
“Philippine Political Law,” as early as 1905 the US Supreme Court
had declared that this right “does not preclude the rights of public
justice.”
It appears that in this Beavers case the US Supreme Court held
that this guarantee of speedy trial cannot be invoked by an accused
first indicted in one district to prevent his transfer to another dis-

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trict where he had also been indicted. This is an early recognition

that speedy trial should also benefit the public complainant or that it
“does not preclude the rights of public justice.” Thus in People vs.
Gines, supra., the High Court made this categorical reminder:
“While accused persons do have rights, many of them choose to
forget that the aggrieved also have the same rights.”

§ V. Speedy Trial Act—The Law

1 Salient Features of the Speedy Trial Act

As stated at the outset, even in the face of numerous legal
advantages for the accused, a law has been passed fortifying this
time, his right to speedy trial. This is Republic Act No. 8493 also
known as Speedy Trial Act of 1998. Its avowed purpose is clearly
set forth in the description of this law: “An act to ensure a speedy
trial of all criminal cases, etc.”
The main features are as follows:

a) The Coverage of the Act—This Act applies to all regular

trial courts that have jurisdiction to try criminal cases,
namely: Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court;
b) Mandatory Pre-Trial in Criminal Cases—Pre-trial, which
used to be allowed only in civil case, is now mandatory also
in criminal cases. We should take note that under Rule 118,
sec. 1, pre-trial is not mandatory in criminal cases for it is
held “where the accused and counsel agree.” The agenda
naturally does not include—considering the “possibility of
amicable settlement” as in civil cases since this is not
 allowed in criminal cases. This has been replaced by the
possibility of “plea bargaining.” Other areas for
consideration are: stipulation of facts, marking of exhibits,
and waiver of possible objections to admissibility of
evidence, either documentary or testimonial; and such other
matters that will promote a fair and expeditious trial;

Other provisions pertain to the mechanics of pre-trial as well as to

the imposition of sanctions for failure of counsel for the accused to
appear during pre-trial conference;

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c) Time Limit for Trial—This law has set a time frame for trial
of cases by those courts enumerated above subject to
certain exceptions. It directed that the entire trial period
shall not exceed 180 days from day 1 of the trial although
subject to the exception in the Rules of Court;
d) Time Limit Between Filing of Information to Arraignment
and Between Arraignment and Trial—The maximum
allowable period from filing of information to arraignment
is within 30 days and another maximum period from
arraignment and trial is within 30 days. These periods
should be added to the 180-day time limit;
e) Exclusions—There are however certain periods during the
criminal proceedings which should not be counted in the
computation of the time limit, namely: a) delay resulting
from other proceedings concerning the accused, e.g., i) time
expended for examination of the mental and physical
capability of accused to stand trial, ii) delay resulting from
other trials involving the accused, iii) delay arising from
interlocutory appeals, etc.; b) period of delay due to
absence or unavailability of essential witness; c) delay due
to mental and physical incapacity to stand trial on the part
of the accused; etc.;
f) Factors for Granting Continuance—While that court is
enjoined to be strict in granting postponements, they may
be granted if the “ends of justice” would be served thereby.
The following factors shall be considered in the grant of
continuance: i) whether or not the denial of continuance
would make the continuation of the proceedings impossible
or miscarriage of justice; ii) the novelty of case and number
of accused which require longer preparation. Continuance
shall no longer be granted on grounds of congestion of the
calendar of the court, lack of diligent preparation and
failure to produce witnesses on the part of the public
prosecutor;
 g) Public Attorney’s Duties where Accused is Imprisoned—If
the accused is under detention, the Public Attorney is
enjoined to i) bring the prisoner to trial or to cause notice to
the person who has custody to advise him of his right to
demand trial; ii) then the person who has custody shall
transmit to the public attorney that the prisoner demands
trial, if such is his demand; iii) upon receipt of such report,
the public attorney shall obtain the presence of the prisoner
for trial;

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h) Remedy where Accused is Not Brought to Trial within the

Time Limit—If the accused were not brought to trial within
the time limit as set forth in this law, the accused may seek
dismissal of the information;
i) Sanctions—The counsel for the accused, the public
prosecutor or public attorney shall be penalized it they
committed acts enumerated in the law which tend to delay
the case. Such sanctions are fines or prohibition from
practicing before that court.

2. Circular No. 98-38 of the Supreme Court Implementing the

Speedy Trial Act
Sec. 15 of the Speedy Trial Act provides that: “The Supreme Court
shall promulgate rules, regulations, administrative orders and
circulars which shall seek to accelerate the disposition of criminal
cases. The rules, regulations administrative orders and circulars
formulated shall provide sanctions against justices and judges who
willfully fail to proceed to trial without justification consistent with
the provisions of this Act.”
Pursuant to this directive, the Supreme Court issued Circular No.
38-98 dated August 11, 1998 six months after the passage of the
Speedy Trial Act which was on February 12, 1998. However, a
reading of the Circular would readily show that most provisions
were reproductions of those in the law. With slight variation in some
of the wordings in the headings, the following are also found in the
circular, namely: Time Limit for Arraignment and Pre-Trial,
Mandatory Pre-trial in Criminal Cases, Pre-Trial Agreement, Non-
appearance at Pre-Trial Conference, Pre-Trial Order, Extended Time
Limit; Time Limit for Trial, Exclusions, Factors for Granting
Continuance; Time Limit Following an Order for New Trial, Public
Attorney’s Duties Where Accused is Imprisoned, Sanctions,
Remedy Where Accused is not Brought to Trial Within the Time
Limit and Republic Act No. 8493 Not a Bar to Provisions on Speedy
Trial in the Constitution.
To repeat, Sec. 15 directs the Supreme Court to “promulgate
rules, regulations, administrative orders and circulars which shall
seek to accelerate the disposition of criminal cases.” It would appear
that this circular did not add much by way of providing ways and
means of accelerating the disposition of criminal cases. There

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appears to be no implementing provisions in this circular that would

facilitate disposition of criminal cases. Afterall, the law itself
already seeks to accelerate the disposition of criminal cases.
Then the other directive under Sec. 15 is that the issuances
“formulated shall provide sanctions against justices and judges who
willfully fail to proceed to trial without justification consistent with
the provisions of this Act.” This Circular No. 38-98 does not also
provide for sanctions against justices and judges who violate or
disregard this law. This is also just as well because the basic law to
be implemented does not also provide for sanctions against justices
or judges—but only against counsel for the accused, the public
prosecutor or the public attorney. It would be going beyond the High
Court’s commission if through a mere implementing circular it
would provide sanctions against those not mentioned in the law. And
besides, can Legislature through this law delegate to the High Court
the power to impose sanctions which is criminal in nature. The
Constitution limits the rule-making power of the Supreme Court—
that it “shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
(Art. VIII, Sec. 5, [5]).

§ VI. The Case Under Annotation, Solar Team Entertainment,

Inc. vs. Hon. How, et al., Supra, And Some Observations

a) Outline of the facts

After reading several times this case under Annotation, Solar
Entertainment, Inc. vs. Hon. How, et al., supra., it would seem that
the ratio decidendi and/or rationale seems to be a little hard to
completely define. The basic facts of the case are as follows:

1. An information was filed against the accused before the

Regional Trial Court;
2. The arraignments were postponed at the instance of the
accused on the ground that an appeal of the resolution of
the public prosecutor which led to the filing of the
Information had been filed and pending with the DOJ;
 3. Before the 3rd scheduled arraignment, the trial court issued
an Order indefinitely postponing arraignment until this
appeal with the DOJ was resolved;

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4. Petitioner brought the case to the Supreme Court on

certiorari and mandamus claiming that there was abuse of
discretion as the Order was contrary to the 30-day time
limit between filing of Information and arraignment under
Sec. 7 of RA 8493, The Speedy Trial Act;
5. The Supreme Court held that there was no abuse of
discretion. We quote pertinent portions of the decision—

i) “The power of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions

of his subordinates even after the information has been
already filed in court is well-settled”
ii) “Procedurally speaking, after the filing of the information,
the court is in complete control of the case and any
disposition therein is subject to its sound discretion”
iii) “The decision to suspend arraignment to await the
resolution of an appeal with the Secretary of Justice is an
exercise of such discretion.”
iv) “Consistent with the ruling in Marcelo, we have since then
held in a number of cases that a court can defer to the
authority of the prosecution arm to resolve once and for all,
the issue of whether or not sufficient ground existed to file
the information.”
v) “Thus in line with our general pronouncement in Crespo,
the courts cannot interfere with the prosecutors’ discretion
over criminal prosecution.”

b) Observations—

1. The petition was an uphill battle even from the start

It would seem that the petition was an uphill battle even from the
start. As will be noted, this Speedy Trial Act, a law decidedly
conceived for the accused was invoked by the offended party in this
case. An order suspending arraignment indefinitely before its third
scheduled arraignment was challenged through certiorari and
mandamus. The offended party must have prayed that in the event
that the challenged Order of indefinite suspension of arraignment
were nullified, the High Court through mandamus would compel the
trial court to arraign the accused. Will mandamus lie against the trial
court? Or is arraigning the accused while still awaiting the resolution
of the Secretary of Justice a ministerial duty on the part of the trial
court which may be compelled by mandamus?

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There is the holding in this decision that “after the filing of the
information the trial court has complete control of the case and any
disposition therein is subject to its sound discretion” (citing
Ledesma vs. CA, 278 SCRA 656; 1987). And there is the further
holding also in this decision that: “The decision to suspend
arraignment to await the resolution of an appeal with the Secretary
of Justice is an exercise of such discretion.”
It is settled that as a general rule only ministerial duties may be
compelled by mandamus but not those which require the exercise of
discretion (Tavera-Luna, Inc. vs. Nable, 67 Phil. 340). Hence, if the
petitioner succeeded in nullifying the Order of indefinite suspension
of arraignment, what is the subsequent recourse of the appellate
court? It would probably remand the case to the court a quo to await
the resolution of the DOJ, if by the time there was no resolution yet.
Since it cannot compel the arraignment of the accused pursuant to its
holding that suspension of “arraignment to await the resolution of an
appeal with the Secretary of Justice is an exercise of discretion,”
then the adventure was for naught.

2. It seems odd that the trial court was allowed to wait indefinitely
the DOJ resolution yet it can discard the same
Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded: “Thus, public
respondent did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it
suspended the arraignment of private respondent to await the
resolution of her petition for review with the Secretary of Justice.”
But the High Court clarifies that: “It bears stressing that the court
is however not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of
Justice since the court is mandated to independently evaluate or
assess the merits of the case, and may either agree or disagree with
the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.”
After reading the above pronouncements which were quoted
verbatim to obviate inaccuracy we cannot help asking the question:
What then is the whole point of waiting for the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice for an indefinite period of time when at the end
of the day, “the court is mandated to independently evaluate or
assess the merits of the case, and may either agree or disagree with
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the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice?” It does not make
sense to accord so much deference to the fact that the appeal of the
resolution of the public prosecutor has been lodged with the
Department of Justice if it has no such weight afterall which should
compel the court to comply with its bidding.
It seems a little odd that the court is mandated to wait for the
DOJ resolution but it is not mandated to follow it. So why allow or
abet indefinite postponement of arraignment on the ground that the
resolution of the DOJ is being awaited when the court may discard
the same anyway?
Perhaps, this kind of problem is likely to arise when two (2)
agencies or entities are conducting parallel investigations or
proceedings on the same matter at the same time.

3. Pendency of appeal with the DOJ is not clearly comprehended

under Sec. 10, par (f) which was relied upon as a justification for the
delay in the arraignment
The Supreme Court further noted that: “Petitioner insists that in
view of the passage of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, the review
authority of the Secretary of Justice after an information has been
already filed in court may possibly transgress the right of a party to a
speedy disposition of his case, in light of the mandatory tenor of the
Speedy Trial Act of 1998 requiring that the accused must be
arraigned within thirty (30) days from the filing of information
against him.”
The High Court dismissed this argument with a terse rejoinder:
“We are not persuaded.” It relied upon Sec. 10 (f) of the law which
provided exclusions of certain periods in the computation of the time
limit “within which trial must commence.” And the High Court also
relied upon Sec. 2 of the Implementing Rules or SC Circular No. 38-
98 providing for another ground excluded in the computation of time
limit between arraignment and Pre-trial, to wit: “or other causes
justifying arraignment shall be excluded.”
To repeat, the High Court relied upon Sec. 10, par. (f) of the law,
The Speedy Trial Act, as providing a legal justification for this delay
in the arraignment. It held that the pendency of appeal with the DOJ
is comprehended within this provision. However, even a circumspect
scrutiny of this ground seems to elude from us its

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meaning or the scenario it is trying to portray. Let us reproduce this

pertinent provision:

“Sec. 10. Exclusions—The following periods of delay shall be excluded in

computing the time within which trial must commence:
 (a) x x x
(b) x x x x x x
(f) any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any
justice or judge motu proprio or on motion of the accused or his/her
counsel or at the request of the public prosecutor, if the justice or
judge granted such continuance on the basis of his/her findings that
the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best
interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. No such
period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court in
accordance with this subparagraph shall be excludable under this
section unless the court set forth, in the record of the case, whether
orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice
served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best
interest of the public and the accused in a speedy trial.”

Truth to tell, it is really difficult to make heads or tails of the exact

meaning of the above provision. What is this subparagraph (f) trying
to say? What are those “reasons for finding that the ends of justice
served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best
interest of the public and the accused in a speedy trial?” Either this
is profound thinking or sloppy law-making. Is the fact of pendency
of the appeal with the DOJ such a ground that would “outweigh the
best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” It
seems the ground for continuance should “outweigh the best interest
of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” In other words, if
the ground is merely for the best interest or does not “outweigh the
best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial”—
would this not be sufficient? Lawmakers should realize that the law
they make are meant for people and they should endeavor to make
the same as understandable as possible. If the people were made to
divine the meaning of the laws then the ends of legislation are not
achieved.

4. Providing in an implementing circular an additional ground for

delay in the trial is an exercise of rule-

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making power by the Supreme Court which may be beyond its

parameters under the Constitution
The High Court also cited SC Circular No. 38-98, Sec. 2 which
added another reason for exclusion in the counting of the 30-day
time limit from arraignment to trial: “or other causes justifying
suspension of arraignment shall be excluded.”
Sec. 15 of the Speedy Trial Act, directed the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules and circulars to accelerate the disposition of
criminal cases and to provide sanctions against justices and judges
who willfully fail to follow the provisions of this Act. Pursuant to
this Sec. 15 of the Speedy Trial Act, the Supreme Court issued
Circular No. 38-98 to implement this Act. However, under Sec. 2 of
this Circular No. 38-98 another ground for exclusion in the counting
of the 30-period from filing of arraignment and trial was added: “or
other causes justifying suspension of arraignment shall be
excluded.”
In this regard, some points are worth considering—

a) Sec. 2 of the Circular No. 38-98 pertains to the excluded

time/grounds between Arraignment and Pre-trial—not
between filing of Information and arraignment. The subject
of the petition in this case is the delay between filing of
information and arraignment. So the ground under Sec. 2 of
Circular No. 38-98 appears to be not applicable;
b) Then assuming this Sec. 2 of Circular No. 38-98 is
applicable in this case, it seems that this is not consistent
with the directive under Sec. 15 of The Speedy Trial Act
which qualifies that the circular should be “to accelerate the
disposition of criminal cases.” It would not be towards this
end of accelerating the disposition of criminal case when
another ground for delay is added: “or other causes
justifying suspension of arraignment shall be excluded.”
c) Then assuming further that this Sec. 2 of Circular No. 38-98
is applicable in this case, would this run counter to one of
the limits to the rule-making powers of the Supreme Court
under the Constitution: that the rules shall not “diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights.” (Art. VIII, Sec. 5.
[5]). What is the nature of this ground for delay which was
added by the Supreme Court in this circular? If this has the
effect of diminishing substantive right by

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providing another ground for delay from arraignment and

Pretrial, then this is not a valid exercise of the rule-making
power of the Supreme Court;

5. DOJ Memorandum setting a self-imposed limit of 75 days for its

review of the resolutions of public prosecutors could have provided
a basis for determination of abuse of discretion
The High Court further gave the assurance that this indefinite
suspension of arraignment is now unlikely to happen because the
DOJ has issued Memorandum Order No. 12 dated July 3, 2000
which mandates that the disposition of appeals of the resolutions of
the Public Prosecutor to said Office shall be within 75 days.
This issuance of DOJ MC No. 12 of July 3, 2000 fixing a
maximum time limit to the pendency of appeal of the ruling of the
Public Prosecutor raises a pertinent question. The import of the DOJ
Memorandum Circular is that after 75 days, the pendency of the
appeal may be classified as a delay in the resolution. This
Memorandum Circular was issued a month BEFORE the
promulgation of this decision under annotation. The complaint of the
petitioner is that the delay in the arraignment has been for about 6
months already or a good 180 days. Obviously, this was more than
double the 75-day time limit set forth by the DOJ in its
Memorandum Circular. To repeat, this DOJ self-imposed time limit
was issued a month before the promulgation of the decision under
Annotation. Is it not possible that this DOJ Memorandum setting a
self-imposed limit of 75 days for its review of the resolutions of
public prosecutors could have provided a basis for determination of
whether there was abuse of discretion?

§ VII. Significance of the Case Under Annotation and

Conclusion

a) The right to speedy trial may be invoked by the accused and

offended parties for diametrically opposing reasons
Solar Entertainment, Inc. vs. Hon. How, et al., supra, earns the
distinction in our jurisprudence as the first case that gave occasion to
the High Court to explain and expound on some of the important
provisions of The Speedy Trial Act of 1998. The peculiar thing

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about this case is that instead of the accused invoking this law—it
was the offended party who did. Certainly, the ultimate goal of the
offended party as petitioner is vastly different from that of the
accused as petitioner. The questioned provision, Sec. 7 of The
Speedy Trial Act, decrees that the maximum period between filing
of information and arraignment should be within 30 days. If it were
the accused who invokes this provision, his plea would have been
for dismissal of the case if this 30-day limit were inordinately
extended. His reason is that if this provision has been violated, so is
his Constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy trial.
If it were the offended party who invokes this provision, his plea
would have been for immediate proceedings, (not of course
dismissal of the case as the accused would have asked),—so that the
accused would get convicted soonest, if warranted.
 The basic problem seems to be the reliance of the offended party
on speedy trial—a Constitutional right conceived and crafted for the
accused. Speedy trial aims to free the accused of the travails and
anxiety of being a criminal defendant for a long period of time. On
the other hand, in this case, speedy trial is being invoked by the
offended party but the real leason is that it wanted the accused tried
and convicted as soon as possible. Under this guarantee, we can
expect either side (the private complainant or the accused) at one
time praying for the same relief for diametrically opposing reasons.
For the accused, he invokes right to speedy trial to set him free at
once—but for the offended party, he invokes this right to speedy
trial to get a conviction of the accused soonest. On the part of the
accused, it would seem that the right to a speedy trial is a valid plea
if the grounds for its invocation are there. On the part of the
offended party, it would seem implausible that he wanted the
accused to have an expeditious trial—because he wanted him to
benefit from this constitutional guarantee of speedy trial. The
unarticulated reason, as stated earlier, is that the offended party
wanted the accused to be convicted at once.

b) By origin and nature, it is more appropriate for the accused to

invoke the right to speedy trial
This is not to say however that the right to speedy trial cannot
altogether be invoked by the offended party. What we are saying is

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that by origin and nature, this right is a more fitting plea for the
accused. There is clear constitutional support when an accused seeks
the dismissal of the case for an inordinately delayed trial by arguing
that the accused is invoking Art. III, Sec. 14 (2) of the Constitution
which says that: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled
to a speedy trial.” It seems a little awkward and tinged with
hypocrisy if the offended party when asking for an expeditious trial
would also invoke Art. III, Sec. 14 (2) of the Constitution that: “In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to a speedy trial.”
We are reminded of French Premier George Clemenceau who
advocated a continued divided East and West Germany for he feared
that this country would be more powerful once reunited. With his
point subtly hidden, he remarked to the effect that “such was his
affection for Germany that he wanted two of them” (Henry
Kissenger, “The White House Years,” Little, Brown and Company,
1979 ed., p. 98).
It is not shown where the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 originated,
but perhaps, if this were the product of the expertise of bar and
judicial groups, it would not have left so much to be desired. As it
stands, the law seems to conjure up an ideal scenario wherein things
 just fall into place upon the filing of information. It seems that the
stubborn cultural realities, the budgetary constraints, the ever
burgeoning poor as accused litigants, the pathetic clogging of the
dockets of the courts and the undeniable fact of “litigation
explosion” in the country, among others, were not seriously taken
into consideration. In fact under Sec. 11 (b) of the law, docket
congestion as a veritable factor in the delay of cases seems to be
glossed over when it provides that “no continuance shall be granted
because of general congestion of the court’s calendar.” However,
this is not to denigrate the efforts to come up with a Speedy Trial
Act, as had been done in the United States. We find the endeavor
commendable given the fact that the problem posed by the right to
speedy trial is nothing short of a legal Gordon knot. It is our earnest
hope that the law shall be successfully implemented as this would
contribute to a large measure in our continuing quest for justice.

——o0o——

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