PATRICK A. CARONAN V. RICHARD A. CARONAN
Caronan” be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys; and
FACTS: The complainant Patrick A. Caronan and respondent Richard A.
Caronan are siblings born to Porferio R. Caronan Jr. and Norma A. Caronan.
Respondent is two years older than complainant being born on 1975. Both
finished their secondary education at the Makati High School. Respondent
enrolled at Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM) in 1991 where he
stayed for a year before transferring to the Philippine Military Academy
(PMA) before being discharged in 1993. Complainant obtained degree in
Business Administration in 1997 at the University of Makati. Also in 1997,
Respondent moved to Nueva Vizcaya with wife Rosana and their 3 children.
He never went back to earn a college degree.
In 1999, respondent told complainant that he enrolled in a law school in
Nueva Vizcaya. In 2004, their mother informed complainant that respondent
enrolled at the St. Mary’s University’s College of Law in Bayombong, Nueva
Ecija using the complainant’s name and college records from the University
of Makati. Complainant brushed these aside for he did not anticipate the
consequences to him.
In 2009, after complainant was promoted as a Store Manager of the 7-11
store in Muntinlupa, he was ordered to report to the head office of Philippine
Seven Corporation (PSC) and was then requested at the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) in relation to an investigation involving respondent, who at
that points, was using the name “Atty. Patrick A. Caronan”. He was asked to
identify documents showing respondent’s use of the “Patrick A. Caronan”. It
was then complainant was informed in a case of qualified theft and estafa in
which respondent was involved.
Respondent’s use of the name “Atty. Patrick A. Caronan” continues to
perpetuate crimes and commit unlawful activities such as; almost victimizing
fellow church-member’s relatives, tricking someone into believing that he was
authorized to sell a parcel of land in Taguig City when in fact, he was not.
Further, he learned that respondent was arrested for gun-running activities,
illegal possession of explosives and violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP)
22. With this, complainant was eventually forced to resign from PSC, hence,
complainant filed the present Complaint-Affidavit to stop respondent’s
alleged use of the former’s name and identity, and illegal practice of law.
On March 9, 2015, the IBP-CDB conducted the scheduled mandatory
conference where both parties failed to appear. IBP Investigating
Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera issued his Report and
Recommendation, finding respondent guilty of illegally and falsely assuming
complainant’s name, identity and academic records.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IBP erred in ordering that:
(a) the name “Patrick A.
(b) the name “Richard A. Caronan” be barred from being admitted to the Bar.
HELD: The IBP is correct in ordering that the name “Patrick A. Caronan” be
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. The respondent, Richard A. Caronan a.k.a.
“Atty. Patrick A. Caronan”, has failed to present any proof to prove his
identify. The respondent admitted, upon his arrest on August 31, 2012 that
he is married to Rosana Halili-Caronan. This diverges to the official NSO
records showing that “Patrick A. Caronan” is married to Myrna G. Tagpis, not
to Rosana Halili-Caronan. In addition, the photograph of the respondent
when he was arrested as “Richard A. Caronan” on August 16, 2012, shows
the same person as the one in the photograph in the IBP records of “Atty.
Patrick A. Caronan”.
The IBP also did not err in ordering that the name “Richard A. Coronan” be
barred from being admitted in the Bar. Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the
Rules of the Court, no applicant for admission to the Bar Examinations shall
be admitted unless he had pursued and satisfactorily completed a bachelor’s
degree in arts or sciences. The respondent never completed his college
degree. He did enrol at the PLM in 1991, but left a year later and entered the
PMA where he was discharged in 1993 without graduating. Clearly,
respondent has not completed the requisite pre-law degree.
The Court does not discount the possibility of the respondent finishing his
college degree and earn a law degree under his real name. However, his
false assumption of his brother’s name, identity, and educational records
renders him fit for admission to the Bar. Respondent exhibited his dishonesty
and utter lack of moral fitness. The acts of the respondent do not have a
place in the legal profession where one of the primary duties of its members
is to uphold its integrity and dignity.
277) Que v. Revilla, AC No. 7054, 11 Nov 2014 (Caro)
Complainant: Conrado Que
Respondent: Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr.
Petition for reinstatement
Facts:
− [Background] The SC disbarred Revilla for:
o abuse of court procedures and processes;
o filing of multiple actions and forum-shopping;
o willful, intentional and deliberate resort to falsehood
and deception before the courts;
o maligning the name of his fellow lawyer; and
o fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in court
− originally, the IBP recommended suspension for 1 year but SC
found this punishment to be too lenient considering the multiple
ethical infractions committed by Revilla.
− 8 July 2010, Revilla filed a petition for Judicial Clemency and
Compassion, praying to have his license restored based on
humanitarian considerations – DENIED
− 11 Jan 2011, he filed an Appeal for Grace, Succor, and Mercy
his or her conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has
elapsed in between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement.
In this case, Revilla demonstrated active participation in community and
church activities and that he has long expressed deep remorse and genuine
repentance. However, while the SC believes that Revilla does not inherently
lack moral fiber, they were not convinced that he had sufficiently achieved
moral reformation.
In previous cases, SC considered the
(1) conduct of the disbarred attorney before and after disbarment,
(2) the time that had elapsed from the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement, and more importantly,
(3) the disbarred attorneys’ sincere realization and acknowledgement of guilt.
In the present case, we are not fully convinced that the passage of more than
4 is sufficient to enable the respondent to reflect and to realize his
professional transgressions. He has failed to show by clear and convincing
evidence that he is duly reformed.
WHEREFORE, the Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency is DENIED.

asking the Court to reconsider the penalty imposed. He argued

that Que failed to provide clear and convincing evidence what
merited his disbarment – DENIED
− 13 Jul 2011, he reiterated his pleas for the Court’s compassion
and mercy, stating that he learned his lesson – DENIED
− 17 May 2012, he sent a letter, asking once again for
reinstatement – DENIED
− He filed 4 more petitions/appeals, claiming that
o he has since never been involved in any
immoral/illegal activities,
o he has devoted himself to religious worship
o he promises to maintain the a high degree of morality
and ethics if reinstated
− he pleaded for clemency, not because he intended to practice law
again, but for peace of mind, and to be made whole after being
shattered.

Issue: W/N Respondent should be reinstated?

Held: NO. The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatement is whether the
lawyer has sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and
character. The lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by clear and convincing
evidence that he or she is again worthy of membership in the Bar. The Court
takes into consideration the character and standing prior to the disbarment,
the nature and character of the charge/s for which he or she was disbarred,
CRISELDA F. JOSE, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
DANILO OMEGA, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition erroneously entitled as a Petition for Review on
Certiorari which should be a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On November 14, 1994, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (Branch 22)
rendered a decision in Civil Case No. CEO-15709, entitled Danilo Omega,
Plaintiff, versus, Criselda F. Jose, Defendant., the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, based on the evidence thus presented, this Court finds for
the plaintiff. Judgment is hereby rendered declaring the March 3, 1981
marriage between plaintiff Danilo Omega and Criselda F. Jose, null and
void ab initio. Custody over the three children Joselyn, Danilo, Jr. and
Jordan, all surnamed Omega shall be entrusted to plaintiff Danilo Omega.
Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of Manila with a copy of this judgment. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.[1]
The ground for declaring the marriage null and void is psychological
incapacity on the part of defendant Criselda under Article 36 of the Family
Code of the Philippines. During the trial, the counsel on record of defendant
Criselda was Atty. Margarito D. Yap of the Cebu City District Office of the
Public Attorneys Office (PAO). However, defendant Criselda filed a Notice of
Appeal, dated December 7, 1994, on her own, without the assistance of Atty.
Yap.[2]
The Judicial Records Division (JRD) of the Court of Appeals sent a notice to
pay docket fee, dated August 3, 1995 to Atty. Yap which was received by
him.[3] On October 24, 1995, the appellate court, through the Former
Sixteenth Division,[4] promulgated a Resolution which reads as follows:
For failure of the defendant-appellant to pay the docketing fee in this case
within the reglementary period which expired on August 25, 1995, despite
receipt by his counsel on August 10, 1995 of this Courts notice dated August
3, 1995, this appeal is hereby DISMISSED pursuant to Section 1(d), Rule 50
of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.[5]
On May 9, 1996, the Division Clerk of Court issued the Entry of Judgment
certifying that the above-quoted Resolution had become final and executory
as of December 1, 1995.[6] It is indicated at the bottom of said Entry of
Judgment that Atty. Yap and the Special and Appealed Cases Division of the
PAO were sent copies of the Entry of Judgment.
On May 13, 1996, the appellate court received a letter of even date from
defendant-appellant Criselda addressed to the Clerk of Court of the Court of
Appeals inquiring about the status of her appeal and claiming that she has
not received any notice from the appellate court.[7]
The appellate court noted the explanation of the clerk in the Civil Cases
Section of the Judicial Records Division (JRD) of said court that Atty. Yap
was sent the notice to pay docket fee because Criselda had sent a copy of
her Notice of Appeal to Atty. Yap and that per the records of the case, Atty.
Yap was earlier sent a copy of the formal offer of exhibits and duly received
in his behalf, he filed the comments and objections to the exhibits for the
plaintiff; he appeared at the hearings conducted by the trial court.[8]
On October 28, 1996, Criselda through counsel filed a Motion for Leave of
Court to File Omnibus Motions/Motion to Reinstate Appeal.[9]On December
16, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued the following Resolution:
Considering that the Resolution dismissing this appeal has become final on
December 1, 1995 and an Entry of Judgment has in fact been made on May
9, 1996, the Motion for Leave of Court to File Omnibus Motions/Motion to
Reinstate Appeal and the Omnibus Motions/Motion to Reinstate Appeal are
hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Criseldas motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, the present petition on the following ground:
The public respondent Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave error in
denying the petitioners Motion for Leave of Court to file Omnibus
Motions/Motion to Reinstate Appeal and the Omnibus Motions/Motion to
Reinstate Appeal which if not corrected, would deprive petitioner of her
constitutional right to due process and injustice would be done to her.[11]
on which basis, petitioner Criselda raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WHO APPEALED HER CASE BY
HERSELF WITHOUT COUNSEL WAS VALIDLY SERVED WITH NOTICE
TO PAY THE DOCKETING FEE AND NOTICE OF THE RESOLUTION
DISMISSING HER APPEAL FOR FAILURE TO PAY THE DOCKETING
FEE.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DENYING THE PETITIONERS MOTION FOR LEAVE OF COURT TO FILE
OMNIBUS MOTIONS/MOTION TO REINSTATE APPEAL AND THE
OMNIBUS MOTIONS/MOTION TO REINSTATE APPEAL.[12]
After private respondent filed his Comment, parties filed their respective
Memoranda in compliance with the Resolution of the Court dated December
14, 1998.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
Based on the records, it appears that the PAO, through Atty. Victor C.
Laborte and Atty. Yap, represented petitioner during the trial of the
case. Although petitioner herself personally filed the Notice of Appeal, the
fact remains that Atty. Yap or the PAO has not filed any formal notice of
withdrawal of appearance in the trial court. Therefore, insofar as the
appellate court is concerned, Atty. Yap is the counsel of record. As such, the
appellate court did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioners motion for leave of court to file omnibus motions or motion to
reinstate appeal.
Section 22, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, provides:
Section 22. Attorney who appears in lower court presumed to represent
client on appeal. An attorney who appears de parte in a case before a lower
court shall be presumed to continue representing his client on appeal, unless
he files a formal petition withdrawing his appearance in the appellate court.
Payment of the docket and other legal fees within the prescribed period is
both mandatory and jurisdictional, and failure of the appellant to conform with
the rules on appeal renders the judgment final and executory.[13]
Indeed, the Court, in some instances, had allowed liberal construction of the
Rules of Court with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for
perfecting appeals on equitable consideration.[14] In Buenaflor vs. Court of
Appeals, the Court has enunciated the following:
The established rule is that the payment in full of the docket fees within the
prescribed period is mandatory. Nevertheless, this rule must be qualified, to
wit: First, the failure to pay appellate court docket fee within the reglementary
period allows only discretionary dismissal, not automatic dismissal, of the
appeal; Second, such power should be used in the exercise of the Courts
sound discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play and
with great deal of circumspection considering all attendant circumstances.
Admittedly, this Court has allowed the filing of an appeal in some cases
where a stringent application of the rules would have denied it, only when to
do so would serve the demands of justice and in the exercise of the Courts
equity jurisdiction. This is based on the rule of liberality in the interpretation of
the Rules to achieve substantial justice. It may be recalled that the general
rule is that the Rules of Court are rules of procedure and whenever called for
they should be so construed as to give effect rather than defeat their
essence.
Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 6. Construction These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to
promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding.
Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial
justice and, therefore, they should not be applied in a very rigid and technical
sense.The exception is that, while the Rules are liberally construed, the
provisions with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting
appeals are strictly applied. As an exception to the exception, these rules
have sometimes been relaxed on equitable considerations. Also, in some
cases the Supreme Court has given due course to an appeal perfected out of
time where a stringent application of the rules would have denied it, but only
when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice, and in the
exercise of equity jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
The underlying consideration in this petition is that the act of dismissing the
notice of appeal, if done in excess of the trial courts jurisdiction, amounts to
an undue denial of the petitioners right to appeal. The importance and real
purpose of the remedy of appeal has been emphasized in Castro v. Court of
Appeals where this Court ruled that an appeal is an essential part of our
judicial system and trial courts are advised to proceed with caution so as not
to deprive a party of the right to appeal and instructed that every party-litigant
should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition
of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities.[15]
However, the Court finds no cogent reason to be liberal in the present case
for the following reasons:
Petitioners counsel, Atty. Margarito Yap of the PAO was properly sent by the
appellate court a notice to pay the docket fees. Atty. Yap or the PAO did not
file any formal withdrawal of appearance and therefore, for all intents and
purposes, the appellate court correctly sent the notice to Atty. Yap. It is
settled that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and omission of
their counsel.[16]
Moreover, under Section 21, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, an attorney is
presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he
appears. Under Section 22 of the same Rule, an attorney who appears de
parte in a case before a lower court shall be presumed to continue
representing his client on appeal, unless he files a formal petition
withdrawing his appearance in the appellate court.
Petitioner failed to pursue her appeal for almost two years. She herself filed
the notice of appeal on December 4, 1994 but thought of inquiring from the
Court of Appeals about her appeal only on May 13, 1996 (or after the lapse
of one year and five months) as to the status of her appeal.
Petitioner failed to show that her appeal is extremely meritorious that to
deprive her of an appeal would unduly affect her substantial rights.
In other words, petitioner failed to show any compelling reason to warrant the
issuance of the writ of certiorari. The Court of Appeals committed no grave
abuse of discretion in denying petitioners Motion for Leave of Court to File
Omnibus Motions/Motion to Reinstate Appeal. Its Resolution dated October
24, 1995 dismissing petitioners appeal had become final and executory as of
December 1, 1995.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. VINE
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, represented by Vicente C. Ponce; and
ROMONAFE CORPORATION, represented by Oscar F.
Tirona, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Although not authorized to handle cases pending in the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court, lawyers of the National Power Corporation may
nonetheless file notices of appeal of adverse decisions rendered by trial
courts. They cannot, however, enter into compromise agreements without
any specific authority to do so.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the January 19, 1999 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-GR CV No. 57710,[1] which is quoted here in full:
"At the hearing of this case on December 10, 1998, the Honorable Ricardo P.
Galvez, Solicitor General, appeared personally and moved for the dismissal
of the case on the ground that the authority of the lawyers of the National
Power Corporation to appear as Special Attorneys of the Solicitor General is
limited to cases before the lower courts (RTCs and MTCs). He also invokes
the provisions of the Administrative Code (Section 35(1) Chapter 12, Title III,
Book IV) that said lawyers have no authority to appear before this Court.
"WHEREFORE, without objection on the part of all the parties in this case,
the instant appeal is DISMISSED."[2]
Also challenged by petitioner is the March 8, 1999 CA Resolution denying
their Motion for Reconsideration, pertinent portions of which are quoted
hereunder:
"xxx (W)hether or not the Solicitor General moved for the dismissal of the
appeal, the foregoing copious notes show beyond cavil the courts' resolve to
dismiss cases appealed to this Court by NAPOCOR's house lawyers without
coursing the appeal to the Solicitor General.
"That the Solicitor General did not ask for the dismissal of the appeal is
irrelevant; his belated Manifestation giving the NAPOCOR counsels putative
authority to appeal to us cannot cure the basic legal defect which is a
violation of the Administrative Code (Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book
IV). We have said so in all the many cases brought to us by NAPOCOR's
counsel. We iterate the same rulings.
"Motion DENIED."[3]
The Facts
The undisputed facts of the case are summarized by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) as follows:
"1. On July 12, 1995, petitioner instituted a complaint for expropriation of
several parcels of land located at San Agustin, Dasmarias, Cavite, with an
area of 96,963.38 and 48,103.12 square meters, respectively owned by
respondents Vine Development Corporation (Vine hereafter) and Romonafe
Corporation (Romonafe for brevity).The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
1140-95 and was raffled to Branch 21 of the Regional Trial Court in Imus,
Cavite.
"2. On January 26, 1996, the trial court issued a writ of possession
authorizing petitioner to enter and take possession of the property after a
showing that it ha[d] deposited with the Philippine National Bank the amount
of P4,616,223.37 representing the assessed value of the property for
taxation purposes pursuant to the provisions of P.D. 42 and the Supreme
Court ruling in National Power Corporation versus Jocson, 206 SCRA 520
(1992).
"3. By Order dated December 3, 1996, the trial court constituted a panel of
commissioners for purposes of determining the just compensation of subject
property. The panel conducted an ocular inspection of the property on
January 10, 1997.
"4. In an undated Commissioner's Valuation Report, the panel recommended
just compensation at the rate of P3,500.00 per square meter.
"5. Earlier, however, the Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC) issued
Resolution No. 08-95 dated October 25, 1995 placing the fair market value of
Romonafe and Vine's subject property at P1,500.00 and P2,000.00 per
square meter, respectively.
"6. One (1) year and eight (8) months later, the PAC amended its aforesaid
resolution under PAC Resolution No. 07-97 dated June 25, 1997 by
increasing the valuation of the Romonafe's property from P1,500.00 to
P3,500.00 per square meter, or an increase of P2,000.00 per square
meter. The amendment was made in response to the letter of
reconsideration dated June 9, 1997 filed by Romonafe.
"7. While the case was pending, petitioner negotiated with Romonafe for the
acquisition of an additional area of 27,293.88 square meters of its adjacent
land.
"8. After due trial, the lower court rendered its Decision on September 5,
1997, the dispositive portion of which reads:
'WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the parcels of
land of the defendants hereinabove described consisting of 146,066.5
square meters to have been lawfully expropriated and now belong to the
plaintiff to be used for public purpose.
'The plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay to the defendants, through the Branch
Clerk of Court, the fair market value of the property at P3,500.00 per square
meter, that is, for defendant Vine Development Corporation, the total sum of
P339,371,830.00 and for defendant Romonafe Corporation, the total sum of
P168,360,920.00 plus legal rate of interest - i.e., 6% per annum - starting
from the time the plaintiff took possession of the property up to the time the
full amount shall have been paid.
...... ...
'The Branch Clerk of Court of this Court is hereby ordered to have a certified
copy of this decision be registered in the Office of the Registry of Deeds of
Cavite.
...... ...
'SO ORDERED.'
(Underscoring ours)
"9. Petitioner directly appealed the foregoing decision to the Court of Appeals
on the ground that it is contrary to law, jurisprudence and evidence on
record. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 57710.
"10. During the pendency of the appeal, petitioner and Romonafe entered
into a Compromise Agreement (copy attached as Annex B-1) under which
petitioner would acquire seventy five thousand three hundred ninety seven
(75,397) square meters of land comprising the 48,103.12 square meters
subject of the appeal and 27,293.88 square meters at P3,500 per square
meter. Romonafe would give petitioner a total discount of P6,542,810.40 so
much so that the net principal amount representing the total purchase price
of the land amounts to two hundred eighty million pesos (P280,000,000.00)"
"11. By Resolution dated June 2, 1998, the Court of Appeals gave the OSG
a period of ten (10) days to comment on said compromise agreement.
"12. In its Comment dated August 18, 1998, the OSG prayed that the
compromise agreement be disapproved and that the appeal be instead
resolved on the merits. A copy of said comment is hereto attached as Annex
C.
"13. On September 30, 1998, the OSG filed a motion to admit its
supplemental comment whereby it brought to the attention of the Court of
Appeals the fact that the Compromise Agreement was signed by the
deputized counsels of the petitioner in flagrant violation [of] the terms and
conditions of their deputation. A copy of said supplemental comment is
hereto attached as Annex D.
"14. By Resolution dated November 25, 1998, the Court of Appeals set the
case for hearing/oral argument on December 10, 1998.
"15. During the December 10, 1998 hearing, the Solicitor General personally
appeared and argued that subject compromise agreement suffers from two
(2) fatal infirmities, namely: (1) it is grossly disadvantageous to the
government; and (2) the deputized lawyers of the petitioner have no legal
authority to bind the Solicitor General [to] the same agreement.
"16. The following day, or on December 11, 1998, the OSG filed a
Manifestation dated December 11, 1998 (copy attached as Annex E), the full
text of which reads:
'THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (OSG), to this Honorable
Court, respectfully manifests that the OSG[-]deputized counsel of the
National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) have the authority to file notices of
appeal in cases being handled by them such as the subject case pursuant to
their deputation letters.However, such authority does not extend to
withdrawal of said appeal, execution of compromise agreements and filing of
pleadings before the appellate courts without the review and approval of the
Solicitor General.
"17. In a Resolution dated January 19, 1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed
petitioner's appeal, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
"18. Petitioner, through counsel, immediately filed its motion for
reconsideration on February 5, 1999 (copy attached as Annex F) which the
Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution dated March 8, 1999 x x x."[4]
Hence, this Petition.[5]
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:
"A The Honorable Court of Appeals patently erred in declaring that the
Solicitor General personally moved for the dismissal of the appeal during the
hearing conducted on December 10, 1998.
"B The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal for lack of
legal or factual basis."
Since the two issues are interrelated, we shall take them up jointly as
follows: Did the NPC lawyers have the authority to (a) file the appeal from
the trial court and (b) enter into the Compromise Agreement?
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Main Issue:
Authority of the NPC Lawyers
On the grounds that (1) the NPC lawyers had no authority to file the appeal,
and (2) Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez had personally moved for its
dismissal during the Oral Argument on December 10, 1998, the CA
dismissed the said appeal. On the other hand, the state lawyer contends
that he did not ask for a dismissal, but only objected to the Compromise
Agreement entered into by and between Romonafe Corporation and
petitioner.According to him, the Agreement suffers from two fatal
infirmities: (1) it is grossly disadvantageous to the government, and (2) the
OSG-deputized lawyers of petitioner had no legal authority to bind the
solicitor general.
We agree with the solicitor general. There is nothing in the records of the
Oral Argument showing that he had moved for the dismissal of the
appeal.Rather, his ardent prayer, even in his Comment dated August 18,
1998, had been to disapprove the Compromise Agreement and to resolve
the appeal on its merits.
No Legal Basis for Dismissal of Appeal
It is undisputed that the OSG has "supervision in the handling" of NPC court
cases as provided for in Section 15-A of Republic Act No. 6395, which
states as follows:
"Sec. 15-A. The corporation shall be under the direct supervision of the
Office of the President and all legal matters shall be handled by the Chief
Legal Counsel of the corporation, provided that the Solicitor General's Office
shall have supervision in the handling of court cases only of the corporation."
Furthermore, the authority of the OSG to represent NPC is specified in
Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of EO 292, which provides:
"SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. -- The Office of the Solicitor General shall
represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. When authorized by
the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also represent
government owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor
General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall
discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers. It shall have the following
specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its
officers in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and all other courts or
tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government
or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party."
To assist it in representing the government, the OSG is empowered to
deputize legal officers of government departments, bureaus, agencies and
offices. Paragraph 8 of the same section reads as follows:
"(8) Deputize legal officers of government departments, bureaus, agencies
and offices to assist the Solicitor General and appear or represent the
Government in cases involving their respective offices, brought before the
courts and exercise supervision and control over such legal officers with
respect to such cases."
In pursuance of such power, the OSG issued to the NPC lawyers a letter of
deputization[6] worded as follows:
"As Special Attorneys, you are authorized to appear as counsel in all civil
cases in the lower courts (RTCs and MTCs) involving the NPC, subject to the
same conditions stipulated in our letters."[7]
The CA ruled that the deputization of the NPC lawyers excluded the authority
to file appeals in the higher courts. We disagree. Under Section 2 (a) , Rule
41[8] of the Revised Rules of Court which pertains to ordinary appeals, the
notice of appeal is filed in the very same court which rendered the assailed
decision, which in this case was the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus,
Cavite. Since the notice was filed before the RTC, the NPC lawyers acted
clearly within their authority. Indeed, their action ensured that the appeal
was filed within the reglementary period. Regardless of which mode of
appeal is used, the appeal itself is presumed beneficial to the government;
hence, it should be allowed. After all, the OSG may withdraw it, if it believes
that the appeal will not advance the government's cause.
The reason for the continuous dismissal of NPC appeals in the CA is not the
absence of authority of the lawyers per se, but the failure of these lawyers to
inform the OSG of the lower court's adverse decision, resulting in the OSG's
lack of participation in the appellate proceeding.
Granting arguendo that the NPC lawyers had no authority to file the appeal,
this defect was cured by the OSG's subsequent Manifestation, the full text of
which reads:
"THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (OSG) to this Honorable
Court, respectfully manifests that the OSG[-] deputized counsels of the
National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) have the authority to file notices of
appeal in cases being handled by them such as the subject case pursuant to
their deputation letters.However, such authority does not extend to
withdrawal of said appeal, execution of compromise agreements and filing of
pleadings before the appellate courts without the review and approval of the
Solicitor General."
Authority to Compromise
"A compromise is an agreement between two or more persons who, to avoid
a lawsuit, amicably settle their differences on such terms as they can agree
on."[9] A compromise may be effected by persons who, as expressed or
implied from their relations, are representing and acting under the authority
of the parties to a controversy. In the absence of such authority, no
compromise by a third person is binding,[10] as Article 1878 of the Civil Code
provides that an agent, such as the counsel for the case, needs a special
power to compromise. Hence, in Monte de Piedad v. Rodrigo,[11] the Court
ruled that "if an attorney is not authorized by the client, he cannot
compromise his client's claim." Furthermore, Section 23, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court requires "special authority" for attorneys to bind their clients:
"Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. - Attorneys have authority
to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in
writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial
procedure. But they cannot, without special authority, compromise their
client's litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but the
full amount in cash."
If, as already ruled, NPC lawyers cannot even handle Napocor cases in the
CA, how indeed can they be allowed to bind Napocor to
compromises?Definitely then, their signatures on the instant Compromise
Agreement are invalid.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the appealed
Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to
the Court of Appeals for disposition on the merits as prayed for by the Office
of the Solicitor General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Florencia Diaz vs. Republic
Facts:
This is a letter-motion praying for reconsideration for the third time of the
resolution of the Supreme Court denying the petition for review filed by
petitioner Florencia Diaz.
The petitioner filed an application for registration of a vast tract of land in
Nueva Ecija. She alleged that she possessed the land as owner and worked,
developed and harvested the agricultural products and benefits of the same
continuously, publicly and adversely for more than 26 years.
OSG opposed the application because the land in question was within the
Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation. Thus, it was inalienable as it formed
part of the public domain.
Prior to this case, the Supreme Court already ruled in the case of Director of
Lands vs. Reyes that the property was inalienable as it formed part of a
military reservation and the existence of a Possessory Information Title No.
216 (registered in the name of a certain Melecio Padilla) which the
respondent in the sited case anchored its claim on the land, was not proven.
CFI ruled in favor of the petitioner. Upon appeal, the CA ruled in favor of the
Republic.
Subsequently, CA encouraged the parties to reach an amicable settlement
on the matter. The parties entered into one. However, OSG backed out from
the settlement and informed the CA that the track of land subject of the
amicable settlement was still within the military reservation.
CA ruled in favor of the Republic.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration and assailed the decision of Justice
Mendoza saying that Mendoza should have inhibited himself when the case
reached CA since he was also the assistance SolGen during the initial
stages of the land registration proceedings. Petitioner then filed for a review
on certiorari which the SC denied. The MR was also denied. The petitioner
then wants the case referred to the SC en banc which was likewise denied.
SC then issued a directive that no further pleadings would be entertained.
Petitioner then wrote letters addressed to Justice Quisumbing and Justice
Puno alleging there was a miscarriage of justice and that the petitioner was
tempted to go to media regarding the situation.
Issue:
WON the land in dispute can be registered to the petitioner.
Ruling:
1. The ruling in the case of Director of Lands vs. Reyes is applicable in this
case and thus constitutes res judicata. The Supreme Court ruled that in
registration cases filed under the provisions of the Public Land Act for the
judicial confirmation of an incomplete and imperfect title, an order dismissing
an application for registration and declaring the land as part of the public
domain constitutes res judicata, not only against the adverse claimant but
also against all persons.
2. Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is
inconclusive as to possession, for is is shown by the evidence that the land
involved is largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact, at the time
of the hearing, it was conceded that approximately 13,957 hectares of said
land consist of public forest. It is well-settled that forest land is incapable of
registration; and its inclusion in a title, whether such title be one issued using
the Spanish sovereignty or under the present Torrens system of registration,
nullifies the title. However, it is true that forest lands may be registered when
they have been reclassified as alienable by the President in a clear and
categorical manner (upon the recommendation of the proper department
head who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into
alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands) coupled with possession
by the claimant as well as that of her predecessors-in-interest. Unfortunately
for the petitioner, she was not able to produce such evidence. Her
occupation thereof could not have ripened into ownership of the subject land.
3. The compromise agreement is null and void. The land in question could
not have been a valid subject matter of a contract because, being forest land,
it was inalienable.