Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.

T-174880 issued in the name of

Carmencita on February 9, 2005. The subject lot used to be a part of
Lot No. 1907-A,8 which was partitioned in the following manner among
the heirs of Spouses Carlos Padilla (Carlos) and Asuncion Pacres
(Asuncion):9

Lot No. TCT No. Heirs

1907-A-1
FIRST DIVISION
1907-A-2
March 12, 2014
G.R. No. 187944
VARMENCITA SUAREZ, Petitioner, 1907-A-3
vs.
MR. and MRS. FELIX E. EMBOY, JR. and MARILOU P. EMBOY- 1907-A-4
DELANTAR, Respondents.
1907-A-5
DECISION
REYES, J.:
For review in the instant Petition1 is the Decision2 rendered on March
19, 2009 and Resolution3 issued on May 5, 2009 by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03489. The CA granted the Petition
for Review4 filed by Mr. and Mrs. Felix Emboy, Jr. (Felix) and Marilou
Emboy-Delantar (Marilou) (respondents), seeking to reverse the
decisions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12,5 and
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 3,6 of Cebu City,
rendered on February 26, 2008 in Civil Case No. CEB-33328,7 and on
September 25, 2006 in Civil Case No. R-49832, respectively. The
RTC affirmed the MTCC in upholding the claims of Carmencita
Suarez (Carmencita) in her complaint for unlawful detainer instituted
against the respondents.
Antecedents
At the center of the dispute is a 222-square meter parcel of land,
designated as Lot No. 1907-A-2 (subject lot) of the subdivision plan
Psd-165686, situated in Barangay Duljo, Cebu City, and covered by
T-543459 Spouses Rogelio and Praxedes Padilla
T-543460 Heirs of Vicente Padilla (Vicente), namely: (1) Azucena
Padilla, married to Felly Carrera; (2) Remedios Padilla
(Remedios), married to Oscar Dimay; (3) Veronica Padilla
(Veronica);10 and (4) Moreno Padilla (Moreno), married to
Teresita Curso (Teresita)
T-543461 Cresencio Padilla
T-543462 Fructousa Baricuatro
T-543463 Claudia Padilla-Emboy (Claudia)
A house, which is occupied by respondents Felix and Marilou, stands
in the subject lot. The respondents claim that their mother, Claudia,
had occupied the subject lot during her lifetime and it was earmarked
to become her share in Lot No. 1907-A. They had thereafter stayed in
the subject lot for decades after inheriting the same from Claudia, who
had in turn succeeded her own parents, Carlos and Asuncion.11
In 2004, respondents Felix and Marilou were asked by their cousins,
who are the Heirs of Vicente, to vacate the subject lot and to transfer
to Lot No. 1907-A-5, a landlocked portion sans a right of way. They
refused to comply insisting that Claudia’s inheritance pertained to Lot
No. 1907-A-2.12
Not long after, the respondents received from Carmencita’s counsel,
Atty. Jufelenito R. Pareja (Atty. Pareja), a demand letter, dated
February 23, 2004, requiring them to vacate the subject lot. They
were informed that Carmencita had already purchased on February
12, 2004 the subject lot from the former’s relatives. However, the
respondents did not heed the demand. Instead, they examined the
records pertaining to the subject lot and uncovered possible
anomalies, i.e., forged signatures and alterations, in the execution of a
series of deeds of partition relative to Lot No. 1907-A. On August 13,
2004, they filed before the RTC of Cebu City a complaint13 for
nullification of the partition and for the issuance of new TCTs covering
the heirs’ respective portions of Lot No. 1907-A.14
On December 8, 2004, Carmencita filed before the MTCC and against
the respondents a complaint for unlawful detainer, the origin of the
instant petition.1âwphi1 She alleged that she bought the subject lot
from Remedios, Moreno, Veronica and Dionesia,15 the registered
owners thereof and the persons who allowed the respondents to
occupy the same by mere tolerance. As their successor-in-interest,
she claimed her entitlement to possession of the subject lot and the
right to demand from the respondents to vacate the same.16
The MTCC upheld Carmencita’s claims in its decision rendered on
September 25, 2006. The respondents were ordered to vacate the
subject lot and remove at their expense all the improvements they had
built thereon. They were likewise made solidarily liable to pay
Carmencita Php 20,000.00 as attorney’s fees.17
In the Decision dated February 26, 2008, the RTC affirmed in its
entirety the MTCC ruling.18
The respondents challenged the MTCC and RTC judgments through
a Petition for Review19 filed before the CA.
The respondents argued that they have been occupying the subject
lot in the concept of owners for several decades. Carmencita, on the
other hand, was a buyer in bad faith for having purchased the
property despite the notice of lis pendens clearly annotated on the
subject lot’s title. Even her complaint for unlawful detainer was filed on
December 8, 2004 subsequent to the respondents’ institution on
August 13, 2004 of a petition for nullification of the partition. Citing
Sarmiento v. CA,20 the respondents emphasized that "even if one is
the owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be wrested
from another who had been in the physical or material possession of
the same for more than one year by resorting to a summary action of
ejectment."21 The respondents also invoked the doctrine enunciated in
Amagan v. Marayag22 that the pendency of another action anchored
on the issue of ownership justifies the suspension of an ejectment suit
involving the same real property. The foregoing is especially true in
the case at bar where the issue of possession is so interwoven with
that of ownership. Besides, the resolution of the question of ownership
would necessarily result in the disposition of the issue of possession.
The respondents also stressed that the deed of sale dated April 1,
2004, which was attached to the complaint for unlawful detainer, bore
tell-tale signs of being spurious. First, Atty. Pareja’s demand letter
sent to the respondents instead referred to a deed of sale dated
February 12, 2004. Secondly, Teresita, who now lives in Luzon and
has been estranged from Moreno since the 1980s, was a signatory in
the deed of sale. Thirdly, a certain Veronida Padilla, a fictitious
person, also signed the deed of sale as among the vendors, but she,
too, was impleaded as a co-defendant in the ejectment suit. Fourthly,
the deed was only registered the following year after its supposed
execution.
The respondents insisted that the Heirs of Vicente, who had allegedly
sold the subject lot to Carmencita, had never physically occupied the
same. Hence, there was no basis at all for Carmencita’s claim that the
respondents’ possession of the subject lot was by mere tolerance of
the alleged owners.
The respondents also presented before the CA a newly discovered
evidence, which they found in an old wooden chest in their ancestral
home. A duly notarized document captioned as an
"Agreement,"23 dated February 23, 1957, showed that Vicente and his
spouse, Dionesia, had waived their hereditary rights to Lot No. 1907-
A. The document stated that Vicente obtained a loan from the
Philippine National Bank using Lot No. 1907-A as a collateral. The
loan was paid by Carlos and Asuncion and the waiver must have
been executed in order to be fair to Vicente’s siblings. Prescinding
from the above, the Heirs of Vicente no longer had ownership rights
over the subject lot to convey to Carmencita.
The respondents also averred that Carmencita’s complaint lacked a
cause of action. The certification to file an action was issued by the
officials of Barangay Duljo in the name of James Tan Suarez,
Carmencita’s brother, who had no real rights or interests over the
subject lot. Further, while Carmencita based her claim over the
subject lot by virtue of a deed of sale executed on April 1, 2004, no
demand to vacate was made upon the respondents after that date.
The absence of such demand rendered the complaint fatally
defective, as the date of its service should be the reckoning point of
the one-year period within which the suit can be filed.
In support of the respondents’ prayer for the issuance of injunctive
reliefs, they argued that their loss would be irreparable. Moreover, the
resolution of the respondents’ petition for nullification of the partition of
Lot No. 1907-A, in which Carmencita was likewise impleaded as a
defendant, would be rendered useless in the event that the latter’s
complaint for unlawful detainer would be granted and the former’s
ancestral house demolished.
The Ruling of the CA
On March 19, 2009, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision
reversing the disquisitions of the courts a quo and dismissing
Carmencita’s complaint for unlawful detainer. The CA explained:
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when.—Subject to the
provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the
possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person
against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal
representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or
other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper
Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully
withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons
claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together
with damages and costs.
The distinction between forcible entry and unlawful detainer was
lucidly explained in Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals,:
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are two distinct actions
defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. [In] forcible entry,
one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer,
one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or
termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express
or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the
beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior
possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, the possession was
originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination
of the right to possess, hence the issue of rightful possession is
decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual possession and
the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of the defendant’s right
to continue in possession.
What determines the cause of action is the nature of defendant’s entry
into the land. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed
against the intruder within one (1) year therefrom is forcible entry. If,
on the other hand, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter
became illegal, the case is one of unlawful detainer which must be
filed within one (1) year from the date of the last demand.
A close perusal of [Carmencita’s] complaint a quo reveals that the
action was neither one of forcible entry nor unlawful detainer but
essentially involved an issue of ownership which must be resolved in
an accion reivindicatoria. It did not characterize [the respondents’]
alleged entry into the land: whether the same was legal or illegal. It
did not state how [the respondents] entered the land and constructed
a house thereon. It was also silent on whether [the respondents’]
possession became legal before [Carmencita] demanded from them
to vacate the land. The complaint merely averred that their relatives
previously owned the lot [the respondents] were occupying and that
after [Carmencita] purchased it[,] she, as its new owner, demanded
[for the respondents] to vacate the land. Moreover, it is undisputed
that [the respondents] and their ancestors have been occupying the
land for several decades already. There was no averment as to how
or when [Carmencita’s] predecessors tolerated [the respondents’]
possession of the land. Consequently, there was no contract to speak
of, whether express or implied, between [the respondents], on one
hand, and [Carmencita] or her predecessors, on the other, as would
qualify [the respondents’] possession of the land as a case of unlawful
detainer. Neither was it alleged that [the respondents] took
possession of the land through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth to make out a case of forcible entry. In any event, [Carmencita]
cannot legally assert that [the respondents’] possession of the land
was by mere tolerance. This is because [Carmencita’s] predecessors-
in-interest did not yet own the property when [Claudia] took
possession thereof. Take note that [Carmencita’s] predecessors-in-
interest merely stepped into the shoes of their parents who were also
co-heirs of [Claudia]. Finally, to categorize a cause of action as one
constitutive of unlawful detainer, plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance
must have been present from the start of the possession which he
later seek[s] to recover. This is clearly wanting in the case at bar.
Indeed, when the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible
entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was
effected or how and when dispossession started, as in the case at
bar, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion
reivindicatoria in the proper RTC. If [Carmencita] is truly the owner of
the subject property and she was unlawfully deprived of the real right
of possession or ownership thereof, she should present her claim
before the RTC in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria,
and not before the municipal trial court in a summary proceeding of
unlawful detainer or forcible entry.
Munoz vs. Court of Appeals enunciated:
For even if he is the owner, possession of the property cannot be
wrested from another who had been in possession thereof for more
than twelve (12) years through a summary action for ejectment.
Although admittedly[,] petitioner may validly claim ownership based on
the muniments of title it presented, such evidence does not
responsibly address the issue of prior actual possession raised in a
forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of actual
condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet
possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or
terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such
possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the
character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time,
he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he
is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.24 (Citations omitted and
underscoring supplied)
In Carmencita’s Motion for Reconsideration25 filed before the CA, she
alleged that the case of Sarmiento cited by the respondents is not
applicable to the present controversy since it involves a boundary
dispute, which is properly the subject of an accion reivindicatoria and
over which the MTCC has no jurisdiction. She claimed that Rivera v.
Rivera26 finds more relevance in the case at bar. In Rivera, the
contending parties were each other’s relatives and the Court ruled
that in an unlawful detainer case, prior physical possession by the
complainant is not necessary.27Instead, what is required is a better
right of possession. Further, the MTCC cannot be divested of
jurisdiction just because the defendants assert ownership over the
disputed property.
In the herein assailed Resolution dated May 5, 2009, the CA denied
Carmencita’s Motion for Reconsideration.
In essence, the instant petition presents the following issues:
I
Whether or not Carmencita’s complaint against the respondents had
sufficiently alleged and proven a cause of action for unlawful detainer.
II
Whether or not the pendency of the respondents’ petition for
nullification of partition of Lot No. 1907-A and for the issuance of new
certificates of title can abate Carmencita’s ejectment suit.
Carmencita’s Allegations
In support of the petition, Carmencita reiterates that she purchased
the subject lot from the Heirs of Vicente, who were then the registered
owners thereof. At the time of the sale, respondents Felix and Marilou
were occupying the subject lot. Thus, Atty. Pareja, in Carmencita’s
behalf, demanded that they vacate the property. The respondents’
refusal to comply with the demand turned them into deforciants
unlawfully withholding the possession of the subject lot from
Carmencita, the new owner, whose recourse was to file a complaint
for unlawful detainer.
Further, Carmencita insists that a certificate of title shall not be subject
to a collateral attack28 and the issue of ownership cannot be resolved
in an action for unlawful detainer. A pending suit involving the
question of ownership of a piece of real property will not abate an
ejectment complaint as the two are not based on the same cause of
action and are seeking different reliefs.29
Additionally, Carmencita invokes the doctrine in Eastern Shipping
Lines, Inc. v. CA30 that the registered owner of a property is entitled to
its possession. In Arcal v. CA,31 the Court also explained that the
occupation of a property not by its registered owner but by others
depends on the former’s tolerance, and the occupants are bound by
an implied promise to vacate upon demand, failing at which, a suit for
ejectment would be proper.32
The Respondents’Arguments
In their Comment33 to the instant petition, the respondents stress that
Carmencita’s complaint for unlawful detainer was fundamentally
inadequate. There was practically no specific averment as to when
and how possession by tolerance of the respondents began. In the
complaint, Carmencita made a general claim that the respondents
possessed "the property by mere tolerance ‘with the understanding
that they would voluntarily vacate the premises and remove their
house(s) thereon upon demand by the owners’."34 In Spouses Valdez,
Jr. v. CA,35 the Court ruled that the failure of the complainants to
allege key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal
and deprives the MTCC of jurisdiction over the action.
In their rejoinder,36 the respondents likewise argue that the issues of
possession and ownership are inseparably linked in the case at bar.
Carmencita’s complaint for ejectment was based solely on her
spurious title, which is already the subject of the respondents’ petition
for nullification of partition of Lot No. 1907-A.
Our Disquisition
The instant petition lacks merit.
Carmencita had not amply alleged and proven that all the requisites
for unlawful detainer are present in the case at bar.
"Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its
possession. However, the owner cannot simply wrest possession
thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To
recover possession, he must resort to the proper judicial remedy and,
once he chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the
conditions necessary for such action to prosper."37
In Spouses Valdez, Jr.,38 the Court is instructive anent the three kinds
of actions available to recover possession of real property, viz:
(a) accion interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and (c) accion
reivindicatoria.
Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely,
forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico) [sic]. In
forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real property
by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in
unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied. The two are distinguished from each
other in that in forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal
from the beginning, and that the issue is which party has prior de facto
possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant is
originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination
of the right to possess.
The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature,
lies in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. Both
actions must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry
on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last
demand, in case of unlawful detainer. The issue in said cases is the
right to physical possession.
Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of
possession which should be brought in the proper regional trial court
when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an
ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of
realty independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of
the complaint more than one year had elapsed since defendant had
turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s possession had
become illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal
detainer, but an accion publiciana. On the other hand, accion
reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership also brought in the
proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding.39 (Citations
omitted)
In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following key jurisdictional
facts must be alleged and sufficiently established:
(1)initially, possession of property by the defendant was by
contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2)eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by
plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of
possession;
(3)thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the
property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof;
and
(4)within one year from the last demand on defendant to
vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for
ejectment.40
In the case at bar, the first requisite mentioned above is markedly
absent. Carmencita failed to clearly allege and prove how and when
the respondents entered the subject lot and constructed a house upon
it.41 Carmencita was likewise conspicuously silent about the details on
who specifically permitted the respondents to occupy the lot, and how
and when such tolerance came about.42 Instead, Carmencita
cavalierly formulated a legal conclusion, sans factual substantiation,
that (a) the respondents’ initial occupation of the subject lot was lawful
by virtue of tolerance by the registered owners, and (b) the
respondents became deforciants unlawfully withholding the subject
lot’s possession after Carmencita, as purchaser and new registered
owner, had demanded for the former to vacate the property.43 It is
worth noting that the absence of the first requisite assumes even
more importance in the light of the respondents’ claim that for
decades, they have been occupying the subject lot as owners thereof.
Again, this Court stresses that to give the court jurisdiction to effect
the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, it is necessary
that the complaint must sufficiently show such a statement of facts as
to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which the
statutes provide a remedy, without resort to parol testimony, as these
proceedings are summary in nature. In short, the jurisdictional facts
must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to
aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where
it does not state how entry was effected or how and when
dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.44
As an exception to the general rule, the respondents’ petition for
nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907-A can abate Carmencita’s
suit for unlawful detainer.
In Amagan, the Court is emphatic that:
As a general rule, therefore, a pending civil action involving ownership
of the same property does not justify the suspension of ejectment
proceedings. "The underlying reasons for the above ruling were that
the actions in the Regional Trial Court did not involve physical or de
facto possession, and, on not a few occasions, that the case in the
Regional Trial Court was merely a ploy to delay disposition of the
ejectment proceeding, or that the issues presented in the former could
quite as easily be set up as defenses in the ejectment action and
there resolved."
Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await the outcome of
the pending civil action. One such exception is Vda. de Legaspi v.
Avendaño, wherein the Court declared:
"x x x. Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as
distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the right of the plaintiff to
recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial
proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less productive of
confusion and disturbance of physical possession, with all its
concomitant inconvenience and expenses. For the Court in which the
issue of legal possession, whether involving ownership or not, is
brought to restrain, should a petition for preliminary injunction be filed
with it, the effects of any order or decision in the unlawful detainer
case in order to await the final judgment in the more substantive case
involving legal possession or ownership. It is only where there has
been forcible entry that as a matter of public policy the right to
physical possession should be immediately set at rest in favor of the
prior possession regardless of the fact that the other party might
ultimately be found to have superior claim to the premises involved,
thereby to discourage any attempt to recover possession thru force,
strategy or stealth and without resorting to the courts."
 xxxx
Indisputably, the execution of the MCTC Decision would have resulted
in the demolition of the house subject of the ejectment suit; thus, by
parity of reasoning, considerations of equity require the suspension of
the ejectment proceedings. We note that, like Vda. de Legaspi, the
respondent’s suit is one of unlawful detainer and not of forcible entry.
And most certainly, the ejectment of petitioners would mean a
demolition of their house, a matter that is likely to create the
"confusion, disturbance, inconveniences and expenses" mentioned in
the said exceptional case.
Necessarily, the affirmance of the MCTC Decision would cause the
respondent to go through the whole gamut of enforcing it by physically
removing the petitioners from the premises they claim to have been
occupying since 1937. (Respondent is claiming ownership only of the
land, not of the house.) Needlessly, the litigants as well as the courts
will be wasting much time and effort by proceeding at a stage wherein
the outcome is at best temporary, but the result of enforcement is
permanent, unjust and probably irreparable.
We should stress that respondent’s claim to physical possession is
based not on an expired or a violated contract of lease, but allegedly
on "mere tolerance." Without in any way prejudging the proceedings
for the quieting of title, we deem it judicious under the present
exceptional circumstances to suspend the ejectment case.45 (Citations
omitted)
The Court then quoted with favor the following portion of the Decision
dated July 8, 1997, penned by Associate Justice Artemio G. Tuquero
in CA-G.R. No. 43611-SP, from which the Amagan case sprang:
"ONE. Private respondent Teodorico T. Marayag anchors his action
for unlawful detainer on the theory that petitioners’ possession of the
property in question was by mere tolerance. However, in answer to
his demand letter dated April 13, 1996 x x x, petitioners categorically
denied having any agreement with him, verbal or written, asserting
that they are ‘owners of the premises we are occupying at 108 J.P.
Rizal Street, San Vicente, Silang, Cavite.’ In other words, it is not
merely physical possession but ownership as well that is involved in
this case.["]
"TWO. In fact, to protect their rights to the premises in question,
petitioners filed an action for reconveyance, quieting of title and
damages against private respondents, docketed as Civil Case No.
TG-1682 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City. The
issue of ownership is squarely raised in this action. Undoubtedly, the
resolution of this issue will be determinative of who is entitled to the
possession of the premises in question.["]
"THREE. The immediate execution of the judgment in the unlawful
detainer case will include the removal of the petitioners’ house [from]
the lot in question.["]
"To the mind of the Court it is injudicious, nay inequitable, to allow
demolition of petitioners’ house prior to the determination of the
question of ownership [of] the lot on which it stands."46 (Citation
omitted)
We find the doctrines enunciated in Amagan squarely applicable to
the instant petition for reasons discussed hereunder.
Carmencita’s complaint for unlawful detainer is anchored upon the
proposition that the respondents have been in possession of the
subject lot by mere tolerance of the owners. The respondents, on the
other hand, raise the defense of ownership of the subject lot and point
to the pendency of Civil Case No. CEB-30548, a petition for
nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907-A, in which Carmencita
and the Heirs of Vicente were impleaded as parties. Further, should
Carmencita’s complaint be granted, the respondents’ house, which
has been standing in the subject lot for decades, would be subject to
demolition. The foregoing circumstances, thus, justify the exclusion of
the instant petition from the purview of the general rule.
All told, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in dismissing
Carmencita's complaint for unlawful detainer. As discussed above, the
jurisdictional requirement of possession by mere tolerance of the
owners had not been amply alleged and proven. Moreover,
circumstances exist which justify the abatement of the ejectment
proceedings. Carmencita can ventilate her ownership claims in an
action more suited for the purpose. The respondents, on other hand,
need not be exposed to the risk of having their house demolished
pending the resolution of their petition for nullification of the partition of
Lot No. 1907-A, where ownership over the subject lot is likewise
presented as an issue.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DENIED.

The Decision rendered on March 19, 2009 and Resolution issued on

May 5, 2009 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03489 are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 155830 August 15, 2012
NUMERIANO P. ABOBON, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICITAS ABATA ABOBON and GELIMA ABATA
ABOBON, Respondents.
CARPIO,*
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The controversy involves the rightful possession of a parcel of
registered land. The respondents, who were the registered owners,
sued the petitioner, their first cousin, to recover 1the possession of the
land in question, stating that they had only allowed the petitioner to
use the land out of pure benevolence, but the petitioner asserted that
the land belonged to him as owner by right of succession from his
parents.
Antecedents
Respondents Felicitas and Gelima Abobon were the plaintiffs in this
action fer recovery of possession and damages brought against
petitioner Numeriano Abobon (Numeriano) in the 2nd Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Labrador-Sual in Pangasinan (MCTC). They
averred that they were the registered owners of that parcel of
unirrigated riceland with an area of 4,668 square meters, more or
less, and situated in Poblacion, Labrador, Pangasinan, and covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 201367 of the Registry of
Deeds of Pangasinan (Exhibit A); that they had allowed Numeriano,
their first cousin, the free use of the land out of benevolence; and that
they now immediately needed the parcel of land for their own use and
had accordingly demanded that Numeriano should vacate and return
it to them but he had refused.
In his answer, Numeriano admitted being the first cousin of the
respondents and the existence of TCT No. 201367 covering the land
in question, and having received the demand for him to vacate. He
alleged, however, that he did not vacate because he was the owner of
the land in question. He asserted that if the land in question related to
the unirrigated riceland with an area of 3,000 square meters that he
was presently tilling and covered by tax declaration no. 2 in the name
of his father, Rafael Abobon (Rafael), then the respondents did not
have a valid cause of action against him because he had inherited
that portion from his parents; that he and his predecessors-in-interest
had also continuously, publicly and adversely and in the concept of
owner possessed the parcel of land for more than 59 years; that in
1937, his grandfather Emilio Abobon (Emilio), the original owner, had
granted that portion of 3,000 square meters to Rafael when he got
married to his mother, Apolonia Pascua, by means of a
donation propter nuptias; that since then his parents had possessed
and tilled the land; that he himself had exclusively inherited the land
from his parents in 1969 because his brother Jose had received his
own inheritance from their parents; that the possession of his parents
and his own had continued until the present; that assuming that the
respondents were the true owners of the land, they were already
estopped by laches from recovering the portion of 3,000 square
meters from him.
On August 23, 2000, after due proceedings, the MCTC ruled in favor
of the respondents,1 finding that the respondents’ parents Leodegario
Abobon (Leodegario) and Macaria Abata (Macaria) had purchased
the property on February 27, 1941 from Emilio with the conformity of
Emilio’s other children, including Rafael; that on February 4, 1954,
Leodegario and Macaria had registered their title and ownership
under TCT No. 15524; that on February 16, 1954, Leodegario and
Macaria had sold the land to Juan Mamaril; that on February 25,
1954, Juan Mamaril had registered the land in his name under TCT
No. 15678; that on November 13, 1970, Juan Mamaril had sold the
land back to Leodegario, and TCT No. 87308 had been issued under
the name of Leodegario; that on January 16, 1979, Leodegario had
submitted a sworn statement as required by Presidential Decree No.
27 to the effect that his tenant on the land had been one Cornelio
Magno; that on April 15, 1993, the respondents had inherited the land
upon the death of Leodegario; that on October 22, 1994, the
respondents had adjudicated the land unto themselves through a
deed of extrajudicial settlement; that after due publication of the deed
of extrajudicial settlement, the respondents had registered the land in
their own names on December 20, 1994, resulting in the issuance of
TCT No. 201367 to them; that after the 1989 palay harvest, the
respondents had allowed the petitioner the free use of the land out of
benevolence; that the respondents had started to verbally demand
that the petitioner vacate the land on May 25, 1993; and that because
the petitioner had refused to vacate, the respondents had then
brought a complaint in the barangay on May 31, 1996, where
mediation had failed to settle the dispute.
The MCTC further found that the 3,000 square-meter land Numeriano
referred to as donated to his parents was not the same as the land in
question due to their boundaries being entirely different; that in the
donation propter nuptias (Exhibit 11), Emilio had stated that the
parcels of land thereby covered had not been registered under Act
No. 496 or under the provisions of the Spanish Mortgage Law,
whereas the land in question had already been registered; that even
assuming that the 3,000 square-meter land was inside the land in
question, his claim would still not prosper because the
donation propter nuptias in his parents’ favor had been invalid for not
having been signed and accepted in writing by Rafael, his father; that
the donation propter nuptias had also been cancelled or dissolved
when his mother had signed as an instrumental witness and his father
had given his consent to the sale of the land in question then covered
by Original Certificate No. 28727 by Emilio to Leodegario; and that his
parents’ assent to the sale signified either that his parents had
conformed to the dissolution of the donation propter nuptias in their
favor, or that the land sold to Leodegario had been different from the
land donated to them.
The MCTC held that the respondents were not guilty of laches
because of their numerous acts and transactions from 1941 until 1996
involving the land in question, specifically: (a) the sale of the land to
Juan Mamaril and its repurchase by Leodogario; (b) the registration of
title and ownership; (c) the extrajudicial partition of the property by the
heirs of Leodegario; (d) Numeriano’s free use of the land from 1989
onwards upon being allowed to do so by the respondents; (e) the
verbal demands from the respondents since 1993 for Numeriano to
vacate the land; and (f) the commencement of the action to recover
possession against Numeriano. It considered such acts and
transactions as negating any notion of the respondents’ abandonment
of their right to assert ownership.2
The MCTC disposed thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant as follows:
1. Declaring the plaintiffs as the true and lawful owner and possessor
of the land in question;
2. Ordering the defendant to vacate the premises in question and to
surrender its possession to the plaintiffs;
3. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the amount of ₱
20,000.00 as moral damages and the amount of ₱ 5,000.00 as
exemplary damages;
4. Ordering the defendant to pay the amount of ₱ 10,000.00 as and
for attorney’s fees;
5. Dismissing the counterclaim;
6. Ordering the defendant to pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.3
Numeriano appealed to the Regional Trial Court in Lingayen City,
Pangasinan (RTC), which, on April 16, 2001, upheld the MCTC,4 viz:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES well-considered, the appeal taken by
defendant/appellant is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Citing the variance between the description of the land in question
and the description of the land covered by the donation propter
nuptias, as well as the failure of Numeriano to explain his parents’
participation in the sale of the land in question in 1941 to Leodegario
and Macaria, the RTC concluded that the land in question was really
separate and distinct from the property donated to his parents in
1937;5 and lent credence to the respondents’ claim that they had
allowed him to use the land only out of their benevolence.6
Still dissatisfied, Numeriano appealed via petition for review to the
Court of Appeals (CA), submitting that he was the lawful owner and
possessor of the 3,000 square meter parcel of land that he occupied
and cultivated; and that the respondents’ TCT was invalid.7
On May 16, 2002, however, the CA rejected Numeriano’s
submissions and affirmed the RTC,8 holding that the respondents
were in possession of a certificate of title that enjoyed the conclusive
presumption of validity, by virtue of which they were entitled to
possess the land in question; that the parcel of land that he owned
was different from the land in question; and that his impugning the
validity of the respondents’ TCT partook of the nature of an
impermissible collateral attack against the TCT, considering that the
validity of a Torrens title could be challenged only directly through an
action instituted for that purpose.9
The CA, pointing out that the MCTC’s declaration that the
respondents were the true owners of the land in question went
beyond the ambit of a possessory action that was limited to
determining only the issue of physical possession,10 deleted the
declaration, and disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered. The Decision
under appeal is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the
declaration by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of respondents as to
the owners of the subject parcel of land is deleted.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this appeal, with Numeriano positing as follows:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN AWARDING POSSESSION OF SUBJECT PREMISES TO
RESPONDENTS WITHOUT CITING ANY REASONS THEREFOR
AND DESPITE THE FACT THAT EVIDENCE ON HAND SHOWS
PETITIONER BECAME THE LAWFUL OWNER THEREOF PRIOR
TO TIME RESPONDENTS ACQUIRED THE SAME.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE LOT BEING CLAIMED BY
RESPONDENTS IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT BEING CLAIMED BY
PETITIONER.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER SHOULD FILE A SEPARATE
ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF TITLE AS THERE IS NO NEED
THEREFOR.
IV.
ASSUMING SANS ADMITTING THAT PETITIONER IS NOT THE
LAWFUL OWNER OF SUBJECT PREMISES, WHETHER OR NOT
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
RTC’S AND MCTC’S DECISIONS ORDERING PETITIONER TO PAY
DAMAGES, ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS OF SUIT AND
DISMISSING HIS COUNTERCLAIM.11
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
First of all, a fundamental principle in land registration under the
Torrens system is that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the
person whose name appears therein.12 The certificate of title thus
becomes the best proof of ownership of a parcel of land;13 hence,
anyone who deals with property registered under the Torrens system
may rely on the title and need not go beyond the title.14 This reliance
on the certificate of title rests on the doctrine of indefeasibility of the
land title, which has long been well-settled in this jurisdiction. It is only
when the acquisition of the title is attended with fraud or bad faith that
the doctrine of indefeasibility finds no application.15
Accordingly, we rule for the respondents on the issue of the
preferential right to the possession of the land in question. Their
having preferential right conformed to the age-old rule that whoever
held a Torrens title in his name is entitled to the possession of the
land covered by the title.16 Indeed, possession, which is the holding of
a thing or the enjoyment of a right,17 was but an attribute of their
registered ownership.
It is beyond question under the law that the owner has not only the
right to enjoy and dispose of a thing without other limitations than
those established by law, but also the right of action against the
holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it.18 He may
exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal of the thing,
and, for this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably
necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful
physical invasion or usurpation of his property.19
Secondly, Numeriano denies to the respondents the right to rely on
their TCT, insisting that he had become the legal owner of the land in
question even before the respondents had acquired it by succession
from their parents, and that he had acted in good faith in possessing
the land in question since then. He argues that he did not need to file
a separate direct action to annul the respondents’ title because "by
proving that they are owners thereof, said title may be annulled as an
incidental result."20
Numeriano’s argument lacks legal basis. In order for him to properly
assail the validity of the respondents’ TCT, he must himself bring an
action for that purpose. Instead of bringing that direct action, he
mounted his attack as a merely defensive allegation herein. Such
manner of attack against the TCT was a collateral one, which was
disallowed by Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (The
Property Registration Decree), viz:
Section 48. Certificate not Subject to Collateral attack. — A certificate
of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered,
modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance
with law.
Thirdly, the core issue in an action for the recovery of possession of
realty like this one concerned only the priority right to the possession
of the realty.21 As such, Numeriano’s assertion of ownership in his
own right could not be finally and substantively determined herein, for
it was axiomatic that the adjudication of the question of ownership in
an action for the recovery of possession of realty would only be
provisional and would not even be a bar to an action between the
same parties involving the ownership of the same property.22
Fourthly, Numeriano insists that the land he occupied had been
donated to his parents and was different from the land in question.
His insistence was bereft of factual support. All the lower courts
uniformly found that his evidence related to a parcel of land entirely
different from the land in question. According to the MCTC, "the land
for which he has presented evidence to support his claim of
ownership is entirely different from the land the plaintiffs are
claiming."23 On its part, the RTC held that "the land, subject matter of
this controversy is all of 4668 sq. meters and bearing different
boundaries from that of the donated property and was already
registered under OCT No. 28727 as early as 1926," such that "the
subject property is separate and distinct from that property donated to
the defendant’s parents in 1937."24 Agreeing with both lower courts,
the CA declared: "(i)n fine, what these decisions are saying is that
petitioner may have evidence that he owns a parcel of land but, based
on the evidence he had presented, the said parcel of land is different
from the one he is presently occupying."25
We sustain the lower courts. The findings of fact of lower courts,
particularly when affirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive upon
the Court. In this as well as in other appeals, the Court, not being a
trier of facts, does not review their findings, especially when they are
supported by the records or based on substantial evidence.26 It is not
the function of the Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over again,
unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower courts are
absolutely devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous as to
constitute palpable error or grave abuse of discretion.27 There has
been no such showing made by Numeriano herein.
Lastly, the Court must undo the awards of moral and exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees.
To be recoverable, moral damages must be capable of proof and
must be actually proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. Courts
cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in
determining the fact and amount of damages.28 Yet, nothing was awards of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees
adduced here to justify the grant of moral damages. What we have are DELETED.
was only the allegation on moral damages, with the complaint stating
that the respondents had been forced to litigate, and that they had The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety and wounded feelings from
the petitioner’s refusal to restore the possession of the land in SO ORDERED.
question to them.29 The allegation did not suffice, for allegation was
not proof of the facts alleged. LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
The Court cannot also affirm the exemplary damages granted in favor
of the respondents. Exemplary damages were proper only if the
respondents, as the plaintiffs, showed their entitlement to moral,
temperate or compensatory damages.30 Yet, they did not establish
their entitlement to such other damages.

As to attorney’s fees, the general rule is that such fees cannot be

recovered by a successful litigant as part of the damages to be
assessed against the losing party because of the policy that no
premium should be placed on the right to litigate.31 Indeed, prior to the
effectivity of the present Civil Code, such fees could be recovered
only when there was a stipulation to that effect. It was only under the
present Civil Code that the right to collect attorney’s fees in the cases
mentioned in Article 220832 of the Civil Code came to be
recognized.33 Such fees are now included in the concept of actual
damages.34

Even so, whenever attorney’s fees are proper in a case, the decision
rendered therein should still expressly state the factual basis
and legal justification for granting them.35 Granting them in the
dispositive portion of the judgment is not enough;36 a discussion of
the .factual basis and legal justification for them must be laid out in the
body of the decision.37 Considering that the award of attorney's fees in
favor of the respondents fell short of this requirement, the Court
disallows the award for want of the factual and legal premises in the
body of the decision. 38 The requirement for express findings of fact
and law has been set in order to bring the case within the exception
and justify the award of the attorney's fees. Otherwise, the award is a
conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to
speculation and conjecture.39

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on May

16, 2002 by the Court of Appeals, with the MODIFICATION that the
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 76217 September 14, 1989
GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO VILLEZA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-76216 September 14, 1989
GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ORLANDO
GERNALE, respondents.
Alam, Verano & Associates for petitioner.
Francisco D. Lozano for private respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose, residents
of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are the owners of a parcel of land
situated in Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of
232,942 square meters and covered by TCT No. 50023 of the
Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal issued on September 11,
1980 which canceled TCT No. 56762/ T-560. The land was originally
registered on August 5, 1948 in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Rizal as OCT No. 19, pursuant to a Homestead Patent granted by the
President of the Philippines on July 27, 1948, under Act No. 141.
On February 26, 1982, the spouses Jose executed a special power of
attorney authorizing petitioner German Management Services to
develop their property covered by TCT No. 50023 into a residential
subdivision. Consequently, petitioner on February 9,1983 obtained
Development Permit No. 00424 from the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission for said development. Finding that part of the
property was occupied by private respondents and twenty other
persons, petitioner advised the occupants to vacate the premises but
the latter refused. Nevertheless, petitioner proceeded with the
development of the subject property which included the portions
occupied and cultivated by private respondents.
Private respondents filed an action for forcible entry against petitioner
before the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, alleging that they
are mountainside farmers of Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal
and members of the Concerned Citizens of Farmer's Association; that
they have occupied and tilled their farmholdings some twelve to fifteen
years prior to the promulgation of P.D. No. 27; that during the first
week of August 1983, petitioner, under a permit from the Office of the
Provincial Governor of Rizal, was allowed to improve the Barangay
Road at Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal at its expense,
subject to the condition that it shag secure the needed right of way
from the owners of the lot to be affected; that on August 15, 1983 and
thereafter, petitioner deprived private respondents of their property
without due process of law by: (1) forcibly removing and destroying
the barbed wire fence enclosing their farmholdings without notice; (2)
bulldozing the rice, corn fruit bearing trees and other crops of private
respondents by means of force, violence and intimidation, in violation
of P.D. 1038 and (3) trespassing, coercing and threatening to harass,
remove and eject private respondents from their respective
farmholdings in violation of P.D. Nos. 316, 583, 815, and 1028. 1
On January 7,1985, the Municipal Trial Court dismissed private
respondents' complaint for forcible entry. 2 On appeal, the Regional
Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch LXXI sustained the dismissal by
the Municipal Trial Court. 3
Private respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals. On July 24,1986, said court gave due course to their petition
and reversed the decisions of the Municipal Trial Court and the
Regional Trial Court. 4
The Appellate Court held that since private respondents were in
actual possession of the property at the time they were forcibly
ejected by petitioner, private respondents have a right to commence
an action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality of
possession. 5 Petitioner moved to reconsider but the same was
denied by the Appellate Court in its resolution dated September 26,
1986. 6
Hence, this recourse.
The issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals denied
due process to petitioner when it reversed the decision of the court a
quo without giving petitioner the opportunity to file its answer and
whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry
case against petitioner. 7
We affirm. The Court of Appeals need not require petitioner to file an
answer for due process to exist. The comment filed by petitioner on
February 26, 1986 has sufficiently addressed the issues presented in
the petition for review filed by private respondents before the Court of
Appeals. Having heard both parties, the Appellate Court need not
await or require any other additional pleading. Moreover, the fact that
petitioner was heard by the Court of Appeals on its motion for
reconsideration negates any violation of due process.
Notwithstanding petitioner's claim that it was duly authorized by the
owners to develop the subject property, private respondents, as actual
possessors, can commence a forcible entry case against petitioner
because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting
process and never determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not
involved. 8
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that at the time petitioner entered
the property, private respondents were already in possession thereof .
There is no evidence that the spouses Jose were ever in possession
of the subject property. On the contrary, private respondents'
peaceable possession was manifested by the fact that they even
planted rice, corn and fruit bearing trees twelve to fifteen years prior to
petitioner's act of destroying their crops.
Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on
the muniments of title it presented, such evidence does not
responsively address the issue of prior actual possession raised in a
forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of the actual
condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet
possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or
terror. 9 Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover
such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be
the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in
time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property
until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. 10
Both the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court have
rationalized petitioner's drastic action of bulldozing and destroying the
crops of private respondents on the basis of the doctrine of self-help
enunciated in Article 429 of the New Civil Code. 11 Such justification is
unavailing because the doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at
the time of actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in the
case at bar. When possession has already been lost, the owner must
resort to judicial process for the recovery of property. This is clear
from Article 536 of the Civil Code which states, "(I)n no case may
possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there
is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an
action or right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke
the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver
the thing."
WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to DENY the instant petition. The
decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 24,1986 is hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., concurs in the result.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28716 November 18, 1970
FELIX CAISIP, IGNACIO ROJALES and FEDERICO
VILLADELREY, Petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents.
Godofredo F. Trajano and Rafael A. Francisco for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant
Solicitor General Antonio G. Ibarra and Solicitor Conrado T.
Limcaoco for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
This case is before Us upon petition of defendants Felix
Caisip, Ignacio Rojales and Federico Villadelrey, for review on
certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed
that of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, convicting
them of the crime of Grave Coercion, with which they are
charged, and sentencing each to four (4) months and one (1)
day of arresto mayor and to pay a fine of P200.00, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, not to exceed
one-third of the principal penalty, as well as one-third of the
costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
As set forth in the trial court's decision, the background of
the present case is this:
The complainant Gloria Cabalag is the wife of Marcelino
Guevarra who cultivated a parcel of land known as Lot 105-A
of Hacienda Palico situated in sitio Bote-bote, barrio
Tampisao, Nasugbu, Batangas. The said parcel of land used
to be tenanted by the deceased father of the complainant.
Hacienda Palico is owned by Roxas y Cia. and administered
by Antonio Chuidian. The overseer of the said hacienda is
Felix Caisip, one of the accused herein. Even before the
occurrence of the incident presently involved, there had been
a series of misunderstandings and litigations involving the
complainant and her husband, on one hand, and the men of
Hacienda Palico on the
other.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It appears that on December 23, 1957, Marcelino Guevarra
filed an action with the Court of Agrarian Relations seeking
recognition as a lawful tenant of Roxas y Cia. over lot No.
105-A of Hacienda Palico. In a decision dated February 22,
1958, the Court of Agrarian Relations declared it has no
jurisdiction over the case, inasmuch as Guevarra is not a
tenant on the said parcel of land. An appeal was taken by
Guevarra to the Supreme Court, but the appeal was
dismissed in a resolution dated April 10,
1958.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On May 17, 1958, Roxas y Cia. filed an action against
Marcelino Guevarra in the justice of the peace court of
Nasugbu, Batangas, for forcible entry, praying therein that
Guevarra be ejected from the premises of Lot No. 105-A.
After due hearing, the said Court in a decision dated May 2,
1959 ordered Guevarra to vacate the lot and to pay damages
and accrued rentals. A writ of execution was issued by
Justice of the Peace Rodolfo A. Castillo of Nasugbu, which
was served on Guevarra on June 6, 1959, and the return of
which was made by Deputy Sheriff Leonardo R. Aquino of
this Court on June 23, 1959 (Exhibit "10"). The writ recites
among other things that the possession of the land was
delivered to the Roxas y Cia. thru Felix Caisip, the overseer,
and Guevarra was given twenty days from June 6, 1959
within which to leave the premises.
The record before Us does not explain why said decision was
executed. According to the complainant, her husband's
counsel had appealed from said decision. The justice of the
peace who rendered it, Hon. Rodolfo Castillo, said that there
really had been an attempt to appeal, which was not given
due course because the reglementary period therefor had
expired; that a motion to reconsider his order to this effect
was denied by him; and that a second motion for
reconsideration was "still pending consideration," and it was
October 19, 1959 when such testimony was
given.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Continuing the narration of the antecedent facts, His Honor,
the Trial Judge, added:
On June 15, 1959, some trouble occurred between the
complainant and Caisip regarding the cutting of sugar cane
on Lot 105-A. The following day June 16, 1959, the
complainant allegedly again entered the premises of Lot 105-
A and refused to be driven out by Felix Caisip. Due to the
aforementioned incidents, Gloria Cabalag was charged in the
justice of the peace court of Nasugbu, Batangas, with grave
coercion for the incident of June 15, 1959, docketed in the
said court as Criminal Case No. 968 (Exhibit "3"); and with
the crime of unjust vexation for the incident of June 16,
1959, docketed in the said court as Criminal Case No. 970.
Both cases, however, were filed only on June 25, 1959.
In other words, these criminal cases, Nos. 968 and 970,
against Gloria Cabalag, were filed eight (8) days after the
incident involved in the case at bar. It is, also, noteworthy
that both cases were - on motion of the prosecution, filed
after a reinvestigation thereof - provisionally dismissed, on
November 8, 1960, by the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, upon the ground "that the evidence of record ...
are insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt." The decision of said court, in the case at
bar, goes on to say:
It further appears that due to the tenacious attitude of Gloria
Cabalag to remain in the premises, Caisip sought the help of
the chief of police of Nasugbu who advised him to see
Deputy Sheriff Aquino about the matter. The latter, however,
informed Caisip that he could not act on the request to eject
Gloria Cabalag and to stop her from what she was doing
without a proper court order. Caisip then consulted Antonio
Chuidian, the hacienda administrator, who, in turn, went to
the chief of police and requested for the detail of policemen
in sitio Bote-bote. The chief of police, acting on said request,
assigned the accused Ignacio Rojales and Federico
Villadelrey, police sergeant and police corporal, respectively,
of the Nasugbu Police Force, to sitio Bote-bote. 1chanrobles
virtual law library
On June 17, 1959, at about 5:00 p.m., Gloria Cabalag was
seen weeding the portion of Lot 105-A which was a ricefield.
Appellant Caisip approached her and bade her to leave, but
she refused to do so, alleging that she and her husband had
the right to stay there and that the crops thereon belong to
them. She having stuck to this attitude, even when he
threatened to call the police, Caisip went to his co-
defendants, Sgt. Rojales and Cpl. Villadelrey, both of the
local police, who were some distance away, and brought
them with him. Rojales told Gloria, who was then in a
squatting position, to stop weeding. As Gloria insisted on her
right to stay in said lot, Rojales grabbed her right hand and,
twisting the same, wrested therefrom the trowel she was
holding. Thereupon, Villadelrey held her left hand and,
together with Rojales, forcibly dragged her northward -
towards a forested area, where there was a banana
plantation - as Caisip stood nearby, with a drawn
gun.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Inasmuch as Gloria shouted "Ina ko po! Ina ko po!" 2her
neighbors, Librada Dulutan, followed, soon later, by
Francisca Andino, came and asked the policemen why they
were dragging her. The policemen having answered that they
would take Gloria to town which was on the west - Francisca
Andino pleaded that Gloria be released, saying that, if their
purpose was as stated by them, she (Gloria) would willingly
go with them. By this time, Gloria had already been dragged
about eight meters and her dress, as well as her
blouse 3were torn. She then agreed to proceed westward to
the municipal building, and asked to be allowed to pass by
her house, within Lot 105-A, in order to breast-feed her
nursing infant, but, the request was turned down. As they
passed, soon later, near the house of Zoilo Rivera, head of
the tenant organization to which she was affiliated, in the
barrio of Camachilihan, Gloria called out for him, whereupon,
he went down the house and accompanied them to the
municipal building. Upon arrival thereat, Rojales and
Villadelrey turned her over to the policeman on duty, and
then departed. After being interrogated by the chief of police,
Gloria was, upon representations made by Zoilo Rivera,
released and allowed to go
home.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The foregoing is the prosecution's version. That of the
defense is to the effect that, upon being asked by the
policemen to stop weeding and leave the premises, Gloria,
not only refused to do so, but, also, insulted them, as well as
Caisip. According to the defense, she was arrested because
of the crime of slander then committed by her. Appellants
Rojales and Villadelrey, moreover, testified that, as they
were heading towards the barrio of Camachilihan, Gloria
proceeded to tear her
clothes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
His Honor, the Trial Judge, accepted, however, the version of
the prosecution and found that of the defense unworthy of
credence. The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, which
fully concurred in this view, are "final," and our authority to
review on certiorari its appealed decision is limited to
questions purely of law. 4Appellants maintain that the Court
of Appeals has erred: (1) in not finding their acts "justified
under Article 429 of the New Civil Code"; (2) in holding that
the 20-day period of grace given to Marcelino Guevarra and
his wife, Gloria Cabalag, by the sheriff, to vacate Lot 105-A,
was valid and lawful; (3) in finding that the elements of the
crime of grave coercion are present in the case at bar; and
(4) in finding appellants guilty as charged. This pretense is
clearly untenable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
Art. 429 of our Civil Code, reading:
The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to
exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof.
For this purpose, he may use such force as may be
reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or
threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his
property.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
upon which appellants rely is obviously inapplicable to the
case at bar, for, having been given 20 days from June 6,
1959, within which to vacate Lot 105-A, complainant did not,
on June 17, 1959 - or within said period - invade or usurp
said lot. She had merely remained in possession thereof,
even though the hacienda owner may have become its co-
possessor. Appellants did not "repel or prevent in actual
or threatened ... physical invasion or usurpation."
They expelled Gloria from a property of which she and her
husband were in possession even before the action for
forcible entry was filed against them on May 17, 1958,
despite the fact that the Sheriff had explicitly authorized
them to stay in said property up to June 26, 1959, and had
expressed the view that he could not oust them therefrom on
June 17, 1959, without a judicial order therefor.
It is urged, that, by weeding and refusing to leave Lot 105-A,
Gloria had committed a crime in the presence of the
policemen, despite the aforementioned 20-day period, which,
appellants claim, the sheriff had no authority to grant. This
contention is manifestly untenable, because: (1) said period
was granted in the presence of the hacienda owner's
representative, appellant Caisip, who, by not objecting
thereto, had impliedly consented to or ratified the act
performed by the sheriff; (2) Gloria and her husband were
thereby allowed to remain, and had, in fact, remained, in
possession of the premises, perhaps together with the owner
of the hacienda or his representative, Caisip; (3) the act of
removing weeds from the ricefield was beneficial to its owner
and to whomsoever the crops belonged, and, even if they
had not authorized it, does not constitute a criminal offense;
and (4) although Gloria and her husband had been sentenced
to vacate the land, the judgment against them did not
necessarily imply that they, as the parties who had tilled it
and planted thereon, had no rights, of any kind whatsoever,
in or to the standing crops, inasmuch as "necessary
expenses shall be refunded to every possessor," 5and the
cost of cultivation, production and upkeep has been held to
partake of the nature of necessary expenses. 6chanrobles
virtual law library
It is, accordingly, clear that appellants herein had, by means
of violence, and without legal authority therefor, prevented
the complainant from "doing something not prohibited by
law," (weeding and being in Lot 105-A), and compelled her
"to do something against" her will (stopping the weeding and
leaving said lot), "whether it be right or wrong," thereby
taking the law into their hands, in violation of Art. 286 of the
Revised Penal Code. 7chanrobles virtual law library
Appellant Caisip argues that, not having used violence
against the complaining witness, he should be acquitted of
the charge. In this connection, His Honor, the Trial Judge,
correctly observed:
... While it is true that the accused Caisip did not lay hands
on the complainant, unlike the accused Rojales and
Villadelrey who were the ones who used force against Gloria,
and while the Court is also inclined to discredit the claim of
the complainant that Felix Caisip drew a gun during the
incident, it sufficiently appears from the record that the
motivation and inducement for the coercion perpetrated on
the complainant came from the accused Caisip. It was his
undisguised and particular purpose to prevent Gloria from
entering the land and working on the same. He was the one
who first approached Gloria with this objective in mind, and
tried to prevent her from weeding the land. He had tried to
stop Gloria from doing the same act even the day previous to
the present incident. It was Caisip who fetched the
policemen in order to accomplish his purpose of preventing
Gloria from weeding the land and making her leave the
premises. The policemen obeyed his bidding, and even when
the said policemen were already over-asserting their
authority as peace officers, Caisip simply stood by without
attempting to stop their abuses. He could be hardly said to
have disapproved an act which he himself induced and
initiated. 8chanrobles virtual law library
In other words, there was community of purpose between
the policemen and Caisip, so that the latter is guilty of grave
coercion, as a co-conspirator, apart from being a principal by
induction. 9chanrobles virtual law library
In the commission of the offense, the aggravating
circumstances of abuse of superior strength 10and disregard
of the respect due the offended party, by reason of her
sex, 11were present, insofar as the three appellants herein
are concerned. As regards appellants Rojales and Villadelrey,
there was the additional aggravating circumstance of having
taken advantage of their positions as members of the local
police force. Hence, the penalty of imprisonment meted out
to appellants herein, which is the minimum of the maximum
prescribed in said Art. 286, 12and the fine imposed upon
them, are in accordance with
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed,
with costs against the defendants-appellants. It is so
ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-59603 April 29, 1987
EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CEFERINO E. DULAY, in his capacity as the Presiding
Judge, Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu
City, and SAN ANTONIO DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
Elena M. Cuevas for respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The question raised in this petition is whether or not Presidential
Decrees Numbered 76, 464, 794 and 1533 have repealed and
superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court,
such that in determining the just compensation of property in an
expropriation case, the only basis should be its market value as
declared by the owner or as determined by the assessor, whichever is
lower.
On January 15, 1979, the President of the Philippines, issued
Proclamation No. 1811, reserving a certain parcel of land of the public
domain situated in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu and
covering a total area of 1,193,669 square meters, more or less, for the
establishment of an export processing zone by petitioner Export
Processing Zone Authority (EPZA).
Not all the reserved area, however, was public land. The proclamation
included, among others, four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate
area of 22,328 square meters owned and registered in the name of
the private respondent. The petitioner, therefore, offered to purchase
the parcels of land from the respondent in acccordance with the
valuation set forth in Section 92, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 464,
as amended. The parties failed to reach an agreement regarding the
sale of the property.
The petitioner filed with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, a complaint for expropriation with a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession against the private
respondent, to expropriate the aforesaid parcels of land pursuant to
P.D. No. 66, as amended, which empowers the petitioner to acquire
by condemnation proceedings any property for the establishment of
export processing zones, in relation to Proclamation No. 1811, for the
purpose of establishing the Mactan Export Processing Zone.
On October 21, 1980, the respondent judge issued a writ of
possession authorizing the petitioner to take immediate possession of
the premises. On December 23, 1980, the private respondent flied its
answer.
At the pre-trial conference on February 13, 1981, the respondent
judge issued an order stating that the parties have agreed that the
only issue to be resolved is the just compensation for the properties
and that the pre-trial is thereby terminated and the hearing on the
merits is set on April 2, 1981.
On February 17, 1981, the respondent judge issued the order of
condemnation declaring the petitioner as having the lawful right to
take the properties sought to be condemned, upon the payment of just
compensation to be determined as of the filing of the complaint. The
respondent judge also issued a second order, subject of this petition,
appointing certain persons as commissioners to ascertain and report
to the court the just compensation for the properties sought to be
expropriated.
On June 19, 1981, the three commissioners submitted their
consolidated report recommending the amount of P15.00 per square
meter as the fair and reasonable value of just compensation for the
properties.
On July 29, 1981, the petitioner Med a Motion for Reconsideration of
the order of February 19, 1981 and Objection to Commissioner's
Report on the grounds that P.D. No. 1533 has superseded Sections 5
to 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of just
compensation through commissioners; and that the compensation
must not exceed the maximum amount set by P.D. No. 1533.
On November 14, 1981, the trial court denied the petitioner's motion
for reconsideration and gave the latter ten (10) days within which to
file its objection to the Commissioner's Report.
On February 9, 1982, the petitioner flied this present petition for
certiorari and mandamus with preliminary restraining order, enjoining
the trial court from enforcing the order dated February 17, 1981 and
from further proceeding with the hearing of the expropriation case.
The only issue raised in this petition is whether or not Sections 5 to 8,
Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court had been repealed or deemed
amended by P.D. No. 1533 insofar as the appointment of
commissioners to determine the just compensation is concerned.
Stated in another way, is the exclusive and mandatory mode of
determining just compensation in P.D. No. 1533 valid and
constitutional?
The petitioner maintains that the respondent judge acted in excess of
his jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in denying the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration and in setting the
commissioner's report for hearing because under P.D. No. 1533,
which is the applicable law herein, the basis of just compensation
shall be the fair and current market value declared by the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated or such market value as
determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. Therefore, there is
no more need to appoint commissioners as prescribed by Rule 67 of
the Revised Rules of Court and for said commissioners to consider
other highly variable factors in order to determine just compensation.
The petitioner further maintains that P.D. No. 1533 has vested on the
assessors and the property owners themselves the power or duty to
fix the market value of the properties and that said property owners
are given the full opportunity to be heard before the Local Board of
Assessment Appeals and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.
Thus, the vesting on the assessor or the property owner of the right to
determine the just compensation in expropriation proceedings, with
appropriate procedure for appeal to higher administrative boards, is
valid and constitutional.
Prior to the promulgation of P.D. Nos. 76, 464, 794 and 1533, this
Court has interpreted the eminent domain provisions of the
Constitution and established the meaning, under the fundametal law,
of just compensation and who has the power to determine it. Thus, in
the following cases, wherein the filing of the expropriation proceedings
were all commenced prior to the promulgation of the aforementioned
decrees, we laid down the doctrine onjust compensation:
Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals (93 SCRA 503, 516),
xxx xxx xxx
"And in the case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration, 31 SCRA 413, the Court, speaking thru now Chief
Justice Fernando, reiterated the 'well-settled (rule) that just
compensation means the equivalent for the value of the property at
the time of its taking. Anything beyond that is more and anything short
of that is less, than just compensation. It means a fair and full
equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the measure of the
indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity."
Garcia v. Court ofappeals (102 SCRA 597, 608),
xxx xxx xxx
"Hence, in estimating the market value, all the capabilities of
the property and all the uses to which it may be applied or for
which it is adapted are to be considered and not merely the
condition it is in the time and the use to which it is then applied
by the owner. All the facts as to the condition of the property
and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities may
be shown and considered in estimating its value."
Republic v. Santos (141 SCRA 30, 35-36),
"According to section 8 of Rule 67, the court is not bound by
the commissioners' report. It may make such order or render
such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property
essential to the exercise of his right of condemnation, and to
the defendant just compensation for the property expropriated.
This Court may substitute its own estimate of the value as
gathered from the record (Manila Railroad Company v.
Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286)."
However, the promulgation of the aforementioned decrees practically
set aside the above and many other precedents hammered out in the
course of evidence-laden, well argued, fully heard, studiously
deliberated, and judiciously considered court proceedings. The
decrees categorically and peremptorily limited the definition of just
compensation thus:
P.D. No. 76:
xxx xxx xxx
"For purposes of just compensation in cases of private
property acquired by the government for public use, the basis
shall be the current and fair market value declared by the
owner or administrator, or such market value as determined by
the Assessor, whichever is lower."
P.D. No. 464:
"Section 92. Basis for payment of just compensation in
expropriation proceedings. — In determining just
compensation which private property is acquired by the
government for public use, the basis shall be the market value
declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal
interest in the property, or such market value as determined by
the assessor, whichever is lower."
P.D. No. 794:
"Section 92. Basis for payment of just compensation in
expropriation proceedings. — In determining just
compensation when private property is acquired by the
government for public use, the same shall not exceed the
market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone
having legal interest in the property, or such market value as
determined by the assessor, whichever is lower."
P.D. No. 1533:
"Section 1. In determining just compensation for private
property acquired through eminent domain proceedings, the
compensation to be paid shall not exceed the value declared
by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest
in the property or determined by the assessor, pursuant to the
Real Property Tax Code, whichever value is lower, prior to the
recommendation or decision of the appropriate Government
office to acquire the property."
We are constrained to declare the provisions of the Decrees on just
compensation unconstitutional and void and accordingly dismiss the
instant petition for lack of merit.
The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited
decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial
prerogatives. It tends to render this Court inutile in a matter which
under the Constitution is reserved to it for final determination.
Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically
would still have the power to determine the just compensation for the
property, following the applicable decrees, its task would be relegated
to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by
the owner or the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be
useless for the court to appoint commissioners under Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court. Moreover, the need to satisfy the due process clause
in the taking of private property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be
said that a judicial proceeding was not had before the actual taking.
However, the strict application of the decrees during the proceedings
would be nothing short of a mere formality or charade as the court has
only to choose between the valuation of the owner and that of the
assessor, and its choice is always limited to the lower of the two. The
court cannot exercise its discretion or independence in determining
what is just or fair. Even a grade school pupil could substitute for the
judge insofar as the determination of constitutional just compensation
is concerned.
In the case of National Housing Authority v. Reyes (123 SCRA 245),
this Court upheld P.D. No. 464, as further amended by P.D. Nos. 794,
1224 and 1259. In this case, the petitioner National Housing Authority
contended that the owner's declaration at P1,400.00 which happened
to be lower than the assessor's assessment, is the just compensation
for the respondent's property under section 92 of P.D. No. 464. On the
other hand, the private respondent stressed that while there may be
basis for the allegation that the respondent judge did not follow the
decree, the matter is still subject to his final disposition, he having
been vested with the original and competent authority to exercise his
judicial discretion in the light of the constitutional clauses on due
process and equal protection.
To these opposing arguments, this Court ruled ihat under the
conceded facts, there should be a recognition that the law as it stands
must be applied; that the decree having spoken so clearly and
unequivocably calls for obedience; and that on a matter where the
applicable law speaks in no uncertain language, the Court has no
choice except to yield to its command. We further stated that "the
courts should recognize that the rule introduced by P.D. No. 76 and
reiterated in subsequent decrees does not upset the established
concepts of justice or the constitutional provision on just
compensation for, precisely, the owner is allowed to make his own
valuation of his property."
While the Court yielded to executive prerogative exercised in the form
of absolute law-making power, its members, nonetheless, remained
uncomfortable with the implications of the decision and the abuse and
unfairness which might follow in its wake. For one thing, the President
himself did not seem assured or confident with his own enactment. It
was not enough to lay down the law on determination of just
compensation in P.D. 76. It had to be repeated and reiterated in P.D.
464, P.D. 794, and P.D. 1533. The provision is also found in P.D.
1224, P.D. 1259 and P.D. 1313. Inspite of its effectivity as general law
and the wide publicity given to it, the questioned provision or an even
stricter version had to be embodied in cases of specific expropriations
by decree as in P.D. 1669 expropriating the Tambunting Estate and
P.D. 1670 expropriating the Sunog Apog area in Tondo, Manila.
In the present petition, we are once again confronted with the same
question of whether the courts under P.D. 1533, which contains the
same provision on just compensation as its predecessor decrees, still
have the power and authority to determine just compensation,
independent of what is stated by the decree and to this effect, to
appoint commissioners for such purpose.
This time, we answer in the affirmative.
In overruling the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and objection
to the commissioner's report, the trial court said:
"Another consideration why the Court is empowered to appoint
commissioners to assess the just compensation of these
properties under eminent domain proceedings, is the well-
entrenched ruling that 'the owner of property expropriated is
entitled to recover from expropriating authority the fair and full
value of the lot, as of the time when possession thereof was
actually taken by the province, plus consequential damages —
including attorney's fees — from which the consequential
benefits, if any should be deducted, with interest at the legal
rate, on the aggregate sum due to the owner from and after
the date of actual taking.' (Capitol Subdivision, Inc. v. Province
of Negros Occidental, 7 SCRA 60). In fine, the decree only
establishes a uniform basis for determining just compensation
which the Court may consider as one of the factors in arriving
at 'just compensation,' as envisage in the Constitution. In the
words of Justice Barredo, "Respondent court's invocation of
General Order No. 3 of September 21, 1972 is nothing short of
an unwarranted abdication of judicial authority, which no judge
duly imbued with the implications of the paramount principle of
independence of the judiciary should ever think of doing." (Lina
v. Purisima, 82 SCRA 344, 351; Cf. Prov. of Pangasinan v.
CFI Judge of Pangasinan, Br. VIII, 80 SCRA 117) Indeed,
where this Court simply follows PD 1533, thereby limiting the
determination of just compensation on the value declared by
the owner or administrator or as determined by the Assessor,
whichever is lower, it may result in the deprivation of the
landowner's right of due process to enable it to prove its claim
to just compensation, as mandated by the Constitution. (Uy v.
Genato, 57 SCRA 123). The tax declaration under the Real
Property Tax Code is, undoubtedly, for purposes of taxation."
We are convinced and so rule that the trial court correctly stated that
the valuation in the decree may only serve as a guiding principle or
one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not
substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be
awarded and how to arrive at such amount. A return to the earlier
well-established doctrine, to our mind, is more in keeping with the
principle that the judiciary should live up to its mission "by vitalizing
and not denigrating constitutional rights." (See Salonga v. Cruz Paño,
134 SCRA 438, 462; citing Mercado v. Court of First Instance of Rizal,
116 SCRA 93.) The doctrine we enunciated in National Housing
Authority v. Reyes, supra, therefore, must necessarily be abandoned
if we are to uphold this Court's role as the guardian of the fundamental
rights guaranteed by the due process and equal protection clauses
and as the final arbiter over transgressions committed against
constitutional rights.
The basic unfairness of the decrees is readily apparent.
Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the
taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the
facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its
improvements and capabilities, should be considered.
In this particular case, the tax declarations presented by the petitioner
as basis for just compensation were made by the Lapu-Lapu
municipal, later city assessor long before martial law, when land was
not only much cheaper but when assessed values of properties were
stated in figures constituting only a fraction of their true market value.
The private respondent was not even the owner of the properties at
the time. It purchased the lots for development purposes. To peg the
value of the lots on the basis of documents which are out of date and
at prices below the acquisition cost of present owners would be
arbitrary and confiscatory.
Various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific
properties singled out for expropriation. The values given by provincial
assessors are usually uniform for very wide areas covering several
barrios or even an entire town with the exception of the poblacion.
Individual differences are never taken into account. The value of land
is based on such generalities as its possible cultivation for rice, corn,
coconuts, or other crops. Very often land described as "cogonal" has
been cultivated for generations. Buildings are described in terms of
only two or three classes of building materials and estimates of areas
are more often inaccurate than correct. Tax values can serve as
guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for just compensation.
To say that the owners are estopped to question the valuations made
by assessors since they had the opportunity to protest is illusory. The
overwhelming mass of land owners accept unquestioningly what is
found in the tax declarations prepared by local assessors or municipal
clerks for them. They do not even look at, much less analyze, the
statements. The Idea of expropriation simply never occurs until a
demand is made or a case filed by an agency authorized to do so.
It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the opportunity to
prove that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it
is repulsive to basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the
haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail
over the judgment of a court promulgated only after expert
commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and
arguments pro and con have been presented, and after all factors and
considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been
judiciously evaluated.
As was held in the case of Gideon v. Wainwright (93 ALR
2d,733,742):
"In the light of these and many other prior decisions of this Court, it is
not surprising that the Betts Court, when faced with the contention
that 'one charged with crime, who is unable to obtain counsel must be
furnished counsel by the State,' conceded that '[E]xpressions in the
opinions of this court lend color to the argument. . .' 316 U.S., at 462,
463, 86 L ed. 1602, 62 S Ct. 1252. The fact is that in deciding as it
did-that "appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right, essential
to a fair trial" — the Court in Betts v. Brady made an ubrupt brake with
its own well-considered precedents. In returning to these old
precedents, sounder we believe than the new, we but restore
constitutional principles established to achieve a fair system of justice.
. ."
We return to older and more sound precedents. This Court has the
duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles,
precepts, doctrines, or rules. (See Salonga v. Cruz Pano, supra).
The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is
a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may
make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of
the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be
taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or
executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail
over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from
looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation.
We, therefore, hold that P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the court's
discretion to appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court, is unconstitutional and void. To hold otherwise would be to
undermine the very purpose why this Court exists in the first place.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby

DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued on February 16,
1982 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,

Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ.,concur.
Teehankee, C.J., in the result.
Yap, J., on leave.
Petition dismissed. Order lifted and set aside.
Bar by prior judgment vs. conclusiveness of judgment
G.R. No. 191101 October 1, 2014
SPOUSES MARIO OCAMPO and CARMELITA F. OCAMPO, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF BERNARDINO U. DIONISIO, represented by ARTEMIO SJ. DIONISIO,
Respondents.
" x x x.
The doctrine of res judicata is laid down under Section 47, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, which
pertinently provides that:
Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.— The effect of a judgment or
final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
xxxx
(b) In other cases, the judgment orfinal order is, with respect to the matter
directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in
relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in
interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the
same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties of their successors in
interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment
or final order which appears upon its faceto have been so adjudged, or
which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
This provision comprehends two distinct concepts of res judicata: (1) bar by
former judgmentand (2) conclusiveness of judgment.18 In Judge Abelita III
v. P/Supt. Doria, et al.,19 the Court explained the two aspects of res
judicata, thus:
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the
judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred,
there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this
instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the
second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the court of
competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the
parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit
involving the same cause of action before the same or other tribunal.
But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no
identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those
matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to
matters merely involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known
as "conclusiveness of judgment." Stated differently, any right, fact or matter
in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of
an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the
merits is conclusivelysettled by the judgment therein and cannot again be
litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim,
demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.20
For res judicataunder the first concept, bar by prior judgment, to apply, the
following requisites must concur, viz: (a) finality of the former judgment; (b)
the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (c) it must bea judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be,
between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and
causes of action.21
The first three requisites are present in this case. The Decision dated
September 12, 1997 in the forcible entry case rendered by the MTC, a court
which has jurisdiction over the subjectproperty and the parties, had long
become final. The said MTC decision is an adjudication on the merits.
However, the fourth requisite is not present. Although there is identity of
parties and subject matter as between the forcible entry case and recovery
of possession case, there is no identity of causes of action.
As correctly found by the RTC and the CA, the forcible entry case only
involves the issue of possession over the subject property while the
recovery of possession case puts in issue the ownership of the subject
property and the concomitant right to possess the same as an attribute of
ownership.
In an action for forcible entry and detainer, the only issue is possession in
fact, or physical possession of real property, independently of any claim of
ownership that either party may put forth in his pleading. If plaintiff can
prove prior physical possession in himself, he may recover such possession
even from the owner, but, on the other hand, if he cannot prove such prior
physical possession, he has no right of action for forcible entry and detainer
even if he should be the owner of the property.22
Thus, even the MTC, in its Decision dated September 12, 1997 in the forcible
entry case, stressed that its determination is only limited to the issue of who
has "actual prior possession" of the subject property regardless of the
ownership of the same.23
On the other hand, the recovery of possession case is actually an accion
reinvindicatoria or a suit to recover possession of a parcel of land as an
element of ownership. A perusal of the complaint filed by the respondents
in the recoveryof possession case shows that the respondents, as
successors-in-interest of Dionisio, are asserting ownership of the subject
property and are seeking the recovery of possession thereof.
A judgment rendered in a forcible entry case will not bar an action between
the same parties respecting title or ownership because between a case for
forcible entry and an accion reinvindicatoria, there is no identity of causes of
action.24 Such determination does not bind the title or affect the ownership
of the land; neither is it conclusive of the facts therein found in a case
between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving
possession.
The decision in the forcible entry case is conclusive only as to the MTC’s
determination that the petitioners are not liable for forcible entry since the
respondents failed to prove their prior physical possession; it is not
conclusive as to the ownership of the subject property. Besides, Section 18,
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that a "judgment rendered
in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be conclusive with respect to
the possession only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the
ownership of the land."
x x x."
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G. R. No. L-41001 September 30, 1976
MANILA LODGE NO. 761, BENEVOLENT AND PROTECTIVE ORDER
OF THE ELKS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CITY OF MANILA, and
TARLAC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
No. L-41012 September 30, 1976
TARLAC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CITY OF MANILA, LODGE NO.
761, BENEVOLENT AND PROTECTIVE ORDER OF ELKS,
INC., respondents.
CASTRO, C.J.: têñ.£îhqwâ£
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENTOF THE FACTS
These two cases are petitions on certiorari to review the decision dated
June 30, 1975 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 51590-R entitled
"Tarlac Development Corporation vs. City of Manila, and Manila Lodge
No. 761, Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, Inc.," affirming the trial
court's finding in Civil Case No. 83009 that the property subject of the
decision a quo is a "public park or plaza."
On June 26, 1905 the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. l360 which
authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. The
reclaimed area was to form part of the Luneta extension. The Act
provided that the reclaimed area "Shall be the property of the City of
Manila" and that "the City of Manila is hereby authorized to set aside a
tract of the reclaimed land formed by the Luneta extension x x x at the
north end not to exceed five hundred feet by six hundred feet in size, for
a hotel site, and to lease the same, with the approval of the Governor
General, to a responsible person or corporation for a term not exceed
ninety-nine years."
Subsequently, the Philippine Commission passed on May 18, 1907 Act
No. 1657, amending Act No. 1360, so as to authorize the City of' Manila
either to lease or to sell the portion set aside as a hotel site.
The total area reclaimed was a little over 25 hectares. The City of Manila
applied for the registration of the reclaimed area, and on January 20,
1911, O.C.T. No. 1909 was issued in the name of the City of Manila. The
title described the registered land as "un terreno conocido con el nombre
de Luneta Extension, situato en el distrito de la Ermita x x x." The
registration was "subject, however to such of the incumbrances
mentioned in Article 39 of said law (Land Registration Act) as may be
subsisting" and "sujeto a las disposiciones y condiciones impuestas en la
Ley No. 1360; y sujeto tambein a los contratos de venta, celebrados y
otorgados por la Ciudad de Manila a favor del Army and Navy Club y la
Manila Lodge No. 761, Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks,
fechados respectivamente, en 29 de Diciembre de 1908 y 16 de Enero
de 1909." 1
On July 13, 1911 the City of Manila, affirming a prior sale dated January
16, 1909 cancelled 5,543.07 square meters of the reclaimed area to the
Manila Lodge No. 761, Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks of the
U.S.A. (BPOE, for short) on the basis of which TCT No. 2195 2 was
issued to the latter over the Marcela de terreno que es parte de la Luneta
Extension, Situada en el Distrito le la Ermita ... ." At the back of this title
vas annotated document 4608/T-1635, which in part reads as follows:
"que la citada Ciusdad de Manila tendra derecho a su opcion, de
recomparar la expresada propiedad para fines publicos solamete in
cualquier tiempo despues de cincuenta anos desde el 13 le Julio le 1911,
precio de la misma propiedad, mas el valor que entonces tengan las
mejoras."
For the remainder of the Luneta Extension, that is, after segregating
therefrom the portion sold to the Manila Lodge No. 761, PBOE, a new
Certificate of Title No. 2196 3 was issued on July 17, 1911 to the City of
Manila.
Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, subsequently sold the said 5,543.07
square meters to the Elks Club, Inc., to which was issued TCT No.
67488. 4 The registered owner, "The Elks Club, Inc.," was later changed
by court oder to "Manila Lodge No. 761, Benevolent and Protective Order
of Elks, Inc."
In January 1963 the BPOE. petitioned the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch IV, for the cancellation of the right of the City of Manila to
repurchase the property This petition was granted on February 15, 1963.
On November 19, 1963 the BPOE sold for the sum of P4,700,000 the
land together with all the improvements thereon to the Tarlac
Development Corporation (TDC, for short) which paid P1,700.000 as
down payment and mortgaged to the vendor the same realty to secure
the payment of the balance to be paid in quarterly installments.5At the time of
the sale,, there was no annotation of any subsisting lien on the title to the property. On December 12,
1963 TCT No. 73444 was issued to TDC over the subject land still described as "UNA PARCELA DE
TERRENO, que es parte de la Luneta Extension, situada en el Distrito de Ermita ... ."
In June 1964 the City of Manila filed with the Court of First Instance of
Manila a petition for the reannotation of its right to repurchase; the court,
after haering, issued an order, dated November 19, 1964, directing the
Register of Deeds of the City of Manila to reannotate in toto the entry
regarind the right of the City of Manila to repurchase the property after
fifty years. From this order TDC and BPOE appealed to this Court which
on July 31, 1968 affirmed in G.R. Nos. L-24557 and L-24469 the trial
court's order of reannotation, but reserved to TDC the right to bring
another action for the clarification of its rights.
As a consequence of such reservation, TDC filed on April 28, 1971
against the City of Manila and the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, a
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 83009 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, containing three causes of action and praying -
a) On the first cause of action, that the plaintiff TDC be declared to have
purchased the parcel of land now in question with the buildings and
improvements thereon from the defendant BPOE for value and in good
faith, and accordingly ordering the cancellation of Entry No. 4608/T-1635
on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 73444 in the name of the Plaintiff;
b) On the second cause of action, ordering the defendant City of Manila
to pay the plaintiff TDC damages in the sum of note less than one
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00);
c) On the third cause of action, reserving to the plaintiff TDC the right to
recover from the defendant BPOE the amounts mentioned in par. XVI of
the complaint in accordance with Art. 1555 of the Civil Code, in the
remote event that the final judgment in this case should be that the parcel
of land now in question is a public park; and
d) For costs, and for such other and further relief as the Court may deem
just and equitable. 6
Therein defendant City of Manila, in its answer dated May 19, 1971,
admitted all the facts alleged in the first cause of action except the
allegation that TDC purchased said property "for value and in good faith,"
but denied for lack of knowledge or information the allegations in the
second and third causes of action. As, special and affirmative defense,
the City of Manila claimed that TDC was not a purchaser in good faith for
it had actual notice of the City's right to repurchase which was annotated
at the back of the title prior to its cancellation, and that,
assuming arguendo that TDC had no notice of the right to repurchase, it
was, nevertheless, under obligation to investigate inasmuch as its title
recites that the property is a part of the Luneta extension. 7
The Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, in its answer dated June 7, 1971,
admitted having sold the land together with the improvements thereon for
value to therein plaintiff which was in good faith, but denied for lack of
knowledge as to their veracity the allegations under the second cause of
action. It furthermore admitted that TDC had paid the quarterly
installments until October l5, 1964 but claimed that the latter failed
without justifiable cause to pay the subsequent installments. It also
asserted that it was a seller for value in good faith without having
misrepresented or concealed tacts relative to the title on the property. As
counterclaim, Manila Lodge No. 761 (BPOE) sought to recover the
balance of the purchase price plus interest and costs. 8
On June 15, 1971 TDC answered the aforesaid counterclaim, alleging
that its refusal to make further payments was fully justified.9
After due trial the court a quo rendered on July 14, 1972 its decision
finding the subject land to be part of the "public park or plaza" and,
therefore, part of the public domain. The court consequently declared that
the sale of the subject land by the City of Manila to Manila Lodge No.
761, BPOE, was null and void; that plaintiff TDC was a purchaser thereof
in g faith and for value from BPOE and can enforce its rights against the
latter; and that BPOE is entitled to recover from the City of Manila
whatever consideration it had 'paid the latter. 'The dispositive part of the
decision reads:
ñé+.£ªw ph!1
 WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares that the parcel
of land formerly covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
Nos 2195 and 67488 in the name of BPOE and now by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 73444 in the name of
Tarlac Development Corporation is a public' park or plaza,
and, consequently, instant complaint is dimissed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
In view of the reservation made by plaintiff Tarlac
Development Corporation to recover from defendant
BPOE the amounts mentioned in paragraph XVI of the
complaint in accordance with Article 1555 of the Civil
Code, the Court makes no pronouncement on this point. 10
From said decision the therein plaintiff TDC as well as the defendant
Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, appealed to the Court of Appeals.
In its appeal docketed as CA-G.R. No. 51590-R, the Manila Lodge No.
761, BPOE, avers that the trial court committed the following errors,
namely:
1. In holding that the property subject of the action is not patrimonial
property of the City of Manila; and
2. In holding that the Tarlac Development Corporation may recover and
enforce its right against the defendant BPOE. 11
The Tarlac Development Corporation, on the other hand, asserts that the
trial court erred:
(1) In finding that the property in question is or was a public park and in
consequently nullifying the sale thereof by the City of Manila to BPOE;
(2) In applying the cases of Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, 30 Phil. 602,
and Government vs. Cabangis, 53 Phil. 112, to the case at bar; and
(3) In not holding that the plaintiff-appellant is entitled to ,recover
damages from the defendant City of Manila. 12
Furthermore, TDC as appellee regarding the second assignment of error
raised by BPOE, maintained that it can recover and enforce its rigth
against BPOE in the event that the land in question is declared a public
park or part thereof.13
In its decision promulgated on June 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals
concur ed in the findings and conclusions of the lower court upon the
ground that they are supported by he evidence and are in accordance
with law, and accordingly affirmed the lower court's judgment.
Hence, the present petitions for review on certiorari.
G.R. No. L-41001
The Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, contends, in its petition for review on
certiorari docketed as G.R. No. L-41001, that the Court of Appeals erred
in (1) disregarding the very enabling acts and/or statutes according to
which the subject property was, and still is, patrimonial property of the
City of Manila and could therefore be sold and/or disposed of like any
other private property; and (2) in departing from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings when it simply made a general affirmance
of the court a quo's findings and conclusions without bothering to discuss
or resolve several vital points stressed by the BPOE in its assigned
errrors. 14
G.R. No. L-41012
The Tarlac Development Corporation, in its petition for review on
certiorari docketed as G.R. No. L-41012, relies on the following grounds
for the allowance of its petition:
1. that the Court of Appeals did not correctly interpret Act No. 1360, as
amended by Act No. 1657, of the Philippine Commission; and
2. that the Court of Appeals has departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings in that it did not make its own findings but
simply recited those of the lower court. 15
ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS
FIRST ISSUE
Upon the first issue, both petitioners claim that the property subject of the
action, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 1360, as amended by Act
No. 1657, was patrimonial property of the City of Manila and not a park or
plaza.
Arguments of Petitioners
In G.R. No. L-41001, the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, admits that
"there appears to be some logic in the conclusion" of the Court of
Appeals that "neither Act No. 1360 nor Act No. 1657 could have meant to
supply the City of Manila the authority to sell the subject property which is
located at the south end not the north — of the reclaimed area." 16 It
argues, however, that when Act No. 1360, as amended, authorized the
City of Manila to undertake the construction of the Luneta extension by
reclaimed land from the Manila Bay, and declared that the reclaimed land
shall be the "property of the City of Manila," the State expressly granted
the ownership thereof to the City of Manila which. consequently. could
enter into transactions involving it; that upon the issuance of O.C.T. No.
1909, there could he no doubt that the reclaimed area owned by the City
was its patrimonial property;" that the south end of the reclaimed area
could not be for public use for. as argued by TDC a street, park or
promenade can be property for public use pursuant to Article 344 of the
Spanish Civil Code only when it has already been so constructed or laid
out, and the subject land, at the time it was sold to the Elk's Club, was
neither actually constructed as a street, park or promenade nor laid out
as a street, park or promenade;" that even assuming that the subject
property was at the beginning property of public dominion, it was
subsequently converted into patrimonial property pursuant to Art. 422 of
the Civil Code, inasmuch as it had never been used, red or utilized since
it was reclaimed in 1905 for purpose other than this of an ordinary real
estate for sale or lease; that the subject property had never been
intended for public use, is further shown by the fact that it was neither
included as a part of the Luneta Park under Plan No. 30 of the National
Planning Commission nor considered a part of the Luneta National Park
(now Rizal Park) by Proclamation No. 234 dated December 19, 1955 of
President Ramon Magsaysay or by Proclamation Order No. 274 dated
October 4, 1967 of President Ferdinand E. Marcos;" 19 that, such being
the case, there is no reason why the subject property should -not be
considered as having been converted into patrimonial property, pursuant
to the ruling in Municipality vs. Roa 7 Phil. 20, inasmuch as the City of
Manila has considered it as its patrimonial property not only bringing it
under the operation of the Land Registration Act but also by disposing of
it; 20 and that to consider now the subject property as a public plaza or
park would not only impair the obligations of the parties to the contract of
sale (rated July 13, 1911, but also authorize deprivation of property
without due process of law.21
G.R. No. L-410112
In L-41012, the petitioner TDC stresses that the principal issue is the
interpretation of Act No. 1360, as amended by. Act No. 1657 of the
Philippine Commission, 22 and avers that inasmuch as Section 6 of Act
No. 1360, as amended by Act 1657, provided that the reclamation of the
Luneta extension was to be paid for out of the funds of the City of Manila
which was authorized to borrow P350,000 "to be expended in the
construction of Luneta Extension," the reclaimed area became "public
land" belonging to the City of Manila that spent for the reclamation,
conformably to the holding in Cabangis,23 and consequently, said land
was subject to sale and other disposition; that the Insular Government
itself considered the reclaimed Luneta extension as patrimonial property
subject to disposition as evidenced by the fact that See. 3 of Act 1360
declared that "the land hereby reclaimed shall be the property of the City
of Manila;" that this property cannot be property for public use for
according to Article 344 of the Civil Code, the character of property for
public use can only attach to roads and squares that have already been
constructed or at least laid out as such, which conditions did not obtain
regarding the subject land, that Sec. 5 of Act 1360 authorized the City of
Manila to lease the northern part of the reclaimed area for hotel
purposes; that Act No. 1657 furthermore authorized the City of Manila to
sell the same; 24 that the express statutory authority to lease or sell the
northern part of the reclaimed area cannot be interpreted to mean that
the remaining area could not be sold inasmuch as the purpose of the
statute was not merely to confer authority to sell the northern portion but
rather to limit the city's power of disposition thereof, to wit: to prevent
disposition of the northern portion for any purpose other than for a hotel
site that the northern and southern ends of the reclaimed area cannot be
considered as extension of the Luneta for they lie beyond the sides of the
original Luneta when extended in the direction of the sea, and that is the
reason why the law authorized the sale of the northern portion for hotel
purposes, and, for the same reason, it is implied that the southern portion
could likewise be disposed of.26
TDC argues likewise that there are several items of uncontradicted
circumstantial evidence which may serve as aids in construing the
legislative intent and which demonstrate that the subject property is
patrimonial in nature, to wit: (1) Exhibits "J" and "J-1", or Plan No. 30 of
the National Planning Commission showing the Luneta and its vicinity, do
not include the subject property as part of the Luneta Park; (2) Exhibit
"K", which is the plan of the subject property covered by TCT No. 67488
of BPOE, prepared on November 11, 1963, indicates that said property is
not a public park; (3) Exhibit "T", which is a certified copy of Proclamation
No. 234 issued on December 15, 1955 is President Magsaysay, and
Exhibit "U" which is Proclamation Order No. 273 issued on October 4,
1967 by President Marcos, do not include the subject property in the
Luneta Park-, (4) Exhibit "W", which is the location plan of the Luneta
National Park under Proclamations Nos. 234 and 273, further confirms
that the subject property is not a public park; and (5) Exhibit "Y", which is
a copy of O.C.T. No. 7333 in the name of the United States of America
covering the land now occupied by the America covering the land now
occupied by the American Embassy, the boundaries of which were
delineated by the Philippine Legislature, states that the said land is
bounded on the northwest by properties of the Army and Navy Club
(Block No. 321) and the Elks Club (Block No. 321), and this circumstance
shows that even the Philippine Legislature recognized the subject
property as private property of the Elks Club. 27
TDC furthermore contends that the City of Manila is estopped from
questioning the validity of the sale of the subject property that it executed
on July 13, 1911 to the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, for several
reasons, namely: (1) the City's petition for the reannotation of Entry No.
4608/T-1635 was predicated on the validity of said sale; (2) when the
property was bought by the petitioner TDC it was not a public plaza or
park as testified to by both Pedro Cojuanco, treasurer of TDC, and the
surveyor, Manuel Añoneuvo, according to whom the subject property was
from all appearances private property as it was enclosed by fences; (3)
the property in question was cadastrally surveyed and registered as
property of the Elks Club, according to Manuel Anonuevo; (4) the
property was never used as a public park, for, since the issuance of
T.C.T. No. 2165 on July 17, 1911 in the name of the Manila Lodge NO.
761, the latter used it as private property, and as early as January 16,
1909 the City of Manila had already executed a deed of sale over the
property in favor of the Manila Lodge No. 761; and (5) the City of Manila
has not presented any evidence to show that the subject property has
ever been proclaimed or used as a public park. 28
TDC, moreover, contends that Sec. 60 of Com. Act No. 141 cannot apply
to the subject land, for Com. Act No. 141 took effect on December 1,
1936 and at that time the subject land was no longer part of the part of
the public domain. 29
TDC also stresses that its rights as a purchaser in good faith cannot be
disregarded, for the mere mention in the certificate of title that the lot it
purchased was "part of the Luneta extension" was not a sufficient
warning that tile title to the City of Manila was invalid; and that although
the trial court, in its decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals, found the
TDC -to has been an innocent purchaser for value, the court disregarded
the petitioner's rights as such purchaser that relied on Torrens certificate
of title. 30
The Court, continues the petitioner TDC erred in not holding that the
latter is entitled to recover from the City of Manila damages in the amount
of P100,000 caused by the City's petition for- reannotation of its right to
repurchase.
DISCUSSION AND RESOLUTION OF FIRST ISSUE
It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that courts must give effect to
the general legislative intent that can be discovered from or is unraveled
by the four corners of the statute, 31 and in order to discover said intent,
the whole statute, and not only a particular provision thereof, should be
considered.32 It is, therefore, necessary to analyze all the provisions of Act
No. 1360, as amended, in order to unravel the legislative intent.
Act No. 1360 which was enacted by the Philippine Commission on June
26, 1905, as amended by Act No. 1657 enacted on May 18, 1907,
authorized the "construction of such rock and timber bulkheads or sea
walls as may be necessary for the making of an extension to the Luneta"
(Sec. 1 [a]), and the placing of the material dredged from the harbor of
Manila "inside the bulkheads constructed to inclose the Luneta extension
above referred to" (Sec. 1 [a]). It likewise provided that the plan of
Architect D. H. Burnham as "a general outline for the extension and
improvement of the Luneta in the City of Manila" be adopted; that "the
reclamation from the Bay of Manila of the land included in said projected
Luneta extension... is hereby authorized and the land thereby reclaimed
shall be the property of the City of Manila" (Sec. 3); that "the City of
Manila is hereby authorized to set aside a tract of the reclaimed land
formed by the Luneta extension authorized by this Act at the worth end of
said tract, not to exceed five hundred feet by six hundred feet in size, for
a hotel site, and to lease the same with the approval of the Governor
General, ... for a term not exceeding ninety-nine years; that "should the
Municipal Board ... deem it advisable it is hereby authorized to advertise
for sale to sell said tract of land ... ;" "that said tract shall be used for hotel
purposes as herein prescribed, and shall not be devoted to any other
purpose or object whatever;" "that should the grantee x x x fail to
maintain on said tract a first-class hotel x x x then the title to said tract of
land sold, conveyed, and transferred, and shall not be devoted to any
other purpose or object whatever;" "that should the grantee x x x fail to
maintain on said tract a first-class hotel x x x then the title to said tract of
land sold, conveyed, and transferred to the grantee shall revert to the City
of Manila, and said City of Manila shall thereupon become entitled to
immediate possession of said tract of land" (Sec. 5); that the construction
of the rock and timber bulkheads or sea wall "shall be paid for out of the
funds of the City of Manila, but the area to be reclaimed by said proposed
Luneta extension shall be filled, without cost to the City of Manila, with
material dredged from Manila Bay at the expense of the Insular
Government" (Sec. 6); and that "the City of Manila is hereby authorized to
borrow from the Insular Government ... the sum of three hundred
thousand pesos, to be expended in the construction of Luneta extension
provided for by paragraph (a) of section one hereof" (Sec.7).
The grant made by Act No. 1360 of the reclaimed land to the City of
Manila is a grant of "public" nature, the same having been made to a
local political subdivision. Such grants have always
been strictly construed against the grantee.33 One compelling reason
given for the strict interpretation of a public grant is that there is in such
grant a gratuitous donation of, public money or resources which results in
an unfair advantage to the grantee and for that reason, the grant should
be narrowly restricted in favor of the public.34 This reason for strict
interpretation obtains relative to the aforesaid grant, for, although the City
of Manila was to pay for the construction of such work and timber
bulkheads or sea walls as may be necessary for the making of the Luneta
extension, the area to be reclaimed would be filled at the expense of the
Insular Government and without cost to the City of Manila, with material
dredged from Manila Bay. Hence, the letter of the statute should be
narrowed to exclude maters which if included would defeat the policy of
the legislation.
The reclaimed area, an extension to the Luneta, is declared to be
property of the City of Manila. Property, however, is either of public
ownership or of private ownership. 35 What kind of property of the City is
the reclaimed land? Is it of public ownership (dominion) or of private
ownership?
We hold that it is of public dominion, intended for public use.
Firstly, if the reclaimed area was granted to the City of Manila as its
patrimonial property, the City could, by virtue of its ownership, dispose of
the whole reclaimed area without need of authorization to do so from the
lawmaking body. Thus Article 348 of the Civil Code of Spain provides that
"ownership is the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing without further
limitations than those established by law." 36 The right to dispose (jus
disponendi) of one's property is an attribute of ownership. Act No. 1360,
as amended, however, provides by necessary implication, that the City of
Manila could not dispose of the reclaimed area without
being authorized by the lawmaking body. Thus the statute provides that
"the City of Manila is hereby authorized to set aside a tract ... at the north
end, for a hotel site, and to lease the same ... should the municipal board
... deem it advisable, it is hereby authorized ...to sell said tract of land ... "
(Sec. 5). If the reclaimed area were patrimonial property of the City, the
latter could dispose of it without need of the authorization provided by the
statute, and the authorization to set aside ... lease ... or sell ... given by
the statute would indeed be superfluous. To so construe the statute s to
render the term "authorize," which is repeatedly used by the statute,
superfluous would violate the elementary rule of legal hermeneutics that
effect must be given to every word, clause, and sentence of the statute
and that a statute should be so interpreted that no part thereof becomes
inoperative or superfluous. 37 To authorize means to empower, to give a
right to act. 38 Act No. 1360 furthermore qualifies the verb it authorize"
with the adverb "hereby," which means "by means of this statue or
section," Hence without the authorization expressly given by Act No.
1360, the City of Manila could not lease or sell even the northern portion;
much less could it dispose of the whole reclaimed area. Consequently,
the reclaimed area was granted to the City of Manila, not as its
patrimonial property. At most, only the northern portion reserved as a
hotel site could be said to be patrimonial property for, by express
statutory provision it could be disposed of, and the title thereto would
revert to the City should the grantee fail to comply with the terms
provided by the statute.
TDC however, contends that the purpose of the authorization provided in
Act No. 1360 to lease or sell was really to limit the City's power of
disposition. To sustain such contention is to beg the question. If the
purpose of the law was to limit the City's power of disposition then it is
necessarily assumed that the City had already the power to dispose, for if
such power did not exist, how could it be limited? It was precisely Act
1360 that gave the City the power to dispose for it was hereby authorized
by lease of sale. Hence, the City of Manila had no power to dispose of
the reclaimed land had such power not been granted by Act No. 1360,
and the purpose of the authorization was to empower the city to sell or
lease the northern part and not, as TDC claims, to limit only the power to
dispose. Moreover, it is presumed that when the lawmaking body enacted
the statute, it had full knowledge of prior and existing laws and legislation
on the subject of the statute and acted in accordance or with respect
thereto.39 If by another previous law, the City of Manila could already
dispose of the reclaimed area, which it could do if such area were given
to it as its patrimonial property, would it then not be a superfluity for Act
No. 1360 to authorize the City to dispose of the reclaimed land? Neither
has petitioner TDC pointed to any other law that authorized the City to do
so, nor have we come across any. What we do know is that if the
reclaimed land were patrimonial property, there would be no need of
giving special authorization to the City to dispose of it. Said authorization
was given because the reclaimed land was not intended to be patrimonial
property of the City of Manila, and without the express authorization to
dispose of the northern portion, the City could not dispose of even that
part.
Secondly, the reclaimed area is an "extension to the Luneta in the City of
Manila." 40 If the reclaimed area is an extension of the Luneta, then it is of
the same nature or character as the old Luneta. Anent this matter, it has
been said that a power to extend (or continue an act or business) cannot
authorize a transaction that is totally distinct. 41 It is not disputed that the
old Luneta is a public park or plaza and it is so considered by Section 859
of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila.42 Hence the "extension to
the Luneta" must be also a public park or plaza and for public use.
TDC, however, contends that the subject property cannot be considered
an extension of the old Luneta because it is outside of the limits of the old
Luneta when extended to the sea. This is a strained interpretation of the
term "extension," for an "extension," it has been held, "signifies
enlargement in any direction — in length, breadth, or circumstance." 43
Thirdly, the reclaimed area was formerly a part of the manila Bay. A bay
is nothing more than an inlet of the sea. Pursuant to Article 1 of the Law
of Waters of 1866, bays, roadsteads, coast sea, inlets and shores are
parts of the national domain open to public use. These are also property
of public ownership devoted to public use, according to Article 339 of the
Civil Code of Spain.
When the shore or part of the bay is reclaimed, it does not lose its
character of being property for public use, according to Government of
the Philippine Islands vs. Cabangis.44 The predecessor of the claimants in
this case was the owner of a big tract of land including the lots in
question. From 1896 said land began to wear away due to the action of
the waters of Manila Bay. In 1901 the lots in question became completely
submerged in water in ordinary tides. It remained in such a state until
1912 when the Government undertook the dredging of the Vitas estuary
and dumped the Sand and - silt from estuary on the low lands completely
Submerged in water thereby gradually forming the lots in question.
Tomas Cabangis took possession thereof as soon as they were
reclaimed hence, the claimants, his successors in interest, claimed that
the lots belonged to them. The trial court found for the claimants and the
Government appealed. This Court held that when the lots became a part
of the shore. As they remained in that condition until reclaimed by the
filling done by the Government, they belonged to the public domain. for
public use .4' Hence, a part of the shore, and for that purpose a part of
the bay, did not lose its character of being for public use after it was
reclaimed.
Fourthly, Act 1360, as amended, authorized the lease or sale of the
northern portion of the reclaimed area as a hotel sites. The subject
property is not that northern portion authorized to be leased or sold; the
subject property is the southern portion. Hence, applying the rule
of expresio unius est exlusio alterius, the City of Manila was not
authorized to sell the subject property. The application of this principle of
statutory construction becomes the more imperative in the case at bar
inasmuch as not only must the public grant of the reclaimed area to the
City of Manila be, as above stated, strictly construed against the City of
Manila, but also because a grant of power to a municipal corporation, as
happens in this case where the city is author ized to lease or sell the
northern portion of the Luneta extension, is strictly limited to such as are
expressly or impliedly authorized or necessarily incidental to the
objectives of the corporation.
Fifthly, Article 344 of the Civil Code of Spain provides that to property of
public use, in provinces and in towns, comprises the provincial and town
roads, the squares streets fountains, and public waters the promenades,
and public works of general service paid for by such towns or provinces."
A park or plaza, such as the extension to the Luneta, is undoubtedly
comprised in said article.
The petitioners, however, argue that, according to said Article 344, in
order that the character of property for public use may be so attached to
a plaza, the latter must be actually constructed or at least laid out as
such, and since the subject property was not yet constructed as a plaza
or at least laid out as a plaza when it was sold by the City, it could not be
property for public use. It should be noted, however, that properties of
provinces and towns for public use are governed by the same principles
as properties of the same character belonging to the public domain.46 In
order to be property of public domain an intention to devote it to public
use is sufficient. 47 The, petitioners' contention is refuted by Manresa
himself who said, in his comments", on Article 344, that: ñé+.£ªw ph!1
Las plazas, calles y paseos publicos correspondent sin
duda aiguna aldominio publico municipal ), porque se
hallan establecidos sobre suelo municipal y estan
destinadas al uso de todos Laurent presenta tratando de
 las plazas, una question relativa a si deben conceptuarse
como de dominio publico los lugares vacios libres, que se
encuenttan en los Municipios rurales ... Laurent opina
contra Pioudhon que toda vez que estan al servicio de
todos pesos lugares, deben considerable publicos y de
dominion publico. Realmente, pala decidir el punto,
bastara siempre fijarse en el destino real y efectivo de los
citados lugares, y si este destino entraña un uso comun
de todos, no hay duda que son de dominio publico
municipal si no patrimoniales.
It is not necessary, therefore, that a plaza be already constructed of- laid
out as a plaza in order that it be considered property for public use. It is
sufficient that it be intended to be such In the case at bar, it has been
shown that the intention of the lawmaking body in giving to the City of
Manila the extension to the Luneta was not a grant to it of patrimonial
property but a grant for public use as a plaza.
We have demonstrated ad satietatem that the Luneta extension as
intended to be property of the City of Manila for public use. But, could not
said property-later on be converted, as the petitioners contend, to
patrimonial property? It could be. But this Court has already said,
in Ignacio vs. The Director of Lands, 49 the executive and possibly the
legislation department that has the authority and the power to make the
declaration that said property, is no longer required for public use, and
until such declaration i made the property must continue to form paint of
the public domain. In the case at bar, there has been no such explicit or
unequivocal declaration It should be noted, furthermore, anent this
matter, that courts are undoubted v not. primarily called upon, and are not
in a position, to determine whether any public land is still needed for the
purposes specified in Article 4 of the Law of Waters .50
Having disposed of the petitioners' principal arguments relative to the
main issue, we now pass to the items of circumstantial evidence which
TDC claims may serve as aids in construing the legislative intent in the
enactment of Act No. 1360, as amended. It is noteworthy that all these
items of alleged circumstantial evidence are acts far removed in time
from the date of the enactment of Act No.1360 such that they cannot be
considered contemporaneous with its enactment. Moreover, it is not
farfetched that this mass of circumstantial evidence might have been
influenced by the antecedent series of invalid acts, to wit: the City's
having obtained over the reclaimed area OCT No. 1909 on January
20,1911; the sale made by the City of the subject property to Manila
Lodge No. 761; and the issuance to the latter of T.C.T. No. 2195. It
cannot gainsaid that if the subsequent acts constituting the circumstantial
evidence have been base on, or at least influenced, by those antecedent
invalid acts and Torrens titles S they can hardly be indicative of the intent
of the lawmaking body in enacting Act No. 1360 and its amendatory act.
TDC claims that Exhs. "J," "J-l" "K," "T," "U," "W" and "Y" show that the
subject property is not a park.
Exhibits "J" and "J-1," the "Luneta and vicinity showing proposed
development" dated May 14, 1949, were prepared by the National Urban
Planning Commission of the Office of the President. It cannot be
reasonably expected that this plan for development of the Luneta should
show that the subject property occupied by the ElksClub is a public park,
for it was made 38 years after the sale to the Elks, and after T.C.T. No.
2195 had been issued to Elks. It is to be assumed that the Office of the
President was cognizant of the Torrens title of BPOE. That the subject
property was not included as a part of the Luneta only indicated that the
National Urban Planning Commission that made the plan knew that the
subject property was occupied by Elks and that Elks had a Torrens title
thereto. But this in no way proves that the subject property was originally
intended to be patrimonial property of the City of Manila or that the sale to
Elks or that the Torrens-title of the latter is valid.
Exhibit "K" is the "Plan of land covered by T.C.T . No ----, as prepared for
Tarlac Development Company." It was made on November 11, 1963 by
Felipe F. Cruz, private land surveyor. This surveyor is admittedly a
surveyor for TDC. 51 This plan cannot be expected to show that the
subject property is a part of the Luneta Park, for he plan was made to
show the lot that "was to be sold to petitioner." This plan must have also
assumed the existence of a valid title to the land in favor of Elks.
Exhibits "T" and "U" are copies of Presidential Proclamations No. 234
issued on November 15, 1955 and No. 273 issued on October 4, 1967,
respectively. The purpose of the said Proclamations was to reserve
certain parcels of land situated in the District of Ermita, City of Manila, for
park site purposes. Assuming that the subject property is not within the
boundaries of the reservation, this cannot be interpreted to mean that the
subject property was not originally intended to be for public use or that it
has ceased to be such. Conversely, had the subject property been
included in the reservation, it would mean, if it really were private
property, that the rights of the owners thereof would be extinguished, for
the reservations was "subject to private rights, if any there be." That the
subject property was not included in the reservation only indicates that
the President knew of the existence of the Torrens titles mentioned
above. The failure of the Proclamations to include the subject property in
the reservation for park site could not change the character of the subject
property as originally for public use and to form part of the Luneta Park.
What has been said here applies to Exhibits "V", "V-1" to "V-3," and "W"
which also refer to the area and location of the reservation for the Luneta
Park.
Exhibit "Y" is a copy of O.C.T. No. 7333 dated November 13, 1935,
covering the lot where now stands the American Embassy [Chancery]. It
states that the property is "bounded ... on the Northwest by properties of
Army and Navy Club (Block No.321) and Elks Club (Block No. 321)."
Inasmuch as the said bounderies delineated by the Philippine Legislature
in Act No. 4269, the petitioners contend that the Legislature recognized
and conceded the existence of the Elks Club property as a primate
property (the property in question) and not as a public park or plaza. This
argument is non sequitur plain and simple Said Original Certificate of Title
cannot be considered as an incontrovertible declaration that the Elks
Club was in truth and in fact the owner of such boundary lot. Such
mention as boundary owner is not a means of acquiring title nor can it
validate a title that is null and void.
TDC finally claims that the City of Manila is estopped from questioning
the validity of the sale it executed on July 13,'1911 conconveying the
subject property to the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE. This contention
cannot be seriously defended in the light of the doctrine repeatedly
enunciated by this Court that the Government is never estopped by
mistakes or errors on the pan of its agents, and estoppel does not apply
to a municipal corporation to validate a contract that is prohibited by law
or its against Republic policy, and the sale of July 13, 1911 executed by
the City of Manila to Manila Lodge was certainly a contract prohibited by
law. Moreover, estoppel cannot be urged even if the City of Manila
accepted the benefits of such contract of sale and the Manila Lodge No.
761 had performed its part of the agreement, for to apply the doctrine of
estoppel against the City of Manila in this case would be tantamount to
enabling it to do indirectly what it could not do directly. 52
The sale of the subject property executed by the City of Manila to the
Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, was void and inexistent for lack of subject
matter. 53 It suffered from an incurable defect that could not be ratified
either by lapse of time or by express ratification. The Manila Lodge No.
761 therefore acquired no right by virtue of the said sale. Hence to
consider now the contract inexistent as it always has seen, cannot be, as
claimed by the Manila Lodge No. 761, an impairment of the obligations of
contracts, for there was it, contemplation of law, no contract at all.
The inexistence of said sale can be set up against anyone who asserts a
right arising from it, not only against the first vendee, the Manila Lodge
No. 761, BPOE, but also against all its suceessors, including the TDC
which are not protected the doctrine of bona fide ii purchaser without
notice, being claimed by the TDC does not apply where there is a total
absence of title in the vendor, and the good faith of the purchaser TDC
cannot create title where none exists. 55
The so-called sale of the subject property having been executed, the
restoration or restitution of what has been given is order 56
SECOND ISSUE
The second ground alleged in support of the instant petitions for review
on certiorari is that the Court of Appeals has departed from the accepted
and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of the
power of supervision. TDC in L-41012, argues that the respondent Court
did not make its own findings but simply recited those of the lower court
and made a general affirmance, contrary to the requirements of the
Constitution; that the respondent Court made glaring and patent mistakes
in recounting even the copied findings, palpably showing lack of
deliberate consideration of the matters involved, as, for example, when
said court said that Act No. 1657 authorized the City of Manila to set
aside a portion of the reclaimed land "formed by the Luneta Extension of-
to lease or sell the same for park purposes;" and that respondent Court.
further more, did not resolve or dispose of any of the assigned errors
contrary to the mandate of the Judiciary Act..57
The Manila Lodge No. 761, in L-41001, likewise alleges, as one of the
reasons warranting review, that the Court of Appeals departed from the
accepted and usual course of Judicial proceedings by simply making a
general affirmance of the court a quo findings without bothering to resolve
several vital points mentioned by the BPOE in its assigned errors. 58
COMMENTS ON SECOND ISSUE
We have shown in our discussion of the first issue that the decision of the
trial court is fully in accordance with law. To follows that when such
decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the affirmance was
likewise in accordance with law. Hence, no useful purpose will be served
in further discussing the second issue.
CONCLUSION
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions in both G.R. Nos. L-41001 and L-41012
are denied for lack of merit, and the decision of the Court of Appeals of
June 30, 1975, is hereby affirmed, at petitioner's cost.

Makasiar, Munoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur. 1äw phï1.ñët

Teehankee, concurs in the result which is wholly consistent with the basic
rulings and jugdment of this Court in its decision of July 31, 1968.