G.R. No.
80762 March 19, 1990 Lloyd Peñacerrada, and thus would like to surrender to
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FAUSTA GONZALES, AUGUSTO GONZALES,
CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR., CUSTODIO
GONZALES, JR., NERIO GONZALES and ROGELIO
LANIDA, accused, CUSTODIO GONZALES,
SR., accused-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:
In a decision 1 dated October 31, 1984, the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo, Branch XXXVIII (38), in Criminal Case No.
13661, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Fausta
Gonzales, Augusto Gonzales, Custodia Gonzales,
Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales and Rogelio
Lanida," found all the accused, except Rogelio Lanida
who eluded arrest and up to now has remain at large and
not yet arrained, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder as defined under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code. They were sentenced "to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1)
day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased victim in the amount of P40,000.00, plus moral
damages in the sum of P14,000.00 and to pay the
costs." 2 The victim was Lloyd Peñacerrada, 44,
landowner, and a resident of Barangay Aspera, Sara,
Iloilo.
Through their counsel, all the accused, except of course
Rogelio Lanida, filed a notice of appeal from the trial
court's decision. During the pendency of their appeal and
before judgment thereon could be rendered by the Court
of Appeals, however, all the accused-appellants, except
Custodio Gonzales, Sr., withdrew their appeal and chose
instead to pursue their respective applications for parole
before the then Ministry, now Department, of Justice,
Parole Division. 3
On October 27, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision 4 on the appeal of Custodio Gonzales, Sr. It
modified the appealed decision in that the lone appellant
was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the
heirs of Lloyd Peñacerrada in the amount of P30,000.00.
In all other respect, the decision of the trial court was
affirmed. Further, on the basis of our ruling in People
vs. Ramos, 5 the appellate court certified this case to us
for review.6
The antecedent facts are as follows:
At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of February 21,
1981, Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of Barangay
Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo, was awakened from his sleep by the
spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. Augusto
informed Paja that his wife had just killed their landlord,
the authorities. Seeing Augusto still holding the knife
allegedly used in the killing and Fausta with her dress
smeared with blood, Paja immediately ordered a nephew
of his to take the spouses to the police authorities at the
Municipal Hall in Poblacion, Ajuy. As instructed, Paja's
nephew brought the Gonzales spouses, who "backrode"
on his motorcycle, to the municipal building. 7 Upon
reaching the Ajuy Police sub-station, the couple informed
the police on duty of the incident. That same night,
Patrolman Salvador Centeno of the Ajuy Police Force and
the Gonzales spouses went back to Barangay Tipacla.
Reaching Barangay Tipacla the group went to Paja's
residence where Fausta was made to stay, while Paja,
Patrolman Centeno, and Augusto proceeded to the
latter's residence at Sitio Nabitasan where the killing
incident allegedly occurred. 8 There they saw the lifeless
body of Lloyd Peñacerrada, clad only in an underwear,
sprawled face down inside the bedroom. 9 The group
stayed for about an hour during which time Patrolman
Centeno inspected the scene and started to make a rough
sketch thereof and the immediate surroundings. 10 The
next day, February 22, 1981, at around 7:00 o'clock in the
morning, Patrolman Centeno, accompanied by a
photographer, went back to the scene of the killing to
conduct further investigations. Fausta Gonzales, on the
other hand, was brought back that same day by Barangay
Captain Paja to the police substation in Ajuy. When
Patrolman Centeno and his companion arrived at Sitio
Nabitasan, two members of the 321st P.C. Company
stationed in Sara, Iloilo, who had likewise been informed
of the incident, were already there conducting their own
investigation. Patrolman Centeno continued with his
sketch; photographs of the scene were likewise taken.
The body of the victim was then brought to the Municipal
Hall of Ajuy for autopsy.
The autopsy of Lloyd Peñacerrada's cadaver was
performed at about 11:20 a.m. on February 22, 1981; after
completed, a report was made with the following findings:
PHYSICAL FINDINGS
1. Deceased is about 5 ft. and 4 inches in height, body
moderately built and on cadaveric rigidity.
EXTERNAL FINDINGS
1. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 9 cm. in length, located
at the lower 3rd anterior aspect of the arm, right, directed
upward to the right axillary pit.
2. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the proximal 3rd,
forearm right, posterior aspect with an entrance of 5 cm.
in width and 9 cm. in length with an exit at the middle 3rd,
posterior aspect of the forearm, right, with 1 cm. wound
exit.
3. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the middle 3rd,
posterior aspect of the forearm right, 1 cm. in width.
4. Incised wound, 4 cm. long, depth visualizing the right
lateral border of the sternum, 6th and 7th ribs, right
located 1.5 inches below the right nipple.
5. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 10.5 cm. in depth, directed
inward to the thoracic cavity right, located at the left
midclavicular line at the level of the 5th rib left.
6. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 9.5 cm. in depth directed
toward the right thoracic cavity, located at the mid left
scapular line at the level of the 8th intercostal space.
7. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, located at the base of
the left armpit directed toward the left thoracic cavity.
8. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 11 cm. in length,
directed toward the left deltoid muscle, located at the
upper 3rd axilla left.
9. Puncture wound, 3 cm in width, 11.5 cm in length,
located at the anterior aspect, proximal 3rd arm left,
directed downward.
10. Stab wound, thru and thru, 2.5 cm. in width, and 5 cm.
in length, medial aspect, palm right.
11. Stabwound, 4 cm.in width, iliac area, right, directed
inward with portion of large intestine and mysentery
coming out.
12. Stab wound, 4 cm. in width, located at the posterior
portion of the shoulder, right, directed downward to the
aspex of the light thoracic cavity.
13. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 10 cm. in length,
located at the medial portion of the medial border of the
right scapula.
14. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 4.5 cm. in length,
located at the posterior aspect of the right elbow.
15. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 2 cm. in length, located
at the posterior portion, middle 3rd, forearm, right.
16. Lacerated wound at the anterior tantanelle with
fissural fracture of the skull.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Stab wound No. 5, injuring the left ventricle of the heart.
2. Stab wound No. 6, severely injuring the right lower lobe
of the lungs.
3. Stab wound No. 7, injuring the right middle lobe of the
lungs.
4. Stab wound No. 11, injuring the descending colon of
the large intestine, thru and thru.
5. Stab wound No. 12, severely injuring the apex of the
right lungs (sic).
CAUSE OF DEATH:
MASSIVE HEMMORRHAGE DUE TO MULTIPLE
LACERATED, STABBED (sic), INCISED AND
PUNCTURED WOUNDS.
JESUS D. ROJAS, M.D.
Rural Health Physician
Ajuy, Iloilo 11
The autopsy report thus showed that Dr. Rojas "found
sixteen (16) wounds, five (5) of which are fatal because
they penetrated the internal organs, heart, lungs and
intestines of the deceased." 12
On February 23, two days after the incident, Augusto
Gonzales appeared before the police sub-station in the
poblacion of Ajuy and voluntarily surrendered to Police
Corporal Ben Sazon for detention and protective custody
for "having been involved" in the killing of Lloyd
Peñacerrada. He requested that he be taken to the P.C.
headquarters in Sara, Iloilo where his wife, Fausta, was
already detained having been indorsed thereat by the
Ajuy police force. 13
Based on the foregoing and on the investigations
conducted by the Ajuy police force and the 321st P.C.
Company, an information for murder dated August 26,
1981, was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo against the
spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. The information
read as follows:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal
accuses FAUSTA GONZALES and
AUGUSTO GONZALES of the crime of
MURDER committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of
February, 1981, in the Municipality of
Ajuy, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Court, the
above-named accused with four other
companions whose identities are still
unknown and are still at large, armed with
sharp-pointed and deadly weapons,
conspiring, confederating and helping
each other, with treachery and evident
premeditation, with deliberate intent and
decided purpose to kill, and taking
advantage of their superior strength and
number, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault,
stab, hack, hit and wound Lloyd D.
Peñacerrada, with the weapons with
 which said accused were provided at the
time, thereby inflicting upon said Lloyd D.
Peñacerrada multiple wounds on
different parts of his body as shown by
autopsy report attached to the record of
this case which multifarious wounds
caused the immediate death of said
Lloyd D. Peñacerrada.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
14
Iloilo City, August 26, 1981.
When arraigned on September 16, 1981, Augusto and
Fausta both entered a plea of not guilty. Before trial,
however, Jose Huntoria 15 who claimed to have witnessed
the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, presented himself to
Nanie Peñacerrada, the victim's widow, on October 6,
1981, and volunteered to testify for the prosecution. A
reinvestigation of the case was therefore conducted by
the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo on the basis of which an
Amended Information, 16 dated March 3, 1982, naming as
additional accused Custodio Gonzales, Sr. (the herein
appellant), Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales, and
Rogelio Lanida, was filed. Again, all the accused except
as earlier explained, Lanida, pleaded not guilty to the
crime.
At the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Jesus Rojas,
the Rural Health physician of Ajuy who conducted the
autopsy on the body of the victim; Bartolome Paja, the
barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla; Patrolman
Salvador Centeno and Corporal Ben Sazon of the Ajuy
Police Force; Sgt. (ret) Nicolas Belicanao and Sgt.
Reynaldo Palomo of the 321st P.C. Company based in
Sara, Iloilo; Jose Huntoria; and Nanie Peñacerrada, the
widow.
Dr. Jesus Rojas testified that he performed the autopsy
on the body of the deceased Lloyd Penacerrada at around
11:20 a.m. on February 22, 1981 after it was taken to the
municipal hall of Ajuy. 17 His findings revealed that the
victim suffered from 16 wounds comprising of four (4)
punctured wounds, seven (7) stab wounds, four (4)
incised wounds, and one (1) lacerated wound. In his
testimony, Dr. Rojas, while admitting the possibility that
only one weapon might have caused all the wounds
(except the lacerated wound) inflicted on the victim,
nevertheless opined that due to the number and different
characteristics of the wounds, the probability that at least
two instruments were used is high. 18 The police
authorities and the P.C. operatives for their part testified
on the aspect of the investigation they respectively
conducted in relation to the incident. Nanie Peñacerrada
testified mainly on the expenses she incurred by reason
of the death of her husband while Barangay Captain
Bartolome Paja related the events surrounding the
surrender of the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales
to him, the location of the houses of the accused, as well
as on other matters.
By and large, the prosecution's case rested on Huntoria's
alleged eyewitness account of the incident. According to
Huntoria, who gave his age as 30 when he testified on
July 27, 1982, 19 at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon on
February 21, 1981, he left his work at Barangay Central,
in Ajuy, Iloilo where he was employed as a tractor driver
by one Mr. Piccio, and walked home; 20 he took a short-
cut route. 21 While passing at the vicinity of the Gonzales
spouses' house at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, he
heard cries for help. 22 Curiosity prompted him to
approach the place where the shouts were emanating.
When he was some 15 to 20 meters away, he hid himself
behind a clump of banana
trees. 23 From where he stood, he allegedly saw all the
accused ganging upon and takings turns in stabbing and
hacking the victim Lloyd Peñacerrada, near a "linasan" or
threshing platform. He said he clearly recognized all the
accused as the place was then awash in
moonlight. 24 Huntoria further recounted that after the
accused were through in stabbing and hacking the victim,
they then lifted his body and carried it into the house of
the Gonzales spouses which was situated some 20 to 25
meters away from the "linasan". 25 Huntoria then
proceeded on his way home. Upon reaching his house,
he related what he saw to his mother and to his
wife 26 before he went to sleep. 27Huntoria explained that
he did not immediately report to the police authorities what
he witnessed for fear of his life. 28 In October 1981
however, eight months after the extraordinary incident he
allegedly witnessed, bothered by his conscience plus the
fact that his father was formerly a tenant of the victim
which, to his mind, made him likewise a tenant of the
latter, he thought of helping the victim's widow, Nanie
Peñacerrada. Hence, out of his volition, he travelled from
his place at Sitio Nabitasan, in Barangay Tipacla
Municipality of Ajuy, to Sara, Iloilo where Mrs.
Peñacerrada lived, and related to her what he saw on
February 21, 1981. 29
Except Fausta who admitted killing Lloyd Peñacerrada in
defense of her honor as the deceased attempted to rape
her, all the accused denied participation in the crime. The
herein accused-appellant, Custodio Gonzales, Sr.,
claimed that he was asleep 30 in his house which was
located some one kilometer away from the scene of the
crime 31 when the incident happened. He asserted that he
only came to know of it after his grandchildren by Augusto
and Fausta Gonzales went to his house that night of
February 21, 1981 to inform him. 32
The trial court disregarded the version of the defense; it
believed the testimony of Huntoria.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Custodia Gonzales,
Sr., the lone appellant, contended that the trial court erred
in convicting him on the basis of the testimony of Jose
Huntoria, the lone alleged eyewitness, and in not
appreciating his defense of alibi.
The Court of Appeals found no merit in both assigned
errors. In upholding Huntoria's testimony, the appellate
court held that:
. . . Huntoria positively identified all the
accused, including the herein accused-
appellant, as the assailants of
Peñacerrada. (TSN, p. 43, July 27, 1982)
The claim that Huntoria would have
difficulty recognizing the assailant at a
distance of 15 to 20 meters is without
merit, considering that Huntoria knew all
the accused. (Id., pp. 37-39) If Huntoria
could not say who was hacking and who
was stabbing the deceased, it was only
because the assailant were moving
around the victim.
As for the delay in reporting the incident
to the authorities, we think that Huntoria's
explanation is satisfactory. He said he
feared for his life. (Id., pp. 50-51, 65) As
stated in People vs. Realon, 99 SCRA
442, 450 (1980): "The natural reticence
of most people to get involved in a
criminal case is of judicial notice. As held
in People v. Delfin, '. . . the initial
reluctance of witnesses in this country to
volunteer information about a criminal
case and their unwillingness to be
involved in or dragged into criminal
investigations is common, and has been
judicially declared not to affect
credibility.'"
It is noteworthy that the accused-
appellant self admitted that he had
known Huntoria for about 10 years and
that he and Huntoria were in good terms
and had no misunderstanding
whatsoever. (TSN, p. 33, July 18, 1984)
He said that he could not think of any
reason why Huntoria should implicate
him. (Id., p. 34) Thus, Huntoria's
credibility. is beyond question. 33
The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the appellant's
defense of alibi. 34 The appellate court, however, found
the sentence imposed by the trial court on the accused-
appellant erroneous. Said the appellate court:
Finally, we find that the trial court
erroneously sentenced the accused-
appellant to 12 years and 1 day to 17
years and 4 months of reclusion
temporal. The penalty for murder under
Article 248 is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death. As there was
no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, the imposible penalty
should be reclusion perpetua.
Consequently, the appeal should have
been brought to the Supreme Court. With
regard to the indemnity for death, the
award of P40,000.00 should be reduced
to P30,000.00, in accordance with the
rulings of the Supreme Court. (E.g.,
People v. De la Fuente, 126 SCRA 518
(1983); People v. Atanacio, 128 SCRA
31 (1984); People v. Rado, 128 SCRA 43
(1984); People v. Bautista, G.R. No.
68731, Feb. 27, 1987).35
The case, as mentioned earlier, is now before us upon
certification by the Court of Appeals, the penalty imposed
being reclusion perpetua.
After a careful review of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution, we find the same insufficient to convict the
appellant of the crime charged.
To begin with, the investigation conducted by the police
authorities leave much to be desired. Patrolman Centeno
of the Ajuy police force in his sworn statements 36 even
gave the date of the commission of the crime as "March
21, 1981." Moreover, the sketch 37 he made of the scene
is of little help. While indicated thereon are the alleged
various blood stains and their locations relative to the
scene of the crime, there was however no indication as to
their quantity. This is rather unfortunate for the
prosecution because, considering that there are two
versions proferred on where the killing was carried out,
the extent of blood stains found would have provided a
more definite clue as to which version is more credible. If,
as the version of the defense puts it, the killing transpired
inside the bedroom of the Gonzales spouses, there would
have been more blood stains inside the couple's bedroom
or even on the ground directly under it. And this
circumstance would provide an additional mooring to the
claim of attempted rape asseverated by Fausta. On the
other hand, if the prosecution's version that the killing was
committed in the field near the linasan is the truth, then
blood stains in that place would have been more than in
any other place.
The same sloppiness characterizes the investigation
conducted by the other authorities. Police Corporal Ben
Sazon who claimed that accused Augusto Gonzales
surrendered to him on February 23, 1981 failed to state
clearly the reason for the "surrender." It would even
appear that Augusto "surrendered" just so he could be
safe from possible revenge by the victim's kins. Corporal
Sazon likewise admitted that Augusto never mentioned to
him the participation of other persons in the killing of the
victim. Finally, without any evidence on that point, P.C.
investigators of the 321st P.C. Company who likewise
conducted an investigation of the killing mentioned in their
criminal complaint 38 four other unnamed persons, aside
from the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales, to have
conspired in killing Lloyd Peñacerrada.
Now on the medical evidence. Dr. Rojas opined that it is
possible that the sixteen wounds described in the autopsy
report were caused by two or more bladed instruments.
Nonetheless, he admitted the possibility that one bladed
instrument might have caused all. Thus, insofar as Dr.
Rojas' testimony and the autopsy report are concerned,
Fausta Gonzales' admission that she alone was
responsible for the killing appears not at all too
impossible. And then there is the positive testimony of Dr.
Rojas that there were only five wounds that could be fatal
out of the sixteen described in the autopsy report. We
shall discuss more the significance of these wounds later.
It is thus clear from the foregoing that if the conviction of
the appellant by the lower courts is to be sustained, it can
only be on the basis of the testimony of Huntoria, the self-
proclaimed eyewitness. Hence, a meticulous scrutiny of
Huntoria's testimony is compelling.
To recollect, Huntoria testified that he clearly saw all the
accused, including the appellant, take turns in hacking
and stabbing Lloyd Peñacerrada, at about 8:00 o'clock in
the evening, on February 21, 1981, in the field near a
"linasan" while he (Huntoria) stood concealed behind a
clump of banana trees some 15 to 20 meters away from
where the crime was being committed. According to him,
he recognized the six accused as the malefactors
because the scene was then illuminated by the moon.
He further stated that the stabbing and hacking took
about an hour. But on cross-examination, Huntoria
admitted that he could not determine who among the six
accused did the stabbing and/or hacking and what
particular weapon was used by each of them.
ATTY. GATON (defense counsel on cross-examination):
Q And you said that the moon was bright, is it correct?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And you would like us to understand that you saw the
hacking and the stabbing, at that distance by the herein
accused as identified by you?
A Yes, sir, because the moon was brightly shining.
Q If you saw the stabbing and the hacking, will you
please tell this Honorable Court who was hacking the
victim?
A Because they were surrounding Peñacerrada and
were in constant movement, I could not determine who
did the hacking.
ATTY. GATON:
The interpretation is not clear.
COURT:
They were doing it rapidly.
A The moving around or the hacking or the "labu" or
"bunu" is rapid. I only saw the rapid movement of their
arms, Your Honor, and I cannot determine who was
hacking and who was stabbing. But I saw the hacking
and the stabbing blow.
ATTY. GATON:
Q You cannot positively identify before this Court who
really hacked Lloyd Peñacerrada?
A Yes sir, I cannot positively tell who did the hacking.
Q And likewise you cannot positively tell this Honorable
Court who did the stabbing?
A Yes sir, and because of the rapid movements.
Q I noticed in your direct testimony that you could not
even identify the weapons used because according to
you it was just flashing?
A Yes, sir.39
(Emphasis supplied)
From his very testimony, Huntoria failed to impute a
definite and specific act committed, or contributed, by the
appellant in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada.
It also bears stressing that there is nothing in the findings
of the trial court and of the Court of Appeals which would
categorize the criminal liability of the appellant as a
principal by direct participation under Article 17,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, there
is nothing in the evidence for the prosecution that
inculpates him by inducement, under paragraph 2 of the
same Article 17, or by indispensable cooperation under
paragraph 3 thereof. What then was the direct part in the
killing did the appellant perform to support the ultimate
punishment imposed by the Court of Appeals on him?
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides how criminal
liability is incurred.
Art. 4. Criminal liability — Criminal
liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done
be different from that which he intended.
2. By any person performing an act which
would be an offense against persons or
property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment or on
 account of the employment of inadequate
or ineffectual means.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, one of the means by which criminal liability is
incurred is through the commission of a felony. Article 3
of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, provides
how felonies are committed.
Art. 3. Definition — Acts and omissions
punishable by law are felonies (delitos).
Felonies are committed not only by
means of deceit (dolo) but also by means
of fault (culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed
with deliberate intent; and there is fault
when the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of
foresight, or lack of skill.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the elements of felonies in general are: (1) there
must be an act or omission; (2) the act or omission must
be punishable under the Revised Penal Code; and (3) the
act is performed or the omission incurred by means of
deceit or fault.
Here, while the prosecution accuses, and the two lower
courts both found, that the appellant has committed a
felony in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, forsooth there
is paucity of proof as to what act was performed by the
appellant. It has been said that "act," as used in Article 3
of the Revised Penal Code, must be understood as "any
bodily movement tending to produce some effect in the
external world." 40 In this instance, there must therefore
be shown an "act" committed by the appellant which
would have inflicted any harm to the body of the victim
that produced his death.
Yet, even Huntoria, as earlier emphasized, admitted quite
candidly that he did not see who "stabbed" or who
"hacked" the victim. Thus this principal witness did not
say, because he could not whether the appellant "hacked
or "stabbed" victim. In fact, Huntoria does not know what
specific act was performed by the appellant. This lack of
specificity then makes the case fall short of the test laid
down by Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code previously
discussed. Furthermore, the fact that the victim sustained
only five fatal wounds out of the total of sixteen inflicted,
as adverted to above, while there are six accused charged
as principals, it follows to reason that one of the six
accused could not have caused or dealt a fatal wound.
And this one could as well be the appellant, granted ex
gratia argumenti that he took part in the hacking and
stabbing alleged by Huntoria. And why not him? Is he not
after all the oldest (already sexagenarian at that time) and
practically the father of the five accused? And pursuing
this argument to the limits of its logic, it is possible, nay
even probable, that only four, or three, or two of the
accused could have inflicted all the five fatal wounds to
the exclusion of two, three, or four of them. And stretching
the logic further, it is possible, nay probable, that all the
fatal wounds, including even all the non-fatal wounds,
could have been dealt by Fausta in rage against the
assault on her womanhood and honor. But more
importantly, there being not an iota of evidence that the
appellant caused any of the said five fatal wounds,
coupled with the prosecution's failure to prove the
presence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt, the
appellant's conviction can not be sustained.
Additionally, Huntoria's credibility as a witness is likewise
tarnished by the fact that he only came out to testify in
October 1981, or eight long months since he allegedly
saw the killing on February 21, 1981. While ordinarily the
failure of a witness to report at once to the police
authorities the crime he
had witnessed should not be taken against him and
should not affect his credibility, 41 here, the unreasonable
delay in Huntoria's coming out engenders doubt on his
veracity. 42 If the silence of coming out an alleged
eyewitness for several weeks renders his credibility
doubtful, 43 the more it should be for one who was mute
for eight months. Further, Huntoria's long delay in
reveiling what he allegedly witnessed, has not been
satisfactorily explained. His lame excuse that he feared
his life would be endangered is too pat to be believed.
There is no showing that he was threatened by the
accused or by anybody. And if it were true that he feared
a possible retaliation from the accused, 44 why did he
finally volunteer to testify considering that except for the
spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales who were already
under police custody, the rest of the accused were then
still free and around; they were not yet named in the
original information, 45 thus the supposed danger on
Huntoria's life would still be clear and present when he
testified.
Moreover, Huntoria is not exactly a disinterested witness
as portrayed by the prosecution. He admitted that he was
a tenant of the deceased. In fact, he stated that one of the
principal reasons why he testified was because the victim
was also his landlord.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, Mr. Huntoria, why did it take you so long from the
time you saw the stabbing and hacking of Lloyd
Peñacerrada when you told Mrs. Peñacerrada about what
happened to her husband?
A At first I was then afraid to tell anybody else but because
I was haunted by my conscience and secondly the victim
was also my landlord I revealed what I saw to the wife of
the victim.46
xxx xxx xxx
 (Emphasis ours.)
At this juncture, it may be relevant to remind that under
our socioeconomic set-up, a tenant owes the very source
of his livelihood, if not existence itself, from his landlord
who provides him with the land to till. In this milieu, tenants
like Huntoria are naturally beholden to their landlords and
seek ways and means to ingratiate themselves with the
latter. In this instance, volunteering his services as a
purported eyewitness and providing that material
testimony which would lead to the conviction of the entire
family of Augusto Gonzales whose wife, Fausta, has
confessed to the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, would, in a
perverted sense, be a way by which Huntoria sought to
ingratiate himself with the surviving family of his deceased
landlord. This is especially so because the need to get into
the good graces of his landlord's family assumed a
greater urgency considering that he ceased to be
employed as early as May 1981. 47 Volunteering his
services would alleviate the financial distress he was in.
And Huntoria proved quite sagacious in his choice of
action for shortly after he volunteered and presented
himself to the victim's widow, he was taken under the
protective wings of the victim's uncle, one Dr. Biclar, who
gave him employment and provided lodging for his
family. 48 Given all the foregoing circumstances, we can
not help but dismiss Huntoria as an unreliable witness, to
say the least.
At any rate, there is another reason why we find the
alleged participation of the appellant in the killing of Lloyd
Peñacerrada doubtful — it is contrary to our customs and
traditions. Under the Filipino family tradition and culture,
aging parents are sheltered and insulated by their adult
children from any possible physical and emotional harm.
It is therefore improbable for the other accused who are
much younger and at the prime of their manhood, to
summon the aid or allow the participation of their 65-year
old 49 father, the appellant, in the killing of their lone
adversary, granting that the victim was indeed an
adversary. And considering that the appellant's residence
was about one kilometer from the scene of the
crime, 50 we seriously doubt that the appellant went there
just for the purpose of aiding his three robust male sons
(Custodia Jr., Nerio, and Augusta), not to mention the
brother and sister, Rogelio and Fausta, in the killing of
Lloyd Peñacerrada, even if the latter were a perceived
enemy.
Finally, while indeed alibi is a weak defense, 51 under
appropriate circumstances, like in the instant case in
which the participation of the appellant is not beyond cavil
it may be considered as exculpatory. Courts should not at
once look with disfavor at the defense of alibi for if taken
in the light of the other evidence on record, it may be
sufficient to acquit the accused. 52
In fine, the guilt of the appellant has not been proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the appellant is hereby
ACQUITTED. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
G.R. No. L-35748 | December 14, 1931
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
ROMANA SILVESTRE and MARTIN
ATIENZA, defendants-appellants.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
Martin Atienza and Romana Silvestre appeal to this court
from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan convicting them upon the information of the crime
of arson as follows: The former as principal by direct
participation, sentenced to fourteen years, eight months,
and one day of cadena temporal, in accordance with
paragraph 2 of article 550, Penal Code; and the latter as
accomplice, sentenced to six years and one day
of presidio mayor; and both are further sentenced to the
accessories of the law, and to pay each of the persons
whose houses were destroyed by the fire, jointly and
severally, the amount set forth in the information, with
costs.
Counsel appointed by the court to defend the accused-
appellants de oficio, after delivering his argument, prayed
for the affirmance of the judgment with reference to the
appellant Martin Atienza, and makes the following
assignments of error with reference to Romana Silvestre,
to wit:
1. The lower court erred in convincing Romana
Silvestre as accomplice of the crime charged in
the information.
2. Finally, the court erred in not acquitting said
defendant from the information upon the ground
of insufficient evidence, or at the least, of
reasonable doubt.
The following facts were proved at the hearing beyond a
reasonable doubt:
Romana Silvestre, wife of Domingo Joaquin by her
second marriage, cohabited with her codefendant Martin
Atienza from the month of March, 1930, in the barrio of
Masocol, municipality of Paombong, Province of Bulacan.
On May 16, 1930, the complaining husband, Domingo
Joaquin, filed with the justice of the peace for that
municipality, a sworn complaint for adultery, supported by
affidavits of Gerardo Cabigao and Castor de la Cruz
(Exhibit B). On the same date, May 16, 1930, the said
accused were arrested on a warrant issued by said justice
of the peace. On the 20th of the month, they were
released on bail, each giving a personal bond of P6,000.
Pending the preliminary investigation of the case, the two
defendants begged the municipal president of Paombong,
Francisco Suerte Felipe, to speak to the complaint,
Domingo Joaquin, urging him to withdraw the complaint,
the two accused binding themselves to discontinue
cohabitation, and promising not to live again in the barrio
of Masocol; Martin Atienza voluntarily signed the promise
(Exhibit A). The municipal president transmitted the
defendants' petition to the complaining husband, lending
it his support. Domingo Joaquin acceded to it, and on May
20, 1930, filed a motion for the dismissal of his complaint.
In consideration of this petition, the justice of the peace of
Paombong dismissed the adultery case commenced
against the accused, and cancelled the bonds given by
them, with the costs against the complainant.
The accused then left the barrio of Masocol and went to
live in that of Santo Niño, in the same municipality of
Paombong.
About November 20, 1930, the accused Romana
Silvestre met her son by her former marriage, Nicolas de
la Cruz, in the barrio of Santo Niño, and under pretext of
asking him for some nipa leaves, followed him home to
the village of Masocol, and remained there. The accused,
Martin Atienza, who had continued to cohabit with said
Romana Silvestre, followed her and lived in the home of
Nicolas de la Cruz. On the night of November 25, 1930,
while Nicolas de la Cruz and his wife, Antonia de la Cruz,
were gathered together with the appellants herein after
supper, Martin Atienza told said couple to take their
furniture out of the house because he was going to set fire
to it. Upon being asked by Nicolas and Antonia why he
wanted to set fire to the house, he answered that that was
the only way he could be revenged upon the people of
Masocol who, he said, had instigated the charge of
adultery against him and his codefendant, Romana
Silvestre. As Martin Atienza was at that time armed with a
pistol, no one dared say anything to him, not even
Romana Silvestre, who was about a meter away from her
codefendant. Alarmed at what Martin Atienza had said,
the couple left the house at once to communicate with the
barrio lieutenant, Buenaventura Ania, as to what they had
just heard Martin Atienza say; but they had hardly gone a
hundred arms' length when they heard cries of "Fire! Fire!"
Turning back they saw their home in flames, and ran back
to it; but seeing that the fire had assumed considerable
proportions, Antonia took refuge in the schoolhouse with
her 1 year old babe in her arms, while Nicolas went to the
home of his parents-in-law, took up the furniture he had
deposited there, and carried it to the schoolhouse. The
fire destroyed about forty-eight houses. Tomas Santiago
coming from the barrio artesian well, and Tomas
Gonzalez, teacher at the barrio school of Masocol, and
Felipe Clemente, an old man 61 years of age, coming
from their homes, to the house on fire, saw Martin Atienza
going away from the house where the fire started, and
Romana Silvestre leaving it.lawphil.net
As stated in the beginning, counsel appointed by this court
to defend the accused-appellant de oficio, prays for the
affirmance of the judgment appealed from with reference
to defendant Martin Atienza. The facts related heretofore,
proved beyond a reasonable doubt at the hearing, justify
this petition of the de oficio counsel, and establish beyond
a reasonable doubt said defendant's guilt of arson as
charged, as principal by direct participation.
With respect to the accused-appellant Romana Silvestre,
the only evidence of record against her are: That, being
married, she lived adulterously with her codefendant
Martin Atienza, a married man; that both were denounced
for adultery by Domingo Joaquin, Romana Silvestre's
second husband; that in view of the petition of the
accused, who promised to discontinue their life together,
and to leave the barrio of Masocol, and through the good
offices of the municipal president of Paombong, the
complaining husband asked for the dismissal of the
complaint; that in pursuance of their promise, both of the
accused went to lived in the barrio of Santo Niño, in the
same municipality; that under pretext for some nipa
leaves from her son by her former marriage, Nicolas de la
Cruz, who had gone to the barrio of Santo Niño, Romana
Silvestre followed him to his house in the barrio of
Masocol on November 23, 1930, and remained there; that
her codefendant, Martin Atienza followed her, and stayed
with his coaccused in the same house; that on the night
of November 25, 1930, at about 8 o'clock, while all were
gathered together at home after supper, Martin Atienza
expressed his intention of burning the house as the only
means of taking his revenge on the Masocol resident, who
had instigated Domingo Joaquin to file the complaint for
adultery against them, which compelled them to leave the
barrio of Masocol; that Romana Silvestre listened to her
codefendant's threat without raising a protest, and did not
give the alarm when the latter set fire to the house. Upon
the strength of these facts, the court below found her
guilty of arson as accomplice.
Article 14 of the Penal Code, considered in connection
with article 13, defines an accomplice to be one who does
not take a direct part in the commission of the act, who
does not force or induce other to commit it, nor cooperates
in the commission of the act by another act without which
it would not have been accomplished, yet cooperates in
the execution of the act by previous or simultaneous
actions.
Now then, which previous or simultaneous acts
complicate Romana Silvestre in the crime of arson
committed by her codefendant Martin Atienza? Is it her
silence when he told the spouses, Nicolas de la Cruz and
Antonia de la Cruz, to take away their furniture because
he was going to set fire to their house as the only means
of revenging himself on the barrio residents, her passive
presence when Martin Atienza set fire to the house, where
there is no evidence of conspiracy or cooperation, and her
failure to give the alarm when the house was already on
fire?
The complicity which is penalized requires a certain
degree of cooperation, whether moral, through advice,
encouragement, or agreement, or material, through
external acts. In the case of the accused-appellant
Romana Silvestre, there is no evidence of moral or
material cooperation, and none of an agreement to
commit the crime in question. Her mere presence and
silence while they are simultaneous acts, do not constitute
cooperation, for it does not appear that they encouraged
or nerved Martin Atienza to commit the crime of arson;
and as for her failure to give the alarm, that being a
subsequent act it does not make her liable as an
accomplice.
The trial court found the accused-appellant Martin Atienza
guilty of arson, defined and penalized in article 550,
paragraph 2, of the Penal Code, which reads as follows:
ART. 550. The penalty of cadena temporal shall
be imposed upon:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Any person who shall set fire to any inhabited
house or any building in which people are
accustomed to meet together, without knowing
whether or not such building or house was
occupied at the time, or any freight train in motion,
if the damage caused in such cases shall exceed
six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.
While the defendant indeed knew that besides himself
and his codefendant, Romana Silvestre, there was
nobody in De la Cruz's house at the moment of setting fire
to it, he cannot be convicted merely arson less serious
than what the trial court sentenced him for, inasmuch as
that house was the means of destroying the others, and
he did not know whether these were occupied at the time
or not. If the greater seriousness of setting fire to an
inhabited house, when the incendiary does not know
whether there are people in it at the time, depends upon
the danger to which the inmates are exposed, not less
serious is the arson committed by setting fire to inhabited
houses by means of another inhabited house which the
firebrand knew to be empty at the moment of committing
the act, if he did not know whether there were people or
not in the others, inasmuch as the same danger exists.
With the evidence produced at the trial, the accused-
appellant Martin Atienza might have been convicted of the
crime of arson in the most serious degree provided for in
article 549 of the Penal Code, if the information had
alleged that at the time of setting fire to the house, the
defendant knew that the other houses were occupied,
taking into account that barrio residents are accustomed
to retire at the tolling of the bell for the souls in purgatory,
i.e., at 8 o'clock at night.
For all the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion
and so hold, that: (1) Mere passive presence at the scene
of another's crime, mere silence and failure to give the
alarm, without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do
not constitute the cooperation required by article 14 of the
Penal Code for complicity in the commission of the crime
witnessed passively, or with regard to which one has kept
silent; and (2) he who desiring to burn the houses in a
barrio, without knowing whether there are people in them
or not, sets fire to one known to be vacant at the time,
which results in destroying the rest, commits the crime of
arson, defined and penalized in article 550, paragraph 2,
Penal Code.
By virtue wherefore, the judgment appealed from is
modified as follows: It is affirmed with reference to the
accused-appellant Martin Atienza, and reversed with
reference to the accused-appellant Romana Silvestre,
who is hereby acquitted with
one-half of the costs de oficio. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor,
Ostrand, Romualdez, and Imperial, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 152133 | February 9, 2006
ROLLIE CALIMUTAN, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court, petitioner Rollie Calimutan
prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23306, dated 29 August
2001,1affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 46, of Masbate, Masbate, in Criminal Case
No. 8184, dated 19 November 1998,2 finding petitioner
Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Information3 filed with the RTC charged petitioner
Calimutan with the crime of homicide, allegedly
committed as follows –
That on or about February 4, 1996, in the morning thereof,
at sitio Capsay, Barangay Panique, Municipality of
Aroroy, Province of Masbate, Philippines within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused with intent to kill, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and throw a
stone at PHILIP CANTRE, hitting him at the back left
portion of his body, resulting in laceration of spleen due to
impact which caused his death a day after.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Masbate, Masbate, September 11, 1996.
Accordingly, the RTC issued, on 02 December 1996, a
warrant4 for the arrest of petitioner Calimutan. On 09
January 1997, however, he was provisionally
released5 after posting sufficient bailbond.6 During the
arraignment on 21 May 1997, petitioner Calimutan
pleaded not guilty to the crime of homicide charged
against him.7
In the course of the trial, the prosecution presented three
witnesses, namely: (1) Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez, a Senior
Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI); (2) Belen B. Cantre, mother of the
victim, Philip Cantre; and (3) Rene L. Sañano, companion
of the victim Cantre when the alleged crime took place.
Their testimonies are collectively summarized below.
On 04 February 1996, at around 10:00 a.m., the victim
Cantre and witness Sañano, together with two other
companions, had a drinking spree at a videoke bar in
Crossing Capsay, Panique, Aroroy, Masbate. From the
videoke bar, the victim Cantre and witness Sañano
proceeded to go home to their respective houses, but
along the way, they crossed paths with petitioner
Calimutan and a certain Michael Bulalacao. Victim Cantre
was harboring a grudge against Bulalacao, suspecting the
latter as the culprit responsible for throwing stones at the
Cantre’s house on a previous night. Thus, upon seeing
Bulalacao, victim Cantre suddenly punched him. While
Bulalacao ran away, petitioner Calimutan dashed towards
the backs of victim Cantre and witness Sañano. Petitioner
Calimutan then picked up a stone, as big as a man’s fist,
which he threw at victim Cantre, hitting him at the left side
of his back. When hit by the stone, victim Cantre stopped
for a moment and held his back. Witness Sañano put
himself between the victim Cantre and petitioner
Calimutan, and attempted to pacify the two, even
convincing petitioner Calimutan to put down another
stone he was already holding. He also urged victim Cantre
and petitioner Calimutan to just go home. Witness
Sañano accompanied victim Cantre to the latter’s house,
and on the way, victim Cantre complained of the pain in
the left side of his back hit by the stone. They arrived at
the Cantre’s house at around 12:00 noon, and witness
Sañano left victim Cantre to the care of the latter’s mother,
Belen.8
Victim Cantre immediately told his mother, Belen, of the
stoning incident involving petitioner Calimutan. He again
complained of backache and also of stomachache, and
was unable to eat. By nighttime, victim Cantre was
alternately feeling cold and then warm. He was sweating
profusely and his entire body felt numb. His family would
have wanted to bring him to a doctor but they had no
vehicle. At around 3:00 a.m. of the following day, 05
February 1996, Belen was wiping his son with a piece of
cloth, when victim Cantre asked for some food. He was
able to eat a little, but he also later vomited whatever he
ate. For the last time, he complained of backache and
stomachache, and shortly thereafter, he died. 9
Right after his death, victim Cantre was examined by Dr.
Conchita S. Ulanday, the Municipal Health Officer of
Aroroy, Masbate. The Post-Mortem Examination
Report10 and Certification of Death,11 issued and signed
by Dr. Ulanday, stated that the cause of death of victim
Cantre was cardio-respiratory arrest due to suspected
food poisoning. The body of victim Cantre was
subsequently embalmed and buried on 13 February 1996.
Unsatisfied with the findings of Dr. Ulanday, the Cantre
family, with the help of the Lingkod Bayan-Circulo de
Abogadas of the ABS-CBN Foundation, requested for an
exhumation and autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre
by the NBI. The exhumation and autopsy of the body of
the victim Cantre was conducted by Dr. Ronaldo B.
Mendez on 15 April 1996,12 after which, he reported the
following findings –
Body; fairly well-preserved with sign of partial autopsy;
clad in white Barong Tagalog and blue pants placed inside
a wooden golden-brown coffin and buried in a concrete
niche.
Contused-abrasion, 2.3 x 1.0 cms., posterior chest wall,
left side.
Hematoma, 16.0 x 8.0 cms., abdomen, along mid-line.
Hemoperitoneum, massive, clotte [sic].
Laceration, spleen.
Other visceral organ, pale and embalmed.
Stomach contains small amount of whitish fluid and other
partially digested food particles.
xxxx
CAUSE OF DEATH: TRAUMATIC INJURY OF THE
ABDOMEN.
In his testimony before the RTC, Dr. Mendez affirmed the
contents of his exhumation and autopsy report. He
explained that the victim Cantre suffered from an internal
hemorrhage and there was massive accumulation of
blood in his abdominal cavity due to his lacerated spleen.
The laceration of the spleen can be caused by any blunt
instrument, such as a stone. Hence, Dr. Mendez
confirmed the possibility that the victim Cantre was stoned
to death by petitioner Calimutan.13
To counter the evidence of the prosecution, the defense
presented the sole testimony of the accused, herein
petitioner, Calimutan.
According to petitioner Calimutan, at about 1:00 p.m. on
04 February 1996, he was walking with his house helper,
Michael Bulalacao, on their way to Crossing Capsay,
Panique, Aroroy, Masbate, when they met with the victim
Cantre and witness Sañano. The victim Cantre took hold
of Bulalacao and punched him several times. Petitioner
Calimutan attempted to pacify the victim Cantre but the
latter refused to calm down, pulling out from his waist an
eight-inch Batangas knife and uttering that he was looking
for trouble, either "to kill or be killed." At this point,
petitioner Calimutan was about ten meters away from the
victim Cantre and was too frightened to move any closer
for fear that the enraged man would turn on him; he still
had a family to take care of. When he saw that the victim
Cantre was about to stab Bulalacao, petitioner Calimutan
picked up a stone, which he described as approximately
one-inch in diameter, and threw it at the victim Cantre. He
was able to hit the victim Cantre on his right buttock.
Petitioner Calimutan and Bulalacao then started to run
away, and victim Cantre chased after them, but witness
Sañano was able to pacify the victim Cantre. Petitioner
Calimutan allegedly reported the incident to a kagawad of
Barangay Panique and to the police authorities and
sought their help in settling the dispute between
Bulalacao and the victim Cantre. Bulalacao, meanwhile,
refused to seek medical help despite the advice of
petitioner Calimutan and, instead, chose to go back to his
hometown.14
Petitioner Calimutan was totally unaware of what had
happened to the victim Cantre after the stoning incident
on 04 February 1996. Some of his friends told him that
they still saw the victim Cantre drinking at a videoke bar
on the night of 04 February 1996. As far as he knew, the
victim Cantre died the following day, on 05 February 1996,
because of food poisoning. Petitioner Calimutan
maintained that he had no personal grudge against the
victim Cantre previous to the stoning incident.15
On 19 November 1998, the RTC rendered its
Decision,16 essentially adopting the prosecution’s
account of the incident on 04 February 1996, and
pronouncing that –
It cannot be legally contended that the throwing of the
stone by the accused was in defense of his companion, a
stranger, because after the boxing Michael was able to
run. While it appears that the victim was the unlawful
aggressor at the beginning, but the aggression already
ceased after Michael was able to run and there was no
more need for throwing a stone. The throwing of the stone
to the victim which was a retaliatory act can be considered
unlawful, hence the accused can be held criminally liable
under paragraph 1 of Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
The act of throwing a stone from behind which hit the
victim at his back on the left side was a treacherous one
and the accused committed a felony causing physical
injuries to the victim. The physical injury of hematoma as
a result of the impact of the stone resulted in the laceration
of the spleen causing the death of the victim. The accused
is criminally liable for all the direct and natural
consequences of this unlawful act even if the ultimate
result had not been intended. (Art. 4, Par. 1, Revised
Penal Code; People vs. Narciso, CA-G.R. No. 03532-CR,
Jan. 13, 1964)
One is not relieved from criminal liability for the natural
consequences of one’s illegal acts merely because one
does not intend to produce such consequences (U.S. vs.
Brobst, 14 Phil. 310).
The crime committed is Homicide as defined and
penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and so holds that accused
ROLLIE CALIMUTAN is GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Homicide defined and penalized
under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code with no
mitigating or aggravating circumstance and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law hereby imposes the penalty
of imprisonment from EIGHT (8) YEARS of Prision Mayor
as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
of Reclusion Temporal as maximum, and to indemnify the
heirs of Philip Cantre the sum of Fifty Thousand
(₱50,000.00) Pesos as compensatory damages and the
sum of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos as moral
damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
Petitioner Calimutan appealed the Decision of the RTC to
the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in its
Decision, dated 29 August 2001,17 sustained the
conviction of homicide rendered by the RTC against
petitioner Calimutan, ratiocinating thus –
The prosecution has sufficiently established that the
serious internal injury sustained by the victim was caused
by the stone thrown at the victim by the accused which,
the accused-appellant does not deny. It was likewise
shown that the internal injury sustained by the victim was
the result of the impact of the stone that hit the victim. It
resulted to a traumatic injury of the abdomen causing the
laceration of the victim’s spleen.
This is clearly shown by the autopsy report prepared by
Dr. Ronaldo Mendez, a Senior Medico Legal Officer of the
NBI after the exhumation of the victim’s cadaver…
The Court cannot give credence to the post mortem report
prepared by Municipal Health Officer Dr. Conchita
Ulanday stating that the cause of the victim’s death was
food poisoning. Dr. Ulanday was not even presented to
testify in court hence she was not even able to identify
and/or affirm the contents of her report. She was not made
available for cross-examination on the accuracy and
correctness of her findings.
Dr. Conchita Ulanday’s post mortem report cannot prevail
over the autopsy report (Exh. "C") of the Medico-Legal
Officer of the NBI who testified and was cross-examined
by the defense.
Besides, if accused-appellant was convinced that the
victim indeed died of food poisoning, as reported by Dr.
Conchita Ulanday, why did they not present her as their
witness to belie the report of the Medico-Legal Officer of
the NBI.
The trial court’s evaluation of the testimony of Dr. Mendez
is accorded the highest respect because it had the
opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of said
witness.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Branch 46, finding
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of homicide is hereby AFFIRMED.
The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution, dated 15 January
2002,18 denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
petitioner Calimutan for lack of merit since the issues
raised therein had already been passed and ruled upon in
its Decision, dated 29 August 2001.
Comes now petitioner Calimutan, by way of the present
Petition for Review on Certiorari, seeking (1) the reversal
of the Decisions of the RTC, dated 19 November 1998,
and of the Court of Appeals, dated 29 August 2001,
convicting him of the crime of homicide; and, (2)
consequently, his acquittal of the said crime based on
reasonable doubt.
Petitioner Calimutan contended that the existence of the
two autopsy reports, with dissimilar findings on the cause
of death of the victim Cantre, constituted reasonable
doubt as to the liability of petitioner Calimutan for the said
death, arguing that –
x x x [I]t was Dra. Conchita Ulanday, Municipal Health
Officer of Aroroy, Masbate was the first physician of the
government who conducted an examination on the
cadaver of the victim Philip Cantre whose findings was
that the cause of his death was due to food poisoning
while the second government physician NBI Medico Legal
Officer Dr. Ronaldo Mendez whose findings was that the
cause of the death was due to a traumatic injury of the
abdomen caused by a lacerated spleen and with these
findings of two (2) government physicians whose findings
are at variance with each other materially, it is humbly
contended that the same issue raised a reasonable doubt
on the culpability of the petitioner.
As there are improbabilities and uncertainties of the
evidence for the prosecution in the case at bar, it suffices
to reaise [sic] reasonable doubt as to the petitioner’s guilt
and therefore, he is entitled to acquittal (People vs.
Delmendo, G.R. No. 32146, November 23, 1981).19
In this jurisdiction, an accused in a criminal case may only
be convicted if his or her guilt is established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable
doubt requires only a moral certainty or that degree of
proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind;
it does not demand absolute certainty and the exclusion
of all possibility of error.20
In the Petition at bar, this Court finds that there is proof
beyond reasonable doubt to hold petitioner Calimutan
liable for the death of the victim Cantre.
Undoubtedly, the exhumation and autopsy report and the
personal testimony before the RTC of prosecution
witness, NBI Senior Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Mendez, are
vital pieces of evidence against petitioner Calimutan. Dr.
Mendez determined that the victim Cantre died of internal
hemorrhage or bleeding due to the laceration of his
spleen. In his testimony, Dr. Mendez clearly and
consistently explained that the spleen could be lacerated
or ruptured when the abdominal area was hit with a blunt
object, such as the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan
at the victim Cantre.
It bears to emphasize that Dr. Mendez was presented by
the prosecution as an expert witness, whose "competency
and academic qualification and background" was
admitted by the defense itself.21 As a Senior Medico-
Legal Officer of the NBI, Dr. Mendez is presumed to
possess sufficient knowledge of pathology, surgery,
gynecology, toxicology, and such other branches of
medicine germane to the issues involved in a case.22
Dr. Mendez’s testimony as an expert witness is
evidence,23 and although it does not necessarily bind the
courts, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals had
properly accorded it great weight and probative value.
Having testified as to matters undeniably within his area
of expertise, and having performed a thorough autopsy on
the body of the victim Cantre, his findings as to the cause
of death of the victim Cantre are more than just the mere
speculations of an ordinary person. They may sufficiently
establish the causal relationship between the stone
thrown by the petitioner Calimutan and the lacerated
spleen of the victim Cantre which, subsequently, resulted
in the latter’s death. With no apparent mistake or
irregularity, whether in the manner by which Dr. Mendez
performed the autopsy on the body of the victim Cantre or
in his findings, then his report and testimony must be
seriously considered by this Court.
Moreover, reference to other resource materials on
abdominal injuries would also support the conclusion of
Dr. Mendez that the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan
caused the death of the victim Cantre.
One source explains the nature of abdominal injuries 24 in
the following manner –
The skin may remain unmarked inspite of extensive
internal injuries with bleeding and disruption of the internal
organs. The areas most vulnerable are the point of
attachment of internal organs, especially at the source of
its blood supply and at the point where blood vessels
change direction.
The area in the middle superior half of the abdomen,
forming a triangle bounded by the ribs on the two sides
and a line drawn horizontally through the umbilicus
forming its base is vulnerable to trauma applied from
any direction. In this triangle are found several blood
vessels changing direction, particularly the celiac trunk, its
branches (the hepatic, splenic and gastric arteries) as
well as the accompanying veins. The loop of the
duodenum, the ligament of Treitz and the pancreas are in
the retroperitoneal space, and the stomach and
transverse colon are in the triangle, located in the
peritoneal cavity. Compression or blow on the area may
cause detachment, laceration, stretch-stress, contusion of
the organs (Legal Medicine 1980, Cyril H. Wecht et., p.
41).
As to injuries to the spleen, in particular,25 the same
source expounds that –
The spleen usually suffers traumatic rupture resulting
from the impact of a fall or blow from the crushing and
grinding effects of wheels of motor vehicles. Although the
organ is protected at its upper portion by the ribs and also
by the air-containing visceral organs, yet on account of
its superficiality and fragility, it is usually affected by
trauma. x x x.
Certainly, there are some terms in the above-quoted
paragraphs difficult to comprehend for people without
medical backgrounds. Nevertheless, there are some
points that can be plainly derived therefrom: (1) Contrary
to common perception, the abdominal area is more than
just the waist area. The entire abdominal area is divided
into different triangles, and the spleen is located in the
upper triangle, bounded by the rib cage; (2) The spleen
and all internal organs in the same triangle are vulnerable
to trauma from all directions. Therefore, the stone need
not hit the victim Cantre from the front. Even impact from
a stone hitting the back of the victim Cantre, in the area of
the afore-mentioned triangle, could rupture the spleen;
and (3) Although the spleen had already been ruptured or
lacerated, there may not always be a perceptible external
injury to the victim. Injury to the spleen cannot, at all times,
be attributed to an obvious, external injury such as a cut
or bruise. The laceration of the victim Cantre’s spleen can
be caused by a stone thrown hard enough, which qualifies
as a nonpenetrating trauma26 –
Nonpenetrating Trauma. The spleen, alone or in
combination with other viscera, is the most frequently
injured organ following blunt trauma to the abdomen or
the lower thoracic cage. Automobile accidents provide the
predominating cause, while falls, sledding and bicycle
injuries, and blows incurred during contact sports are
frequently implicated in children. x x x
The sheer impact of the stone thrown by petitioner
Calimutan at the back of the victim Cantre could rupture
or lacerate the spleen – an organ described as vulnerable,
superficial, and fragile – even without causing any other
external physical injury. Accordingly, the findings of Dr.
Mendez that the victim Cantre died of internal
hemorrhage from his lacerated spleen, and the cause of
the laceration of the spleen was the stone thrown by
petitioner Calimutan at the back of the victim Cantre, does
not necessarily contradict his testimony before the RTC
that none of the external injuries of the victim Cantre were
fatal.
Based on the foregoing discussion, the prosecution was
able to establish that the proximate cause of the death of
the victim Cantre was the stone thrown at him by
petitioner Calimutan. Proximate cause has been defined
as "that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred."27
The two other witnesses presented by the prosecution,
namely Sañano and Belen Cantre, had adequately
recounted the events that transpired on 04 February 1996
to 05 February 1996. Between the two of them, the said
witnesses accounted for the whereabouts, actions, and
physical condition of the victim Cantre during the said
period. Before the encounter with petitioner Calimutan
and Bulalacao, the victim Cantre seemed to be physically
fine. However, after being hit at the back by the stone
thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan, the victim Cantre
had continuously complained of backache. Subsequently,
his physical condition rapidly deteriorated, until finally, he
died. Other than being stoned by petitioner Calimutan,
there was no other instance when the victim Cantre may
have been hit by another blunt instrument which could
have caused the laceration of his spleen.
Hence, this Court is morally persuaded that the victim
Cantre died from a lacerated spleen, an injury sustained
after being hit by a stone thrown at him by petitioner
Calimutan. Not even the post-mortem report of Dr.
Ulanday, the Municipal Health Officer who first examined
the body of the victim Cantre, can raise reasonable doubt
as to the cause of death of the victim Cantre. Invoking Dr.
Ulanday’s post-mortem report, the defense insisted on the
possibility that the victim Cantre died of food poisoning.
The post-mortem report, though, cannot be given much
weight and probative value for the following reasons –
First, a closer scrutiny of the words used by Dr. Ulanday
in her post-mortem report, as well as in the death
certificate of the victim Cantre, reveals that although she
suspected food poisoning as the cause of death, she held
back from making a categorical statement that it was so.
In the post-mortem report, 28 she found that "x x x the
provable (sic) cause of death was due to cardio-
respiratory arrest. Food poisoning must be confirm (sic)
by laboratory e(x)am." In the death certificate of the victim
Cantre, 29 she wrote that the immediate cause of death
was "Cardio-Respiratory Arrest" and the antecedent
cause was "Food Poisoning Suspect." There was no
showing that further laboratory tests were indeed
conducted to confirm Dr. Ulanday’s suspicion that the
victim Cantre suffered from food poisoning, and without
such confirmation, her suspicion as to the cause of death
remains just that – a suspicion.
Second, Dr. Ulanday executed before the NBI a sworn
statement30 in which she had explained her findings in the
post-mortem report, to wit –
05. Q: Did you conduct an autopsy on his cadaver?
A: I did sir, but not as exhaustive as that done by the NBI
Medico-legal.
06. Q: Now, what do you want to state regarding your
certification on the death of PHILIP B. CANTRE?
A: I stated in the certification and even in the Death
Certificate about "Food Poisoning". What I stated in the
Death Certificate was that CANTRE was a SUSPECTED
victim of food poisoning. I didn’t state that he was a case
of food poisoning. And in the Certification, I even
recommended that an examination be done to confirm
that suspicion.
07. Q: What gave you that suspicion of poisoning?
A: As there were no external signs of fatal injuries except
that of the contusion or abrasion, measuring as that size
of a 25 centavo coin, I based my suspicion from the
history of the victim and from the police investigation.
08. Q: You also mentioned in your Certification that there
was no internal hemorrhage in the cadaver. Did you open
the body of the cadaver?
A: As I have already stated sir, I did not conduct an
exhaustive autopsy. I made an incision on the abdomen
and I explored the internal organs of the cadaver with my
hand in search for any clotting inside. But I found none. I
did not open the body of the cadaver.
09. Q: You mentioned about a contusion you have
observed on the cadaver. Where was it located?
A: On the left portion of his back, sir.
10. Q: Now, is it possible that if somebody be hit by a hard
object on that part of his body, his SPLEEN could be
injured?
A: Yes, sir. But that would depend on how strong or
forceful the impact was.
In contrast, Dr. Mendez described in his testimony before
the RTC31 how he conducted the autopsy of the body of
the victim Cantre, as follows –
Q What specific procedure did you do in connection with
the exhumation of the body of the victim in this case?
A We opened the head, chest and the abdomen.
Q That was part of the autopsy you have conducted?
A Yes, sir.
Q Aside from opening the head as well as the body of the
victim Philip Cantre, what other matters did you do in
connection therewith?
A We examined the internal organs.
Q What in particular internal organs you have examined?
A The brain, the heart, the lungs, the liver, the kidneys,
the pancreas plus the intestines.
xxxx
Q The cause of death as you have listed here in your
findings is listed as traumatic injury of the abdomen, will
you kindly tell us Doctor what is the significance of this
medical term traumatic injury of the abdomen?
A We, medico-legal officers of the NBI don’t do what other
doctors do as they make causes of death as internal
hemorrhage we particularly point to the injury of the body
like this particular case the injury was at the abdomen of
the victim.
Q Will you tell as Doctor what particular portion of the
abdomen of the victim this traumatic injury is located?
A Along the midline but the damaged organ was at the
left.
Q What particular organ are you referring to?
A The spleen, sir.
The difference in the extent of the examinations
conducted by the two doctors of the body of the victim
Cantre provides an adequate explanation for their
apparent inconsistent findings as to the cause of death.
Comparing the limited autopsy conducted by Dr. Ulanday
and her unconfirmed suspicion of food poisoning of the
victim Cantre, as opposed to the exhaustive autopsy
performed by Dr. Mendez and his definitive finding of a
ruptured spleen as the cause of death of the victim
Cantre, then the latter, without doubt, deserves to be
given credence by the courts.
Third, that the prosecution no longer presented Dr.
Ulanday before the RTC despite being included in its list
of witnesses did not amount to a willful suppression of
evidence that would give rise to the presumption that her
testimony would be adverse to the prosecution if
produced.32 As this Court already expounded in the case
of People v. Jumamoy33 –
The prosecution's failure to present the other witnesses
listed in the information did not constitute, contrary to the
contention of the accused, suppression of evidence. The
prosecutor has the exclusive prerogative to determine the
witnesses to be presented for the prosecution. If the
prosecution has several eyewitnesses, as in the instant
case, the prosecutor need not present all of them but only
as many as may be needed to meet the quantum of proof
necessary to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the other witnesses
may, therefore, be dispensed with for being merely
corroborative in nature. This Court has ruled that the non-
presentation of corroborative witnesses would not
constitute suppression of evidence and would not be fatal
to the prosecution's case. Besides, there is no showing
that the eyewitnesses who were not presented in court as
witnesses were not available to the accused. We reiterate
the rule that the adverse presumption from a suppression
of evidence is not applicable when (1) the suppression is
not willful; (2) the evidence suppressed or withheld is
merely corroborative or cumulative; (3) the evidence is at
the disposal of both parties; and (4) the suppression is an
exercise of a privilege. Moreover, if the accused believed
that the failure to present the other witnesses was
because their testimonies would be unfavorable to the
prosecution, he should have compelled their appearance,
by compulsory process, to testify as his own witnesses or
even as hostile witnesses.
It was a judgment call for the prosecution to no longer
present Dr. Ulanday before the RTC, perhaps believing
that it had already presented sufficient evidence to merit
the conviction of petitioner Calimutan even without her
testimony. There was nothing, however, preventing the
defense from calling on, or even compelling, with the
appropriate court processes, Dr. Ulanday to testify in
court as its witness if it truly believed that her testimony
would be adverse to the case presented by the
prosecution.
While this Court is in accord with the factual findings of
the RTC and the Court of Appeals and affirms that there
is ample evidence proving that the death of the victim
Cantre was caused by his lacerated spleen, an injury
which resulted from being hit by the stone thrown at him
by petitioner Calimutan, this Court, nonetheless, is at
variance with the RTC and the Court of Appeals as to the
determination of the appropriate crime or offense for
which the petitioner should have been convicted for.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies felonies
according to the means by which they are committed, in
particular: (1) intentional felonies, and (2) culpable
felonies. These two types of felonies are distinguished
from each other by the existence or absence of malicious
intent of the offender –
In intentional felonies, the act or omission of the offender
is malicious. In the language of Art. 3, the act is performed
with deliberate intent (with malice). The offender, in
performing the act or in incurring the omission, has the
intention to cause an injury to another. In culpable
felonies, the act or omission of the offender
is not malicious. The injury caused by the offender to
another person is "unintentional, it being simply the
incident of another act performed without malice."
(People vs. Sara, 55 Phil. 939). As stated in Art. 3, the
wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of
foresight or lack of skill.34
In the Petition at bar, this Court cannot, in good
conscience, attribute to petitioner Calimutan any
malicious intent to injure, much less to kill, the victim
Cantre; and in the absence of such intent, this Court
cannot sustain the conviction of petitioner Calimutan for
the intentional crime of homicide, as rendered by the RTC
and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Instead, this Court
finds petitioner Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the culpable felony of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code expressly provides
for the definition of reckless imprudence –
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without
malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material
damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing or failing
to perform such act, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence,
physical condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
There are several circumstances, discussed in the
succeeding paragraphs, that demonstrate petitioner
Calimutan’s lack of intent to kill the victim Cantre, and
conversely, that substantiate the view of this Court that
the death of victim Cantre was a result of petitioner
Calimutan’s reckless imprudence. The RTC and the Court
of Appeals may have failed to appreciate, or had
completely overlooked, the significance of such
circumstances.
It should be remembered that the meeting of the victim
Cantre and witness Sañano, on the one hand, and
petitioner Calimutan and his helper Bulalacao, on the
other, was a chance encounter as the two parties were on
their way to different destinations. The victim Cantre and
witness Sañano were on their way home from a drinking
spree in Crossing Capsay, while petitioner Calimutan and
his helper Bulalacao were walking from the market to
Crossing Capsay. While the evidence on record suggests
that a running grudge existed between the victim Cantre
and Bulalacao, it did not establish that there was likewise
an existing animosity between the victim Cantre and
petitioner Calimutan.1avvphil.net
In both versions of the events of 04 February 1996
submitted by the prosecution and the defense, it was the
victim Cantre who was the initial aggressor. He suddenly
punched Bulalacao, the helper and companion of
petitioner Calimutan, when they met on the road. The
attack of the victim Cantre was swift and unprovoked,
which spurred petitioner Calimutan into responsive action.
Given that this Court dismisses the claim of petitioner
Calimutan that the victim Cantre was holding a knife, it
does take into account that the victim Cantre was
considerably older and bigger, at 26 years of age and with
a height of five feet and nine inches, compared to
Bulalacao, the boy he attacked, who was only 15 years
old and stood at about five feet. Even with his bare hands,
the victim Cantre could have hurt Bulalacao. Petitioner
Calimutan sought only to protect Bulalacao and to stop
the assault of the victim Cantre against the latter when he
picked up a stone and threw it at the victim Cantre. The
stone was readily available as a weapon to petitioner
Calimutan since the incident took place on a road. That
he threw the stone at the back of the victim Cantre does
not automatically imply treachery on the part of petitioner
Calimutan as it is highly probable that in the midst of the
fray, he threw the stone rashly and impulsively, with no
regard as to the position of the victim Cantre. When the
victim Cantre stopped his aggression after being hit by the
stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan, the latter also
desisted from any other act of violence against the victim
Cantre.
The above-described incident could not have taken more
than just a few minutes. It was a very brief scuffle, in which
the parties involved would hardly have the time to ponder
upon the most appropriate course of action to take. With
this in mind, this Court cannot concur in the declaration
made by the Court of Appeals that petitioner Calimutan
threw the stone at the victim Cantre as a retaliatory act. It
was evidently a swift and spontaneous reaction to an
unexpected and unprovoked attack by the victim Cantre
on Bulalacao. That Bulalacao was already able to run
away from the victim Cantre may have escaped the notice
of the petitioner Calimutan who, under the pressure of the
circumstances, was forced to act as quickly as possible.
The prosecution did not establish that petitioner
Calimutan threw the stone at the victim Cantre with the
specific intent of killing, or at the very least, of harming the
victim Cantre. What is obvious to this Court was petitioner
Calimutan’s intention to drive away the attacker who was,
at that point, the victim Cantre, and to protect his helper
Bulalacao who was, as earlier described, much younger
and smaller in built than the victim Cantre.35
Granting that petitioner Calimutan was impelled by a
lawful objective when he threw the stone at the victim
Cantre, his act was committed with inexcusable lack of
precaution. He failed to consider that a stone the size of a
man’s fist could inflict substantial injury on someone. He
also miscalculated his own strength, perhaps unaware, or
even completely disbelieving, that he could throw a stone
with such force as to seriously injure, or worse, kill
someone, at a quite lengthy distance of ten meters.
Since it is irrefragable that the stone thrown by petitioner
Calimutan at the victim Cantre was the proximate cause
of the latter’s death, despite being done with reckless
imprudence rather than with malicious intent, petitioner
Calimutan remains civilly liable for such death. This Court,
therefore, retains the reward made by the RTC and the
Court of Appeals to the heirs of the victim Cantre of the
amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death and
another ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23306, dated 29 August
2001, affirming the Decision of the RTC in Criminal Case
No. 8184, dated 19 November 1998, is hereby
MODIFIED. Petitioner Calimutan is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide, under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code, and is accordingly sentenced to
imprisonment for a minimum period of 4 months of arresto
mayor to a maximum period of two years and one day
of prision correccional. Petitioner Calimutan is further
ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim Cantre the
amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the latter’s
death and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-1477 | January 18, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JULIO GUILLEN, defendant-appellant.
PER CURIAM, J.:
This case is before us for review of, and by virtue of
appeal from, the judgment rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Manila in case No. 2746, whereby Julio
Guillen y Corpus, or Julio C. Guillen, is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and
multiple frustrated murder, as charged in the information,
and is sentenced to the penalty of death, to indemnify the
of the deceased Simeon Valera (or Barrela) in the sum of
P2,000 and to pay the costs.
Upon arraignment the accused entered a plea of not guilty
to the charges contained in the information.
Then the case was tried in one of the branches of the
Court of First Instance of Manila presided over by the
honorable Buenaventura Ocampo who, after the
submission of the evidence of the prosecution and the
defense, rendered judgment as above stated.
In this connection it should be stated that, at the beginning
of the trial and before arraignment, counsel de oficio for
the accused moved that the mental condition of Guillen
be examined. The court, notwithstanding that it had found
out from the answers of the accused to questions
propounded to him in order to test the soundness of his
mind, that he was not suffering from any mental
derangement, ordered that Julio Guillen be confined for
Hospital, there to be examined by medical experts who
should report their findings accordingly. This was done,
and, according to the report of the board of medical
experts, presided over by Dr. Fernandez of the National
Psychopathic Hospital, Julio Guillen was not insane. Said
report (Exhibit L), under the heading "Formulation and
Diagnosis," at pages 13 and 14, reads:
FORMULATION AND DIAGNOSIS
Julio C. Guillen was placed under constant
observation since admission. There was not a
single moment during his whole 24 hours daily,
that he was not under observation.
The motive behind the commission of the crime is
stated above. The veracity of this motivation was
determined in the Narcosynthesis. That the
narco-synthesis was successful was checked up
the day after the test. The narco-synthesis proved
not only reveal any conflict or complex that may
explain a delusional or hallucinatory motive
behind the act.
Our observation and examination failed to elicit
any sign or symptom of insanity in Mr. Julio C.
Guillen. He was found to be intelligent, always
able to differentiate right from wrong, fully aware
of the nature of the crime he committed and is
equally decided to suffer for it in any manner or
form.
His version of the circumstances of the crime, his
conduct and conversation relative thereto, the
motives, temptations and provocations that
preceded the act, were all those of an individual
with a sound mind.
On the other hand he is an man of strong will and
conviction and once arriving at a decision he
executes, irrespective of consequences and as in
this case, the commission of the act at Plaza
Miranda.
What is of some interest in the personality of Julio
C. Guillen is his commission of some overt acts.
This is seen not only in the present instance, but
sometime when an employee in la Clementina
Cigar Factory he engaged in a boxing bout Mr.
Manzano, a Span-wanted to abuse the women
cigar makers, and felt it his duty to defend them.
One time he ran after a policeman with a knife in
hand after being provoked to a fight several times.
He even challenged Congressman Nueno to a
fight sometime before when Mr. Nueno was
running for a seat in the Municipal Board of the
City of Manila, after hearing him deliver one of his
apparently outspoken speeches.
All these mean a defect in his personality
characterized by a weakness of censorship
especially in relation to rationalization about the
consequences of his acts.
In view of the above findings it is our considered
opinion that Julio C. Guillen is not insane but is an
individual with a personality defect which in
Psychiatry is termed, Constitutional Psychopathic
Inferiority.
Final Diagnosis
Not insane: Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority,
without psychosis.
In view of the above-quoted findings of the medical board,
and notwithstanding the contrary opinion of one Dr.
Alvarez, who was asked by the defense to give his opinion
on the matter, the court ruled that Guillen, not being
insane, could be tired, as he was tired, for the offenses he
committed on the date in question.
THE FACTS
Upon careful perusal of the evidence and the briefs
submitted by counsel for the accused, the Solicitor
General and their respective memoranda, we find that
there is no disagreement between the prosecution and
the defense, as to the essential facts which caused the
filing of the present criminal case against this accused.
Those facts may be stated as follows:
On the dates mentioned in this decision, Julio Guillen y
Corpus, although not affirmed with any particular political
group, has voted for the defeated candidate in the
presidential elections held in 1946. Manuel A. Roxas, the
successful candidate, assumed the office of President of
the Commonwealth and subsequently President of the
President of the Philippine Republic. According to Guillen,
he became disappointed in President Roxas for his
alleged failure to redeem the pledges and fulfill the
promises made by him during the presidential election
campaign; and his disappointment was aggravated when,
according to him, President Roxas, instead of looking
after the interest of his country, sponsored and
campaigned for the approval of the so-called "parity"
measure. Hence he determined to assassinate the
President.
After he had pondered for some time over the ways and
means of assassinating President Roxas, the opportunity
presented itself on the night of March 10, 1947, when at a
popular meeting held by the Liberal Party at Plaza de
Miranda, Quiapo, Manila attended by a big crowd,
President Roxas, accompanied by his wife and daughter
and surrounded by a number of ladies and gentlemen
prominent in government and politics, stood on a platform
erected for that purpose and delivered his speech
expounding and trying to convince his thousand of
listeners of the advantages to be gained by the
Philippines, should the constitutional amendment granting
American citizens the same rights granted to Filipino
nationals be adopted.
Guillen had first intended to use a revolver for the
accomplishment of his purpose, but having lost said
firearm, which was duly licensed, he thought of two hand
grenades which were given him by an American soldier in
the early days of the liberation of Manila in exchange for
two bottles of whisky. He had likewise been weighing the
chances of killing President Roxas, either by going to
Malacañan, or following his intended victim in the latter's
trips to provinces, for instance, to Tayabas (now Quezon)
where the President was scheduled to speak, but having
encountered many difficulties, he decided to carry out his
plan at the pro-parity meeting held at Plaza de Miranda
JULIO C. GUILLEN
on the night of March 10, 1947.
On the morning of that he went to the house of Amando
Hernandez whom he requested to prepare for him a
document (Exhibit B), in accordance with their pervious
understanding in the preceding afternoon, when they met
at the premises of the Manila Jockey Club on the occasion
of an "anti-parity" meeting held there. On account of its
materially in this case, we deem it proper to quote
hereunder the contents of said document. An English
translation (Exhibit B-2) from its original Tagalog reads:
FOR THE SAKE OF A FREE PHILIPPINES
I am the only one responsible for what happened.
I conceived it, I planned it, and I carried it out all
by myself alone. It took me many days and nights
pondering over this act, talking to my own
conscience, to my God, until I reached my
conclusion. It was my duty.
I did not expected to live long; I only had on life to
spare. And had I expected to lives to spare, I
would not have hesitated either ton sacrifice it for
the sake of a principle which was the welfare of
the people.
Thousands have died in Bataan; many more have
mourned the loss of their husbands, of their sons,
and there are millions now suffering. Their deeds
bore no fruits; their hopes were frustrated.
I was told by my conscience and by my God that
there was a man to be blamed for all this: he had
deceived the people, he had astounded them with
no other purpose than to entice them; he even
went to the extent of risking the heritage of our
future generations. For these reasons he should
not continue any longer. His life would mean
nothing as compared with the welfare of eighteen
million souls. And why should I not give up my life
too if only the good of those eighteen million
souls.
These are the reasons which impelled me to do
what I did and I am willing to bear up the
consequences of my act. I t matters not if others
will curse me. Time and history will show, I am
sure, that I have only displayed a high degree of
patriotism in my performance of my said act.
Hurrah for a free Philippines.
Cheers for the happiness of every Filipino home.
May God pity on me.
Amen.
A copy (Exhibit B-1) of the original in Tagalog (Exhibit B),
made at the request of Guillen by his nephew, was
handed to him only at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of
March 10, 1947, for which reason said Exhibit B-1
appears unsigned, because he was in a hurry for that
meeting at Plaza de Miranda.
When he reached Plaza de Miranda, Guillen was carrying
two hand grenades concealed in a paper bag which also
contained peanuts. He buried one of the hand grenades
(Exhibit D), in a plant pot located close to the platform,
and when he decided to carry out his evil purpose he
stood on the chair on which he had been sitting and, from
a distance of about seven meters, he hurled the grenade
at the President when the latter had just closed his
speech, was being congratulated by Ambassador Romulo
and was about to leave the platform.
General Castañeda, who was on the platform, saw the
smoking, hissing, grenade and without losing his
presence of mind, kicked it away from the platform, along
the stairway, and towards an open space where the
general thought the grenade was likely to do the least
harm; and, covering the President with his body, shouted
to the crowd that everybody should lie down. The grenade
fell to the ground and exploded in the middle of a group of
persons who were standing close to the platform.
Confusion ensued, and the crowd dispersed in a panic. It
was found that the fragments of the grenade had seriously
injured Simeon Varela (or Barrela ) — who died on the
following day as the result of mortal wounds caused by
the fragments of the grenade (Exhibits F and F-1) —
Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio
Maglalang.
Guillen was arrested by members of the Police
Department about two hours after the occurrence. It
appears that one Angel Garcia, who was one spectators
at that meeting, saw how a person who was standing next
to him hurled an object at the platform and, after the
explosion, ran away towards a barber shop located near
the platform at Plaza de Miranda. Suspecting that person
was the thrower of the object that exploded, Garcia went
after him and had almost succeeded in holding him, but
Guillen offered stiff resistance, got loose from Garcia and
managed to escape. Garcia pursued him, but some
detectives, mistaking the former for the real criminal and
the author of the explosion, placed him under arrest. In
the meantime, while the City Mayor and some agents of
the Manila Police Department were investigating the
affair, one Manuel Robles volunteered the information
that the person with whom Angel Garcia was wrestling
was Julio Guillen; that he (Manuel Robles) was
acquainted with Julio Guillen for the previous ten years
and had seen each other in the plaza a few moments
previous to the explosion.
The police operatives interrogated Garcia and Robles,
and Julio Guillen was, within two hours after the
occurrence, found in his home at 1724 Juan Luna Street,
Manila, brought to the police headquarters and identified
by Angel Garcia, as the same person who hurled towards
the platform the object which exploded and whom Garcia
tried to hold when he was running away.
During the investigation conducted by the police he
readily admitted his responsibility, although at the same
time he tried to justify his action in throwing the bomb at
President Roxas. He also indicated to his captors the
place where he had hidden his so called last will quoted
above and marked Exhibit B, which was then unsigned by
him and subsequently signed at the police headquarters.
Re-enacting the crime (Exhibit C), he pointed out to the
police where he had buried (Exhibit C-1) the other hand
grenade (Exhibit D), and, in the presence of witnesses he
signed a statement which contained his answers to
question propounded to him by Major A. Quintos of the
Manila Police, who investigated him soon after his arrest
(Exhibit E). From a perusal of his voluntary statement, we
are satisfied that it tallies exactly with the declarations and
made by him on the witness stand during the trial of this
case.
THE ISSUES
In the brief submitted by counsel de oficio for this
appellant, several errors are assigned allegedly
committed by the trial court, namely: first, "in finding the
appellant guilty of murder for the death of Simeon
Varela"; second, "in declaring the appellant guilty of the
complex crime of murder and multiple frustrated
murder"; third, "in applying sub-section 1 of article 49 of
the Revised Penal Code in determining the penalty to be
imposed upon the accused"; andfourth, "in considering
the concurrence of the aggravating circumstances of
nocturnity and of contempt of public authorities in the
commission of crime."
The evidence for the prosecution, supported by the
brazen statements made by the accused, shows beyond
any shadow of doubt that, when Guillen attended that
meeting, carrying with him two hand grenades, to put into
execution his preconceived plan to assassinate President
Roxas, he knew fully well that, by throwing one of those
two hand grenades in his possession at President Roxas,
and causing it to explode, he could not prevent the
persons who were around his main and intended victim
from being killed or at least injured, due to the highly
explosive nature of the bomb employed by him to carry
out his evil purpose.
Guillen, testifying in his own behalf, in answer to questions
propounded by the trial judge (page 96 of transcript)
supports our conclusion. He stated that he performed the
act voluntarily; that his purpose was to kill the President,
but that it did not make any difference to him if there were
some people around the President when he hurled that
bomb, because the killing of those who surrounded the
President was tantamount to killing the President, in view
of the fact that those persons, being loyal to the President
being loyal to the President, were identified with the latter.
In other word, although it was not his main intention to kill
the persons surrounding the President, he felt no
conjunction in killing them also in order to attain his main
purpose of killing the President.
The facts do not support the contention of counsel for
appellant that the latter is guilty only of homicide through
reckless imprudence in regard to the death of Simeon
Varela and of less serious physical injuries in regard to
Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio
Maglalang, and that he should be sentenced to the
corresponding penalties for the different felonies
committed, the sum total of which shall not exceed three
times the penalty to be imposed for the most serious crime
in accordance with article 70 in relation to article 74 of the
Revised Penal Code.
In throwing hand grenade at the President with the
intention of killing him, the appellant acted with malice. He
is therefore liable for all the consequences of his wrongful
act; for in accordance with article 4 of the Revised Penal
Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person
committing felony (delito) although the wrongful act done
be different from that which he intended. In criminal
negligence, the injury caused to another should be
unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act
performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil.,
939.) In the words of Viada, "in order that an act may be
qualified as imprudence it is necessary that either malice
nor intention to cause injury should intervene; where such
intention exists, the act should qualified by the felony it
has produced even though it may not have been the
intention of the actor to cause an evil of such gravity as
that produced.' (Viada's Comments on the Penal Code,
vol. 7, 5th ed., p.7.) And, as held by this Court, a
deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially
inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence.
(People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232.) Where such unlawful
act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended
victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence.
(People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605)
Squarely on the point by counsel is the following decision
of the Supreme Court of Spain:
Cuestion 62. Se presenta A, a las ocho de la
noche, en el estanco de B a comprar tabaco, y
habiendose negado este a darselo al fiado, se
retira a quel sin mediar entre ambos disputa
alguna; pero; trnscurrido un cuarto de hora,
hallandose el estanquero despachando a C, se
oye la detonacion de un arma de fuego disparada
por A desde la calle, quedando muertos en el
acto C y el estanquero; supuesta la no intencion
en A de matar a C y si solo al estanquero, cabe
calificar la muerte de este de homicidio y la de c
de imprudencia temeraria? — La Sala de lo
Criminal de la Auudiencia de Granada lo estimo
asi, y condeno al procesado a catorse anos de
reclusion por el homivcidio y a un año de prision
correctional por la imprudencia. Aparte de que la
muerte del estanquero debio calificarse de
assesinato y no de homicidio, por haberse
ejecutado con aleviosa. es evidente que la
muerte de C, suponiendo que no se propusiera
ejecutaria el procesado, no pudo calificarse de
imprudencia teme raria, sino que tambien debio
declararsele responsable de la misma, a tenor de
lo puesto en este apartado ultimo del articulo; y
que siendo ambas muertes producidas por un
solo hecho, o sea por un solo disparo, debio
imponerse al reo la pena del delito de asesinato
en el grado maximo, a tenor de lo dispuesto en el
art. 90 del Codigo, o sea la pena de muerte. Se
ve, pues, claramente que en el antedicha
sentencia, aparte de otros articulos del Codigo,
se infringio por la Sala la disposicion de este
apartado ultimo del articulo muy principalmente,
y asi lo declaro el Tribunal Supremo en S. de 18
junio de 1872. (Gaceta de 1,0 de agosto.) (I
Viada, 5th Ed., p. 42.)
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:
Art. 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes. — When a
single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other, the penalty for
the most serious crime shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period.
We think it is the above-quoted article and not paragraph
1 of article 49 that is applicable. The case before us is
clearly governed by the first clause of article 48 because
by a single act, that a throwing highly explosive hand
grenade at President Roxas, the accused committed two
grave felonies, namely: (1) murder, of which Simeon
Varela was the victim; and (2) multiple attempted murder,
of which President Roxas, Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro
Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang were the injured parties.
The killing of Simeon Varela was attended by the
qualifying circumstance of treachery. In the case
of People vs. Mabug-at, supra, this court held that the
qualifying circumstance of treachery may be properly
considered, even when the victim of the attack was not
the one whom the defendant intended to kill, if it appears
from the evidence that neither of the two persons could in
any manner put up defense against the attack, or become
aware of it. In the same case it was held that the qualifying
circumstance of premeditation may not be properly taken
into the account when the person whom the defendant
proposed to kill was different from the one who became
his victim.
There can be no question that the accused attempted to
kill President Roxas by throwing a hand grenade at him
with the intention to kill him, thereby commencing the
commission of a felony by over acts, but he did not
succeed in assassinating him "by reason of some cause
or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance."
For the same reason we qualify the injuries caused on the
four other persons already named as merely attempted
and not frustrated murder.
In this connection, it should be stated that , although there
is abundant proof that , in violation of the provisions of
article 148 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused
Guillen has committed among others the offense of
assault upon a person in authority, for in fact his efforts
were directed towards the execution of his main purpose
of eliminating President Roxas for his failure to redeem
his electoral campaign promises, by throwing at him in his
official capacity as the Chief Executive of the nation the
hand grenade in question, yet, in view of the appropriate
allegation charging Guillen with the commission of said
offense, we shall refrain making a finding to that effect.
The complex crimes of murder and multiple attempted
murder committed by the accused with the single act of
throwing a hand grenade at the President, was attended
by the various aggravating circumstances alleged in the
information, without any mitigating circumstance. But we
do not deem it necessary to consider said aggravating
circumstances because in any event article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code above-quoted requires that the
penalty for the most serious of said crimes be applied in
its maximum period. The penalty for murder is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death. (Art. 248.)
It is our painful duty to apply the law and mete out to the
accused the extreme penalty provided by it upon the facts
and circumstances hereinabove narrated.
The sentence of the trial court being correct, we have no
alternative but to affirm it, and we hereby do so by a
unanimous vote. The death sentence shall be executed in
accordance with article 81 of the Revised Penal Code,
under authority of the Director of Prisons, on such working
day as the trial court may fix within 30 days from the date
the record shall have been remanded. It is so ordered.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla,
Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 80089 April 13, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SATURNINO REY, defendant-appellant.
PADILLA, J.:
Saturnino Rey was charged with the crime of Murder
before the Regional Trial Court of Capiz, committed as
follows:
That on or about 8:40 o'clock in the
evening of May 28, 1983, at Poblacion,
Pilar, Capiz, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the above-
named accused armed with a .45 caliber
pistol, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously shoot one
NICOLAS PAGAYUNAN in a sudden and
in unexpected manner, thereby inflicting
upon the latter a gunshot wound above
the nipple and sternum, right, thru and
thru which caused his death thereafter; 1
After trial, Judge Rodrigo V. Cosico found the following
facts to have been established:
... On the evening of May 28, 1983, which
was a fiesta day, while Rosette
Pagayunan, a teacher at the San
Esteban Elementary School, was
preparing to cook food at her house, she
found out that there was no water.
Accordingly, Mrs. Pagayunan instructed
her two (2) children, Babette and Nicolas,
to get water from the faucet of the
accused Saturnino Rey, also a public
school teacher. At that time, Mr. Rey's
faucet was allegedly the only one with
water at the neighborhood because of
the long drought. Nicolas was then a
nineteen-year old fourth year high school
student at the Colegio de la Purisima
Concepcion, Roxas City. Babette and
Nicolas proceeded towards the house of
Mr. Rey to get water. Babette and Nicolas
found Roban Rey, son of the accused,
near the faucet. Roban was sitting atop
the steps of the kitchen stairway talking
with Nicolas. While Nicolas was standing
beside the faucet waiting for his pail to be
filled with water, he was shot twice by
Saturnino Rey from the window of his
bedroom which was about four (4)
meters away. The shooting was
witnessed by Roban Rey and Babette
Pagayunan, who was about three (3)
meters away from the faucet. After he
was hit, Nicolas said to Roban: "I was
hit." Soon after, Nicolas fell in front of
Roban Roban went up their house and
told Saturnino Rey: "Daddy you hit
Colas." Babette went home and reported
the shooting incident to her mother who
fainted. The Pagayunan sisters and their
group went to the place to get the body of
Nicolas, who was taken to the Medicare
Hospital in Pilar, Capiz, where he was
given a first-aid treatment. Thereafter,
Nicolas was taken to Roxas City but died
before reaching the hospital.
On the morning of May 29, 1983,
Patrolmen Jose Ballera and Hanzel
Villareal conducted an investigation at
the place of the shooting incident and
found an empty shell (Exh. C) below the
window of the room of Saturnino Rey.
During the investigation, Roban Rey, in
the presence of the police investigators
and Romeo Bacalocos, pointed to the
direction of the window of the room of his
father, Saturnino Rey, as the place where
the firing came from.2
The trial court found the defendant-appellant guilty, as
charged, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to indemnify the heirs of the victim
in the amount of P30,000.00, to pay the heirs of the victim
the amount of P50,000.00 for moral damages and to pay
the costs.
From this judgment, the accused Saturnino Rey
appealed. His counsel assails the trial court for completely
believing the testimony of the prosecution witnesses.
Counsel points to certain facts and circumstances of
weight and substance which the trial court allegedly
overlooked, misapplied or misinterpreted, and which, if
considered, will materially alter the result, to wit: "1) the
fact that it was summer and the water system
connections, particularly those in the higher level of the
town, were not functioning; 2) the fact that the water
faucet at the backyard of the accused-appellant was not
functioning, not merely because the water pressure was
too weak for the faucet to function but also because the
water connection had been disconnected (t.s.n., p. 283);
3) the fact that the houses of both the deceased and the
accused-appellant and their immediate neighborhood are
on the same higher level of the town; 4) the fact that the
household of the accused-appellant were getting their
water supply from Martin Cunada, their nearest neighbor,
because he had a water pump, several water storage
tanks, and a well; 5) the fact that the immediate neighbors
of the Pagayunans had wells, water storage tanks, as well
as water system connections and some of their neighbors
were relatives and close friends of the Pagayunans; 6) the
fact that the Pagayunans were known and seen to obtain
their water supply from these immediate neighbors; 7) the
fact that the Pagayunans (who were relatively new in the
neighborhood) had never drawn water from the faucet of
the accused-appellant; 8) the fact that the house of the A My child aging four years of age with my second wife.
accused-appellant was at least 120 meters away from the
house of the deceased; 9) the fact that the only access to Q What happened while you were in your room that night
the accused-appellant's bedroom window from the and that time with your child?
outside was through the shuttered gate of the wire-
enclosed vegetable garden; 10) the fact that the six-foot-
A There was a person who opened my window, the
high chicken and barb-wire fence of the vegetable garden
window of my room where I was lying down.
was covered with climbing plants, thereby blocking the
view from the windows as well as from the outside into the
bedroom; 11) the fact that the accused- appellant's house Q Now do you know who was that person who opened the
was of the bungalow type and the sill of the bedroom window of your room where you were, lying down?
window was only about 3.5 feet from the ground; 12) the
fact that the deceased was found just below or near the A No, sir. At first I did not know.
bedroom window and within the enclosed vegetable
garden, not only by members of the accused-appellant's Q Will you please describe to the Honorable Court the
family but also by Martin Cunada, a friend and barkada of room where you were staying in and the window which
the deceased, who happened to be passing by just after was opened?
gunfire sounded; 13) the fact that Martin Cunada, who
stayed for some five minutes at the scene of the incident A The frontage of my house is facing (witness pointing to
right after the shooting, did not see Babette Pagayunan or the western direction). The elevation of the flooring is one
any other member of the deceased's family anywhere in foot. The height of the window from the floor is this high
the vicinity; 14) the fact that after the shooting only (witness referring to the window of the courtroom
Babette Pagayunan of the Pagayunan household was estimated to be 2 1/2 feet).
seen with the deceased and the Rey children at the
Medicare Hospital and in Roxas City; 15) the fact that
Q After you noticed that a person opened your window,
none of the four water containers the deceased allegedly
the window of your bedroom, what happened?
brought with him to the accused-appellant's backyard
faucet was ever found or seen before, during, or after the
shooting; 16) the fact that except for Dr. Buenvenida, all A I felt for my pistol.
the other four (4) witnesses of the prosecution concocted
some material portions of their testimonies; 17) the fact Q What happened after that?
that in a small rural town in the interior the inhabitants sup
and sleep early; and 18) the fact that it was the night of A I sat on the bed and asked, Who are you?'
the town fiesta and older folks tend to be more security-
conscious." 3 Q And did you receive an answer after asking who was
that person?
The appeal is without merit. The circumstances
enumerated by the counsel for the appellant are of little A No, sir.
importance because the accused-appellant, Saturnino
Rey, had admitted having fired the shot that killed the
deceased Nicolas Pagayunan. His testimony in court Q What happened after you received no answer?
reads, as follows:
A I fired a shot.
Q Now, will you please inform the Honorable Court at
about 8:40 in the night of May 28, 1983 where you were Q How many times did you fire your pistol?
and what you were doing.
A Twice.
A I was inside my room of my house.
Q By the way, how wide was that window in your room?
Q And what were you doing.
A About 1 1/2 meters wide.
A I was lying down.
Q And did you see anybody to whom or at whom you fired
Q Did you have any companion in your room that night your pistol?
and at that time?
A The first shot that I fired was upward, on the air.
A Yes, sir.
Q My question to you is, did you see any person outside
Q Inform the court who were your companions. the window?
A Yes, sir. Q And how far were you seated on your bed, how far was
your bed from the wall of the window?
Q Were you able to discern the facial features of the
person you saw at the window? A About one foot.

ATTY. PATRICIO: Q What happened after you fired the second shot directed
at that man at your window?
Objection, your Honor.
A I gave out an alarm to my children.4
COURT:
Having invoked self-defense, it was incumbent upon the
All right, reform. defendant-appellant to prove by clear and convincing
evidence the fact that he acted in self-defense. The
defendant must rely on the strength of his own evidence
ATTY. ABELA:
and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution, for
even if it were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the
Q How well did you see the person you saw at your accused himself admitted the killing. 5 In this regard,
window? defendant-appellant failed to discharge the burden
reposed upon him by law to prove self-defense. The trial
A Silhouette. court found that the testimony of the defendant-appellant
gave evasive and ambiguous answers before the
Q Will you be able to recognize the person you saw at court. 6 We have examined the record of the case and we
your window that night? find no cogent reason to disturb said findings of the trial
court. The witnesses for the prosecution had no evil
A No, sir. motive to testify falsely against the appellant.

Q And what was the person you saw at your window doing
when you fired the shot?
A You mean the first shot?
Q The first shot what was the person doing.?
A After he pushed the shutter of the window he put his
hand down.
Q And at that time you fired the second shot what was the
man doing.?
A I was looking at him and he had the action of drawing
something and that was the time I fired the second shot.
Q By the way how close was the man to your window that
night?
A Just like this, from myself up to Atty. Abela (distance
estimated to be 1 1/2 meters).
Q My question to you is, how close was that man to the
window of your room?
A He was right at the window.
Q And what part of the body of that man can be seen by
you?
A From the waist.
Besides, defendant-appellant's testimony, even if true,
does not establish a case of self-defense. There is no
evidence of unlawful aggression on the part of the
deceased. The defendant-appellant merely testified that
he saw a person open the window of his bedroom and
when he inquired who the person was and received no
answer, he fired a shot into the air then, when said person
lifted his right arm chest high, 7 he fired the second shot.
The interval between the two shots was only about three
(3) to five (5) seconds. 8 For unlawful aggression to be
appreciated in self-defense, there must be an actual
sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger
thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating
attitude. 9 The raising of the right arm chest high alone by
an unarmed person cannot be considered unlawful
aggression. Absent unlawful aggression on the part of the
deceased, there cannot be self-defense on the part of the
accused.
The defendant-appellant also failed to rebut the
presumption that the shooting was done with criminal
intention. His conduct after the shooting incident was
inconsistent with the conduct of a person who had
innocently shot a person by accident. It would appear that
he did not do anything to help his victim who was lying
down on the ground, bleeding and moaning. He did not
go down from his house even after finding that the person
he had shot was Nicolas Pagayunan. Instead, he uttered
curses.10 Then, very early the next morning, at about 5:30
o'clock, he left his house and stayed with his brother in a
neighboring municipality, 11 and did not go home even to
help the police in their investigation. 12 Flight is an
indication of a guilty mind.
The defendant-appellant also contends that treachery
or alevosia was not charged in the information filed
against him, or proven by the evidence presented by the
prosecution at the trial.
The contention is without merit. The information filed in
this case specifically stated that the accused, Saturnino
Rey, armed with a.45 caliber pistol, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously shot Nicolas Pagayunan "in a sudden and
unexpected manner." This is sufficient allegation of
treachery because a sudden and unexpected attack,
without the slightest provocation on the person of the one
attacked is the essence of treachery or alevosia. It is not
necessary that the information should use specifically the
word "alevosia" or treachery. It is sufficient if the
information alleges facts in clear and explicit language
which would show treachery or alevosia without the use
of the specific word.13
Treachery in the shooting of Nicolas Pagayunan was
established by the testimony of Babette Pagayunan who
declared that the accused-appellant suddenly and without
warning shot the deceased as the latter was waiting for
his pail to be filled with water and while talking to the son
of the accused-appellant. The attack was sudden,
unexpected, without warning, and without giving the
victim an opportunity to defend himself or repel the
aggression. In fact, the deceased did not sense any
danger that he would be shot by the defendant-appellant
as there was no previous grudge or misunderstanding
between them.
The claim of the defendant-appellant that he had fired a
warning shot into the air appears to be an afterthought.
Babette Pagayunan categorically declared that her
brother, Nicolas Pagayunan, was hit on the first shot. Her
testimony, on cross examination, reads as follows:
Q How many shots did Saturnino Rey the accused, direct
to your brother?
A Two shots were delivered by Saturnino Rey. The first
shot hit my brother. I did not know whether the second
shot hit my brother. After the first shot my brother
staggered towards Roban. 14
Besides, the shots were fired in rapid succession so that
the first shot could not serve as a warning shot. Babette
Pagayunan stated:
Q How long after the first shot did you hear the second
shot?
A Seconds only. The interval was seconds.
Q So that the second shot came right after the first shot?
A Yes, sir.15
The defendant-appellant, Saturnino Rey, also testified, as
follows:
Q You testified a while ago that you fired two shots. How
long after you fired the first shot that you also fired the
second shot?
A The interval was only seconds.
Q About two seconds?
A Three seconds or more.
Q But it could not be more than five seconds, right?
A No, sir. 16
As the People's counsel observed, if the version of the
defendant-appellant were true, the empty shell would
have fallen near the defendant-appellant's bed, inside his
room, and not outside the house where Pat. Hanzel
Villareal found it; and that the first shot would have hit a
part of the house.
The trial court, therefore, correctly found the offense
committed by the defendant-appellant to be murder,
qualified as it was by treachery.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is
AFFIRMED With costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 5126. September 2, 1909. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
CATALINO APOSTOL, Defendant-Appellant.
1. ARSON; EDIFICE USED AS DWELLING. — The words
"Edifice used as a dwelling" in paragraph 1 of article 553 of the
Penal Code, signify and edifice intended for human habitation,
in an uninhabited place, at a time when it is unoccupied.
DECISION
ARELLANO, C.J. :
The judgment entered in this case by the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija finds that on the 16th of
December, 1907, five individuals, among them being the
accused herein, went to the house where Pedro
Tabilisima, Celestino Vergara, and Tranquilino Manipul
were living, and there inquired after some carabaos that
had disappeared, and because these above-mentioned
inmates answered that they knew nothing about the
matter, ordered them to leave the house, but as the three
men named above refused to do so, the accused,
Catalino Apostol, set fire to the hut and the same was
burnt down.
In the opinion of the trial court the responsibility of the
accused has been fully established by the testimony of
the injured parties. And inasmuch as,, according to the
same, the act comes within the provisions of article 549 of
the Penal Code, Catalino Apostol was sentenced to
sixteen years and one day of cadena temporal, to the
accessories of the law, to indemnity the value of the burnt
hut in the sum of P1, and to pay the costs.
An appeal having been taken to this court, the defense
claimed, on behalf of the offender: (1) The absence of
proof of criminal intent; (2) that in view of the fact that the
burnt hut was situated in an uninhabited place, it is not
proper to apply article 549, but article 554 of the Penal
Code.
Criminal intent as well as the will to commit a crime are
always presumed to exist on the part of the person who
executes an act which the law punishes, unless the
contrary shall appear. (Art. 1, Penal Code.)
As to the circumstances connected with the burning of the
hut, Pedro Tabilisima testified that he and his friends were
in the same; that the accused and his companions arrived
at 8 p.m. and questioned them about carabaos that they
said had been stolen from them; that after they replied that
they knew nothing, the former set fire to the house and
they jumped out of it; that the witness and two
companions lived in the house; that it was situated in an
uninhabited place, surrounded by fields; that the nearest
houses were far away, and cries could not be heard from
one house to another; and that the burnt house was not
worth more than P1, because it was a small one, the
witness himself having constructed it.
Celestino Vergara says that several individuals arrived at
8 o’clock at night, asked them for carabaos that they
claimed to have lost, wounded Tranquilino Manipul, who
was asleep, and Pedro Tabilisima, forced them to leave
the house, and as they did not want to do so for fear of
being assaulted the accused set fire to the same; they
tried to put out the fire as long as they could, but when no
longer able jumped out of the house. The house was in
an uninhabited locality, in the fields, the nearest house
being a small store to which the cry of a person might
carry, and the neighboring houses could be seen.
Tranquilino Manipul testified in almost the same terms as
this last witness. The argument which the defense
advances, based on article 554, which in connection with
553 punishes the setting fire to a building intended for
habitation, in an uninhabited place, does not apply,
because the article in question refers to an edifice
intended for human habitation in an uninhabited place at
a time when the same is unoccupied. It is article 549,
which punishes with the very severe penalties of cadena
temporal to cadena perpetua "those who shall set fire to
any edifice, farmhouse, hut, shed, or vessel in port, with
knowledge that one or more persons were within the
same," that must be applied.
The law must be applied as laid down in the abovequoted
excerpt.
But the court, in view of the nature of the crime and
considering the circumstances attending the same,
recognizes the extreme severity of the penalty; therefore
we apply the remedy afforded it by article 2, paragraph 2,
of the Penal Code, when a strict application of the
provisions of the code would result in an excessive
penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice
and the injury caused by the crime.
For the reasons above set forth the judgment appealed
from is hereby affirmed with costs against the Appellant.
Ten days from date let a confirming judgment be entered,
and ten days thereafter let the case be remanded to the
lower court for action.
Without prejudice to the immediate execution of the
judgment, let the clerk of this court, as provided in the said
article 2 of the Penal Code, respectfully address a
communication to the Honorable, the Governor-General
of these Islands, giving the result of this decision and the
sentence, requesting him, should he so desire, to make
use of the prerogative with which he is invested in order
to reduce or mitigate the penalty imposed. So ordered.
Torres, Johnson, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-6486 | March 2, 1911
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAFAEL B. CATOLICO, defendant-appellant.
B. Pobre for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Harvey for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Cagayan, Hon. Charles A. Low
presiding, convicting the defendant of the crime of
malversation of public funds and sentencing him to two
months' imprisonment, to perpetual disqualification to
hold public office or public employment of any kind, and
to the payment of the costs.
It appears from the proofs of the prosecution that the
accused as justice of the peace of Baggao, Province of
Cagayan, on the 2d day of October, 1909, had before him
sixteen separate civil cases commenced by Juan Canillas
against sixteen distinct individuals, each one for damages
resulting from a breach of contract; that said cases were
all decided by the appellant in favor of the plaintiff; that
each one of the defendant in said cases appealed from
the decision of the justice of the peace and deposited P16
as required by law, at the same time giving a bond of P50,
each one of which was approved by the court; that on the
12th day of said month the plaintiff in said cases
presented a writing to the appellant as said justice of the
peace, alleging that the sureties on the said bonds were
insolvent and later demonstrated this to the satisfaction of
the appellant; that thereupon the latter ordered the
cancellation of the said bonds and, in the same order,
required each of the appellants to file another bond within
fifteen days, that, inasmuch as none of the appellants in
said causes presented new bonds within the time fixed,
the plaintiff in said causes applied to the appellant, as said
court, for an order declaring final the judgment entered in
each of the said sixteen cases and commanding the
execution of the same, at the same time asking that the
sums deposited by the defendants in said actions be
attached (so called in the record) and delivered to him in
satisfaction of said judgments; that the accused acceded
to the petition of the plaintiff, ordered said sums attached
and delivered same to the plaintiff, at the same time
requiring of the plaintiff a bond of P50 for each
attachment, conditioned that he would respond for the
damages which should result from such attachment.
After this attachment (so called) the attorney for the
defendants in the said sixteen cases presented a
complaint against the appellant to the Court of First
Instance, by virtue of which said court ordered that the
plaintiff, Juan Canillas, deliver to the clerk of the Court of
First Instance the sums deposited by the defendants in
said actions. Canillas obeyed the order of the court and
made the delivery as required.
Upon these facts the Acting Attorney-General
recommends the acquittal of the accused. We are in entire
accord with that recommendation. The case made against
the appellant lacks many of the essential elements
required by law to be present in the crime of malversation
of public funds. The accused did not convert the money to
his own use or to the use of any other person; neither did
he feloniously permit anybody else to convert it.
Everything he did was done in good faith under the belief
that he was acting judicially and correctly. The fact that he
ordered the sums, deposited in his hands by the
defendants — appellants in the sixteen actions referred
to, attached for the benefit of the plaintiff in those actions,
after the appeals had been dismissed and the judgments
in his court had become final, and that he delivered the
said sums to the plaintiff in satisfaction of the judgment
which he held in those cases, can not be considered an
appropriation or a taking of said sums within the meaning
of Act No. 1740. He believed that, as presiding officer of
the court of justice of the peace, he had a perfect right
under the law to cancel the bonds when it was clearly
shown to him that the sureties thereon were insolvent, to
require the filing of new undertakings, giving the parties
ample time within which to do so, to dismiss the appeals
in case said undertakings were not filed, and to declare
the judgment final. He believed that after said appeals had
been dismissed and said judgment had become final, the
sums deposited were subject to be applied in payment of
the judgments in the actions in which said sums had been
deposited and that he was acting judicially and legally in
making such applications.
To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain
crimes made such by statute, be accompanied by a
criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to
duty or to consequences, as, in law, is equivalent to
criminal intent. The maxim is, actus non facit reum, nisi
mens rea — a crime is not committed if the mind of the
person performing the act complained of be innocent.
In the case at bar the appellant was engaged in exercising
the functions of a court of justice of the peace. He had
jurisdictions of the actions before him. He had a right and
it was his duty to require the payment by each appellant
of P16, as well as the giving of a proper undertaking with
solvent sureties. While, in dismissing the appeals and
delivering the P256 to the plaintiff in the said cases, he
may have exceeded his authority as such court and
passed beyond the limits of his jurisdiction and power, a
question we do not now discuss or decide, it was, so far
as appears from the record, at most a pure mistake of
judgment, an error of the mind operating upon a state of
facts. Giving the act complained of the signification most
detrimental to the appellant, it, nevertheless, was simply
the result of the erroneous exercise of the judicial function,
and not an intention to deprive any person of his property
feloniously. His act had back of it the purpose to do justice
to litigants and not to embezzle property. He acted that
honest debts might be paid to those to whom they were
legally and justly due, and not to enrich himself or another
by criminalmisappropriation. It was an error committed by
a court, not an act done by a criminal-minded man. It was
a mistake, not a crime.
It is true that a presumption of criminal intention may arise
from proof of the commission of a criminal act; and the
general rule is that, if it is proved that the accused
committed the criminal act charged, it will be presumed
that the act was done with criminal intention, and that it is
for the accused to rebut this presumption. But it must be
borne in mind that the act from which such presumption
springs must be a criminal act. In the case before us the
act was not criminal. It may have been an error; it may
have been wrong and illegal in the sense that it would
have been declared erroneous and set aside on appeal or
other proceeding in the superior court. It may well be that
his conduct was arbitrary to a high degree, to such a
degree in fact as properly to subject him to reprimand or
even suspension or removal from office. But, from the
facts of record, it was not criminal. As a necessary result
no presumption of criminal intention arises from the act.
Neither can the presumption of a criminal intention arise
from the act complained of, even though it be admitted
that the crime, if any, is that of malversation of public
funds as defined and penalized in Act No. 1740. It is true
that that Act provides that "In all prosecutions for
violations of the preceding section, the absence of any of
the public funds or property of which any person
described in said section has charge, and any failure or
inability of such person to produce all the funds and
property properly in his charge on the demand of any
officer authorized to examine or inspect such person,
office, treasury, or depositary shall be deemed to
be prima facie evidence that such missing funds or
property have been put to personal uses or used for
personal ends by such person within the meaning of the
preceding section." Nevertheless, that presumption is a
rebuttable one and constitutes only a prima facie case
against the person accused. If he present evidence
showing that, in fact, he has not put said funds or property
to personal uses, then that presumption is at an end and
the prima facie case destroyed. In the case at bar it was
necessary for the accused to offer any such evidence, for
the reason that the people's own pleading alleged, and its
own proofs presented, along with the criminal
charge, facts which showed, of themselves, that said
money had not been put to personal uses or used for
personal ends. In other words, the prosecution
demonstrated, both by the allegations in its information
filed against the accused and by its proofs on the trial, that
the absence of the funds in question was not due to the
personal use thereof by the accused, thus affirmatively
and completely negativing the presumption which, under
the act quoted, arises from the absence of the funds. The
presumption was never born. It never existed. The facts
which were presented for the purpose of creating such
presumption were accompanied by other facts which
absolutely prevented its creation.
On the other hand, if it be admitted that the crime, if any,
is that of estafa, as defined in paragraph 5 of article 535
of the Penal Code, then the presumption just referred to
does not arise. Mere absence of the funds is not sufficient
proof of conversion. Neither is the mere failure of the
accused to turn over the funds at any given time sufficient
to make even a prima facie case. (U. S. vs. Morales, 15
Phil. Rep., 236; U. S. vs. Dominguez, 2 Phil. Rep., 580.)
Conversion must be affirmatively proved, either by direct
evidence or by the production of facts from which
conversion necessarily follows. (U.
S. vs. Morales, supra.)
The judgment of conviction is reversed and the defendant
ordered discharged from custody forthwith.
Arellano, C. J., Mapa and Trent, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 75256 January 26, 1989
JOHN PHILIP GUEVARRA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE IGNACIO ALMODOVAR, respondent.
PARAS, J.:
Presented before Us is a special civil action
for certiorari against the Honorable Judge Ignacio
Almodovar of the City Court of Legaspi, Branch 1, Legaspi
City, raising beautiful questions of law which We are
tasked to resolve. Considering the issues and arguments
raised by petitioner, We impleaded the People of the
Philippines as party respondents herein in a resolution
dated 17 September 1986 (p. 41, Rollo).
The relevant facts gathered from the records are as
follows:
Petitioner John Philip Guevarra, then 11 years old, was
playing with his best friend Teodoro Almine, Jr. and three
other children in their backyard in the morning of 29
October 1984. They were target-shooting a bottle cap
(tansan) placed around fifteen (15) to twenty (20) meters
away with an air rifle borrowed from a neighbor. In the
course of their game, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his
left collar bone which caused his unfortunate death.
After conduct a preliminary investigation, the examining
Fiscal exculpated petitioner due to his age and because
the unfortunate occurrence appeared to be an accident.
The victim's parents appealed to the Ministry of Justice,
which ordered the Fiscal to file a case against petitioner
for Homicide through reckless Imprudence. The
information dated 9 October 1985 was consequently filed,
which narrated in part:
. . . the above-named accused, who is
over 9 years but below 15 years of age
and acting with discernment, did then
and there, without taking the necessary
precautions to prevent and/or avoid
accident or injuries to persons, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously operate and
cause to be fired, in a reckless and
imprudent manner, an air rifle with .22
caliber bore with rifling, oxygen and bolt
operated thereby hitting as a result of
said carelessness and imprudence one
TEODORICO PABLO ALMINE at the left
side of the body with its pellet, causing
injuries which directly caused his
untimely death; . . . (p. 8, Rollo)
On 25 October 1985, petitioner moved to quash the said
information on the following grounds:

I
THAT THE FACTS CHARGED DO NOT
CONSTITUTE OFFENSE.
II
THAT THE INFORMATION CONTAINS
AVERMENTS WHICH IF TRUE WOULD
CONSTITUTE A LEGAL EXCUSE OR
JUSTIFICATION.
III
THAT THIS HONORABLE COURT HAS
NO JURISDICTION OVER THE
OFFENSE CHARGED AND THE
PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT. (p. 9,
Rollo)
This motion, in an Order dated 4 April 1986, was denied
with respect to the first and third grounds relied upon.
However, the resolution of the second ground was
deferred until evidence shall have been presented during
trial.
On 26 July 1986, this present petition for certiorari was
filed, raising two (2) issues, to wit:
I (46 CJS Intent p. 1103.)
WHETHER AN ELEVEN (11) YEAR OLD
BOY COULD BE CHARGED WITH THE
CRIME OF HOMICIDE THRU
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE, AND
II
WHETHER THE COURT HAD
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT
IT DID NOT PASS THRU THE
BARANGAY LUPON. (Petition, p. 3,
Rollo)
Going through the written arguments of the parties, the
surfacing of a corollary controversy with respect to the first
issue raised is evident, that is, whether the term
"discernment", as used in Article 12(3) of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) is synonymous with "intent." It is the
position of the petitioner that "discernment" connotes
'intent' (p. 96, Rollo), invoking the unreported case
of People vs. Nieto, G.R. No. 11965, 30 April 1958. In that
case We held that the allegation of "with intent to kill . . ."
amply meets the requirement that discernment should be
alleged when the accused is a minor between 9 and 15
years old. Petitioner completes his syllogism in saying
that:
If discernment is the equivalent of 'with
intent', then the allegation in the
information that the accused acted with
discernment and willfully unlawfully, and
feloniously, operate or cause to be fired
in a reckless and imprudent manner an
air rifle .22 caliber' is an inherent
contradiction tantamount to failure of the
information to allege a cause of action or
constitute a legal excuse or exception.
(Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 97,
Rollo)
If petitioner's argument is correct, then no minor between
the ages of 9 and 15 may be convicted of a quasi-offense
under Article 265 of the RPC.
On the contrary, the Solicitor General insists that
discernment and intent are two different concepts. We
agree with the Solicitor General's view; the two terms
should not be confused.
The word "intent" has been defined as
(a) design; a determination to do a certain
things; an aim; the purpose of the mind,
including such knowledge as is essential
to such intent;. . .; the design resolve, or
determination with which a person acts.'
It is this intent which comprises the third element of dolo
as a means of committing a felony, freedom and
intelligence being the other two. On the other hand, We
have defined the term discernment, as used in Article
12(3) of the RPC, in the old case of People vs. Doquena,
68 Phil. 580(1939), in this wise:
The discernment that constitutes an
exception to the exemption from criminal
liability of a minor under fifteen years of
age but over nine, who commits an act
prohibited by law, is his mental capacity
to understand the difference between
right and wrong . . . (Emphasis supplied)
p. 583
From the foregoing, it is clear that the terms "intent" and
"discernment" convey two distinct thoughts. While both
are products of the mental processes within a person, the
former refers to the desired of one's act while the latter
relates to the moral significance that person ascribes to
the said act. Hence a person may not intend to shoot
another but may be aware of the consequences of his
negligent act which may cause injury to the same person
in negligently handling an air rifle. It is not connect,
therefore, to argue, as petitioner does, that since a minor
above nine years of age but below fifteen acted with
discernment, then he intended such act to be done. He
may negligently shoot his friend, thus did not intend to
shoot him, and at the same time recognize the
undesirable result of his negligence.
In further outlining the distinction between the words
"intent" and "discernment," it is worthy to note the basic
reason behind the enactment of the exempting
circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the RPC; the
complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or
intent, or on the absence of negligence on the part of the
accused. 1 In expounding on intelligence as the second
element of dolus, Albert 2 has stated:
The second element
of dolus is intelligence; without this
power, necessary to determine the
morality of human acts to distinguish a
licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist,
and because ... the infant 3 (has) no
intelligence, the law exempts (him) from
criminal liability. (Emphasis supplied)
lt is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of
age and below are not capable of performing a criminal
act. On the other hand, minors above nine years of appeal
but below fifteen are not absolutely exempt. However,
they are presumed to be without criminal capacity, but
which presumption may be rebutted if it could be proven
that they were "capable of appreciating the nature and
criminality of the act, that is, that (they) acted with
discernment. " 4 The preceding discussion shows that
"intelligence" as an element of dolo actually embraces the
concept of discernment as used in Article 12 of the RPC
and as defined in the aforecited case of People vs.
Doquena, supra. It could not therefore be argued that
discernment is equivalent or connotes 'intent' for they
refer to two different concepts. Intelligence, which
includes discernment, is a distinct element of dolo as a
means of committing an offense.
In evaluating felonies committed by means of culpa, three
(3) elements are indispensable, namely, intelligence,
freedom of action, and negligence. Obviously, intent is
wanting in such felonies. However, intelligence remains
as an essential element, hence, it is necessary that a
minor above nine but below fifteen years of age be
possessed with intelligence in committing a negligent act
which results in a quasi-offense. For him to be criminally
liable, he must discern the rightness or wrongness of the
effects of his negligent act. Indeed, a minor over nine
years of age but below fifteen may be held liable for a
quasi-offense under Article 365 of the RPC. A reading of
the said Article would reveal such fact as it starts off with
the phrase "Any person. . ." without any distinction or
exception made. Ubi lex non distinquit nec nos
distinguere debemos.
In his last attempt to justify his position equating the words
"intent" and "discernment" used under the law, he cites
the case of People vs. Nieto, supra. However, petitioner
failed to present the qualifying sentence preceding the
ruling he now invokes, which reads:
That requirement should be deemed
amply met with the allegation in the
information that she. . ."with the intent to
kill, did then and there wilfully, criminally
and feloniously push one Lolita Padilla . .
." into a deep place of the Peñaranda
River and as a consequence thereof
Lolita Padilla got drowned and died right
then and there.' This allegation clearly
conveys the Idea that she knew what
would be the consequence of her
unlawful act of pushing her victim into
deep water and that she knew it to be
wrong. (Emphasis supplied)
From the above, it is clear that We did not mean to equate
the words "intent" and "discernment." What We meant
was that the combined effect of the words used in the
information is to express a knowledge, on the part of the
accused Nieto, of the wrongness or rightness of her act.
Hence, petitioner may not validly contend that since the
information now in question alleged "discernment", it in
effect alleged "intent." The former may never embrace the
Idea of the latter; the former expresses the thought of
passivity while the latter signifies activity.
Coming now to the second issue of jurisdiction, it is
contended by the petitioner that the case against him
should have first been brought before the Lupong
Tagapayapa pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1508,
Section 2(3). He submits that, considering his entitlement
to a two-degree privileged mitigating circumstance due to
his minority, P.D. 1508 applies to his case because the
penalty imposable is reduced to not higher than arresto
menor from an original arresto mayor maximum to prision
correccional medium as prescribed in Article 365 of the
RPC. This is not correct. The jurisdiction of a court over a
criminal case is determined by the penalty imposable
under the law for the offense and not the penalty
ultimately imposed (People vs. Caldito, 72 Phil. 263;
People vs. Purisima, 69 SCRA 314; Dioquino vs. Cruz
and People vs. Savellano, 116 SCRA 451). The same
principle applies in construing Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508,
which states:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Offense punishable by imprisonment
exceeding 30 day , or a fine exceeding P
200.00; ... (emphasis supplied)
Expounding on the above provision, a member of the
committee that drafted P.D. 1508 has said:
The law says 'punishable,' not 'punished.'
One should therefore consider the
penalty provided for by law or ordinance
 as distinguished from the penalty actually
imposed in particular cases after
considering the attendant circumstances
affecting criminal liability. 5
The foregoing finds support in our jurisprudence as above
cited. We therefore rule that, in construing Section 2(3) of
P.D. 1508, the penalty which the law defining the offense
attaches to the latter should be considered. Hence, any
circumstance which may affect criminal liability must not
be considered.
The petitioner, in his arguments, asserts that since P.D.
1508 has not been complied with, the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the case. This erroneous perception has
been corrected long before. As intimated in the case
of Royales vs. IAC, 127 SCRA 470, and categorically
stated in Ebol vs. Amin, 135 SCRA 438, P.D. 1508 is not
jurisdictional.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition
is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Temporary
Restraining Order effective 17 September 1986 is
LIFTED. Let this case be REMANDED to the lower court
for trial on the merits. No cost.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairperson), Padilla, Sarmiento and
Regalado, JJ., concur.
EDUARDO P. MANUEL
vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 165842 | November 29, 2005
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------x
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 26877, affirming the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3, convicting Eduardo
P. Manuel of bigamy in Criminal Case No. 19562-R.
Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed
on November 7, 2001, the accusatory portion of which
reads:
That on or about the 22nd day of
April, 1996, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused EDUARDO P. MANUEL, being
then previously and legally married to
RUBYLUS [GAA] and without the said
marriage having been legally dissolved,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage
with TINA GANDALERA-MANUEL,
herein complainant, who does not know
the existence of the first marriage of said
EDUARDO P. MANUEL to Rubylus
[Gaa].
CONTRARY TO LAW. [3]
The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975,
Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaa before Msgr.
Feliciano Santos in Makati, which was then still a
municipality of the Province of Rizal.[4] He met the private
complainant Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City
sometime in January 1996. She stayed in Bonuan,
Dagupan City for two days looking for a friend. Tina was
then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while
Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio
City to visit her. Eventually, as one thing led to another,
they went to a motel where, despite Tinas resistance,
Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her. Eduardo
proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her
that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to
Baguio City to meet Tinas parents, and was assured by
them that their son was still single.
Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in
the first week of March 1996. They were married on April
22, 1996 before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding
Judge of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61.[5] It
appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was
single.
 The couple was happy during the first three years marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard

of their married life. Through their joint efforts, they were from Rubylus for more than 20 years.

able to build their home in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio

After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002
City. However, starting 1999, Manuel started making
finding Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice
bigamy. He was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money
from six (6) years and ten (10) months, as minimum, to
from Eduardo, he would slap her.[6] Sometime in January
ten (10) years, as maximum, and directed to indemnify the
2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return.
private complainant Tina Gandalera the amount
Worse, he stopped giving financial support.
of P200,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus costs of

Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious suit.[9]

and made inquiries from the National Statistics Office

The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove
(NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had
beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of bigamy
been previously married. She secured an NSO-certified
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. It declared
copy of the marriage contract.[7] She was so embarrassed
that Eduardos belief, that his first marriage had been
and humiliated when she learned that Eduardo was in fact
dissolved because of his first wifes 20-year absence,
already married when they exchanged their own vows.[8]
even if true, did not exculpate him from liability for bigamy.

For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime Citing the ruling of this Court in People v. Bitdu,[10] the trial

in 1995 in a bar where she worked as a Guest Relations court further ruled that even if the private complainant had

Officer (GRO). He fell in love with her and married her. He known that Eduardo had been previously married, the

informed Tina of his previous marriage to Rubylus Gaa, latter would still be criminally liable for bigamy.

but she nevertheless agreed to marry him. Their marital Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He

relationship was in order until this one time when he alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy
noticed that she had a love-bite on her neck. He then because when he married the private complainant, he did

abandoned her. Eduardo further testified that he declared so in good faith and without any malicious intent. He

he was single in his marriage contract with Tina because maintained that at the time that he married the private
he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid. complainant, he was of the honest belief that his first

He did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the marriage no longer subsisted. He insisted that

nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. conformably to Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there
must be malice for one to be criminally liable for a felony.
Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced
He was not motivated by malice in marrying the private
to marry his first wife because she threatened to commit
complainant because he did so only out of his
suicide unless he did so. Rubylus was charged
overwhelming desire to have a fruitful marriage. He
with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He visited
posited that the trial court should have taken into account
her in jail after three months and never saw her again. He
Article 390 of the New Civil Code. To support his view, the
insisted that he married Tina believing that his first
appellant cited the rulings of this Court in United States v. Appeals[16] to support its ruling. The dispositive portion of

Pealosa[11] and Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals.[12] the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred
that Eduardos defense of good faith and reliance on the
Courts ruling in United States v. Enriquez[13] were
misplaced; what is applicable is Article 41 of the Family
Code, which amended Article 390 of the Civil Code. Citing
the ruling of this Court in Republic
Nolasco,[14] the OSG further posited that as provided in
Article 41 of the Family Code, there is a need for a judicial
foregoing, the Decision promulgated on
July 31, 2002 is hereby MODIFIED to
reflect, as it hereby reflects, that
accused-appellant is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10)
years of prision mayor as maximum.
v. Said Decision is AFFIRMED in all other
respects.
SO ORDERED.[17]

declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse to

enable the present spouse to marry. Even assuming that Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant
the first marriage was void, the parties thereto should not petition for review on certiorari, insisting that:
be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of the
I
marriage; THE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF
the matter should be submitted to the proper court for LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT
PETITIONERS FIRST WIFE CANNOT
resolution. Moreover, the OSG maintained, the private BE LEGALLY PRESUMED DEAD
complainants knowledge of the first marriage would not UNDER ARTICLE 390 OF THE CIVIL
CODE AS THERE WAS NO JUDICIAL
afford any relief since bigamy is an offense against the DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE
DEATH AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER
State and not just against the private complainant. ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE.

II
However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that THE COURT OF APPEALS
the penalty imposed by the trial court was erroneous and COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF
LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE AWARD
sought the affirmance of the decision appealed from with OF PHP200,000.00 AS MORAL
DAMAGES AS IT HAS NO BASIS
modification. IN FACT AND IN LAW.[18]

On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming

The petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to
the decision of the RTC with modification as to the penalty
prove the second element of the felony, i.e., that the
of the accused. It ruled that the prosecution was able to
marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his/her
prove all the elements of bigamy. Contrary to the
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
contention of the appellant, Article 41 of the Family Code
presumed dead under the Civil Code. He avers that when
should apply. Before Manuel could lawfully marry the
he married Gandalera in 1996, Gaa had been absent for
private complainant, there should have been a judicial
21 years since 1975; under Article 390 of the Civil Code,
declaration of Gaas presumptive death as the absent
she was presumed dead as a matter of law. He points out
spouse. The appellate court cited the rulings of this Court
that, under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil
in Mercado v. Tan[15] and Domingo v. Court of
Code, one who has been absent for seven years, whether
or not he/she is still alive, shall be presumed dead for all
purposes except for succession, while the second
paragraph refers to the rule on legal presumption of death
with respect to succession.
The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death
of the absent spouse arises by operation of law upon the
satisfaction of two requirements: the
specified period and the present spouses reasonable
belief that the absentee is dead. He insists that he was
able to prove that he had not heard from his first wife since
1975 and that he had no knowledge of her whereabouts
or whether she was still alive; hence, under Article 41 of
the Family Code, the presumptive death of Gaa had
arisen by operation of law, as the two requirements of
Article 390 of the Civil Code are present. The petitioner
concludes that he should thus be acquitted of the crime of
bigamy.
The petitioner insists that except for the period of
absences provided for in Article 390 of the Civil Code, the
rule therein on legal presumptions remains valid and
effective. Nowhere under Article 390 of the Civil Code
does it require that there must first be a judicial declaration
of death before the rule on presumptive death would
apply. He further asserts that contrary to the rulings of the
trial and appellate courts, the requirement of a judicial
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the
Family Code is only a requirement for the validity of the
subsequent or second marriage.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the trial court and the
CA erred in awarding moral damages in favor of the
private complainant. The private complainant was a GRO
before he married her, and even knew that he was already
married. He genuinely loved and took care of her and
gave her financial support. He also pointed out that she
had an illicit relationship with a lover whom she brought to
their house.
In its comment on the petition, the OSG maintains that the
decision of the CA affirming the petitioners conviction is in
accord with the law, jurisprudence and the evidence on
record. To bolster its claim, the OSG cited the ruling of
this Court in Republic v. Nolasco.[19]
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and
penalizes bigamy, reads:
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision
mayor shall be imposed upon any person
who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means
of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.
The provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish
Penal Code, to wit:
El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior
matrimonio sin hallarse legtimamente
disuelto el anterior, ser castigado con la
pena de prision mayor. xxx
The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to
preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage
established by law.[20] The phrase or before the absent
spouse had been declared presumptively dead by means
of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings was
incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because the
drafters of the law were of the impression that in
consonance with the civil law which provides for the
presumption of death after an absence of a number of
years, the judicial declaration of presumed death like

annulment of marriage should be a justification for
bigamy.[21]
For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the
prosecution is burdened to prove the felony: (a) he/she
has been legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a
subsequent marriage without the former marriage having
been lawfully dissolved. The felony is consummated on
the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent
marriage.[22] It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy
that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential
requirements, would be valid were it not for the
subsistence of the first marriage.[23] Viada avers that a
third element of the crime is that the second marriage
must be entered into with fraudulent intent (intencion
fraudulente) which is an essential element of a felony
by dolo.[24] On the other hand, Cuello Calon is of the view
that there are only two elements of bigamy: (1) the
existence of a marriage that has not been lawfully
dissolved; and (2) the celebration of a second marriage. It
does not matter whether the first marriage is void or
voidable because such marriages have juridical effects
until lawfully dissolved by a court of competent
jurisdiction.[25] As the Court ruled in Domingo v. Court of
Appeals[26] and Mercado v. Tan,[27] under the Family
Code of the Philippines, the judicial declaration of nullity
of a previous marriage is a defense.
In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code,
Albert is of the same view as Viada and declared that
there are three (3) elements of bigamy: (1) an undissolved
marriage; (2) a new marriage; and (3) fraudulent intention
constituting the felony of the act.[28] He explained that:
This last element is not stated in Article
349, because it is undoubtedly
incorporated in the principle antedating
all codes, and, constituting one of the
landmarks of our Penal Code, that,
where there is no willfulness there is no
crime. There is no willfulness if the
subject
believes that the former marriage has
been dissolved; and this must be
supported by very strong evidence, and if
this be produced, the act shall be
deemed not to constitute a crime. Thus,
a person who contracts a second
marriage in the reasonable and well-
founded belief that his first wife is dead,
because of the many years that have
elapsed since he has had any news of
her whereabouts, in spite of his
endeavors to find her, cannot be deemed
guilty of the crime of bigamy, because
there is no fraudulent intent which is one
of the essential elements of the crime.[29]
As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner
is charged with bigamy, a felony by dolo (deceit). Article
3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
there is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate
intent. Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent. Since
a felony by dolo is classified as an intentional felony, it is
deemed voluntary.[30] Although the words with malice do
not appear in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such
phrase is included in the word voluntary.[31]
Malice is a mental state or condition prompting
the doing of an overt act without legal excuse or
justification from which another suffers injury.[32]When the
act or omission defined by law as a felony is proved to
have been done or committed by the accused, the law
presumes it to have been intentional.[33] Indeed, it is a
legal presumption of law that every man intends the
natural or probable consequence of his voluntary act in
the absence of proof to the contrary, and such
presumption must prevail unless a reasonable doubt
exists from a consideration of the whole evidence.[34]
For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there The phrase or before the absent spouse has been

must be a confluence of both an evil act and an evil declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.[35] rendered on the proceedings in Article 349 of the Revised

Penal Code was not an aggroupment of empty or useless

In the present case, the prosecution proved that the
words. The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive
petitioner was married to Gaa in 1975, and such marriage
death of the absent spouse is for the benefit of the spouse
was not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage
present, as protection from the pains and the
is presumed to subsist.[36] The prosecution also proved
consequences of a second marriage, precisely because
that the petitioner married the private complainant in
he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the
1996, long after the effectivity of the Family Code.
defense of good faith based on mere testimony is found

The petitioner is presumed to have acted with incredible.

malice or evil intent when he married the private

The requirement of judicial declaration is also for
complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good
the benefit of the State. Under Article II, Section 12 of the
faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for
Constitution, the State shall protect and strengthen the
a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal
family as a basic autonomous social institution. Marriage
intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse
is a social institution of the highest importance. Public
because everyone is presumed to know the
policy, good morals and the interest of society require that
law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
the marital relation should be surrounded with every

It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his safeguard and its severance only in the manner

defense that when he married the private complainant in prescribed and the causes specified by law.[37] The laws

1996, he was of the well-grounded belief regulating civil marriages are necessary to serve the

that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard interest, safety, good order, comfort or general welfare of

from her for more than 20 years since 1975. He should the community and the parties can waive nothing

have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court essential to the validity of the proceedings. A civil

declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging

required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in stable relationships over transient ones; it enhances the

relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial welfare of the community.

declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted

In a real sense, there are three parties to every
in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part
civil marriage; two willing spouses and an approving
when he married the private complainant and, as a
State. On marriage, the parties assume new relations to
consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in
each other and the State touching nearly on every aspect
such case. The petitioner, however, failed to discharge his
of life and death. The consequences of an invalid
burden.
marriage to the parties, to innocent parties and to society,

are so serious that the law may well take means


calculated to ensure the procurement of the most positive
evidence of death of the first spouse or of the presumptive
death of the absent spouse[38] after the lapse of the period
provided for under the law. One such means is the
requirement of the declaration by a competent court of the
presumptive death of an absent spouse as proof that the
present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage on a
well-grounded belief of the death of the first spouse.
Indeed, men readily believe what they wish to be true, is
a maxim of the old jurists. To sustain a second marriage
and to vacate a first because one of the parties believed
the other to be dead would make the existence of the
marital relation determinable, not by certain extrinsic
facts, easily capable of forensic ascertainment and proof,
but by the subjective condition of individuals.[39] Only with
such proof can marriage be treated as so dissolved as to
permit second marriages.[40] Thus, Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code has made the dissolution of
marriage dependent not only upon the personal belief of
parties, but upon certain objective facts easily capable of
accurate judicial cognizance,[41] namely, a judgment of
the presumptive death of the absent spouse.
The petitioners sole reliance on Article 390 of the
Civil Code as basis for his acquittal for bigamy is
misplaced.
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide
Art. 390. After an absence of seven
years, it being unknown whether or not,
the absentee still lives, he shall be
presumed dead for all purposes, except
for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed
dead for the purpose of opening his
succession till after an absence of ten
years. If he disappeared after the age of
seventy-five years, an absence of five
years shall be sufficient in order that his
succession may be opened.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed
dead for all purposes, including the
division of the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a
vessel lost during a sea
voyage, or an aeroplane
which is missing, who has
not been heard of for four
years since the loss of the
vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed
forces who has taken part
in war, and has been
missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in
danger of death under
other circumstances and
his existence has not been
known for four years.
The presumption of death of the spouse who had
been absent for seven years, it being unknown whether
or not the absentee still lives, is created by law and arises
without any necessity of judicial declaration.[42] However,
Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended the
foregoing rules on presumptive death, reads:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any
person during the subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse
had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present had a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of
death under the circumstances set forth
in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall
be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the
subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouse present
must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Court for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.[43]
With the effectivity of the Family Code,[44] the
period of seven years under the first paragraph of Article
390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive
years. Thus, before the spouse present may contract a
subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary
proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death
of the absentee spouse,[45] without prejudice to the effect
of the reappearance of the absentee spouse. As
explained by this Court in Armas v. Calisterio:[46]
In contrast, under the 1988
Family Code, in order that a subsequent
bigamous marriage may exceptionally be
considered valid, the following conditions
must concur, viz.: (a) The prior spouse of
the contracting party must have been
absent for four consecutive years, or two
years where there is danger of death
under the circumstances stated in Article
391 of the Civil Code at the time of
disappearance; (b) the spouse present
has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse is already dead; and (c) there is,
unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee for
which purpose the spouse present can
institute a summary proceeding in court
to ask for that declaration. The last
condition is consistent and in
consonance with the requirement of
judicial intervention in subsequent
marriages as so provided in Article 41, in
relation to Article 40, of the Family Code.
The Court rejects petitioners contention that the
requirement of instituting a petition for declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is
designed merely to enable the spouse present to contract
a valid second marriage and not for the acquittal of one
charged with bigamy. Such provision was designed to
harmonize civil law and Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, and put to rest the confusion spawned by the
rulings of this Court and comments of eminent authorities
on Criminal Law.
As early as March 6, 1937, this Court ruled
in Jones v. Hortiguela[47] that, for purposes of the
marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former
spouse judicially declared an absentee before the spouse
present may contract a subsequent marriage. It held that
the declaration of absence made in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose the
taking of the necessary precautions for the administration
of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil
marriage, however, the law only requires that the former
spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at
the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present
does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that
such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and
the spouse present so believes at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.[48] In In Re Szatraw,[49] the
Court declared that a judicial declaration that a person is
presumptively dead, because he or she had been
unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris
tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the
stage of finality or become final; and that proof of actual
death of the person presumed dead being unheard from
in seven years, would have to be made in another
proceeding to have such particular fact finally determined.
The Court ruled that if a judicial decree declaring a person
presumptively dead because he or she had not been
heard from in seven years cannot become final and
executory even after the lapse of the reglementary period
within which an appeal may be taken, for such
presumption is still disputable and remains subject to
contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is
useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to
the petitioner. The Court stated that it should not waste its
valuable time and be made to perform a superfluous and
meaningless act.[50] The Court also took note that a
petition for a declaration of the presumptive death of an
absent spouse may even be made in collusion with the
other spouse.
 In Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines,[51] the
Court declared that the words proper proceedings in
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code can only refer to
those authorized by law such as Articles 390 and 391 of
the Civil Code which refer to the administration or
settlement of the estate of a deceased person. In Gue v.
Republic of the Philippines,[52] the Court rejected the
contention of the petitioner therein that, under Article 390
of the Civil Code, the courts are authorized to declare the
presumptive death of a person after an absence of seven
years. The Court reiterated its rulings in Szatraw,
Lukban and Jones.
Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino was of
the view that the provision of Article 349 or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment reached in the proper proceedings
is erroneous and should be considered as not written. He
opined that such provision presupposes that, if the prior
marriage has not been legally dissolved and the absent
first spouse has not been declared presumptively dead in
a proper court proceedings, the subsequent marriage is
bigamous. He maintains that the supposition is not
true.[53] A second marriage is bigamous only when the
circumstances in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 83 of the
Civil Code are not present.[54] Former Senator Ambrosio
Padilla was, likewise, of the view that Article 349 seems
to require judicial decree of dissolution or judicial
declaration of absence but even with such decree, a
second marriage in good faith will not constitute bigamy.
He posits that a second marriage, if not illegal, even if it
be annullable, should not give rise to bigamy.[55] Former
Justice Luis B. Reyes, on the other hand, was of the view
that in the case of an absent spouse who could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code, the spouse
present cannot be charged and convicted of bigamy in
case he/she contracts a second marriage.[56]
The Committee tasked to prepare the Family
Code proposed the amendments of Articles 390 and 391
of the Civil Code to conform to Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, in that, in a case where a spouse is absent
for the requisite period, the present spouse may contract
a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment
declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to
avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present
spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead.[57] Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the
present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage;
thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with
bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be
convicted of the crime. As explained by former Justice
Alicia Sempio-Diy:
Such rulings, however, conflict with Art.
349 of the Revised Penal Code providing
that the present spouse must first ask for
a declaration of presumptive death of the
absent spouse in order not to be guilty of
bigamy in case he or she marries again.
The above Article of the Family
Code now clearly provides that for the
purpose of the present spouse
contracting a second marriage, he or she
must file a summary proceeding as
provided in the Code for the declaration
of the presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the latters
reappearance. This provision is intended
to protect the present spouse from a
criminal prosecution for bigamy under
Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code
because with the judicial declaration that
the missing spouses presumptively dead,
the good faith of the present spouse in
contracting a second marriage is already
established.[58]
 Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L.
Pineda (now Undersecretary of Justice) who wrote that
things are now clarified. He says judicial declaration of
presumptive death is now authorized for purposes of
remarriage. The present spouse must institute a summary
proceeding for declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, where the ordinary rules of procedure in trial
will not be followed. Affidavits will suffice, with possible
clarificatory examinations of affiants if the Judge finds it
necessary for a full grasp of the facts. The judgment
declaring an absentee as presumptively dead is without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the said
absentee.
Dean Pineda further states that before, the weight
of authority is that the clause before the absent spouse
has been declared presumptively dead x x x should be
disregarded because of Article 83, paragraph 3 of the Civil
Code. With the new law, there is a need to institute a
summary proceeding for the declaration of the
presumptive death of the absentee, otherwise, there is
bigamy.[59]
According to Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D.
Regalado, an eminent authority on Criminal Law, in some
cases where an absentee spouse is believed to be dead,
there must be a judicial declaration of presumptive death,
which could then be made only in the proceedings for the
settlement of his estate.[60]Before such declaration, it was
held that the remarriage of the other spouse is bigamous
even if done in good faith.[61] Justice Regalado opined that
there were contrary views because of the ruling
in Jones and the provisions of Article 83(2) of the Civil
Code, which, however, appears to have been set to rest
by Article 41 of the Family Code, which requires a
summary hearing for the declaration of presumptive death
of the absent spouse before the other spouse can
remarry.
Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition
for a declaration of the presumptive death of an absent
spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code may be filed
under Articles 239 to 247 of the same Code.[62]
On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the
trial court and the CA for awarding moral damages in favor
of the private complainant. The petitioner maintains that
moral damages may be awarded only in any of the cases
provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, and bigamy is
not one of them. The petitioner asserts that the appellate
court failed to apply its ruling in People v.
Bondoc,[63] where an award of moral damages for bigamy
was disallowed. In any case, the petitioner maintains, the
private complainant failed to adduce evidence to prove
moral damages.
The appellate court awarded moral damages to
the private complainant on its finding that she adduced
evidence to prove the same. The appellate court ruled that
while bigamy is not included in those cases enumerated
in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, it is not proscribed from
awarding moral damages against the petitioner. The
appellate court ruled that it is not bound by the following
ruling in People v. Bondoc:
... Pero si en dichos asuntos se
adjudicaron daos, ello se debi
indedublamente porque el articulo 2219
del Cdigo Civil de Filipinas autoriza la
adjudicacin de daos morales en los
delitos de estupro, rapto, violacin,
adulterio o concubinato, y otros actos
lascivos, sin incluir en esta enumeracin el
delito de bigamia. No existe, por
consiguiente, base legal para adjudicar
aqu los daos de P5,000.00 arriba
mencionados.[64]

The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the
CA are based on the evidence and the law. The OSG,
likewise, avers that the CA was not bound by its ruling
in People v. Rodeo.
The Court rules against the petitioner.
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be recovered if they
are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or
omission.[65] An award for moral damages requires the
confluence of the following conditions: first, there must be
an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological,
clearly sustained by the claimant; second, there must be
culpable act or omission factually established; third, the
wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate
cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and fourth,
the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases
stated in Article 2219 or Article 2220 of the Civil Code.[66]
Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the
offended party only in criminal cases enumerated in
Article 2219, paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Civil Code
and analogous cases, viz.:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be
recovered in the following and
analogous cases.
(1) A criminal offense resulting
in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing
physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction,
rape, or other lascivious
acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention
or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other
form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article
309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to
in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29,
30, 32, 34 and 35.
The parents of the female
seduced, abducted, raped, or abused,
referred to in No. 3 of this article, may
also recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants,
ascendants, and brothers and sisters
may bring the action mentioned in No. 9
of this article in the order named.
Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages should
be awarded in all cases where the aggrieved party has
suffered mental anguish, fright, moral anxieties,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation and similar injury arising out of an act or
omission of another, otherwise, there would not have
been any reason for the inclusion of specific acts in Article
2219[67] and analogous cases (which refer to those cases
bearing analogy or resemblance, corresponds to some
others or resembling, in other respects, as in form,
proportion, relation, etc.)[68]
Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically
mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code in which the
offender may be ordered to pay moral damages to the
private complainant/offended party. Nevertheless, the
petitioner is liable to the private complainant for moral
damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20
and 21 of the Civil Code.
According to Article 19, every person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith. This provision contains what is commonly
referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, and sets
certain standards which must be observed not only in the
exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of that he was single. He even brought his parents to the

ones duties. The standards are the following: act with house of the private complainant where he and his

justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty and parents made the same assurance that he was single.

good faith. The elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there Thus, the private complainant agreed to marry the

is a legal right or duty; (b) exercised in bad faith; and (c) petitioner, who even stated in the certificate of marriage

for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.[69] that he was single. She lived with the petitioner and

dutifully performed her duties as his wife, believing all the

Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all
while that he was her lawful husband. For two years or so
other provisions of law which do not especially provide for
until the petitioner heartlessly abandoned her, the private
its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner
complainant had no inkling that he was already married to
which does not conform to the standards set forth in the
another before they were married.
said provision and results in damage to another, a legal

wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must Thus, the private complainant was an innocent

be responsible.[70] If the provision does not provide a victim of the petitioners chicanery and heartless

remedy for its violation, an action for damages under deception, the fraud consisting not of a single act alone,

either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be but a continuous series of acts. Day by day, he maintained

proper. Article 20 provides that every person who, the appearance of being a lawful husband to the private

contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to complainant, who

another shall indemnify the latter for the same. On the changed her status from a single woman to a married

other hand, Article 21 provides that any person who woman, lost the consortium, attributes and support of a

willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that single man she could have married lawfully and endured

is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall mental pain and humiliation, being bound to a man who it

compensate the latter for damages. The latter provision turned out was not her lawful husband.[72]

is adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes

The Court rules that the petitioners collective acts
which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless,
of fraud and deceit before, during and after his marriage
even though they have actually suffered material and
with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and
moral injury should vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for
with malice and caused injury to the latter. That she did
that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible
not sustain any physical injuries is not a bar to an award
for human foresight to prove for specifically in the statutes.
for moral damages. Indeed, in Morris v. Macnab,[73] the
Whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been
New Jersey Supreme Court ruled:
violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article
xxx The defendant cites
21 of the Civil Code or other applicable provisions of law
authorities which indicate that, absent
depends upon the circumstances of each case.[71] physical injuries, damages for shame,
humiliation, and mental anguish are not
recoverable where the actor is simply
In the present case, the petitioner courted the private negligent. See Prosser, supra, at p. 180;
2 Harper & James, Torts, 1031 (1956).
complainant and proposed to marry her. He assured her But the authorities all recognize that
where the wrong is willful rather than
 negligent, recovery may be had for the
ordinary, natural, and proximate
consequences though they consist of
shame, humiliation, and mental anguish.
See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co.,
117 NJL 90, 94, 186 A 585 (Sup. Ct.
1936); Kuzma v. Millinery Workers, etc.,
Local 24, 27 N.J. Super, 579, 591, 99
A.2d 833 (App. Div. 1953); Prosser,
supra, at p. 38. Here the defendants
conduct was not merely negligent, but
was willfully and maliciously wrongful. It
was bound to result in shame,
humiliation, and mental anguish for the
plaintiff, and when such result did ensue
the plaintiff became entitled not only to
compensatory but also to punitive
damages. See Spiegel v. Evergreen
Cemetery Co., supra; Kuzma v Millinery
Workers, etc., Local 24, supra. CF. Note,
Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts,
70 Harv. L. Rev. 517 (1957). The plaintiff
testified that because of the defendants
bigamous marriage to her and the
attendant publicity she not only was
embarrassed and ashamed to go out but
couldnt sleep but couldnt eat, had terrific
headaches and lost quite a lot of weight.
No just basis appears for judicial
interference with the jurys reasonable
allowance of $1,000 punitive damages
on the first count. See Cabakov v.
Thatcher, 37 N.J. Super 249, 117 A.2d
298 (App. Div.[74] 1955).
The Court thus declares that the petitioners acts are
against public policy as they undermine and subvert the
family as a social institution, good morals and the interest
and general welfare of society.
Because the private complainant was an innocent
victim of the petitioners perfidy, she is not barred from
claiming moral damages. Besides, even considerations of
public policy would not prevent her from recovery. As held
in Jekshewitz v. Groswald:[75]
Where a person is induced by the
fraudulent representation of another to
do an act which, in consequence of such
misrepresentation, he believes to be
neither illegal nor immoral, but which is in
fact a criminal offense, he has a right of
action against the person so inducing him
for damages sustained by him in
consequence of his having done such
act. Burrows v. Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B.
816. In Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass.
370, 17 N.E. 892, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721, the
court said that a false representation by
the defendant that he was divorced from
his former wife, whereby the plaintiff was
induced to marry him, gave her a remedy
in tort for deceit. It seems to have been
assumed that the fact that she had
unintentionally violated the law or
innocently committed a crime by
cohabiting with him would be no bar to
the action, but rather that it might be a
ground for enhancing her damages. The
injury to the plaintiff was said to be in her
being led by the promise to give the
fellowship and assistance of a wife to one
who was not her husband and to assume
and act in a relation and condition that
proved to be false and ignominious.
Damages for such an injury were held to
be recoverable in Sherman v. Rawson,
102 Mass. 395 and Kelley v. Riley, 106
Mass. 339, 343, 8 Am. Rep. 336.
Furthermore, in the case at bar the
plaintiff does not base her cause of action
upon any transgression of the law by
herself but upon the defendants
misrepresentation. The criminal relations
which followed, innocently on her part,
were but one of the incidental results of
the defendants fraud for which damages
may be assessed.
[7] Actions for deceit for
fraudulently inducing a woman to enter
into the marriage relation have been
maintained in other jurisdictions. Sears v.
Wegner, 150 Mich. 388, 114 N.W. 224,
17 L.R. A. (N.S.) 819; Larson v. McMillan,
99 Wash. 626, 170 P. 324; Blossom v.
Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434, 97 Am. Dec. 747;
Morril v. Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 33 A. 829, 33
L.R.A. 411. Considerations of public
policy would not prevent recovery where
the circumstances are such that the
plaintiff was conscious of no moral
turpitude, that her illegal action was
induced solely by the defendants
misrepresentation, and that she does not
base her cause of action upon any
transgression of the law by herself. Such
considerations
distinguish this case from cases in which
the court has refused to lend its aid to the
enforcement of a contract illegal on its
face or to one who has consciously and
voluntarily become a party to an illegal
act upon which the cause of action is
founded. Szadiwicz v. Cantor, 257 Mass.
 518, 520, 154 N.E. 251, 49 A. L. R.
958.[76]
Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the
Court finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral damages
to be just and reasonable.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. L-31695 | November 26, 1929
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
SIA TEB BAN (alias JUAN TONINO, alias JUAN
ANTONIO, alias PEDRO ANTONIO), defendant-
appellant.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
Found guilty of qualified theft and habitual delinquency,
the defendant was sentenced by the municipal court of
Manila and on appeal, by the Court of First Instance of
this City, to two years, four months, and one day presidio
correccional, with costs, and to the additional penalty of
twenty-one years' imprisonment.
He now contends that he is not guilty of the crime with
which he is charged.
But it has been proved that he took the watch described
in the information without the owner's consent, having
been overtaken a few moments later by a friend of the
offended party, who found the stolen watch on the
appellant. It is alleged that animus lucrandi has not been
proved. We find it sufficiently established, as the acts of
the accused (one's intention may be gathered from one's
deeds) unequivocally show. 1awphil.net
It is a fundamental doctrine of law that the act penalized
by the law is presumed to be voluntary unless contrary is
shown (art. 1, Penal Code). And from the appellant's
felonious acts, freely and deliberately executed, the moral
and legal presumption of a criminal and injurious intent
arises conclusively and indisputably, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary (sec. 334, No. 2, Act No. 190).
In view of the fact that we find no merit in this appeal and
that the law provides for the imposition of accessory
penalties, the appealed judgment is modified, the
appellant being sentenced to the accessory penalties
provided in article 58 of the Penal Code, the said
judgment being affirmed in all other respects, with costs
against the appellant. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Ostrand and
Johns, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 97471 | February 17, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ISABELO PUNO y GUEVARRA, alias "Beloy," and
ENRIQUE AMURAO y PUNO, alias "Enry," accused-
appellants.
REGALADO, J.:
The primal issue for resolution in this case is whether
accused-appellants committed the felony of kidnapping
for ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,
as charged in the information; or a violation of Presidential
Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery
Law of 1974), as contended by the Solicitor General and
found by the trial court; or the offense of simple robbery
punished by Paragraph 5, Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code, as claimed by the defense.
In an information dated and filed on May 31, 1989 in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103, as
Criminal Case No. Q-57404 thereof, appellants were
charged with kidnapping for ransom allegedly committed
in the following manner:
That on or about the 13th day of January,
1988 in Quezon City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, being then
private individuals, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping
each other, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and
carry away one MARIA DEL SOCORRO
SARMIENTO y MUTUC * for the purpose
of extorting ransom, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended party in
such amount as may be awarded to her
under the provisions of the Civil Code.1
On a plea of not guilty when arraigned,2 appellants went
to trial which ultimately resulted in a judgment
promulgated on September 26, 1990 finding them guilty
of robbery with extortion committed on a highway,
punishable under Presidential Decree No. 532, with this
disposition in the fallo thereof:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby
rendered finding the accused ISABELO
 PUNO and ENRIQUE AMURAO GUILTY
as principals of robbery with extortion
committed on a highway and, in
accordance with P.D. 532, they are both
sentenced to a jail term of reclusion
perpetua.
The two accused are likewise ordered to
pay jointly and severally the offended
private victim Ma. Socorro M. Sarmiento
the sum of P7,000.00 as actual damages
and P3,000.00 as temperate damages.3
Before us now in this appeal, appellants contend that the
court a quo erred (1) in convicting them under
Presidential Decree No. 532 since they were not
expressly charged with a crime therein; (2) in applying
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court since the
charge under said presidential decree is not the offense
proved and cannot rightly be used as the offense proved
which is necessarily included in the offense charged.4
For the material antecedents of this case, we quote with
approval the following counter-statement of facts in the
People's brief5 which adopted the established findings of
the court a quo, documenting the same with page
references to the transcripts of the proceedings, and
which we note are without any substantial divergence in
the version proffered by the defense.
This is a prosecution for kidnapping for
ransom allegedly done on January 13,
1988 by the two accused (tsn, Jan. 8,
1990, p. 7).
Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento
owns a bakeshop in Araneta Avenue,
Quezon City called Nika Cakes and
Pastries. She has a driver of her own just
as her husband does (Ibid., pp. 4-6).
At around 5:00 in the afternoon of
January 13, 1988, the accused Isabelo
Puno, who is the personal driver of Mrs.
Sarmiento's husband (who was then
away in Davao purportedly on account of
local election there) arrived at the
bakeshop. He told Mrs. Socorro that her
own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga
on an emergency (something bad befell
a child), so Isabelo will temporary (sic)
take his place (Id., pp. 8-9).
Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle
Verde in Pasig came and so she got into
the Mercedes Benz of her husband with
Isabelo on (sic) the wheel. After the car
turned right in (sic) a corner of Araneta
Avenue, it stopped. A young man,
accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the
car beside the driver (Id., pp. 9-10).
Once inside, Enrique clambered on top of
the back side of the front seat and went
onto where Ma. Socorro was seated at
the rear. He poke (sic) a gun at her (Id.,
p. 10).
Isabelo, who earlier told her that Enrique
is his nephew announced, "ma'm, you
know, I want to get money from you." She
said she has money inside her bag and
they may get it just so they will let her go.
The bag contained P7,000.00 and was
taken (Id., pp. 11-14).
Further on, the two told her they wanted
P100,000.00 more. Ma. Socorro agreed
to give them that but would they drop her
at her gas station in Kamagong St.,
Makati where the money is? The car went
about the Sta. Mesa area. Meanwhile,
Ma. Socorro clutched her Rosary and
prayed. Enrique's gun was menacingly
storing (sic) at her soft bread (sic) brown,
perfumed neck. He said he is an NPA
and threatened her (Id., p.15).
The car sped off north towards the North
superhighway. There Isabelo, Beloy as
he is called, asked Ma. Socorro to issue
a check for P100,000.00. Ma. Socorro
complied. She drafted 3 checks in
denominations of two for P30 thousand
and one for P40 thousand. Enrique
ordered her to swallow a pill but she
refused (Id., pp. 17-23).
Beloy turned the car around towards
Metro Manila. Later, he changed his mind
and turned the car again towards
Pampanga. Ma. Socorro, according to
her, jumped out of the car then, crossed
to the other side of the superhighway
and, after some vehicles ignored her, she
was finally able to flag down a fish
vendors van. Her dress had blood
because, according to Ma. Socorro, she
fell down on the ground and was injured
when she jumped out of the car. Her
dress was torn too (Id., pp. 23-26).
On reaching Balintawak, Ma. Socorro
reported the matter to CAPCOM (Id., p.
27).
Both accused were, day after, arrested.
Enrique was arrested trying to encash
Ma. Socorro's P40,000.00 check at PCI
Bank, Makati. (tsn, Oct. 18, 1989, pp. 10-
13)6
As observed by the court below, the defense does not
dispute said narrative of complainant, except that,
according to appellant Puno, he stopped the car at North
Diversion and freely allowed complainant to step out of
the car. He even slowed the car down as he drove away,
until he saw that his employer had gotten a ride, and he
claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while
running across the highway.7
Appellants further testified that they brought the Mercedez
Benz car to Dolores, San Fernando, Pampanga and
parked it near a barangay or police outpost. They
thereafter ate at a restaurant and divided their loot.8 Much
later, when he took the stand at the trial of this case,
appellant Puno tried to mitigate his liability by explaining
that he was in dire need of money for the medication of
his ulcers.9
On these relatively simple facts, and as noted at the start
of this opinion, three theories have been advanced as to
what crime was committed by appellants. The trial court
cohered with the submission of the defense that the crime
could not be kidnapping for ransom as charged in the
information. We likewise agree.
Prefatorily, it is worth recalling an accepted tenet in
criminal law that in the determination of the crime for
which the accused should be held liable in those
instances where his acts partake of the nature of variant
offenses, and the same holds true with regard to the
modifying or qualifying circumstances thereof, his motive
and specific intent in perpetrating the acts complained of
are invaluable aids in arriving at a correct appreciation
and accurate conclusion thereon.
Thus, to illustrate, the motive of the accused has been
held to be relevant or essential to determine the specific
nature of the crime as, for instance, whether a murder was
committed in the furtherance of rebellion in which case the
latter absorbs the former, or whether the accused had his
own personal motives for committing the murder
independent of his membership in the rebellious
movement in which case rebellion and murder would
constitute separate offenses. 10 Also, where injuries were
inflicted on a person in authority who was not then in the
actual performance of his official duties, the motive of the
offender assumes importance because if the attack was
by reason of the previous performance of official duties by
the person in authority, the crime would be direct assault;
otherwise, it would only be physical injuries. 11
In the case at bar, there is no showing whatsoever that
appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or at the time
they committed the wrongful acts against complainant,
other than the extortion of money from her under the
compulsion of threats or intimidation. This much is
admitted by both appellants, without any other esoteric
qualification or dubious justification. Appellant Puno, as
already stated, candidly laid the blame for his
predicament on his need for funds for, in his own
testimony, "(w)hile we were along the way Mam (sic)
Corina was telling me "Beloy, I know your family very well
and I know that your (sic) not (a) bad person, why are you
doing this?" I told her "Mam, (sic), because I need money
and I had an ulcer and that I have been getting an (sic)
advances from our office but they refused to give me any
bale (sic). . . ." 12
With respect to the specific intent of appellants vis-a-
vis the charge that they had kidnapped the victim, we can
rely on the proverbial rule of ancient respectability that for
this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that
the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the
offended party of her liberty, 13 and not where such
restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident
in the commission of another offense primarily intended
by the offenders. Hence, as early as United States
vs. Ancheta, 14 and consistently reiterated thereafter, 15 it
has been held that the detention and/or forcible taking
away of the victims by the accused, even for an
appreciable period of time but for the primary and ultimate
purpose of killing them, holds the offenders liable for
taking their lives or such other offenses they committed in
relation thereto, but the incidental deprivation of the
victims' liberty does not constitute kidnapping or serious
illegal detention.
That appellants in this case had no intention whatsoever
to kidnap or deprive the complainant of her personal
liberty is clearly demonstrated in the veritably
confessional testimony of appellant Puno:
Q At what point did Mrs. Sarmiento handed (sic) the bag
containing the P7,000.00 to your nephew?
A Santo Domingo Exit.
Q And how about the checks, where were you already
when the checks was (sic) being handed to you?
A Also at the Sto. Domingo exit when she signed the
checks.
Q If your intention was just to robbed (sic) her, why is it
that you still did not allow her to stay at Sto. Domingo,
after all you already received the money and the checks?
A Because we had an agreement with her that when she
signed the checks we will take her to her house at Villa
(sic) Verde.
Q And why did you not bring her back to her house at
Valle Verde when she is (sic) already given you the
checks?
A Because while we were on the way back I (sic) came to
my mind that if we reach Balintawak or some other place
along the way we might be apprehended by the police. So
when we reached Santa Rita exit I told her "Mam (sic) we
will already stop and allow you to get out of the car." 16
Neither can we consider the amounts given to appellants
as equivalent to or in the nature of ransom, considering
the immediacy of their obtention thereof from the
complainant personally. Ransom, in municipal criminal
law, is the money, price or consideration paid or
demanded for redemption of a captured person or
persons, a payment that releases from captivity. 17 It can
hardly be assumed that when complainant readily gave
the cash and checks demanded from her at gun point,
what she gave under the circumstances of this case can
be equated with or was in the concept of ransom in the
law of kidnapping. These were merely amounts
involuntarily surrendered by the victim upon the occasion
of a robbery or of which she was summarily divested by
appellants. Accordingly, while we hold that the crime
committed is robbery as defined in Article 293 of the
Code, we, however, reject the theory of the trial court that
the same constitutes the highway robbery contemplated
in and punished by Presidential Decree No. 532.
The lower court, in support of its theory, offers this
ratiocination:
The court agrees that the crime is
robbery. But it is also clear from the
allegation in the information that the
victim was carried away and extorted for
more money. The accused admitted that
the robbery was carried on from Araneta
Avenue up to the North Superhighway.
They likewise admitted that along the
way they intimidated Ma. Socorro to
produce more money that she had with
her at the time for which reason Ma.
Socorro, not having more cash, drew out
three checks. . . .
In view of the foregoing the court is of the
opinion that the crimes committed is that
punishable under P.D. 532 (Anti-Piracy
and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974)
under which where robbery on the
highway is accompanied by extortion the
penalty is reclusion perpetua.18
The Solicitor General concurs, with the observation that
pursuant to the repealing clause in Section 5 of said
decree, "P.D. No- 532 is a modification of the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code, particularly Article 267 which
are inconsistent with it." 19 Such opinion and
complementary submission consequently necessitate an
evaluation of the correct interplay between and the legal
effects of Presidential Decree No. 532 on the pertinent
Provisions of the Revised Penal Code, on which matter
we are not aware that any definitive pronouncement has
as yet been made.
Contrary to the postulation of the Solicitor General,
Presidential Decree No. 532 is not a modification of Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code on kidnapping and serious
illegal detention, but of Articles 306 and 307 on
brigandage. This is evident from the fact that the relevant
portion thereof which treats of "highway robbery"
invariably uses this term in the alternative and
synonymously with brigandage, that is, as "highway
robbery/brigandage." This is but in line with our previous
ruling, and which still holds sway in criminal law, that
highway robbers (ladrones) and brigands are
synonymous. 20
Harking back to the origin of our law on brigandage
(bandolerismo) in order to put our discussion thereon in
the proper context and perspective, we find that a band of
brigands, also known as highwaymen or freebooters, is
more than a gang of ordinary robbers. Jurisprudence on
the matter reveals that during the early part of the
American occupation of our country, roving bands were
organized for robbery and pillage and since the then
existing law against robbery was inadequate to cope with
such moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law was
passed. 21
The following salient distinctions between brigandage and
robbery are succinctly explained in a treatise on the
subject and are of continuing validity:
The main object of the Brigandage Law
is to prevent the formation of bands of
robbers. The heart of the offense
consists in the formation of a band by
more than three armed persons for the
purpose indicated in art. 306. Such
formation is sufficient to constitute a
violation of art. 306. It would not be
necessary to show, in a prosecution
under it, that a member or members of
the band actually committed robbery or
kidnapping or any other purpose
attainable by violent means. The crime is
proven when the organization and
purpose of the band are shown to be
such as are contemplated by art 306. On
the other hand, if robbery is committed by
a band, whose members were not
primarily organized for the purpose of
committing robbery or kidnapping, etc.,
the crime would not be brigandage, but
only robbery. Simply because robbery
was committed by a band of more than
three armed persons, it would not follow
that it was committed by a band of
brigands. In the Spanish text of art. 306,
it is required that the band "sala a los
campos para dedicarse a
robar." 22 (Emphasis supplied).
In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia,
indiscriminate highway robbery. If the purpose is only a
particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in
band if there are at least four armed participants. 23 The
martial law legislator, in creating and promulgating
Presidential Decree No. 532 for the objectives announced
therein, could not have been unaware of that distinction
and is presumed to have adopted the same, there being
no indication to the contrary. This conclusion is buttressed
by the rule on contemporaneous construction, since it is
one drawn from the time when and the circumstances
under which the decree to be construed originated.
Contemporaneous exposition or construction is the best
and strongest in the law. 24
Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as
highway robbery or brigandage only acts of robbery
perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any
person or persons on Philippine highways as defined
therein, and not acts of robbery committed against only a
predetermined or particular victim, is evident from the
preambular clauses thereof, to wit:
WHEREAS, reports from law-
enforcement agencies reveal that
lawless elements are still committing acts
of depredation upon the persons and
properties of innocent and defenseless
inhabitants who travel from one place to
another, thereby disturbing the peace,
order and tranquility of the nation
and stunting the economic and social
progress of the people:
WHEREAS, such acts of depredations
constitute . . . highway
robbery/brigandage which are among the
highest forms of lawlessness condemned
by the penal statutes of all countries;
WHEREAS, it is imperative that said
lawless elements be discouraged from
perpetrating such acts of depredaions by
imposing heavy penalty on the offenders,
with the end in view of eliminating all
obstacles to the economic, social,
educational and community progress of
the people. (Emphasis supplied).
Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of
robbery against a particular person chosen by the
accused as their specific victim could be considered as
committed on the "innocent and defenseless inhabitants
who travel from one place to another," and which single
act of depredation would be capable of "stunting the
economic and social progress of the people" as to be
considered "among the highest forms of lawlessness
condemned by the penal statutes of all countries," and
would accordingly constitute an obstacle "to the
economic, social, educational and community progress of
the people, " such that said isolated act would constitute
the highway robbery or brigandage contemplated and
punished in said decree. This would be an exaggeration
bordering on the ridiculous.
True, Presidential Decree No. 532 did introduce
amendments to Articles 306 and 307 of the Revised Penal
Code by increasing the penalties, albeit limiting its
applicability to the offenses stated therein when
committed on the highways and without prejudice to the
liability for such acts if committed. Furthermore, the
decree does not require that there be at least four armed
persons forming a band of robbers; and the presumption
in the Code that said accused are brigands if they use
unlicensed firearms no longer obtains under the decree.
But, and this we broadly underline, the essence of
brigandage under the Code as a crime of depredation
wherein the unlawful acts are directed not only against
specific, intended or preconceived victims, but against
any and all prospective victims anywhere on the highway
and whosoever they may potentially be, is the same as
the concept of brigandage which is maintained in
Presidential Decree No. 532, in the same manner as it
was under its aforementioned precursor in the Code and,
for that matter, under the old Brigandage Law. 25
Erroneous advertence is nevertheless made by the court
below to the fact that the crime of robbery committed by
appellants should be covered by the said amendatory
decree just because it was committed on a highway.
Aside from what has already been stressed regarding the
absence of the requisite elements which thereby
necessarily puts the offense charged outside the purview
and intendment of that presidential issuance, it would be
absurd to adopt a literal interpretation that any unlawful
taking of property committed on our highways would be
covered thereby. It is an elementary rule of statutory
construction that the spirit or intent of the law should not
be subordinated to the letter thereof. Trite as it may
appear, we have perforce to stress the elementary caveat
that he who considers merely the letter of an instrument
goes but skin deep into its meaning, 26 and the
fundamental rule that criminal justice inclines in favor of
the milder form of liability in case of doubt.
If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed
on a highway would be the determinant for the application
of Presidential Decree No. 532, it would not be farfetched
to expect mischievous, if not absurd, effects on the corpus
of our substantive criminal law. While we eschew resort to
a reductio ad absurdum line of reasoning, we apprehend
that the aforestated theory adopted by the trial court falls
far short of the desideratum in the interpretation of laws,
that is, to avoid absurdities and conflicts. For, if a motor
vehicle, either stationary or moving on a highway, is
forcibly taken at gun point by the accused who happened
to take a fancy thereto, would the location of the vehicle
at the time of the unlawful taking necessarily put the
offense within the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 532,
thus rendering nugatory the categorical provisions of the
Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972? 27 And, if the scenario is
one where the subject matter of the unlawful asportation
is large cattle which are incidentally being herded along
and traversing the same highway and are impulsively set
upon by the accused, should we apply Presidential
Decree No. 532 and completely disregard the explicit
prescriptions in the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974? 28
We do not entertain any doubt, therefore, that the
coincidental fact that the robbery in the present case was
committed inside a car which, in the natural course of
things, was casually operating on a highway, is not within
the situation envisaged by Section 2(e) of the decree in its
definition of terms. Besides, that particular provision
precisely defines "highway robbery/brigandage" and, as
we have amply demonstrated, the single act of robbery
conceived and committed by appellants in this case does
not constitute highway robbery or brigandage.
Accordingly, we hold that the offense committed by
appellants is simple robbery defined in Article 293 and
punished under Paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code with prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its medium period. Appellants
have indisputably acted in conspiracy as shown by their
concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of thought and
community of purpose. In the determination of their
respective liabilities, the aggravating circumstances of
craft 29 shall be appreciated against both appellants and
that of abuse of confidence shall be further applied
against appellant Puno, with no mitigating circumstance
in favor of either of them. At any rate, the intimidation
having been made with the use of a firearm, the penalty
shall be imposed in the maximum period as decreed by
Article 295 of the Code.
We further hold that there is no procedural obstacle to the
conviction of appellants of the crime of simple robbery
upon an information charging them with kidnapping for
ransom, since the former offense which has been proved
is necessarily included in the latter offense with which they
are charged. 30 For the former offense, it is sufficient that
the elements of unlawful taking, with intent to gain, of
personal property through intimidation of the owner or
possessor thereof shall be, as it has been, proved in the
case at bar. Intent to gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed
to be alleged in an information where it is charged that
there was unlawful taking (apoderamiento) and
appropriation by the offender of the things subject of the
robbery. 31
These foregoing elements are necessarily included in the
information filed against appellants which, as formulated,
allege that they wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
kidnapped and extorted ransom from the complainant.
Such allegations, if not expressly but at the very least by
necessary implication, clearly convey that the taking of
complainant's money and checks (inaccurately termed as
ransom) was unlawful, with intent to gain, and through
intimidation. It cannot be logically argued that such a
charge of kidnapping for ransom does not include but
could negate the presence of any of the elements of
robbery through intimidation of persons. 32
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the trial court is
hereby SET ASIDE and another one is rendered
CONVICTING accused-appellants Isabelo Puno y
Guevarra and Enrique Amurao y Puno of robbery as
Punished in Paragraph 5 of Article 294, in relation to
Article 295, of the Revised Penal Code and IMPOSING
on each of them an indeterminate sentence of four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum,
and jointly and severally pay the offended party, Maria del
Socorro M. Sarmiento, the amounts of P7,000.00 as
actual damages and P20,000.00 as moral damages, with
costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 142773. January 28, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. MARLON DELIM, LEON DELIM,
MANUEL DELIM alias BONG (At Large), ROBERT
DELIM (At Large), and RONALD
DELIM alias BONG, accused-appellants.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court on automatic review is the
Decision,[1] dated January 14, 2000, of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 46, Urdaneta City, finding accused-
appellants Marlon Delim, Leon Delim and Ronald Delim
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
and sentencing them to suffer the supreme penalty of
death. The court also ordered accused-appellants to pay,
jointly and severally, the heirs of the victim the sums of
P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
Accused-appellants Marlon, Ronald and Leon,
together with Manuel alias Bong and Robert, all surnamed
Delim, were indicted for murder under an Information
dated May 4, 1999 which reads:
That on or about January 23, 1999, in the evening at Brgy.
Bila, Sison, Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with
short firearms barged-in and entered the house of
Modesto Delim and once inside with intent to
kill, treachery, evident premedidation (sic), conspiring
with one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously grab, hold, hogtie, gag with a piece of
cloth, brought out and abduct Modesto Delim, accused
Leon Delim and Manuel Delim stayed in the house
guarded and prevented the wife and son of Modesto
Delim from helping the latter, thereafter with abuse of
superior strength stabbed and killed said Modesto Delim,
to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
CONTRARY to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659.[2]
Only accused-appellants Marlon (Bongbong), Leon
and Ronald, all surnamed Delim, were
apprehended. Accused Robert and Manuel remain at-
large.
 At their arraignment, Marlon, Ronald and Leon, with
the assistance of their counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
charge.
At the trial, the prosecution established the following
relevant facts[3]
Marlon, Manuel and Robert Delim are brothers. They
are the uncles of Leon Delim and Ronald Delim. Modesto
Manalo Bantas, the victim, was an Igorot and a
carpenter. He took the surname Delim after he was
adopted by the father of Marlon, Manuel and
Robert. However, Modestos wife, Rita, an illiterate, and
their 16-year old son, Randy, continued using Manalo
Bantas as their surname. Modesto, Rita and Randy
considered Marlon, Robert, Ronald, Manuel and Leon as
their relatives.Manuel and Leon were the neighbors of
Modesto. Marlon, Robert and Ronald used to visit
Modesto and his family. Modesto and his family and the
Delim kins resided in Barangay Bila, Sison, Pangasinan.
On January 23, 1999, at around 6:30 in the evening,
Modesto, Rita and Randy were preparing to have their
supper in their home. Joining them were Modesto and
Ritas two young grandchildren, aged 5 and 7 years
old. They were about to eat their dinner when Marlon,
Robert and Ronald suddenly barged into the house and
closed the door. Each of the three intruders was armed
with a short handgun. Marlon poked his gun at Modesto
while Robert and Ronald simultaneously grabbed and
hog-tied the victim. A piece of cloth was placed in the
mouth of Modesto.[4] Marlon, Robert and Ronald herded
Modesto out of the house on their way towards the
direction of Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan. Rita and Randy
were warned by the intruders not to leave the house. Leon
and Manuel, who were also armed with short handguns,
stayed put by the door to the house of Modesto and
ordered Rita and Randy to stay where they were. Leon
and Manuel left the house of Modesto only at around 7:00
a.m. the following day, January 24, 1999.
As soon as Leon and Manuel had left, Randy rushed
to the house of his uncle, Darwin Nio, at Sitio Labayog,
informed the latter of the incident the night before and
sought his help for the retrieval of Modesto. Randy was
advised to report the matter to the police
authorities. However, Randy opted to first look for his
father. He and his other relatives scoured the vicinity to
locate Modesto to no avail. They proceeded to Paldit,
Sison, Pangasinan, around 200 meters away from
Modestos house, to locate Modesto but failed to find him
there. On January 25, 1999, Randy and his relatives
returned to the housing project in Paldit, Sison,
Pangasinan to locate Modesto but again failed to find him
there. On January 26, 1999, Randy reported the incident
to the police authorities.
At around 3:00 in the afternoon of January 27, 1999,
Randy, in the company of his relatives, Nida Pucal, Pepito
Pucal, Bernard Osias and Daniel Delim, returned to the
housing project in Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan and this time
they found Modesto under thick bushes in a grassy
area. He was already dead. The cadaver was bloated and
in the state of decomposition. It exuded a bad odor. Tiny
white worms swarmed over and feasted on the
cadaver. Randy and his relatives immediately rushed to
the police station to report the incident and to seek
assistance.
When informed of the discovery of Modestos
cadaver, the local chief of police and SPO2 Jovencio
Fajarito and other policemen rushed to the scene and saw
the cadaver under the thick bushes. Pictures were taken
of the cadaver.[5] Rita and Randy divulged to the police
investigators the names and addresses of Marlon,
Ronald, Robert, Leon and Manuel, whom they claimed
were responsible for the death of Modesto. Rita and
Randy were at a loss why the five malefactors seized
Modesto and killed him. Rita and Randy gave their
respective sworn statements to the police
investigators.[6] Police authorities proceeded to arrest
Marlon, Ronald, Robert, Manuel and Leon but failed to
find them in their respective houses. The police officers
scoured the mountainous parts of Barangays Immalog
and Labayog to no avail.
The cadaver was autopsied by Dr. Maria Fe L. De
Guzman who prepared her autopsy report, which reads:
SIGNIFICANT EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
- Body - both upper extremities are flexed
- both lower extremities are flexed
- (+) body decomposition
- (+) worms coming out from injuries
- 10 x 10 ml. GSW, pre-auricular area, right
- 20 x 20 ml. GSW, mandibular areas, right
- 10 x 10 ml. GSW, maxillary area, right
- 10 x 10 ml. GSW, below middle nose, directed upward
(POE)
- 30 x 40 ml. GSW, mid parieto occipital area (POEx)
- 2 x 1 cms. lacerated wound, right cheek
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, axillary area, left
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, lateral aspect M/3rd left arm
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, lateral aspect D/3rd, left arm
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect M/3rd, left arm
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect D/3rd, left arm
- #3; 1 x 1 cm. in line with each other, stabbed wound,
medial aspect, M/3rd, left forearm
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect, D/3rd, left
forearm
- 10 x 6 cms. Inflamed scrotum
- penis inflamed
SIGNIFICANT INTERNAL FINDINGS:
- no significant internal findings
CAUSE OF DEATH:
GUN SHOT WOUND, HEAD.[7]
The stab wounds sustained by Modesto on his left
arm and forearm were defensive wounds. The police
investigators were able to confirm that Marlon, Ronald,
Robert, Leon and Manuel had no licenses for their
firearms.[8]
Records of the PNP Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group in Baguio City show that Marlon had
pending cases for robbery in the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City in Criminal Case No. 16193-R, and for
robbery in band in Criminal Cases Nos. 9801 and 9802
pending with the Regional Trial Court in Urdaneta,
Pangasinan.[9]
To exculpate themselves, Marlon, Ronald and Leon
interposed denial and alibi.[10]
Ronald claimed that on January 23, 1999, he, his
wife and children, his mother, his brothers and sisters
were in their house at Asan Norte, Sison, Pangasinan
about two kilometers away from Modestos house.
He denied having been in the house of Modesto on
January 23, 1999 and of abducting and killing him. He
theorized that Rita and Randy falsely implicated him upon
the coaching of Melchor Javier who allegedly had a
quarrel with him concerning politics.
Leon for his part averred that on January 23, 1999,
he was in the house of his sister, Hermelita Estabillo at
No. 55-B, Salet, Laoag City, Ilocos Norte where he had
been living since 1997 after leaving Asan Norte, Sison,
Pangasinan. Since then, he had been working for Sally
Asuncion at a hollow-block factory in that city where he
was a stay-in worker.
Sally Asuncion corroborated Leons alibi. She
testified that Leon Delim never went home to his
hometown in Pangasinan during his employment. His
sister, Hermelita Estabillo, likewise averred that on
January 23, 1999, his brother was at her house to give
her his laundry. She claimed that the distance between
Laoag City and Bila, Sison, Pangasinan can be traversed
in six hours by bus. Leon presented a Barangay
Certificate to prove that he was a resident of Laoag City
from January 1998 up to February 1999.[11]
Marlon asserted that he was on vacation in
Dumaguete City from December 26, 1998 up to January
29, 1999. During his stay there, he lived with his sister,
Francisca Delim. Upon his return to Manila on January
29, 1999, he immediately proceeded to Baguio to visit his
cousin. Marlon denied setting foot in Bila, Sison,
Pangasinan after his sojourn in Dumaguete City.
The trial court rendered judgment finding accused-
appellants guilty of murder. The dispositive portion of the
trial courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION beyond
reasonable doubt is hereby rendered against Ronald
Delim, Marlon Delim and Leon Delim (for) the commission
of Aggravated Murder, an offense defined and penalized
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by R.A. 7659 and the Court sentences Marlon Delim,
Ronald Delim and Leon Delim to suffer the penalty of
DEATH, to be implemented in the manner as provided for
by law; the Court likewise orders the accused, jointly and
solidarily, to indemnify the heirs of Modesto Delim the sum
of P75,000.00 as moral damages, plus the amount of
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to transmit
the entire records of this case to the Honorable Supreme
Court, and to prepare the mittimus fifteen (15) days from
date of promulgation.
The Jail Warden, Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology, Urdaneta District Jail, Urdaneta City is hereby
ordered to transmit the persons of Marlon, Ronald and
Leon, all surnamed Delim to the New Bilibid Prisons,
Muntinlupa City, fifteen days from receipt of this decision.
SO ORDERED.[12]
The trial court appreciated treachery as a qualifying
circumstance and of taking advantage of superior
strength, nighttime and use of unlicensed firearms as
separate of aggravating circumstances in the commission
of the crime. Marlon, Ronald and Leon, in their appeal
brief, assail the decision alleging that:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED IN THE CASE AT BAR.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS DEFENSE OF ALIBI.[13]
Before resolving the merits of the case at bar, we first
resolve the matter of whether the crime charged in the
Information is murder or kidnapping. During the
deliberation, some distinguished members of the Court
opined that under the Information, Marlon, Ronald and
Leon are charged with kidnapping under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code and not with murder in its aggravated
form in light of the allegation therein that the
accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously grab(bed),
h(e)ld, hog-tie(d), gag(ged), with a piece of cloth, brought
out and abduct(ed) Modesto Delim (while) Leon Delim
and Manuel Delim stayed in the house (and) guarded and
prevented the wife and son of Modesto Delim from helping
the latter. They submit that the foregoing allegation
constitutes the act of deprivation of liberty of the victim,
the gravamen in the crime of kidnapping. They contend
that the fact that the Information went further to charge
accused with the killing of the victim should be of no
moment, the real nature of the criminal charge being
determined not from the caption or the preamble of the
Information nor from the specification of the law alleged to
have been violated these being conclusions of law but by
the actual recital of facts in the complaint or
information. They further submit that since the
prosecution failed to prove motive on the part of Marlon,
Ronald and Leon to kill Modesto, they are not criminally
liable for the death of the victim but only for kidnapping
the victim.
It bears stressing that in determining what crime is
charged in an information, the material inculpatory facts
recited therein describing the crime charged in relation to
the penal law violated are controlling. Where the specific
intent of the malefactor is determinative of the crime
charged such specific intent must be alleged in the
information and proved by the prosecution. A decade
ago, this Court held in People v. Isabelo Puno, et
al.,[14] that for kidnapping to exist, there must be
indubitable proof that the actual specific intent of the
malefactor is to deprive the offended party of his liberty
and not where such restraint of his freedom of action is
merely an incident in the commission of another offense
primarily intended by the malefactor. This Court further
held:
x x x. Hence, as early as United States vs. Ancheta, and
consistently reiterated thereafter, it has been held that the
detention and/or forcible taking away of the victims by the
accused, even for an appreciable period of time but for
the primary and ultimate purpose of killing them, holds the
offenders liable for taking their lives or such other offenses
they committed in relation thereto, but the incidental
deprivation of the victims liberty does not constitute
kidnapping or serious illegal detention.[15]
If the primary and ultimate purpose of the accused is
to kill the victim, the incidental deprivation of the victims
liberty does not constitute the felony of kidnapping but is
merely a preparatory act to the killing, and hence, is
merged into, or absorbed by, the killing of the
victim.[16] The crime committed would either be homicide
or murder.
What is primordial then is the specific intent of
the malefactors as disclosed in the information or
criminal complaint that is determinative of what crime
the accused is charged with--that of murder or
kidnapping.
Philippine and American penal laws have a common
thread on the concept of specific intent as an essential
element of specific intent crimes. Specific intent is used to
describe a state of mind which exists where
circumstances indicate that an offender actively desired
certain criminal consequences or objectively desired a
specific result to follow his act or failure to act.[17] Specific
intent involves a state of the mind. It is the particular
purpose or specific intention in doing the prohibited
act.Specific intent must be alleged in the Information and
proved by the state in a prosecution for a crime requiring
specific intent.[18] Kidnapping and murder are specific
intent crimes.
Specific intent may be proved by direct evidence or
by circumstantial evidence. It may be inferred from the
circumstances of the actions of the accused as
established by the evidence on record.[19]
Specific intent is not synonymous with
motive. Motive generally is referred to as the reason
which prompts the accused to engage in a particular
criminal activity.Motive is not an essential element of a
crime and hence the prosecution need not prove the
same. As a general rule, proof of motive for the
commission of the offense charged does not show guilt
and absence of proof of such motive does not establish
the innocence of accused for the crime charged such as
murder.[20] The history of crimes shows that murders are
generally committed from motives comparatively
trivial.[21] Crime is rarely rational. In murder, the specific
intent is to kill the victim. In kidnapping, the specific intent
is to deprive the victim of his/her liberty. If there is no
motive for the crime, the accused cannot be convicted for
kidnapping.[22] In kidnapping for ransom, the motive is
ransom. Where accused kills the victim to avenge the
death of a loved one, the motive is revenge.
In this case, it is evident on the face of the
Information that the specific intent of the malefactors in
barging into the house of Modesto was to kill him and that
he was seized precisely to kill him with the attendant
modifying circumstances. The act of the malefactors of
abducting Modesto was merely incidental to their primary
purpose of killing him. Moreover, there is no specific
allegation in the information that the primary intent of
the malefactors was to deprive Modesto of his
freedom or liberty and that killing him was merely
incidental to kidnapping.[23] Irrefragably then, the crime
charged in the Information is Murder under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code and not Kidnapping under Article
268 thereof.
 The threshold issue that now comes to fore is
whether or not the prosecution mustered the requisite
quantum of evidence to prove that Marlon, Ronald and
Leon are guilty of murder.
In criminal prosecutions, the prosecution is burdened
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond cavil of
doubt. The prosecution must rely on the strength of its
own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence
of the accused. The proof against the accused must
survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must
not be permitted to sway judgment.[24]
In the case at bar, the prosecution was burdened to
prove the corpus delicti which consists of two things: first,
the criminal act and second, defendants agency in the
commission of the act.[25] Wharton says that corpus
delicti includes two things: first, the objective; second, the
subjective element of crimes.[26] In homicide (by dolo) and
in murder cases, the prosecution is burdened to prove: (a)
the death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the
death was produced by the criminal act of some other
than the deceased and was not the result of accident,
natural cause or suicide; and (c) that defendant
committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally
responsible for the act which produced the death.[27] To
prove the felony of homicide or murder, there must be
incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the
victim was deliberately killed (with malice); in other words,
that there was intent to kill. Such evidence may
consist inter alia in the use of weapons by the
malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds
sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the
malefactors before, at the time or immediately after the
killing of the victim. If the victim dies because of a
deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is
conclusively presumed.
The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus
delicti beyond reasonable doubt either by direct evidence
or by circumstantial or presumptive evidence.[28]
In the case at bar, the prosecution adduced the
requisite quantum of proof of corpus delicti. Modesto
sustained five (5) gunshot wounds. He also sustained
seven (7) stab wounds,[29] defensive in nature. The use by
the malefactors of deadly weapons, more specifically
handguns and knives, in the killing of the victim as well as
the nature, number and location of the wounds sustained
by said victim are evidence of the intent by the
malefactors to kill the victim with all the consequences
flowing therefrom.[30] As the State Supreme Court of
Wisconsin held in Cupps v. State:[31]
This rule, that every person is presumed to contemplate
the ordinary and natural consequences of his own acts, is
applied even in capital cases. Because men generally act
deliberately and by the determination of their own will, and
not from the impulse of blind passion, the law presumes
that every man always thus acts, until the contrary
appears. Therefore, when one man is found to have killed
another, if the circumstances of the homicide do not of
themselves show that it was not intended, but was
accidental, it is presumed that the death of the deceased
was designed by the slayer; and the burden of proof is on
him to show that it was otherwise.
The prosecution did not present direct evidence to
prove the authors of the killing of Modesto. It relied on
circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden of proving
the guilt of accused-appellants of murder. Circumstantial
evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and
circumstances from which the existence of the main fact
may be inferred according to reason and common
experience.[32] What was once a rule of account
respectability is now entombed in Section 4, Rule 133 of
the Revised Rules of Evidence which states that
circumstantial evidence, sometimes referred to as indirect
or presumptive evidence, is sufficient as anchor for a
judgment of conviction if the following requisites concur:
x x x if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the
facts from which the inferences are derived have been
established; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.[33]
The prosecution is burdened to prove the essential
events which constitute a compact mass of circumstantial
evidence, and the proof of each being confirmed by the
proof of the other, and all without exception leading by
mutual support to but one conclusion: the guilt of accused
for the offense charged.[34] For circumstantial evidence to
be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances
must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that accused is guilty and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and
with every other rational hypothesis except that of
guilt.[35] If the prosecution adduced the requisite
circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of accused
beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence shifts
to the accused to controvert the evidence of the
prosecution.
In the present case, the prosecution mustered the
requisite quantum of circumstantial evidence to prove that
accused-appellants, in confabulation with their co-
accused, conspired to kill and did kill Modesto:
1. Randy Bantas testified that Marlon and Ronald
barged into the house of Modesto, each armed with a
handgun. Marlon poked his gun on Modesto while Ronald
hog-tied Modesto. They then seized Modesto and herded
him out of his house:
FISCAL TOMBOC: What were you doing then
at that time in your house?
A We were eating, sir.
Q You said we, who were your companions
eating then at that time?
A My father, my mother and the two children
and myself, sir.
Q While taking your supper that time, do you
recall if there was anything unusual that
happened at that time?
A When we were about to start to eat three
armed men entered our house.
Q Do you know these three armed men who
entered your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who are they, name them one by one?
A Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Ronald
Delim.
Q Are these three persons inside the courtroom
now?
A Two of them, sir.
Q Who are these two who are inside the
courtroom?
A Marlon and Ronald, sir.
Q Will you please stand up and point to them?
A (Witness is pointing to a person seated on the
bench inside the courtroom, who, when his
name was asked answered Marlon
Delim. Likewise, witness is pointing unto a
person seated on the bench inside the
courtroom, who, when his name was
asked he answered Ronald Delim).
Q You said that these two armed persons
entered your house, what kind of arm were
they carrying at that time?
A Short handgun, sir.
Q When these three armed persons whom you
have mentioned, armed with short
firearms, what did they do then when they
entered your house?
A They took my father, sir.
Q Who took your father?
A Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Ronald
Delim, sir.
Q When these three persons took your father,
what did you do then?
A None, sir.
COURT: How did they get your father?
A They poked a gun and brought him outside
the house, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: Who poked a gun?
A Marlon Delim, sir.
Q Again, Mr. Witness, will you point to the
person who poked a gun?
A (Witness is pointing to Malon (sic) Delim, one
of the accused).
Q After bringing your father out from your
house, what transpired next?
A Manuel Delim and Leon Delim said, Stay in
your house, and guarded us.
COURT: You said your father was taken out,
who?
A Marlon, Robert and Ronald, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: Where did these three
persons bring your father?
A I do not know where they brought my father,
sir.
COURT: Was your father taken inside your
house or outside?
A Inside our house, sir.
Q You said that Marlon poked a gun at your
father, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did Ronald and Robert do while Marlon
was poking his gun to your father?
A Ronald and Robert were the ones who pulled
my father out, sir.[36]
Randys account of the incident was corroborated by
his mother, Rita, who testified:
PROSECUTION TOMBOC: You said during the
last hearing that on January 23, 1999 at
around 6:30 in the evening while preparing
for your supper three (3) armed men
entered inside your house, who were these
three (3) men who entered your house?
A I know, Marlon, Bongbong and Robert, sir.
ATTY. FLORENDO: We just make of record
that the witness is taking her time to
answer, Your Honor.
PROSECUTOR TOMBOC: You said that
Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Bongbong
entered your house, are these three (3)
persons who entered your house in Court
now?
A They are here except the other one, sir.
Q Will you please step down and point to the
persons who entered your house?
A Witness is pointing to Marlon Delim, Robert
Delim is not in Court and Bongbong is
Ronald Delim.
Q After these three (3) armed men entered your
house, what happened then?
 A My husband was brought out, sir.
Q What is the name of your husband?
A Modesto Delim, sir.[37]
2. Randy said that when Marlon and Ronald barged
into their house, Leon, armed with a handgun, acted as a
lookout when he stood guard by the door of the house of
Modesto and remained thereat until 7:00 a.m. of the next
day:
FISCAL TOMBOC: When your father was
pulled out from your house by these three
persons, what did you and your mother do
while these three persons were taking out
of your house?
A We did not do anything because Manuel and
Leon Delim guarded us.
COURT: Where, in your house?
A Yes, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: From that very time that
your father was pulled out by these three
persons Marlon, Robert and Ronal (sic),
where were Leon and Manuel then?
A They were at the door, sir.
COURT: Why do you know that they were
guarding you?
A Because they were at the door, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: What was their appearance
that time when these two persons were
guarding you, these Leon and Manuel?
A They were armed, sir.
Q What do you mean by armed?
A They have gun, sir.
Q What kind of firearm?
A Short firearm, sir.
Q By the way, where are these Leon and
Manuel now, if you know?
A Leon is here, sir.
Q About Manuel?
A None, sir.
Q Will you please stand up and point at Leon,
Mr. Witness?
A (Witness pointed to a person seated on the
bench inside the courtroom, who when his
name was asked, answered, Leon
Delim).[38]
3. Rita and Randy were ordered by Leon not to leave
the house as Ronald and Marlon left the house with
Modesto in tow. Rita and Randy were detained in their
house up to 7:00 a.m. of January 24, 1999 to prevent
them from seeking help from their relatives and police
authorities.
4. Randy likewise testified that on January 27, 1999,
at about 3:00 p.m., the cadaver of Modesto was found
under the thick bushes in a grassy area in the housing
project located about 200 meters away from the house of
Modesto. The cadaver exuded bad odor and was already
in the state of decomposition:
Q So what did you do then on January 27,
where did you look for your father?
A The same place and at 3:00 oclock P.M., we
were able to find my father.
COURT: Where?
A At the housing project at Paldit, Sison,
Pangasinan, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: Do you have companions at
that time when you were able to look for
your father on January 27, 1999 at 3:00
oclock P.M.?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who?
A My Aunt, sir.
Q What is the name of your Aunt?
A Nida Pucal, sir.
Q Who else?
A Pepito Pucal, Bernard Osias and Daniel
Delim, sir.
COURT: When you found your father, what was
his condition?
A He was dead, sir.
COURT: Go ahead.
FISCAL TOMBOC: You said that he was
already dead, what was his appearance
then when you saw him dead?
A He has bad odor, sir, in the state of
decompsition (sic).[39]
The testimony of Randy was corroborated by Dr. de
Guzman who testified that the cadaver of Modesto was in
a state of decomposition, with tiny white worms crawling
from his wounds, and that his penis and scrotum were
inflamed. The victim sustained five gunshot wounds and
defensive wounds on the left arm and forearm:
PROS. TOMBOC:
Q Will you please tell the Honorable Court your
findings, Doctora?
WITNESS:
A First finding: Upon seeing the cadaver, this is
the position of the body, both upper
extremities are flexed and both lower
extremities are flexed (Nakakukot).
Q How many days had already elapsed when
you autopsied the cadaver of the victim,
Doctora?
A Four (4) days upon the recovery of the body,
sir.
Q And what was your findings Doctora?
A The body was already under the state of
decomposition, sir, with foul odor and there
were so many worms coming out from the
injuries, there were tiny white worms, sir.
Q What else did you observe Doctora?
A Upon seeing the cadaver I asked the relative
to refer it to the NBI sir. Actually the victim
was an igorot (sic) and they have tradition
that they will bury immediately. Whether
they like it or not I should do it, sir.
Q What else Doctora?
A And the penis was inflammed (sic), the
scrotum was also inflammed (sic), sir.
And for the head injuries there was 10 x 10
ml. GSW pre-auricular area, right; there
was also 20 ml x 20 ml. GSW, mandibular
area, right; I cannot also determine the exit.
Q So there were two (2) gunshot wounds
(GSW) Doctora?
A Yes sir.
And there was also 10 x 10 ml. GSW, maxillary
area, right; there was also 10 x 10 ml.
GSW, below middle nose, directed upward
(POE); and there was also 30 x 40 ml.
GSW, mid parieto-occipital area (POEx).
Q How many all in all are the gunshot wound?
A Five (5) sir.
And also there was 2 x 1 cms. Lacerated
wound, right cheek; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed
wound, axillary area, left; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed
wound, lateral aspect M/3rd, left arm; 1 x 1
cm. stabbed wound lateral aspect D/3rd,
left arm; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial
aspect M/3rd, left arm; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed
wound, medial aspect D/3rd, left arm; and
#3; 1 x 1 cm. in line with each other,
stabbed wound, medial aspect, M/3rd, left
forearm.
Q How many stabbed wound are there
Doctora?
A There were seven (7) stabbed wounds, sir.
Q Those stabbed wounds were defensive
wounds, Doctora?
A Yes sir.[40]
The state of decomposition of the cadaver, with tiny
white worms swarming and feasting on it and the
distention of his scrotum and penis are evidence that the
cadaver was in the stage of putrefaction and that the
victim had been dead for a period ranging from three to
six days.[41] Admittedly, there are variant factors
determinative of the exact death of the victim. An equally
persuasive authority states:
Chronological Sequence of Putrefactive Changes
Occurring in Tropical Region:
Time Since Death Condition of the Body
48 hours Ova of flies seen.
Trunk bloated. Face discolored and swollen. Blisters
present.
Moving maggots seen.
72 hours Whole body grossly swollen and disfigured. Hair
and nails loose.
Tissues soft and discolored.[42]
The lapse of two or three to four days from the
seizure of the victim in the evening of January 23, 1999 to
the discovery of his cadaver which was already in the
state of putrefaction in the afternoon of January 27, 1999,
about 200 meters away from his house, is consistent with
and confirmatory of the contention of the prosecution that
the victim was killed precisely by the very malefactors who
seized him on January 23, 1999.
5. When police authorities went to the residences of
all the malefactors, the latter had flown the coop and were
nowhere to be found:
COURT: In connection with this case, you
investigated the wife and son of Modesto
Delim?
A Yes, sir.
Q In the course of the investigation did you
come to know who were the suspects?
A Yes, sir, she elaborated that the suspects
were their neighbors, Marlon Delim and his
brothers, sir.
Q What are the names of the brothers?
A Manuel Delim, Leon Delim I cannot
remember the others, sir.
 Q By reason of that information were you able
to apprehend any of them for
investigation?
A No, sir.
Q Why?
A Because when we were dispatched by the
Chief of Police no Delim brothers could be
found, they all left the place, sir.
Q In what place did you look for the brothers
Delim?
A Within the vicinity, sir.
Q In what place?
A Brgy. Bila and the place where the crime was
committed in Brgy. Bila and the place
where the cadaver was found in Paldit, sir.
Q Where did you look for the Delim brothers?
A Nearby barangays, Immalog, sir.
Q Wherelse (sic)?
A Labayog, Sison, sir.
Q Wherelse?
A In mountainous part of Immalog, part of Tuba
Benguet, sir.
Q What was the result?
A Negative result, sir.[43]
6. Leon was the neighbor of Modesto and Rita while
Marlon and Ronald used to go to the house of Modesto
and Rita:
COURT: These Leon and Manuel Delim are
they known to you prior to that day,
January 23, 1999?
A Yes, sir, I know them.
Q Why do you know Manuel and Leon prior to
January 23, 1999?
A They are my neighbors, sir.
Q How about Marlon, Robert and Bongbong do
you know them before January 23, 1999?
A I know them, sir.
Q Why do you know them?
A They used to go to our house, sir.
Q I noticed that Marlon, Bongbong, Robert,
Manuel and Leon are all Delims and your
husbands name is Modesto Delim are they
related with each other?
A Yes, sir.[44]
The sudden disappearance of Marlon, Ronald and
Leon from their houses in Barangay Bila, Sison is strong
circumstantial evidence of their guilt for the death of
Modesto. Although flight after the commission of an
offense does not create a legal presumption of guilt,
nevertheless, the same is admissible in evidence against
them and if not satisfactorily explained in a manner
consistent with their innocence, will tend to show that
they, in fact, killed Modesto.[45]
It is true that the prosecution failed to prove motive
on the part of the malefactors to abduct and kill
Modesto. Indeed, Randy and Rita testified that they were
not aware of any misunderstanding or grudge between
Modesto on the one hand and Marlon, Ronald and Leon
and their co-accused on the other before the incident, or
any motivation on the part of the three malefactors to
cause harm to Modesto. Nonetheless, it cannot thereby
be concluded that a person or persons other than Marlon,
Ronald and Leon were criminally responsible for the
death of the victim. It is a matter of judicial notice that
nowadays persons have killed or committed serious
crimes for no reason at all.[46] In this case, the inscrutable
facts are that Marlon and Ronald, each of whom was
armed with a handgun, forcibly took Modesto from his
house at the gunpoint, hogtied, put a piece of cloth in his
mouth and after Ronald and Marlon had left the house
with Modesto in tow, Rita heard three gunshots or so and
the cadaver of Modesto was found concealed under the
bushes and already in a state of putrefaction in the
afternoon of January 27, 1999. Modesto sustained
several gunshot wounds and died because of a gunshot
wound on the head. The criminal acts and the connection
of Marlon, Ronald and Leon with said acts having been
proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, the
act itself furnishes the evidence, that to its perpetration
there was some causes or influences moving the
mind.[47] The remarkable tapestry intricately woven by the
prosecution should not be trashed simply because the
malefactors had no motive to kill Modesto.
Ranged against the evidence of the prosecution, the
burden of evidence shifted on Marlon, Ronald and Leon
to rebut the same and explain what happened to the victim
after taking him from his house in the evening of January
23, 1999. They may have freed the victim shortly after
taking him, or the victim may have been able to escape
and that thereafter a person or some other persons may
have killed him. However, Marlon, Ronald and Leon failed
to give any explanation. Instead, they merely denied
having seized and killed the victim and interposed alibi as
their defense.
Leon is equally guilty for the death of Modesto
because the evidence on record shows that he conspired
with accused-appellants Marlon and Ronald and accused
Robert and Manuel in killing the victim.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree
to commit a felony and decide to commit it.[48] Conspiracy
must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as
the felony itself, more specifically by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Conspiracy is not presumed. It may be
proved by direct evidence or by circumstantial
evidence. Conspiracy is deducible from the acts of the
malefactors before, during and after the commission of
the crime which are indicative of a joint purpose,
concerted action and concurrence of sentiment.[49] To
establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof
as to the existence of a previous agreement to commit a
crime.[50] It is sufficient if, at the time of the commission of
the crime, the accused had the same purpose and were
united in its execution. If conspiracy is established, the act
of one is deemed the act of all. It matters not who among
the accused actually shot and killed the victim.[51] This is
based on the theory of a joint or mutual agency ad hoc for
the prosecution of the common plan:
x x x The acts and declarations of an agent, within the
scope of his authority, are considered and treated as the
acts and declarations of his principal. What is so done by
an agent, is done by the principal through him, as his mere
instrument. Franklin Bank of Baltimore v. Pennsylvania D.
& M. Steam Navigation Co., 11 G. & J. 28, 33 (1839). If
the conspiracy be proved to have existed, or rather if
evidence be given to the jury of its existence, the acts of
one in furtherance of the common design are the acts of
all; and whatever one does in furtherance of the common
design, he does as the agent of the co-conspirators. R. v.
OConnell, 5 St.Tr. (N.S.) 1, 710.[52]
In the eyes of the law, conspirators are one man,
they breathe one breath, they speak one voice, they wield
one arm and the law says that the acts, words and
declaration of each, while in the pursuit of the common
design, are the acts, words and declarations of all.[53]
In the case at bar, Marlon, Ronald and Leon arrived
together in the house of Modesto, each armed with a
handgun. Marlon and Ronald barged into said house
while Leon stood guard by the door thereof. After Marlon
and Ronald had left with Modesto in tow, Leon stood by
the door and warned Randy and Rita not to leave the
house. Leon stood guard by the door of the house until
7:00 a.m. of January 24, 1999 when he left the house. The
overt acts of all the malefactors were so synchronized and
executed with precision evincing a preconceived plan or
design of all the malefactors to achieve a common
purpose, namely the killing of Modesto.Irrefragably, the
tasks assigned to Leon in the commission of the crime
were (a) to act as a lookout; (b) to ensure that Rita and
Randy remain in their house to prevent them from seeking
assistance from police authorities and their relatives
before their mission to kill Modesto shall have been a fait
accompli as well as the escape of Marlon and
Ronald.[54] Patently, Leon, a lookout for the group, is guilty
of the killing of Modesto.[55] Leon may not have been at
the situs criminis when Modesto was killed by Marlon and
Ronald nevertheless he is a principal by direct
participation.[56] If part of a crime has been committed in
one place and part in another, each person concerned in
the commission of either part is liable as principal. No
matter how wide may be the separation of the
conspirators, if they are all engaged in a common plan for
the execution of a felony and all take their part in
furtherance of the common design, all are liable as
principals. Actual presence is not necessary if there is a
direct connection between the actor and the crime. [57]
Ronald, Marlon and Leon, however, assail the
testimonies of Randy and Rita alleging that the same were
marred by inconsistencies:
1. Randy initially stated that he did not know
where the assailants brought his
father. Later however, Randy claimed that
the malefactors proceeded to the direction of
Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan;
2. Rita on the other hand identified Leon,
Marlon and Ronald as those who barged into
their house. She later changed her
testimony and declared that it was Robert,
together with Marlon and Ronald who
barged into the house;
3. Rita likewise testified that two men stood
outside the house guarding them. Later, she
testified that after the three men brought out
the victim, the two other accused entered the
house and guarded them there;
4. Rita claimed that she went out to look for her
husband the next day, or on January 25,
1999, and she was accompanied by her son
Randy. However, Randy testified that he
was alone when he looked for his father from
January 24 to 26, 1999.[58]
We do not agree with Marlon, Ronald and
Leon. Case law has it that the findings of facts of the trial
court, its calibration of the collective testimonies of
witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight
thereof and its conclusions culled from its findings are
accorded by the appellate court great respect, if not
conclusive effect, because of its unique advantage of
observing at close range the demeanor, deportment and
conduct of the witnesses as they give their testimonies
before the court. In the present case, the trial court gave
credence and full probative weight to the testimonies of
the witnesses of the prosecution. Moreover, there is no
evidence on record that Randy and Rita were moved by
any improper or ill motive in testifying against the
malefactors and the other accused; hence, their
testimonies must be given full credit and probative
weight.[59] The inconsistencies in the testimonies of Rita
and Randy do not render them incredible or their
testimonies barren of probative weight. It must be borne
in mind that human memory is not as unerring as a
photograph and a persons sense of observation is
impaired by many factors including the shocking effect of
a crime. A truth-telling witness is not always expected to
give an error-free testimony considering the lapse of time
and the treachery of human memory. What is primordial
is that the mass of testimony jibes on material points, the
slight clashing of statements dilute neither the witnesses
credibility nor the veracity of his testimony.[60] Variations
on the testimony of witnesses on the same side with
respect to minor, collateral or incidental matters do not
impair the weight of their united testimony to the
prominent facts.[61] Inconsistencies on minor and trivial
matters only serve to strengthen rather than weaken the
credibility of witnesses for they erase the suspicion of
rehearsed testimony.[62]
Moreover, the testimony of a witness should be
construed in its entirety and not in truncated terms and the
true meaning of answers to isolated questions
propounded to a witness is to be ascertained by due
consideration of all the questions propounded to the
witness and his answers thereto.[63]
Randys testimony that he did know where the
malefactors brought his father is not inconsistent with his
testimony that Ronald and Marlon brought his father
towards the direction of Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan. Randy
may not have known the destination of accused-
appellants but he saw the direction to which they
went.While it may be true that when asked to identify the
three who barged into their house, Rita pointed to Leon
as one of them, however, Rita had been consistent
throughout her testimony that those who barged into their
house were Ronald and Marlon. Leons counsel never
cross-examined Rita and impeached her testimony on her
identification of Leon as one of those who barged into their
house to give her an opportunity to explain her perceived
inconsistency conformably with Rule 132, Section 13 of
the Revised Rules of Evidence which reads:
Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he
has made at other times statements inconsistent with his
present testimony, the statements must be related to him,
with the circumstances of the times and places and the
persons present, and he must be asked whether he made
such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the
statements be in writing they must be shown to the
witness before any question is put to him concerning
them.[64]
Hence, the presentation of the inconsistent
statements made by Rita is insufficient for the desired
impeachment of her.[65] As to whether Rita and Randy
were together in looking for Modesto or Leon merely stood
guard by the door of the house or entered the house are
inconsequential. The fact is that Leon stood guard
throughout the night to prevent Rita and Randy from
seeking assistance for the seizure and killing of Modesto.
This Court is convinced, as the trial court was, that
the respective testimonies of Randy and Rita bear the
earmarks of truth and sincerity. Despite intense and
grueling cross-examination, they responded with
consistency upon material details that could only come
from a firsthand knowledge of the shocking events which
unfolded before their eyes. The Court thus finds no cogent
reason to disregard the findings of the trial court regarding
their credibility.
Marlon, Ronald and Leon contend that the trial court
committed a reversible error in not giving credence and
probative weight to their evidence to prove their defense
of alibi. They aver that their collective evidence to prove
their defense is strong.
We do not agree. Case law has it that the defense of
alibi is one of the weakest of defenses in criminal
prosecution because the same is easy to concoct
between relatives, friends and even those not related to
the offender.[66] It is hard for the prosecution to
disprove. For alibi to merit approbation by the trial court
and this Court, Marlon, Ronald and Leon are burdened to
prove with clear and convincing evidence that they were
in a place other than the situs criminis at the time of the
commission of the crime; that it was physically impossible
for them to have committed the said crime.[67] They failed
to discharge their burden. Moreover, Rita and Randy
positively and spontaneously identified Marlon, Ronald
and Leon as the culprits. The house of Ronald, where he
claimed he was when the crime was committed, was only
two kilometers away from the house of Modesto and can
be negotiated by a tricycle. Leon failed to adduce any
documentary evidence to prove his employment by Sally
Asuncion. The barefaced fact that he was a resident of
Laoag City does not constitute proof that he was in Laoag
City on the day of the commission of the crime. With
respect to Marlon, he failed to adduce evidence aside
from his self-serving testimony that he resided in, left
Dumaguete City and arrived in Manila on January 29,
1999.
The trial court convicted Marlon, Ronald and Leon of
murder with the qualifying circumstance of treachery in
the killing of Modesto. The trial court likewise appreciated
nighttime and abuse of superior strength and the use of
unlicensed firearms as separate aggravating
circumstances. The Office of the Solicitor General
contends that indeed treachery was attendant in the killing
of Modesto. Hence, Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty of
murder defined in and penalized by Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The Court however finds that Marlon, Ronald and
Leon are guilty only of homicide defined in and penalized
by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Qualifying circumstances such as treachery and
abuse of superior strength must be alleged and proved
clearly and conclusively as the crime itself. Mere
conjectures, suppositions or presumptions are utterly
insufficient and cannot produce the effect of qualifying the
crime.[68] As this Court held: No matter how truthful these
suppositions or presumptions may seem, they must not
and cannot produce the effect of aggravating the
condition of defendant.[69] Article 14, paragraph 16 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that there is treachery
when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and especially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from
the defense which the offended party might make. For
treachery to be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance,
the prosecution is burdened to prove the following
elements: (a) the employment of means of execution
which gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or retaliate; (b) the means of execution is
deliberately or consciously adopted.[70] Although the
victim may have been defenseless at the time he was
seized but there is no evidence as to the particulars of
how he was assaulted and killed, treachery cannot be
appreciated against the accused.[71] In this case, the
victim was defenseless when seized by Marlon and
Ronald. However, the prosecution failed to present any
witness or conclusive evidence that Modesto was
defenseless immediately before and when he was
attacked and killed. It cannot be presumed that although
he was defenseless when he was seized the victim was
in the same situation when he was attacked, shot and
stabbed by the malefactors. To take advantage of
superior strength means to purposely use force that is out
of proportion to the means of defense available to the
person attacked.[72] What is primordial, this Court held
in People v. Rogelio Francisco[73] is that the assailants
deliberately took advantage of their combined
strength in order to consummate the crime. It is
necessary to show that the malefactors cooperated in
such a way as to secure advantage from their superiority
in strength.[74] In this case, the prosecution failed to
adduce evidence that Marlon and Ronald deliberately
took advantage of their numerical superiority when
Modesto was killed. The barefaced facts that the
malefactors outnumbered Modesto and were armed while
Modesto was not does not constitute proof that the three
took advantage of their numerical superioty and their
handguns when Modesto was shot and stabbed.[75]
In sum then, we believe that Marlon, Ronald and
Leon are guilty only of Homicide defined in and penalized
by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion
temporal in its full period.
Although the special aggravating circumstance of the
use of unlicensed firearms was proven during the trial,
there is no allegation in the Information that Marlon,
Ronald and Leon had no license to possess the
firearm. Lack of license to possess a firearm is an
essential element of the crime of violation of PD1866 as
amended by Republic Act No. 8294, or as a special
aggravating circumstance in the felony of homicide or
murder.[76] Neither can dwelling, although proven,
aggravate the crime because said circumstance was not
alleged in the Information as required by Rule 110,
Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Court.[77] Although this
rule took effect on December 1, 2000, after the
commission of the offense in this case, nonetheless it had
been given retroactive effect considering that the rule is
favorable to the accused.[78]
There being no modifying circumstances in the
commission of homicide, Marlon, Ronald and Leon should
be meted an indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which
shall be taken from the entirety of prision mayor, ranging
from 6 years and one day to 12 years and the maximum
period of which shall be taken from the medium period
of reclusion temporal, ranging from 14 years, 8 months
and one day to 17 years and 4 months.
Consequently, the award for damages in favor of the
heirs of the victim should be modified. The sum
of P75,000.00 awarded as moral damages should be
reduced to P50,000.00 in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence.[79] The amount of P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages is in order.[80] In addition, civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 should be
awarded without need of proof, likewise in consonance
with prevailing jurisprudence.[81]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision
of the trial court is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accused-appellants Marlon Delim,
Ronald Delim and Leon Delim are hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of Homicide
defined in and penalized by Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code. There being no modifying circumstances in
the commission of the crime, each of accused-appellants
is hereby meted an indeterminate penalty of from ten (10)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its maximum
period as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal in its
medium period as maximum. Accused-appellants are
hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to the heirs
of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 by way of civil
indemnity, the amount of P50,000.00 by way of moral
damages and the amount of P25,000.00 by way of
exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-66884 May 28, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VICENTE TEMBLOR alias "RONALD," defendant-
appellant.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
The accused-appellant Vicente Temblor alias "Ronald"
was charged with the crime of murder in Criminal Case
No. 1809 of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court) of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City for shooting
to death Julius Cagampang. The information alleged:
That on or about the evening of
December 30, 1980 at Talo-ao,
Buenavista, Agusan del Norte,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused
conspiring, and confederating with one
another with Anecito Ellevera who is at
large, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery
and with intent to kill, attack, assault and
shoot with firearms one Julius
Cagampang, hitting the latter on the vital
parts of the body thereby inflicting mortal
wounds, causing the direct and
instantaneous death of the said Julius
Cagampang.
CONTRARY TO LAW: Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Upon arraignment on June 8, 1982, he entered a plea of
not guilty. After trial, he was convicted and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the
accessory penalties thereof under Articles 41 and 42 of
the Revised Penal Code, and to indemnify the heirs of the
victim in the amount of P12,000 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. He appealed.
The evidence of the prosecution showed that at about
7:30 in the evening of December 30, 1980, while
Cagampang, his wife and their two children, were
conversing in the store adjacent to their house in
Barangay Talo-ao, Buenavista, Province of Agusan del
Norte, the accused Vicente Temblor alias Ronald, arrived
and asked to buy a half-pack of Hope cigarettes. While
Cagampang was opening a pack of cigarettes, there was
a sudden burst of gunfire and Cagampang instantly fell on
the floor, wounded and bleeding on the head. His wife
Victorina, upon seeing that her husband had been shot,
shouted her husband's name "Jul" Two persons, one of
whom she later Identified as the accused, barged into the
interior of the store through the main door and demanded
that she brings out her husband's firearm. "Igawas mo ang
iyang armas!" ("You let out his firearm!") they shouted.
The accused fired two more shots at the fallen victim.
Terrified, Victorina hurried to get the "maleta" (suitcase)
where her husband's firearm was hidden. She gave the
suitcase to the accused who, after inspecting its contents,
took her husband's .38 caliber revolver, and fled.
In 1981, some months after the incident, Victorina was
summoned to the Buenavista police station by the Station
Commander Milan, where she saw and Identified the
accused as the man who killed her husband.
The accused's defense was an alibi. He alleged that from
4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December 30, 1980, he
and his father had been in the house of Silverio Perol in
Barangay Camagong, Nasipit, Agusan del Norte, where
they spent the night drinking over a slaughtered dog as
"pulutan," until 8:00 o'clock in the morning of the following
day, December 31, 1980.
The accused and his companion, admittedly members of
the dreaded NPA (New People's Army) were not
apprehended earlier because they hid in the mountains of
Malapong with other members- followers of the New
People's Army. Temblor surrendered to Mayor Dick
Carmona of Nasipit during the mass surrender of
dissidents in August, 1981. He was arrested by the
Buenavista Police at the Buenavista public market on
November 26, 1981 and detained at the Buenavista
municipal jail.
The accused capitalized the fact that the victim's widow,
Victorina, did not know him by name. That circumstance
allegedly renders the Identification of the accused, as the
perpetrator of her husband's killing, insufficient. However,
during the trial, the accused was positively identified by
the widow who recognized him because she was less
than a meter away from him inside the store which was
well lighted inside by a 40-watt flourescent lamp and by
an incandescent lamp outside. Her testimony was
corroborated by another prosecution witness — a tricycle
driver, Claudio Sabanal — who was a long-time
acquaintance of the accused and who knew him as
"Ronald." He saw the accused in the store of Cagampang
at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening of December 30,
1980. He heard the gunshots coming from inside the
store, and saw the people scampering away.
Dr. Alfredo Salonga who issued the post-mortem
examination report certified that the victim sustained three
(3) gunshot wounds.
Rebutting the accused's alibi, the prosecution presented
a Certification of the Nasipit Lumber Company's
Personnel Officer, Jose F. Tinga (Exh. D), and the
NALCO Daily Time Record of Silverio Perol (Exh. D),
showing that Perol was not at home drinking with the
accused and his father, but was at work on December 30,
1980 from 10:50 o'clock in the evening up to 7:00 o'clock
in the morning of December 31, 1980. The accused did
not bother to overcome this piece of rebuttal evidence.
In this appeal, the appellant alleges that the court a
quo erred:
1. in finding that he was positively
identified by the prosecution witness as
the killer of the deceased Julius
Cagampang; and
2. in rejecting his defense of allbi.
The appeal deserves no merit. Was the accused
positively Identified as the killer of Cagampang? The
settled rule is that the trial court's assessment of the
credibility of witnesses while testifying is generally binding
on the appellate court because of its superior advantage
in observing their conduct and demeanor and its findings,
when supported by convincingly credible evidence as in
the case at bar, shall not be disturbed on appeal (People
vs. Dava, 149 SCRA, 582).<äre||anº•1àw>
The minor inconsistencies in the testimony of the
eyewitness Victorina Vda. de Cagampang did not
diminish her credibility, especially because she had
positively Identified the accused as her husband's
assailant, and her testimony is corroborated by the other
witnesses. Her testimony is credible, probable and
entirely in accord with human experience.
Appellant's self-serving and uncorroborated alibi cannot
prevail over the positive Identification made by the
prosecution witnesses who had no base motives to falsely
accuse him of the crime. Furthermore, the rule is that in
order for an alibi to be acceptable as a defense, it is not
enough that the appellant was somewhere else when the
crime was committed; it must be demonstrated beyond
doubt that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime. Here it was admitted that Perol's
house in barrio Camagong, Nasipit is accessible to barrio
Talo-ao in Buenavista by jeep or tricycle via a well-paved
road in a matter of 15 to 20 minutes. The testimony of the
witnesses who had positively Identified him could not be
overcome by the defendant's alibi. (People vs. Mercado,
97 SCRA 232; People vs. Venancio Ramilo, 146 SCRA
258.)
Appellant's alleged lack of motive for killing Cagampang
was rejected by the trial court which opined that the
defendant's knowledge that Cagampang possessed a
firearm was motive enough to kill him as killings
perpetrated by members of the New People's Army for the
sole purpose of acquiring more arms and ammunition for
their group are prevalent not only in Agusan del Norte but
elsewhere in the country. It is known as the NPA's "agaw
armas" campaign. Moreover, proof of motive is not
essential when the culprit has been positively Identified
(People vs. Tan, Jr., 145 SCRA 615).
The records further show that the accused and his
companion fled after killing Cagampang and taking his
firearm. They hid in the mountains of Agusan del Norte.
Their flight was an implied admission of guilt (People vs.
Dante Astor, 149 SCRA 325; People vs. Realon, 99
SCRA 422).
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in
all respects, except as to the civil indemnity payable to the
heirs of the Julius Cagampang which is increased to
P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-68969 January 22, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
USMAN HASSAN y AYUN, respondent.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This is a pauper's appeal of the decision 1 of the
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Ninth Judicial
Region Branch XIII, dated January 25, 1984, which
"finds the accused USMAN HASSAN y AYUN guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the Crime of
MURDER, and there being neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance attending the commission of the
crime, and pursuant to Paragraph No. 1 of Article 64 of
the Revised Penal Code, hereby imposes upon the said
accused the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and all
its accessory penalties; to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased victim Ramon Pichel, Jr. y Uro the amount of
P12,000.00 and to pay the costs." 2
Usman Hassan was accused of murder for stabbing to
death Ramon Pichel, Jr. y Uro, 24, single, and a resident
of Zamboanga City. 3 At the time of his death on July
23,1981, the deceased was employed as manager of the
sand and gravel business of his father. On the other
hand, Hassan was an illiterate, 15-year-old pushcart
cargador. 4
The quality of justice and the majesty of the law shine
ever brightest when they are applied with more jealousy
to the poor, the marginalized, and the disadvantaged.
Usman Hassan, the herein accused-appellant, belongs
to this class. At the time of the alleged commission of the
crime, he was poor, marginalized, and disadvantaged.
He was a flotsam in a sea of violence, following the
odyssey of his widowed mother from one poverty-
stricken area to another in order to escape the ravages
of internicine war and rebellion in Zamboanga del Sur. In
the 15 years of Hassan's existence, he and his family
had to evacuate to other places for fear of their lives, six
times. His existence in this world has not even been
officially recorded; his birth has not been registered in
the Registry of Births because the Samal tribe, to which
he belongs, does not see the importance of registering
births and deaths.
Usman was convicted on the bases of the testimony of a
lone eyewitness for the prosecution and the sloppiness
of the investigation conducted by the police investigator,
Police Corporal Rogelio Carpio of the Homicide and
Arson Section of the Zamboanga City Police Station,
who also testified for the prosecution.
We rule that Usman Hassan's guilt was not proved
beyond reasonable doubt and that Usman Hassan must,
therefore, be set free.
The lone eyewitness for the prosecution is Jose
Samson, 24 years old when he testified, married, and a
resident of Zamboanga City. On the day of the killing, he
was employed at the sand and gravel business of the
father of the deceased but was jobless at the time of his
examination-in-chief on February 3, 1982.
He testified that he was with Ramon Pichel, Jr. at about
7:00 o'clock in the evening of July 23, 1981; that he was
a backrider in the motorcycle of Ramon when they went
to buy mangoes at Fruit Paradise near the Barter Trade
Zone in Zamboanga City that while he was selecting
mangoes, he saw a person stab Ramon who was seated
at his red Honda motorcycle which was parked about
two or three meters from the fruit stand where he
Samson) was selecting mangoes; that he saw the
assailant stab Ramon "only once" and that after the
stabbing, the assailant ran towards the PNB Building.
When asked at the cross-examination if he knew the
assailant, Samson said, "I know him by face but I do not
know his name." 5
This sole eyewitness recounted the stabbing thus:
"While Ramoncito Pichel, Jr. was holding the motorcycle
with both of his hands, the assailant come from behind,
held his left hand and stabbed him from behind on his
chest while the victim was sitting on the motorcycle." He
claimed that he was able to see the assailant because it
was very bright there that Ramon was facing the light of
a petromax lamp, and that all these happened in front of
the fruit stand a — distance of about 6 to 7 meters from
the side of the road.
Samson described the assailant as wearing a white,
short-sleeved t-shirt and maong pants, but "he did not
see if the aggressor was wearing shoes," that the
assailant stabbed Ramon with a knife but "he did not
exactly see what kind of knife it was, and he did not see
how long the knife was He said he brought the wounded
Ramon to the Zamboanga City General Hospital in a
tricycle.
On cross-examination, Samson testified:
xxx xxx xxx
Q When you rushed Ramon Pichel, Jr. to the hospital
you came to know that he was already dead, is that
correct?
A Yes, sir, I learned that he was already dead.
Q In the hospital, were you investigated by the police?
A They just asked the description of that person as to his
attire and his appearance.
Q And it was while in the hospital that you told them the
description of the one who stabbed Ramon Pichel, Jr.?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And the body of Ramon Pichel, Jr., was brought to the
Funeraria La Merced?
A Yes, sir,
Q Can you recall what time was that?
A I do not know what time was that.
Q And it was all La Merced Funeraria that the police
brought to you the accused?
A...
Q For Identification?
A Yes, sir.
Q And he was alone when you Identified him?
A Yes he was alone.
Q Aside from working with the Pichel family in their sand
and gravel business, do you have any blood relationship
with them?
A Yes. sir. 6
(Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
What comes as a surprise is that Samson's
statement 7 which was taken only on July 25, 1981, two
days after the stabbing, and sworn to only on July 27,
1981, also two days after it was taken, or four days after
the killing, was never presented or mentioned by the
prosecution at all. The information was practically forced
out of Police Corporal Rogelio P. Carpio, a witness for
the People, during his cross-examination. 8 The sworn
statement contained the following questions and
answers:
xxx xxx xxx
Q-14. What and please narrate it to me briefly in your
own words, the incident you are referring?
A-14. While I was busy selecting some mangoes, I saw
unidentified person whom I can recognize by face if seen
again embraced my companion Ramon Pitcher Jr. while
the latter was aboard his motorcycle parked within the
area. That this person without much ado, and armed
with a knife suddenly stabbed him (Ramon). That by
coincidence to this incident, our eye met each other and
immediately thereafter, he fled the area toward the
Philippine National Bank (PNB). That this unidentified
person was sporting a semi-long hair, dressed in White
Polo-Shirt (Short sleeve), maong pants height to more or
less 5'5, Dark Complexion. That as this unidentified
person fled the area I immediately came to aid my
companion, Ramon Pitcher, Jr., and rushed him to
Zamboanga General Hospital, on board a Tricycle. That
may companion (Ramon) did not whispered (sic) any
words to me for he was in serious condition and few
minutes later, he expired.
Q-15. Was tills unidentified person was with companion
when he attack (sic) Ramon Pitcher Jr.?
A-15. He was alone Sir.
Q-16. Can you really Identified (sic) this person who
attacked and stabbed your companion, Ramon Pitcher,
Jr., that evening in question?
A-16. Yes, Sir,
Q-17. Do you still remember that confrontation we made
at the Office of La Merced Funeral Homes, wherein you
were confronted with one Usman Hassan, whom this
Officer brought along?
A-17. Yes, Sir.
Q-18. Was he the very person, who attacked and
stabbed your companion, Ramon Pitcher, Jr.?
A-18. Yes, Sir, he was the very person who attacked and
stabbed my companion, Ramon Pitcher, Jr., that evening
in question.
Q-19. Why?
A-19. Because his face and other physical appearance
were fully noted by me and this I cannot forget for the
rest of my life.
Q-20. Before this incident, was there any altercation that
had ensued while in the process of buying some
mangoes in that area?
A-20. None Sir.
Q-21. Were you able to note what kind of knife used by
said Usman Hassan in stabbing your companion,
Ramon Pitcher Jr.?
A-21: None Sir,
Q-22. Well, I have nothing more to ask of you, do you
have anything more to say, add or alter in this
statement?
A-22. No more Sir.
Q-23. Are you willing to give a supplemental statement if
needed in the future?
A-23. Yes, Sir. 9
(Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
The version of the sole eyewitness appearing in his
statement 10 is substantially the same as that embodied
in the "Case Report," Exhibit it "C", by Police Corporal
Carpio, also admitted a s Exhibit "2." This exhibit for the
prosecution confirms the sworn statement of witness
Samson that an unidentified person, whom he
recognized only by face, appeared and without any
provocation, the latter embraced the victim and stabbed
the same allegedly with a knife." The rest of the Case
Report: is also significant in that it confirms the
confrontation between the accused and Jose Samson in
the funeral parlor arranged by the police Investigator and
prosecution witness, Corporal Carpio.
xxx xxx xxx
From this end, a follow-up was made
within the premises of the Old Barter
Trade, wherein the person of USMAN
HASSAN Y AYUN, of Paso Bolong, this
City, was arrested in connection with the
above stated incident. That this Officer
and companions arrested this person
Usman due to his physical appearance,
which was fully described by victim's
companion. Jose Samson. During his
arrest, a knife, measuring to more or
less seven (7) inches in blade was
confiscated in his possession. The
person of Usman Hassan was brought
along at the La Merced Funeral Homes
for a confrontation with victims
companion, Jose Samson and in this
confrontation, Jose Samson positively
Identified said Usman Hassan as the
very person who stabbed the victim.
Usman Hassan, on the other hand,
denied the charges levelled against hub
and admitted ownership of said knife;
claiming among other things that he
used said knife for slicing mangoes. 11
xxx xxx xxx
We hold that the evidence for the prosecution in its
entirety does not satisfy the quantum of proof — beyond
reasonable doubt — required by the Constitution, the
law, and applicable jurisprudence to convict an accused
person. The said evidence denies us the moral certainty
which would allow us to pronounce, without uneasiness
of conscience. Usman Hassan y Ayun guilty of the killing
of the deceased Ramon Pichel, Jr. y Uro, and condemn
him to life imprisonment and in effect turning him into a
flotsam again in a sea of convicted felons in which he
would be a very young stranger.
In evaluating the worth of the testimony of the lone
eyewitness for the prosecution against the denial and
alibi of the accused, value judgment must not be
separated from the constitutionally guaranteed
presumption of innocence.
When the evidence for the prosecution
and the evidence for the accused are
weighed, the scales must be tipped in
favor of the latter. This is because of the
constitutional presumtion of innocence
the accused enjoys as a counter-foil to
the awesome authority of the State that
is prosecuting him.
The element of doubt, if reasonable in
this case, must operate against the
inference of guilt the prosecution would
 draw from its evidence. That evidence,
as it happens, consists only of the
uncorroborated statement of the two
policemen which, as previously
observed, is flawed and therefore
suspect. 12
The testimony of Jose Samson, the lone eyewitness, is
weak and unconvincing. And so with the evidence
sought to be introduced by Police Corporal Carpio. We
discover, for example, that the expert testimony of the
medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation, Dr. Valentin Bernalez, presented by the
prosecution, contradicted, on material points, the
testimony of the one eyewitness, Jose Samson. While
Samson averred on the witness stand that he saw the
assailant stab the deceased "from behind on his
chest" 13 only once, the NBI medico-legal officer
Identified two stab wounds, one at the front portion of the
chest at the level and third rib, (sic) and another stab
wound located at the left arm posterior aspect." 14 The
same medical expert also concluded from the nature and
location of the chest wound, which was the cause of
death, that the same was inflicted on the victim while the
alleged accused was in front of him." 15
The investigation of this case by the Homicide/Arson
Section of the Zamboanga Southern Police Sector, 16 at
Zamboanga City, particularly by Police Corporal Rogelio
P. Carpio, leaves much to be desired. For one, we are
not satisfied with the procedure adopted by the police
investigators in the Identification of the accused as the
assailant. We have no doubt that Usman Hassan was
"presented" alone 17 to Jose Samson by the police
investigator and prosecution witness, Police Corporal
Carpio, and his police companions, at the office of the La
Merced Funeral Homes in Zamboanga City. As correctly
termed by the very evidence 18 of the prosecution, the
procedure adopted by the police investigators was a
confrontation" between Jose Samson, Jr. and Usman.
Earlier, on direct examination, Corporal Carpio testified
that Usman was alone when he was brought to Samson
for confrontation in the funeral parlor. However, on
cross-examination, Carpio made a turnabout by saying
that the accused was Identified by Samson in a "police
line-up;" this tergiversation we dare say, was an
afterthought, more the result of an over or careless
cross-examination, augmented by the leading
questions 19 of the trial judge rather than a
fastidiousness if not sincerity, on the part of the police
investigator, to honestly correct erroneous statements in
his examination-in-chief. The fact remains that both
Samson and the accused testified clearly and
unequivocably that Usman was alone when presented to
Samson by Carpio. There was no such police line-up as
the police investigator, to honestly correct erreoneous
statements in his examination-in-chief. The fact remains
that both Samson and the accused testified clearly and
unequivocably that Usman was alone when presented to
Samson by Carpio. There was no such police
investigator claimed on second thought.
The manner by which Jose Samson, Jr. was made to
confront and Identify the accused alone at the funeral
parlor, without being placed in the police line-up, was
"pointedly suggsestive, generated confidence where
there was none, activated visual imagination, and, all
told, subserted his reliability as eyewitness. This
unusual, coarse, and highly singular method of
Identification, which revolts against the accepted
principles of scientific crime detection, alienates the
esteem of every just man, and commands neither our
respect nor acceptance." 20
Moreover, the confrontation arranged by the police
investigator between the self-proclaimed eyewitness and
the accused did violence to the right of the latter to
counsel in all stages of the investigation into the
commission of a crime especially at its most crucial
stage — the Identification of the accused.
As it turned out, the method of Identification became just
a confrontation. At that critical and decisive moment, the
scales of justice tipped unevenly against the young,
poor, and disadvantaged accused. The police procedure
adopted in this case in which only the accused was
presented to witness Samson, in the funeral parlor, and
in the presence of the grieving relatives of the victim, is
as tainted as an uncounselled confession and thus falls
within the same ambit of the constitutionally entrenched
protection. For this infringement alone, the accused-
appellant should be acquitted.
Moreover, aside from this slipshod Identification
procedure, the rest of the investigation of the crime and
the preparation of the evidence for prosecution were
done haphazardly, perfunctorily, and superficially.
Samson was not investigated thoroughly and
immediately after the incident. As previously mentioned,
his statement was taken by the investigator only two
days after the murder of Ramon Pichel, Jr. and sworn
only two days after it had been taken. Similarly, there is
nothing in the record to show that the fruit vendor—from
whom Samson and the deceased were buying mangoes
that fateful evening and who certainly must have
witnessed the fatal stabbing—was investigated, or why
he was not investigated. Nor is any explanation given as
to why the companion 21 of the accused at the time
Corporal Carpio arrested him (accused) 'sitting on a
pushcart " 22 at about 8:00 P.M. (around 7:00 P.M.,
according to Usman) of that same evening near the
scene of the crime, was not also investigated when he
could have been a material witness of the killing or of the
innocence of the accused. In addition, the knife and its
scabbard, 23Confiscated by Carpio from Usman (tucked
on the right side of his waist") at the time of his arrest,
were not even subjected to any testing at all to
determine the presence of human blood which could be
typed and compared with the blood type of the
deceased. A crime laboratory test — had Carpio or the
prosecuting fiscal, or even the trial judge, insisted on it
— would have revealed whether or not the knife in
question (confiscated from the accused by Carpio one
hour after the alleged commission of the crime) had
indeed been the weapon used to kill Ramon. The police
investigator instead nonchalantly dismissed this sin of
omission by saying that the knife could have been
cleaned or the bloodstain could have been taken
away. 24 This presumption of the deadly weapon's
having been "cleaned" of bloodstains is tantamount to
pronouncing the accused of being guilty.
Our doubt about the guilt of the accused is further
deepened by a resolution, 25 in a separate case, 26 of
Assistant City Fiscal of Zamboanga City and deputized
Tanod bayan Prosecutor Pablo Murillo, which clearly
reveals that on July 24, 1981, a day after the killing of
Ramon Pichel, Jr., a similar stabbing took place at Plaza
Pershing near the place of the earlier incident, with the
suspect in that frustrated homicide case being a certain
Benhar Isa, 'a notorious and a deadly police character"
in Zamboanga City, with a long record of arrests. In that
resolution, Fiscal Murillo said the same Benhar Isa was
tagged as 'also a suspect in the stabbing of Ramon
Pichel, Jr. to death and the stabbing of Pastor Henry
Villagracia at the Fruit Paradise, this City." The said
resolution further states that "with regards to this incident
or witnesses ever testified for fear of possible
reprisals." 27
The trial of Usman Hassan began on October 27, 1981.
Benhar Isa himself was killed by a policeman on August
28, 1981, while he (Isa) "was apparently under the
influence of liquor armed with a knife (was) molesting
and extorting money from innocent civilians' and "making
trouble." 28 The records of the case at bar do not show
any attempt on the part of Corporal Carpio, or any other
police officer, to investigate or question Benhar Isa in
connection with the killing of Pichel, Jr. Was it fear of the
notorious police character that made the police officers
disregard the possible connection between the slaying of
Ramon and that of the person (Harun Acan y Arang of
the Ministry of National Defense) 29 who was allegedly
stabbed by Benhar Isa a day after the killing of Ramon
Jr.? And yet questioning Isa might have provided that
vital link to the resolution of Usman's guilt or innocence.
But why should the police officers investigate Isa when
Usman Hassan was already in custody and could be an
available fall guy? Usman Hassan, instead, became a
victim of a grave injustice. Indeed, Usman Hassan is too
poor to wage a legal fight to prove his innocence. And he
is so marginalized as to claim and deserve an honest-to-
goodness, thorough, and fair police investigation with all
angles and leads pursued to their logical, if not scientific,
conclusions. Sadly circumstanced as he is, the authority
of the State was too awesome for him to counteract.
The appealed decision made much ado of the admission
by Usman "that he was arrested at the former barter
trade, which is a place just across the place of the
stabbing at the Fruit Paradise." 30 The trial judge found it
"therefore strange that on the very evening of the
stabbing incident he was still at the barter trade area by
8:00 o'clock in the evening when he usually comes to the
city proper at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning and goes
home at past 5:00 o'clock and sometimes 6:00 o'clock in
the afternoon." 31 Usman's explanation — that, at around
7:00 o'clock P.M., he was waiting for transportation to
take him home — was found by the trial court as 'flimsy
and weak since he did not explain why he had to go
home late that evening." 32 But the whole trouble is
nobody asked him. The trial judge did not propound any
single question to the accused, and only three to his
mother on innocuous matters, by way of clarification, if
only to put on record what the mother and son could
articulate with clarity. Taking into account their poverty
and illiteracy, the mother and son needed as much, if not
more, help, than the trial judge extended to the
prosecution witnesses during their examination by
asking them clarificatory and mostly leading questions.
In that sense and to that extent, the accused was
disadvantaged.
A fact that looms large, though mutely to testify on the
innocence of the accused but the importance of which
was brushed away by the trial judge was the presence of
the accused near the scene (about 100 to 150 meters
away) soon after the stabbing (he testified at around
7:00 P.M. although Police Corporal Carpio stated it was
8:00 P.M.) where he was found sitting on his pushcart
with a companion. If he were the assailant, he would
have fled. But the trial court instead indulged in
conjecture, foisting the probability that the accused 'was
lulled by a false sense of security in returning to the
place (of the stabbing), when no police officers
immediately responded and appeared at the scene of
the crime," adding 'there are numerous cases in the past
where criminals return to the scene of their crimes, for
reasons only psychologist can explain." 33 It must have
escaped the trial court's attention that Usman has no
criminal record, and, therefore, he could not be generally
classed with criminals. In the second place, the trial
court's rationalization ignores the biblical truism
recognized by human nature and endorsed with
approval by this Court that "(T)he wicked flee when no
man pursueth but the righteous are as bold as a lion." 34
And now as a penultimate observation, we could not
help but note the total absence of motive ascribed to
Usman for stabbing Ramon, a complete stranger to him.
While, as a general rule, motive is not essential in order
to arrive at a conviction, because, after all, motive is a
state of mind, 35 procedurally, however, for purposes of
complying with the requirement that a judgment of guilty
must stem from proof beyond reasonable doubt, the lack
of motive on the part of the accused plays a pivotal role
towards his acquittal. This is especially true where there
is doubt as to the Identity of the culprit 36 as when 'the
Identification is extremely tenuous," 37 as in this case.
We can not end this travail without adverting to the
cavalier manner in which the trial court disregarded the
claimed young age of Usman Hassan.
 The defense claims that the accused
Usman Hassan is a minor, basing such
claim on the testimony of Lahunay
Hassan, the mother of said accused,
who declared that her son Usman
Hassan, who is one of her four (4)
children, was born in the year 1967. She
testified that she was just told by a
person coming from their place about
the year of the birth of her son Usman.
However on cross-examination,
Lahunay Hassan cannot even
remember the date or year of birth of her
other children. The failure of Lahunay
Hassan to remember the date or year of
birth of her children is of course
understandable, considering that she is
unschooled and she belongs to a tribe
that does not register births, deaths or
marriages, however, it is strange that
she only took pains to find out the year
of birth of her son Usman. For this
reason, the Court granted a motion of
the defense on September 13, 1982, to
have the herein accused examined by a
competent dentist to determine his age.
However, the findings of the dentist of
Zamboanga General Hospital which is
marked as Exhibit "5" shows the
following: "age cannot be determined
accurately under present mouth
conditions. Approximately, he can be
from 14 to 21 years of age." This simply
means that the herein accused could
either be 14 years of age or 21 years of
age, or any age in between those
aforestated years. From the observation
of this court, the accused Usman
Hassan was about 18 years of age at
the time he committed this crime and
this observation is based on his
personal appearance, his size and facial
features and other personal
characteristics, hence he can not be
classified as a youthful offender under
Article. 189 of Presendential Decree No.
603, as ammended by Presedential
Decree No. 1179. In the case of U.S. vs.
Mallari, 29 Phil. 13 and People vs.
Reyes and Panganiban, CA 48 O.G.
1022, cited in the Edition, Page 680, it
was ruled by the Supreme Court that "In
cases where the age of the culprit is at
issue as a basis for claiming an
exempting mitigating circumstance, it is
incumbent upon the accused to
establish that circumstance ad any other
elements of defense. 38
Considering that the age of the accused could exempt
him from punishment or cause the suspension of his
sentence under Articles 12 and 80, respectively of the
Revised Penal Code, if found guilty, more
meticulousness and care should have been demanded
of medical or scientific sources, and less reliance on the
observation of the judge as had happened in this case.
The preliminary findings of the dentist that the accused
could be anywhere between fourteen to twenty one
years, despite the difficulty of arriving at an accurate
determination due to Hassan's mouth condition, would
have placed the trial judge on notice that there is the
probability that the accused might be exempted from
criminal liability due to his young age. All the foregoing
indicates that the accused had not been granted the
concern and compassion with which the poor,
marginalized, and disadvantaged so critically deserve. It
is when judicial and police processes and procedures
are thoughtlessly and haphazardly observed that cries of
the law and justice being denied the poor are heard. In
any event, all this would not be of any moment now,
considering the acquittal of the accused herein ordered.
WHEREFORE, the decision is hereby REVERSED, and
the accused Usman Hassan y Ayun is ACQUITTED of
the crime charged. His release from confinement is
hereby Ordered, unless he is held for another legal
cause. With costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 166479 | February 28, 2006
RODOLFO C. VELASCO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks
to set aside the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 23366 dated 30 July 2004 which affirmed the
decision2 of Branch 41 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Dagupan City in Criminal Case No. 98-02175-D dated
29 June 1999, finding accused-petitioner Rodolfo C.
Velasco guilty of Attempted Murder, and its
Resolution3 dated 21 December 2004 denying petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.
An Information4 dated 20 April 1998 charged petitioner
with the crime of Attempted Murder committed as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of April, 1998, in the City of
Dagupan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, SN I
RODOLFO C. VELASCO, being then armed with a gun,
with treachery and with intent to kill one FREDERICK
MARAMBA, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally, attack, assault and use personal violence upon
the latter by shooting him, hitting him on the left upper
arm, the said accused having thus commenced a felony
directly by overt acts but did not perform all the acts of
execution which could have produced the crime of
murder, by reason of some cause or accident other than
his own spontaneous desistance, to the damage and
prejudice of said FREDERICK MARAMBA.
When arraigned, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel
de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.5
On 29 September 1998, the Hon. Luis M. Fontanilla,
Executive Judge of RTC of Dagupan City, ordered the
release of petitioner after a surety bond was posted by the
Mega Pacific Insurance Corporation in the amount of
₱120,000.00.6
The evidence is summarized by the trial court as follows:
The evidence of the prosecution tends to show that on
April 19, 1998, at about 7:30 o’clock in the morning,
private complainant Frederick Maramba was cleaning and
washing his owner type jeep in front of his house at Lasip
Grande, Dagupan City when a motorized tricycle stopped
near him. Accused Rodolfo Velasco dashed out of the
tricycle, approached the complainant and fired at him
several times with a .45 caliber pistol. The accused
missed with his first shot but the second one hit the
complainant at the upper arm, causing him to stumble on
the ground. The complainant stood up and ran, while the
accused continued firing at him but missed.
The shooting incident was reported to the police sub-
station in Malued District by Barangay Captain Dacasin of
Lasip Grande, describing the suspect as wearing a vest
or a "chaleco." The police, composed of SPO4 Romulo
Villamil, PO3 Rolando Alvendo, and SPO1 Soliven
respondent and pursued the accused who proceeded on
board a motorized tricycle to the highway going to
Barangay Banaoang in Calasiao town.
The police caught up with the tricycle and brought the
accused to the police sub-station. A firearm (Exhibit "A")
protruding from the waistline of the accused, three (3)
magazines (Exhibit "B", "B-1" & "B-2") and fourteen (14)
live ammunitions (Exhibits ‘C" to "C-13") were confiscated
from the possession of the accused. The police also
recovered seven (7) spent ammunitions (Exhibits "D" to
"D-6") at the crime scene. At the City Jail in Dagupan City
where the accused was subsequently brought, the private
complainant Frederick Maramba identified and pointed to
the accused as the one who fired at him, hitting him on
the upper left arm. Complainant identified the affidavit
which he executed naming the accused as his assailant
(Exhibit "H") and who shot him on the morning of April 19,
1998 in front of his residence at Lasip Grande.
Private complainant further testified that he was
hospitalized and treated at the Region 1 Medical Center,
Dagupan City by Dr. Arturo de Vera, Jr. who issued a
Medico-Legal Certificate stating that the victim sustained,
"Gunshot wound point of entry: 1.5 cm lateral aspect
distal, 3rd arm left" and; "Gunshot wound point of exit: 4
cm lateral aspect posterior, 3rd arm left" (Exhibit "I"). By
reason of his wounds, complainant incurred expenses for
hospitalization and medicines in the total amount of
₱2,696.06 (Exhibit "J" to "J-14").
Armando Maramba, the driver of the tricycle in which the
accused rode, testified that he picked up the accused who
was wearing a chaleco, at the intersection of Pogo-Lasip
Road. Upon reaching the parked jeep which was being
washed by the private complainant, the accused ordered
him to stop. The accused alighted and fired several shots
at the victim. Then the accused went back to the tricycle
and ordered him to proceed to Calasiao. The accused
alighted at the intersection of the De Venecia Highway
and Malued Road and took another tricycle. Witness
executed an affidavit before the Police Headquarters in
Dagupan City (Exhibit "G") and identified the accused as
the one who shot the private complainant.
The accused, on the other hand, interposed the defense
of alibi. He said that on April 18, 1998, he went to a friend’s
house in Lingayen, Pangasinan and spent the night there.
The following morning, April 19, 1998, between 6:00 to
7:00 o’clock, he left Lingayen riding in the Volkswagen car
of Berting Soriano. He alighted at the corner of Banaoang
diversion road. From there he took a tricycle and told the
driver to bring him at the foot of the bridge going to
Bayambang. While on his way to Calasiao, he heard a
jeep behind him blowing its horn and when he looked back
he saw three men on board pointing their guns at him. He
told the tricycle driver to stop and thereupon the three men
approached him and introduced themselves as
policemen. They confiscated his gun and then brought
him to the police station for interrogation. Thereafter, the
police lodged him in the City Jail of Dagupan.
Accused testified that he did not know personally the
complaining witness and denied having fired at him. He
further said that his .45 caliber pistol which was seized
from him by the police is licensed (Exhibit "2").7
In its decision dated 29 June 1999, the RTC of Dagupan
City, Branch 41, found petitioner guilty of the crime
charged, disposing of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Rodolfo C. Velasco guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted
murder, defined and penalized under Article 248, in
relation to the 3rd par. of Arts. 6 and 51 of the Revised
Penal Code, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of Four (4) years of prision
correccional, as minimum to Eight (8) years and One (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum.
Accused is further ordered to indemnify the complaining
witness the amount of ₱2,696.00, as actual damages.8
The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the
private complainant Frederick Maramba and Armando
Maramba when they identified petitioner as the assailant.
It rejected petitioner’s defense of alibi saying it was not
impossible for him to be at the crime scene when the
crime was committed because the place where he
allegedly alighted from the car of a certain Berting Soriano
was only about ten minutes away. It concluded that his
defense cannot prevail over the positive identification
made by the prosecution witnesses.
On 1 July 1999, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal
signifying his intention to appeal to the Court of Appeals.9
Pending appeal with the Court of Appeals, petitioner, after
filing a Motion to Bail, was allowed to post bail in the
amount of ₱160,000.00.10 To obviate the possibility of
flight, the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID)
was directed to include petitioner in its hold departure
list.11
On 30 July 2004, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC. The decretal
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the appeal is
DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated June 29, 1999
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41 of Dagupan City, in
Criminal Case No. 98-02175-D, is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against accused-appellant.12
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the decision
which motion was denied per resolution13 dated 21
December 2004.
Petitioner is now before us via petition for review on
certiorari, raising the following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION PER THE RESOLUTION
DATED DECEMBER 21, 2004.14
Petitioner invokes the defenses of denial and alibi. He
denies having shot the victim. He alleges that the
prosecution was not able to sufficiently establish the
identity of the assailant because the Barangay Chairman,
who reported the incident to the policemen, identified the
assailant as one wearing a "chaleco," was not presented
to corroborate the testimony of petitioner. He contends
that had the Barangay Chairman been presented, the
latter’s testimony would have been adverse to the
prosecution. Instead, he points out that the prosecution
presented police officers who were not eyewitnesses. He
adds that he had no motive to harm, much less kill, the
victim, the latter being a total stranger. He explains that
since the identity of the assailant is in doubt, motive
becomes important and his alibi gains weight and value.15
In a resolution dated 6 April 2005, the Court, without
giving due course to the petition, required respondent to
file a Comment.16
In its Comment17 dated 8 September 2005, respondent
People of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), argues that the factual findings
of the Court of Appeals cannot be reviewed since the
issue (i.e., positive identification) petitioner is raising
involves the credibility of witnesses and the weighing of
evidence. It asserts that since the same deals with a
question of fact and there being no instance present to
take the case out of the general rule that factual findings
of the Court of Appeals may be reviewed, a review thereof
cannot be made because only a question of law can be
re-examined if a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court has been filed. It adds that
even if the case is to be decided on the merits, the petition
likewise will fail.
In his Reply,18 petitioner submits that a review of the facts
of the case is justified on the ground that the Court of
Appeals sanctioned substantial and jurisprudential
departures committed by the trial court. He maintains that
(1) the trial court precipitately observed that alibi is a weak
defense; (2) the trial court did not consider that the
prosecution had no evidence proving his intention to kill;
(3) the trial court did not consider the fact that victim did
not know him and vice-versa; (4) it was impossible for him,
a navy man – a protector of the people – to have failed to
fatally hit the victim after firing seven shots; and (5) the
instant case is a frame up.
On 17 October 2005, the Court gave due course to the
petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.19
In his memorandum, petitioner further argues that the
findings of fact in this case should be reviewed because
the Court of Appeals erroneously restated the factual
findings of the trial court when it purposely omitted and
added words changing the tenor of the shooting incident
as found by the trial court. He adds that the findings of fact
of the trial court do not support a conviction of attempted
murder but only attempted homicide as there was no
treachery since private complainant was still able to focus
his eyes on the gunman until he was fired upon. Further,
he points out that the Court of Appeals made different
findings as to where the seven spent shells were
recovered. He maintains there was suppression of
evidence when the prosecution failed to present a ballistic
report on the seven empty shells that would show the
identity of the assailant. In addition, he claims that since
there was suppression of evidence on the part of the
prosecution, the testimony of Armando Maramba is not
credible, he being a relative of the victim.
Petitioner primarily invokes the defenses of denial and
alibi. It is his claim that the prosecution failed to
conclusively establish the identity of the assailant and that
he was merely framed-up.
At the outset, it must be stressed that the instant petition
for review on certiorari was filed pursuant to Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court where a review is not a matter of right
but of sound judicial discretion and will be granted only
when there are special and important reasons therefor. It
is not the function of this Court to re-examine the evidence
submitted by the parties unless the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are not supported by evidence on record
or the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.
This Court is limited to the review or revision of errors of
law and not to analyze or weigh the evidence all over
again.20
We agree with the OSG that as ruled by this Court, no
questions of facts may be raised in this Court under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, unless, among other grounds,
there is clear and convincing proof that the judgment of
the Court of Appeals is based on a misapprehension of
facts or when the Court of Appeals failed to notice and
appreciate certain relevant facts of substance which if
properly considered would justify a different conclusion,
and when there is a grave abuse of discretion in the
appreciation of facts in the light of the evidence on record.
Anything less will not suffice to overturn the decision of
the Court of Appeals affirming on appeal the decision of
the trial court. It bears stressing that the findings of facts
of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonial evidence
of the parties and the assessment of the credibility and
probative weight of the evidence of the parties and its
conclusion anchored on its findings are given high respect
if not conclusive effect by this Court, especially if affirmed
by the Court of Appeals because of the unique advantage
of the trial court of observing and monitoring the
demeanor, conduct and deportment of the witnesses as
they regale the court with their testimonies. The exception
to this rule is when the trial court ignored, overlooked,
misconstrued or misappreciated cogent facts and
circumstances of substance which if considered would
alter the outcome of the case.21 After scrutinizing the
records of the case and thoroughly evaluating all the
evidence proffered, we find no reason to deviate from the
findings of facts of the trial court as affirmed by the Court
of Appeals.
In the case at bar, the testimonies of private complainant
Frederick Maramba and Armando Maramba were given
credence and full probative weight and credence by the
trial court in the identification of petitioner as the assailant.
Private complainant saw petitioner alight from the tricycle
of Armando Maramba before he successively shot at him
at a distance of about four meters while chasing him for
25 to 30 meters.22 Armando Maramba witnessed the
shooting because he was the driver of the tricycle in which
petitioner rode in going to the house of private
complainant and in leaving the crime scene.23 After the
shooting incident, private complainant went to the City Jail
and identified petitioner as the person who shot him.24 At
the Dagupan City Police Station, Armando Maramba
pointed to petitioner as the assailant not because he saw
a man wearing a chaleco, but because it was he whom he
saw shoot the private complainant.25
Petitioner asks that the findings of fact of the case should
be reviewed because the Court of Appeals erroneously
restated the factual findings of the trial court when it
purposely omitted and added words changing the tenor of
the shooting incident as found by the trial court. Petitioner
said the Court of Appeals purposely added the word
"suddenly" and replaced the phrase "near him" with "in
front of." He adds that the Court of Appeals added the
phrase "without any warning" and removed the phrase
"approached the complainant." He even claims that the
Court of Appeals changed the manner how private
complainant was shot, when he was hit, and how he
stumbled and how he was able to stand up and continue
running. He further states that the Court of Appeals made
a different finding as to where the seven spent shells were
recovered. He points out that the Court said the seven
spent shells were recovered from the accused while the
trial court found that the same were found in the crime
scene.
As above discussed, the findings of the trial court on its
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and their
testimonies and the probative weight thereof, are
accorded by the appellate court high respect if not
conclusive effect, unless the trial court ignored,
misconstrued or misinterpreted facts and circumstances,
which if considered, would alter the outcome of the
case.26 In the case at bar, the addition or omission of
these words, and the difference between the findings of
the trial court and the Court of Appeals as to where the
seven spent shells were found, are too minor and
inconsequential to affect the outcome of this case. These,
even if considered, would not overturn the established
fact that petitioner was identified as the assailant. Nothing
in the record shows that there was any inconsistency as
regards the identity of the assailant. Both private
complainant and Armando Maramba were one in pointing
to petitioner as the culprit.
Petitioner interposes the defenses of denial and alibi. He
denies participation in the crime claiming that he was
aboard a tricycle on his way to Calasiao, Pangasinan,
when policemen arrested him and brought him to the
Dagupan Police Station. On the other hand, the victim
himself identified petitioner as his attacker which
statement was corroborated by Armando Maramba.
To be believed, denial must be buttressed by strong
evidence of non-culpability. Otherwise, it is purely self-
serving and without merit.27 Settled is the rule that the
defense of alibi is inherently weak and crumbles in the
light of positive declarations of truthful witnesses who
testified on affirmative matters.28 Greater weight is given
to the categorical identification of the accused by the
prosecution witnesses than to the accused's plain denial
of participation in the commission of the crime.29 There
being no strong and credible evidence adduced to
overcome the testimonies of private complainant and
Armando Maramba pointing to him as the culprit, no
weight can be given petitioner’s denial.
Petitioner’s defense of alibi likewise fails. As against
positive identification by prosecution witnesses, the
accused’s alibi is worthless.30 Having been identified by
two credible witnesses, petitioner cannot escape liability.
Moreover, for alibi to prosper, it must be proven that
during the commission of the crime, the accused was in
another place and that it was physically impossible for him
to be at the locus criminis.31 Courts view the defense of
alibi with suspicion and caution not only because it is
inherently weak and unreliable, but also it can be
fabricated easily.32 As found by the trial court, it was not
physically impossible for petitioner to be at the crime
scene when the crime was committed since it only takes
a ten-minute ride from the place where he allegedly
alighted from the car of one Berting Soriano to the crime
scene. We have held that:
Alibi, the plea of having been elsewhere than at the scene
of the crime at the time of the commission of the felony, is
a plausible excuse for the accused. Let there be no
mistake about it. Contrary to the common notion, alibi is
in fact a good defense. But to be valid for purposes of
exoneration from a criminal charge, the defense of alibi
must be such that it would have been physically
impossible for the person charged with the crime to be at
the locus criminis at the time of its commission, the reason
being that no person can be in two places at the same
time. The excuse must be so airtight that it would admit of
no exception. Where there is the least possibility of
accused’s presence at the crime scene, the alibi will not
hold water.33
Petitioner contends there was suppression of evidence
when the prosecution did not place on the witness stand
Barangay Captain Dacasain of Lasip Grande and when it
failed to present a ballistic report on the seven empty
shells because both are vital evidence to prove the
identity of the assailant.
We find such contention untenable.
As to the non-presentation of Barangay Captain Dacasin,
the same does not constitute suppression of evidence.
Barangay Captain Dacasin was not an eyewitness to the
shooting incident contrary to the claim of petitioner.
Although he was the one who reported the incident to the
police station, he was merely informed by Armando
Maramba that the person who shot private complainant
wore a "chaleko" or vest.34 Thus, not being an eyewitness,
his testimony, even if taken, would have nothing to do with
the identification of the assailant. If he really wanted to
have Barangay Captain Dacasin take the witness stand,
he could have asked the trial court for a subpoena ad
testificandum. This, he did not do.
As regards the failure of the police to present a ballistic
report on the seven spent shells recovered from the crime
scene, the same does not constitute suppression of
evidence. A ballistic report serves only as a guide for the
courts in considering the ultimate facts of the case.35 It
would be indispensable if there are no credible
eyewitnesses to the crime inasmuch as it is corroborative
in nature.36 The presentation of weapons or the slugs and
bullets used and ballistic examination are not
prerequisites for conviction. The corpus delicti and the
positive identification of accused-appellant as the
perpetrator of the crime are more than enough to sustain
his conviction.37 Even without a ballistic report, the
positive identification by prosecution witnesses is more
than sufficient to prove accused’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. 38 In the instant case, since the identity of the
assailant has been sufficiently established, a ballistic
report on the slugs can be dispensed with in proving
petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitioner’s asseveration that it is unthinkable for him to
shoot private complainant because he has no motive to
harm, much less kill the latter, he being a total stranger,
deserves scant consideration. It must be stressed that
motive is a state of (one’s) mind which others cannot
discern. It is not an element of the crime, and as such
does not have to be proved. In fact, lack of motive for
committing a crime does not preclude conviction. It is
judicial knowledge that persons have been killed or
assaulted for no reason at all.39 Even in the absence of a
known motive, the time-honored rule is that motive is not
essential to convict when there is no doubt as to the
identity of the culprit.40 Motive assumes significance only
where there is no showing of who the perpetrator of the
crime was.41 In the case at bar, since petitioner has been
positively identified as the assailant, the lack of motive is
no longer of consequence.
Petitioner argues that the testimony of prosecution
witness Armando Maramba should not be given weight
because the same is biased and incredible on the ground
that he is the uncle of the private complainant.
This argument does not inspire belief. The blood
relationship of Armando Maramba and private
complainant would not render the former’s testimony
unworthy of belief. On the contrary, relationship could
strengthen the witnesses’ credibility, for it is unnatural for
an aggrieved relative to falsely accuse someone other
than the actual culprit. Their natural interest in securing
the conviction of the guilty would deter them from
implicating a person other than the true offender.42 It is
settled that where there is no evidence and nothing to
indicate that the principal witnesses for the prosecution
were actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that
they were not so actuated and their testimonies are
entitled to full faith and credit.43 The weight of the
testimony of witnesses is not impaired nor in anyway
affected by their relationship to the victim when there is
no showing of improper motive on their
part.44Jurisprudence likewise holds that if an accused had
really nothing to do with a crime, it would be against the
natural order of events and of human nature, and against
the presumption of good faith, that a prosecution witness
would falsely testify against him.45 In the case before us,
aside from petitioner’s claim that he was framed-up, there
is nothing in the records that shows that Armando
Maramba had ulterior motives in testifying against him.
Necessarily, the testimony of Armando Maramba must be
given full credit.
Petitioner claims that as a navy man who is trained to kill
enemies of the state, a "protector of the people," he could
not have acted in the manner which the prosecution
pointed out. He said it is against human experience to
attempt to kill a person in the presence of a witness and
in broad daylight, and that it is preposterous that after
firing seven shots at close range, he failed to fatally hit the
private complainant. All these, he said, only point to a
different assailant.
We are not convinced. The records show that the shooting
happened at around 7:30 a.m. The fact that the shooting
occurred in broad daylight does not render its commission
impossible.46 This Court takes notice that it is not unusual
that killings are perpetrated in front of witnesses. In the
instant case, the attempted killing was witnessed by
Armando Maramba, the driver of the tricycle which
petitioner rode in going to, and in leaving, the crime scene.
Petitioner argues that he could not have been the
assailant because it was simply impossible for him, being
a navy man, not to fatally hit private complainant after
firing seven shots at close range. In effect, what he is
saying is that the bungled killing cannot be the handiwork
of an experienced soldier like him. Such an argument
does not hold water. In the case of People v.
Mamarion,47 we brushed aside the very same argument
raised by the accused therein who was an experienced
military man. We ruled that an accused is not entitled to
an acquittal simply because of his previous, or even
present, good moral character and exemplary conduct.
The fact that petitioner was a navy man -- a protector of
the people -- does not mean that he is innocent of the
crime charged or that he is incapable of doing it. This
argument fails in light of the identification made by the
victim himself and by Armando Maramba that it was
petitioner who was the assailant.
Finally, petitioner submits that if ever he committed a
crime, he merely committed attempted homicide. He
maintains there was no sudden firing because the victim
testified he was observing the alleged gunman for a
period of ten seconds before the latter finally drew his .45
caliber pistol and fired at him. After the first shot, the victim
was able to run away.
The lower court was correct in appreciating treachery in
the commission of the crime. There is treachery when the
following essential elements are present, viz: (a) at the
time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to
defend himself; and (b) the accused consciously and
deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or
forms of attack employed by him.48 The essence of
treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on an
unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on the
part of the victim.49 It was clearly established that private
complainant, while washing his jeep, was suddenly fired
upon by petitioner for no reason at all. The suddenness of
the shooting and the fact that he was unarmed left private
complainant with no option but to run for his life. It is
likewise apparent that petitioner consciously and
deliberately adopted his mode of attack making sure that
private complainant will have no chance to defend himself
by reason of the surprise attack. Petitioner’s claim that the
shooting was not sudden because private complainant
was observing him from the time he alighted from the
tricycle is belied by the fact that private complainant was
not able to run when he was first fired upon. Though
private complainant was looking at him, the former was
not forewarned by any outward sign that an attack was
forthcoming. It was only after the first shot that he felt his
life was in danger.
Having commenced the criminal act by overt acts but
failing to perform all acts of execution as to produce the
felony by reason of some cause other than his own
desistance, petitioner committed an attempted felony.
Petitioner already commenced his attack with a manifest
intent to kill by shooting private complainant seven times,
but failed to perform all the acts of execution by reason of
causes independent of his will, that is, poor aim and the
swiftness of the latter. Private complainant sustained a
wound on the left arm that is not sufficient to cause his
death. The settled rule is that where the wound inflicted
on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime
is only attempted murder, since the accused did not
perform all the acts of execution that would have brought
about death.50
The penalty imposed by the trial court is correct. Under
Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower
than two degrees than that prescribed by law for the
consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principal
in an attempted felony. Under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpertua
to death. The penalty two degrees lower is prision mayor.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there
being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the
minimum of the penalty to be imposed should be within
the range of prision correccional, and the maximum of the
penalty to be imposed should be within the range
of prision mayor in its medium period.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.