1. FF Cruz and Co., Inc. v. CA (164 SCRA 733)
00 as exemplary
G.R. No. L-52732 August 29, 1988
F.F. CRUZ and CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, GREGORIO MABLE as substituted by his wife
LUZ ALMONTE MABLE and children DOMING, LEONIDAS, LIGAYA,
ELENA, GREGORIO, JR., SALOME, ANTONIO, and BERNARDO all
surnamed MABLE, respondents.
Luis S. Topacio for petitioner.
Mauricio M. Monta for respondents.
CORTES, J.:
This petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals puts in issue the
application of the common law doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
The essential facts of the case are not disputed.
The furniture manufacturing shop of petitioner in Caloocan City was situated
adjacent to the residence of private respondents. Sometime in August 1971,
private respondent Gregorio Mable first approached Eric Cruz, petitioner's
plant manager, to request that a firewall be constructed between the shop and
private respondents' residence. The request was repeated several times but
they fell on deaf ears. In the early morning of September 6, 1974, fire broke
out in petitioner's shop. Petitioner's employees, who slept in the shop
premises, tried to put out the fire, but their efforts proved futile. The fire spread
to private respondents' house. Both the shop and the house were razed to the
ground. The cause of the conflagration was never discovered. The National
Bureau of Investigation found specimens from the burned structures negative
for the presence of inflammable substances.
Subsequently, private respondents collected P35,000.00 on the insurance on
their house and the contents thereof.
On January 23, 1975, private respondents filed an action for damages against
petitioner, praying for a judgment in their favor awarding P150,000.00 as
actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.
damages, P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs. The Court of First Instance
held for private respondents:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment, in favor
of plaintiffs, and against the defendant:
1. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs the amount
of P80,000.00 for damages suffered by said plaintiffs for the
loss of their house, with interest of 6% from the date of the
filing of the Complaint on January 23, 1975, until fully paid;
2. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of
P50,000.00 for the loss of plaintiffs' furnitures, religious
images, silverwares, chinawares, jewelries, books, kitchen
utensils, clothing and other valuables, with interest of 6% from
date of the filing of the Complaint on January 23, 1975, until
fully paid;
3. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of
P5,000.00 as moral damages, P2,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and P5,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees;
4. With costs against the defendant;
5. Counterclaim is ordered dismissed, for lack of merit. [CA
Decision, pp. 1-2; Rollo, pp. 29-30.]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in a decision promulgated on November 19,
1979, affirmed the decision of the trial court but reduced the award of
damages:
WHEREFORE, the decision declaring the defendants liable is
affirmed. The damages to be awarded to plaintiff should be
reduced to P70,000.00 for the house and P50,000.00 for the
furniture and other fixtures with legal interest from the date of
the filing of the complaint until full payment thereof. [CA
Decision, p. 7; Rollo, p. 35.]
A motion for reconsideration was filed on December 3, 1979 but was denied
in a resolution dated February 18, 1980. Hence, petitioner filed the instant
petition for review on February 22, 1980. After the comment and reply were
filed, the Court resolved to deny the petition for lack of merit on June 11, 1980.
However, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was granted, and
the petition was given due course on September 12, 1980. After the parties
filed their memoranda, the case was submitted for decision on January 21,
1981.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred:
1. In not deducting the sum of P35,000.00, which private respondents
recovered on the insurance on their house, from the award of damages.
2. In awarding excessive and/or unproved damages.
3. In applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to the facts of the instant case.
The pivotal issue in this case is the applicability of the common law doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur, the issue of damages being merely consequential. In view
thereof, the errors assigned by petitioner shall be discussed in the reverse
order.
1. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, whose application to the instant case
petitioner objects to, may be stated as follows:
Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is
shown to be under the management of the defendant or his
servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not happen if those who have its management or
control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident
arose from want of care. [Africa v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., G.R. No.
L-12986, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 448.]
Thus, in Africa, supra, where fire broke out in a Caltex service station while
gasoline from a tank truck was being unloaded into an underground storage
tank through a hose and the fire spread to and burned neighboring houses,
this Court, applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, adjudged Caltex liable for
the loss.
The facts of the case likewise call for the application of the doctrine,
considering that in the normal course of operations of a furniture
manufacturing shop, combustible material such as wood chips, sawdust, paint,
varnish and fuel and lubricants for machinery may be found thereon.
It must also be noted that negligence or want of care on the part of petitioner
or its employees was not merely presumed. The Court of Appeals found that
petitioner failed to construct a firewall between its shop and the residence of
private respondents as required by a city ordinance; that the fire could have
been caused by a heated motor or a lit cigarette; that gasoline and alcohol
were used and stored in the shop; and that workers sometimes smoked inside
the shop [CA Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 33.]
Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, petitioner's failure to
construct a firewall in accordance with city ordinances would suffice to support
a finding of negligence.
Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to the
neighboring houses were it not for another negligent omission
on the part of defendants, namely, their failure to provide a
concrete wall high enough to prevent the flames from leaping
over it. As it was the concrete wall was only 2-1/2 meters high,
and beyond that height it consisted merely of galvanized iron
sheets, which would predictably crumble and melt when
subjected to intense heat. Defendant's negligence, therefore,
was not only with respect to the cause of the fire but also with
respect to the spread thereof to the neighboring
houses.[Africa v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., supra; Emphasis
supplied.]
In the instant case, with more reason should petitioner be found guilty of
negligence since it had failed to construct a firewall between its property and
private respondents' residence which sufficiently complies with the pertinent
city ordinances. The failure to comply with an ordinance providing for safety
regulations had been ruled by the Court as an act of negligence [Teague v.
Fernandez, G.R. No. L-29745, June 4, 1973, 51 SCRA 181.]
The Court of Appeals, therefore, had more than adequate basis to find
petitioner liable for the loss sustained by private respondents.
2. Since the amount of the loss sustained by private respondents constitutes
a finding of fact, such finding by the Court of Appeals should not be disturbed
by this Court [M.D. Transit & Taxi Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-
23882, February 17, 1968, 22 SCRA 559], more so when there is no showing
of arbitrariness.
In the instant case, both the CFI and the Court of Appeals were in agreement
as to the value of private respondents' furniture and fixtures and personal
effects lost in the fire (i.e. P50,000.00). With regard to the house, the Court of
Appeals reduced the award to P70,000.00 from P80,000.00. Such cannot be
categorized as arbitrary considering that the evidence shows that the house
was built in 1951 for P40,000.00 and, according to private respondents, its
reconstruction would cost P246,000.00. Considering the appreciation in value
of real estate and the diminution of the real value of the peso, the valuation of
the house at P70,000.00 at the time it was razed cannot be said to be
excessive.
3. While this Court finds that petitioner is liable for damages to private
respondents as found by the Court of Appeals, the fact that private
respondents have been indemnified by their insurer in the amount of
P35,000.00 for the damage caused to their house and its contents has not
escaped the attention of the Court. Hence, the Court holds that in accordance
with Article 2207 of the Civil Code the amount of P35,000.00 should be
deducted from the amount awarded as damages. Said article provides:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals
is hereby AFFIRMED with the following modifications as to the damages
awarded for the loss of private respondents' house, considering their receipt
of P35,000.00 from their insurer: (1) the damages awarded for the loss of the
house is reduced to P35,000.00; and (2) the right of the insurer to subrogation
and thus seek reimbursement from petitioner for the P35,000.00 it had paid
private respondents is recognized.
SO ORDERED.

Art. 2207. If the plaintiffs property has been insured, and he

has received indemnity from the insurance company for the
injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract
complained of, the insurance company is subrogated to the
rights of the insured against the wrongdoer or the person who
violated the contract. If the amount paid by the insurance
company does not fully cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved
party shall be entitled to recover the deficiency from the
person causing the loss or injury. (Emphasis supplied.]

The law is clear and needs no interpretation. Having been indemnified by their
insurer, private respondents are only entitled to recover the deficiency from
petitioner.

On the other hand, the insurer, if it is so minded, may seek reimbursement of

the amount it indemnified private respondents from petitioner. This is the
essence of its right to be subrogated to the rights of the insured, as expressly
provided in Article 2207. Upon payment of the loss incurred by the insured, the
insurer is entitled to be subrogated pro tanto to any right of action which the
insured may have against the third person whose negligence or wrongful act
caused the loss [Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Jamila & Co., Inc., G.R. No.
L-27427, April 7, 1976, 70 SCRA 323.]

Under Article 2207, the real party in interest with regard to the indemnity
received by the insured is the insurer [Phil. Air Lines, Inc. v. Heald Lumber Co.,
101 Phil. 1031, (1957).] Whether or not the insurer should exercise the rights
of the insured to which it had been subrogated lies solely within the former's
sound discretion. Since the insurer is not a party to the case, its identity is not
of record and no claim is made on its behalf, the private respondent's insurer
has to claim his right to reimbursement of the P35,000.00 paid to the insured.
2. Cipriano v. CA (263 SCRA 711)
[G.R. No. 107968. October 30, 1996]
ELIAS S. CIPRIANO and/or E.S. CIPRIANO ENTERPRISES, petitioner,
vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MACLIN ELECTRONICS,
INC., respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 36045 which affirmed in toto the decision of Branch 58[2] of
the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, ordering the petitioner to
pay P252,155.00 to private respondent for the loss of the latters vehicle while
undergoing rustproofing and P10,000.00 in attorneys fees.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Elias S. Cipriano is the owner of E.S. Cipriano Enterprises,
which is engaged in the rustproofing of vehicles, under the style
Motobilkote. On April 30, 1991, private respondent Maclin Electronics, Inc.,
through an employee, brought a 1990 model Kia Pride Peoples car to
petitioners shop for rustproofing. The car had been purchased the year before
from the Integrated Auto Sales, Inc. for P252,155.00.
The vehicle was received in the shop under Job Order No.
123581,[3] which showed the date it was received for rustproofing as well its
condition at the time. Neither the time of acceptance nor the hour of release,
however, was specified. According to the petitioner, the car was brought to his
shop at 10 oclock in the morning of April 30, 1991 and was ready for release
later that afternoon, as it took only six hours to complete the process of
rustproofing.
In the afternoon of May 1, 1991, fire broke out at the Lambat restaurant,
which petitioner also owned, adjoining his Mobilkote rustproofing shop. The
fire destroyed both the shop and the restaurant, including private respondents
Kia Pride. The car had been kept inside the building, allegedly to protect it from
theft. Petitioner claimed that despite efforts to save the vehicle, there was
simply not enough time to get it out of the building, unlike three other cars
which had been saved because they were parked near the entrance of the
garage.[4]
On May 8 1991, private respondent sent a letter to petitioner, demanding
reimbursement for the value of the Kia Pride. In reply, petitioner denied liability
on the ground that the fire was a fortuitous event. This prompted private
respondent to bring this suit for the value of its vehicle and for damages against
petitioner. Private respondent alleged that its vehicle was lost due to the
negligence and imprudence of the petitioner, citing petitioners failure to
register his business with the Department of Trade and Industry under P.D.
No. 1572 and to insure it as required in the rules implementing the Decree.[5]
In his Answer, petitioner invoked Art. 1174 of the Civil Code and denied
liability for the loss which he alleged was due to a fortuitous event. He later
testified that he employed an electrician who regularly inspected the lighting in
his restaurant and rustproofing shop. In addition, he claimed he had installed
fire-fighting devices and that the fire was an accident entirely independent of
his will and devoid of any negligence on his part. He further averred that private
respondents car was ready for release as early as afternoon of April 30, 1991,
and that it was private respondents delay in claiming it that was the cause of
the loss.
Petitioner explained that rustproofing involved spraying asphalt-like
materials underneath motor vehicle so that rust will not corrode its body and
that the materials and chemicals used for this purpose are not
inflammable. Therefore, he could not be made to assume the risk of loss due
to fire. He also claimed that he was not required to register his business with
the Department of Trade and Industry, because he was not covered by P.D.
No. 1572.
On the other hand, private respondent argued that petitioner was liable
for the loss of the car even if it was caused by a fortuitous event. It contended
that the nature of petitioners business required him to assume the risk because
under P.D. No. 1572, petitioner was required to insure his property as well as
those of his customers.
The trial court sustained the private respondents contention that the
failure of defendant to comply with P.D. No. 1572 is in effect a manifest act of
negligence which renders defendant [petitioner herein] liable for the loss of the
car even if the same was caused by fire,[6] even as it ruled that the business of
rustproffing is definitely covered by P.D. No. 1572. Since petitioner did not
register his business and insure it, he must bear the cost of loss of his
customers. As already noted, the court ordered petitioner to pay private
respondent P252,155.00 with interest at 6% per annum from the filing of the
case and attorneys fees in the amount of P10,000.00.
On appeal, the decision was affirmed. The Court of Appeals ruled that the
provisions of the Civil Code relied upon by the petitioner are not applicable to
this case, and that the law applicable to the case is P.D. No. 1572, the purpose
of which is to protect customers who entrust their properties to service and
repair enterprises. The Court of Appeals held that by virtue of the provisions
of P.D. No. 1572 and its implementing rules and regulations which require fire
insurance coverage prior to accreditation, owners of service and repair
enterprises assume the risk of loss of their customers property. The appellate
court stated:
Defendant-appellant was operating the business of rustproofing of
cars and other motor vehicles illegally at the time of the fire in
question; i.e., without the necessary accreditation and license from
the Department of Trade and Industry, and it is for this reason that
it did not carry at least a fire insurance coverage to protect the
vehicles entrusted to it by its customers. Therefore, it must bear
the consequences of such illegal operation, including the risk of
losses or injuries to the vehicles of its customers brought by
unforeseen or fortuitous events like the fire that gutted its shop and
completely burned appellees car while said vehicle was in its
possession.[7]
The Court of Appeals also affirmed the award of attorneys fees, ruling
that although the lower court did not expressly and specifically state the reason
for the award, the basis therefor could be inferred from the finding that
petitioner unjustly refused to pay private respondents valid and demandable
claim. Said the appellate court:
Such wanton, reckless, and illegal operation of appellants business
resulted in appellees lack of protection from the fire that gutted
appellants shop and which completely burned its car while in
appellants possession for rustproofing. Yet appellant adamantly
and stubbornly refused to pay appellee the value of its lost car. It
was, therefore, correctly ordered by the court a quo to pay appellee
reasonable attorneys fees as it had unjustly and unreasonably
refused to satisfy the latters plainly valid, just, and demandable
claim, compelling said appellee to file this action to protect its
interest (Art. 2208, pars. (2) and (5), New Civil Code).[8]
Hence, this appeal. Petitioner contends that the fire which destroyed
private respondents car was a fortuitous event for which he cannot be held
responsible. In support of his argument, he cites the following provisions of the
Civil Code:
ART. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is
otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires
the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which
could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
ART. 1262. An obligation which consists in the delivery of a determinate thing
shall be extinguished if it should be lost or destroyed without the fault of the
debtor, and before he has incurred in delay.
When by law or stipulation, the obligor is liable even for fortuitous events, the
loss of the thing does not extinguish the obligation, and he shall be responsible
for damages. The same rule applies when the nature of the obligation requires
the assumption of risk.
The contention is without merit. The issue in this case is whether
petitioner was required to insure his business and the vehicles received by him
in the course of his business and, if so, whether his failure to do so constituted
negligence, rendering him liable for loss due to the risk required to be insured
against. We hold that both questions must be answered in the affirmative.
We have already held that violation of a statutory duty is negligence per
se. In F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[9] we held the owner of a
furniture shop liable for the destruction of the plaintiffs house in a fire which
started in his establishment in view of his failure to comply with an ordinance
which required the construction of a firewall. In Teague v. Fernandez,[10] we
stated that where the very injury which was intended to be prevented by the
ordinance has happened, non-compliance with the ordinance was not only an
act negligence, but also the proximate cause of the death.
Indeed, the existence of a contract between petitioner and private
respondent does not bar a finding of negligence under the principles of quasi-
delict, as we recently held in Fabre v. Court of Appeals.[11] Petitioner's
negligence is the source of his obligation. He is not being held liable for breach
of his contractual obligation due to negligence but for his negligence in not
complying with a duty imposed on him by law. It is therefore immaterial that
the loss occasioned to private respondent was due to a fortuitous event, since
it was petitioners negligence in not insuring against the risk which was the
proximate cause of the loss.
Thus, P.D. No. 1572, 1 requires service and repair enterprises for motor
vehicles, like that of petitioners to register with the Department of Trade and
Industry. As condition for such registration or accreditation, Ministry Order No.
32 requires covered enterprises to secure insurance coverage. Rule III of this
Order provides in pertinent parts:[12]
1- REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCREDITATION
1) Enterprises applying for original accreditation shall submit the following:
1.1. List of machineries/equipment/tools in useful condition;
 1.2. List of certified engineers/accredited technicians mechanics
with their personal data;
1.3. Copy of Insurance Policy of the shop covering the property
entrusted by its customer for repair, service or maintenance
together with a copy of the official receipt covering the full
payment of premium;
award of attorneys fees in the decision of the trial court, it was error for the
Court of Appeals to sustain such award.
WHEREFORE, the decision, dated November 18, 1992, of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED, with the modification that the award of attorneys fees
is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.

1.4. Copy of Bond referred to under Section 7, Rule III of this Rules
and Regulations;

1.5. Written service warranty in the form prescribed by the Bureau;

1.6. Certificate issued by the Securities and Exchange

Commission and Articles of Incorporation or Partnership in
case of corporation or partnership;

1.7. Such other additional documents which the Director may require
from time to time.

8 - INSURANCE POLICY

The insurance policy for the following risks like theft, pilferage, fire, flood and
loss should cover exclusively the machines, motor vehicles, heavy equipment,
engines, electronics, electrical, airconditioners, refrigerators, office machines
and data processing equipment, medical and dental equipment, other
consumer mechanical and industrial equipment stored for repair and/or service
in the premises of the applicant.

There is thus a statutory duty imposed on petitioner and it is for his failure
to comply with this duty that he was guilty of negligence rendering him liable
for damages to private respondent. While the fire in this case may be
considered a fortuitous event,[13] this circumstance cannot exempt petitioner
from liability for loss.
We think, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the
award of attorneys fees by the lower court. It is now settled that the reasons
or grounds for an award of attorneys fees must be set forth in the decision of
the court.[14] They cannot be left to inference as the appellate court held in this
case. The reason for this is that it is not sound policy to penalize the right to
litigate. An award of attorneys fees, being an exception to this policy and
limited to the grounds enumerated in the law,[15]must be fully justified in the
decision. It can not simply be inserted as an item of recoverable damages in
the judgment of the court. Since in this case there is no justification for the
3. Marinduque Iron Mines Agents, Inc. v. The Workmen’s Compensation
Commission (99 Phil 480)
[G.R. No. L-8110. June 30, 1956.]
MARINDUQUE IRON MINES AGENTS, INC., Petitioner, vs. THE
WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, THE HEIRS OF PEDRO
MAMADOR and GERONIMO MA. COLL, Respondents.
DECISION
BENGZON, J.:
The Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc. questions by certiorari the order of the
Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner confirming the referee’s award of
compensation to the heirs of Pedro Mamador for his accidental death.
Only the right to compensation is disputed; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarynot the
amount.
“It appears,” says the award, “that on August 23, 1951, at
6:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary00 a.m. in Bo. Sumangga, Mogpog, Marinduque,
the deceased Mamador together with other laborers of the Respondent-
corporation, (Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc.) boarded a truck belonging
to the latter, which was then driven by one Procopio Macunat, also employed
by the corporation, and on its way to their place of work at the mine camp at
Talantunan, while trying to overtake another truck on the company road, it
turned over and hit a coconut tree, resulting in the death of said Mamador and
injury to the others.”
Procopio Macunat was prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased. (Criminal Case No. 1491). He has paid nothing
however, to the latter.
In his first proposition Petitioner challenges the validity of the proceedings
before the Commission, asserting it had not been given the opportunity to
cross-examine the opposing witnesses. According to Respondents.
“The records show that pursuant to a request made by this Commission on
March 28, 1953 to investigate the above-entitled case, the Public Defender of
Boac, Marinduque, notified Respondent Geronimo Ma. Coll and the general
manager of the Respondent company, Mr. Eric Lenze, to appear before him in
an investigation, first on May 12, 1953, when neither of them appeared, and
the second on May 29, 1953, when only Mr. Geronimo Ma. Coll. appeared.
The sworn testimony of Mr. Ma. Coll was then taken down in a question and
answer method. On August 18, 1953, thru Referee Ramon Villaflor, this
Commission wrote the Respondent company to comment on the enclosed
copy of the sworn declaration of Ma. Coll. The Respondentcompany, thru its
Vice President, denied its liability under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as
amended. In an investigation conducted on February 8, 1954 by the
undersigned referee, the Respondent company thru Mr. Lenze who was
assisted by counsel, was allowed to examine the records of the case including
the sworn declaration of Ma. Coll and was given all the opportunity to rebut the
same by additional evidence.”
In our opinion, Petitioner’s grievance does not rest on any sound basis,
because it was given notice, and therefore had the chance, to examine (and
cross-examine) the witnesses against it. The statute even permits the
Commissioner (or his referee) to take testimony without notice (section 48 Act
3428 as amended) provided of course such ex parte evidence is reduced to
writing, and the adverse party is afforded opportunity to examine and rebut the
same which was done in this instance.
Anyway we are not shown how its failure to cross-examine the witnesses
prejudiced the Petitioner’s position.
In its second proposition, Petitioner maintains that this claim is barred by
section 6 of the Workmen’s Compensation Law, because (a) Macunat was
prosecuted and required to indemnify the heirs of the deceased and (b) an
amicable settlement was concluded between said heirs and Macunat.
Section 6 provides as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Sec. 6. Liability of third parties. — In case an employee suffers an injury for
which compensation is due under this Act by any other person besides his
employer, it shall be optional with such injured employee either to claim
compensation from his employer, under this Act, or sue such other person for
damages, in accordance with law; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand in case
compensation is claimed and allowed in accordance with this Act, the
employer who paid such compensation or was found liable to pay the same,
shall succeed the injured employee to the right of recovering from such person
what he paid:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Provided, That in case the employer
recovers from such third person damages in excess of those paid or allowed
under this Act, such excess shall be delivered to the injured employee or any
other person entitled thereto, after deduction of the expenses of the employer
and the costs of the proceedings. The sum paid by the employer for
compensation or the amount of compensation to which the employee or his
dependents are entitled, shall not be admissible as evidence in any damage
suit or action.”
It is the Petitioner’s contention that Criminal Case No. 1491 and its outcome
constituted an election by the employee (or his heirs) to sue the third person,
such election having the effect of releasing the employer. However, Criminal
Case No. 1491 was not a suit for damages against the third person, it being
alleged, without contradiction that the heirs did not intervene therein and have
not so far received the indemnity ordered by the court. At any rate, we have
already decided in Nava vs. Inchausti Co. 1 that the indemnity granted the
heirs in a criminal prosecution of the “other person” does not affect the liability Nevertheless, even granting there was negligence, it surely was not
of the employer to pay compensation. 2 “notorious” negligence, which we have interpreted to mean the same thing as
“gross” negligence 3 — implying “conscious indifference to consequences”
As to the alleged “amicable settlement,” it consists of an affidavit wherein, for
“pursuing a course of conduct which would naturally and probably result in
the sum of 150 pesos, Mamador’s widow promised “to forgive Macunat for the
injury” “utter disregard of consequences.” (38 Am. Jur., 691) Getting or
wrong committed and not to bring him before the authorities for prosecution.”
accepting a free ride on the company’s haulage truck couldn’t be gross
Upon making such promise — Petitionerargues — she elected one of the
negligence, because as the referee found, “no danger or risk was apparent.”
remedies, (against the third person) and is barred from the other remedy
(against the employer). The contention may not be sustained, inasmuch as all There being no other material point raised in the petition for review, the award
the widow promised was to forego the offender’s criminal prosecution. Note of compensation is hereby affirmed, with costs against Petitioner.
further that a question may be raised whether she could bind the other heirs
of the deceased.
The most important aspect of this appeal, is the effect of the deceased’s having
violated the employer’s prohibition against laborers riding the haulage
trucks. Petitioner claims such violation was the laborer’s “notorious
negligence” which, under the law, precludes recovery. The Commission has
not declared that the prohibition was known to Mamador. Yet the employer
does not point out in the record evidence to that effect. Supposing Mamador
knew the prohibition, said the referee, “can we truthfully say that he boarded
the fatal truck with full apprehension of the existence of the danger, if any at
all, that an ordinary prudent man would try to avoid? I do not believe so, and
even in the presence of doubt, the same must be resolved in his favor. Unless
of course, we can attribute to him a desire to end his life. Nowhere in the
records of this case can we find the slightest insinuation of that desire.”
There is no doubt that mere riding on haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon
is not negligence, ordinarily. It couldn’t be, because transportation by truck is
not dangerous per se. It is argued that there was notorious negligence in this
particular instance because there was the employer’s prohibition. Does
violation of this order constitute negligence? Many courts hold that violation of
a statute or ordinance constitutes negligence per se. Others consider the
circumstances.
However there is practical unanimity in the proposition that violation of a rule
promulgated by a Commission or board is not negligence per se; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarybut it may be evidence of negligence. (C.J.S., Vol. 65, p.
427.)
This order of the employer (prohibition rather) couldn’t be of a greater
obligation than the rule of a Commission or board. And the referee correctly
considered this violation as possible evidence of negligence; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarybut it declared that under the circumstance, the laborer
could not be declared to have acted with negligence. Correctly, it is believed,
since the prohibition had nothing to do with personal safety of the riders.
Such finding is virtually a finding of fact which we may not overrule in this
certiorari proceeding.
4. Añonuevo v. CA (Gr No. 130003)
G.R. No. 130003 October 20, 2004
JONAS AÑONUEVO, Petitioner.
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JEROME VILLAGRACIA, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The bicycle provides considerable speed and freedom of movement to the
rider. It derives a certain charm from being unencumbered by any enclosure,
affording the cyclist the perception of relative liberty. It also carries some
obvious risks on the part of the user and has become the subject of regulation,
if not by the government, then by parental proscription.
The present petition seeks to bar recovery by an injured cyclist of damages
from the driver of the car which had struck him. The argument is hinged on the
cyclist’s failure to install safety devices on his bicycle. However, the lower
courts agreed that the motorist himself caused the collision with his own
negligence. The facts are deceptively simple, but the resolution entails
thorough consideration of fundamental precepts on negligence.
The present petition raises little issue with the factual findings of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 160, of Pasig City, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Both courts adjudged petitioner, Jonas Añonuevo ( Añonuevo ),
liable for the damages for the injuries sustained by the cyclist, Jerome
Villagracia (Villagracia). Instead, the petition hinges on a sole legal question,
characterized as "novel" by the petitioner: whether Article 2185 of the New
Civil Code, which presumes the driver of a motor vehicle negligent if he was
violating a traffic regulation at the time of the mishap, should apply by analogy
to non-motorized vehicles.1
As found by the RTC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the accident in
question occurred on 8 February 1989, at around nine in the evening, at the
intersection of Boni Avenue and Barangka Drive in Mandaluyong (now a city).
Villagracia was traveling along Boni Avenue on his bicycle, while Añonuevo,
traversing the opposite lane was driving his Lancer car with plate number PJJ
359. The car was owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer of
Añonuevo’s brother, Jonathan. Añonuevo was in the course of making a left
turn towards Libertad Street when the collision occurred. Villagracia sustained
serious injuries as a result, which necessitated his hospitalization several
times in 1989, and forced him to undergo four (4) operations.
On 26 October 1989, Villagracia instituted an action for damages against
Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc. and Añonuevo before the RTC.2 He had also
filed a criminal complaint against Añonuevo before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Mandaluyong, but the latter was subsequently acquitted of the criminal
charge.3 Trial on the civil action ensued, and in a Decision dated 9 March
1990, the RTC rendered judgment against Procter and Gamble and
Añonuevo, ordering them to pay Villagracia the amounts of One Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos (₱150, 000.00). for actual damages, Ten Thousand Pesos
(₱10,000.00) for moral damages, and Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00)
for attorney’s fees, as well as legal costs.4 Both defendants appealed to the
Court of Appeals.
In a Decision5 dated 8 May 1997, the Court of Appeals Fourth Division affirmed
the RTC Decision in toto6 . After the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for
Reconsideration in a Resolution7 dated 22 July 1997, Procter and Gamble and
Añonuevo filed their respective petitions for review with this Court. Procter and
Gamble’s petition was denied by this Court in a Resolution dated 24
November 1997. Añonuevo’s petition,8 on the other hand, was given due
course,9 and is the subject of this Decision.
In arriving at the assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the factual
findings of the RTC. Among them: that it was Añonuevo’s vehicle which had
struck Villagracia;10 that Añonuevo’s vehicle had actually hit Villagracia’s left
mid-thigh, thus causing a comminuted fracture;11 that as testified by
eyewitness Alfredo Sorsano, witness for Villagracia, Añonuevo was
"umaarangkada," or speeding as he made the left turn into Libertad;12 that
considering Añonuevo’s claim that a passenger jeepney was obstructing his
path as he made the turn. Añonuevo had enough warning to control his
speed;13 and that Añonuevo failed to exercise the ordinary precaution, care
and diligence required of him in order that the accident could have been
avoided.14 Notably, Añonuevo, in his current petition, does not dispute the
findings of tortious conduct on his part made by the lower courts, hinging his
appeal instead on the alleged negligence of Villagracia. Añonuevo proffers no
exculpatory version of facts on his part, nor does he dispute the conclusions
made by the RTC and the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the Court, which is
not a trier of facts,15 is not compelled to review the factual findings of the lower
courts, which following jurisprudence have to be received with respect and are
in fact generally binding.16
Notwithstanding, the present petition presents interesting questions for
resolution. Añonuevo’s arguments are especially fixated on a particular
question of law: whether Article 2185 of the New Civil Code should apply by
analogy to non-motorized vehicles.17 In the same vein, Añonuevo insists that
Villagracia’s own fault and negligence serves to absolve the former of any
liability for damages.
Its is easy to discern why Añonuevo chooses to employ this line of argument.
Añonuevo points out that Villagracia’s bicycle had no safety gadgets such as
a horn or bell, or headlights, as invoked by a 1948 municipal ordinance.18 Nor
was it duly registered with the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, as required
by the same ordinance. Finally, as admitted by Villagracia, his bicycle did not
have foot brakes.19 Before this Court, Villagracia does not dispute these
allegations, which he admitted during the trial, but directs our attention instead
to the findings of Añonuevo’s own negligence.20 Villagracia also contends that,
assuming there was contributory negligence on his part, such would not
exonerate Añonuevo from payment of damages. The Court of Appeals
likewise acknowledged the lack of safety gadgets on Villagracia’s bicycle, but
characterized the contention as "off-tangent" and insufficient to obviate the fact
that it was Añonuevo’s own negligence that caused the accident.21
Añonuevo claims that Villagracia violated traffic regulations when he failed to
register his bicycle or install safety gadgets thereon. He posits that Article 2185
of the New Civil Code applies by analogy. The provision reads:
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person
driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was
violating any traffic regulation.
The provision was introduced for the first time in this jurisdiction with the
adoption in 1950 of the New Civil Code.22 Its applicability is expressly qualified
to motor vehicles only, and there is no ground to presume that the law intended
a broader coverage.
Still, Añonuevo hypothesizes that Article 2185 should apply by analogy to all
types of vehicles23 . He points out that modern-day travel is more complex now
than when the Code was enacted, the number and types of vehicles now in
use far more numerous than as of then. He even suggests that at the time of
the enactment of the Code, the legislators "must have seen that only motor
vehicles were of such public concern that they had to be specifically
mentioned," yet today, the interaction of vehicles of all types and nature has
"inescapably become matter of public concern" so as to expand the application
of the law to be more responsive to the times.24
What Añonuevo seeks is for the Court to amend the explicit command of the
legislature, as embodied in Article 2185, a task beyond the pale of judicial
power. The Court interprets, and not creates, the law. However, since the
Court is being asked to consider the matter, it might as well examine whether
Article 2185 could be interpreted to include non-motorized vehicles.
At the time Article 2185 was formulated, there existed a whole array of non-
motorized vehicles ranging from human-powered contraptions on wheels such
as bicycles, scooters, and animal-drawn carts such as calesas and carromata.
These modes of transport were even more prevalent on the roads of the 1940s
and 1950s than they are today, yet the framers of the New Civil Code chose
then to exclude these alternative modes from the scope of Article 2185 with
the use of the term "motorized vehicles." If Añonuevo seriously contends that
the application of Article 2185 be expanded due to the greater interaction today
of all types of vehicles, such argument contradicts historical experience. The
ratio of motorized vehicles as to non-motorized vehicles, as it stood in 1950,
was significantly lower than as it stands today. This will be certainly affirmed
by statistical data, assuming such has been compiled, much less confirmed by
persons over sixty. Añonuevo’s characterization of a vibrant intra-road
dynamic between motorized and non-motorized vehicles is more apropos to
the past than to the present.
There is a fundamental flaw in Añonuevo’s analysis of Art. 2185, as applicable
today. He premises that the need for the distinction between motorized and
non-motorized vehicles arises from the relative mass of number of these
vehicles. The more pertinent basis for the segregate classification is the
difference in type of these vehicles. A motorized vehicle operates by reason of
a motor engine unlike a non-motorized vehicle, which runs as a result of a
direct exertion by man or beast of burden of direct physical force. A motorized
vehicle, unimpeded by the limitations in physical exertion. is capable of greater
speeds and acceleration than non-motorized vehicles. At the same time,
motorized vehicles are more capable in inflicting greater injury or damage in
the event of an accident or collision. This is due to a combination of factors
peculiar to the motor vehicle, such as the greater speed, its relative greater
bulk of mass, and greater combustability due to the fuels that they use.
There long has been judicial recognition of the peculiar dangers posed by the
motor vehicle. As far back as 1912, in the U.S. v. Juanillo25 , the Court has
recognized that an automobile is capable of great speed, greater than that of
ordinary vehicles hauled by animals, "and beyond doubt it is highly dangerous
when used on country roads, putting to great hazard the safety and lives of the
mass of the people who travel on such roads."26 In the same case, the Court
emphasized:
A driver of an automobile, under such circumstances, is required to use a
greater degree of care than drivers of animals, for the reason that the machine
is capable of greater destruction, and furthermore, it is absolutely under the
power and control of the driver; whereas, a horse or other animal can and does
to some extent aid in averting an accident. It is not pleasant to be obliged to
slow down automobiles to accommodate persons riding, driving, or walking. It
is probably more agreeable to send the machine along and let the horse or
person get out of the way in the best manner possible; but it is well to
understand, if this course is adopted and an accident occurs, that the
automobile driver will be called upon to account for his acts. An automobile
driver must at all times use all the care and caution which a careful and prudent
driver would have exercised under the circumstances.27
American jurisprudence has had occasion to explicitly rule on the relationship
between the motorist and the cyclist. Motorists are required to exercise
ordinary or reasonable care to avoid collision with bicyclists.28 While the duty
of using ordinary care falls alike on the motorist and the rider or driver of a
bicycle, it is obvious, for reasons growing out of the inherent differences in the
two vehicles, that more is required from the former to fully discharge the duty
than from the latter.29
The Code Commission was cognizant of the difference in the natures and
attached responsibilities of motorized and non-motorized vehicles. Art. 2185
was not formulated to compel or ensure obeisance by all to traffic rules and
regulations. If such were indeed the evil sought to be remedied or guarded
against, then the framers of the Code would have expanded the provision to
include non-motorized vehicles or for that matter, pedestrians. Yet, that was
not the case; thus the need arises to ascertain the peculiarities attaching to a
motorized vehicle within the dynamics of road travel. The fact that there has
long existed a higher degree of diligence and care imposed on motorized
vehicles, arising from the special nature of motor vehicle, leads to the
inescapable conclusion that the qualification under Article 2185 exists
precisely to recognize such higher standard. Simply put, the standards
applicable to motor vehicle are not on equal footing with other types of
vehicles.
Thus, we cannot sustain the contention that Art. 2185 should apply to non-
motorized vehicles, even if by analogy. There is factual and legal basis that
necessitates the distinction under Art. 2185, and to adopt Añonuevo’s thesis
would unwisely obviate this distinction.
Even if the legal presumption under Article 2185 should not apply to
Villagracia, this should not preclude any possible finding of negligence on his
part. While the legal argument as formulated by Añonuevo is erroneous, his
core contention that Villagracia was negligent for failure to comply with traffic
regulations warrants serious consideration, especially since the imputed
negligent acts were admitted by Villagracia himself.
The Civil Code characterizes negligence as the omission of that diligence
which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place.30 However, the
existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by the personal
judgment of the actor in a given situation, but rather, it is the law which
determines what would be reckless or negligent.31
Añonuevo, asserts that Villagracia was negligent as the latter had
transgressed a municipal ordinance requiring the registration of bicycles and
the installation of safety devices thereon. This view finds some support if
anchored on the long standing principle of negligence per se.
The generally accepted view is that the violation of a statutory duty constitutes
negligence, negligence as a matter of law, or negligence per se.32 In Teague
vs. Fernandez,33 the Court cited with approval American authorities elucidating
on the rule:
"The mere fact of violation of a statute is not sufficient basis for an inference
that such violation was the proximate cause of the injury complained. However,
if the very injury has happened which was intended to be prevented by the
statute, it has been held that violation of the statute will be deemed to be the
proximate cause of the injury." (65 C.J.S. 1156)
"The generally accepted view is that violation of a statutory duty constitutes
negligence, negligence as a matter of law, or, according to the decisions on
the question, negligence per se, for the reason that non-observance of what
the legislature has prescribed as a suitable precaution is failure to observe that
care which an ordinarily prudent man would observe, and, when the state
regards certain acts as so liable to injure others as to justify their absolute
prohibition, doing the forbidden act is a breach of duty with respect to those
who may be injured thereby; or, as it has been otherwise expressed, when the
standard of care is fixed by law, failure to conform to such standard is
negligence, negligence per se or negligence in and of itself, in the absence of
a legal excuse. According to this view it is immaterial, where a statute has been
violated, whether the act or omission constituting such violation would have
been regarded as negligence in the absence of any statute on the subject or
whether there was, as a matter of fact, any reason to anticipate that injury
would result from such violation. x x x." (65 C.J.S. pp.623-628)
"But the existence of an ordinance changes the situation. If a driver causes an
accident by exceeding the speed limit, for example, we do not inquire whether
his prohibited conduct was unreasonably dangerous. It is enough that it was
prohibited. Violation of an ordinance intended to promote safety is negligence.
If by creating the hazard which the ordinance was intended to avoid it brings
about the harm which the ordinance was intended to prevent, it is a legal cause
of the harm. This comes only to saying that in such circumstances the law has
no reason to ignore the causal relation which obviously exists in fact. The law
has excellent reason to recognize it, since it is the very relation which the
makers of the ordinance anticipated. This court has applied these principles to
speed limits and other regulations of the manner of driving." (Ross vs.
Hartman, 139 Fed. 2d 14 at 15).
"x x x However, the fact that other happenings causing or contributing toward
an injury intervened between the violation of a statute or ordinance and the
injury does not necessarily make the result so remote that no action can be
maintained. The test is to be found not in the number of intervening events or
agents, but in their character and in the natural and probable connection
between the wrong done and the injurious consequence. The general principle
is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the
cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of
the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the very thing which the
statute or ordinance was intended to prevent." (38 Am Jur 841)34
In Teague, the owner of a vocational school stricken by a fire resulting in
fatalities was found negligent, base on her failure to provide adequate fire exits
in contravention of a Manila city ordinance.35 In F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. v. Court
of Appeals36 , the failure of the petitioner to construct a firewall in accordance
with city ordinances sufficed to support a finding of negligence.37 In Cipriano v.
Court of Appeals, 38 the Court found that the failure of the petitioner to register
and insure his auto rustproofing shop in accordance with the statute
constituted negligence per se, thus holding him liable for the damages for the
destruction by fire of a customer’s vehicle garaged therein.
Should the doctrine of negligence per se apply to Villagracia, resulting from his
violation of an ordinance? It cannot be denied that the statutory purpose for
requiring bicycles to be equipped with headlights or horns is to promote road
safety and to minimize the occurrence of road accidents involving bicycles. At
face value, Villagracia’s mishap was precisely the danger sought to be
guarded against by the ordinance he violated. Añonuevo argues that
Villagracia’s violation should bar the latter’s recovery of damages, and a
simplistic interpretation of negligence per se might vindicate such an
argument.
But this is by no means a simple case. There is the fact which we consider as
proven, that Añonuevo was speeding as he made the left turn, and such
negligent act was the proximate cause of the accident. This reckless behavior
would have imperiled anyone unlucky enough within the path of Añonuevo’s
car as it turned into the intersection, whether they are fellow motorists,
pedestrians, or cyclists. We are hard put to conclude that Villagracia would
have avoided injury had his bicycle been up to par with safety regulations,
especially considering that Añonuevo was already speeding as he made the
turn, or before he had seen Villagracia. Even assuming that Añonuevo had
failed to see Villagracia because the bicycle was not equipped with headlights,
such lapse on the cyclist’s part would not have acquitted the driver of his duty
to slow down as he proceeded to make the left turn.
This court has appreciated that negligence per se, arising from the mere
violation of a traffic statute, need not be sufficient in itself in establishing liability
for damages. In Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,39 a collision
between a truck and a privately-owned Cimarron van caused the death of three
of the van’s passengers. The petitioner therein, the owner of the truck, argued
that the driver of the Cimarron was committing multiple violations of the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code40 at the time of the accident. Among these
violations: the Cimarron was overloaded at the time of the accident; the front
seat of the van was occupied by four adults, including the driver; and the van
had only one functioning headlight. Similar as in this case, petitioner therein
invoked Article 2185 and argued that the driver of the Cimarron should be
presumed negligent. The Court, speaking through Justice Mendoza,
dismissed these arguments:
[It] has not been shown how the alleged negligence of the Cimarron driver
contributed to the collision between the vehicles. Indeed, petitioner has the
burden of showing a causal connection between the injury received and the
violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. He must show that the
violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it
substantially contributed thereto. Negligence consisting in whole or in part, of
violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless
it is a contributing cause of the injury. Petitioner says that "driving an
overloaded vehicle with only one functioning headlight during nighttime
certainly increases the risk of accident," that because the Cimarron had only
one headlight, there was "decreased visibility," and that the fact that the vehicle
was overloaded and its front seat overcrowded "decreased its
maneuverability." However, mere allegations such as these are not sufficient
to discharge its burden of proving clearly that such alleged negligence was the
contributing cause of the injury.41
Sanitary Steam42 is controlling in this case. The bare fact that Villagracia was
violating a municipal ordinance at the time of the accident may have sufficiently
established some degree of negligence on his part, but such negligence is
without legal consequence unless it is shown that it was a contributing cause
of the injury. If anything at all, it is but indicative of Villagracia’s failure in
fulfilling his obligation to the municipal government, which would then be the
proper party to initiate corrective action as a result. But such failure alone is
not determinative of Villagracia’s negligence in relation to the accident.
Negligence is relative or comparative, dependent upon the situation of the
parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the particular
circumstances reasonably require.43 To determine if Villagracia was negligent,
it is not sufficient to rely solely on the violations of the municipal ordinance, but
imperative to examine Villagracia’s behavior in relation to the
contemporaneous circumstances of the accident.
The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may arise from
the logical consequences of the facts leading to the mishap. The doctrine (and
Article 2185, for that matter) is undeniably useful as a judicial guide in
adjudging liability, for it seeks to impute culpability arising from the failure of
the actor to perform up to a standard established by a legal fiat. But the
doctrine should not be rendered inflexible so as to deny relief when in fact
there is no causal relation between the statutory violation and the injury
sustained. Presumptions in law, while convenient, are not intractable so as to
forbid rebuttal rooted in fact. After all, tort law is remunerative in spirit, aiming
to provide compensation for the harm suffered by those whose interests have
been invaded owing to the conduct of others.44
Under American case law, the failures imputed on Villagracia are not grievous
enough so as to negate monetary relief. In the absence of statutory
requirement, one is not negligent as a matter of law for failing to equip a horn,
bell, or other warning devise onto a bicycle.45 In most cases, the absence of
proper lights on a bicycle does not constitute negligence as a matter of
law46 but is a question for the jury whether the absence of proper lights played
a causal part in producing a collision with a motorist.47 The absence of proper
lights on a bicycle at night, as required by statute or ordinance, may constitute
negligence barring or diminishing recovery if the bicyclist is struck by a motorist
as long as the absence of such lights was a proximate cause of the
collision;48 however, the absence of such lights will not preclude or diminish
recovery if the scene of the accident was well illuminated by street lights,49 if
substitute lights were present which clearly rendered the bicyclist visible,50 if
the motorist saw the bicycle in spite of the absence of lights thereon,51 or if the
motorist would have been unable to see the bicycle even if it had been
equipped with lights.52 A bicycle equipped with defective or ineffective brakes
may support a finding of negligence barring or diminishing recovery by an
injured bicyclist where such condition was a contributing cause of the
accident.53
The above doctrines reveal a common thread. The failure of the bicycle owner
to comply with accepted safety practices, whether or not imposed by ordinance
or statute, is not sufficient to negate or mitigate recovery unless a causal
connection is established between such failure and the injury sustained. The
principle likewise finds affirmation in Sanitary Steam, wherein we declared that
the violation of a traffic statute must be shown as the proximate cause of the
injury, or that it substantially contributed thereto.54 Añonuevo had the burden
of clearly proving that the alleged negligence of Villagracia was the proximate
or contributory cause of the latter’s injury.
On this point, the findings of the Court of Appeals are well-worth citing:
[As] admitted by appellant Añonuevo, he first saw appellee Villagracia at a
distance of about ten (10) meters before the accident. Corrolarily, therefore,
he could have avoided the accident had he [stopped] alongside with an
earlier (sic) jeep which was already at a full stop giving way to appellee. But
according to [eyewitness] Sorsano, he saw appellant Añonuevo
"umaarangkada" and hit the leg of Villagracia (TSN March 14, 1990 p. 30).
This earlier (sic) jeep at a full stop gave way to Villagracia to proceed but
Añonuevo at an unexpected motion (umarangkada) came out hitting
Villagracia (TSN March 9, 1990 p. 49). Appellant Añonuevo admitted that he
did not blow his horn when he crossed Boni Avenue (TSN March 21, 1990 p.
47).55
By Añonuevo’s own admission, he had seen Villagracia at a good distance of
ten (10) meters. Had he been decelerating, as he should, as he made the turn,
Añonuevo would have had ample opportunity to avoid hitting Villagracia.
Moreover, the fact that Añonuevo had sighted Villagracia before the accident
would negate any possibility that the absence of lights on the bike contributed
to the cause of the accident.56 A motorist has been held liable for injury to or
death of a bicyclist where the motorist turned suddenly into the bicyclist so as
to cause a collision.57
Neither does Añonuevo attempt before this Court to establish a causal
connection between the safety violations imputed to Villagracia and the
accident itself. Instead, he relied on a putative presumption that these
violations in themselves sufficiently established negligence appreciable
against Villagracia. Since the onus on Añonuevo is to conclusively prove the
link between the violations and the accident, we can deem him as having failed
to discharge his necessary burden of proving Villagracia’s own liability.
Neither can we can adjudge Villagracia with contributory
negligence.1âwphi1 The leading case in contributory negligence, Rakes v.
Atlantic Gulf58 clarifies that damages may be mitigated if the claimant "in
conjunction with the occurrence, [contributes] only to his injury."59 To hold a
person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he
performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or
signs of an impending danger to health and body.60 To prove contributory
negligence, it is still necessary to establish a causal link, although not
proximate, between the negligence of the party and the succeeding injury. In
a legal sense, negligence is contributory only when it contributes proximately
to the injury, and not simply a condition for its occurrence.61
As between Añonuevo and Villagracia, the lower courts adjudged Añonuevo
as solely responsible for the accident. The petition does not demonstrate why
this finding should be reversed. It is hard to imagine that the same result would
not have occurred even if Villagracia’s bicycle had been equipped with safety
equipment. Añonuevo himself admitted having seen Villagracia from ten (10)
meters away, thus he could no longer claim not having been sufficiently
warned either by headlights or safety horns. The fact that Añonuevo was
recklessly speeding as he made the turn likewise leads us to believe that even
if Villagracia’s bicycle had been equipped with the proper brakes, the cyclist
would not have had opportunity to brake in time to avoid the speeding car.
Moreover, it was incumbent on Añonuevo to have established that Villagracia’s
failure to have installed the proper brakes contributed to his own injury. The
fact that Añonuevo failed to adduce proof to that effect leads us to consider
such causal connection as not proven.

All told, there is no reason to disturb the assailed judgment.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals

is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
5. Yamada v. Manila Railroad Co. (33 Phil 11) automobile was secured at a certain price hour and was driven and controlled
by a chauffeur supplied by the taxicab company. The journey to Cavite Viejo
was made without incident but, on the return trip, while crossing the tracks of
defendant railroad company in the barrio of San Juan, municipality of Cavite
G.R. No. L-10073 December 24, 1915 Viejo, the automobile was struck by a train and the plaintiffs
injured.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
BUTARO YAMADA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD CO.,
defendant, and BACHRACH GARAGE & TAXICAB CO., Defendant- The trial court dismissed the complaint on the merits as to the Manila Railroad
Appellant. Company and held the defendant taxicab company liable for damages to the
plaintiffs in various amounts. The taxicab company
appealed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It appears from the record, and was found by the trial court, that the driver of
G.R. No. L-10074 December 24, 1915 the automobile drove his machine upon the railroad tracks without observing
the precautions which ordinary care and prudence would require, without
reducing speed and without taking any precaution looking to determining
KENJIRO KARABAYASHI, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD whether there was danger from a train or locomotive. The trial court
CO., defendant, and BACHRACH GARAGE & TAXICAB CO., Defendant- accordingly found that the driver was guilty of gross negligence and that said
Appellant. negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. It also found that the
driver had been, in effect, instructed by the taxicab company to approach and
pass over railroad tracks in the manner and form followed and observed on
the occasion in question, and that, for that reason, the taxicab company was
liable for the damages caused.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
G.R. No. L-10075 December 24, 1915 law library

TAKUTARU UYEHARA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD Several errors are assigned by the appellant. The first one relates to the finding
CO., defendant, and BACHRACH GARAGE & TAXICAB CO., Defendant- of the trial court: "That the driver of the automobile did not slacken speed,
Appellant. which was fast, upon approaching the railroad crossing, which was clearly
visible and had to be approached on an upward grade, or take any other
D.R. Williams for appellant. precaution to avert accident. ... and I can but conclude that the driver of the
Rohde and Wright for appellees. automobile was grossly negligent and careless in not taking such precaution
as would have notified him of the coming of the train. On the contrary, he
proceeded with reckless speed and regardless of possible or threatened
MORELAND, J.:
danger. If he had been driving the automobile at a proper rate of speed for
going over railroad crossing he could easily have stopped before going over
The three cases dealt with in this decision differ in their facts only with respect the railroad crossing after seeing the train."chanrobles virtual law library
to the injury suffered by the respective plaintiffs. The law applicable to them is
the same and, at the request of counsel, they will be decided at the same time.
The argument of the appellant which is devoted to this findings seems to admit
Plaintiffs claim damages against both the railroad and the garage company
impliedly at least that the driver of the automobile maintained his rate of speed
because of injuries suffered by them in a collision between a train owned by
as he approached and went upon the railroad crossing; and that he took no
and operated over tracks belonging to the railroad company and an automobile
precaution to ascertain the approach of a
the property of the Bachrach Garage & Taxicab
train.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Co.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The appellant contended on the trial and offered evidence to prove that, on
On January 2, 1913, the plaintiffs, together with three companions, hired an
approaching the railroad crossing from the direction in which the automobile
automobile from the defendant taxicab company for a trip to Cavite Viejo. The
was travelling at the time, the view of the railroad tracks in both directions was
obstructed by bushes and trees growing alongside thereof, and that it was
impossible for a person approaching the crossing even though on guard, to
detect by sight the approach of a train. If that were the case, it was clearly the
duty of the driver to reduce the speed of his car and the noise thereof to such
an extent that he would be able to determine from the unrestricted and
uninterrupted use of all his faculties whether or not a train was near. It is the
law that a person must use ordinary care and prudence in passing over a
railroad crossing. While we are not prepared to lay down any absolute rule as
to what precise acts of precaution are necessary to be done or left undone by
a person who may have need to pass over a railroad crossing, we may say
that it is always incumbent on him to use ordinary care and diligence. What
acts are necessary to constitute such care and diligence must depend on the
circumstances of each particular case. The degree of care differs in different
cases. Greater care is necessary in crossing a road where the cars are running
at a high rate of speed and close together than where they are running at less
speed and remote from one another. But in every case due care should be
exercised. It is very possible that where, on approaching a crossing, the view
of the tracks in both directions is unobstructed for such a distance as to render
it perfectly safe to pass over without the use of any other faculty than sight,
such use alone is sufficient and it is not necessary to stop or even to slacken
speed or listen. On the other hand, where the view of the tracks is obstructed,
them it is driver's duty to slacken speed, to reduce the noise, if any, of the
vehicle, to look and to listen, if necessary, or do any other act necessary to
determine that a train is not in dangerous proximity to the
crossing.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the case at bar the appellant's own showing is to the effect that the view of
the track in the direction from which the train was coming was obstructed in
such manner that neither the track nor a train could be seen as a traveler
approached the crossing; and yet, in spite of that fact, the chauffeur drove
upon the tracks without investigation or precaution of any kind. The very fact
that a train was approaching and was so near as to collide with the automobile
is strong evidence of the fact that no precautions were taken to determine that
fact. It is undoubted that if the driver had taken the simplest means of
permitting his own faculties to exercise themselves fairly, there would have
been no accident, as the presence of the train would have been discovered in
an instant; but he chose, rather, to give his senses no opportunity to protect
him or his passengers and drove on the track at full speed with all the noise
which an automobile produces at such speed on an upgrade and the sense of
hearing impaired by the rush of the wind. Railroad trains rarely pass over
tracks without noise and their presence, generally speaking, is easily detected
by persons who take ordinary precautions.
Under this assignment the appellant's main effort is being to the demonstration
of the fact that there was a custom established among automobile drivers of
Manila by which they habitually drove their cars over railroad crossings in the
manner in which the automobile was driven by defendant's servant on the
occasion in controversy. To prove that custom counsel presents the evidence
of the president of the defendant company, Mr. Bachrach, who testified on the
trial that all of his drivers, including the one in charge of the car on the night of
the accident, operated cars in that manner and that it was the custom among
automobile drivers generally. Counsel also cites the testimony of the witness
Palido, living near the scene of the accident, who testified that, as a general
rule, automobiles passed over the railroad crossing without changing speed.
This testimony was corroborated by the defendant company's driver who had
the automobile in charge at the time of the occurrence. Basing himself on this
alleged custom counsel contends that "When a person does what is usual and
customary, i. e., proceeds as he and others engaged in a like occupation have
been accustomed to proceed, the action cannot be characterized as reckless,
nor, strictly speaking as negligent." To this the obvious reply may be made, for
the moment admitting the existence of the custom, that a practice which is
dangerous to human life cannot ripen into a custom which will protect anyone
who follows it. To go upon a railroad crossing without making any effort to
ascertain the approach of a train is so hazardous an act and one so dangerous
to life, that no one may be permitted to excuse himself who does it, provided
injury result. One who performs an act so inherently dangerous cannot, when
an accident occurs, take refuge behind the plea that others have performed
the same act safely.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Under the second error assigned, the appellant contends with much vigor that
the plaintiffs cannot recover for the reason that the negligence of the driver of
the automobile, if any, was imputable to them, they having permitted the driver
to approach and pass over the railroad crossing without the use of ordinary
care and diligence to determine the proximity of a train or locomotive, and
having made no effort to caution or instruct him or compel him to take
reasonable care in making the crossing. With this contention we cannot agree.
We think the better rule, and one more consonant with the weight of authority,
is that a person who hires a public automobile and gives the driver direction
as to the place to which he wishes to be conveyed, but exercise no other
control over the conduct of the driver, is not responsible for acts of negligence
of the latter or prevented from recovering for injuries suffered from a collision
between the automobile and a train, caused by the negligence either of the
locomotive engineer or the automobile driver. (Little vs. Hackett, 116 U.S.,
366.) The theory on which the negligence of the driver has in some instances
been imputed to the occupant of the vehicle is that, having trusted the driver
by selecting the particular conveyance, the plaintiff so far identified himself with
the owner and his servants that, in case of injury resulting from their
negligence, he was considered a party thereto. This was the theory upon which
the case of Thorogood vs. Bryan (8 C.B., 115) was decided, which is the
leading case in favor of the principle contended for by appellant. The Supreme
Court of the United States, however, in Little vs. Hackett (116 U.S., 366), had
this to say concerning the ground on which the Thorogood case was decided:
"The truth is, the decision in Thorogood vs. Bryan rests upon indefensible
ground. The identification of the passenger with the negligent driver or the
owner, without his personal cooperation or encouragement, is a gratuitous
assumption. There is no such identity. The parties are not in the same position.
The owner of public conveyance is a carrier, and the driver or the servant of
the passenger, and his asserted identity with them is contradicted by the daily
experience of the world."chanrobles virtual law library
Further discussing the same question the court said: "There is no distinction
in principle whether the passenger be on public conveyance like a railroad train
or an omnibus, or be on a hack hired from a public stand in the street for a
drive. Those on a hack do not become responsible for the negligence of the
driver if they exercise no control over him further than to indicate the route they
wish to travel or the places to which they wish to go. If he is their agent so that
his negligence can be imputed to them to prevent their recovery against a third
party, he must be their agent in all other respects, so far as the management
of the carriage is concerned, and responsibility to third parties would attach to
them for injuries caused by his negligence in the course of his employment.
But, as we have already stated, responsibility cannot, within any recognized
rules of law, be fastened upon one who has in no way interfered with and the
with and controlled in the matter causing the injury. From the simple fact of
hiring the carriage or riding in it no such liability can arise. The party hiring or
riding must in some way have cooperated in producing the injury complained
of before he incur any liability for it. 'If the law were otherwise,' as said by Mr.
Justice Depue in his elaborate opinion in the latest case in New Jersey, 'not
only the hirer of the coach but also all the passengers in it would be under a
constraint to mount the box and superintend the conduct of the driver in the
management and control of his team, or be put for remedy exclusively to an
action against the irresponsible driver or equally irresponsible owner of a
coach taken, it may be, from a coach stand, for the consequences of an injury
which was the product of the cooperating wrongful acts of the driver and of a
third person, and that too, though the passengers were ignorant of the
character of the driver, and of the responsibility of the owner of the team, and
strangers to the route over which they were to be carried.' (New York, Lake
Erie & Western Railroad vs. Steinbrenner, 47 N.J.L. [18 Vroom], 161,
171.)"chanrobles virtual law library
We are of the opinion, therefore, that the rule is as we have stated it. Ordinarily
where one rides in public vehicle with the driver thereof and is injured by the
negligence of a third person, to which negligence that of the driver contributes
his contributory negligence is not imputable to the passenger unless said
passenger has or is in the position to have and exercise some control over the
driver with reference to the matter wherein he was negligent. Whether the
person injured exercises any control over the conduct of the driver further than
to indicate the place to which he wishes to drive is a question of fact to be
determined by the trial court on all of the evidence in the case. (Duval vs.
Railroad Co., 134 N. C., 331; Hampel vs. Detroit etc. R. R. Co., 110 Am. St.
Rep., 275; Cotton vs. Willmar etc. R. R. Co., 99 Minn., 366; Shultz vs. Old
Colony Street Ry. Co., 193 Mass., 309; Wilson vs. Puget Sound Elec. Ry. Co.,
52 Wash., 522; Johnson vs. Coey, 237 Ill., 88; Hindu vs. Steere, 209 Mass.
442.)chanrobles virtual law library
The appellant assigns as the third error the finding of the trial court "that the
defendant Manila Railroad Company was not guilty of negligence which
contributed to the causing of the accident complained of."chanrobles virtual
law library
In this connection it appears that, prior to the beginning of the action now
before us, two actions were instituted, both growing out of the accident which
forms the basis of the actions before us: (1) A criminal action against the
engineer of the train, in which the engineer was acquitted; and (2) a civil action
for damages by the garage and taxicab company, the appellant herein, against
the defendant railroad company, for damages to the automobile which was
destroyed as a result of the accident, in which judgment was for defendant.
There is evidence in the record showing that the locomotive engineer gave
due and timely signals on approaching the crossing in question. The trial court
found that the employees of the railroad company fully performed their duty as
the train approached the crossing on the night in question and that, therefore,
the railroad company in nowise contributed to the accident. We do not believe
that the record will justify us in a reversal of this finding. There is abundant
evidence to support it and we have nothing before us by which that evidence
may be impeached. That the bell was rung and the whistle was blown on
nearing the crossing, giving due and timely warning to all persons
approaching, was testified to not only by servants of the corporation but by
passengers on the train. We find nothing in the record which materially impairs
the credibility of these witnesses or to show that their evidence is improbable
or unreasonable; and we would be going far under such circumstances in
discarding it and reversing a judgment based
thereon.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The appellant under this assignment of error presents other facts which he
claims show necessarily that the company was negligent. He asserts: "(1) That
this accident occurred in the heart of the barrio of San Juan (Cavite Viejo),
within approximately one hundred meters of the railroad station, that is, in a
populous community; (2) that the railroad company did not maintain either a
flagman or protecting gates at the grade crossing where the accident occurred,
while the sign "Railroad Crossing" was broken on the side toward the road; (3)
that trees and undergrowth had been permitted to grow on and adjoining the
right of way and houses were constructed thereon, in such manner as to
obstruct the view of persons approaching the railroad track until within a few
meters thereof; and (4) that the approach to the crossing is twisting, and on
either side thereof are ditches about two meters deep."chanrobles virtual law
library
With respect to the existence of trees and undergrowth on the railroad
company's right of way, the evidence is conflicting, plaintiff maintaining and
attempting to prove that such trees and undergrowth existed, while defendant
company contended and offered evidence to show that no such growth existed
at the time of the accident. On this conflict of evidence the trial court found:
"Evidence on the part of the defendant Bachrach Garage & Taxicab Co. is to
the effect that the view from the crossing along the track towards Manila was
obstructed by bushes growing on the railroad right to way along the track, while
the preponderance of the evidence discloses that for a distance of twelve or
fifteen meters from the a view of the track for a considerable distance is wholly
unobstructed, and I can but conclude that the driver of the unobstructed, and
I can but conclude that the driver of the automobile was grossly negligent and
careless in not taking such precaution as would have notified him of the coming
of the train. On the contrary, he proceeded with reckless speed and regardless
of possible or threatened danger."chanrobles virtual law library
Here again we are met with a contradiction in the evidence of witnesses who,
so far as appears, are equally entitled to credit, which conflict has been
resolved by the trial court in favor of the witnesses for the defendant railroad
company. Counsel for appellant has failed to give any reason why we should
we should accept the testimony of appellant's witnesses rather than those of
the railroad company and he has also neglected to point out any error
committed by the trial court in making its finding in this regard. A careful
examination of the record discloses no reason why the judgment of the trial
court on this point should be disturbed, there appearing nothing on which we
could base a judgment declaring that the trial court erred in making its
decision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
As to the other facts set forth on which appellant predicates negligence on the
part of the railroad company, we find them, even if admitted, to be insufficient
to establish negligence. It is not negligence on the part of the railroad company
to maintain grade crossing, even in populous district; nor is it negligence not
to maintain a flagman at such crossing. It is true that a railroad company is
held to greater caution in the more thronged streets of the densely populated
portions of the city than in the less frequented streets in suburban parts or in
towns; but this does not mean that it is negligence to maintain grade crossing
in such densely populated portions or that it is negligence not to maintain a
flagman at crossings located in such districts. It simply means that the
company in operating its trains over such crossings must exercise care
commensurate with the use of crossings in any given
locality.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The main contention of the appellant is based on the claim that, even admitting
as proved all of the facts alleged by the plaintiffs, the appellant is not liable. It
is maintained that up to the time the accident occurred the defendant taxicab
company had fully performed its duty to the public, it being undisputed in the
record that the driver was competent and had a long and satisfactory record,
having driven cars for the defendant for 5 or 6 years without accident or
misadventure, and that his negligence, if any, in attempting to pass over the
crossing on the occasion before us, cannot legally be imputed to the taxicab
company so as to make it liable for the damages resulting therefrom. In
supporting of this argument the case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil., Rep., 663),
is cited as determinative of the question under consideration. The appellant,
however, having denied the fact of negligence, we might, before entering on a
discussion of the applicability of the principles enunciated in Johnson vs.
David to the facts before us, repeat what we have already said, that it appears
from the record, and was found by the trial court, that the driver of the
automobile drove his machine upon the railroad tracks without observing the
precautions which ordinary care and prudence would have required. He made
substantially no effort toward ascertaining whether there was danger from a
train or locomotive. The trial court found, as was quite necessary under the
facts, that the driver was guilty of gross negligence and that such negligence
was the proximate cause of the accident. It also found that the taxicab
company had permitted its drivers to approach and pass over railroad tracks
in the manner and form followed and observed on the occasion in question
until it had become a custom among its drivers, known and sanctioned by the
company; and that, for that reason, the taxicab company was liable for the
damages caused. We are of the opinion that the trial court is fully supported in
the finding that the conduct of the officials of the taxicab company, and notably
the president thereof, amounted, in law, to a sanction of the custom
established among its automobile drivers in passing over railroad crossings.
Counsel is met, therefore, at the opening of his discussion on this branch of
the case, with the question: Did the defendant taxicab company fully discharge
its duty when it furnished a suitable and proper car and selected driver who
had been with the company for 5 or 6 years and who had not had an accident
or misadventure before? We think not. It was the duty of the company not only
to furnish a suitable and proper car and select a competent operator, but also
to supervise and, where necessary, instruct him
properly.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Returning now to the applicability of the case of Johnson vs. David to the facts
before us:chanrobles virtual law library
The Civil Code, in dealing with the liability of a master for the negligent acts of
his servant, makes a distinction between private individuals and public
enterprises. (Art. 1903, Civil Code.) That article, together with the preceding
article, is as follows:
ART 1902. A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another
when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so
done.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable,
not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for the persons for whom
they should be responsible.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother is liable for the damages
caused by the minors who live with
them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Guardians are liable for the damages caused by minors or incapacitated
persons who are under their authority and live with
them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which
the latter may be employed or on account of their
duties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The State is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not
when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it
pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the
proceeding article shall be applicable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
Finally, master or directors of arts and trades are liable for the damages
caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their
custody.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The liability referred to in this articles shall cease when the persons mentioned
therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to avoid the damage.
These two articles are found under chapter 2, title 16, of the Civil Code, dealing
with "obligations which arise from fault or negligence;" and set out the cases,
generally speaking, in which the master is liable for the acts of his servant.
That chapter also contains articles providing for liability for negligent acts of
servants in special cases, among them 1905, which provides that "the
possessor of an animal, or the one who uses it, is liable for the damages it
may cause even when said animal escapes from him or strays," but that this
liability shall cease "in the case the damage should arise from force majeure or
from the fault of the person who may have suffered it;" 1906, which declares
that "the owner of a game preserve shall be liable for damages caused by the
game to neighboring estates, should he not have done what may have been
necessary to avoid increase of the same or should he have hindered the efforts
of the owners of said estates to hunt;" 1907, which provides for the liability of
the owner of a building "for damages which may result from the collapse of the
whole or a part thereof, if it should occur through the absence of necessary
repairs;" 1908, which states that "owners shall be liable for damages caused
by the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due
diligence, and been placed in a safe and proper place;" "by excessive smoke,
which may be noxious to persons of property;" "by the fall of trees, located in
places of transit, when not caused by force majeure;" "by the emanations of
sewers or deposits of infectious matters, when constructed without
precautions proper for the place where they are located;" and "the head of a
family who dwells in a house, or in a part of the same, is liable for the damages
by the things which may be thrown or which may fall therefrom."chanrobles
virtual law library
These are the only cases under the Civil Code in which damages may be
recovered from the master for the negligent of his servant. As is seen from a
reading of article 1903, a person being driven about by his servant's negligent
acts except under certain circumstances. (Chapman vs. Underwood, 27 Phil.,
Rep., 374; Johnson vs. David, supra.) On the other hand, the master is liable
for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the owner or director of a
business or enterprise and the negligent acts are committed while the servant
is engaged in his master's employment as such
owner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The distinction made in the Code has been observed, as would naturally be
expected, by the decisions of this court. In the case of Johnson vs.
David, supra, we held that the defendant was not liable for the acts of his
servant in negligently driving a horse and carriage against plaintiff, who was at
the time riding a bicycle in the streets of Manila, throwing him to the ground
and injuring him and his bicycle. It appeared in that case that the vehicle was
owned by the defendant, that it was being driven by the defendant's coachman
on the private affairs of the owner, that it was not a public conveyance driven
for hire or as a part of a business or enterprise. In that case we said: "It would
seem, from an examination of these various provisions, that the obligation to
respond for the negligent acts of another was limited to the particular cases
mentioned; in other words, we are of the opinion and so hold that it was the
intention of the legislature in enacting said chapter 2 to enumerate all the
persons for whose negligent acts third persons are responsible. Article 1902
provides when a person himself is liable for negligence. Articles 1903, 1904,
1905, 1906, 1907, 1908, and 1910 provide when a person shall be liable for
injuries caused, not by his own negligence but by the negligence of other
persons or things.
xxx xxx xxx
These sections do not include a liability on the part of the plaintiff for injuries
resulting from acts of negligence such as are complained of in the present
cause . . . ."chanrobles virtual law library
These case of Chapman vs. Underwood, (27 Phil., Rep., 374) was similar in
its facts and the principles governing it, to that of Johnson vs. David. In that
case the plaintiff, while about to board a street car, was struck by an
automobile which, at the time, was being driven on the wrong side of the street.
The automobile was in charge of the servant of the owner, who was present
in the automobile at the time the accident occurred. The automobile was not a
part of defendant's business nor was it being used at the time as a part or
adjunct of any business or enterprise owned or conducted by him. Although
the act of the driver was negligent, and was so declared by this court, it was,
nevertheless, held that the master was not liable for the results of the act. We
said:
The defendant, however, is not responsible for the negligence of his driver,
under the facts and circumstances of this case. As we have said in the case
of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil., Rep., 663), the driver does not fall within the list
of person in article 1903 of the Civil Code for whose acts the defendant would
be responsible.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Although in the David case the owner of the vehicle was not present at the
time the alleged negligent acts were committed by the driver, the same rule
applies where the owner is present, unless the negligent acts of the driver are
continued for such a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable
opportunity to observe them and to direct his driver to desist therefrom. An
owner who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his driver to
continue in a violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after he
has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver,
becomes himself responsible for such acts. The owner of an automobile who
permits his chauffeur to drive up the Escolta, for example, at a speed of 60
miles an hour, without any effort to stop him, although he has had a reasonable
opportunity to do so, becomes himself responsible, both criminally and civilly,
for the results produced by the acts of his chauffeur. On the other hand, if the
driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having a
reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, injures a person
or violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present
therein at the time the act was committed, is not responsible, either civilly or
criminally, therefor. The act complained of must be continued in the presence
of the owner for such a length of time that the owner, by his acquiescence,
makes his driver's act his own.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
In the case before us it does not appear from the record that, from the time the
automobile took the wrong side of the road to the commission of the injury,
sufficient time intervened to afford the defendant an opportunity correct the act
of his driver. Instead, it appears with fair clearness that the interval between
the turning out to meet and pass the street car and the happening of the
accident was so short as not to be sufficient to charge defendant with the
negligence of the driver.
The case of Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., Rep., 624), was a case
of a different character. There an automobile was being operated by the
defendant as a public vehicle carrying passengers from Balayan to Tuy
(Province of Batangas) and return for hire. On one to the trips, the machine,
by reason of a defect in the steering gear, refused to respond to the guidance
of the driver and, as a result a child was run over and killed. That case, as is
seem at a glance, is quite different from the case of Johnson vs. David and
that of Chapman vs. Underwood, in that the automobile was operated as a
business or enterprise on which the defendant had entered for gain; and this
is the particular distinction which is made in article 1903 of the Civil Code which
holds the masters responsible for the negligent acts of the servant when the
master is the owner "of an establishment or enterprise," and the acts
complained of are committed within the scope of the servant's employment in
such business. In the case under discussion we held that, in addition to the
requirement to furnish and use proper and safe machines, it was the duty of a
person or corporation operating automobiles for hire to exercise ordinary care
and diligence in the selection of the drivers of his or its automobiles and in
supervision over them while in his or its employ, including the promulgation of
proper rules and regulations and the formulation and due publication of proper
instructions for their guidance in cases where such rules, regulations and the
formulation and due publication of proper instructions for their guidance in
cases where such rules, regulations and instruction are necessary. Discussion
article 1903 of the Civil Code, which, as we have seen, not only established
liability in case of negligence but also provides when that liability ceases, the
court in that case said:
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by
the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption
of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either
in the selection of the selection of the servant or employee or in supervision
over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that that presumption is juris
tantum and not juris et de jure and consequently may be rebutted. It follows
necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in
selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good
father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from
liability.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on
his own negligence and not on that of his servant. This is the notable
peculiarity of the Spanish law of negligence. It is, of course, in striking contrast
to the American doctrine that, in relations with strangers, the negligence of the
servant is conclusively the negligence of the
master.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the case before us the death of the child caused by a defect in the steering
gear of the automobile immediately raised the presumption that Leynes was
negligent in selecting a defective automobile or in his failure to maintain it in
good condition after selection and the burden of proof was on him to show that
he had exercised the care of a good father of a family.
In that case we further said: "From the commencement of the use of the
machine until the accident occurred sufficient time had not elapsed to require
an examination of the machine by the defendant as a part of his duty of
inspection and supervision. While it does not appear that the defendant
formulated rules and regulations for the guidance of the drivers and gave them
proper instructions, designed for the protection of the public and the
passengers, the evidence shows, as we have seen, that the death of the child
was not caused by a failure to promulgate rules and regulations. It was caused
by a defect in the machine as to which the defendant has shown himself free
from responsibility."chanrobles virtual law library
We, therefore, see that taxicab company did not perform its full duty when it
furnished a safe and proper car and a driver with a long and satisfactory
record. It failed to comply with one of the essential requirements of the law of
negligence in this jurisdiction, that of supervision and instruction, including the
promulgation of proper rules and regulations and the formulation and
publication of proper instructions for their guidance in cases where such rules
and regulations and instructions are necessary. To repeat, it was found by the
trial court, and that finding is fully sustained by the record, that it was the
custom of the driver who operated the machine on the night of the accident, to
approach and pass over railroad crossings without adequate precautions, and
that such custom was known to and had been sanctioned by the officials of
the taxicab company, the president of the company testifying that none of its
drivers, especially the one who operated the car on the night of the accident,
were accustomed to stop or even reduce speed or take any other precaution
in approaching and passing over railroad crossings, no matter of what nature,
unless they heard "the signal of a car." He testified that he himself had ridden
behind several of his drivers, among them the one who handled the automobile
on the night of the accident, and that it was settled practice, to which he made
no objection and as to which he gave no instructions, to approach and pass
over railroad crossings without any effort to ascertain the proximity of a train.
These facts and circumstances bring the case within the doctrine enunciated
in the Litonjua case to which reference has already been made, and, at the
same time, remove it from that class of cases governed by Johnson vs. David.
Not only has the defendant taxicab company failed to rebut the presumption
of negligence arising from the carelessness of its servant, but it has, in effect,
made those negligent acts its own by having observed and known the custom
of its drivers without disapproving it and without issuing instructions designed
to supersede it.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We are of the opinion that the trial court erred in fixing the amount of damages
which the plaintiffs suffered. Under the law, each of the plaintiffs, is entitled to
recover the time, doctors' bills and hospital bills and hospital bills and
medicines, and any other item of expense which it was found necessary to
undergo by reason of the damages
sustained.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The plaintiff Butaro Yamada is entitled to be reimbursed for his hospital bill of
P49, for the P50 which he paid to Dr. Strahan, and for the loss of time which
he suffered at the rate of P100 a month. The trial court allowed him for certain
alleged fees of doctors and expenses in hospitals and at hot springs in Japan.
He was also allowed P150 alleged by him to have been paid to a Japanese
doctor in Manila. We do not believe that the record warrants these allowances.
As to the expenses in Japan, we may say that the injury occurred to plaintiff
on the 2nd of January and he remained in Manila for nearly 6 months before
going to Japan. According to the testimony of Dr. Strahan the plaintiff was in
good physical condition long before he left this country for Japan. His
testimony is to the effect that the plaintiff suffered no permanent injuries, the
damage being limited to temporary shocks and bruises, and that he would be
ready for his usual occupation in about 3 months. According to plaintiff's own
testimony he went back to work 2 months after the injury, but, claiming he still
felt pains, went to Japan. We do not believe that we ought to accept the
plaintiff's bare statement as to his physical condition after leaving the
Philippine Islands in defiance of the testimony of Dr. Strahan as to his physical
condition 3 months after the injury was received and particularly in view of the
fact that he returned to work at the end of 2 months. As to the P150 alleged to
have been paid to a Japanese doctor in Manila, we have grave doubts whether
he had sufficiently proved that item of expenditure. He does not give the name
of the physician to whom he paid the money and he presents no receipt or
voucher from the person whom he paid. He made no memorandum of the
payment at the time or of the person to whom he paid it or of the date on which
it was paid. All of his testimony relating to the items which constitute his
damage was based on a memorandum made from memory on the morning of
the trial. It seems to us that where the sources of knowledge are to so large
an extent within the knowledge and control of the person who presents the
evidence, he should be held rather strictly to presenting the best evidence that
the circumstances permit. If he had offered the Japanese doctor as a witness
or if he had even produced receipts from him, the matter would have borne
quite a different aspect.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
We are accordingly of the opinion that the judgment in favor of this plaintiff
should consist simply of the loss of time, amounting to 2 months at P100 a
month, his hospital bill of P49 and his doctor's bill of P50, in all P299, with
costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
With respect to the plaintiff Takutaru Uyehara, the judgment in his favor must
be also modified. Concerning his condition we have substantially the same
testimony by the same doctor that we had in the case of Yamada. There were
no permanent injuries. The plaintiff suffered merely from shock and bruises.
He was quite recovered in 3 months. It appears that he was earning P200 a
month at the time of his injury and that his hospital expense, including
attendance of a physician, was P350. We are satisfied from the record that he
is entitled to P600 for 3 months' loss of wages and to P350 for hospital
expenses and medical attendance. As to the claim for P150 paid to a Japanese
doctor, we have in substance the same circumstances found in connection
with the claim of the plaintiff Yamada, - no name, no date, no memorandum,
no receipt; nothing but the testimony of the plaintiff himself based upon date
prepared from memory. It is worthy of note also that both this plaintiff and
plaintiff Yamada claim to have paid exactly the same amount to Japanese
doctors in Manila.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Takutaru Uyehara for the
sum of P950, and costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
With respect to the judgment in favor of the plaintiff Kenjiro Karabayashi, we
are clear that it must be reduced in amount. This plaintiff was able, immediately
after the accident occurred, to move about readily an to assist his injured
companions. He did not go to a hospital, or, so far as appeared, consult a
physician until some time after the accident. He alleges that he paid to
Japanese doctors P310 and to massage doctors P130, and that he paid P365
for medicines. The injury was received on the 2d of January, 1913, and this
caution was commenced in October of the same year. It seem to us incredible
that the plaintiff, who suffered and suffers from no physical injury testified to
by any physician, should have paid out during that time more than P800 for
medicines and doctors. That sum exceeds the sums claimed to have been
paid out by the other plaintiffs, who were so badly injured that they were carried
in a semiconscious condition to the hospital and were unable to move without
assistance for some days.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
This plaintiff complains of loss of memory as the only result of his injuries and
claims that he is unable to obtain a salary equivalent to that which he was
receiving before the accident. He presents no evidence of such loss of memory
except his own statement, his physical condition at the time of the trial being
apparently perfect and there being at that time no evidence, as he himself
admitted, of loss of memory. He presented no doctor to testify as to services
rendered, indeed, he does not even furnish the name of the person to whom
the money was paid, and he shows no receipts and produces no evidence
except his own statement with respect to the amount paid out for medicines.
We believe that, under this testimony, no damages should be allowed to this
plaintiff except possibly salary for the short period during which, by reason of
shock, he may have been unable to render active service. He testified that he
lost two and one-half months' time, during which he did not work at all, and
that his services were worth P160 a
month.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The judgment of the Court of First Instance with respect to this plaintiff, Kenjiro
Karabayashi, is modified and judgment in his favor and against the Bachrach
Garage & Taxicab Co. for P400 is hereby decreed, with
costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It may be urged that the reductions in the amounts allowed the several plaintiffs
by the trial court are arbitrary, the evidence as to the damages sustained being
uncontradicted and the trial court having based its judgment thereon. It is clear,
however, that we are in no way interfering with the rule so many times laid
down by this court that we will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court
as to the credibility of witnesses except where it appears that the court
overlooked or misapplied facts or circumstances of weight and influence
appearing in the case. Here the trial court seems to have overlooked those
facts and circumstances top which we have adverted and which we have made
the basis of the modification. It nowhere appears in the decision of the trial
court or elsewhere in the record that it took any of those facts and
circumstances into consideration. So ordered.
6. Martinez v. William Van Buskirk (GR No. L-5691)
G.R. No. L-5691 December 27, 1910
S. D. MARTINEZ and his wife, CARMEN ONG DE MARTINEZ, plaintiffs-
appellees,
vs.
WILLIAM VAN BUSKIRK, defendant-appellant.
Lionel D. Hargis for appellant.
Sanz and Oppisso for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
The facts found by the trial court are undisputed by either party in this case.
They are —
That on the 11th day of September, 1908, the plaintiff, Carmen Ong
de Martinez, was riding in a carromata on Calle Real, district of Ermita,
city of Manila, P.I., along the left-hand side of the street as she was
going, when a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant used for the
purpose of transportation of fodder by the defendant, and to which was
attached a pair of horses, came along the street in the opposite
direction to that the in which said plaintiff was proceeding, and that
thereupon the driver of the said plaintiff's carromata, observing that
the delivery wagon of the defendant was coming at great speed,
crowded close to the sidewalk on the left-hand side of the street and
stopped, in order to give defendant's delivery wagon an opportunity to
pass by, but that instead of passing by the defendant's wagon and
horses ran into the carromata occupied by said plaintiff with her child
and overturned it, severely wounding said plaintiff by making a serious
cut upon her head, and also injuring the carromata itself and the
harness upon the horse which was drawing it.
xxx xxx xxx
These facts are not dispute, but the defendant presented evidence to
the effect that the cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the
time the accident occurred, was a good servant and was considered
a safe and reliable cochero; that the delivery wagon had sent to deliver
some forage at Paco Livery Stable on Calle Herran, and that for the
purpose of delivery thereof the cochero driving the team as
defendant's employee tied the driving lines of the horses to the front
end of the delivery wagon and then went back inside of the wagon for
the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered; that while
unloading the forage and in the act of carrying some of it out, another
vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a whip and made some
other noises, which frightened the horses attached to the delivery
wagon and they ran away, and the driver was thrown from the inside
of the wagon out through the rear upon the ground and was unable to
stop the horses; that the horses then ran up and on which street they
came into collision with the carromata in which the plaintiff, Carmen
Ong de Martinez, was riding.
The defendant himself was not with the vehicle on the day in question.
Upon these facts the court below found the defendant guilty of negligence and
gave judgment against him for P442.50, with interest thereon at the rate of 6
per cent per annum from the 17th day of October, 1908, and for the costs of
the action. The case is before us on an appeal from that judgment.
There is no general law of negligence in the Philippine Islands except that
embodied in the Civil Code. The provisions of that code pertinent to this case
are —
Art. 1902. A person who by an act or omission causes damage to
another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the
damage so done.
Art. 1903. The obligation imposed by preceding article is demandable,
not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the
persons for whom they should be responsible.
The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the
damages caused by the minors who live with them.
Guardians are liable for the damages caused by minors or
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live with
them.
Owners of directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable
for the damages caused by the employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of their
duties.
 The State is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent,
but not when the damages should have been caused by the official to
whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the
provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.
Finally, masters or directors of arts and trades are liable for the
damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under
their custody.
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons
mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to avoid the damage.
Passing the question whether or not an employer who has furnished a gentle
and tractable team and a trusty and capable driver is, under the last paragraph
of the above provisions, liable for the negligence of such driver in handling the
team, we are of the opinion that the judgment must be reversed upon the
ground that the evidence does not disclose that the cochero was negligent.
While the law relating to negligence in this jurisdiction may possibly be some
what different from that in Anglo-Saxon countries, a question we do not now
discuss, the rules under which the fact of negligence is determined are,
nevertheless, generally the same. That is to say, while the law designating
the person responsible for a negligent act may not be the same here as in
many jurisdictions, the law determining what is a negligent act is the same
here, generally speaking, as elsewhere. (Supreme court of Spain, 4
December, 1903; 16 May, 1893; 27 June, 1894; 9 April, 1896; 14 March, 1901;
2 March, 1904; 7 February, 1905; 16 June, 1905; 23 June, 1905; 13 April,
1903; 7 March, 1902; 12 June, 1900; 2 March, 1907; 18 March, 1898; 3 June,
1901.)
It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which caused the
damage were gentle and tractable; that the cochero was experienced and
capable; that he had driven one of the horses several years and the other five
or six months; that he had been in the habit, during all that time, of leaving
them in the condition in which they were left on the day of the accident; that
they had never run away up to that time and there had been, therefore, no
accident due to such practice; that to leave the horses and assist in unloading
the merchandise in the manner described on the day of the accident was the
custom of all cochero who delivered merchandise of the character of that which
was being delivered by the cochero of the defendant on the day in question,
which custom was sanctioned by their employers.
In our judgment, the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the
horses in the manner described by the evidence in this case, either under
Spanish or American jurisprudence. (Lynch vs. Nurdin, 1 Q. B., 422;
Rumsey vs. Nelson, 58 Vt., 590; Drake vs. Mount, 33 N. J. L., 442; Hoboken
Land and Improvement Co. vs. Lally, 48 N. J. L., 604; Wasmer vs. D. L. & W.
R. R. Co., 80 N. Y., 212.) lawphi1.net
In the case of Hayman vs. Hewitt (Peake N. P. Cas., pt. 2, p. 170), Lord
Kenyon said:
He was performing his duty while removing the goods into the house,
and, if every person who suffered a cart to remain in the street while
he took goods out of it was obliged to employ another to look after the
horses, it would be impossible for the business of the metropolis to go
on.
In the case of Griggs vs. Fleckenstein (14 Minn., 81), the court said:
The degree of care required of the plaintiff, or those in charged of his
horse, at the time of the injury, is that which would be exercised by a
person of ordinary care and prudence under like circumstances. It can
not be said that the fact of leaving the horse unhitched is in itself
negligence. Whether it is negligence to leave a horse unhitched must
be depend upon the disposition of the horse; whether he was under
the observation and control of some person all the time, and many
other circumstances; and is a question to be determined by the jury
from the facts of each case.
In the case of Belles vs. Kellner (67 N. J. L., 255), it was held that it was error
on the part of the trial court to refuse to charge that "it is not negligence for the
driver of a quite, gentle horse to leave him unhitched and otherwise unattended
on the side of a public highways while the driver is upon the sidewalk loading
goods on the wagon." The said court closed its opinion with these words:
There was evidence which could have fully justified the jury in finding
that the horse was quite and gentle, and that the driver was upon the
sidewalk loading goods on the wagon, at time of the alleged injury,
and that the horse had been used for years in that way without
accident. The refusal of the trial court to charge as requested left the
jury free to find was verdict against the defendant, although the jury
was convinced that these facts were proven.lawphil.net
In the case of Southworth vs. Ry. Co. (105 Mass., 342), it was held:
That evidence that a servant, whom traders employed to deliver
goods, upon stopping with his horse and wagon to deliver a parcel at
a house from fifty to a hundred rods from a railroad crossing, left the
 horse unfastened for four or five minutes while he was in the house, There was presented in this case, and by the plaintiffs themselves, not only
knowing that it was not afraid of cars, and having used it for three or the fact of the runway and the accident resulting therefrom, but also the
four months without ever hitching it or knowing it to start, is not conditions under which the runaway occurred. Those conditions showing of
conclusive, as a matter of law, of a want of due care on his part. themselves that the defendant's cochero was not negligent in the management
of the horse, the prima facie case in plaintiffs' favor, if any, was destroyed as
The duty, a violation of which is claimed to be negligence in the respect in soon as made.
question, is to exercise reasonable care and prudence. Where reasonable
care is employed in doing an act not itself illegal or inherently likely to produce It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the universal
damage to others, there will be no liability, although damage in fact ensues. practice of merchants to deliver merchandise of the kind of that being delivered
(Milwaukee Ry. Co. vs. Arms, 91 U. S., 489; Parrott vs. Wells, 15 Wall., 524; at the time of the injury, in the manner in which that was then being delivered;
Brown vs. Kendall, 6 Cushing, 292; Jackson Architectural Iron and that it is the universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which
Works vs.Hurlbut, 158 N. Y., 34 Westerfield vs. Levis, 43 La. An., 63; they were left at the time of the accident. This is the custom in all cities. It has
Niosi vs. Empire Steam Laundry, 117 Cal., 257.) not been productive of accidents or injuries. The public, finding itself
unprejudiced by such practice, has acquiesced for years without objection.
The act of defendant's driver in leaving the horses in the manner proved was Ought the public now, through the courts, without prior objection or notice, to
not unreasonable or imprudent. Acts the performance of which has not proved be permitted to reverse the practice of decades and thereby make culpable
destructive or injurious and which have, therefore, been acquiesced in by and guilty one who had every reason and assurance to believe that he was
society for so long a time that they have ripened into custom, can not be held acting under the sanction of the strongest of all civil forces, the custom of a
to be themselves unreasonable or imprudent. Indeed the very reason why they people? We think not.
have been permitted by society is that they beneficial rather than prejudicial.itc-
alf Accidents sometimes happen and injuries result from the most ordinary The judgement is reversed, without special finding as to costs. So ordered.
acts of life. But such are not their natural or customary results. To hold that,
because such an act once resulted in accident or injury, the actor is necessarily
negligent, is to go far. The fact that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
sometimes successfully invoked in such a case, does not in any sense militate
against the reasoning presented. That maxim at most only creates aprima
facie case, and that only in the absence of proof of the circumstances under
which the act complained of was performed. It is something invoked in favor
of the plaintiff before defendant's case showing the conditions and
circumstances under which the injury occurred, the creative reason for the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur disappears. This is demonstrated by the case
of Inland and Seaboard Costing Co. vs. Tolson (139 U.S., 551), where the
court said (p. 554):

. . . The whole effect of the instruction in question, as applied to the

case before the jury, was that if the steamboat, on a calm day and in
smooth water, was thrown with such force against a wharf properly
built, as to tear up some of the planks of the flooring, this would
be prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant's
agent in making the landing, unless upon the whole evidence in the
case this prima facie evidence was rebutted. As such damage to a
wharf is not ordinarily done by a steamboat under control of her
officers and carefully managed by them, evidence that such damage
was done in this case was prima facie, and, if unexplained, sufficient
evidence of negligence on their part, and the jury might properly be so
instructed.
7. People v. Vistan (GR No. 17218)
G.R. No. 17218 September 8, 1921
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NARCISO VISTAN Y DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
Ross & Lawrence, and Ewald E. Selph for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
VILLAMOR, J.:
The appellant was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the
crime of serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence and sentenced
to imprisonment for three months of arresto mayor, with the corresponding
accessory penalties and to pay the costs.
The complaint is as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of April, 1920, in the city of Manila,
Philippine Islands, while street car No. 203 of the Manila Electric
Railroad and Light Co. was receiving passengers at the intersection
of M. H. del Pilar and Isaac Peral Streets of this city, said accused,
who was then and there the conductor in charge of said street car, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously and with reckless
imprudence signal the motorman to go ahead without minding and
without taking into account that one Hugo Borromeo, whom he could
then see was at that very moment about to board the car with one foot
on the running board, thereby causing the said Hugo Borromeo to be
thrown down by the jerk of the moving car and his foot overrun by the
rear wheels of said car No. 203 upon falling on the ground, with the
result that his left foot was crushed and injured to such an extent as to
require medical attendance and prevent the said offended party from
engaging in his habitual work for a period of more than ninety days;
that due to said accident Hugo Borromeo lost his left foot which had
to be amputated. Contrary to law.
It appears from the record that on April 10, 1920, after two sons of the offended
the street car No. 203 which had stopped at the intersection of M. H. del Pilar
and Isaac Peral Streets of this city, and also in attempting to board the same
car, the said Hugo Borromeo with his right hand took a hold of the iron bar on
the right side of the only entrance door, and with the left the iron bar in the
middle of the entrance. When he had his right foot on the platform, the
conductor in charge of the car, the accused herein, gave the signal to start.
Thereupon the car suddenly moved forward with a jerk thus causing his left
hand to slip off while the right one was pinioned between the iron bar and the
woodwork upon which it was fixed and he was unable to draw it out
immediately due to the speed of the car. In the meantime he was momentarily
dragged along and when his knees were touching the ground, he felt that his
left foot had become numb, unaware that his foot was overrun by the wheel,
until he was on the ground about 10 meters, more or less, from the place where
the car had started.
The defense tried to prove that the street car being in motion, the offended
party ran after it and attempted to board it, but unfortunately missed the
running board and upon falling down one of his feet was caught by the wheels
of the car. The witnesses who testified to this fact undoubtedly referred to the
fact related by the aggrieved party himself when he gave the tails as to how
he was for a time dragged by the car. It was not necessary for the offended
party to run after the car in order to board it, as it was stopped when his two
sons entered it, behind whom he was with his hands holding the bars of the
car, and was then placing his right foot on the running board when the car
started in response to the signal to start given at that very moment by the
accused. The fact is that due probably to the abrupt motion of the car in
starting, the left hand of the offended party slipped off and his right hand was
caught between the iron bar and woodwork upon which it was attached and
having lost the equilibrium he was dragged along for a short distance until his
left foot was caught by the wheels of the car. This fact, which was seen by the
witness Lawson who was some distance behind the car, might cause the
impression that the offended party was running after the car when he fell down,
and, we believe, the witness testified under this impression.
We believe it to be clear that at the time of boarding the car, the offended party
was watching the man who gave the signal to start, that is, the conductor, and
the latter, who, had his eyes toward the door, seeing the nobody was alighting
or boarding the car, rang the bell, whereupon the car started. It is not
improbable that when the accused saw the last passenger with both hands
clinging to the holding device of the car and one foot on the running board, he
thought that the passenger had completely boarded the car and that is why he
gave the signal to start. The question that present itself is whether or not the
accused acted with reckless negligence as alleged in the information.
In the case of U.S. vs. Gomez (R. G. No. 14068),1 the accused was convicted
of the crime of homicide through reckless negligence. The accused was the
motorman of a street car that collided with a carabao cart at the intersection of
Concepcion and Arroceros Streets of the city of Manila. As a result of the
collision, one of the occupants of the cart, Santos Alcartado, was thrown under
the car and killed. In discussing the responsibility of the accused, this court,
among other things, said:
Upon the other point, whether the negligence or imprudence of the
accused can properly be denominated rash it is to be observed that
the amount of care and diligence which a man is required to use in a
particular situation in order to avoid the imputation of negligence
varies with the obviousness of the risk. If the danger of doing injury to
the person or property of another by the pursuance of a certain line of
conduct is great, the individual who proposes to pursue that particular
course is bound to use great care in order to avoid the foreseeable
harm. On the other hand, if the danger is slight, only a slight amount
of care is required. It is thus seen that there are infinite shades of care
or diligence, from the slightest momentary thought or transient glance
of attention to the most vigilant anxiety and solicitude, and whether a
person is bound to use a high or a low degree of care depends upon
the situation presented in the particular case. Now the term negligence
is used to indicate the legal delinquency which results wherever a man
fails to exhibit the care which he ought to exhibit, whether it be slight,
ordinary or great; and it is clear that in a situation where immediate
danger to an individual is indicated the requirement for the exercise of
a high degree of care is more exigent than where nothing more than
possible harm to inanimate things is concerned. As experience only
too well teaches collisions between cars and vehicles carrying people
in the streets are fraught with a high degree of danger to the
passengers, and it results that a high degree of care is required of
those who have control of the agencies involving such danger. The
failure to use the requisite care in such cases is properly denominated
gross negligence or rash imprudence if the actor, having at his
command the means of avoiding the harm, fails to avail himself of it.
The term "rash imprudence," as used in the Spanish Code, would
seem to be approximately equivalent to the "gross negligence" of the
common law; and as was once observed by a brilliant English judge,
gross negligence is only negligence with a vituperative epithet (Rolfe,
B., in Wilson vs. Brett [1843], Mees. and Wels., 113). The same may
substantially be said of the term "rash imprudence" in Spanish law. It
is imprudence with a vituperative epithet. In common usage the word
"rash" seems sometimes to imply a wanton disregard of
consequences, indicative of a state of mind bordering upon deliberate
intention to inflict a positive injury. The legal import of the expression
is in our opinion of somewhat greater latitude, since it wholly excludes
the idea of malice and under conditions more readily felt than defined
is satisfied by proof of mere lack of foresight.
"Reckless imprudence consists in doing or not doing
voluntarily, but without malice, an act, from which material
injury results due to lack of foresight, unexcusable on the part
of the person executing or omitting to do it." (Decision of the
supreme court of Spain, May 14, 1904, referred to by Viada in
his Commentaries, 5 Supp., 457.)
"Reckless imprudence, punishable as crime, consists in the
lack of prevision and rational precaution with which all acts
must be executed, from which probable injury or damage may
easily result." (Decision of the supreme court of Spain, March
16, 1905, referred to by Viada in his Commentaries, 5 Supp.,
461.)
The distinction between simple imprudence, which is a constitutive
element of a misdemeanor under article 590 of the Penal Code, and
rash imprudence, which is a constitutive element of the offense
punishable under article 580 of the same Code, is not clearly indicated
in the books; but we think the weight of authority will be found to
support the proposition that where immediate personal harm,
preventable in the exercise of reasonable care, is threatened to a
human being by reason of a course of conduct which is being pursued
by another, and the danger is visible and consciously appreciated by
the actor, the failure to use reasonable care to prevent the threatened
injury constitutes reckless negligence.
Simple imprudence, on the other hand, is a mere lack of prevision in
a situation where either the threatened harm is not immediate or the
danger is not openly visible. The following is cited in Viada as a case
of simple imprudence: A man goes hunting and raises his gun to shoot
at a bird. Upon lowering the gun without firing, he negligently fails to
lower the hammer; and while the gun is being thus carried cocked, it
is accidentally discharged with the result that a person casually in
range of the gun is wounded. As will be seen in this case, although
there is imprudence on the part of the hunter, there is not a conscious
advertance to the danger to which the other person is being subjected.
Said the court:
"The fact set forth as proved in the first finding of the court
below is not sufficiently such as would indicate real reckless
imprudence on the part of Cecilio Mogarra, inasmuch as the
act of lowering his gun ad putting it under his arm without
lowering the hammer, which constitute negligence, does not
show grave fault, but only mere lack of foresight chargeable
as simple imprudence." (Decision of the supreme court of
 Spain, March 12, 1904, referred to by Viada in his
Commentaries, 5 Supp., 457.)

Taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case at bar, we are of
the opinion that the act of the accused in giving the order to start the car, when
the offended party had his hands already on the holding devices of the car and
his foot on the running board, constitutes carelessness or negligence, but does
not show grave fault amounting to reckless imprudence and the accused
having acted with simple imprudence or negligence, has incurred the penalty
provided by article 590, case No. 4, of the Penal Code.

The judgment appealed from is modified, and the accused and appellant is
sentenced to pay a fine of 60 pesetas and to suffer the corresponding
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to censure, with the costs
of this instance de oficio. So ordered.
8. Negros Navigation Co Inc. v. CA (GR No. 110398)
[G.R. No. 110398. November 7, 1997]
NEGROS NAVIGATION CO., INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, RAMON MIRANDA, SPS. RICARDO and VIRGINIA DE
LA VICTORIA, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming with modification the Regional Trial Courts award of
damages to private respondents for the death of relatives as a result of the
sinking of petitioners vessel.
In April of 1980, private respondent Ramon Miranda purchased from the
Negros Navigation Co., Inc. four special cabin tickets (#74411, 74412, 74413
and 74414) for his wife, daughter, son and niece who were going to Bacolod
City to attend a family reunion. The tickets were for Voyage No. 457-A of the
M/V Don Juan, leaving Manila at 1:00 p.m. on April 22, 1980.
The ship sailed from the port of Manila on schedule.
At about 10:30 in the evening of April 22, 1980, the Don Juan collided off
the Tablas Strait in Mindoro, with the M/T Tacloban City, an oil tanker owned
by the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) and the PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC). As a result, the M/V Don Juan sank.
Several of her passengers perished in the sea tragedy. The bodies of some of
the victims were found and brought to shore, but the four members of private
respondents families were never found.
Private respondents filed a complaint on July 16, 1980 in the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 34, against the Negros Navigation, the Philippine
National Oil Company (PNOC), and the PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation (PNOC/STC), seeking damages for the death of Ardita de la
Victoria Miranda, 48, Rosario V. Miranda, 19, Ramon V. Miranda, Jr., 16, and
Elfreda de la Victoria, 26.
In its answer, petitioner admitted that private respondents purchased
ticket numbers 74411, 74412, 74413 and 74414; that the ticket numbers were
listed in the passenger manifest; and that the Don Juan left Pier 2, North
Harbor, Manila on April 22, 1980 and sank that night after being rammed by
the oil tanker M/T Tacloban City, and that, as a result of the collision, some of
the passengers of the M/V Don Juan died. Petitioner, however, denied that the
four relatives of private respondents actually boarded the vessel as shown by
the fact that their bodies were never recovered. Petitioner further averred that
the Don Juan was seaworthy and manned by a full and competent crew, and
that the collision was entirely due to the fault of the crew of the M/T Tacloban
City.
On January 20, 1986, the PNOC and petitioner Negros Navigation Co.,
Inc. entered into a compromise agreement whereby petitioner assumed full
responsibility for the payment and satisfaction of all claims arising out of or in
connection with the collision and releasing the PNOC and the PNOC/STC from
any liability to it. The agreement was subsequently held by the trial court to be
binding upon petitioner, PNOC and PNOC/STC. Private respondents did not
join in the agreement.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on February 21, 1991, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the plaintiffs, ordering all the defendants to pay jointly and severally to the
plaintiffs damages as follows:
To Ramon Miranda:
P42,025.00 for actual damages;
P152,654.55 as compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity of
his wife;
P90,000.00 as compensatory damages for wrongful death of three (3)
victims;
P300,000.00 as moral damages;
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, all in the total amount
of P634,679.55; and
P40,000.00 as attorneys fees.
To Spouses Ricardo and Virginia de la Victoria:
P12,000.00 for actual damages;
 P158,899.00 as compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity;
P30,000.00 as compensatory damages for wrongful death;
P100,000.00 as moral damages;
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, all in the total amount
of P320,899.00; and
P15,000.00 as attorneys fees.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals[1] affirmed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court with modification
1. Ordering and sentencing defendants-appellants, jointly and
severally, to pay plaintiff-appellee Ramon Miranda the amount
of P23,075.00 as actual damages instead of P42,025.00;
2. Ordering and sentencing defendants-appellants, jointly and
severally, to pay plaintiff-appellee Ramon Miranda the amount
of P150,000.00, instead of P90,000.00, as compensatory
damages for the death of his wife and two children;
3. Ordering and sentencing defendants-appellants, jointly and
severally, to pay plaintiffs-appellees Dela Victoria spouses the
amount of P50,000.00, instead of P30,000.00, as compensatory
damages for the death of their daughter Elfreda Dela Victoria;
Hence this petition, raising the following issues:
(1) whether the members of private respondents families were
actually passengers of the Don Juan;
(2) whether the ruling in Mecenas v. Court of Appeals,[2] finding the
crew members of petitioner to be grossly negligent in the
performance of their duties, is binding in this case;
(3) whether the total loss of the M/V Don Juan extinguished
petitioners liability; and
(4) whether the damages awarded by the appellate court are
excessive, unreasonable and unwarranted.
First. The trial court held that the fact that the victims were passengers of
the M/V Don Juan was sufficiently proven by private respondent Ramon
Miranda, who testified that he purchased tickets numbered 74411, 74412,
74413, and 74414 at P131.30 each from the Makati office of petitioner for
Voyage No. 47-A of the M/V Don Juan, which was leaving Manila on April 22,
1980. This was corroborated by the passenger manifest (Exh. E) on which the
numbers of the tickets and the names of Ardita Miranda and her children and
Elfreda de la Victoria appear.
Petitioner contends that the purchase of the tickets does not necessarily
mean that the alleged victims actually took the trip. Petitioner asserts that it is
common knowledge that passengers purchase tickets in advance but do not
actually use them. Hence, private respondent should also prove the presence
of the victims on the ship. The witnesses who affirmed that the victims were
on the ship were biased and unreliable.
This contention is without merit. Private respondent Ramon Miranda
testified that he personally took his family and his niece to the vessel on the
day of the voyage and stayed with them on the ship until it was time for it to
leave. There is no reason he should claim members of his family to have
perished in the accident just to maintain an action. People do not normally lie
about so grave a matter as the loss of dear ones. It would be more difficult for
private respondents to keep the existence of their relatives if indeed they are
alive than it is for petitioner to show the contrary. Petitioners only proof is that
the bodies of the supposed victims were not among those recovered from the
site of the mishap. But so were the bodies of the other passengers reported
missing not recovered, as this Court noted in the Mecenas[3] case.
Private respondent Mirandas testimony was corroborated by Edgardo
Ramirez. Ramirez was a seminarian and one of the survivors of the collision.
He testified that he saw Mrs. Miranda and Elfreda de la Victoria on the ship
and that he talked with them. He knew Mrs. Miranda who was his teacher in
the grade school. He also knew Elfreda who was his childhood friend and
townmate. Ramirez said he was with Mrs. Miranda and her children and niece
from 7:00 p.m. until 10:00 p.m. when the collision happened and that he in fact
had dinner with them. Ramirez said he and Elfreda stayed on the deck after
dinner and it was there where they were jolted by the collision of the two
vessels. Recounting the moments after the collision, Ramirez testified that
Elfreda ran to fetch Mrs. Miranda. He escorted her to the room and then tried
to go back to the deck when the lights went out. He tried to return to the cabin
but was not able to do so because it was dark and there was a stampede of
passengers from the deck.
Petitioner casts doubt on Ramirez testimony, claiming that Ramirez could
not have talked with the victims for about three hours and not run out of stories
to tell, unless Ramirez had a storehouse of stories. But what is incredible about
acquaintances thrown together on a long journey staying together for hours on
end, in idle conversation precisely to while the hours away?
Petitioner also points out that it took Ramirez three (3) days before he
finally contacted private respondent Ramon Miranda to tell him about the fate
of his family. But it is not improbable that it took Ramirez three days before
calling on private respondent Miranda to tell him about the last hours of Mrs.
Miranda and her children and niece, in view of the confusion in the days
following the collision as rescue teams and relatives searched for survivors.
Indeed, given the facts of this case, it is improper for petitioner to even
suggest that private respondents relatives did not board the ill-fated vessel and
perish in the accident simply because their bodies were not recovered.
Second. In finding petitioner guilty of negligence and in failing to exercise
the extraordinary diligence required of it in the carriage of passengers, both
the trial court and the appellate court relied on the findings of this Court
in Mecenas v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[4] which case was brought for the
death of other passengers. In that case it was found that although the
proximate cause of the mishap was the negligence of the crew of the
M/T Tacloban City, the crew of the Don Juan was equally negligent as it found
that the latters master, Capt. Rogelio Santisteban, was playing mahjong at the
time of collision, and the officer on watch, Senior Third Mate Rogelio De Vera,
admitted that he failed to call the attention of Santisteban to the imminent
danger facing them. This Court found that Capt. Santisteban and the crew of
the M/V Don Juan failed to take steps to prevent the collision or at least delay
the sinking of the ship and supervise the abandoning of the ship.
Petitioner Negros Navigation was found equally negligent in tolerating the
playing of mahjong by the ship captain and other crew members while on
board the ship and failing to keep the M/V Don Juan seaworthy so much so
that the ship sank within 10 to 15 minutes of its impact with the M/T Tacloban
City.
In addition, the Court found that the Don Juan was overloaded. The
Certificate of Inspection, dated August 27, 1979, issued by the Philippine
Coast Guard Commander at Iloilo City stated that the total number of persons
allowed on the ship was 864, of whom 810 are passengers, but there were
actually 1,004 on board the vessel when it sank, 140 persons more than the
maximum number that could be safely carried by it.
Taking these circumstances together, and the fact that the M/V Don Juan,
as the faster and better-equipped vessel, could have avoided a collision with
the PNOC tanker, this Court held that even if the Tacloban City had been at
fault for failing to observe an internationally-recognized rule of navigation,
the Don Juan was guilty of contributory negligence. Through Justice Feliciano,
this Court held:
The grossness of the negligence of the Don Juan is underscored when one
considers the foregoing circumstances in the context of the following
facts: Firstly, the Don Juan was more than twice as fast as the Tacloban City.
The Don Juans top speed was 17 knots; while that of the Tacloban City was
6.3. knots. Secondly, the Don Juan carried the full complement of officers and
crew members specified for a passenger vessel of her class. Thirdly, the Don
Juan was equipped with radar which was functioning that night. Fourthly, the
Don Juans officer on-watch had sighted the Tacloban City on his radar screen
while the latter was still four (4) nautical miles away. Visual confirmation of
radar contact was established by the Don Juan while the Tacloban City was
still 2.7 miles away. In the total set of circumstances which existed in the
instant case, the Don Juan, had it taken seriously its duty of extraordinary
diligence, could have easily avoided the collision with the Tacloban
City. Indeed, the Don Juan might well have avoided the collision even if it had
exercised ordinary diligence merely.
It is true that the Tacloban City failed to follow Rule 18 of the International
Rules of the Road which requires two (2) power-driven vessels meeting end
on or nearly end on each to alter her course to starboard (right) so that each
vessel may pass on the port side (left) of the other. The Tacloban City, when
the two (2) vessels were only three-tenths (0.3) of a mile apart, turned (for the
second time) 15o to port side while the Don Juan veered hard to starboard. . .
. [But] route observance of the International Rules of the Road will not relieve
a vessel from responsibility if the collision could have been avoided by proper
care and skill on her part or even by a departure from the rules.
In the petition at bar, the Don Juan having sighted the Tacloban City when it
was still a long way off was negligent in failing to take early preventive action
and in allowing the two (2) vessels to come to such close quarters as to render
the collision inevitable when there was no necessity for passing so near to the
Tacloban City as to create that hazard or inevitability, for the Don Juan could
choose its own distance. It is noteworthy that the Tacloban City, upon turning
hard to port shortly before the moment of collision, signalled its intention to do
so by giving two (2) short blasts with its horn. The Don Juan gave no
answering horn blast to signal its own intention and proceeded to turn hard to
starboard.
We conclude that Capt. Santisteban and Negros Navigation are properly held
liable for gross negligence in connection with the collision of the Don Juan and
Tacloban City and the sinking of the Don Juan leading to the death of hundreds
of passengers. . . .[5]
Petitioner criticizes the lower courts reliance on the Mecenas case,
arguing that, although this case arose out of the same incident as that involved
in Mecenas, the parties are different and trial was conducted
separately. Petitioner contends that the decision in this case should be based
on the allegations and defenses pleaded and evidence adduced in it or, in
short, on the record of this case.
The contention is without merit. What petitioner contends may be true
with respect to the merits of the individual claims against petitioner but not as
to the cause of the sinking of its ship on April 22, 1980 and its liability for such
accident, of which there can only be one truth. Otherwise, one would be
subscribing to the sophistry: truth on one side of the Pyrenees, falsehood on
the other!
Adherence to the Mecenas case is dictated by this Courts policy of
maintaining stability in jurisprudence in accordance with the legal maxim stare
decisis et non quieta movere (Follow past precedents and do not disturb what
has been settled.) Where, as in this case, the same questions relating to the
same event have been put forward by parties similarly situated as in a previous
case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a
bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.[6] In Woulfe v. Associated
Realties Corporation,[7] the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that where
substantially similar cases to the pending case were presented and applicable
principles declared in prior decisions, the court was bound by the principle of
stare decisis. Similarly, in State ex rel. Tollinger v. Gill,[8] it was held that under
the doctrine of stare decisis a ruling is final even as to parties who are
strangers to the original proceeding and not bound by the judgment under
the res judicata doctrine. The Philadelphia court expressed itself in this wise:
Stare decisis simply declares that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion
reached in one case should be applied to those which follow, if the facts are
substantially the same, even though the parties may be different.[9] Thus, in J.
M. Tuason v. Mariano, supra, this Court relied on its rulings in other cases
involving different parties in sustaining the validity of a land title on the principle
of stare decisis et non quieta movere.
Indeed, the evidence presented in this case was the same as those
presented in the Mecenas case, to wit:
Document Mecenas case This case
Decision of Commandant Exh. 10[10] Exh. 11-B-NN/X
Phil. Coast Guard in BMI Case
No. 415-80 dated 3/26/81
Decision of the Minister Exh. 11[11] Exh. ZZ
of National Defense dated 3/12/82
Resolution on the motion Exh. 13[12] Exh. AAA
for reconsideration of the (private respondents)
decision of the Minister of
National Defense dated 7/24/84
Certificate of inspection Exh. 1-A[13] Exh. 19-NN
dated 8/27/79
Certificate of Stability Exh. 6-A[14] Exh. 19-D-NN
dated 12/16/76
Nor is it true that the trial court merely based its decision on
the Mecenas case. The trial court made its own independent findings on the
basis of the testimonies of witnesses, such as Senior Third Mate Rogelio de
Vera, who incidentally gave substantially the same testimony on petitioners
behalf before the Board of Marine Inquiry. The trial court agreed with the
conclusions of the then Minister of National Defense finding both vessels to be
negligent.
Third. The next issue is whether petitioner is liable to pay damages
notwithstanding the total loss of its ship. The issue is not one of first
impression. The rule is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence that a shipowner
may be held liable for injuries to passengers notwithstanding the exclusively
real and hypothecary nature of maritime law if fault can be attributed to the
shipowner.[15]
In Mecenas, this Court found petitioner guilty of negligence in (1) allowing
or tolerating the ship captain and crew members in playing mahjong during the
voyage, (2) in failing to maintain the vessel seaworthy and (3) in allowing the
ship to carry more passengers than it was allowed to carry. Petitioner is,
therefore, clearly liable for damages to the full extent.
Fourth. Petitioner contends that, assuming that the Mecenas case
applies, private respondents should be allowed to claim only P43,857.14 each
as moral damages because in the Mecenas case, the amount of P307,500.00
was awarded to the seven children of the Mecenas couple. Under petitioners
formula, Ramon Miranda should receive P43,857.14, while the De la Victoria
spouses should receive P97,714.28.
Here is where the principle of stare decisis does not apply in view of
differences in the personal circumstances of the victims. For that matter,
differentiation would be justified even if private respondents had joined the
private respondents in the Mecenas case. The doctrine of stare decisis works
as a bar only against issues litigated in a previous case. Where the issue
involved was not raised nor presented to the court and not passed upon by the
court in the previous case, the decision in the previous case is not stare
decisis of the question presently presented.[16] The decision in
the Mecenas case relates to damages for which petitioner was liable to the
claimants in that case.
In the case at bar, the award of P300,000.00 for moral damages is
reasonable considering the grief petitioner Ramon Miranda suffered as a result
of the loss of his entire family. As a matter of fact, three months after the
collision, he developed a heart condition undoubtedly caused by the strain of
the loss of his family. The P100,000.00 given to Mr. and Mrs. de la Victoria is
likewise reasonable and should be affirmed.
As for the amount of civil indemnity awarded to private respondents, the
appellate courts award of P50,000.00 per victim should be sustained. The
amount of P30,000.00 formerly set in De Lima v. Laguna Tayabas
Co.,[17] Heirs of Amparo delos Santos v. Court of Appeals,[18] and Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court[19] as benchmark was
subsequently increased to P50,000.00 in the case of Sulpicio Lines, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals,[20] which involved the sinking of another interisland ship on
October 24, 1988.
We now turn to the determination of the earning capacity of the
victims. With respect to Ardita Miranda, the trial court awarded damages
computed as follows:[21]
In the case of victim Ardita V. Miranda whose age at the time of the accident
was 48 years, her life expectancy was computed to be 21.33 years, and
therefore, she could have lived up to almost 70 years old. Her gross earnings
for 21.33 years based on P10,224.00 per annum, would
be P218,077.92. Deducting therefrom 30% as her living expenses, her net
earnings would be P152,654.55, to which plaintiff Ramon Miranda is entitled
to compensatory damages for the loss of earning capacity of his wife. In
considering 30% as the living expenses of Ardita Miranda, the Court takes into
account the fact that plaintiff and his wife were supporting their daughter and
son who were both college students taking Medicine and Law respectively.
In accordance with the ruling in Villa-Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,[22] we think the life expectancy of Ardita Miranda was correctly
determined to be 21.33 years, or up to age 69. Petitioner contends, however,
that Mrs. Miranda would have retired from her job as a public school teacher
at 65, hence her loss of earning capacity should be reckoned up to 17.33 years
only.
The accepted formula for determining life expectancy is 2/3 multiplied by
(80 minus the age of the deceased). It may be that in the Philippines the age
of retirement generally is 65 but, in calculating the life expectancy of individuals
for the purpose of determining loss of earning capacity under Art. 2206(1) of
the Civil Code, it is assumed that the deceased would have earned income
even after retirement from a particular job. In this case, the trial court took into
account the fact that Mrs. Miranda had a masters degree and a good prospect
of becoming principal of the school in which she was teaching. There was
reason to believe that her income would have increased through the years and
she could still earn more after her retirement, e.g., by becoming a consultant,
had she not died. The gross earnings which Mrs. Miranda could reasonably be
expected to earn were it not for her untimely death was, therefore, correctly
computed by the trial court to be P218,077.92 (given a gross annual income
of P10,224.00 and life expectancy of 21.33 years).
Petitioner contends that from the amount of gross earnings, 60% should
be deducted as necessary living expenses, not merely 30% as the trial court
allowed.Petitioner contends that 30% is unrealistic, considering that Mrs.
Mirandas earnings would have been subject to taxes, social security
deductions and inflation.
We agree with this contention. In Villa-Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,[23] the Court allowed a deduction of P1,184.00 for living expenses
from the P2,184.00 annual salary of the victim, which is roughly 54.2%
thereof. The deceased was 29 years old and a training assistant in the
Bacnotan Cement Industries. In People v. Quilaton,[24] the deceased was a 26-
year old laborer earning a daily wage. The court allowed a deduction
of P120,000.00 which was 51.3% of his annual gross earnings
of P234,000.00. In People v. Teehankee,[25] the court allowed a deduction
of P19,800.00, roughly 42.4% thereof from the deceaseds annual salary
of P46,659.21. The deceased, Maureen Hultman, was 17 years old and had
just received her first paycheck as a secretary. In the case at bar, we hold that
a deduction of 50% from Mrs. Mirandas gross earnings (P218,077.92) would
be reasonable, so that her net earning capacity should be P109,038.96. There
is no basis for supposing that her living expenses constituted a smaller
percentage of her gross income than the living expenses in the decided
cases. To hold that she would have used only a small part of her income for
herself, a larger part going to the support of her children would be conjectural
and unreasonable.
As for Elfreda de la Victoria, the trial court found that, at the time of her
death, she was 26 years old, a teacher in a private school in Malolos, Bulacan,
earning P6,192.00 per annum. Although a probationary employee, she had
already been working in the school for two years at the time of her death and
she had a general efficiency rating of 92.85% and it can be presumed that, if
not for her untimely death, she would have become a regular teacher. Hence,
her loss of earning capacity is P111,456.00, computed as follows:
net earning capacity (x) = life expectancy x [ gross annual
income less reasonable & necessary living expenses (50%) ]
x = [ 2 (80-26) ] x [P6,192.00 - P3,096.00]
3
= 36 x 3,096.00
= P111,456.00
On the other hand, the award of actual damages in the amount
of P23,075.00 was determined by the Court of Appeals on the basis of receipts
submitted by private respondents. This amount is reasonable considering the
expenses incurred by private respondent Miranda in organizing three search
teams to look for his family, spending for transportation in going to places such
as Batangas City and Iloilo, where survivors and the bodies of other victims
were found, making long distance calls, erecting a monument in honor of the
four victims, spending for obituaries in the Bulletin Today and for food, masses
and novenas.
Petitioners contention that the expenses for the erection of a monument
and other expenses for memorial services for the victims should be considered
included in the indemnity for death awarded to private respondents is without
merit. Indemnity for death is given to compensate for violation of the rights of
the deceased, i.e., his right to life and physical integrity.[26] On the other hand,
damages incidental to or arising out of such death are for pecuniary losses of
the beneficiaries of the deceased.
As for the award of attorneys fees, we agree with the Court of Appeals
that the amount of P40,000.00 for private respondent Ramon Miranda
and P15,000.00 for the de la Victoria spouses is justified. The appellate court
correctly held:
instruments given to it by the law for securing the ends of law and public
policy. One of those instruments is the institution of exemplary damages; one
of those ends, of special importance in an archipelagic state like the
Philippines, is the safe and reliable carriage of people and goods by sea.[28]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
modification and petitioner is ORDERED to pay private respondents damages
as follows:
To private respondent Ramon Miranda:
P23,075.00 for actual damages;
P109,038.96 as compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity
of his wife;

The Mecenas case cannot be made the basis for determining the award for P150,000.00 as compensatory damages for wrongful death of three
attorneys fees. The award would naturally vary or differ in each case. While it (3) victims;
is admitted that plaintiff-appellee Ramon Miranda who is himself a lawyer,
represented also plaintiffs-appellees Dela Victoria spouses, we note that P300,000.00 as moral damages;
separate testimonial evidence were adduced by plaintiff-appellee Ramon
Miranda (TSN, February 26, 1982, p. 6) and plaintiffs-appellees spouses Dela P300,000.00 as exemplary damages, all in the total amount
Victoria (TSN, August 13, 1981, p. 43). Considering the amount of work and of P882,113.96; and
effort put into the case as indicated by the voluminous transcripts of
stenographic notes, we find no reason to disturb the award of P40,000.00 for P40,000.00 as attorneys fees.
plaintiff-appellee Ramon Miranda and P15,000.00 for plaintiffs-appellees Dela
Victoria spouses.[27]
To private respondents Spouses Ricardo and Virginia de la Victoria:
The award of exemplary damages should be increased to P300,000.00
P12,000.00 for actual damages;
for Ramon Miranda and P100,000.00 for the de la Victoria spouses in
accordance with our ruling in the Mecenas case:
P111,456.00 as compensatory damages for loss of earning
capacity;
Exemplary damages are designed by our civil law to permit the courts to
reshape behaviour that is socially deleterious in its consequence by creating
negative incentives or deterrents against such behaviour. In requiring P50,000.00 as compensatory damages for wrongful death;
compliance with the standard of extraordinary diligence, a standard which is in
fact that of the highest possible degree of diligence, from common carriers and P100,000.00 as moral damages;
in creating a presumption of negligence against them, the law seeks to compel
them to control their employees, to tame their reckless instincts and to force P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, all in the total amount
them to take adequate care of human beings and their property. The Court will of P373,456.00; and
take judicial notice of the dreadful regularity with which grievous maritime
disasters occur in our waters with massive loss of life. The bulk of our P15,000.00 as attorneys fees.
population is too poor to afford domestic air transportation. So it is that
notwithstanding the frequent sinking of passenger vessels in our waters,
crowds of people continue to travel by sea. This Court is prepared to use the Petitioners are further ordered to pay costs of suit.
 In the event the Philippine National Oil Company and/or the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation pay or are required to pay all or a portion
of the amounts adjudged, petitioner Negros Navigation Co., Inc. shall
reimburse either of them such amount or amounts as either may have paid,
and in the event of failure of Negros Navigation Co., Inc., to make the
necessary reimbursement, PNOC and/or PNOC/STC shall be entitled to a writ
of execution without need of filing another action.
SO ORDERED.
9. Cang v. Cullen (GR No. 163078)
G.R. No. 163078 November 25, 2009
STEPHEN CANG and GEORGE NARDO y JOSOL, Petitioners,
vs.
HERMINIA CULLEN, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision1 dated December 2, 2002 and the Resolution2 dated
February 23, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 69841. In
the assailed Decision, the CA reversed and set aside the Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20504,
an action for damages.
The claim for damages was precipitated by a vehicular accident involving a
taxicab bearing Plate No. GVG-672, owned by petitioner Stephen Cang and
driven by petitioner George Nardo, and a motorcycle owned by respondent
Herminia Cullen and driven by Guillermo Saycon.
On October 29, 1996, at about 3:10 p.m., Saycon was driving the Honda
motorcycle, with Plate No. LLC-A-4589, along P. del Rosario Street, Cebu City,
occupying the middle portion of the outer lane. The taxi, on the other hand,
was traveling on the inner lane and slightly behind, but to the left of, the
motorcycle. Respondent alleged that between Sikatuna and D. Jakosalem
Streets, the taxi veered to the right and sideswiped the motorcycle, then
attempted to speed away. Peace officers near the scene flagged down the
taxi. As a result of the collision, Saycon was seriously injured.4
Petitioners, meanwhile, claimed that it was the motorcycle that bumped into
the taxi. Nardo narrated that he was driving the taxi on the inner lane (near the
center island) along P. del Rosario St., moving towards the intersection of D.
Jakosalem St. When the "caution" signal of the traffic light flashed, he
immediately slowed down. It was at that point that the motorcycle bumped into
the taxi’s rear.5
Respondent, as employer, out of compassion, paid all of Saycon’s hospital
and medical expenses amounting to ₱185,091.00.6 She also alleged that due
to the injuries Saycon sustained, he was unable to work. For humanitarian
reasons, respondent had given Saycon an amount equivalent to his wages
from October 31, 1996 to May 30, 1997. She also gave Saycon ₱2,000.00 per
month from June 1997 until he was able to return to work.7
On July 3, 1997, respondent filed a Complaint for damages against petitioners
praying that judgment be rendered ordering the latter to pay, jointly and
severally, ₱205,091.00 in actual damages; ₱2,000.00 per month from June
1997 up to the time Saycon would be able to return to work, with 6% per annum
interest from the date of extrajudicial demand; ₱50,000.00 as exemplary
damages; 20% of the total amount by way of attorney’s fees; ₱10,000.00 as
acceptance fee; ₱500.00 per court appearance, as appearance fee;
₱20,000.00 as litigation expenses; and the cost of the suit.8
Petitioner Cang filed a Motion to Dismiss contending that the complaint
violated Presidential Decree No. 1508, or the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
The motion was dismissed on September 24, 1997.9
Subsequently, petitioners filed their Answer with Counterclaims. Cang averred
that Nardo was not driving the taxi as the former’s employee, but that Nardo
was leasing the taxi from him.10 Petitioners also claimed that Nardo did not
sideswipe the motorcycle driven by Saycon, nor did the latter speed away after
the incident. They maintained that, at the time of the impact, Nardo’s taxi was
on its proper lane and that it was the motorcycle that veered into Nardo’s lane
and bumped the taxi.11 Further, they alleged that after the impact, Nardo drove
the taxi backward to where Saycon and the motorcycle were slumped on the
road. He then alighted from the taxi. Meanwhile, two traffic enforcers had
crossed the street. After examining Saycon’s injuries, one of the enforcers
ordered Nardo to bring the former to a hospital. Nardo hesitated for a moment
because he wanted the enforcers to make a sketch of the accident first, to
show the exact positions of the vehicles at the time of the accident. However,
he was prevailed upon by the traffic enforcers to bring Saycon to the hospital.
Hence, it was not true that Nardo attempted to speed away from the scene of
the accident. Petitioner Cang also claimed that Saycon was driving the
motorcycle without any protective headgear and that the latter was not
authorized to drive the motorcycle since he only had a student’s
permit.12 Petitioner Cang prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of
merit, for lack of cause of action and for lack of legal capacity. He also prayed
for the award of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱20,000.00 as exemplary
damages, ₱10,000.00 as acceptance fee, ₱30,000.00 as attorney’s fees,
₱20,000.00 as litigation expenses, and ₱1,000.00 per court appearance.13
After trial, the RTC ruled in petitioners’ favor. In its Decision14 dated January
31, 2000, the trial court disposed:
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the defendants. Plaintiffs (sic) complaint is hereby dismissed.
Defendants’ counterclaims are likewise denied.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 15
Respondent appealed the RTC Decision to the CA. On December 2, 2002, the
CA promulgated the assailed Decision,16 reversing the RTC Decision, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated January
31, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 22 is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to pay plaintiff-
appellant, jointly and severally[,] the following:
1.) The sum of ₱166,197.08 as actual damages which were incurred
for the hospitalization and other medical expenses of plaintiff-
appellant’s driver Guillermo Saycon; and
`2.) The sum of ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.17
Petitioners are now before this Court on Petition for Review seeking the
reversal of the CA Decision and its Resolution denying their Motion for
Reconsideration. They argue that the CA erred in reversing the judgment
rendered by the trial court; in giving credence to the eyewitness’ testimony of
Ike Aldemita, that petitioner Nardo had overtaken the motorcycle driven by
Saycon and, therefore, was the negligent party; and in awarding damages to
respondent.18
The petition is meritorious.
We note that the present Petition raises questions of fact. Whether a person
is negligent or not is a question of fact which we cannot ordinarily pass upon
in a petition for review on certiorari, as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing
errors of law.19
However, although findings of fact of the CA are generally conclusive on this
Court, this rule admits of the following exceptions:20
(1) the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are
contradictory;
(2) the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures;
(3) the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact
is mainly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(4) there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
(5) the appellate court, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues
of the case and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee;
(6) the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a
misapprehension of facts;
(7) the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if
properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; and
(8) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of
the trial court or are mere conclusions without citation of specific
evidence, or where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed
by respondent, or where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are premised on the absence of evidence but are contradicted by the
evidence on record.
Thus, when there are conflicting findings of fact by the CA on one hand and
by the trial court on the other, as in this case,21 the Court may give due course
to petitions raising factual issues by way of exception and only in the presence
of extremely meritorious circumstances.22
Contrary to the CA’s ruling, we find that the RTC correctly disregarded
Aldemita’s testimony. Between the RTC and the CA, it is the former’s
assessment of the witnesses’ credibility that should control.23
The trial court gave little credence to Aldemita’s testimony, upon its finding
that:
On the other hand, multicab driver Aldemita contended that he saw everything.
He said that the motorcycle and the taxi overtook him. He told the court during
his testimony that the motorcycle was ahead of the taxi. He further said that
the motorcycle was nearer him (TSN, February 13, 1998, Savellon, p. 4). The
court finds him inconsistent. If both were ahead of him and the motorcycle was
ahead of the taxi, then, the motorcycle could not be nearer him. Because if the
motorcycle was indeed nearer him, then, it could not have been ahead of the
taxi. But rather, the taxi was ahead of the motorcycle. But in a later testimony,
he said that they were beside each other (TSN, Feb. 12, 1998, Savellon, p.
17).
He also said that both tried to pass the lane which would fit only two vehicles.
He told the court that both vehicles were running fast – at a speed of more
than 30 kph – when the motorcycle was hit by the taxi. It would seem to the
court that both vehicles were racing each other. Aldemita further said that in
trying to pass the motorcycle, the taxi hit the left handle bar of the motorcycle.
The handle bar was twisted and the motorcycle fell down to the left side. But if
the taxi was indeed to the left of the motorcycle and if it really swerved to the
right and hit the motorcycle – the law of force would tell us that the motorcycle
would fall to the right after impact. It is the most logical direction for the
motorcycle to fall. If the taxi was indeed traveling at a fast speed when it hit
the motorcycle, the impact would not have only caused a mere twisted handle
and the motorcycle would not have only fallen on its side as claimed by
Aldemita. High speed impact would have caused the motorcycle and its driver
greater damage and would have dislocated them much farther away than
where it fell in this case.
He claimed that he was more or less ten (10) meters from the site of the
accident when it happened (TSN, Feb. 12, 1998, p. 12). The court can,
therefore, say that he was also quite far from the scene of the accident and
could not be that certain as to what really happened.
Aldemita also said that he signaled the taxi driver to stop (TSN, Feb. 12, 1998,
Savellon, p. 6). However, later when asked, he said he signaled the
"policeman" to stop the taxi driver or not (sic). He also claimed that he was
near (sic) the motorcyclist than the "policemen." He further claimed that he
was there at the scene of the accident to help but later said he never saw the
driver of the taxi (TSN, Feb. 12, 1998, Savellon, p. 17). The court finds this
highly unusual for somebody who claimed to be at the scene of the accident
not to see the driver who came out of his vehicle to reason out with the
responding enforcers. He said he was the one who removed the motorcycle
which pinned its driver and then helped carried (sic) the driver to the taxi as
told by the "policeman" (TSN, Feb. 12, 1998, Savellon p. 7). But later, he said
that somebody took his place in carrying the victim because there were already
many people (TSN, Feb. 12, 1998, Savellon, p. 17). x x x.
xxxx
The court also cannot fail to notice the uncontroverted allegation of Nardo
during his testimony that Aldemita was not the person (the multicab driver) he
saw during the time of the accident. He claimed that the person who testified
in court last February 12, 1998, was not the driver of the multicab who was at
the scene of the accident that fateful night (sic) of October 29, 1996 (TSN,
Aug. 24, 1998, Pieras, p. 12). Allegations and claims like this when not
countered and disproved would certainly cast doubt on the credibility of the
subject person and consequently, on his testimonies, too.
Based on the points, the court cannot help but find Aldemita’s testimony as
uncertain and filled with so many inconsistencies. They contradicted with each
other at many instances. The court believes in either of the two possibilities --
Aldemita did not really actually and exactly see the whole incident or he was
lying through his teeth. Thus, the court cannot give so much weight to his
testimony.24
The CA failed to refute the trial court’s detailed analysis of the events leading
to the accident and what transpired thereafter. It merely said that the lower
court should have considered Aldemita’s eyewitness testimony.25 The CA
based its findings of the accident only on Aldemita’s account. It failed to
consider all the other testimonial and documentary evidence analyzed by the
trial court, which substantially controverted Aldemita’s testimony.
In contrast, the trial court found Nardo more credible on the witness stand.
Thus:
During his testimonies, Nardo appeared to be consistent, sincere and certain
in his statements. He appeared to be acknowledgeable (sic) in his work as a
driver. He conveyed a definite degree of credibility when he testified. The Court
has decided to give more appreciation to his testimonies.26lavvph!1
We are inclined to give greater weight to the trial court’s assessment of the
two witnesses.
The findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are accorded great
weight and respect – even considered as conclusive and binding on this
Court27 – since the trial judge had the unique opportunity to observe the
witness firsthand and note his demeanor, conduct and attitude under grueling
examination.28 Only the trial judge can observe the furtive glance, blush of
conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh of a
witness, or his scant or full realization of an oath – all of which are useful aids
for an accurate determination of a witness’ honesty and sincerity.29 He can
thus be expected to determine with reasonable discretion which testimony is
acceptable and which witness is worthy of belief.30
Absent any showing that the trial court’s calibration of the credibility of the
witnesses was flawed, we are bound by its assessment.31 This Court will
sustain such findings unless it can be shown that the trial court
ignored,32overlooked, misunderstood,33 misappreciated,34 or
misapplied35 substantial facts and circumstances, which, if considered, would
materially affect the result of the case.36
We find no such circumstances in this case. The trial court’s meticulous and
dispassionate analysis of the facts of the case is noteworthy. It succeeded in
presenting a clear and logical picture of the events even as it admitted that the
resolution of the case was made more difficult by the "inefficiencies,
indifference, ineptitude, and dishonesty of the local law enforcers, and the
litigants,"37 which left the court without an official sketch of the accident,38 with
no photographs or any other proof of the damage to the respondent’s
motorcycle,39 with an altered police report,40 and with the baffling matter of the
victim’s driver’s license being issued two days after the accident took place –
when the victim was supposed to be in the hospital.41
These handicaps notwithstanding, the trial court methodically related in detail
all the testimonial and documentary evidence presented, and made the most
rational analysis of what truly happened on the day of the incident.
The trial court categorically found that it was not the taxi that bumped the
motorcycle. It concluded that based on the evidence presented before the
court, it was the motorcycle that bumped the taxi.42 It also found that at the
time of the accident, Saycon, the driver of the motorcycle, did not have a
license but only had a student driver’s permit. Further, Saycon was not wearing
the proper protective headgear and was speeding.43 Hence, the trial court
concluded:
It was really pitiful that Saycon suffered for what he did. But then, he has only
himself to blame for his sad plight. He had been careless in driving the
motorcycle without a helmet. For speeding. (sic) For driving alone with only a
student permit. (sic) For causing the accident. (sic) If the driver was found
violating traffic rules, a legal presumption that he was negligent arises.44
Section 30 of Republic Act No. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code, provides:
Sec. 30. Student-driver’s permit – Upon proper application and the payment of
the fee prescribed in accordance with law, the Director or his deputies may
issue student-driver’s permits, valid for one year to persons not under sixteen
years of age, who desire to learn to operate motor vehicles.
A student-driver who fails in the examination on a professional or non-
professional license shall continue as a student-driver and shall not be allowed
to take another examination at least one month thereafter. No student-driver
shall operate a motor vehicle, unless possessed of a valid student-driver’s
permit and accompanied by a duly licensed driver.
The licensed driver duly accredited by the Bureau, acting as instructor to the
student driver, shall be equally responsible and liable as the latter for any
violation of the provisions of this Act and for any injury or damage done by the
motor vehicle on account or as a result of its operation by a student-driver
under his direction.45
Saycon was in clear violation of this provision at the time of the accident.
Corollarily, Article 2185 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person
driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
violating any traffic regulation.
The Civil Code characterizes negligence as the omission of that diligence
required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place.46 Negligence, as it
is commonly understood, is conduct that creates an undue risk of harm to
others. It is the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance
that the circumstances justly demand.47 It is the omission to do something
which a reasonable man, guided by considerations that ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something that a prudent and
reasonable man would not do.48
To determine whether there is negligence in a given situation, this Court laid
down this test: Did defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have
used in the same situation? If not, the person is guilty of negligence.49
Based on the foregoing test, we can conclude that Saycon was negligent. In
the first place, he should not have been driving alone. The law clearly requires
that the holder of a student-driver’s permit should be accompanied by a duly
licensed driver when operating a motor vehicle. Further, there is the matter of
not wearing a helmet and the fact that he was speeding. All these prove that
he was negligent.
Under Article 2179 of the Civil Code,
[w]hen the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause
of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts
shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
The trial court gave more credence to Nardo’s version of the accident that he
was on his proper lane, that he was not speeding, and that it was the
motorcycle that bumped into his taxi. The trial court established that the
accident was caused wholly by Saycon’s negligence. It held that "the injuries
and damages suffered by plaintiff (respondent) and Saycon were not due to
the acts of defendants (petitioners) but due to their own negligence and
recklessness."50
Considering that Saycon was the negligent party, he would not have been
entitled to recover damages from petitioners had he instituted his own action.
Consequently, respondent, as his employer, would likewise not be entitled to
claim for damages.
Further militating against respondent’s claim is the fact that she herself was
negligent in the selection and supervision of her employee. Article 2180 of the
Civil Code states:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible
for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated
persons who are under their authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though
the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent;
but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task
done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be
applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable
for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage.51
When an employee causes damage due to his own negligence while
performing his own duties, there arises the juris tantum presumption that his
employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence
of a good father of a family.52 Thus, in the selection of prospective employees,
employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience
and service records. With respect to the supervision of employees, employers
must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation
and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. These facts must be
shown by concrete proof, including documentary evidence.53
The fact that Saycon was driving alone with only a student’s permit is, to our
minds, proof enough that Cullen was negligent – either she did not know that
he only had a student’s permit or she allowed him to drive alone knowing this
deficiency. Whichever way we look at it, we arrive at the same conclusion: that
she failed to exercise the due diligence required of her as an employer in
supervising her employee. Thus, the trial court properly denied her claim for
damages. One who seeks equity and justice must come to this Court with
clean hands.54
In sum, we hold that the trial court correctly found that it was Saycon who
caused the accident and, as such, he cannot recover indemnity for his injury.
On the other hand, respondent, as Saycon’s employer, was also negligent and
failed to exercise the degree of diligence required in supervising her employee.
Consequently, she cannot recover from petitioners what she had paid for the
treatment of her employee’s injuries.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED.
The Decision dated December 2, 2002 and the Resolution dated February 23,
2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69841 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 22, in
Civil Case No. CEB-20504 is hereby REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
 10. Layugan v. IAC (167 SCRA 376)
G.R. No. 73998 November 14, 1988
PEDRO T. LAYUGAN, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, GODOFREDO ISIDRO, and
TRAVELLERS MULTI-INDEMNITY CORPORATION, respondents.
Edralin S. Mateo for petitioner.
Orlando L. Espinas for respondent Travellers Multi-Indemnity Corp.
Roberto T. Vallarta for respondent Godofredo Isidro.
SARMIENTO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are 1) the decision 1 of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court 2 in AC-G.R. CV No. 01055, entitled "Pedro T.
Layugan, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus Godofredo Isidro, Defendant-Appellant
and Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee, versus Travellers Multi-Indemnity
Corporation, Third Party Defendant- Appellant, "which reversed and set aside
the decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch XXVI,
Cabanatuan City, and also dismissed the complaint, third party complaint, and
the counter claims of the parties and 2) the resolution 4 denying the plaintiff-
appellee's (herein petitioner) motion for reconsideration, for lack of merit.
The findings of fact by the trial court which were adopted by the appellate court
are as follows: 5
xxx xxx xxx
Pedro T. Layugan filed an action for damages against
Godofredo Isidro, alleging that on May 15, 1979 while at
Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, the Plaintiff and a
companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck with
Plate No. SU-730 which was parked along the right side of the
National Highway; that defendant's truck bearing Plate No.
PW-583, driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the
plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff was injured and hospitalized
at Dr. Paulino J. Garcia Research and Medical Center and the
Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital; that he spent TEN THOUSAND
PESOS (Pl0,000.00) and will incur more expenses as he
recuperates from said injuries; that because of said injuries he
would be deprived of a lifetime income in the sum of
SEVENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P70,000.00); and that he
agreed to pay his lawyer the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS
(Pl0,000.00).
As prayed for by the plaintiffs counsel, the Court declared the
defendant in default on October 12, 1979, and plaintiff's
evidence was received ex-parte on January 11, 1978 and
February 19, 1980. The decision on behalf of the plaintiff was
set aside to give a chance to the defendant to file his answer
and later on, a third-party complaint.
Defendant admitted his ownership of the vehicle involved in
the accident driven by Daniel Serrano. Defendant countered
that the plaintiff was merely a bystander, not a truck helper
being a brother-in-law law of the driver of said truck; that the
truck allegedly being repaired was parked, occupying almost
half of the right lane towards Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, right
after the curve; that the proximate cause of the incident was
the failure of the driver of the parked truck in installing the
early warning device, hence the driver of the parked car
should be liable for damages sustained by the truck of the
herein defendant in the amount of more than P20,000.00; that
plaintiff being a mere bystander and hitchhiker must suffer all
the damages he incurred. By way of counterclaim defendant
alleged that due to plaintiffs baseless complaint he was
constrained to engage the services of counsel for P5,000.00
and P200.00 per court appearance; that he suffered sleepless
nights, humiliation, wounded feelings which may be estimated
at P30.000.00.
On May 29, 1981, a third-party complaint was filed by the
defendant against his insurer, the Travellers Multi Indemnity
Corporation; that the third-party plaintiff, without admitting his
liability to the plaintiff, claimed that the third-party defendant is
liable to the former for contribution, indemnity and subrogation
by virtue of their contract under Insurance Policy No. 11723
which covers the insurer's liability for damages arising from
death, bodily injuries and damage to property.
Third-party defendant answered that, even assuming that the
subject matter of the complaint is covered by a valid and
existing insurance policy, its liability shall in no case exceed
the limit defined under the terms and conditions stated
therein; that the complaint is premature as no claim has been
submitted to the third party defendant as prescribed under the
Insurance Code; that the accident in question was
approximately caused by the carelessness and gross
negligence of the plaintiff-, that by reason of the third-party
complaint, third-party defendant was constrained to engage
the services of counsel for a fee of P3,000.00.
Pedro Layugan declared that he is a married man with one (1)
child. He was employed as security guard in Mandaluyong,
Metro Manila, with a salary of SIX HUNDRED PESOS
(600.00) a month. When he is off-duty, he worked as a truck
helper and while working as such, he sustained injuries as a
result of the bumping of the cargo truck they were repairing at
Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya by the driver of the
defendant. He used to earn TWO HUNDRED PESOS
(P200.00) to THREE HUNDRED PESOS (P300.00) monthly,
at the rate of ONE HUNDRED PESOS (Pl00.00) per trip. Due
to said injuries, his left leg was amputated so he had to use
crutches to walk. Prior to the incident, he supported his family
sufficiently, but after getting injured, his family is now being
supported by his parents and brother.
GODOFREDO ISIDRO, defendant/third-party plaintiff,
testified that his truck involved in this vehicular accident is
insured with the Travellers Multi Indemnity Corporation
covering own damage and third-party liability, under vehicle
policy No. 11723 (Exh. "1") dated May 30, 1978; that after he
filed the insurance claim the insurance company paid him the
sum of P18,000.00 for the damages sustained by this truck
but not the third party liability.
DANIEL SERRANO, defendant driver, declared that he gave
a statement before the municipal police of Bagabag, Nueva
Vizcaya on May 16, 1979; that he knew the responsibilities of
a driver; that before leaving, he checked the truck. The truck
owner used to instruct him to be careful in driving. He bumped
the truck being repaired by Pedro Layugan, plaintiff, while the
same was at a stop position. From the evidence presented, it
has been established clearly that the injuries sustained by the
plaintiff was caused by defendant's driver, Daniel Serrano.
The police report confirmed the allegation of the plaintiff and
admitted by Daniel Serrano on cross-examination. The
collision dislodged the jack from the parked truck and pinned
the plaintiff to the ground. As a result thereof, plaintiff
sustained injuries on his left forearm and left foot. The left leg
of the plaintiff from below the knee was later on amputated
(Exh. "C") when gangrene had set in, thereby rendering him
incapacitated for work depriving him of his income. (pp. 118
to 120, Record on Appeal.)
xxx xxx xxx
Upon such findings, amply supported by the evidence on record, the trial court
rendered its decision, the dispositive part of which reads as follows: 6
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the defendant is hereby
ordered:
a) To pay the plaintiff SEVENTY THOUSAND (P70,000.00)
PESOS actual and compensatory damages;
b) TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00) PESOS for attorney's fees;
c) FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS for moral damages;
and
d) To pay the costs of this suit. On the third-party complaint,
the third-party defendant is ordered to indemnify the
defendant/third party plaintiff-.
a) The sum of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS for
actual and compensatory damages; and
b) The costs of this suit.
The Intermediate Appellate Court as earlier stated reversed the decision of the
trial court and dismissed the complaint, the third-party complaint, and the
counter- claims of both appellants. 7
Hence, this petition.
The petitioner alleges the following errors. 8
1. WHETHER UPON THE GIVEN FACTS, THE
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ACTED
CORRECTLY IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE AND
DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE'S COMPLAINT.
 2. WHETHER THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
ACTED CORRECTLY IN APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF
"RES IPSA LOQUITUR" WITH PROPER JURIS-
PRUDENTIAL (sic) BASIS.
The crux of the controversy lies in the correctness or error of the decision of
the respondent court finding the petitioner negligent under the doctrine of Res
ipsa loquitur (The thing speaks for itself).<äre||anº•1àw> Corollary thereto, is
the question as to who is negligent, if the doctrine is inapplicable.
The respondent corporation stresses that the issues raised in the petition
being factual, the same is not reviewable by this Court in a petition for review
by certiorari. 9
Indeed, it is an elementary rule in the review of decisions of the Court of
Appeals that its findings of fact are entitled to great respect and will not
ordinarily be disturbed by this Court. 10 For if we have to review every question
of fact elevated to us, we would hardly have any more time left for the weightier
issues compelling and deserving our preferential attention.11 Be that as it may,
this rule is not inflexible. Surely there are established exceptions 12 —when the
Court should review and rectify the findings of fact of the lower court, such as:
1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise,
or conjecture; 2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; 3) there is grave
abuse of discretion; 4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; 5)
the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case if the findings are
contrary to the admission of both the appellant and the appellee; 6) the findings
of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; 7) the said
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; 8) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and 9) when the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence and are contradicted on record.
Exceptions 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, and 9 obtain in the instant case to warrant a deviation
from the general rule.
From its finding that the parked truck was loaded with ten (10) big round
logs 13 the Court of Appeals inferred that because of its weight the truck could
not have been driven to the shoulder of the road and concluded that the same
was parked on a portion of the road 14 at the time of the accident.
Consequently, the respondent court inferred that the mishap was due to the
negligence of the driver of the parked truck.15 The inference or conclusion is
manifestly erroneous. In a large measure, it is grounded on speculation,
surmise, or conjecture. How the respondent court could have reversed the
finding of the trial court that a warning device was installed 16 escapes us
because it is evident from the record that really such a device, in the form of a
lighted kerosene lamp, was installed by the driver of the parked truck three to
four meters from the rear of his parked truck.17 We see this negative finding of
the respondent appellate court as a misreading of the facts and the evidence
on record and directly contravening the positive finding of the trial court that an
early warning device was in proper place when the accident happened and
that the driver of the private respondent was the one negligent. On the other
hand, the respondent court, in refusing to give its "imprimatur to the trial court's
finding and conclusion that Daniel Serrano (private respondent Isidro's driver)
was negligent in driving the truck that bumped the parked truck", did not cite
specific evidence to support its conclusion. In cavalier fashion, it simply and
nebulously adverted to unspecified "scanty evidence on record." 18
On the technical aspect of the case, the respondent corporation would want
us to dismiss this petition on the ground that it was filed out of time. It must be
noted that there was a motion for extension, 19 albeit filed erroneously with the
respondent court, dated March 19, 1986, requesting for 30 days from March
20, 1986, to file the necessary petition or pleading before the Supreme Court".
Also, on April 1, 1986, an appearance of a new lawyer for the petitioner before
the Supreme Court" with motion 20 was filed, again erroneously, with the Court
of Appeals, requesting for 20 days extension "to file the Petition for Review on
Certiorari." Likewise a similar motion 21 was filed with this Court also on April
1, 1986. On the other hand, the instant petition for review was filed on April 17,
1986 22 but it was only after three months, on August 1, 1986, in its
comment 23 that the respondent corporation raised the issue of tardiness. The
respondent corporation should not have waited in ambush before the comment
was required and before due course was given. In any event, to exact its "a
pound of flesh", so to speak, at this very late stage, would cause a grave
miscarriage of justice. Parenthetically, it must be noted that private respondent
Isidro did not raise this issue of late filing.
We now come to the merits of this petition.
The question before us is who was negligent? Negligence is the omission to
do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do24 or as Judge
Cooley defines it, "(T)he failure to observe for the protection of the interests of
another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.25
In Picart vs. Smith, 26 decided more than seventy years ago but still a sound
rule, we held:
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case
may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act
use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person
would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the
imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The
existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the
personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The Law considers
what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
Respondent Isidro posits that any immobile object along the highway, like a
parked truck, poses serious danger to a moving vehicle which has the right to
be on the highway. He argues that since the parked cargo truck in this case
was a threat to life and limb and property, it was incumbent upon the driver as
well as the petitioner, who claims to be a helper of the truck driver, to exercise
extreme care so that the motorist negotiating the road would be properly
forewarned of the peril of a parked vehicle. Isidro submits that the burden of
proving that care and diligence were observed is shifted to the petitioner, for,
as previously claimed, his (Isidro's) Isuzu truck had a right to be on the road,
while the immobile cargo truck had no business, so to speak, to be there.
Likewise, Isidro proffers that the petitioner must show to the satisfaction of a
reasonable mind that the driver and he (petitioner) himself, provided an early
warning device, like that required by law, or, by some other adequate means
that would properly forewarn vehicles of the impending danger that the parked
vehicle posed considering the time, place, and other peculiar circumstances
of the occasion. Absent such proof of care, as in the case at bar, Isidro
concludes, would, under the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur, evoke the
presumption of negligence on the part of the driver of the parked cargo truck
as well as his helper, the petitioner herein, who was fixing the flat tire of the
said truck. 27
Respondent Isidro's contention is untenable.
The evidence on record discloses that three or four meters from the rear of the
parked truck, a lighted kerosene lamp was placed.28 Moreover, there is the
admission of respondent Isidro's driver, Daniel Serrano, to Wit: 29
Question No. 8 (by Patrolman Josefino Velasco)—Will you
narrate to me in brief how the accident happens (sic) if you
can still remember?
Answer: (by Daniel Serrano)
That on or about 10:40 p.m., 15 May 1979
while driving Isuzu truck at Baretbet,
Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya and at KM 285, I
met another vehicle who (sic) did not dim his
(sic) lights which cause (sic) me to be blinded
with intense glare of the light that's why I did
not notice a parked truck who (sic) was
repairing a front flat tire. When I was a few
meters away, I saw the truck which was
loaded with round logs. I step (sic) on my foot
brakes but it did not function with my many
attempts. I have (sic) found out later that the
fluid pipe on the rear right was cut that's why
the breaks did not function. (Emphasis
supplied).
Whether the cargo truck was parked along the road or on half the shoulder of
the right side of the road would be of no moment taking into account the
warning device consisting of the lighted kerosene lamp placed three or four
meters from the back of the truck. 30 But despite this warning which we rule as
sufficient, the Isuzu truck driven by Daniel Serrano, an employee of the private
respondent, still bumped the rear of the parked cargo truck. As a direct
consequence of such accident the petitioner sustained injuries on his left
forearm and left foot. His left leg was later amputated from below the knee
when gangrene had set in. 31
It is clear from the foregoing disquisition that the absence or want of care of
Daniel Serrano has been established by clear and convincing evidence. It
follows that in stamping its imprimatur upon the invocation by respondent Isidro
of the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur to escape liability for the negligence of his
employee, the respondent court committed reversible error.
The respondent court ruled: 32
xxx xxx xxx
In addition to this, we agree with the following arguments of
appellant Godofredo Isidro which would show that the
accident was caused due to the negligence of the driver of the
cargo truck:
xxx xxx xxx
... In the case at bar the burden of proving
that care and diligence was (sic) observed is
 shifted evidently to the plaintiff, for, as
adverted to, the motorists have the right to be
on the road, while the immobile truck has no
business, so to speak, to be there. It is thus
for the plaintiff to show to the satisfaction of a
reasonable mind that the driver and he
himself did employ early warning device such
as that required by law or by some other
adequate means or device that would
properly forewarn vehicles of the impending
danger that the parked vehicle posed
considering the time, place and other peculiar
circumstances of the occasion. Absent such
proof of care, as in the case at bar, will evoke
the presumption of negligence under the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, on the part of the
driver of the parked cargo truck as well as
plaintiff who was fixing the flat tire of said
truck. (pp. 14-17, Appellant's Brief).
(Emphasis supplied).
At this juncture, it may be enlightening and helpful in the proper resolution of
the issue of negligence to examine the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur.
This doctrine is stated thus: "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to
be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management
use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an
explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. 33 Or
as Black's Law Dictionary 34 puts it:
Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself Rebuttable
presumption or inference that defendant was negligent, which
arises upon proof that instrumentality causing injury was in
defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident was one
which ordinarily does not happen in absence of negligence.
Res ipsa loquitur is rule of evidence whereby negligence of
alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from mere fact that
accident happened provided character of accident and
circumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief that in
absence of negligence it would not have occurred and that
thing which caused injury is shown to have been under
management and control of alleged wrongdoer. Hillen v.
Hooker Const. Co., Tex. Civ. App., 484 S.W. 2d 133, 155.
Under doctrine of "res ipsa loquitur" the happening of an injury
permits an inference of negligence where plaintiff produces
substantial evidence that injury was caused by an agency or
instrumentality under exclusive control and management of
defendant, and that the occurrence was such that in the
ordinary course of things would not happen if reasonable care
had been used.
In this jurisdiction we have applied this doctrine in quite a number of cases,
notably in Africa et al. vs. Caltex, Inc., et al., 35 and the latest is in the case
of F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. vs. CA.36
The doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of
negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established
without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of
negligence. 37 The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law 38 but merely a
mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. 39 The rule, when applicable
to the facts and circumstances of a particular case, is not intended to and does
not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the part
of the party charged. 40 It merely determines and regulates what shall be prima
facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach
of the duty of due care.41 The doctrine can be invoked when and only when,
under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily
available. 42 Hence, it has generally been held that the presumption of
inference arising from the doctrine cannot be availed of, or is overcome, where
plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the specific act
of negligence which is the cause of the injury complained of or where there is
direct evidence as to the precise cause of the accident and all the facts and
circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly appear. 43 Finally, once the
actual cause of injury is established beyond controversy, whether by the
plaintiff or by the defendant, no presumptions will be involved and the doctrine
becomes inapplicable when the circumstances have been so completely
eludicated that no inference of defendant's liability can reasonably be made,
whatever the source of the evidence, 44 as in this case.
The private respondent is sued under Art. 2176 in relation to Art. 2180,
paragraph 5, of the Civil Code. In the latter, when an injury is caused by the
negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of
law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in
the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after
selection, or both. Such presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure and
consequently, may be rebutted. If follows necessarily that if the employer
shows to the satisfaction of the court that in the selection and in the supervision
he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the
presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability. 45 In disclaiming
liability for the incident, the private respondent stresses that the negligence of
his employee has already been adequately overcome by his driver's statement
that he knew his responsibilities as a driver and that the truck owner used to
instruct him to be careful in driving. 46

We do not agree with the private respondent in his submission. In the first
place, it is clear that the driver did not know his responsibilities because he
apparently did not check his vehicle before he took it on the road. If he did he
could have discovered earlier that the brake fluid pipe on the right was cut, and
could have repaired it and thus the accident could have been avoided.
Moveover, to our mind, the fact that the private respondent used to intruct his
driver to be careful in his driving, that the driver was licensed, and the fact that
he had no record of any accident, as found by the respondent court, are not
sufficient to destroy the finding of negligence of the Regional Trial Court given
the facts established at the trial 47 The private respondent or his mechanic,
who must be competent, should have conducted a thorough inspection of his
vehicle before allowing his driver to drive it. In the light of the circumstances
obtaining in the case, we hold that Isidro failed to prove that the diligence of a
good father of a family in the supervision of his employees which would
exculpate him from solidary liability with his driver to the petitioner. But even if
we concede that the diligence of a good father of a family was observed by
Isidro in the supervision of his driver, there is not an iota of evidence on record
of the observance by Isidro of the same quantum of diligence in the supervision
of his mechanic, if any, who would be directly in charge in maintaining the road
worthiness of his (Isidro's) truck. But that is not all. There is paucity of proof
that Isidro exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
of his driver, Daniel Serrano, as well as in the selection of his mechanic, if any,
in order to insure the safe operation of his truck and thus prevent damage to
others. Accordingly, the responsibility of Isidro as employer treated in Article
2180, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code has not ceased.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the

respondent court as well as its Resolution denying the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration are hereby SET ASIDE and the decision of the trial court,
dated January 20, 1983, is hereby REINSTATED in toto. With costs against
the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.
 11. Ramos v. CA (GR No. 124354)
G.R. No. 124354 December 29, 1999
ROGELIO E. RAMOS and ERLINDA RAMOS, in their own behalf and as
natural guardians of the minors, ROMMEL RAMOS, ROY RODERICK
RAMOS and RON RAYMOND RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DELOS SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER, DR. ORLINO
HOSAKA and DRA. PERFECTA GUTIERREZ, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
The Hippocratic Oath mandates physicians to give primordial consideration to
the health and welfare of their patients. If a doctor fails to live up to this precept,
he is made accountable for his acts. A mistake, through gross negligence or
incompetence or plain human error, may spell the difference between life and
death. In this sense, the doctor plays God on his patient's fate. 1
In the case at bar, the Court is called upon to rule whether a surgeon, an
anesthesiologist and a hospital should be made liable for the unfortunate
comatose condition of a patient scheduled for cholecystectomy. 2
Petitioners seek the reversal of the decision 3 of the Court of Appeals, dated
29 May 1995, which overturned the decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court,
dated 30 January 1992, finding private respondents liable for damages arising
from negligence in the performance of their professional duties towards
petitioner Erlinda Ramos resulting in her comatose condition.
The antecedent facts as summarized by the trial court are reproduced
hereunder:
Plaintiff Erlinda Ramos was, until the afternoon of June 17,
1985, a 47-year old (Exh. "A") robust woman (TSN, October
19, 1989, p. 10). Except for occasional complaints of
discomfort due to pains allegedly caused by the presence of
a stone in her gall bladder (TSN, January 13, 1988, pp. 4-5),
she was as normal as any other woman. Married to Rogelio
E. Ramos, an executive of Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company, she has three children whose names
are Rommel Ramos, Roy Roderick Ramos and Ron Raymond
Ramos (TSN, October 19, 1989, pp. 5-6).
Because the discomforts somehow interfered with her normal
ways, she sought professional advice. She was advised to
undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in her gall
bladder (TSN, January 13, 1988, p. 5). She underwent a
series of examinations which included blood and urine tests
(Exhs. "A" and "C") which indicated she was fit for surgery.
Through the intercession of a mutual friend, Dr. Buenviaje
(TSN, January 13, 1988, p. 7), she and her husband Rogelio
met for the first time Dr. Orlino Hozaka (should be
Hosaka; see TSN, February 20, 1990, p. 3), one of the
defendants in this case, on June 10, 1985. They agreed that
their date at the operating table at the DLSMC (another
defendant), would be on June 17, 1985 at 9:00 A.M.. Dr.
Hosaka decided that she should undergo a "cholecystectomy"
operation after examining the documents (findings from the
Capitol Medical Center, FEU Hospital and DLSMC) presented
to him. Rogelio E. Ramos, however, asked Dr. Hosaka to look
for a good anesthesiologist. Dr. Hosaka, in turn, assured
Rogelio that he will get a good anesthesiologist. Dr. Hosaka
charged a fee of P16,000.00, which was to include the
anesthesiologist's fee and which was to be paid after the
operation (TSN, October 19, 1989, pp. 14-15, 22-23, 31-33;
TSN, February 27, 1990, p. 13; and TSN, November 9, 1989,
pp. 3-4, 10, 17).
A day before the scheduled date of operation, she was
admitted at one of the rooms of the DLSMC, located along E.
Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City (TSN, October 19,1989, p.
11).
At around 7:30 A.M. of June 17, 1985 and while still in her
room, she was prepared for the operation by the hospital staff.
Her sister-in-law, Herminda Cruz, who was the Dean of the
College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center, was also
there for moral support. She reiterated her previous request
for Herminda to be with her even during the operation. After
praying, she was given injections. Her hands were held by
Herminda as they went down from her room to the operating
room (TSN, January 13, 1988, pp. 9-11). Her husband,
Rogelio, was also with her (TSN, October 19, 1989, p. 18). At
the operating room, Herminda saw about two or three nurses
and Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez, the other defendant, who was to
administer anesthesia. Although not a member of the hospital
staff, Herminda introduced herself as Dean of the College of
Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center who was to provide
moral support to the patient, to them. Herminda was allowed
to stay inside the operating room.
At around 9:30 A.M., Dr. Gutierrez reached a nearby phone
to look for Dr. Hosaka who was not yet in (TSN, January 13,
1988, pp. 11-12). Dr. Gutierrez thereafter informed Herminda
Cruz about the prospect of a delay in the arrival of Dr. Hosaka.
Herminda then went back to the patient who asked, "Mindy,
wala pa ba ang Doctor"? The former replied, "Huwag kang
mag-alaala, darating na iyon" (Ibid.).
Thereafter, Herminda went out of the operating room and
informed the patient's husband, Rogelio, that the doctor was
not yet around (id., p. 13). When she returned to the operating
room, the patient told her, "Mindy, inip na inip na ako, ikuha
mo ako ng ibang Doctor." So, she went out again and told
Rogelio about what the patient said (id., p. 15). Thereafter,
she returned to the operating room.
At around 10:00 A.M., Rogelio E. Ramos was "already dying
[and] waiting for the arrival of the doctor" even as he did his
best to find somebody who will allow him to pull out his wife
from the operating room (TSN, October 19, 1989, pp. 19-20).
He also thought of the feeling of his wife, who was inside the
operating room waiting for the doctor to arrive (ibid.). At almost
12:00 noon, he met Dr. Garcia who remarked that he (Dr.
Garcia) was also tired of waiting for Dr. Hosaka to arrive (id.,
p. 21). While talking to Dr. Garcia at around 12:10 P.M., he
came to know that Dr. Hosaka arrived as a nurse remarked,
"Nandiyan na si Dr. Hosaka, dumating na raw." Upon hearing
those words, he went down to the lobby and waited for the
operation to be completed (id., pp. 16, 29-30).
At about 12:15 P.M., Herminda Cruz, who was inside the
operating room with the patient, heard somebody say that "Dr.
Hosaka is already here." She then saw people inside the
operating room "moving, doing this and that, [and] preparing
the patient for the operation" (TSN, January 13, 1988, p. 16).
As she held the hand of Erlinda Ramos, she then saw Dr.
Gutierrez intubating the hapless patient. She thereafter heard
Dr. Gutierrez say, "ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang
pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan" (id., p. 17). Because of
the remarks of Dra. Gutierrez, she focused her attention on
what Dr. Gutierrez was doing. She thereafter noticed bluish
discoloration of the nailbeds of the left hand of the hapless
Erlinda even as Dr. Hosaka approached her. She then heard
Dr. Hosaka issue an order for someone to call Dr. Calderon,
another anesthesiologist (id., p. 19). After Dr. Calderon
arrived at the operating room, she saw this anesthesiologist
trying to intubate the patient. The patient's nailbed became
bluish and the patient was placed in a trendelenburg position
— a position where the head of the patient is placed in a
position lower than her feet which is an indication that there is
a decrease of blood supply to the patient's brain (Id., pp. 19-
20). Immediately thereafter, she went out of the operating
room, and she told Rogelio E. Ramos "that something wrong
was . . . happening" (Ibid.). Dr. Calderon was then able to
intubate the patient (TSN, July 25, 1991, p. 9).
Meanwhile, Rogelio, who was outside the operating room,
saw a respiratory machine being rushed towards the door of
the operating room. He also saw several doctors rushing
towards the operating room. When informed by Herminda
Cruz that something wrong was happening, he told her
(Herminda) to be back with the patient inside the operating
room (TSN, October 19, 1989, pp. 25-28).
Herminda Cruz immediately rushed back, and saw that the
patient was still in trendelenburg position (TSN, January 13,
1988, p. 20). At almost 3:00 P.M. of that fateful day, she saw
the patient taken to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU).
About two days thereafter, Rogelio E. Ramos was able to talk
to Dr. Hosaka. The latter informed the former that something
went wrong during the intubation. Reacting to what was told
to him, Rogelio reminded the doctor that the condition of his
wife would not have happened, had he (Dr. Hosaka) looked
for a good anesthesiologist (TSN, October 19, 1989, p. 31).
Doctors Gutierrez and Hosaka were also asked by the
hospital to explain what happened to the patient. The doctors
explained that the patient had bronchospasm (TSN,
November 15, 1990, pp. 26-27).
Erlinda Ramos stayed at the ICU for a month. About four
months thereafter or on November 15, 1985, the patient was
released from the hospital.
 During the whole period of her confinement, she incurred
hospital bills amounting to P93,542.25 which is the subject of
a promissory note and affidavit of undertaking executed by
Rogelio E. Ramos in favor of DLSMC. Since that fateful
afternoon of June 17, 1985, she has been in a comatose
condition. She cannot do anything. She cannot move any part
of her body. She cannot see or hear. She is living on
mechanical means. She suffered brain damage as a result of
the absence of oxygen in her brain for four to five minutes
(TSN, November 9, 1989, pp. 21-22). After being discharged
from the hospital, she has been staying in their residence, still
needing constant medical attention, with her husband Rogelio
incurring a monthly expense ranging from P8,000.00 to
P10,000.00 (TSN, October 19, 1989, pp. 32-34). She was
also diagnosed to be suffering from "diffuse cerebral
parenchymal damage" (Exh. "G"; see also TSN, December
21, 1989,
p. 6). 5
Thus, on 8 January 1986, petitioners filed a civil case 6 for damages with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against herein private respondents
alleging negligence in the management and care of Erlinda Ramos.
During the trial, both parties presented evidence as to the possible cause of
Erlinda's injury. Plaintiff presented the testimonies of Dean Herminda Cruz and
Dr. Mariano Gavino to prove that the sustained by Erlinda was due to lack of
oxygen in her brain caused by the faulty management of her airway by private
respondents during the anesthesia phase. On the other hand, private
respondents primarily relied on the expert testimony of Dr. Eduardo Jamora, a
pulmonologist, to the effect that the cause of brain damage was Erlinda's
allergic reaction to the anesthetic agent, Thiopental Sodium (Pentothal).
After considering the evidence from both sides, the Regional Trial Court
rendered judgment in favor of petitioners, to wit:
After evaluating the evidence as shown in the finding of facts
set forth earlier, and applying the aforecited provisions of law
and jurisprudence to the case at bar, this Court finds and so
holds that defendants are liable to plaintiffs for damages. The
defendants were guilty of, at the very least, negligence in the
performance of their duty to plaintiff-patient Erlinda Ramos.
On the part of Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez, this Court finds that she
omitted to exercise reasonable care in not only intubating the
patient, but also in not repeating the administration of atropine
(TSN, August 20, 1991, pp. 5-10), without due regard to the
fact that the patient was inside the operating room for almost
three (3) hours. For after she committed a mistake in
intubating [the] patient, the patient's nailbed became bluish
and the patient, thereafter, was placed in trendelenburg
position, because of the decrease of blood supply to the
patient's brain. The evidence further shows that the hapless
patient suffered brain damage because of the absence of
oxygen in her (patient's) brain for approximately four to five
minutes which, in turn, caused the patient to become
comatose.
On the part of Dr. Orlino Hosaka, this Court finds that he is
liable for the acts of Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez whom he had
chosen to administer anesthesia on the patient as part of his
obligation to provide the patient a good anesthesiologist', and
for arriving for the scheduled operation almost three (3) hours
late.
On the part of DLSMC (the hospital), this Court finds that it is
liable for the acts of negligence of the doctors in their "practice
of medicine" in the operating room. Moreover, the hospital is
liable for failing through its responsible officials, to cancel the
scheduled operation after Dr. Hosaka inexcusably failed to
arrive on time.
In having held thus, this Court rejects the defense raised by
defendants that they have acted with due care and prudence
in rendering medical services to plaintiff-patient. For if the
patient was properly intubated as claimed by them, the patient
would not have become comatose. And, the fact that another
anesthesiologist was called to try to intubate the patient after
her (the patient's) nailbed turned bluish, belie their claim.
Furthermore, the defendants should have rescheduled the
operation to a later date. This, they should have done, if
defendants acted with due care and prudence as the patient's
case was an elective, not an emergency case.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, judgment is
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants.
Accordingly, the latter are ordered to pay, jointly and
severally, the former the following sums of money, to wit:
 1) the sum of P8,000.00 as actual monthly
expenses for the plaintiff Erlinda Ramos
reckoned from November 15, 1985 or in the
total sum of P632,000.00 as of April 15, 1992,
subject to its being updated;
2) the sum of P100,000.00 as reasonable
attorney's fees;
3) the sum of P800,000.00 by way of moral
damages and the further sum of P200,000,00
by way of exemplary damages; and,
4) the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED. 7
Private respondents seasonably interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court rendered a Decision, dated 29 May 1995, reversing the
findings of the trial court. The decretal portion of the decision of the appellate
court reads:
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing premises the appealed
decision is hereby REVERSED, and the complaint below
against the appellants is hereby ordered DISMISSED. The
counterclaim of appellant De Los Santos Medical Center is
GRANTED but only insofar as appellees are hereby ordered
to pay the unpaid hospital bills amounting to P93,542.25, plus
legal interest for justice must be tempered with mercy.
SO ORDERED. 8
The decision of the Court of Appeals was received on 9 June 1995 by
petitioner Rogelio Ramos who was mistakenly addressed as "Atty. Rogelio
Ramos." No copy of the decision, however, was sent nor received by the
Coronel Law Office, then counsel on record of petitioners. Rogelio referred the
decision of the appellate court to a new lawyer, Atty. Ligsay, only on 20 June
1995, or four (4) days before the expiration of the reglementary period for filing
a motion for reconsideration. On the same day, Atty. Ligsay, filed with the
appellate court a motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration. The motion for reconsideration was submitted on 4 July 1995.
However, the appellate court denied the motion for extension of time in its
Resolution dated 25 July 1995. 9Meanwhile, petitioners engaged the services
of another counsel, Atty. Sillano, to replace Atty. Ligsay. Atty. Sillano filed on
7 August 1995 a motion to admit the motion for reconsideration contending
that the period to file the appropriate pleading on the assailed decision had not
yet commenced to run as the Division Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals
had not yet served a copy thereof to the counsel on record. Despite this
explanation, the appellate court still denied the motion to admit the motion for
reconsideration of petitioners in its Resolution, dated 29 March 1996, primarily
on the ground that the fifteen-day (15) period for filing a motion for
reconsideration had already expired, to wit:
We said in our Resolution on July 25, 1995, that the filing of a
Motion for Reconsideration cannot be extended; precisely, the
Motion for Extension (Rollo, p. 12) was denied. It is, on the
other hand, admitted in the latter Motion that
plaintiffs/appellees received a copy of the decision as early as
June 9, 1995. Computation wise, the period to file a Motion
for Reconsideration expired on June 24. The Motion for
Reconsideration, in turn, was received by the Court of
Appeals already on July 4, necessarily, the 15-day period
already passed. For that alone, the latter should be denied.
Even assuming admissibility of the Motion for the
Reconsideration, but after considering the
Comment/Opposition, the former, for lack of merit, is hereby
DENIED.
SO ORDERED. 10
A copy of the above resolution was received by Atty. Sillano on 11 April 1996.
The next day, or on 12 April 1996, Atty. Sillano filed before this Court a motion
for extension of time to file the present petition for certiorari under Rule 45.
The Court granted the motion for extension of time and gave petitioners
additional thirty (30) days after the expiration of the fifteen-day (15) period
counted from the receipt of the resolution of the Court of Appeals within which
to submit the petition. The due date fell on 27 May 1996. The petition was filed
on 9 May 1996, well within the extended period given by the Court.
Petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals on the following
grounds:
I
IN PUTTING MUCH RELIANCE ON THE TESTIMONIES OF
RESPONDENTS DRA. GUTIERREZ, DRA. CALDERON
AND DR. JAMORA;
II
 IN FINDING THAT THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE
RESPONDENTS DID NOT CAUSE THE UNFORTUNATE
COMATOSE CONDITION OF PETITIONER ERLINDA
RAMOS;
III
IN NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA
LOQUITUR. 11
Before we discuss the merits of the case, we shall first dispose of the
procedural issue on the timeliness of the petition in relation to the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners with the Court of Appeals. In their
Comment, 12 private respondents contend that the petition should not be given
due course since the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners on the
decision of the Court of Appeals was validly dismissed by the appellate court
for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. We do not agree.
A careful review of the records reveals that the reason behind the delay in filing
the motion for reconsideration is attributable to the fact that the decision of the
Court of Appeals was not sent to then counsel on record of petitioners, the
Coronel Law Office. In fact, a copy of the decision of the appellate court was
instead sent to and received by petitioner Rogelio Ramos on 9 June 1995
wherein he was mistakenly addressed as Atty. Rogelio Ramos. Based on the
other communications received by petitioner Rogelio Ramos, the appellate
court apparently mistook him for the counsel on record. Thus, no copy of the
decision of the counsel on record. Petitioner, not being a lawyer and unaware
of the prescriptive period for filing a motion for reconsideration, referred the
same to a legal counsel only on 20 June 1995.
It is elementary that when a party is represented by counsel, all notices should
be sent to the party's lawyer at his given address. With a few exceptions, notice
to a litigant without notice to his counsel on record is no notice at all. In the
present case, since a copy of the decision of the appellate court was not sent
to the counsel on record of petitioner, there can be no sufficient notice to speak
of. Hence, the delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration cannot be
taken against petitioner. Moreover, since the Court of Appeals already issued
a second Resolution, dated 29 March 1996, which superseded the earlier
resolution issued on 25 July 1995, and denied the motion for reconsideration
of petitioner, we believed that the receipt of the former should be considered
in determining the timeliness of the filing of the present petition. Based on this,
the petition before us was submitted on time.
After resolving the foregoing procedural issue, we shall now look into the
merits of the case. For a more logical presentation of the discussion we shall
first consider the issue on the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquiturto
the instant case. Thereafter, the first two assigned errors shall be tackled in
relation to the res ipsa loquiturdoctrine.
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means "the thing or the
transaction speaks for itself." The phrase "res ipsa loquitur'' is a maxim for the
rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding
circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence,
or make out a plaintiff's prima facie case, and present a question of fact for
defendant to meet with an explanation. 13 Where the thing which caused the
injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant
or his servants and the accident is such as in ordinary course of things does
not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it
affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant,
that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendant's want of care. 14
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is simply a recognition of the postulate that,
as a matter of common knowledge and experience, the very nature of certain
types of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the part of the
person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of
some explanation by the defendant who is charged with negligence. 15 It is
grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis
of such experience or common knowledge, negligence may be deduced from
the mere occurrence of the accident itself. 16 Hence, res ipsa loquitur is
applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge.
However, much has been said that res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive
law and, as such, does not create or constitute an independent or separate
ground of liability. 17 Instead, it is considered as merely evidentiary or in the
nature of a procedural rule. 18 It is regarded as a mode of proof, or a mere
procedural of convenience since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves a
plaintiff of, the burden of producing specific proof of negligence. 19 In other
words, mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with
the requirement of proof of negligence. It is simply a step in the process of
such proof, permitting the plaintiff to present along with the proof of the
accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine,
creating an inference or presumption of negligence, and to thereby place on
the defendant the burden of going forward with the proof. 20 Still, before resort
to the doctrine may be allowed, the following requisites must be satisfactorily
shown:
1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily
does not occur in the absence of someone's
negligence;
 2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the
exclusive control of the defendant or
defendants; and
3. The possibility of contributing conduct
which would make the plaintiff responsible is
eliminated. 21
In the above requisites, the fundamental element is the "control of
instrumentality" which caused the damage. 22Such element of control must be
shown to be within the dominion of the defendant. In order to have the benefit
of the rule, a plaintiff, in addition to proving injury or damage, must show a
situation where it is applicable, and must establish that the essential elements
of the doctrine were present in a particular incident. 23
Medical malpractice 24 cases do not escape the application of this doctrine.
Thus, res ipsa loquitur has been applied when the circumstances attendant
upon the harm are themselves of such a character as to justify an inference of
negligence as the cause of that harm. 25 The application of res ipsa loquitur in
medical negligence cases presents a question of law since it is a judicial
function to determine whether a certain set of circumstances does, as a matter
of law, permit a given inference. 26
Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice
suits to prove that a physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated
from the standard medical procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with
because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence. 27 The reason is that
the general rule on the necessity of expert testimony applies only to such
matters clearly within the domain of medical science, and not to matters that
are within the common knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by
anyone familiar with the facts. 28 Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons of
skill and experience are competent to testify as to whether a patient has been
treated or operated upon with a reasonable degree of skill and care. However,
testimony as to the statements and acts of physicians and surgeons, external
appearances, and manifest conditions which are observable by any one may
be given by non-expert witnesses. 29 Hence, in cases where the res ipsa
loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon
proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where
the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper
standard of care. 30 Where common knowledge and experience teach that a
resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been
exercised, an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which
is ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how and why it
occurred. 31 When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is
prove a nexus between the particular act or omission complained of and the
injury sustained while under the custody and management of the defendant
without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard of
care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other way,
under usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress
for injury suffered by him.
Thus, courts of other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in the following
situations: leaving of a foreign object in the body of the patient after an
operation, 32 injuries sustained on a healthy part of the body which was not
under, or in the area, of treatment, 33 removal of the wrong part of the body
when another part was intended, 34 knocking out a tooth while a patient's jaw
was under anesthetic for the removal of his tonsils, 35 and loss of an eye while
the patient plaintiff was under the influence of anesthetic, during or following
an operation for appendicitis, 36 among others.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa loquitur has been
measurably enlarged, it does not automatically apply to all cases of medical
negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of proof to the defendant to
show that he is not guilty of the ascribed negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is not a
rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously
applied, depending upon the circumstances of each case. It is generally
restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say, as
a matter of common knowledge and observation, that the consequences of
professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due
care had been
exercised. 37 A distinction must be made between the failure to secure results,
and the occurrence of something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the
service or treatment rendered followed the usual procedure of those skilled in
that particular practice. It must be conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur can have no application in a suit against a physician or surgeon which
involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. 38 The physician
or surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why any particular diagnosis
was not correct, or why any particular scientific treatment did not produce the
desired result. 39 Thus, res ipsa loquitur is not available in a malpractice suit if
the only showing is that the desired result of an operation or treatment was not
accomplished. 40The real question, therefore, is whether or not in the process
of the operation any extraordinary incident or unusual event outside of the
routine performance occurred which is beyond the regular scope of customary
professional activity in such operations, which, if unexplained would
themselves reasonably speak to the average man as the negligent cause or
causes of the untoward consequence. 41 If there was such extraneous
interventions, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be utilized and the
defendant is called upon to explain the matter, by evidence of exculpation, if
he could. 42
We find the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in the case at bar. As will
hereinafter be explained, the damage sustained by Erlinda in her brain prior to
a scheduled gall bladder operation presents a case for the application of res
ipsa loquitur.
A case strikingly similar to the one before us is Voss vs. Bridwell, 43 where the
Kansas Supreme Court in applying the res ipsa loquitur stated:
The plaintiff herein submitted himself for a mastoid operation
and delivered his person over to the care, custody and control
of his physician who had complete and exclusive control over
him, but the operation was never performed. At the time of
submission he was neurologically sound and physically fit in
mind and body, but he suffered irreparable damage and injury
rendering him decerebrate and totally incapacitated. The
injury was one which does not ordinarily occur in the process
of a mastoid operation or in the absence of negligence in the
administration of an anesthetic, and in the use and
employment of an endoctracheal tube. Ordinarily a person
being put under anesthesia is not rendered decerebrate as a
consequence of administering such anesthesia in the
absence of negligence. Upon these facts and under these
circumstances a layman would be able to say, as a matter of
common knowledge and observation, that the consequences
of professional treatment were not as such as would ordinarily
have followed if due care had been exercised.
Here the plaintiff could not have been guilty of contributory
negligence because he was under the influence of
anesthetics and unconscious, and the circumstances are
such that the true explanation of event is more accessible to
the defendants than to the plaintiff for they had the exclusive
control of the instrumentalities of anesthesia.
Upon all the facts, conditions and circumstances alleged in
Count II it is held that a cause of action is stated under the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 44
Indeed, the principles enunciated in the aforequoted case apply with equal
force here. In the present case, Erlinda submitted herself for cholecystectomy
and expected a routine general surgery to be performed on her gall bladder.
On that fateful day she delivered her person over to the care, custody and
control of private respondents who exercised complete and exclusive control
over her. At the time of submission, Erlinda was neurologically sound and,
except for a few minor discomforts, was likewise physically fit in mind and
body. However, during the administration of anesthesia and prior to the
performance of cholecystectomy she suffered irreparable damage to her brain.
Thus, without undergoing surgery, she went out of the operating room already
decerebrate and totally incapacitated. Obviously, brain damage, which Erlinda
sustained, is an injury which does not normally occur in the process of a gall
bladder operation. In fact, this kind of situation does not in the absence of
negligence of someone in the administration of anesthesia and in the use of
endotracheal tube. Normally, a person being put under anesthesia is not
rendered decerebrate as a consequence of administering such anesthesia if
the proper procedure was followed. Furthermore, the instruments used in the
administration of anesthesia, including the endotracheal tube, were all under
the exclusive control of private respondents, who are the physicians-in-charge.
Likewise, petitioner Erlinda could not have been guilty of contributory
negligence because she was under the influence of anesthetics which
rendered her unconscious.
Considering that a sound and unaffected member of the body (the brain) is
injured or destroyed while the patient is unconscious and under the immediate
and exclusive control of the physicians, we hold that a practical administration
of justice dictates the application of res ipsa loquitur. Upon these facts and
under these circumstances the Court would be able to say, as a matter of
common knowledge and observation, if negligence attended the management
and care of the patient. Moreover, the liability of the physicians and the hospital
in this case is not predicated upon an alleged failure to secure the desired
results of an operation nor on an alleged lack of skill in the diagnosis or
treatment as in fact no operation or treatment was ever performed on Erlinda.
Thus, upon all these initial determination a case is made out for the application
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Nonetheless, in holding that res ipsa loquitur is available to the present case
we are not saying that the doctrine is applicable in any and all cases where
injury occurs to a patient while under anesthesia, or to any and all anesthesia
cases. Each case must be viewed in its own light and scrutinized in order to
be within the res ipsa loquitur coverage.
Having in mind the applicability of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine and the
presumption of negligence allowed therein, the Court now comes to the issue
of whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that private respondents were
not negligent in the care of Erlinda during the anesthesia phase of the
operation and, if in the affirmative, whether the alleged negligence was the
proximate cause of Erlinda's comatose condition. Corollary thereto, we shall
also determine if the Court of Appeals erred in relying on the testimonies of
the witnesses for the private respondents.
In sustaining the position of private respondents, the Court of Appeals relied
on the testimonies of Dra. Gutierrez, Dra. Calderon and Dr. Jamora. In giving
weight to the testimony of Dra. Gutierrez, the Court of Appeals rationalized ATTY. ALCERA:
that she was candid enough to admit that she experienced some difficulty in
the endotracheal intubation 45 of the patient and thus, cannot be said to be She will be incompetent Your Honor.
covering her negligence with falsehood. The appellate court likewise opined
that private respondents were able to show that the brain damage sustained COURT:
by Erlinda was not caused by the alleged faulty intubation but was due to the
allergic reaction of the patient to the drug Thiopental Sodium (Pentothal), a
short-acting barbiturate, as testified on by their expert witness, Dr. Jamora. On Witness may answer if she knows.
the other hand, the appellate court rejected the testimony of Dean Herminda
Cruz offered in favor of petitioners that the cause of the brain injury was A: As have said, I was with the patient, I was
traceable to the wrongful insertion of the tube since the latter, being a nurse, beside the stretcher holding the left hand of
was allegedly not knowledgeable in the process of intubation. In so holding, the patient and all of a sudden heard some
the appellate court returned a verdict in favor of respondents physicians and remarks coming from Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez
hospital and absolved them of any liability towards Erlinda and her family. herself. She was saying "Ang hirap ma-
intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O
We disagree with the findings of the Court of Appeals. We hold that private lumalaki ang tiyan.
respondents were unable to disprove the presumption of negligence on their
part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate cause of her xxx xxx xxx
piteous condition.
ATTY. PAJARES:
In the instant case, the records are helpful in furnishing not only the logical
scientific evidence of the pathogenesis of the injury but also in providing the Q: From whom did you hear those words
Court the legal nexus upon which liability is based. As will be shown "lumalaki ang tiyan"?
hereinafter, private respondents' own testimonies which are reflected in the
transcript of stenographic notes are replete of signposts indicative of their A: From Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez.
negligence in the care and management of Erlinda.
xxx xxx xxx
With regard to Dra. Gutierrez, we find her negligent in the care of Erlinda during
the anesthesia phase. As borne by the records, respondent Dra. Gutierrez
Q: After hearing the phrase "lumalaki ang
failed to properly intubate the patient. This fact was attested to by Prof.
tiyan," what did you notice on the person of
Herminda Cruz, Dean of the Capitol Medical Center School of Nursing and
the patient?
petitioner's sister-in-law, who was in the operating room right beside the
patient when the tragic event occurred. Witness Cruz testified to this effect:
A: I notice (sic) some bluish discoloration on
the nailbeds of the left hand where I was at.
ATTY. PAJARES:
Q: Where was Dr. Orlino Ho[s]aka then at
Q: In particular, what did Dra. Perfecta
that particular time?
Gutierrez do, if any on the patient?
A: I saw him approaching the patient during
A: In particular, I could see that she was
that time.
intubating the patient.
Q: When he approached the patient, what did
Q: Do you know what happened to that
he do, if any?
intubation process administered by Dra.
Gutierrez?
 A: He made an order to call on the
anesthesiologist in the person of Dr.
Calderon.
Q: Did Dr. Calderon, upon being called, arrive
inside the operating room?
A: Yes sir.
Q: What did [s]he do, if any?
A: [S]he tried to intubate the patient.
Q: What happened to the patient?
A: When Dr. Calderon try (sic) to intubate the
patient, after a while the patient's nailbed
became bluish and I saw the patient was
placed in trendelenburg position.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Do you know the reason why the patient
was placed in that trendelenburg position?
A: As far as I know, when a patient is in that
position, there is a decrease of blood supply
to the brain. 46
xxx xxx xxx
The appellate court, however, disbelieved Dean Cruz's testimony in the trial
court by declaring that:
A perusal of the standard nursing curriculum in our country
will show that intubation is not taught as part of nursing
procedures and techniques. Indeed, we take judicial notice of
the fact that nurses do not, and cannot, intubate. Even on the
assumption that she is fully capable of determining whether or
not a patient is properly intubated, witness Herminda Cruz,
admittedly, did not peep into the throat of the patient. (TSN,
July 25, 1991, p. 13). More importantly, there is no evidence
that she ever auscultated the patient or that she conducted
any type of examination to check if the endotracheal tube was
in its proper place, and to determine the condition of the heart,
lungs, and other organs. Thus, witness Cruz's categorical
statements that appellant Dra. Gutierrez failed to intubate the
appellee Erlinda Ramos and that it was Dra. Calderon who
succeeded in doing so clearly suffer from lack of sufficient
factual bases. 47
In other words, what the Court of Appeals is trying to impress is that being a
nurse, and considered a layman in the process of intubation, witness Cruz is
not competent to testify on whether or not the intubation was a success.
We do not agree with the above reasoning of the appellate court. Although
witness Cruz is not an anesthesiologist, she can very well testify upon matters
on which she is capable of observing such as, the statements and acts of the
physician and surgeon, external appearances, and manifest conditions which
are observable by any one. 48 This is precisely allowed under the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur where the testimony of expert witnesses is not required. It
is the accepted rule that expert testimony is not necessary for the proof of
negligence in non-technical matters or those of which an ordinary person may
be expected to have knowledge, or where the lack of skill or want of care is so
obvious as to render expert testimony unnecessary. 49 We take judicial notice
of the fact that anesthesia procedures have become so common, that even an
ordinary person can tell if it was administered properly. As such, it would not
be too difficult to tell if the tube was properly inserted. This kind of observation,
we believe, does not require a medical degree to be acceptable.
At any rate, without doubt, petitioner's witness, an experienced clinical nurse
whose long experience and scholarship led to her appointment as Dean of the
Capitol Medical Center School at Nursing, was fully capable of determining
whether or not the intubation was a success. She had extensive clinical
experience starting as a staff nurse in Chicago, Illinois; staff nurse and clinical
instructor in a teaching hospital, the FEU-NRMF; Dean of the Laguna College
of Nursing in San Pablo City; and then Dean of the Capitol Medical Center
School of Nursing. 50Reviewing witness Cruz' statements, we find that the
same were delivered in a straightforward manner, with the kind of detail, clarity,
consistency and spontaneity which would have been difficult to fabricate. With
her clinical background as a nurse, the Court is satisfied that she was able to
demonstrate through her testimony what truly transpired on that fateful day.
Most of all, her testimony was affirmed by no less than respondent Dra.
Gutierrez who admitted that she experienced difficulty in inserting the tube into
Erlinda's trachea, to wit:
ATTY. LIGSAY:
 Q: In this particular case, Doctora, while you
were intubating at your first attempt (sic), you
did not immediately see the trachea?
DRA. GUTIERREZ:
A: Yes sir.
Q: Did you pull away the tube immediately?
A: You do not pull the . . .
Q: Did you or did you not?
A: I did not pull the tube.
Q: When you said "mahirap yata ito," what
were you referring to?
A: "Mahirap yata itong i-intubate," that was
the patient.
Q: So, you found some difficulty in inserting
the tube?
A: Yes, because of (sic) my first attempt, I did
not see right away. 51
Curiously in the case at bar, respondent Dra. Gutierrez made the haphazard
defense that she encountered hardship in the insertion of the tube in the
trachea of Erlinda because it was positioned more anteriorly (slightly deviated
from the normal anatomy of a person) 52 making it harder to locate and, since
Erlinda is obese and has a short neck and protruding teeth, it made intubation
even more difficult.
The argument does not convince us. If this was indeed observed, private
respondents adduced no evidence demonstrating that they proceeded to
make a thorough assessment of Erlinda's airway, prior to the induction of
anesthesia, even if this would mean postponing the procedure. From their
testimonies, it appears that the observation was made only as an afterthought,
as a means of defense.
The pre-operative evaluation of a patient prior to the administration of
anesthesia is universally observed to lessen the possibility of anesthetic
accidents. Pre-operative evaluation and preparation for anesthesia begins
when the anesthesiologist reviews the patient's medical records and visits with
the patient, traditionally, the day before elective surgery. 53 It includes taking
the patient's medical history, review of current drug therapy, physical
examination and interpretation of laboratory data. 54 The physical examination
performed by the anesthesiologist is directed primarily toward the central
nervous system, cardiovascular system, lungs and upper airway. 55 A
thorough analysis of the patient's airway normally involves investigating the
following: cervical spine mobility, temporomandibular mobility, prominent
central incisors, diseased or artificial teeth, ability to visualize uvula and the
thyromental distance. 56Thus, physical characteristics of the patient's upper
airway that could make tracheal intubation difficult should be studied. 57 Where
the need arises, as when initial assessment indicates possible problems (such
as the alleged short neck and protruding teeth of Erlinda) a thorough
examination of the patient's airway would go a long way towards decreasing
patient morbidity and mortality.
In the case at bar, respondent Dra. Gutierrez admitted that she saw Erlinda for
the first time on the day of the operation itself, on 17 June 1985. Before this
date, no prior consultations with, or pre-operative evaluation of Erlinda was
done by her. Until the day of the operation, respondent Dra. Gutierrez was
unaware of the physiological make-up and needs of Erlinda. She was likewise
not properly informed of the possible difficulties she would face during the
administration of anesthesia to Erlinda. Respondent Dra. Gutierrez' act of
seeing her patient for the first time only an hour before the scheduled operative
procedure was, therefore, an act of exceptional negligence and professional
irresponsibility. The measures cautioning prudence and vigilance in dealing
with human lives lie at the core of the physician's centuries-old Hippocratic
Oath. Her failure to follow this medical procedure is, therefore, a clear indicia of
her negligence.
Respondent Dra. Gutierrez, however, attempts to gloss over this omission by
playing around with the trial court's ignorance of clinical procedure, hoping that
she could get away with it. Respondent Dra. Gutierrez tried to muddle the
difference between an elective surgery and an emergency surgery just so her
failure to perform the required pre-operative evaluation would escape
unnoticed. In her testimony she asserted:
ATTY. LIGSAY:
Q: Would you agree, Doctor, that it is good
medical practice to see the patient a day
before so you can introduce yourself to
establish good doctor-patient relationship
and gain the trust and confidence of the
patient?
 DRA. GUTIERREZ: First of all, Dr. Jamora cannot be considered an authority in the field of
anesthesiology simply because he is not an anesthesiologist. Since Dr.
A: As I said in my previous statement, it Jamora is a pulmonologist, he could not have been capable of properly
depends on the operative procedure of the enlightening the court about anesthesia practice and procedure and their
anesthesiologist and in my case, with elective complications. Dr. Jamora is likewise not an allergologist and could not
cases and normal cardio-pulmonary therefore properly advance expert opinion on allergic-mediated processes.
clearance like that, I usually don't do it except Moreover, he is not a pharmacologist and, as such, could not have been
on emergency and on cases that have an capable, as an expert would, of explaining to the court the pharmacologic and
abnormalities (sic). 58 toxic effects of the supposed culprit, Thiopental Sodium (Pentothal).

However, the exact opposite is true. In an emergency procedure, there is The inappropriateness and absurdity of accepting Dr. Jamora's testimony as
hardly enough time available for the fastidious demands of pre-operative an expert witness in the anesthetic practice of Pentothal administration is
procedure so that an anesthesiologist is able to see the patient only a few further supported by his own admission that he formulated his opinions on the
minutes before surgery, if at all. Elective procedures, on the other hand, are drug not from the practical experience gained by a specialist or expert in the
operative procedures that can wait for days, weeks or even months. Hence, in administration and use of Sodium Pentothal on patients, but only from reading
these cases, the anesthesiologist possesses the luxury of time to be at the certain references, to wit:
patient's beside to do a proper interview and clinical evaluation. There is ample
time to explain the method of anesthesia, the drugs to be used, and their ATTY. LIGSAY:
possible hazards for purposes of informed consent. Usually, the pre-operative
assessment is conducted at least one day before the intended surgery, when Q: In your line of expertise on pulmonology,
the patient is relaxed and cooperative. did you have any occasion to use pentothal
as a method of management?
Erlinda's case was elective and this was known to respondent Dra. Gutierrez.
Thus, she had all the time to make a thorough evaluation of Erlinda's case DR. JAMORA:
prior to the operation and prepare her for anesthesia. However, she never saw
the patient at the bedside. She herself admitted that she had seen petitioner A: We do it in conjunction with the
only in the operating room, and only on the actual date of the cholecystectomy. anesthesiologist when they have to intubate
She negligently failed to take advantage of this important opportunity. As such, our patient.
her attempt to exculpate herself must fail.
Q: But not in particular when you practice
Having established that respondent Dra. Gutierrez failed to perform pre- pulmonology?
operative evaluation of the patient which, in turn, resulted to a wrongful
intubation, we now determine if the faulty intubation is truly the proximate
cause of Erlinda's comatose condition. A: No.

Private respondents repeatedly hammered the view that the cerebral anoxia Q: In other words, your knowledge about
which led to Erlinda's coma was due to bronchospasm 59 mediated by her pentothal is based only on what you have
allergic response to the drug, Thiopental Sodium, introduced into her system. read from books and not by your own
Towards this end, they presented Dr. Jamora, a Fellow of the Philippine personal application of the medicine
College of Physicians and Diplomate of the Philippine Specialty Board of pentothal?
Internal Medicine, who advanced private respondents' theory that the oxygen
deprivation which led to anoxic encephalopathy, 60 was due to an A: Based on my personal experience also on
unpredictable drug reaction to the short-acting barbiturate. We find the theory pentothal.
of private respondents unacceptable.
 Q: How many times have you used
pentothal?
A: They used it on me. I went into
bronchospasm during my appendectomy.
Q: And because they have used it on you and
on account of your own personal experience
you feel that you can testify on pentothal here
with medical authority?
A: No. That is why I used references to
support my claims. 61
An anesthetic accident caused by a rare drug-induced bronchospasm properly
falls within the fields of anesthesia, internal medicine-allergy, and clinical
pharmacology. The resulting anoxic encephalopathy belongs to the field of
neurology. While admittedly, many bronchospastic-mediated pulmonary
diseases are within the expertise of pulmonary medicine, Dr. Jamora's field,
the anesthetic drug-induced, allergic mediated bronchospasm alleged in this
case is within the disciplines of anesthesiology, allergology and pharmacology.
On the basis of the foregoing transcript, in which the pulmonologist himself
admitted that he could not testify about the drug with medical authority, it is
clear that the appellate court erred in giving weight to Dr. Jamora's testimony
as an expert in the administration of Thiopental Sodium.
The provision in the rules of evidence 62 regarding expert witnesses states:
Sec. 49. Opinion of expert witness. — The opinion of a
witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill,
experience or training which he is shown to possess, may be
received in evidence.
Generally, to qualify as an expert witness, one must have acquired special
knowledge of the subject matter about which he or she is to testify, either by
the study of recognized authorities on the subject or by practical
experience. 63Clearly, Dr. Jamora does not qualify as an expert witness based
on the above standard since he lacks the necessary knowledge, skill, and
training in the field of anesthesiology. Oddly, apart from submitting testimony
from a specialist in the wrong field, private respondents' intentionally avoided
providing testimony by competent and independent experts in the proper
areas.
Moreover, private respondents' theory, that Thiopental Sodium may have
produced Erlinda's coma by triggering an allergic mediated response, has no
support in evidence. No evidence of stridor, skin reactions, or wheezing —
some of the more common accompanying signs of an allergic reaction —
appears on record. No laboratory data were ever presented to the court.
In any case, private respondents themselves admit that Thiopental induced,
allergic-mediated bronchospasm happens only very rarely. If courts were to
accept private respondents' hypothesis without supporting medical proof, and
against the weight of available evidence, then every anesthetic accident would
be an act of God. Evidently, the Thiopental-allergy theory vigorously asserted
by private respondents was a mere afterthought. Such an explanation was
advanced in order to advanced in order to absolve them of any and all
responsibility for the patient's condition.
In view of the evidence at hand, we are inclined to believe petitioners' stand
that it was the faulty intubation which was the proximate cause of Erlinda's
comatose condition.
Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. 64 An injury or damage is
proximately caused by an act or a failure to act, whenever it appears from the
evidence in the case, that the act or omission played a substantial part in
bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage; and that the injury or
damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of
the act or omission. 65 It is the dominant, moving or producing cause.
Applying the above definition in relation to the evidence at hand, faulty
intubation is undeniably the proximate cause which triggered the chain of
events leading to Erlinda's brain damage and, ultimately, her comatosed
condition.
Private respondents themselves admitted in their testimony that the first
intubation was a failure. This fact was likewise observed by witness Cruz when
she heard respondent Dra. Gutierrez remarked, "Ang hirap ma-intubate nito,
mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan." Thereafter, witness Cruz
noticed abdominal distention on the body of Erlinda. The development of
abdominal distention, together with respiratory embarrassment indicates that
the endotracheal tube entered the esophagus instead of the respiratory tree.
In other words, instead of the intended endotracheal intubation what actually
took place was an esophageal intubation. During intubation, such distention
indicates that air has entered the gastrointestinal tract through the esophagus
instead of the lungs through the trachea. Entry into the esophagus would
certainly cause some delay in oxygen delivery into the lungs as the tube which
carries oxygen is in the wrong place. That abdominal distention had been
observed during the first intubation suggests that the length of time utilized in
inserting the endotracheal tube (up to the time the tube was withdrawn for the
second attempt) was fairly significant. Due to the delay in the delivery of
oxygen in her lungs Erlinda showed signs of cyanosis. 66 As stated in the
testimony of Dr. Hosaka, the lack of oxygen became apparent only after he
noticed that the nailbeds of Erlinda were already blue. 67 However, private
respondents contend that a second intubation was executed on Erlinda and
this one was successfully done. We do not think so. No evidence exists on
record, beyond private respondents' bare claims, which supports the
contention that the second intubation was successful. Assuming that the
endotracheal tube finally found its way into the proper orifice of the trachea,
the same gave no guarantee of oxygen delivery, the hallmark of a successful
intubation. In fact, cyanosis was again observed immediately after the second
intubation. Proceeding from this event (cyanosis), it could not be claimed, as
private respondents insist, that the second intubation was accomplished. Even
granting that the tube was successfully inserted during the second attempt, it
was obviously too late. As aptly explained by the trial court, Erlinda already
suffered brain damage as a result of the inadequate oxygenation of her brain
for about four to five minutes. 68
The above conclusion is not without basis. Scientific studies point out that
intubation problems are responsible for one-third (1/3) of deaths and serious
injuries associated with anesthesia. 69 Nevertheless, ninety-eight percent
(98%) or the vast majority of difficult intubations may be anticipated by
performing a thorough evaluation of the patient's airway prior to the
operation. 70 As stated beforehand, respondent Dra. Gutierrez failed to
observe the proper pre-operative protocol which could have prevented this
unfortunate incident. Had appropriate diligence and reasonable care been
used in the pre-operative evaluation, respondent physician could have been
much more prepared to meet the contingency brought about by the perceived
anatomic variations in the patient's neck and oral area, defects which would
have been easily overcome by a prior knowledge of those variations together
with a change in technique. 71 In other words, an experienced
anesthesiologist, adequately alerted by a thorough pre-operative evaluation,
would have had little difficulty going around the short neck and protruding
teeth. 72 Having failed to observe common medical standards in pre-operative
management and intubation, respondent Dra. Gutierrez' negligence resulted
in cerebral anoxia and eventual coma of Erlinda.
We now determine the responsibility of respondent Dr. Orlino Hosaka as the
head of the surgical team. As the so-called "captain of the ship," 73 it is the
surgeon's responsibility to see to it that those under him perform their task in
the proper manner. Respondent Dr. Hosaka's negligence can be found in his
failure to exercise the proper authority (as the "captain" of the operative team)
in not determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia
protocols. In fact, no evidence on record exists to show that respondent Dr.
Hosaka verified if respondent Dra. Gutierrez properly intubated the patient.
Furthermore, it does not escape us that respondent Dr. Hosaka had scheduled
another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as Erlinda's
cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three hours late for the latter's
operation. Because of this, he had little or no time to confer with his
anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery. This indicates that he was
remiss in his professional duties towards his patient. Thus, he shares equal
responsibility for the events which resulted in Erlinda's condition.
We now discuss the responsibility of the hospital in this particular incident. The
unique practice (among private hospitals) of filling up specialist staff with
attending and visiting "consultants," 74 who are allegedly not hospital
employees, presents problems in apportioning responsibility for negligence in
medical malpractice cases. However, the difficulty is only more apparent than
real.
In the first place, hospitals exercise significant control in the hiring and firing of
consultants and in the conduct of their work within the hospital premises.
Doctors who apply for "consultant" slots, visiting or attending, are required to
submit proof of completion of residency, their educational qualifications;
generally, evidence of accreditation by the appropriate board (diplomate),
evidence of fellowship in most cases, and references. These requirements are
carefully scrutinized by members of the hospital administration or by a review
committee set up by the hospital who either accept or reject the
application. 75 This is particularly true with respondent hospital.
After a physician is accepted, either as a visiting or attending consultant, he is
normally required to attend clinico-pathological conferences, conduct bedside
rounds for clerks, interns and residents, moderate grand rounds and patient
audits and perform other tasks and responsibilities, for the privilege of being
able to maintain a clinic in the hospital, and/or for the privilege of admitting
patients into the hospital. In addition to these, the physician's performance as
a specialist is generally evaluated by a peer review committee on the basis of
mortality and morbidity statistics, and feedback from patients, nurses, interns
and residents. A consultant remiss in his duties, or a consultant who regularly
falls short of the minimum standards acceptable to the hospital or its peer
review committee, is normally politely terminated.
In other words, private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their
attending and visiting "consultant" staff. While "consultants" are not,
technically employees, a point which respondent hospital asserts in denying
all responsibility for the patient's condition, the control exercised, the hiring,
and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an
employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the payment of wages.
In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the control test is
determining. Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, we rule that for the
purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-
employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending
and visiting physicians. This being the case, the question now arises as to
whether or not respondent hospital is solidarily liable with respondent doctors
for petitioner's condition. 76
The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of
its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a
person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of others based
on the former's responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas. 77 Such
responsibility ceases when the persons or entity concerned prove that they
have observed the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent
damage. 78 In other words, while the burden of proving negligence rests on the
plaintiffs, once negligence is shown, the burden shifts to the respondents
(parent, guardian, teacher or employer) who should prove that they observed
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
In the instant case, respondent hospital, apart from a general denial of its
responsibility over respondent physicians, failed to adduce evidence showing
that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and
supervision of the latter. It failed to adduce evidence with regard to the degree
of supervision which it exercised over its physicians. In neglecting to offer such
proof, or proof of a similar nature, respondent hospital thereby failed to
discharge its burden under the last paragraph of Article 2180. Having failed to
do this, respondent hospital is consequently solidarily responsible with its
physicians for Erlinda's condition.
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred in accepting
and relying on the testimonies of the witnesses for the private respondents.
Indeed, as shown by the above discussions, private respondents were unable
to rebut the presumption of negligence. Upon these disquisitions we hold that
private respondents are solidarily liable for damages under Article 2176 79 of
the Civil Code.
We now come to the amount of damages due petitioners. The trial court
awarded a total of P632,000.00 pesos (should be P616,000.00) in
compensatory damages to the plaintiff, "subject to its being updated" covering
the period from 15 November 1985 up to 15 April 1992, based on monthly
expenses for the care of the patient estimated at P8,000.00.
At current levels, the P8000/monthly amount established by the trial court at
the time of its decision would be grossly inadequate to cover the actual costs
of home-based care for a comatose individual. The calculated amount was not
even arrived at by looking at the actual cost of proper hospice care for the
patient. What it reflected were the actual expenses incurred and proved by the
petitioners after they were forced to bring home the patient to avoid mounting
hospital bills.
And yet ideally, a comatose patient should remain in a hospital or be
transferred to a hospice specializing in the care of the chronically ill for the
purpose of providing a proper milieu adequate to meet minimum standards of
care. In the instant case for instance, Erlinda has to be constantly turned from
side to side to prevent bedsores and hypostatic pneumonia. Feeding is done
by nasogastric tube. Food preparation should be normally made by a dietitian
to provide her with the correct daily caloric requirements and vitamin
supplements. Furthermore, she has to be seen on a regular basis by a physical
therapist to avoid muscle atrophy, and by a pulmonary therapist to prevent the
accumulation of secretions which can lead to respiratory complications.
Given these considerations, the amount of actual damages recoverable in
suits arising from negligence should at least reflect the correct minimum cost
of proper care, not the cost of the care the family is usually compelled to
undertake at home to avoid bankruptcy. However, the provisions of the Civil
Code on actual or compensatory damages present us with some difficulties.
Well-settled is the rule that actual damages which may be claimed by the
plaintiff are those suffered by him as he has duly proved. The Civil Code
provides:
Art. 2199. — Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one
is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such
compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory
damages.
Our rules on actual or compensatory damages generally assume that at the
time of litigation, the injury suffered as a consequence of an act of negligence
has been completed and that the cost can be liquidated. However, these
provisions neglect to take into account those situations, as in this case, where
the resulting injury might be continuing and possible future complications
directly arising from the injury, while certain to occur, are difficult to predict.
In these cases, the amount of damages which should be awarded, if they are
to adequately and correctly respond to the injury caused, should be one which
compensates for pecuniary loss incurred and proved, up to the time of
trial; and one which would meet pecuniary loss certain to be suffered but which
could not, from the nature of the case, be made with certainty. 80 In other
words, temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or
compensatory damages in instances where the injury is chronic and
continuing. And because of the unique nature of such cases, no incompatibility
arises when both actual and temperate damages are provided for. The reason
is that these damages cover two distinct phases.
As it would not be equitable — and certainly not in the best interests of the
administration of justice — for the victim in such cases to constantly come
before the courts and invoke their aid in seeking adjustments to the
compensatory damages previously awarded — temperate damages are
appropriate. The amount given as temperate damages, though to a certain
extent speculative, should take into account the cost of proper care.
In the instant case, petitioners were able to provide only home-based nursing
care for a comatose patient who has remained in that condition for over a
decade. Having premised our award for compensatory damages on the
amount provided by petitioners at the onset of litigation, it would be now much
more in step with the interests of justice if the value awarded for temperate
damages would allow petitioners to provide optimal care for their loved one in
a facility which generally specializes in such care. They should not be
compelled by dire circumstances to provide substandard care at home without
the aid of professionals, for anything less would be grossly inadequate. Under
the circumstances, an award of P1,500,000.00 in temperate damages would
therefore be reasonable. 81
In Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals, 82 this Court was confronted with a
situation where the injury suffered by the plaintiff would have led to expenses
which were difficult to estimate because while they would have been a direct
result of the injury (amputation), and were certain to be incurred by the plaintiff,
they were likely to arise only in the future. We awarded P1,000,000.00 in moral
damages in that case.
Describing the nature of the injury, the Court therein stated:
As a result of the accident, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela
underwent a traumatic amputation of her left lower extremity
at the distal left thigh just above the knee. Because of this,
Valenzuela will forever be deprived of the full ambulatory
functions of her left extremity, even with the use of state of the
art prosthetic technology. Well beyond the period of
hospitalization (which was paid for by Li), she will be required
to undergo adjustments in her prosthetic devise due to the
shrinkage of the stump from the process of healing.
These adjustments entail costs, prosthetic replacements and
months of physical and occupational rehabilitation and
therapy. During the lifetime, the prosthetic devise will have to
be replaced and readjusted to changes in the size of her lower
limb effected by the biological changes of middle-age,
menopause and aging. Assuming she reaches menopause,
for example, the prosthetic will have to be adjusted to respond
to the changes in bone resulting from a precipitate decrease
in calcium levels observed in the bones of all post-
menopausal women. In other words, the damage done to her
would not only be permanent and lasting, it would also be
permanently changing and adjusting to the physiologic
changes which her body would normally undergo through the
years. The replacements, changes, and adjustments will
require corresponding adjustive physical and occupational
therapy. All of these adjustments, it has been documented,
are painful.
xxx xxx xxx
A prosthetic devise, however technologically advanced, will
only allow a reasonable amount of functional restoration of the
motor functions of the lower limb. The sensory functions are
forever lost. The resultant anxiety, sleeplessness,
psychological injury, mental and physical pain are
inestimable. 83
The injury suffered by Erlinda as a consequence of private respondents'
negligence is certainly much more serious than the amputation in the
Valenzuela case.
Petitioner Erlinda Ramos was in her mid-forties when the incident occurred.
She has been in a comatose state for over fourteen years now. The burden of
care has so far been heroically shouldered by her husband and children, who,
in the intervening years have been deprived of the love of a wife and a mother.
Meanwhile, the actual physical, emotional and financial cost of the care of
petitioner would be virtually impossible to quantify. Even the temperate
damages herein awarded would be inadequate if petitioner's condition remains
unchanged for the next ten years.
We recognized, in Valenzuela that a discussion of the victim's actual injury
would not even scratch the surface of the resulting moral damage because it
would be highly speculative to estimate the amount of emotional and moral
pain, psychological damage and injury suffered by the victim or those actually
affected by the victim's condition. 84 The husband and the children, all
petitioners in this case, will have to live with the day to day uncertainty of the
patient's illness, knowing any hope of recovery is close to nil. They have
fashioned their daily lives around the nursing care of petitioner, altering their
long term goals to take into account their life with a comatose patient. They,
not the respondents, are charged with the moral responsibility of the care of
the victim. The family's moral injury and suffering in this case is clearly a real
one. For the foregoing reasons, an award of P2,000,000.00 in moral damages
would be appropriate.

Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00

are hereby awarded. Considering the length and nature of the instant suit we
are of the opinion that attorney's fees valued at P100,000.00 are likewise
proper.

Our courts face unique difficulty in adjudicating medical negligence cases

because physicians are not insurers of life and, they rarely set out to
intentionally cause injury or death to their patients. However, intent is
immaterial in negligence cases because where negligence exists and is
proven, the same automatically gives the injured a right to reparation for the
damage caused.

Established medical procedures and practices, though in constant flux are

devised for the purpose of preventing complications. A physician's experience
with his patients would sometimes tempt him to deviate from established
community practices, and he may end a distinguished career using unorthodox
methods without incident. However, when failure to follow established
procedure results in the evil precisely sought to be averted by observance of
the procedure and a nexus is made between the deviation and the injury or
damage, the physician would necessarily be called to account for it. In the case
at bar, the failure to observe pre-operative assessment protocol which would
have influenced the intubation in a salutary way was fatal to private
respondents' case.

WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of the appellate court appealed

from are hereby modified so as to award in favor of petitioners, and solidarily
against private respondents the following: 1) P1,352,000.00 as actual
damages computed as of the date of promulgation of this decision plus a
monthly payment of P8,000.00 up to the time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos
expires or miraculously survives; 2) P2,000,000.00 as moral damages, 3)
P1,500,000.00 as temperate damages; 4) P100,000.00 each as exemplary
damages and attorney's fees; and, 5) the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.
 12. Africa v. Caltex (GR No. L-12986) Investigation disclosed that at about 4:00 P.M. March 18,
1948, while Leandro Flores was transferring gasoline from a
tank truck, plate No. T-5292 into the underground tank of the
Caltex Gasoline Station located at the corner of Rizal Avenue
G.R. No. L-12986 March 31, 1966 and Antipolo Street, this City, an unknown Filipino lighted a
cigarette and threw the burning match stick near the main
THE SPOUSES BERNABE AFRICA and SOLEDAD C. AFRICA, and the valve of the said underground tank. Due to the gasoline
fumes, fire suddenly blazed. Quick action of Leandro Flores
HEIRS OF DOMINGA ONG, petitioners-appellants,
vs. in pulling off the gasoline hose connecting the truck with the
CALTEX (PHIL.), INC., MATEO BOQUIREN and THE COURT OF underground tank prevented a terrific explosion. However, the
flames scattered due to the hose from which the gasoline was
APPEALS, respondents-appellees.
spouting. It burned the truck and the following accessorias
and residences.
Ross, Selph, Carrascoso and Janda for the respondents.
Bernabe Africa, etc. for the petitioners.
2. The Fire Department report: —
MAKALINTAL., J.:
In connection with their allegation that the premises was (sic)
subleased for the installation of a coca-cola and cigarette stand, the
This case is before us on a petition for review of the decision of the Court of complainants furnished this Office a copy of a photograph taken
Appeals, which affirmed that of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing during the fire and which is submitted herewith. it appears in this
petitioners' second amended complaint against respondents. picture that there are in the premises a coca-cola cooler and a rack
which according to information gathered in the neighborhood
The action is for damages under Articles 1902 and 1903 of the old Civil Code. contained cigarettes and matches, installed between the gasoline
It appears that in the afternoon of March 18, 1948 a fire broke out at the Caltex pumps and the underground tanks.
service station at the corner of Antipolo street and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It
started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground The report of Captain Tinio reproduced information given by a certain Benito
storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose Morales regarding the history of the gasoline station and what the chief of the
was inserted. The fire spread to and burned several neighboring houses, fire department had told him on the same subject.
including the personal properties and effects inside them. Their owners,
among them petitioners here, sued respondents Caltex (Phil.), Inc. and Mateo
The foregoing reports were ruled out as "double hearsay" by the Court of
Boquiren, the first as alleged owner of the station and the second as its agent
in charge of operation. Negligence on the part of both of them was attributed Appeals and hence inadmissible. This ruling is now assigned as error. It is
as the cause of the fire. contended: first, that said reports were admitted by the trial court without
objection on the part of respondents; secondly, that with respect to the police
report (Exhibit V-Africa) which appears signed by a Detective Zapanta
The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioners failed to prove allegedly "for Salvador Capacillo," the latter was presented as witness but
negligence and that respondents had exercised due care in the premises and respondents waived their right to cross-examine him although they had the
with respect to the supervision of their employees. opportunity to do so; and thirdly, that in any event the said reports are
admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule under section 35 of Rule 123,
The first question before Us refers to the admissibility of certain reports on the now Rule 130.
fire prepared by the Manila Police and Fire Departments and by a certain
Captain Tinio of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Portions of the first two The first contention is not borne out by the record. The transcript of the hearing
reports are as follows: of September 17, 1953 (pp. 167-170) shows that the reports in question, when
offered as evidence, were objected to by counsel for each of respondents on
1. Police Department report: — the ground that they were hearsay and that they were "irrelevant, immaterial
and impertinent." Indeed, in the court's resolution only Exhibits J, K, K-5 and
X-6 were admitted without objection; the admission of the others, including the
disputed ones, carried no such explanation.
On the second point, although Detective Capacillo did take the witness stand,
he was not examined and he did not testify as to the facts mentioned in his
alleged report (signed by Detective Zapanta). All he said was that he was one
of those who investigated "the location of the fire and, if possible, gather
witnesses as to the occurrence, and that he brought the report with him. There
was nothing, therefore, on which he need be cross-examined; and the
contents of the report, as to which he did not testify, did not thereby become
competent evidence. And even if he had testified, his testimony would still have
been objectionable as far as information gathered by him from third persons
was concerned.
Petitioners maintain, however, that the reports in themselves, that is, without
further testimonial evidence on their contents, fall within the scope of section
35, Rule 123, which provides that "entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence
of the facts therein stated."
There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule just mentioned: (a)
that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially
enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the
performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a
duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other person
had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been
acquired by him personally or through official information (Moran, Comments
on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1957] p. 398).
Of the three requisites just stated, only the last need be considered here.
Obviously the material facts recited in the reports as to the cause and
circumstances of the fire were not within the personal knowledge of the officers
who conducted the investigation. Was knowledge of such facts, however,
acquired by them through official information? As to some facts the sources
thereof are not even identified. Others are attributed to Leopoldo Medina,
referred to as an employee at the gas station were the fire occurred; to Leandro
Flores, driver of the tank truck from which gasoline was being transferred at
the time to the underground tank of the station; and to respondent Mateo
Boquiren, who could not, according to Exhibit V-Africa, give any reason as to
the origin of the fire. To qualify their statements as "official information"
acquired by the officers who prepared the reports, the persons who made the
statements not only must have personal knowledge of the facts stated but must
have the duty to give such statements for record.1
The reports in question do not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule; the
facts stated therein were not acquired by the reporting officers through official
information, not having been given by the informants pursuant to any duty to
do so.
The next question is whether or not, without proof as to the cause and origin
of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply so as to presume
negligence on the part of appellees. Both the trial court and the appellate court
refused to apply the doctrine in the instant case on the grounds that "as to (its)
applicability ... in the Philippines, there seems to he nothing definite," and that
while the rules do not prohibit its adoption in appropriate cases, "in the case at
bar, however, we find no practical use for such doctrine." The question
deserves more than such summary dismissal. The doctrine has actually been
applied in this jurisdiction, in the case of Espiritu vs. Philippine Power and
Development Co. (CA-G.R. No. 3240-R, September 20, 1949), wherein the
decision of the Court of Appeals was penned by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes now
a member of the Supreme Court.
The facts of that case are stated in the decision as follows:
In the afternoon of May 5, 1946, while the plaintiff-appellee and other
companions were loading grass between the municipalities of Bay and
Calauan, in the province of Laguna, with clear weather and without
any wind blowing, an electric transmission wire, installed and
maintained by the defendant Philippine Power and Development Co.,
Inc. alongside the road, suddenly parted, and one of the broken ends
hit the head of the plaintiff as he was about to board the truck. As a
result, plaintiff received the full shock of 4,400 volts carried by the wire
and was knocked unconscious to the ground. The electric charge
coursed through his body and caused extensive and serious multiple
burns from skull to legs, leaving the bone exposed in some parts and
causing intense pain and wounds that were not completely healed
when the case was tried on June 18, 1947, over one year after the
mishap.
The defendant therein disclaimed liability on the ground that the plaintiff had
failed to show any specific act of negligence, but the appellate court overruled
the defense under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The court said:
The first point is directed against the sufficiency of plaintiff's evidence
to place appellant on its defense. While it is the rule, as contended by
the appellant, that in case of noncontractual negligence, or culpa
aquiliana, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish that the
proximate cause of his injury was the negligence of the defendant, it
is also a recognized principal that "where the thing which caused
 injury, without fault of the injured person, is under the exclusive control
of the defendant and the injury is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not occur if he having such control use proper care, it
affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of the explanation, that
the injury arose from defendant's want of care."
And the burden of evidence is shifted to him to establish that he has
observed due care and diligence. (San Juan Light & Transit Co. v.
Requena, 244, U.S. 89, 56 L. ed. 680.) This rule is known by the name
of res ipsa loquitur (the transaction speaks for itself), and is peculiarly
applicable to the case at bar, where it is unquestioned that the plaintiff
had every right to be on the highway, and the electric wire was under
the sole control of defendant company. In the ordinary course of
events, electric wires do not part suddenly in fair weather and injure
people, unless they are subjected to unusual strain and stress or there
are defects in their installation, maintenance and supervision; just as
barrels do not ordinarily roll out of the warehouse windows to injure
passersby, unless some one was negligent. (Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H &
Co. 722; 159 Eng. Reprint 299, the leading case that established that
rule). Consequently, in the absence of contributory negligence (which
is admittedly not present), the fact that the wire snapped suffices to
raise a reasonable presumption of negligence in its installation, care
and maintenance. Thereafter, as observed by Chief Baron Pollock, "if
there are any facts inconsistent with negligence, it is for the defendant
to prove."
It is true of course that decisions of the Court of Appeals do not lay down
doctrines binding on the Supreme Court, but we do not consider this a reason
for not applying the particular doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the case at bar.
Gasoline is a highly combustible material, in the storage and sale of which
extreme care must be taken. On the other hand, fire is not considered a
fortuitous event, as it arises almost invariably from some act of man. A case
strikingly similar to the one before Us is Jones vs. Shell Petroleum Corporation,
et al., 171 So. 447:
Arthur O. Jones is the owner of a building in the city of Hammon which
in the year 1934 was leased to the Shell Petroleum Corporation for a
gasoline filling station. On October 8, 1934, during the term of the
lease, while gasoline was being transferred from the tank wagon, also
operated by the Shell Petroleum Corporation, to the underground tank
of the station, a fire started with resulting damages to the building
owned by Jones. Alleging that the damages to his building amounted
to $516.95, Jones sued the Shell Petroleum Corporation for the
recovery of that amount. The judge of the district court, after hearing
the testimony, concluded that plaintiff was entitled to a recovery and
rendered judgment in his favor for $427.82. The Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit reversed this judgment, on the ground the testimony
failed to show with reasonable certainty any negligence on the part of
the Shell Petroleum Corporation or any of its agents or employees.
Plaintiff applied to this Court for a Writ of Review which was granted,
and the case is now before us for decision.1äwphï1.ñët
In resolving the issue of negligence, the Supreme Court of Louisiana held:
Plaintiff's petition contains two distinct charges of negligence — one
relating to the cause of the fire and the other relating to the spreading
of the gasoline about the filling station.
Other than an expert to assess the damages caused plaintiff's building
by the fire, no witnesses were placed on the stand by the defendant.
Taking up plaintiff's charge of negligence relating to the cause of the
fire, we find it established by the record that the filling station and the
tank truck were under the control of the defendant and operated by its
agents or employees. We further find from the uncontradicted
testimony of plaintiff's witnesses that fire started in the underground
tank attached to the filling station while it was being filled from the tank
truck and while both the tank and the truck were in charge of and being
operated by the agents or employees of the defendant, extended to
the hose and tank truck, and was communicated from the burning
hose, tank truck, and escaping gasoline to the building owned by the
plaintiff.
Predicated on these circumstances and the further circumstance of
defendant's failure to explain the cause of the fire or to show its lack
of knowledge of the cause, plaintiff has evoked the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. There are many cases in which the doctrine may be
successfully invoked and this, we think, is one of them.
Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be
under the management of defendant or his servants and the accident
is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those
who have its management or control use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in absence of explanation by defendant, that the
accident arose from want of care. (45 C.J. #768, p. 1193).
This statement of the rule of res ipsa loquitur has been widely
approved and adopted by the courts of last resort. Some of the cases
in this jurisdiction in which the doctrine has been applied are the
following, viz.: Maus v. Broderick, 51 La. Ann. 1153, 25 So. 977;
Hebert v. Lake Charles Ice, etc., Co., 111 La. 522, 35 So. 731, 64
 L.R.A. 101, 100 Am. St. Rep. 505; Willis v. Vicksburg, etc., R. Co., 115
La. 63, 38 So. 892; Bents v. Page, 115 La. 560, 39 So. 599.
The principle enunciated in the aforequoted case applies with equal force here.
The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was
under the control of appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread to and
burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could have known
how the fire started were appellees and their employees, but they gave no
explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the
incident happened because of want of care.
In the report submitted by Captain Leoncio Mariano of the Manila Police
Department (Exh. X-1 Africa) the following appears:
Investigation of the basic complaint disclosed that the Caltex Gasoline
Station complained of occupies a lot approximately 10 m x 10 m at the
southwest corner of Rizal Avenue and Antipolo. The location is within
a very busy business district near the Obrero Market, a railroad
crossing and very thickly populated neighborhood where a great
number of people mill around t
until
gasoline
tever be theWactjvities of these peopleor lighting a cigarette cannot
be excluded and this constitute a secondary hazard to its operation
which in turn endangers the entire neighborhood to conflagration.
Furthermore, aside from precautions already taken by its operator the
concrete walls south and west adjoining the neighborhood are only 2-
1/2 meters high at most and cannot avoid the flames from leaping over
it in case of fire.
Records show that there have been two cases of fire which caused
not only material damages but desperation and also panic in the
neighborhood.
Although the soft drinks stand had been eliminated, this gasoline
service station is also used by its operator as a garage and repair shop
for his fleet of taxicabs numbering ten or more, adding another risk to
the possible outbreak of fire at this already small but crowded gasoline
station.
The foregoing report, having been submitted by a police officer in the
performance of his duties on the basis of his own personal observation of the
facts reported, may properly be considered as an exception to the hearsay
rule. These facts, descriptive of the location and objective circumstances
surrounding the operation of the gasoline station in question, strengthen the
presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, since on
their face they called for more stringent measures of caution than those which
would satisfy the standard of due diligence under ordinary circumstances.
There is no more eloquent demonstration of this than the statement of Leandro
Flores before the police investigator. Flores was the driver of the gasoline tank
wagon who, alone and without assistance, was transferring the contents
thereof into the underground storage when the fire broke out. He said: "Before
loading the underground tank there were no people, but while the loading was
going on, there were people who went to drink coca-cola (at the coca-cola
stand) which is about a meter from the hole leading to the underground tank."
He added that when the tank was almost filled he went to the tank truck to
close the valve, and while he had his back turned to the "manhole" he, heard
someone shout "fire."
Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to the neighboring houses
were it not for another negligent omission on the part of defendants, namely,
their failure to provide a concrete wall high enough to prevent the flames from
leaping over it. As it was the concrete wall was only 2-1/2 meters high, and
beyond that height it consisted merely of galvanized iron sheets, which would
predictably crumple and melt when subjected to intense heat. Defendants'
negligence, therefore, was not only with respect to the cause of the fire but
also with respect to the spread thereof to the neighboring houses.
There is an admission on the part of Boquiren in his amended answer to the
second amended complaint that "the fire was caused through the acts of a
stranger who, without authority, or permission of answering defendant, passed
through the gasoline station and negligently threw a lighted match in the
premises." No evidence on this point was adduced, but assuming the
allegation to be true — certainly any unfavorable inference from the admission
may be taken against Boquiren — it does not extenuate his negligence. A
decision of the Supreme Court of Texas, upon facts analogous to those of the
present case, states the rule which we find acceptable here. "It is the rule that
those who distribute a dangerous article or agent, owe a degree of protection
to the public proportionate to and commensurate with a danger involved ... we
think it is the generally accepted rule as applied to torts that 'if the effects of
the actor's negligent conduct actively and continuously operate to bring about
harm to another, the fact that the active and substantially simultaneous
operation of the effects of a third person's innocent, tortious or criminal act is
also a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, does not protect the actor
from liability.' (Restatement of the Law of Torts, vol. 2, p. 1184, #439). Stated
in another way, "The intention of an unforeseen and unexpected cause, is not
sufficient to relieve a wrongdoer from consequences of negligence, if such
negligence directly and proximately cooperates with the independent cause in
the resulting injury." (MacAfee, et al. vs. Traver's Gas Corporation, 153 S.W.
2nd 442.)
The next issue is whether Caltex should be held liable for the damages caused
to appellants. This issue depends on whether Boquiren was an independent
contractor, as held by the Court of Appeals, or an agent of Caltex. This
question, in the light of the facts not controverted, is one of law and hence may
be passed upon by this Court. These facts are: (1) Boquiren made an
admission that he was an agent of Caltex; (2) at the time of the fire Caltex
owned the gasoline station and all the equipment therein; (3) Caltex exercised
control over Boquiren in the management of the state; (4) the delivery truck
used in delivering gasoline to the station had the name of CALTEX painted on
it; and (5) the license to store gasoline at the station was in the name of Caltex,
which paid the license fees. (Exhibit T-Africa; Exhibit U-Africa; Exhibit X-5
Africa; Exhibit X-6 Africa; Exhibit Y-Africa).
In Boquiren's amended answer to the second amended complaint, he denied
that he directed one of his drivers to remove gasoline from the truck into the
tank and alleged that the "alleged driver, if one there was, was not in his
employ, the driver being an employee of the Caltex (Phil.) Inc. and/or the
owners of the gasoline station." It is true that Boquiren later on amended his
answer, and that among the changes was one to the effect that he was not
acting as agent of Caltex. But then again, in his motion to dismiss appellants'
second amended complaint the ground alleged was that it stated no cause of
action since under the allegations thereof he was merely acting as agent of
Caltex, such that he could not have incurred personal liability. A motion to
dismiss on this ground is deemed to be an admission of the facts alleged in
the complaint.
Caltex admits that it owned the gasoline station as well as the equipment
therein, but claims that the business conducted at the service station in
question was owned and operated by Boquiren. But Caltex did not present any
contract with Boquiren that would reveal the nature of their relationship at the
time of the fire. There must have been one in existence at that time. Instead,
what was presented was a license agreement manifestly tailored for purposes
of this case, since it was entered into shortly before the expiration of the one-
year period it was intended to operate. This so-called license agreement
(Exhibit 5-Caltex) was executed on November 29, 1948, but made effective as
of January 1, 1948 so as to cover the date of the fire, namely, March 18, 1948.
This retroactivity provision is quite significant, and gives rise to the conclusion
that it was designed precisely to free Caltex from any responsibility with
respect to the fire, as shown by the clause that Caltex "shall not be liable for
any injury to person or property while in the property herein licensed, it being
understood and agreed that LICENSEE (Boquiren) is not an employee,
representative or agent of LICENSOR (Caltex)."
But even if the license agreement were to govern, Boquiren can hardly be
considered an independent contractor. Under that agreement Boquiren would
pay Caltex the purely nominal sum of P1.00 for the use of the premises and
all the equipment therein. He could sell only Caltex Products. Maintenance of
the station and its equipment was subject to the approval, in other words
control, of Caltex. Boquiren could not assign or transfer his rights as licensee
without the consent of Caltex. The license agreement was supposed to be
from January 1, 1948 to December 31, 1948, and thereafter until terminated
by Caltex upon two days prior written notice. Caltex could at any time cancel
and terminate the agreement in case Boquiren ceased to sell Caltex products,
or did not conduct the business with due diligence, in the judgment of Caltex.
Termination of the contract was therefore a right granted only to Caltex but not
to Boquiren. These provisions of the contract show the extent of the control of
Caltex over Boquiren. The control was such that the latter was virtually an
employee of the former.
Taking into consideration the fact that the operator owed his position
to the company and the latter could remove him or terminate his
services at will; that the service station belonged to the company and
bore its tradename and the operator sold only the products of the
company; that the equipment used by the operator belonged to the
company and were just loaned to the operator and the company took
charge of their repair and maintenance; that an employee of the
company supervised the operator and conducted periodic inspection
of the company's gasoline and service station; that the price of the
products sold by the operator was fixed by the company and not by
the operator; and that the receipts signed by the operator indicated
that he was a mere agent, the finding of the Court of Appeals that the
operator was an agent of the company and not an independent
contractor should not be disturbed.
To determine the nature of a contract courts do not have or are not
bound to rely upon the name or title given it by the contracting parties,
should thereby a controversy as to what they really had intended to
enter into, but the way the contracting parties do or perform their
respective obligations stipulated or agreed upon may be shown and
inquired into, and should such performance conflict with the name or
title given the contract by the parties, the former must prevail over the
latter. (Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd. vs. Firemens' Insurance
Company of Newark, New Jersey, 100 Phil. 757).
The written contract was apparently drawn for the purpose of creating
the apparent relationship of employer and independent contractor,
 and of avoiding liability for the negligence of the employees about the
station; but the company was not satisfied to allow such relationship
to exist. The evidence shows that it immediately assumed control, and
proceeded to direct the method by which the work contracted for
should be performed. By reserving the right to terminate the contract
at will, it retained the means of compelling submission to its orders.
Having elected to assume control and to direct the means and
methods by which the work has to be performed, it must be held liable
for the negligence of those performing service under its direction. We
think the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury. (Gulf
Refining Company v. Rogers, 57 S.W. 2d, 183).

Caltex further argues that the gasoline stored in the station belonged to
Boquiren. But no cash invoices were presented to show that Boquiren had
bought said gasoline from Caltex. Neither was there a sales contract to prove
the same.

As found by the trial court the Africas sustained a loss of P9,005.80, after
deducting the amount of P2,000.00 collected by them on the insurance of the
house. The deduction is now challenged as erroneous on the ground that
Article 2207 of the New Civil Code, which provides for the subrogation of the
insurer to the rights of the insured, was not yet in effect when the loss took
place. However, regardless of the silence of the law on this point at that time,
the amount that should be recovered be measured by the damages actually
suffered, otherwise the principle prohibiting unjust enrichment would be
violated. With respect to the claim of the heirs of Ong P7,500.00 was adjudged
by the lower court on the basis of the assessed value of the property
destroyed, namely, P1,500.00, disregarding the testimony of one of the Ong
children that said property was worth P4,000.00. We agree that the court erred,
since it is of common knowledge that the assessment for taxation purposes is
not an accurate gauge of fair market value, and in this case should not prevail
over positive evidence of such value. The heirs of Ong are therefore entitled
to P10,000.00.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed and respondents-appellees

are held liable solidarily to appellants, and ordered to pay them the aforesaid
sum of P9,005.80 and P10,000.00, respectively, with interest from the filing of
the complaint, and costs.
 13. Republic v. Luzon Stevedoring (GR No. L-21749)
G.R. No. L-21749 September 29, 1967
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
H. San Luis and L.V. Simbulan for defendant-appellant.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
The present case comes by direct appeal from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila (Case No. 44572) adjudging the defendant-appellant,
Luzon Stevedoring Corporation, liable in damages to the plaintiff-appellee
Republic of the Philippines.
In the early afternoon of August 17, 1960, barge L-1892, owned by the Luzon
Stevedoring Corporation was being towed down the Pasig river by tugboats
"Bangus" and "Barbero"1 also belonging to the same corporation, when the
barge rammed against one of the wooden piles of the Nagtahan bailey bridge,
smashing the posts and causing the bridge to list. The river, at the time, was
swollen and the current swift, on account of the heavy downpour of Manila and
the surrounding provinces on August 15 and 16, 1960.
Sued by the Republic of the Philippines for actual and consequential damage
caused by its employees, amounting to P200,000 (Civil Case No. 44562, CFI
of Manila), defendant Luzon Stevedoring Corporation disclaimed liability
therefor, on the grounds that it had exercised due diligence in the selection
and supervision of its employees; that the damages to the bridge were caused
by force majeure; that plaintiff has no capacity to sue; and that the Nagtahan
bailey bridge is an obstruction to navigation.
After due trial, the court rendered judgment on June 11, 1963, holding the
defendant liable for the damage caused by its employees and ordering it to
pay to plaintiff the actual cost of the repair of the Nagtahan bailey bridge which
amounted to P192,561.72, with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing
of the complaint.
Defendant appealed directly to this Court assigning the following errors
allegedly committed by the court a quo, to wit:
I — The lower court erred in not holding that the herein defendant-
appellant had exercised the diligence required of it in the selection and
supervision of its personnel to prevent damage or injury to
others.1awphîl.nèt
II — The lower court erred in not holding that the ramming of the
Nagtahan bailey bridge by barge L-1892 was caused by force
majeure.
III — The lower court erred in not holding that the Nagtahan bailey
bridge is an obstruction, if not a menace, to navigation in the Pasig
river.
IV — The lower court erred in not blaming the damage sustained by
the Nagtahan bailey bridge to the improper placement of the dolphins.
V — The lower court erred in granting plaintiff's motion to adduce
further evidence in chief after it has rested its case.
VI — The lower court erred in finding the plaintiff entitled to the amount
of P192,561.72 for damages which is clearly exorbitant and without
any factual basis.
However, it must be recalled that the established rule in this jurisdiction is that
when a party appeals directly to the Supreme Court, and submits his case
there for decision, he is deemed to have waived the right to dispute any finding
of fact made by the trial Court. The only questions that may be raised are those
of law (Savellano vs. Diaz, L-17441, July 31, 1963; Aballe vs. Santiago, L-
16307, April 30, 1963; G.S.I.S. vs. Cloribel, L-22236, June 22, 1965). A
converso, a party who resorts to the Court of Appeals, and submits his case
for decision there, is barred from contending later that his claim was beyond
the jurisdiction of the aforesaid Court. The reason is that a contrary rule would
encourage the undesirable practice of appellants' submitting their cases for
decision to either court in expectation of favorable judgment, but with intent of
attacking its jurisdiction should the decision be unfavorable (Tyson Tan, et al.
vs. Filipinas Compañia de Seguros) et al., L-10096, Res. on Motion to
Reconsider, March 23, 1966). Consequently, we are limited in this appeal to
the issues of law raised in the appellant's brief.
Taking the aforesaid rules into account, it can be seen that the only reviewable
issues in this appeal are reduced to two:
 1) Whether or not the collision of appellant's barge with the supports
or piers of the Nagtahan bridge was in law caused by fortuitous event
or force majeure, and
2) Whether or not it was error for the Court to have permitted the
plaintiff-appellee to introduce additional evidence of damages after
said party had rested its case.
As to the first question, considering that the Nagtahan bridge was an
immovable and stationary object and uncontrovertedly provided with adequate
openings for the passage of water craft, including barges like of appellant's, it
is undeniable that the unusual event that the barge, exclusively controlled by
appellant, rammed the bridge supports raises a presumption of negligence on
the part of appellant or its employees manning the barge or the tugs that towed
it. For in the ordinary course of events, such a thing does not happen if proper
care is used. In Anglo American Jurisprudence, the inference arises by what
is known as the "res ipsa loquitur" rule (Scott vs. London Docks Co., 2 H & C
596; San Juan Light & Transit Co. vs. Requena, 224 U.S. 89, 56 L. Ed., 680;
Whitwell vs. Wolf, 127 Minn. 529, 149 N.W. 299; Bryne vs. Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co., 269 Mass. 130; 168 N.E. 540; Gribsby vs. Smith, 146 S.W.
2d 719).
The appellant strongly stresses the precautions taken by it on the day in
question: that it assigned two of its most powerful tugboats to tow down river
its barge L-1892; that it assigned to the task the more competent and
experienced among its patrons, had the towlines, engines and equipment
double-checked and inspected; that it instructed its patrons to take extra
precautions; and concludes that it had done all it was called to do, and that the
accident, therefore, should be held due to force majeure or fortuitous event.
These very precautions, however, completely destroy the appellant's defense.
For caso fortuito or force majeure(which in law are identical in so far as they
exempt an obligor from liability)2 by definition, are extraordinary events not
foreseeable or avoidable, "events that could not be foreseen, or which, though
foreseen, were inevitable" (Art. 1174, Civ. Code of the Philippines). It is,
therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or
anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee
or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to
foresee the same: "un hecho no constituye caso fortuito por la sola
circunstancia de que su existencia haga mas dificil o mas onerosa la accion
diligente del presento ofensor" (Peirano Facio, Responsibilidad Extra-
contractual, p. 465; Mazeaud Trait de la Responsibilite Civil, Vol. 2, sec. 1569).
The very measures adopted by appellant prove that the possibility of danger
was not only foreseeable, but actually foreseen, and was not caso fortuito.
Otherwise stated, the appellant, Luzon Stevedoring Corporation, knowing and
appreciating the perils posed by the swollen stream and its swift current,
voluntarily entered into a situation involving obvious danger; it therefore
assured the risk, and can not shed responsibility merely because the
precautions it adopted turned out to be insufficient. Hence, the lower Court
committed no error in holding it negligent in not suspending operations and in
holding it liable for the damages caused.
It avails the appellant naught to argue that the dolphins, like the bridge, were
improperly located. Even if true, these circumstances would merely emphasize
the need of even higher degree of care on appellant's part in the situation
involved in the present case. The appellant, whose barges and tugs travel up
and down the river everyday, could not safely ignore the danger posed by
these allegedly improper constructions that had been erected, and in place,
for years.
On the second point: appellant charges the lower court with having abused its
discretion in the admission of plaintiff's additional evidence after the latter had
rested its case. There is an insinuation that the delay was deliberate to enable
the manipulation of evidence to prejudice defendant-appellant.
We find no merit in the contention. Whether or not further evidence will be
allowed after a party offering the evidence has rested his case, lies within the
sound discretion of the trial Judge, and this discretion will not be reviewed
except in clear case of abuse.3
In the present case, no abuse of that discretion is shown. What was allowed
to be introduced, after plaintiff had rested its evidence in chief, were vouchers
and papers to support an item of P1,558.00 allegedly spent for the
reinforcement of the panel of the bailey bridge, and which item already
appeared in Exhibit GG. Appellant, in fact, has no reason to charge the trial
court of being unfair, because it was also able to secure, upon written motion,
a similar order dated November 24, 1962, allowing reception of additional
evidence for the said defendant-appellant.4
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision of the lower Court appealed
from, the same is hereby affirmed. Costs against the defendant-appellant.
 14. Batiquin v. CA 258 SCRA 334
[G.R. No. 118231. July 5, 1996]
DR. VICTORIA L. BATIQUIN and ALLAN BATIQUIN, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES QUEDO D. ACOGIDO and
FLOTILDE G. VILLEGAS, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Throughout history, patients have consigned their fates and lives to the
skill of their doctors. For a breach of this trust, men have been quick to demand
retribution.Some 4,000 years ago, the Code of Hammurabi[1] then already
provided: "If a physician make a deep incision upon a man with his bronze
lancet and cause the man's death, or operate on the eye socket of a man with
his bronze lancet and destroy the man's eyes, they shall cut off his
hand."[2] Subsequently, Hippocrates[3] wrote what was to become part of the
healer's oath: "I will follow that method of treatment which according to my
ability and judgment, I consider for the benefit of my patients, and abstain from
whatever is deleterious and mischievous . . . . While I continue to keep this
oath unviolated may it be granted me to enjoy life and practice the art,
respected by all men at all times but should I trespass and violate this oath,
may the reverse be my lot." At present, the primary objective of the medical
profession is the preservation of life and maintenance of the health of the
people.[4]
Needless to say then, when a physician strays from his sacred duty and
endangers instead the life of his patient, he must be made to answer
therefor. Although society today cannot and will not tolerate the punishment
meted out by the ancients, neither will it and this Court, as this case would
show, let the act go uncondemned.
The petitioners appeal from the decision[5] of the Court of Appeals of 11
May 1994 in CA-G.R. CV No. 30851, which reversed the decision[6] of 21
December 1990 of Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros
Oriental in Civil Case No. 9492.
The facts, as found by the trial court, are as follows:
Dr. Batiquin was a Resident Physician at the Negros Oriental Provincial
Hospital, Dumaguete City from January 9, 1978 to September 1989. Between
1987 and September, 1989 she was also the Actg. Head of the Department of
Obstetrics and Gynecology at the said Hospital.
Mrs. Villegas is a married woman who submitted to Dr. Batiquin for
prenatal care as the latter's private patient sometime before September 21,
1988.
In the morning of September 21, 1988 Dr. Batiquin, with the assistance
of Dr. Doris Teresita Sy who was also a Resident Physician at the same
Hospital, C.I. and O.R. Nurse Arlene Diones and some student nurses
performed a simple cesarean section on Mrs. Villegas at the Negros Oriental
Provincial Hospital and after 45 minutes Mrs. Villegas delivered her first child,
Rachel Acogido, at about 11:45 that morning. Thereafter, Plaintiff remained
confined at the Hospital until September 27, 1988 during which period of
confinement she was regularly visited by Dr. Batiquin. On September 28,
1988, Mrs. Villegas checked out of the Hospital . . . and on the same day she
paid Dr. Batiquin, thru the latter's secretary, the amount of P1,500.00 as
"professional fee" . . . .
Soon after leaving the Hospital Mrs. Villegas began to suffer abdominal
pains and complained of being feverish. She also gradually lost her appetite,
so she consulted Dr. Batiquin at the latter's polyclinic who prescribed for her
certain medicines . . . which she had been taking up to December, 1988.
In the meantime, Mrs. Villegas was given a Medical Certificate by Dr.
Batiquin on October 31, 1988 . . . certifying to her physical fitness to return to
her work on November 7, 1988. So, on the second week of November, 1988
Mrs. Villegas returned to her work at the Rural Bank of Ayungon, Negros
Oriental.
The abdominal pains and fever kept on recurring and bothered Mrs.
Villegas no end and despite the medications administered by Dr.
Batiquin. When the pains become unbearable and she was rapidly losing
weight she consulted Dr. Ma. Salud Kho at the Holy Child's Hospital in
Dumaguete City on January 20, 1989.
The evidence of Plaintiffs show that when Dr. Ma. Salud Kho examined
Mrs. Villegas at the Holy Child's Hospital on January 20, 1989 she found Mrs.
Villegas to be feverish, pale and was breathing fast. Upon examination she felt
an abdominal mass one finger below the umbilicus which she suspected to be
either a tumor of the uterus or an ovarian cyst, either of which could be
cancerous. She had an x-ray taken of Mrs. Villegas' chest, abdomen and
kidney. She also took blood tests of Plaintiff.A blood count showed that Mrs.
Villegas had [an] infection inside her abdominal cavity. The result of all those
examinations impelled Dr. Kho to suggest that Mrs. Villegas submit to another
surgery to which the latter agreed.
 When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs. Villegas she found whitish-
yellow discharge inside, an ovarian cyst on each of the left and right ovaries
which gave out pus, dirt and pus behind the uterus, and a piece of rubber
materials on the right side of the uterus embedded on [sic] the ovarian cyst, 2
inches by 3/4 inch in size. This piece of rubber material which Dr. Kho
described as a "foreign body" looked like a piece of a "rubber glove" . . . and
which is [sic] also "rubber-drain like . . . . It could have been a torn section of a
surgeon's gloves or could have come from other sources. And this foreign
body was the cause of the infection of the ovaries and consequently of all the
discomfort suffered by Mrs. Villegas after her delivery on September 21,
1988.[7]
The piece of rubber allegedly found near private respondent Flotilde
Villegas' uterus was not presented in court, and although Dr. Ma. Salud Kho
testified that she sent it to a pathologist in Cebu City for examination,[8] it was
not mentioned in the pathologist's Surgical Pathology Report.[9]
Aside from Dr. Kho's testimony, the evidence which mentioned the piece
of rubber are a Medical Certificate,[10] a Progress Record,[11] an Anesthesia
Record,[12] a Nurse's Record,[13] and a Physician's Discharge
Summary.[14] The trial court, however, regarded these documentary evidence
as mere hearsay, "there being no showing that the person or persons who
prepared them are deceased or unable to testify on the facts therein stated . .
. . Except for the Medical Certificate (Exhibit "F"), all the above documents
were allegedly prepared by persons other than Dr. Kho, and she merely affixed
her signature on some of them to express her agreement thereto . . . ."[15] The
trial court also refused to give weight to Dr. Kho's testimony regarding the
subject piece of rubber as Dr. Kho "may not have had first-hand knowledge"
thereof,[16] as could be gleaned from her statement, thus:
A . . . I have heard somebody that [sic] says [sic] there is [sic] a foreign
body that goes with the tissues but unluckily I don't know where the
rubber was.[17]
The trial court deemed vital Dr. Victoria Batiquin's testimony that when
she confronted Dr. Kho regarding the piece of rubber, "Dr. Kho answered that
there was rubber indeed but that she threw it away."[18] This statement, the trial
court noted, was never denied nor disputed by Dr. Kho, leading it to conclude:
There are now two different versions on the whereabouts of that offending
"rubber" (1) that it was sent to the Pathologist in Cebu as testified to in Court
by Dr. Kho and (2) that Dr. Kho threw it away as told by her to Defendant. The
failure of the Plaintiffs to reconcile these two different versions serve only to
weaken their claim against Defendant Batiquin.[19]
All told, the trial court held in favor of the petitioners herein.
The Court of Appeals reviewed the entirety of Dr. Kho's testimony and,
even without admitting the private respondents' documentary evidence,
deemed Dr. Kho's positive testimony to definitely establish that a piece of
rubber was found near private respondent Villegas' uterus. Thus, the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, holding:
4. The fault or negligence of appellee Dr. Batiquin is established by
preponderance of evidence. The trial court itself had narrated what happened
to appellant Flotilde after the cesarean operation made by appellee doctor . . .
. After the second operation, appellant Flotilde became well and
healthy. Appellant Flotilde's troubles were caused by the infection due to the
"rubber" that was left inside her abdomen. Both appellants testified that after
the operation made by appellee doctor, they did not go to any other doctor until
they finally decided to see another doctor in January, 1989 when she was not
getting any better under the care of appellee Dr. Batiquin . . . . Appellee Dr.
Batiquin admitted on the witness stand that she alone decided when to close
the operating area; that she examined the portion she operated on before
closing the same . . . . Had she exercised due diligence, appellee Dr. Batiquin
would have found the rubber and removed it before closing the operating
area.[20]
The appellate court then ruled:
Appellants' evidence show[s] that they paid a total of P17,000.00 [deposit of
P7,100.00 (Exh. G-1-A) plus hospital and medical expenses together with
doctor's fees in the total amount P9,900.00 (Exhs. G and G-2)] for the second
operation that saved her life.
For the miseries appellants endured for more than three (3) months, due to
the negligence of appellee Dr. Batiquin, they are entitled to moral damages in
the amount of P100,000.00; exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00
and attorney's fees in the amount of P25,000.00.
The fact that appellant Flotilde can no longer bear children because her uterus
and ovaries were removed by Dr. Kho is not taken into consideration as it is
not shown that the removal of said organs were the direct result of the rubber
left by appellee Dr. Batiquin near the uterus. What is established is that the
rubber left by appellee cause infection, placed the life of appellant Flotilde in
jeopardy and caused appellants fear, worry and anxiety . . . .
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment, dismissing the complaint for damages
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Another judgment is hereby entered ordering
defendants-appellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants the amounts of P17,000.00
as and for actual damages; P100,000.00 as and for moral damages;
P20,000.00 as and for exemplary damages; and P25,000.00 as and for
attorney's fees plus the cost of litigation.
SO ORDERED.[21]
From the above judgment, the petitioners appealed to this Court claiming
that the appellate court; (1) committed grave abuse of discretion by resorting
to findings of fact not supported by the evidence on record, and (2) exceeded
its discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when it gave
credence to testimonies punctured with contradictions and falsities.
The private respondents commented that the petition raised only
questions of fact, which were not proper for review by this Court.
While the rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari, there are exceptions, among which are when the factual
findings of the trial court and the appellate court conflict, when the appealed
decision is clearly contradicted by the evidence on record, or when the
appellate court misapprehended the facts.[22]
After deciphering the cryptic petition, we find that the focal point of the
instant appeal is the appreciation of Dr. Kho's testimony. The petitioners
contend that the Court of Appeals misappreciated the following portion of Dr.
Kho's testimony:
Q What is the purpose of the examination?
A Just in case, I was just thinking at the back of my mind, just in case this
would turn out to be a medico-legal case, I have heard somebody
that [sic] says [sic] there is [sic] a foreign body that goes with the
tissues but unluckily I don't know where the rubber was. It was not
in the Lab, it was not in Cebu.[23] (Italics supplied)
The petitioners prefer the trial court's interpretation of the above testimony, i.e.,
that Dr. Kho's knowledge of the piece of rubber was based on hearsay. The
Court of Appeals, on the other hand, concluded that the underscored phrase
was taken out of context by the trial court. According to the Court of Appeals,
the trial court should have likewise considered the other portions of Dr. Kho's
testimony, especially the following:
Q So you did actually conduct the operation on her?
A Yes, I did.
Q And what was the result?
A Opening up her abdomen, there was whitish-yellow discharge inside
the abdomen, there was an ovarian cyst on the left and side and
there was also an ovarian cyst on the right which, on opening up or
freeing it up from the uterus, turned out to be pus. Both ovaries
turned out . . . to have pus. And then, cleaning up the uterus, at the
back of the uterus it was very dirty, it was full of pus. And there was
a [piece of] rubber, we found a [piece of] rubber on the right side.[24]
We agree with the Court of Appeals. The phrase relied upon by the trial
court does not negate the fact that Dr. Kho saw a piece of rubber in private
respondent Villegas' abdomen, and that she sent it to a laboratory and then to
Cebu City for examination by a pathologist.[25] Not even the Pathologist's
Report, although devoid of any mention of a piece of rubber, could alter what
Dr. Kho saw. Furthermore, Dr. Kho's knowledge of the piece of rubber could
not be based on other than first hand knowledge for, as she asserted before
the trial court:
Q But you are sure you have seen [the piece of rubber]?
A Oh yes. I was not the only one who saw it.[26]
The petitioners emphasize that the private respondents never reconciled
Dr. Kho's testimony with Dr. Batiquin's claim on the witness stand that when
Dr. Batiquin confronted Dr. Kho about the foreign body, the latter said that
there was a piece of rubber but that she threw it away. Although hearsay, Dr.
Batiquin's claim was not objected to, and hence, the same is admissible[27] but
it carries no probative value.[28] Nevertheless, assuming otherwise, Dr.
Batiquin's statement cannot belie the fact that Dr. Kho found a piece of rubber
near private respondent Villegas' uterus. And even if we were to doubt Dr. Kho
as to what she did to the piece of rubber, i.e., whether she threw it away or
sent it to Cebu City, we are not justified in distrusting her as to her recovery of
a piece of rubber from private respondent Villegas' abdomen. On this score, it
is perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with respect to
some facts and disbelieve his testimony with respect to other facts. And it has
been aptly said that even when a witness is found to have deliberately falsified
in some material particulars, it is not required that the whole of his
uncorroborated testimony be rejected, but such portions thereof deemed
worthy of belief may be credited.[29]
It is here worth nothing that the trial court paid heed to the following
portions of Dr. Batiquin's testimony: that no rubber drain was used in the
operation,[30] and that there was neither any tear on Dr. Batiquin's gloves after
the operation nor blood smears on her hands upon removing her
gloves.[31] Moreover, the trial court pointed out that the absence of a rubber
drain was corroborated by Dr. Doris Sy, Dr. Batiquin's assistant during the
operation on private respondent Villegas.[32] But the trial court failed to
recognize that the assertions of Drs. Batiquin and Sy were denials or negative
testimonies. Well-settled is the rule that positive testimony is stronger than
negative testimony.[33] Of course, as the petitioners advocate, such positive
testimony must come from a credible source, which leads us to the second
assigned error.
 While the petitioners claim that contradictions and falsities punctured Dr.
Kho's testimony, a reading of the said testimony reveals no such infirmity and
establishes Dr. Kho as a credible witness. Dr. Kho was frank throughout her
turn on the witness stand. Furthermore, no motive to state any untruth was
ever imputed against Dr. Kho, leaving her trustworthiness unimpaired.[34] The
trial court's following declaration shows that while it was critical of the lack of
care with which Dr. Kho handled the piece of rubber, it was not prepared to
doubt Dr. Kho's credibility, thus only supporting out appraisal of Dr. Kho's
trustworthiness:
This is not to say that she was less than honest when she testified about her
findings, but it can also be said that she did not take the most appropriate
precaution to preserve that "piece of rubber" as an eloquent evidence of what
she would reveal should there be a "legal problem" which she claim[s] to have
anticipated.[35]
Considering that we have assessed Dr. Kho to be a credible witness, her
positive testimony [that a piece of rubber was indeed found in private
respondent Villegas' abdomen] prevails over the negative testimony in favor
of the petitioners.
As such, the rule of res ipsa loquitur comes to fore. This Court has had
occasion to delve into the nature and operation of this doctrine:
This doctrine [res ipsa loquitur] is stated thus: "Where the thing which
causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the
accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those
who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence,
in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose
from want of care." Or as Black's Law Dictionary puts it:
Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable presumption or
inference that defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that [the]
instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's exclusive control, and that
the accident was one which ordinary does not happen in absence of
negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is [a] rule of evidence whereby negligence of
[the] alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from [the] mere fact that [the] accident
happened provided [the] character of [the] accident and circumstances
attending it lead reasonably to belief that in [the] absence of negligence it
would not have occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to have
been under [the] management and control of [the] alleged wrongdoer . . .
. Under [this] doctrine . . . the happening of an injury permits an inference of
negligence where plaintiff produces substantial evidence that [the] injury was
caused by an agency or instrumentality under [the] exclusive control and
management of defendant, and that the occurrence [sic] was such that in the
ordinary course of things would not happen if reasonable care had been used.
xxx xxx xxx
The doctrine of [r]es ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of
negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established
without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of
negligence. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law, but merely a mode of
proof or a mere procedural convenience. The rule, when applicable to the facts
and circumstances of a particular case, is not intended to and does not
dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the party
charged. It merely determines and regulates what shall
be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving
a breach of the duty of due care. The doctrine can be invoked when and only
when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not
readily available.[36]
In the instant case, all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine are
present. First, the entire proceedings of the cesarean section were under the
exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. In this light, the private respondents were
bereft of direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the exact cause of the
foreign object finding its way into private respondent Villegas' body, which,
needless to say, does not occur unless through the intervention of
negligence. Second, since aside from the cesarean section, private
respondent Villegas underwent no other operation which could have caused
the offending piece of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to reason that
such could only have been a by-product of the cesarean section performed by
Dr. Batiquin. The petitioners, in this regard, failed to overcome the
presumption of negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently leaving behind a piece
of rubber in private respondent Villegas' abdomen and for all the adverse
effects thereof.
As a final word, this Court reiterates its recognition of the vital role the
medical profession plays in the lives of the people,[37] and State's compelling
interest to enact measures to protect the public from "the potentially deadly
effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat
our bodies and minds for disease or trauma."[38] Indeed, a physician is bound
to serve the interest of his patients "with the greatest of solicitude, giving them
always his best talent and skill."[39]Through her tortious conduct, the petitioner
endangered the life of Flotilde Villegas, in violation of her profession's rigid
ethical code and in contravention of the legal standards set forth for
professionals, in the general,[40] and members of the medical profession,[41] in
particular.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of 11 May 1994 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 30851 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
 15. Rodriguez v. Manila Railroad Co. (GR No. L-15688)
G.R. No. L-15688 November 19, 1921
REMIGIO RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
Orense & Vera for appellant.
Domingo Imperial for appellees.
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted jointly by Remigio Rodrigueza and three others in
the Court of First Instance of the Province of Albay to recover a sum of money
of the Manila Railroad Company as damages resulting from a fire kindled by
sparks from a locomotive engine under the circumstances set out below. Upon
hearing the cause upon the complaint, answer and an agreed statement of
facts, the trial judge rendered judgment against the defendant company in
favor of the plaintiffs and awarded to them the following sums respectively as
damages, to wit, (1) to Remigio Rodrigueza, P3,000; (2) to Domingo Gonzaga,
P400; (3) to Cristina Luna, P300; and (4) to Perfecta Losantas, P150; all with
lawful interest from March 21, 1919. From this judgment the defendant
appealed.
The facts as appearing from the agreed statement, in relation with the
complaint, are to the effect that the defendant Railroad Company operates a
line through the district of Daraga in the municipality of Albay; that on January
29, 1918, as one of its trains passed over said line, a great quantity of sparks
were emitted from the smokestack of the locomotive, and fire was thereby
communicated to four houses nearby belonging to the four plaintiffs
respectively, and the same were entirely consumed. All of these houses were
of light construction with the exception of the house of Remigio Rodrigueza,
which was of strong materials, though the roof was covered with nipa and
cogon. The fire occurred immediately after the passage of the train, and a
strong wind was blowing at the time. It does not appear either in the complaint
or in the agreed statement whose house caught fire first, though it is stated in
the appellant's brief that the fire was first communicated to the house of
Remigio Rodrigueza, from whence it spread to the others.
In the fourth paragraph of the complaint — which is admitted to be true — it is
alleged that the defendant Railroad Company was conspicuously negligent in
relation to the origin of said fire, in the following respects, namely, first, in failing
to exercise proper supervision over the employees in charge of the locomotive;
secondly, in allowing the locomotive which emitted these sparks to be operated
without having the smokestack protected by some device for arresting sparks;
thirdly, in using in its locomotive upon this occasion Bataan coal, a fuel of
known inferior quality which, upon combustion, produces sparks in great
quantity.
The sole ground upon which the defense is rested is that the house of Remigio
Rodrigueza stood partly within the limits of the land owned by the defendant
company, though exactly how far away from the company's track does not
appear. It further appears that, after the railroad track was laid, the company
notified Rodrigueza to get his house off the land of the company and to remove
it from its exposed position. Rodrigueza did not comply with this suggestion,
though he promised to put an iron roof on his house, which he never did.
Instead, he changed the materials of the main roof to nipa, leaving the kitchen
and media-aguas covered with cogon. Upon this fact it is contended for the
defense that there was contributory negligence on the part of Remigio
Rodrigueza in having his house partly on the premises of the Railroad
Company, and that for this reason the company is not liable. This position is
in our opinion untenable for the reasons which we shall proceed to state.
In the first place, it will be noted that the fact suggested as constituting a
defense to this action could not in any view of the case operate as a bar to
recovery by the three plaintiffs other than Remigio Rodrigueza, even assuming
that the fire was first communicated to his house; for said three plaintiffs are in
nowise implicated in the act which supposedly constitutes the defense. In this
connection it will be observed that the right of action of each of these plaintiffs
is totally distinct from that of his co-plaintiff, so much so that each might have
sued separately, and the defendant if it had seen fit to do so, might in this case
have demurred successfully to the complaint for misjoinder of parties plaintiff.
The fact that the several rights of action of the different plaintiffs arose
simultaneously out of one act of the defendant is not sufficient of itself to
require, or even permit, the joinder of such parties as coplaintiffs in a single
action (30 Cyc., 114) if objection had been made thereto. Domingo Gonzaga,
Cristina Luna, and Perfecta Losantas are therefore entitled to recover upon
the admitted fact that this fire originated in the negligent acts of the defendant;
and the circumstance that the fire may have been communicated to their
houses through the house of Remegio Rodrigueza, instead of having been
directly communicated from the locomotive, is immaterial. (See 38 Am. Dec.,
64, 77; 1 11 R. C. L., 968-971; Kansas City, etc. Railroad Co. vs. Blaker, 64 L.
R. A., 81 Pennsylvania Railroad Co. vs. Hope, 80 Pa. St., 373; 21 Am. Rep.
100.)
With respect to the case of Remegio Rodrigueza it is to be inferred that his Conn., 124; 38 Am. Dec., 64; 74; Southern Ry. Co. vs. Patterson, 105 Va. 6;
house stood upon this ground before the Railroad Company laid its line over 8 Ann. Cas., 44.) And the case for the plaintiff is apparently stronger where the
this course; and at any rate there is no proof that this plaintiff had unlawfully company constructs its line in proximity to a house already built and fails to
intruded upon the railroad's property in the act of building his house. What condemn it and remove it from its right of way.
really occurred undoubtedly is that the company, upon making this extension,
had acquired the land only, leaving the owner of the house free to remove it. From what has been said it is apparent that the judgment appealed from is in
Hence he cannot be considered to have been a trespasser in the beginning. all respect in conformity with the law, and the same is accordingly affirmed,
Rather, he was there at the sufferance of the defendant company, and so long with costs. So ordered.
as his house remained in this exposed position, he undoubtedly assumed the
risk of any loss that might have resulted from fires occasioned by the
defendant's locomotives if operated and managed with ordinary care. But he
cannot be held to have assumed the risk of any damage that might result from
the unlawful negligence acts of the defendant. Nobody is bound to anticipate
and defend himself against the possible negligence of another. Rather he has
a right to assume that the other will use the care of the ordinary prudent man.
(Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Co. vs. Hendrickson, 80 Pa. St., 182; 21
Am. Rep., 97.)

In the situation now under consideration the proximate and only cause of the
damage that occurred was the negligent act of the defendant in causing this
fire. The circumstance that Remigio Rodrigueza's house was partly on the
property of the defendant company and therefore in dangerous proximity to
passing locomotives was an antecedent condition that may in fact have made
the disaster possible, but that circumstance cannot be imputed to him as
contributory negligence destructive of his right of action, because, first, that
condition was not created by himself; secondly, because his house remained
on this ground by the toleration, and therefore with the consent of the Railroad
Company; and thirdly, because even supposing the house to be improperly
there, this fact would not justify the defendant in negligently destroying it.
(Grand Trunk Railway of Canada vs. Richardson, 91 U. S., 454; 23 L. ed., 356;
Norfolk etc. Ry. Co. vs. Perrow, 101 Va., 345, 350.)lawphil.net

The circumstance that the defendant company, upon planting its line near
Remigio Rodrigueza's house, had requested or directed him to remove it, did
not convert his occupancy into a trespass, or impose upon him any additional
responsibility over and above what the law itself imposes in such situation. In
this connection it must be remembered that the company could at any time
have removed said house in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, but
it elected not to do so.

Questions similar to that now before us have been under the consideration of
American courts many times, and their decisions are found to be uniformly
favorable to recovery where the property destroyed has been placed in whole
or in part on the right of way of the railroad company with its express or implied
consent. (L. R. Martin Timber Co. vs.Great Northern Railway Co., 123 Minn.,
423; Ann. Cas., 1915A, p. 496, note; Burroughs vs. Housatonic R.R. Co., 15
 16. Andamo v. IAC (191 SCRA 195)
G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990
NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and
MISSIONARIES OF OUR LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC., respondents.
Lope E. Adriano for petitioners.
Padilla Law Office for private respondent.
FERNAN, C.J.:
The pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is
whether a corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water
conductors and contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and
damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages under
Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the
resulting civil case can proceed independently of the criminal case.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a
parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that
of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious
corporation.
Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances,
including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and
eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners'
crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of
petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed
plants and other improvements to destruction.
In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action, docketed as Criminal Case
No. TG-907-82, before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 4 (Tagaytay
City), against Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and
directors of herein respondent corporation, for destruction by means of
inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed another action against
respondent corporation, this time a civil case, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-
748, for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
before the same court. 1
On March 11, 1983, respondent corporation filed its answer to the complaint
and opposition to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Hearings
were conducted including ocular inspections on the land. However, on April
26, 1984, the trial court, acting on respondent corporation's motion to dismiss
or suspend the civil action, issued an order suspending further hearings in Civil
Case No, TG-748 until after judgment in the related Criminal Case No. TG-
907-82.
Resolving respondent corporation's motion to dismiss filed on June 22, 1984,
the trial court issued on August 27, 1984 the disputed order dismissing Civil
Case No. TG-748 for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was
instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved. Said order was anchored
on the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court which provides
that "criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted
separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action
cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal
action." 2
Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court. 3
On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court, First Civil Cases Division,
promulgated a decision 4 affirming the questioned order of the trial court. 5 A
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the Appellate
Court in its resolution dated May 19, 1986. 6
Directly at issue is the propriety of the dismissal of Civil Case No. TG-748 in
accordance with Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners
contend that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil
Case No. TG-748 since it is predicated on a quasi-delict. Petitioners have
raised a valid point.
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the
facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action. 7 The
purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it, including the period of
prescription, is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action,
made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations
and prayer for relief. 8 The nature of an action is not necessarily determined or
controlled by its title or heading but the body of the pleading or complaint itself.
To avoid possible denial of substantial justice due to legal technicalities,
pleadings as well as remedial laws should be liberally construed so that the
litigants may have ample opportunity to prove their respective claims. 9
Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of petitioners' complaint in Civil
Case No. TG-748:
4) That within defendant's land, likewise located at Biga
(Biluso), Silang, Cavite, adjacent on the right side of the
aforesaid land of plaintiffs, defendant constructed waterpaths
starting from the middle-right portion thereof leading to a big
hole or opening, also constructed by defendant, thru the lower
portion of its concrete hollow-blocks fence situated on the
right side of its cemented gate fronting the provincial highway,
and connected by defendant to a man height inter-connected
cement culverts which were also constructed and lain by
defendant cross-wise beneath the tip of the said cemented
gate, the left-end of the said inter-connected culverts again
connected by defendant to a big hole or opening thru the lower
portion of the same concrete hollowblocks fence on the left
side of the said cemented gate, which hole or opening is
likewise connected by defendant to the cemented mouth of a
big canal, also constructed by defendant, which runs
northward towards a big hole or opening which was also built
by defendant thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-
blocks fence which separates the land of plaintiffs from that of
defendant (and which serves as the exit-point of the
floodwater coming from the land of defendant, and at the
same time, the entrance-point of the same floodwater to the
land of plaintiffs, year after year, during rainy or stormy
seasons.
5) That moreover, on the middle-left portion of its land just
beside the land of plaintiffs, defendant also constructed an
artificial lake, the base of which is soil, which utilizes the water
being channeled thereto from its water system thru inter-
connected galvanized iron pipes (No. 2) and complimented by
rain water during rainy or stormy seasons, so much so that
the water below it seeps into, and the excess water above it
inundates, portions of the adjoining land of plaintiffs.
6) That as a result of the inundation brought about by
defendant's aforementioned water conductors, contrivances
and manipulators, a young man was drowned to death, while
herein plaintiffs suffered and will continue to suffer, as follows:
a) Portions of the land of plaintiffs were
eroded and converted to deep, wide and long
canals, such that the same can no longer be
planted to any crop or plant.
b) Costly fences constructed by plaintiffs
were, on several occasions, washed away.
c) During rainy and stormy seasons the lives
of plaintiffs and their laborers are always in
danger.
d) Plants and other improvements on other
portions of the land of plaintiffs are exposed
to destruction. ... 10
A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action
is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the
elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the
plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for
whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by
the plaintiff. 11
Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by
respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners.
There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of
building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such
action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the
recovery of damages.
In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, 12 the Court applied Article 1902, now
Article 2176 of the Civil Code and held that "any person who without due
authority constructs a bank or dike, stopping the flow or communication
between a creek or a lake and a river, thereby causing loss and damages to a
third party who, like the rest of the residents, is entitled to the use and
enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to the payment of an indemnity
for loss and damages to the injured party.
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain
and the property subject of the instant case is privately owned, the fact remains
that petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained
and will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances
built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the
alleged presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of
respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the
causal connection between the act and the damage, with no pre-existing
contractual obligation between the parties make a clear case of a quasi
delict or culpa aquiliana.
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations.
Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make
use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC
UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners
have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own
land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests
of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on
his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all
reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners
and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures
cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter
can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage
caused by his act or omission constituting fault or negligence, thus:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts
"not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional
and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against
the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and
found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the
tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover damages on both
scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of
the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. 13
The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code,
which states:
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision
though at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider
the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of
the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence,
which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always
had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence.
Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or
"cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain
... 14
In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court held that a quasi-delict
or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a
substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent
from a delict or crime — a distinction exists between the civil liability arising
from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual.
The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from
a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa
extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in
the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the
event of an acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from which the
civil action arose did not exist, in which case the extinction of the criminal
liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability.
In Azucena vs. Potenciano, 16 the Court declared that in quasi-delicts, "(t)he
civil action is entirely independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33
and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can be no logical conclusion than this, for
to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of
the criminal prosecution — whether it be conviction or acquittal — would
render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear
injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court affirming the order of dismissal of the Regional
Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18 (Tagaytay City) dated August 17, 1984 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to reinstate
Civil Case No. TG-748 entitled "Natividad V. Andamo and Emmanuel R.
Andamo vs. Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette Inc." and to proceed with
the hearing of the case with dispatch. This decision is immediately executory.
Costs against respondent corporation.
SO ORDERED.
 17. Navida v. Dizon (GR No. 125078) CELESTINO CALUMPAG, LORETO
CAMACHO, VICTORIANO CANETE,
BERNABE L. NAVIDA, JOSE P. G.R. No. 125078 DOMINADOR P. CANTILLO,
ABANGAN, JR., CEFERINO P. FRUCTUSO P. CARBAJOSA,
ABARQUEZ, ORLANDITO A. VICTORINO S. CARLOS, VICTOR
ABISON, FELIPE ADAYA, ALBERTO CARLOS, GEORGE M. CASSION,
R. AFRICA, BENJAMIN M. ALBAO, JAIME S. CASTAARES, FLAVIANO
FELIPE ALCANTARA, NUMERIANO C. CASTAARES, ELPIDIO
S. ALCARIA, FERNANDO C. CATUBAY, NATHANIEL B.
ALEJADO, LEOPOLDO N. CAUSANG, BEOFIL B. CAUSING,
ALFONSO, FLORO I. ALMODIEL, ADRIANO R. CEJAS, CIRILO G.
ANTONIO B. ALVARADO, ELEANOR CERERA, S, CRISTITUTO M.
AMOLATA, RODOLFO P. ANCORDA, CEREZO, DANTE V. CONCHA,
TRIFINO F. ANDRADA, BERT B. ALBERT CORNELIO, CESAR
ANOCHE, RAMON E. ANTECRISTO, CORTES, NOEL Y. CORTEZ,
ISAGANI D. ANTINO, DOMINGO SERNUE CREDO, CORNELIO A.
ANTOPINA, MANSUETO M. CRESENCIO, ALEX CRUZ, ROGER
APARICIO, HERMINIGILDO CRUZ, RANSAM CRUZ, CANUTO M.
AQUINO, MARCELO S. AQUINO, JR., DADULA, ROMEO L. DALDE,
FELIPE P. ARANIA, ULYSES M. ZACARIAS DAMBAAN, ELISEO
ARAS, ARSENIO ARCE, RUPERTO DAPROZA, VIRGILIO P. DAWAL,
G. ARINZOL, MIGUEL G. ARINZOL, TESIFREDO I. DE TOMAS,
EDGARADO P. ARONG, RODRIGO GAMALLER P. DEANG, CARMELINO
D.R. ASTRALABIO, RONNIE P. DEANG, DIOSDADO P. DEANG,
BACAYO, SOFRONIO BALINGIT, DOMINGO A. DEANG, FELIPE R.
NELSON M. BALLENA, EMNIANO DEANG, JR., JULIETO S. DELA
BALMONTE, MAXIMO M. BANGI, CRUZ, ELIEZER R. DELA TORRE,
SALVADOR M. BANGI, JEFFREY R. DELA TORRE, RAUL
HERMOGENES T. BARBECHO, DEMONTEVERDE, FELIPE P.
ARSENIO B. BARBERO, DIOSDADO DENOLAN, RUBENCIO P. DENOY,
BARREDO, VIRGILIO BASAS, RODRIGO M. DERMIL, ROLANDO B.
ALEJANDRO G. BATULAN, DIAZ, LORENZO DIEGO, JOVENCIO
DOMINGO A. BAUTISTA, VICTOR DIEGO, SATURNINO DIEGO,
BAYANI, BENIGNO BESARES, GREGORIO DIONG, AMADO R.
RUFINO BETITO, GERARDO A. DIZON, FE DIZON, VIRGILO M.
BONIAO, CARLO B. BUBUNGAN, DOMANTAY, LEO S. DONATO,
FERNANDO B. BUENAVISTA, DOMINADOR L. DOSADO, NESTOR
ALEJANDRINO H. BUENO, TOMAS DUMALAG, FREDDIE DURAN, SR.,
P. BUENO, LEONARDO M. MARIO C. ECHIVERE, AQUILLO M.
BURDEOS, VICENTE P. BURGOS, EMBRADORA, MIGUEL EMNACE,
MARCELINO J. CABALUNA, RIO T. EMPAS, EFRAIM ENGLIS,
DIOSDADO CABILING, EMETRIO C. ANICETO ENOPIA, DIOCENE
CACHUELA, BRAULIO B. CADIVIDA, ENTECOSA, RUBENTITO D.
JR., SAMSON C. CAEL, DANIEL B. ENTECOSA, AVELINO C. ENTERO,
CAJURAO, REY A. CALISO, FORTUNATA ENTRADA, ROGELIO
NORBERTO F. CALUMPAG, P. EROY, RODOLFO M. ESCAMILLA,
SERGIO C. ESCANTILLA, LAZARO MANADA, SR., RICARDO S.
A. ESPAOLA, EULOGIO M. ETURMA, MANDANI, CONCHITA MANDANI,
PRIMO P. FERNANDEZ, EDILBERTO ALBERTO T. MANGGA,
D. FERNANDO, GREGORIO S. ALEJANDRO A. MANSANES,
FERNANDO, VICENTE P. FERRER, RUFINO T. MANSANES, EUTIQUIO
MARCELO T. FLOR, ANTONIO M. P. MANSANES, ALCIO P. MARATAS,
FLORES, REDENTOR T. FLOREZA, AGAPITO D. MARQUEZ, RICARDO
NORBERTO J. FUENTES, RICARDO R. MASIGLAT, DENDERIA
C. GABUTAN, PEDRO D.V. GALEOS, MATABANG, ARNELO N.
ARNULFO F. GALEOS, EDGARDO V. MATILLANO, HERNANI C.
GARCESA, BERNARDO P. MEJORADA, ROSITA MENDOZA,
GENTOBA, EDUARDO P. GENTOBA, GREGORIO R. MESA, RENATO
VICTORIO B. GIDO, ROLANDO V. N.MILLADO, ANTONIO L.
GIMENA, EARLWIN L. GINGOYO, MOCORRO, ALBERTO M. MOLINA,
ERNESTO GOLEZ, JUANITO G. JR., DOMINGO P. MONDIA, JUANITO
GONZAGA, ONOFRE GONZALES, P. MONDIA, RICARDO MONTAO,
AMADO J. GUMERE, LEONARDO M. RAUL T. MONTEJO, ROGELIO
GUSTO, ALEJANDRO G. HALILI, MUNAR, RODOLFO E. MUEZ,
NOEL H. HERCEDA, EMILIO V. CRESENCIO NARCISO, PANFILO C.
HERMONDO, CLAUDIO HIPOLITO, NARCISO, BRICS P. NECOR,
TORIBIO S ILLUSORIO, TEODURO MOISES P. NICOLAS, NEMESIO G.
G. IMPANG, JR., GIL A. JALBUNA, NICOLAS, ALFREDO NOFIEL, FELIX
HERMIE L. JALICO, ARMANDO B. T. NOVENA, MARCELO P. OBTIAL,
JAMERLAN, NARCISO JAPAY, SR., TEODORO B. OCRETO,
LIBURO C. JAVINAS, ALEJANDO S. BIBIANO C. ODI, ALFREDO M.
JIMENEZ, FEDERICO T. JUCAR, OPERIO, TEOTISTO B. OPON, IZRO
NAPOLEON T. JUMALON, OSCAR M. ORACION, ALAN E. ORANAS,
JUNSAY, ANASTACIO D. LABANA, ELPEDIO T. OSIAS, ERNESTO M.
CARLOS C. LABAY, AVELINO L. PABIONA, NARCISO J. PADILLA,
LAFORTEZA, LOE LAGUMBAY, NELSON G. PADIOS, SR.,
NORBETO D. LAMPERNIS, FRNACISCO G. PAGUNTALAN,
ROLANDO J. LAS PEAS, ISMAEL RENE B. PALENCIA, MICHAEL P.
LASDOCE, RENOLO L. LEBRILLA, PALOMAR, VIRGILIO E.
CAMILO G. LEDRES, ANASTACIO PANILAGAO, NOLITO C. PANULIN,
LLANOS, ARMANDO A. LLIDO, ROMEO PARAGUAS, NESTOR B.
CARLITO LOPEZ, ARISTON LOS PASTERA, VICENTE Q. PEDAZO,
BAEZ, CONCISO L. LOVITOS, EDGAR M. PEARANDA, ILUMINIDO
ARQUILLANO M. LOZADA, B. PERACULLO, ANTONIO C.
RODOLFO C. LUMAKIN, PRIMITIVO PEREZ, DOMINGO PEREZ, OSCAR
LUNTAO, JR., EMILIO S. MABASA, C. PLEOS, ANTONIETO POLANCOS,
JR., JUANITO A. MACALISANG, SERAFIN G. PRIETO, ZENAIDA
TEOTIMO L. MADULIN, JOSEPH D. PROVIDO, FERNANDO Y. PROVIDO,
MAGALLON, PEDRO P. ERNESTO QUERO, ELEAZAR
MAGLASANG, MARIO G. QUIJARDO, WILLIAM U. QUINTOY,
MALAGAMBA, JAIME B. LAURO QUISTADIO, ROGELIO
MAMARADLO, PANFILO A. RABADON, MARCELINO M.
RELIZAN, RAUL A. REYES, VILLARAN, JESUS L. VILLARBA,
OCTAVIO F. REYES, EDDIE M. ELEAZAR D. VILLARBA, JENNY T.
RINCOR, EMMANUEL RIVAS, VILLAVA, HENRY C. VILLEGAS,
RODULFO RIVAS, BIENVENIDO C. DELFIN C. WALOG, RODOLFO
ROMANCA, JACINTO ROMOC, YAMBAO, EDGAR A. YARE,
ROMEO S. ROMUALDO, ALBERTO MANSUETO M. YBERA, EDUARDO
ROSARIO, ROMEO L. SABIDO, G. YUMANG, HENRY R. YUNGOT,
SIMON SAGNIP, TIMOTEO SALIG, ROMEO P. YUSON, ARSENIA
ROMAN G. SALIGONAN, ZABALA, FELIX N. ZABALA and
VICTORINO SALOMON, GENEROSO GRACIANO ZAMORA,
J. SALONGKONG, RODOLFO E. Petitioners,
SALVANI, JIMMY A. SAMELIN,
EDUARDO A. SAMELIN, ANDRES A. - versus -
SAMELIN, GEORGE SAMELIN,
ROMEO A. SARAOSOS, RUDIGELIO HON. TEODORO A. DIZON, JR.,
S. SARMIENTO, CIRILO SAYAANG, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
JARLO SAYSON, LEONCIO Court, Branch 37, General Santos
SERDONCILLO, RODOLFO C. City, SHELL OIL CO., DOW
SERRANO, NESTOR G. SEVILLA, CHEMICAL CO., OCCIDENTAL
SIMEON F. SIMBA, CATALINO S. CHEMICAL CORP., STANDARD
SIMTIM, SERAFIN T. SINSUANGCO, FRUIT CO., STANDARD FRUIT &
EDUARDO A. SOLA, VICTORINO M. STEAMSHIP CO., DOLE FOOD CO.,
SOLOMON, JAIME B. SUFICIENCIA, INC., DOLE FRESH FRUIT CO., DEL
LYNDON SUMAJIT, ALFREDO P. MONTE FRESH PRODUCE N.A., DEL
SUMAJIT, ALFREDO L. SUMAJIT, MONTE TROPICAL FRUIT CO.,
PEDRO A. SUMARAGO, ERNESTO CHIQUITA BRANDS
SUMILE, NESTOR S. SUMOG-OY, INTERNATIONAL, INC. and CHIQUITA
MANUEL T. SUPAS, WILFREDO A. BRANDS, INC.,
TABAQUE, CONSTANCIO L. Respondents.
TACULAD, EUFROCINO A. x-------------------------x
TAGOTO, JR., SERAPIO TAHITIT, THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY
PANTALEON T. TAMASE, ERNESTO and OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL
TARRE, MAGNO E. TATOY, CORPORATION,
AVELINO TAYAPAD, SAMUEL S. Petitioners,
TERRADO, APOLINARIO B. TICO,
ORLANDO TINACO, ALBERT G. - versus -
TINAY, ANTONIO TOLEDO,
ANTONIO M. TORREGOSA, BERNABE L. NAVIDA, JOSE P.
ISABELO TORRES, JIMMY C. ABANGAN, JR., CEFERINO P.
TORRIBIO, EDUARDO Y. TUCLAOD, ABARQUEZ, ORLANDITO A.
JACINTO UDAL, RICARDO M. ABISON, FELIPE ADAYA, ALBERTO
URBANO, ERNESTO G. VAFLOR, R. AFRICA, BENJAMIN M. ALBAO,
FILOMENO E. VALENZUELA, FELIPE ALCANTARA, NUMERIANO
SALORIANO VELASCO, RODOLFO S. ALCARIA, FERNANDO C.
VIDAL, WALTER VILLAFAE, DANTE ALEJADO, LEOPOLDO N.
VILLALVA, PERIGRINO P. ALFONSO, FLORO I. ALMODIEL,
ANTONIO B. ALVARADO, ELEANOR CERERA, SR., CRISTITUTO M.
AMOLATA, RODOLFO P. ANCORDA, CEREZO, DANTE V. CONCHA,
TRIFINO F. ANDRADA, BERT B. ALBERT CORNELIO, CESAR
ANOCHE, RAMON E. ANTECRISTO, CORTES, NOEL Y. CORTEZ,
ISAGANI D. ANTINO, DOMINGO SERNUE CREDO, CORNELIO A.
ANTOPINA, MANSUETO M. CRESENCIO, ALEX CRUZ, ROGER
APARICIO, HERMINIGILDO CRUZ, RANSAM CRUZ, CANUTO M.
AQUINO, MARCELO S. AQUINO, JR., DADULA, ROMEO L. DALDE,
FELIPE P. ARANIA, ULYSES M. ZACARIAS DAMBAAN, ELISEO
ARAS, ARSENIO ARCE, RUPERTO DAPROZA, VIRGILIO P. DAWAL,
G. ARINZOL, MIGUEL G. ARINZOL, TESIFREDO I. DE TOMAS,
EDGARADO P. ARONG, RODRIGO GAMALLER P. DEANG, CARMELINO
D.R. ASTRALABIO, RONNIE P. DEANG, DIOSDADO P. DEANG,
BACAYO, SOFRONIO BALINGIT, DOMINGO A. DEANG, FELIPE R.
NELSON M. BALLENA, EMNIANO DEANG, JR., JULIETO S. DELA
BALMONTE, MAXIMO M. BANGI, CRUZ, ELIEZER R. DELA TORRE,
SALVADOR M. BANGI, JEFFREY R. DELA TORRE, RAUL
HERMOGENES T. BARBECHO, DEMONTEVERDE, FELIPE P.
ARSENIO B. BARBERO, DIOSDADO DENOLAN, RUBENCIO P. DENOY,
BARREDO, VIRGILIO BASAS, RODRIGO M. DERMIL, ROLANDO B.
ALEJANDRO G. BATULAN, DIAZ, LORENZO DIEGO, JOVENCIO
DOMINGO A. BAUTISTA, VICTOR DIEGO, SATURNINO DIEGO,
BAYANI, BENIGNO BESARES, GREGORIO DIONG, AMADO R.
RUFINO BETITO, GERARDO A. DIZON, FE DIZON, VIRGILO M.
BONIAO, CARLO B. BUBUNGAN, DOMANTAY, LEO S. DONATO,
FERNANDO B. BUENAVISTA, G.R. No. 125598 DOMINADOR L. DOSADO, NESTOR
ALEJANDRINO H. BUENO, TOMAS DUMALAG, FREDDIE DURAN, SR.,
P. BUENO, LEONARDO M. MARIO C. ECHIVERE, AQUILLO M.
BURDEOS, VICENTE P. BURGOS, EMBRADORA, MIGUEL EMNACE,
MARCELINO J. CABALUNA, RIO T. EMPAS, EFRAIM ENGLIS,
DIOSDADO CABILING, EMETRIO C. ANICETO ENOPIA, DIOCENE
CACHUELA, BRAULIO B. CADIVIDA, ENTECOSA, RUBENTITO D.
JR., SAMSON C. CAEL, DANIEL B. ENTECOSA, AVELINO C. ENTERO,
CAJURAO, REY A. CALISO, FORTUNATA ENTRADA, ROGELIO
NORBERTO F. CALUMPAG, P. EROY, RODOLFO M. ESCAMILLA,
CELESTINO CALUMPAG, LORETO SERGIO C. ESCANTILLA, LAZARO
CAMACHO, VICTORIANO CANETE, A. ESPAOLA, EULOGIO M. ETURMA,
DOMINADOR P. CANTILLO, PRIMO P. FERNANDEZ, EDILBERTO
FRUCTUSO P. CARBAJOSA, D. FERNANDO, GREGORIO S.
VICTORINO S. CARLOS, VICTOR FERNANDO, VICENTE P. FERRER,
CARLOS, GEORGE M. CASSION, MARCELO T. FLOR, ANTONIO M.
JAIME S. CASTAARES, FLAVIANO FLORES, REDENTOR T. FLOREZA,
C. CASTAARES, ELPIDIO NORBERTO J. FUENTES, RICARDO
CATUBAY, NATHANIEL B. C. GABUTAN, PEDRO D.V. GALEOS,
CAUSANG, BEOFIL B. CAUSING, ARNULFO F. GALEOS, EDGARDO V.
ADRIANO R. CEJAS, CIRILO G. GARCESA, BERNARDO P.
GENTOBA, EDUARDO P. GENTOBA, GREGORIO R. MESA, RENATO
VICTORIO B. GIDO, ROLANDO V. N.MILLADO, ANTONIO L.
GIMENA, EARLWIN L. GINGOYO, MOCORRO, ALBERTO M. MOLINA,
ERNESTO GOLEZ, JUANITO G. JR., DOMINGO P. MONDIA, JUANITO
GONZAGA, ONOFRE GONZALES, P. MONDIA, RICARDO MONTAO,
AMADO J. GUMERE, LEONARDO M. RAUL T. MONTEJO, ROGELIO
GUSTO, ALEJANDRO G. HALILI, MUNAR, RODOLFO E. MUEZ,
NOEL H. HERCEDA, EMILIO V. CRESENCIO NARCISO, PANFILO C.
HERMONDO, CLAUDIO HIPOLITO, NARCISO, BRICS P. NECOR,
TORIBIO S ILLUSORIO, TEODURO MOISES P. NICOLAS, NEMESIO G.
G. IMPANG, JR., GIL A. JALBUNA, NICOLAS, ALFREDO NOFIEL, FELIX
HERMIE L. JALICO, ARMANDO B. T. NOVENA, MARCELO P. OBTIAL,
JAMERLAN, NARCISO JAPAY, SR., TEODORO B. OCRETO,
LIBURO C. JAVINAS, ALEJANDO S. BIBIANO C. ODI, ALFREDO M.
JIMENEZ, FEDERICO T. JUCAR, OPERIO, TEOTISTO B. OPON, IZRO
NAPOLEON T. JUMALON, OSCAR M. ORACION, ALAN E. ORANAS,
JUNSAY, ANASTACIO D. LABANA, ELPEDIO T. OSIAS, ERNESTO M.
CARLOS C. LABAY, AVELINO L. PABIONA, NARCISO J. PADILLA,
LAFORTEZA, LOE LAGUMBAY, NELSON G. PADIOS, SR.,
NORBETO D. LAMPERNIS, FRANCISCO G. PAGUNTALAN,
ROLANDO J. LAS PEAS, ISMAEL RENE B. PALENCIA, MICHAEL P.
LASDOCE, RENOLO L. LEBRILLA, PALOMAR, VIRGILIO E.
CAMILO G. LEDRES, ANASTACIO PANILAGAO, NOLITO C. PANULIN,
LLANOS, ARMANDO A. LLIDO, ROMEO PARAGUAS, NESTOR B.
CARLITO LOPEZ, ARISTON LOS PASTERA, VICENTE Q. PEDAZO,
BAEZ, CONCISO L. LOVITOS, EDGAR M. PEARANDA, ILUMINIDO
ARQUILLANO M. LOZADA, B. PERACULLO, ANTONIO C.
RODOLFO C. LUMAKIN, PRIMITIVO PEREZ, DOMINGO PEREZ, OSCAR
LUNTAO, JR., EMILIO S. MABASA, C. PLEOS, ANTONIETO POLANCOS,
JR., JUANITO A. MACALISANG, SERAFIN G. PRIETO, ZENAIDA
TEOTIMO L. MADULIN, JOSEPH D. PROVIDO, FERNANDO Y. PROVIDO,
MAGALLON, PEDRO P. ERNESTO QUERO, ELEAZAR
MAGLASANG, MARIO G. QUIJARDO, WILLIAM U. QUINTOY,
MALAGAMBA, JAIME B. LAURO QUISTADIO, ROGELIO
MAMARADLO, PANFILO A. RABADON, MARCELINO M.
MANADA, SR., RICARDO S. RELIZAN, RAUL A. REYES,
MANDANI, CONCHITA MANDANI, OCTAVIO F. REYES, EDDIE M.
ALBERTO T. MANGGA, RINCOR, EMMANUEL RIVAS,
ALEJANDRO A. MANSANES, RODULFO RIVAS, BIENVENIDO C.
RUFINO T. MANSANES, EUTIQUIO ROMANCA, JACINTO ROMOC,
P. MANSANES, ALCIO P. MARATAS, ROMEO S. ROMUALDO, ALBERTO
AGAPITO D. MARQUEZ, RICARDO ROSARIO, ROMEO L. SABIDO,
R. MASIGLAT, DENDERIA SIMON SAGNIP, TIMOTEO SALIG,
MATABANG, ARNELO N. ROMAN B. SALIGONAN, VICTORINO
MATILLANO, HERNANI C. SALOMON, GENEROSO M.
MEJORADA, ROSITA MENDOZA, SALONGKONG, RODOLFO E.
SALVANI, JIMMY A. SAMELIN, x-------------------------x
EDUARDO A. SAMELIN, ANDRES A. CORNELIO ABELLA, JR., IRENEO
SAMELIN, GEORGE SAMELIN, AGABATU, PRUDENCIO
ROMEO A. SARAOSOS, RUDIGELIO ALDEPOLIA, ARTEMIO ALEMAN,
S. SARMIENTO, CIRILO SAYAANG, FIDEL ALLERA, DOMINGO ALONZO,
JARLO SAYSON, LEONCIO CORNELIO AMORA, FELIPE G.
SERDONCILLO, RODOLFO C. AMORA, LEOPOLDO AMORADO,
SERRANO, NESTOR G. SEVILLA, MARCELINO ANDIMAT, JORGE
SIMEON F. SIMBA, CATALINO S. ANDOY, MARGARITO R. ANGELIA,
SIMTIM, SERAFIN T. SINSUANGCO, GREGOTIO APRIANO, ALFREDO A.
EDUARDO A. SOLA, VICTORINO M. ARARAO, BONIFACIO L. ARTIGAS,
SOLOMON, JAIME B. SUFICIENCIA, JERSON ASUAL, SERAFIN
LYNDON SUMAJIT, ALFREDO P. AZUCENA, FELIX M. BADOY,
SUMAJIT, ALFREDO L. SUMAJIT, JULIAN J. BAHALLA, REYNALDO
PEDRO A. SUMARAGO, ERNESTO BAHAYA, ANTONIO L. BALDAGO,
SUMILE, NESTOR S. SUMOG-OY, CESAR N. BALTAZAR, DOMINADO
MANUEL T. SUPAS, WILFREDO A. A. BARING, ANTIPAS A. BATINGAL,
TABAQUE, CONSTANCIO L. MARCIANO NATINGAL, MARINO
TACULAD, EUFROCINO A. BIBANCO, LEANDRO BILIRAN,
TAGOTO, JR., SERAPIO TAHITIT, MARGARITO BLANCO, CATALINO
PANTALEON T. TAMASE, ERNESTO BONGO, MELCHOR BRIGOLE,
TARRE, MAGNO E. TATOY, ELISEO BRINA, ROBERTO BRINA,
AVELINO TAYAPAD, SAMUEL S. LUIS BUGHAO, EDUARDO L.
TERRADO, APOLINARIO B. TICO, BURGUINZO, CELSO M. BUSIA,
ORLANDO TINACO, ALBERT G. RPDITO CABAGTE, RICARADO C.
TINAY, ANTONIO TOLEDO, CABALLES, CARLITO A. CAINDOC,
ANTONIO M. TORREGOSA, CANDIDO CALO, JR., PEDRITO
ISABELO TORRES, JIMMY C. CAMPAS, FERNANDO R.
TORRIBIO, EDUARDO Y. TUCLAOD, CAPAROSO, DANILO CARILLO,
JACINTO UDAL, RICARDO M. BONIFACIO M. CATCHA, FRANKLIN
URBANO, ERNESTO G. VAFLOR, CLARAS, JOSE F. COLLAMAT,
FILOMENO E. VALENZUELA, BERNARDO M. COMPENDIO,
SALORIANO VELASCO, RODOLFO CORNELIO COSTILLAS, ENERIO R.
VIDAL, WALTER VILLAFAE, DANTE DAGAME, FELIMON DEBUMA, JR.,
VILLALVA, PERIGRINO P. RICADO C. DEIPARIME, GREGORIO
VILLARAN, JESUS L. VILLARBA, S. DE LA PENA, JOSE G. DELUAO,
ELEAZAR D. VILLARBA, JENNY T. JR., ELPEDIO A. DIAZ, QUINTINO
VILLAVA, HENRY C. VILLEGAS, DISIPULO, JR., CESAR G.
DELFIN C. WALOG, RODOLFO DONAYRE, JOSE DULABAY, JAIRO
YAMBAO, EDGAR A. YARE, DUQUIZA, ANTONIO ENGBINO,
MANSUETO M. YBERA, EDUARDO ALFREDO ESPINOSA, ALONZO
G. YUMANG, HENRY R. YUNGOT, FAILOG, JAIME FEROLINO,
ROMEO P. YUSON, ARSENIA RODOLFO L. GABITO, PEDRO G.
ZABALA, FELIX N. ZABALA, and GEMENTIZA, RICARDO A.
GRACIANO ZAMORA, GEROLAGA, RODULFO G. GEROY,
Respondents. ROGELIO GONZAGA, ROLANDO
GONZALES, MODESTO M. SALIGUMBA, SILVERIO SILANGAN,
GODELOSAO, HECTOR GUMBAN, ROBERTO SIVA, PACITA SUYMAN,
CAMILO HINAG, LECERIO IGBALIC, CANILO TAJON, AVELINO
SILVERIO E. IGCALINOS, ALFREDO TATAPOD, ROMEO TAYCO,
INTOD, OLEGARIO IYUMA, RENATO TAYCO, CONRADO
DOMINGO B. JAGMOC, JR., TECSON, AGAPITO TECSON,
EDUARDO JARGUE, ROLANDO A. ROMAN. E. TEJERO, ALFREDO
LABASON, ROLANDO LACNO, TILANDOCA, CARLOS B. TIMA,
VIRGILIO A. LADURA, CONSTANCIO HERMONEGES TIRADOR,
M. LAGURA, FRANCISCO LAMBAN, JOSELITO TIRO, PASTOR T.
ENRIQUE LAQUERO, LUCIO B. TUNGKO, LEANDRO B. TURCAL,
LASACA, SISINO LAURDEN, VICENTE URQUIZA, VICENTE
VIVENCIO LAWANGON, ANECITO VILLA, ANTONIO P. VILLARAIZ,
LAYAN, FERNANDO P. LAYAO, LEOPOLDO VILLAVITO and
MARDENIO LAYAO, NEMENCIO C. SAMUEL M. VILLEGAS,
LINAO, PEDRO LOCION, ENERIO Petitioners,
LOOD, DIOSDADO MADATE,
RAMON MAGDOSA, NILO - versus -
MAGLINTE, MARINO G. MALINAO,
CARLITO MANACAP, AURELIO A. THE HON. ROMEO D. MARASIGAN,
MARO, CRISOSTOMO R. MIJARES, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial
CESAR MONAPCO, SILVANO Court, Branch 16, Davao City,
MONCANO, EMILIO MONTAJES, SHELL OIL CO., DOW CHEMICAL
CESAR B. MONTERO, CLEMENTE CO., OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL
NAKANO, RODRIGO H. NALAS, CORP., STANDARD FRUIT CO.,
EMELIANO C. NAPITAN, JUANITO B. STANDARD FRUIT & STEAMSHIP
NARON, JR., LUCIO NASAKA, CO., DOLE FOOD CO., INC., DOLE
TEOFILO NUNEZ, JORGE M. FRESH FRUIT CO., DEL MONTE
OLORVIDA, CANULO P. OLOY, FRESH PRODUCE N.A., DEL MONTE
DOROTEO S. OMBRETE, TROPICAL FRUIT CO., CHIQUITA
TEOFILIO OMOSURA, MIGUEL BRANDS INTERNATIONAL, INC. and
ORALO, SUSANTO C. OTANA, JR., CHIQUITA BRANDS, INC.,
CHARLIE P. PADICA, ALFREDO P. Respondents.
PALASPAS, CATALINO C. PANA, x-------------------------x
ERNESTO M. PASCUAL, DEL MONTE FRESH PRODUCE N.A.
BIENVENIDO PAYAG, and DEL MONTE TROPICAL FRUIT
RESURRECCION PENOS, PEDRO G.R. No. 126654 CO.,
PILAGO, ROMEO PRESBITERO, Petitioners,
OMEO L. PRIEGO, ELADIO QUIBOL,
JESUS D. QUIBOL, MAGNO - versus -
QUIZON, DIONISIO RAMOS,
MAMERTO RANISES, NESTOR B. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
REBUYA, RODRIGO REQUILMEN, DAVAO CITY, BRANCHES 16 AND
ISIDRO RETANAL, CARLITO 13, CORNELIO ABELLA, JR.,
ROBLE, GLICERIO V. ROSETE, IRENEO AGABATU, PRUDENCIO
TINOY G. SABINO, MELCHOR ALDEPOLIA, ARTEMIO ALEMAN,
FIDEL ALLERA, DOMINGO ALONZO, INTOD, OLEGARIO IYUMA,
CORNELIO AMORA, FELIPE G. DOMINGO B. JAGMOC, JR.,
AMORA, LEOPOLDO AMORADO, EDUARDO JARGUE, ROLANDO A.
MARCELINO ANDIMAT, JORGE LABASON, ROLANDO LACNO,
ANDOY, MARGARITO R. ANGELIA, VIRGILIO A. LADURA, CONSTANCIO
GREGOTIO APRIANO, ALFREDO A. M. LAGURA, FRANCISCO LAMBAN,
ARARAO, BONIFACIO L. ARTIGAS, ENRIQUE LAQUERO, LUCIO B.
JERSON ASUAL, SERAFIN LASACA, SISINO LAURDEN,
AZUCENA, FELIX M. BADOY, VIVENCIO LAWANGON, ANECITO
JULIAN J. BAHALLA, REYNALDO LAYAN, FERNANDO P. LAYAO,
BAHAYA, ANTONIO L. BALDAGO, MARDENIO LAYAO, NEMENCIO C.
CESAR N. BALTAZAR, DOMINADO LINAO, PEDRO LOCION, ENERIO
A. BARING, ANTIPAS A. BATINGAL, LOOD, DIOSDADO MADATE,
MARCIANO NATINGAL, MARINO RAMON MAGDOSA, NILO
BIBANCO, LEANDRO BILIRAN, MAGLINTE, MARINO G. MALINAO,
MARGARITO BLANCO, CATALINO CARLITO MANACAP, AURELIO A.
BONGO, MELCHOR BRIGOLE, MARO, CRISOSTOMO R. MIJARES,
ELISEO BRINA, ROBERTO BRINA, CESAR MONAPCO, SILVANO
LUIS BUGHAO, EDUARDO L. MONCANO, EMILIO MONTAJES,
BURGUINZO, CELSO M. BUSIA, CESAR B. MONTERO, CLEMENTE
RPDITO CABAGTE, RICARADO C. NAKANO, RODRIGO H. NALAS,
CABALLES, CARLITO A. CAINDOC, EMELIANO C. NAPITAN, JUANITO B.
CANDIDO CALO, JR., PEDRITO NARON, JR., LUCIO NASAKA,
CAMPAS, FERNANDO R. TEOFILO NUNEZ, JORGE M.
CAPAROSO, DANILO CARILLO, OLORVIDA, CANULO P. OLOY,
BONIFACIO M. CATCHA, FRANKLIN DOROTEO S. OMBRETE,
CLARAS, JOSE F. COLLAMAT, TEOFILIO OMOSURA, MIGUEL
BERNARDO M. COMPENDIO, ORALO, SUSANTO C. OTANA, JR.,
CORNELIO COSTILLAS, ENERIO R. CHARLIE P. PADICA, ALFREDO P.
DAGAME, FELIMON DEBUMA, JR., PALASPAS, CATALINO C. PANA,
RICADO C. DEIPARIME, GREGORIO ERNESTO M. PASCUAL,
S. DE LA PENA, JOSE G. DELUAO, BIENVENIDO PAYAG,
JR., ELPEDIO A. DIAZ, QUINTINO RESURRECCION PENOS, PEDRO
DISIPULO, JR., CESAR G. PILAGO, ROMEO PRESBITERO,
DONAYRE, JOSE DULABAY, JAIRO OMEO L. PRIEGO, ELADIO QUIBOL,
DUQUIZA, ANTONIO ENGBINO, JESUS D. QUIBOL, MAGNO
ALFREDO ESPINOSA, ALONZO QUIZON, DIONISIO RAMOS,
FAILOG, JAIME FEROLINO, MAMERTO RANISES, NESTOR B.
RODOLFO L. GABITO, PEDRO G. REBUYA, RODRIGO REQUILMEN,
GEMENTIZA, RICARDO A. ISIDRO RETANAL, CARLITO
GEROLAGA, RODULFO G. GEROY, ROBLE, GLICERIO V. ROSETE, G.R. No. 127856
ROGELIO GONZAGA, ROLANDO TINOY G. SABINO, MELCHOR
GONZALES, MODESTO M. SALIGUMBA, SILVERIO SILANGAN,
GODELOSAO, HECTOR GUMBAN, ROBERTO SIVA, PACITA SUYMAN,
CAMILO HINAG, LECERIO IGBALIC, CANILO TAJON, AVELINO
SILVERIO E. IGCALINOS, ALFREDO TATAPOD, ROMEO TAYCO,
RENATO TAYCO, CONRADO BURGUINZO, CELSO M. BUSIA,
TECSON, AGAPITO TECSON, RPDITO CABAGTE, RICARADO C.
ROMAN. E. TEJERO, ALFREDO CABALLES, CARLITO A. CAINDOC,
TILANDOCA, CARLOS B. TIMA, CANDIDO CALO, JR., PEDRITO
HERMONEGES TIRADOR, CAMPAS, FERNANDO R.
JOSELITO TIRO, PASTOR T. CAPAROSO, DANILO CARILLO,
TUNGKO, LEANDRO B. TURCAL, BONIFACIO M. CATCHA, FRANKLIN
VICENTE URQUIZA, VICENTE CLARAS, JOSE F. COLLAMAT,
VILLA, ANTONIO P. VILLARAIZ, BERNARDO M. COMPENDIO,
LEOPOLDO VILLAVITO and CORNELIO COSTILLAS, ENERIO R.
SAMUEL M. VILLEGAS, DAGAME, FELIMON DEBUMA, JR.,
Respondents. RICADO C. DEIPARIME, GREGORIO
x-------------------------x S. DE LA PENA, JOSE G. DELUAO,
CHIQUITA BRANDS, INC., and JR., ELPEDIO A. DIAZ, QUINTINO
CHIQUITA BRANDS DISIPULO, JR., CESAR G.
INTERNATIONAL, INC., DONAYRE, JOSE DULABAY, JAIRO
Petitioners, DUQUIZA, ANTONIO ENGBINO,
ALFREDO ESPINOSA, ALONZO
- versus - FAILOG, JAIME FEROLINO,
RODOLFO L. GABITO, PEDRO G.
HON. ANITA ALFELOR-ALAGABAN, GEMENTIZA, RICARDO A.
in her capacity as Presiding Judge GEROLAGA, RODULFO G. GEROY,
of the Regional Trial Court, Davao ROGELIO GONZAGA, ROLANDO
City, Branch 13,CORNELIO ABELLA, GONZALES, MODESTO M.
JR., IRENEO AGABATU, GODELOSAO, HECTOR GUMBAN,
PRUDENCIO ALDEPOLIA, ARTEMIO CAMILO HINAG, LECERIO IGBALIC,
ALEMAN, FIDEL ALLERA, SILVERIO E. IGCALINOS, ALFREDO
DOMINGO ALONZO, CORNELIO INTOD, OLEGARIO IYUMA,
AMORA, FELIPE G. AMORA, DOMINGO B. JAGMOC, JR.,
LEOPOLDO AMORADO, EDUARDO JARGUE, ROLANDO A.
MARCELINO ANDIMAT, JORGE LABASON, ROLANDO LACNO,
ANDOY, MARGARITO R. ANGELIA, VIRGILIO A. LADURA, CONSTANCIO
GREGOTIO APRIANO, ALFREDO A. M. LAGURA, FRANCISCO LAMBAN,
ARARAO, BONIFACIO L. ARTIGAS, ENRIQUE LAQUERO, LUCIO B.
JERSON ASUAL, SERAFIN LASACA, SISINO LAURDEN,
AZUCENA, FELIX M. BADOY, VIVENCIO LAWANGON, ANECITO
JULIAN J. BAHALLA, REYNALDO LAYAN, FERNANDO P. LAYAO,
BAHAYA, ANTONIO L. BALDAGO, MARDENIO LAYAO, NEMENCIO C.
CESAR N. BALTAZAR, DOMINADO LINAO, PEDRO LOCION, ENERIO
A. BARING, ANTIPAS A. BATINGAL, LOOD, DIOSDADO MADATE,
MARCIANO NATINGAL, MARINO RAMON MAGDOSA, NILO
BIBANCO, LEANDRO BILIRAN, MAGLINTE, MARINO G. MALINAO,
MARGARITO BLANCO, CATALINO CARLITO MANACAP, AURELIO A.
BONGO, MELCHOR BRIGOLE, MARO, CRISOSTOMO R. MIJARES,
ELISEO BRINA, ROBERTO BRINA, CESAR MONAPCO, SILVANO
LUIS BUGHAO, EDUARDO L. MONCANO, EMILIO MONTAJES,
CESAR B. MONTERO, CLEMENTE x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
NAKANO, RODRIGO H. NALAS,
EMELIANO C. NAPITAN, JUANITO B.
NARON, JR., LUCIO NASAKA, DECISION
TEOFILO NUNEZ, JORGE M.
OLORVIDA, CANULO P. OLOY,
DOROTEO S. OMBRETE, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
TEOFILIO OMOSURA, MIGUEL
ORALO, SUSANTO C. OTANA, JR., Before the Court are consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari under
CHARLIE P. PADICA, ALFREDO P. Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which arose out of two civil cases that were filed
PALASPAS, CATALINO C. PANA, in different courts but whose factual background and issues are closely
ERNESTO M. PASCUAL, intertwined.
BIENVENIDO PAYAG,
RESURRECCION PENOS, PEDRO The petitions in G.R. Nos. 125078[1] and 125598[2] both assail the
[3]
PILAGO, ROMEO PRESBITERO, Order dated May 20, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
OMEO L. PRIEGO, ELADIO QUIBOL, of General SantosCity, Branch 37, in Civil Case No. 5617. The said Order
JESUS D. QUIBOL, MAGNO decreed the dismissal of the case in view of the perceived lack of jurisdiction
QUIZON, DIONISIO RAMOS, of the RTC over the subject matter of the complaint. The petition in G.R. No.
MAMERTO RANISES, NESTOR B. 125598 also challenges the Orders dated June 4, 1996[4] and July 9,
REBUYA, RODRIGO REQUILMEN, 1996,[5] which held that the RTC of General Santos City no longer had
ISIDRO RETANAL, CARLITO jurisdiction to proceed with Civil Case No. 5617.
ROBLE, GLICERIO V. ROSETE,
TINOY G. SABINO, MELCHOR
SALIGUMBA, SILVERIO SILANGAN, On the other hand, the petitions in G.R. Nos.
ROBERTO SIVA, PACITA SUYMAN, 126654,[6] 127856,[7] and 128398[8] seek the reversal of the Order[9] dated
CANILO TAJON, AVELINO October 1, 1996 of the RTC of Davao City, Branch 16, in Civil Case No.
TATAPOD, ROMEO TAYCO, 24,251-96, which also dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
RENATO TAYCO, CONRADO G.R. Nos. 125078, 125598, 126654, 127856, and 128398 were
TECSON, AGAPITO TECSON, consolidated in the Resolutions dated February 10, 1997,[10] April 28,
ROMAN. E. TEJERO, ALFREDO 1997[11] and March 10, 1999.[12]
TILANDOCA, CARLOS B. TIMA,
HERMONEGES TIRADOR, The factual antecedents of the petitions are as follows:
JOSELITO TIRO, PASTOR T.
TUNGKO, LEANDRO B. TURCAL, Proceedings before
VICENTE URQUIZA, VICENTE G.R. No. 128398 the Texas Courts
VILLA, ANTONIO P. VILLARAIZ,
LEOPOLDO VILLAVITO and Present: Beginning 1993, a number of personal injury suits were filed in
SAMUEL M. VILLEGAS, different Texas state courts by citizens of twelve foreign countries, including
Respondents. CORONA, C.J., the Philippines.The thousands of plaintiffs sought damages for injuries they
Chairperson, allegedly sustained from their exposure to dibromochloropropane (DBCP), a
VELASCO, JR., chemical used to kill nematodes (worms), while working on farms in 23 foreign
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, countries. The cases were eventually transferred to, and consolidated in,
PERALTA,* and the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston
PEREZ, JJ. Division. The cases therein that involved plaintiffs from
the Philippines were Jorge Colindres Carcamo, et al. v. Shell Oil Co., et
Promulgated: May 30, 2011 al., which was docketed as Civil Action No. H-94-1359, and Juan Ramon
Valdez, et al. v. Shell Oil Co., et al., which was docketed as Civil Action No. H-
95-1356. The defendants in the consolidated cases prayed for the dismissal
of all the actions under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
In a Memorandum and Order dated July 11, 1995, the Federal District
Court conditionally granted the defendants motion to dismiss. Pertinently, the
court ordered that:
Delgado, Jorge Carcamo, Valdez and Isae Carcamo
will be dismissed 90 days after the entry of this Memorandum
and Order provided that defendants and third- and fourth-
party defendants have:
(1) participated in expedited discovery in the United
States xxx;
(2) either waived or accepted service of process
and waived any other jurisdictional defense
within 40 days after the entry of this
Memorandum and Order in any action
commenced by a plaintiff in these actions in his
home country or the country in which his injury
occurred. Any plaintiff desiring to bring such an
action will do so within 30 days after the entry of
this Memorandum and Order;
(3) waived within 40 days after the entry of this
Memorandum and Order any limitations-based
defense that has matured since the
commencement of these actions in the courts
of Texas;
(4) stipulated within 40 days after the entry of this
Memorandum and Order that any discovery
conducted during the pendency of these actions
may be used in any foreign proceeding to the
same extent as if it had been conducted in
proceedings initiated there; and
(5) submitted within 40 days after the entry of this
Memorandum and Order an agreement binding
them to satisfy any final judgment rendered in
favor of plaintiffs by a foreign court.
xxxx
Notwithstanding the dismissals that may result from
this Memorandum and Order, in the event that the highest
court of any foreign country finally affirms the dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction of an action commenced by a plaintiff in
these actions in his home country or the country in which he
was injured, that plaintiff may return to this court and, upon
proper motion, the court will resume jurisdiction over the
action as if the case had never been dismissed for [forum non
conveniens].[13]
Civil Case No. 5617 before
the RTC
of General Santos City an
d G.R. Nos. 125078 and
125598
In accordance with the above Memorandum and Order, a total of 336 plaintiffs
from General Santos City (the petitioners in G.R. No. 125078, hereinafter
referred to as NAVIDA, et al.) filed a Joint Complaint[14] in the RTC of General
Santos City on August 10, 1995. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
5617. Named as defendants therein were: Shell Oil Co. (SHELL); Dow
Chemical Co. (DOW); Occidental Chemical Corp. (OCCIDENTAL); Dole Food
Co., Inc., Dole Fresh Fruit Co., Standard Fruit Co., Standard Fruit and
Steamship Co. (hereinafter collectively referred to as DOLE); Chiquita Brands,
Inc. and Chiquita Brands International, Inc. (CHIQUITA); Del Monte Fresh
Produce N.A. and Del Monte Tropical Fruit Co. (hereinafter collectively
referred to as DEL MONTE); Dead Sea Bromine Co., Ltd.; Ameribrom, Inc.;
Bromine Compounds, Ltd.; and Amvac Chemical Corp. (The aforementioned
defendants are hereinafter collectively referred to as defendant companies.)
NAVIDA, et al., prayed for the payment of damages in view of the
illnesses and injuries to the reproductive systems which they allegedly suffered
because of their exposure to DBCP. They claimed, among others, that they
were exposed to this chemical during the early 1970s up to the early 1980s
when they used the same in the banana plantations where they worked at;
and/or when they resided within the agricultural area where such chemical was
used.NAVIDA, et al., claimed that their illnesses and injuries were due to the
fault or negligence of each of the defendant companies in that they produced,
sold and/or otherwise put into the stream of commerce DBCP-containing
products. According to NAVIDA, et al., they were allowed to be exposed to the
said products, which the defendant companies knew, or ought to have known,
were highly injurious to the formers health and well-being.
 THE TORT ASSERTED IN
Instead of answering the complaint, most of the defendant companies THE PRESENT
respectively filed their Motions for Bill of Particulars.[15] During the pendency of COMPLAINT AGAINST
the motions, on March 13, 1996, NAVIDA, et al., filed an Amended Joint DEFENDANT FOREIGN
Complaint,[16] excluding Dead Sea Bromine Co., Ltd., Ameribrom, Inc., COMPANIES IS NOT
Bromine Compounds, Ltd. and Amvac Chemical Corp. as party defendants. WITHIN THE SUBJECT
MATTER JURISDICTION
Again, the remaining defendant companies filed their various Motions OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
for Bill of Particulars.[17] On May 15, 1996, DOW filed an Answer with COURT, BECAUSE IT IS
Counterclaim.[18] NOT A TORT CATEGORY
WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF
On May 20, 1996, without resolving the motions filed by the parties, THE PHILIPPINE LAW
the RTC of General Santos City issued an Order dismissing the
complaint. First, the trial court determined that it did not have jurisdiction to The specific tort asserted against defendant foreign
hear the case, to wit: companies in the present complaint is product liability
tort. When the averments in the present complaint are
examined in terms of the particular categories of tort
THE COMPLAINT FOR recognized in the Philippine Civil Code, it becomes stark clear
DAMAGES FILED WITH that such averments describe and identify the category of
THE REGIONAL TRIAL specific tort known as product liability tort. This is necessarily
COURT SHOULD BE so, because it is the product manufactured by defendant
DISMISSED FOR LACK OF foreign companies, which is asserted to be the proximate
JURISDICTION cause of the damages sustained by the plaintiff workers, and
the liability of the defendant foreign companies, is premised
xxxx on being the manufacturer of the pesticides.

The substance of the cause of action as stated in the
complaint against the defendant foreign companies cites
activity on their part which took place abroad and had
occurred outside and beyond the territorial domain of
the Philippines. These acts of defendants cited in the
complaint included the manufacture of pesticides, their
packaging in containers, their distribution through sale or
other disposition, resulting in their becoming part of the
stream of commerce.
were coerced into submitting their case to the Philippine courts, viz:
Accordingly, the subject matter stated in the complaint and
which is uniquely particular to the present case, consisted of
activity or course of conduct engaged in by foreign defendants
outside Philippine territory, hence, outside and beyond the
jurisdiction of Philippine Courts, including the present
Regional Trial Court.[19]
Second, the RTC of General Santos City declared that the tort alleged
by NAVIDA, et al., in their complaint is a tort category that is not recognized in
Philippine laws. Said the trial court:
It is clear, therefore, that the Regional Trial Court has
jurisdiction over the present case, if and only if the Civil Code
of the Philippines, or a suppletory special law prescribes a
product liability tort, inclusive of and comprehending the
specific tort described in the complaint of the plaintiff
workers.[20]
Third, the RTC of General Santos City adjudged that NAVIDA, et al.,
FILING OF CASES IN
THE PHILIPPINES -
COERCED AND
ANOMALOUS
The Court views that the plaintiffs did not freely choose to file
the instant action, but rather were coerced to do so, merely to
comply with the U.S. District Courts Order dated July 11,
 1995, and in order to keep open to the plaintiffs the
opportunity to return to the U.S. District Court.[21]
Fourth, the trial court ascribed little significance to the voluntary
appearance of the defendant companies therein, thus:
THE DEFENDANTS
SUBMISSION TO
JURISDICTION IS
CONDITIONAL AS IT IS
ILLUSORY
Defendants have appointed their agents authorized to
accept service of summons/processes in
the Philippines pursuant to the agreement in the U.S. court
that defendants will voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of this
court. While it is true that this court acquires jurisdiction over
persons of the defendants through their voluntary
appearance, it appears that such voluntary appearance of the
defendants in this case is conditional. Thus in the Defendants
Amended Agreement Regarding Conditions of Dismissal for
Forum Non Conveniens (Annex to the Complaint) filed with
the U.S. District Court, defendants declared that (t)he
authority of each designated representative to accept service
of process will become effective upon final dismissal of these
actions by the Court. The decision of the U.S. District Court
dismissing the case is not yet final and executory since both
the plaintiffs and defendants appealed therefrom (par. 3(h),
3(i), Amended Complaint). Consequently, since the authority
of the agent of the defendants in the Philippines is conditioned
on the final adjudication of the case pending with
the U.S. courts, the acquisition of jurisdiction by this court
over the persons of the defendants is also conditional. x x x.
The appointment of agents by the defendants, being
subject to a suspensive condition, thus produces no legal
effect and is ineffective at the moment.[22]
Fifth, the RTC of General Santos City ruled that the act of NAVIDA, et
al., of filing the case in the Philippine courts violated the rules on forum
shopping and litis pendencia. The trial court expounded:
THE JURISDICTION
FROWNS UPON AND
PROHIBITS FORUM
SHOPPING
This court frowns upon the fact that the parties herein are both
vigorously pursuing their appeal of the decision of the U.S.
District court dismissing the case filed thereat.To allow the
parties to litigate in this court when they are actively pursuing
the same cases in another forum, violates the rule on forum
shopping so abhorred in this jurisdiction. x x x.
xxxx
THE FILING OF THE CASE
IN U.S. DIVESTED THIS
COURT OF ITS OWN
JURISDICTION
Moreover, the filing of the case in the U.S. courts divested this
court of its own jurisdiction. This court takes note that the U.S.
District Court did not decline jurisdiction over the cause of
action. The case was dismissed on the ground of forum non
conveniens, which is really a matter of venue. By taking
cognizance of the case, the U.S. District Court has, in
essence, concurrent jurisdiction with this court over the
subject matter of this case. It is settled that initial acquisition
of jurisdiction divests another of its own jurisdiction. x x x.
xxxx
THIS CASE IS BARRED BY
THE RULE OF LITIS
PENDENCIA
Furthermore, the case filed in the U.S. court involves the
same parties, same rights and interests, as in this case. There
exists litis pendencia since there are two cases involving the
same parties and interests. The court would like to emphasize
that in accordance with the rule on litis pendencia x x x; the
subsequent case must be dismissed. Applying the foregoing
[precept] to the case-at-bar, this court concludes that since
the case between the parties in the U.S. is still pending, then
this case is barred by the rule on litis pendencia.[23]
In fine, the trial court held that:
 It behooves this Court, then to dismiss this case. For
to continue with these proceedings, would be violative of the
constitutional provision on the Bill of Rights guaranteeing
speedy disposition of cases (Ref. Sec. 16, Article III,
Constitution). The court has no other choice. To insist on
further proceedings with this case, as it is now presented,
might accord this court a charming appearance. But the same
insistence would actually thwart the very ends of justice which
it seeks to achieve.
This evaluation and action is made not on account of but
rather with due consideration to the fact that the dismissal of
this case does not necessarily deprive the parties especially
the plaintiffs of their possible remedies. The court is cognizant
that the Federal Court may resume proceedings of that earlier
case between the herein parties involving the same acts or
omissions as in this case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
considerations, this case is now considered DISMISSED.[24]
On June 4, 1996, the RTC of General Santos City likewise issued
an Order,[25] dismissing DOWs Answer with Counterclaim.
CHIQUITA, DEL MONTE and SHELL each filed a motion for
reconsideration[26] of the RTC Order dated May 20, 1996, while DOW filed a
motion for reconsideration[27] of the RTC Order dated June 4,
1996. Subsequently, DOW and OCCIDENTAL also filed a Joint Motion for
Reconsideration[28] of the RTC Order dated May 20, 1996.
In an Order[29] dated July 9, 1996, the RTC of General Santos City
declared that it had already lost its jurisdiction over the case as it took into
consideration the Manifestation of the counsel of NAVIDA, et al., which stated
that the latter had already filed a petition for review on certiorari before this
Court.
CHIQUITA and SHELL filed their motions for reconsideration[30] of the
above order.
On July 11, 1996, NAVIDA, et al., filed a Petition for Review
on Certiorari in order to assail the RTC Order dated May 20, 1996, which was
docketed as G.R. No. 125078.
The RTC of General Santos City then issued an Order[31] dated
August 14, 1996, which merely noted the incidents still pending in Civil Case
No. 5617 and reiterated that it no longer had any jurisdiction over the case.
On August 30, 1996, DOW and OCCIDENTAL filed their Petition for
Review on Certiorari,[32] challenging the orders of the RTC of General Santos
City dated May 20, 1996, June 4, 1996 and July 9, 1996. Their petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 125598.
In their petition, DOW and OCCIDENTAL aver that the RTC of General
Santos City erred in ruling that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case as well as the persons of the defendant companies.
In a Resolution[33] dated October 7, 1996, this Court resolved to
consolidate G.R. No. 125598 with G.R. No. 125078.
CHIQUITA filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari,[34] which sought
the reversal of the RTC Orders dated May 20, 1996, July 9, 1996 and August
14, 1996. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 126018. In a
Resolution[35] dated November 13, 1996, the Court dismissed the aforesaid
petition for failure of CHIQUITA to show that the RTC committed grave abuse
of discretion. CHIQUITA filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[36] but the same
was denied through a Resolution[37] dated January 27, 1997.
Civil Case No. 24,251-96
before the RTC
of Davao City and G.R.
Nos. 126654, 127856, and
128398
Another joint complaint for damages against SHELL, DOW, OCCIDENTAL,
DOLE, DEL MONTE, and CHIQUITA was filed before Branch 16 of the RTC
of Davao City by 155 plaintiffs from Davao City. This case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 24,251-96. These plaintiffs (the petitioners in G.R. No. 126654,
hereinafter referred to as ABELLA, et al.) amended their Joint-Complaint on
May 21, 1996.[38]
Similar to the complaint of NAVIDA, et al., ABELLA, et al., alleged that,
as workers in the banana plantation and/or as residents near the said
plantation, they were made to use and/or were exposed to nematocides,
which contained the chemical DBCP. According to ABELLA, et al., such
exposure resulted in serious and permanent injuries to their health, including,
but not limited to, sterility and severe injuries to their reproductive
capacities.[39]ABELLA, et al., claimed that the defendant companies
manufactured, produced, sold, distributed, used, and/or made available in
commerce, DBCP without warning the users of its hazardous effects on health,
and without providing instructions on its proper use and application, which the
defendant companies knew or ought to have known, had they exercised
ordinary care and prudence.
Except for DOW, the other defendant companies filed their respective motions
for bill of particulars to which ABELLA, et al., filed their opposition. DOW and
DEL MONTE filed their respective Answers dated May 17, 1996 and June 24,
1996.
11. In the Amended Joint Complaint, plaintiffs aver that: on 11
The RTC of Davao City, however, junked Civil Case No. 24,251-96 in
its Order dated October 1, 1996, which, in its entirety, reads:
Upon a thorough review of the Complaint and
Amended Complaint For: Damages filed by the plaintiffs
against the defendants Shell Oil Company, DOW Chemicals
Company, Occidental Chemical Corporation, Standard Fruit
Company, Standard Fruit and Steamship, DOLE Food
Company, DOLE Fresh Fruit Company, Chiquita Brands, Inc.,
Chiquita Brands International, Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A.
and Del Monte Tropical Fruits Co., all foreign corporations
with Philippine Representatives, the Court, as correctly
pointed out by one of the defendants, is convinced that
plaintiffs would have this Honorable Court dismiss the case to
pave the way for their getting an affirmance by the Supreme
Court (#10 of Defendants Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A. and
Del Monte Tropical Fruit Co., Reply to Opposition dated July
22, 1996). Consider these:
1) In the original Joint Complaint,
plaintiffs state that: defendants have no
properties in the Philippines; they have no
agents as well (par. 18); plaintiffs are suing
the defendants for tortuous acts committed
by these foreign corporations on their
respective countries, as plaintiffs, after
having elected to sue in the place of
defendants residence, are now compelled by
a decision of a Texas District Court to file
cases under torts in this jurisdiction
for causes of actions which occurred
abroad (par. 19); a petition was filed by same
plaintiffs against same defendants in the
Courts of Texas, USA, plaintiffs seeking for
payment of damages based on negligence,
strict liability, conspiracy and international tort
theories (par. 27); upon defendants Motion to
Dismiss on Forum non [conveniens], said
petition was provisionally dismissed on
condition that these cases be filed in the
Philippines or before 11 August 1995
(Philippine date; Should the Philippine Courts
refuse or deny jurisdiction, the U. S. Courts
will reassume jurisdiction.)
July 1995, the Federal District Court issued a Memorandum
and Order conditionally dismissing several of the consolidated
actions including those filed by the Filipino complainants. One
of the conditions imposed was for the plaintiffs to file actions
in their home countries or the countries in which they were
injured x x x. Notwithstanding, the Memorandum and [O]rder
further provided that should the highest court of any foreign
country affirm the dismissal for lack of jurisdictions over these
actions filed by the plaintiffs in their home countries [or] the
countries where they were injured, the said plaintiffs may
return to that court and, upon proper motion, the Court will
resume jurisdiction as if the case had never been dismissed
for forum non conveniens.
The Court however is constrained to dismiss the case
at bar not solely on the basis of the above but because it
shares the opinion of legal experts given in the interview made
by the Inquirer in its Special report Pesticide Cause Mass
Sterility, to wit:
1. Former Justice Secretary Demetrio Demetria in a
May 1995 opinion said: The Philippines should be an
inconvenient forum to file this kind of damage suit
against foreign companies since the causes of action
alleged in the petition do not exist under Philippine
laws. There has been no decided case in Philippine
Jurisprudence awarding to those adversely affected
by DBCP. This means there is no available evidence
which will prove and disprove the relation between
sterility and DBCP.
2. Retired Supreme Court Justice Abraham Sarmiento
opined that while a class suit is allowed in
the Philippines the device has been employed
strictly. Mass sterility will not qualify as a class suit
injury within the contemplation of Philippine statute.
 3. Retired High Court Justice Rodolfo Nocom stated
that there is simply an absence of doctrine here that
permits these causes to be heard. No product liability
ever filed or tried here.
Case ordered dismissed.[40]
Docketed as G.R. No. 126654, the petition for review, filed on November 12,
1996 by ABELLA, et al., assails before this Court the above-quoted order of
the RTC of Davao City.
ABELLA, et al., claim that the RTC of Davao City erred in dismissing Civil Case
No. 24,251-96 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
According to ABELLA, et al., the RTC of Davao City has jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case since Articles 2176 and 2187 of the Civil
Code are broad enough to cover the acts complained of and to support their
claims for damages.
ABELLA, et al., further aver that the dismissal of the case, based on
the opinions of legal luminaries reported in a newspaper, by the RTC of Davao
City is bereft of basis. According to them, their cause of action is based on
quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. They also maintain that the
absence of jurisprudence regarding the award of damages in favor of those
adversely affected by the DBCP does not preclude them from presenting
evidence to prove their allegations that their exposure to DBCP caused their
sterility and/or infertility.
SHELL, DOW, and CHIQUITA each filed their respective motions for
reconsideration of the Order dated October 1, 1996 of the RTC of Davao
City.DEL MONTE also filed its motion for reconsideration, which contained an
additional motion for the inhibition of the presiding judge.
The presiding judge of Branch 16 then issued an Order[41] dated
December 2, 1996, voluntarily inhibiting himself from trying the case. Thus, the
case was re-raffled to Branch 13 of the RTC of Davao City.
In an Order[42] dated December 16, 1996, the RTC of Davao City
affirmed the Order dated October 1, 1996, and denied the respective motions
for reconsideration filed by defendant companies.
Thereafter, CHIQUITA filed a Petition for Review dated March 5, 1997,
questioning the Orders dated October 1, 1996 and December 16, 1996 of the
RTC of Davao City. This case was docketed as G.R. No. 128398.
In its petition, CHIQUITA argues that the RTC of Davao City erred in
dismissing the case motu proprio as it acquired jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case as well as over the persons of the defendant companies
which voluntarily appeared before it. CHIQUITA also claims that the RTC of
Davao City cannot dismiss the case simply on the basis of opinions of alleged
legal experts appearing in a newspaper article.
Initially, this Court in its Resolution[43] dated July 28, 1997, dismissed
the petition filed by CHIQUITA for submitting a defective certificate against
forum shopping. CHIQUITA, however, filed a motion for reconsideration, which
was granted by this Court in the Resolution[44] dated October 8, 1997.
On March 7, 1997, DEL MONTE also filed its petition for review
on certiorari before this Court assailing the above-mentioned orders of the
RTC of Davao City. Its petition was docketed as G.R. No. 127856.
DEL MONTE claims that the RTC of Davao City has jurisdiction
over Civil Case No. 24,251-96, as defined under the law and that the said court
already obtained jurisdiction over its person by its voluntary appearance and
the filing of a motion for bill of particulars and, later, an answer to the
complaint. According to DEL MONTE, the RTC of Davao City, therefore, acted
beyond its authority when it dismissed the case motu proprio or without any
motion to dismiss from any of the parties to the case.
In the Resolutions dated February 10, 1997, April 28, 1997, and March
10, 1999, this Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 125078, 125598, 126654, 127856,
and 128398.
The Consolidated Motion
to Drop DOW,
OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL
as Party-Respondents
filed by NAVIDA, et al. and
ABELLA, et al.
On September 26, 1997, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., filed
before this Court a Consolidated Motion (to Drop Party-Respondents).[45] The
plaintiff claimants alleged that they had amicably settled their cases with DOW,
OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL sometime in July 1997. This settlement agreement
was evidenced by facsimiles of the Compromise Settlement, Indemnity, and
Hold Harmless Agreement, which were attached to the said motion.Pursuant
to said agreement, the plaintiff claimants sought to withdraw their petitions as
against DOW, OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL.
 DOLE, DEL MONTE and CHIQUITA, however, opposed the motion, that it has no objections to the withdrawal of the petition filed by DOW and
as well as the settlement entered into between the plaintiff claimants and OCCIDENTAL in G.R. No. 125598.
DOW, OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL.
In a Resolution[57] dated October 11, 2004, this Court granted, among
The Memoranda of the others, the motion to withdraw petition for review filed by DOW and
Parties OCCIDENTAL.

Considering the allegations, issues, and arguments adduced by the THE ISSUES
parties, this Court, in a Resolution dated June 22, 1998,[46] required all the
parties to submit their respective memoranda. In their Consolidated Memorandum, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.,
presented the following issues for our consideration:
CHIQUITA filed its Memorandum on August 28, 1998;[47] SHELL
asked to be excused from the filing of a memorandum alleging that it had IN REFUTATION
already executed a compromise agreement with the plaintiff
claimants.[48] DOLE filed its Memorandum on October 12, 1998[49] while DEL I. THE COURT DISMISSED THE CASE DUE TO
MONTE filed on October 13, 1998.[50] NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., filed LACK OF JURISDICTION.
their Consolidated Memorandum on February 3, 1999;[51] and DOW and
OCCIDENTAL jointly filed a Memorandum on December 23, 1999.[52] a) The court did not simply dismiss the case because
it was filed in bad faith with petitioners intending to
The Motion to Withdraw have the same dismissed and returned to
Petition for Review in G.R. the Texas court.
No. 125598
b) The court dismissed the case because it was
convinced that it did not have jurisdiction.
On July 13, 2004, DOW and OCCIDENTAL filed a Motion to Withdraw
Petition for Review in G.R. No. 125598, [53] explaining that the said petition is IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITION
already moot and academic and no longer presents a justiciable controversy
since they have already entered into an amicable settlement with NAVIDA, et II. THE TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER
al. DOW and OCCIDENTAL added that they have fully complied with their THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE.
obligations set forth in the 1997 Compromise Agreements.
a. The acts complained of occurred within Philippine
DOLE filed its Manifestation dated September 6, 2004,[54] interposing territory.
no objection to the withdrawal of the petition, and further stating that they
maintain their position that DOW and OCCIDENTAL, as well as other settling b. Art. 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is
defendant companies, should be retained as defendants for purposes of broad enough to cover the acts complained of.
prosecuting the cross-claims of DOLE, in the event that the complaint below
is reinstated. c. Assumption of jurisdiction by the U.S. District Court
over petitioner[s] claims did not divest Philippine
NAVIDA, et al., also filed their Comment dated September 14, [c]ourts of jurisdiction over the same.
2004,[55] stating that they agree with the view of DOW and OCCIDENTAL that
the petition in G.R. No. 125598 has become moot and academic because Civil d. The Compromise Agreement and the subsequent
Case No. 5617 had already been amicably settled by the parties in 1997. Consolidated Motion to Drop Party Respondents
Dow, Occidental and Shell does not unjustifiably
On September 27, 2004, DEL MONTE filed its Comment on Motion to prejudice remaining respondents Dole, Del Monte
Withdraw Petition for Review Filed by Petitioners in G.R. No. 125598,[56]stating and Chiquita.[58]

DISCUSSION
On the issue of
jurisdiction
Essentially, the crux of the controversy in the petitions at bar is
whether the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City erred in
dismissing Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96, respectively, for lack of
jurisdiction.
Remarkably, none of the parties to this case claims that the courts a
quo are bereft of jurisdiction to determine and resolve the above-stated
cases. All parties contend that the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC
of Davao City have jurisdiction over the action for damages, specifically for
approximately P2.7 million for each of the plaintiff claimants.
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., argue that the allegedly tortious
acts and/or omissions of defendant companies occurred within Philippine
territory. Specifically, the use of and exposure to DBCP that was
manufactured, distributed or otherwise put into the stream of commerce by
defendant companies happened in the Philippines. Said fact allegedly
constitutes reasonable basis for our courts to assume jurisdiction over the
case. Furthermore, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., assert that the
provisions of Chapter 2 of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code, as well as
Article 2176 thereof, are broad enough to cover their claim for damages. Thus,
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., pray that the respective rulings of the RTC
of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City in Civil Case Nos. 5617
and 24,251-96 be reversed and that the said cases be remanded to the
courts a quo for further proceedings.
DOLE similarly maintains that the acts attributed to defendant
companies constitute a quasi-delict, which falls under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. In addition, DOLE states that if there were no actionable wrongs
committed under Philippine law, the courts a quo should have dismissed the
civil cases on the ground that the Amended Joint-Complaints of NAVIDA, et
al., and ABELLA, et al., stated no cause of action against the defendant
companies. DOLE also argues that if indeed there is no positive law defining
the alleged acts of defendant companies as actionable wrong, Article 9 of the
Civil Code dictates that a judge may not refuse to render a decision on the
ground of insufficiency of the law. The court may still resolve the case, applying
the customs of the place and, in the absence thereof, the general principles of
law. DOLE posits that the Philippines is the situs of the tortious acts allegedly
committed by defendant companies as NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.,
point to their alleged exposure to DBCP which occurred in the Philippines, as
the cause of the sterility and other reproductive system problems that they
allegedly suffered. Finally, DOLE adds that the RTC of Davao City gravely
erred in relying upon newspaper reports in dismissing Civil Case No. 24,251-
96 given that newspaper articles are hearsay and without any evidentiary
value. Likewise, the alleged legal opinions cited in the newspaper reports were
taken judicial notice of, without any notice to the parties. DOLE, however,
opines that the dismissal of Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 was proper,
given that plaintiff claimants merely prosecuted the cases with the sole intent
of securing a dismissal of the actions for the purpose of convincing the U.S.
Federal District Court to re-assume jurisdiction over the cases.
In a similar vein, CHIQUITA argues that the courts a quo had
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the cases filed before them. The
Amended Joint-Complaints sought approximately P2.7 million in damages for
each plaintiff claimant, which amount falls within the jurisdiction of the
RTC. CHIQUITA avers that the pertinent matter is the place of the alleged
exposure to DBCP, not the place of manufacture, packaging, distribution,
sale, etc., of the said chemical. This is in consonance with the lex loci delicti
commisi theory in determining the situs of a tort, which states that the law of
the place where the alleged wrong was committed will govern the
action. CHIQUITA and the other defendant companies also submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the RTC by making voluntary appearances
and seeking for affirmative reliefs during the course of the proceedings. None
of the defendant companies ever objected to the exercise of jurisdiction by the
courts a quo over their persons. CHIQUITA, thus, prays for the remand of Civil
Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 to the RTC of General Santos City and the
RTC of Davao City, respectively.
The RTC of General
Santos City and the RTC of
Davao City have
jurisdiction over Civil
Case Nos. 5617 and
24,251-96, respectively
The rule is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled
to all or some of the claims asserted therein.[59] Once vested by law, on a
particular court or body, the jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
action cannot be dislodged by anybody other than by the legislature through
the enactment of a law.
At the time of the filing of the complaints, the jurisdiction of the RTC in
civil cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No.
7691, was:

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxxx
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation
expenses, and costs or the value of the property in
controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where
the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds
Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).[60]
Corollary thereto, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 09-94,
states:
2. The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in
determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8)
and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No.
7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely
incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of
action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the
main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the
amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the
jurisdiction of the court.
Here, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., sought in their similarly-
worded Amended Joint-Complaints filed before the courts a quo, the following
prayer:
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most
respectfully prayed that after hearing, judgment be rendered
in favor of the plaintiffs ordering the defendants:
a) TO PAY EACH PLAINTIFF moral
damages in the amount of One Million Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P1,500,00.00);
b) TO PAY EACH PLAINTIFF nominal
damages in the amount of Four Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P400,000.00) each;
c) TO PAY EACH PLAINTIFF exemplary
damages in the amount of Six Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P600,000.00);
d) TO PAY EACH PLAINTIFF attorneys
fees of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00); and
e) TO PAY THE COSTS of the suit.[61]
From the foregoing, it is clear that the claim for damages is the main
cause of action and that the total amount sought in the complaints is
approximately P2.7 million for each of the plaintiff claimants. The RTCs
unmistakably have jurisdiction over the cases filed in General Santos City and
Davao City, as both claims by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., fall within
the purview of the definition of the jurisdiction of the RTC under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129.
Moreover, the allegations in both Amended Joint-Complaints narrate
that:
THE CAUSES OF ACTION
4. The Defendants manufactured, sold, distributed,
used, AND/OR MADE AVAILABLE IN COMMERCE
nematocides containing the chemical dibromochloropropane,
commonly known as DBCP. THE CHEMICAL WAS USED
AGAINST the parasite known as the nematode, which
plagued banana plantations, INCLUDING THOSE in
the Philippines. AS IT TURNED OUT, DBCP not only
destroyed nematodes. IT ALSO CAUSED ILL-EFFECTS ON
THE HEALTH OF PERSONS EXPOSED TO IT AFFECTING
the human reproductive system as well.
5. The plaintiffs were exposed to DBCP in the
1970s up to the early 1980s WHILE (a) they used this
product in the banana plantations WHERE they were
employed, and/or (b) they resided within the agricultural
area WHERE IT WAS USED. As a result of such exposure,
the plaintiffs suffered serious and permanent injuries TO
THEIR HEALTH, including, but not limited to, STERILITY and
severe injuries to their reproductive capacities.

6. THE DEFENDANTS WERE AT FAULT OR WERE
NEGLIGENT IN THAT THEY MANUFACTURED, produced,
sold, and/or USED DBCP and/or otherwise, PUT THE
SAME into the stream of commerce, WITHOUT
INFORMING THE USERS OF ITS HAZARDOUS EFFECTS
ON HEALTH AND/OR WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS ON ITS
PROPER USE AND APPLICATION. THEY allowed Plaintiffs
to be exposed to, DBCP-containing materials which THEY
knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care and prudence ought
to have known, were highly harmful and injurious to the
Plaintiffs health and well-being.
7. The Defendants WHO MANUFACTURED,
PRODUCED, SOLD, DISTRIBUTED, MADE AVAILABLE OR
PUT DBCP INTO THE STREAM OF COMMERCE were
negligent OR AT FAULT in that they, AMONG OTHERS:
a. Failed to adequately warn Plaintiffs of
the dangerous characteristics of DBCP, or to
cause their subsidiaries or affiliates to so
warn plaintiffs;
b. Failed to provide plaintiffs with
information as to what should be reasonably
safe and sufficient clothing and proper
protective equipment and appliances, if any,
to protect plaintiffs from the harmful effects of
exposure to DBCP, or to cause their
subsidiaries or affiliates to do so;
c. Failed to place adequate warnings, in a
language understandable to the worker, on
containers of DBCP-containing materials to
warn of the dangers to health of coming into
contact with DBCP, or to cause their
subsidiaries or affiliates to do so;
d. Failed to take reasonable precaution or
to exercise reasonable care to publish, adopt
and enforce a safety plan and a safe method
of handling and applying DBCP, or to cause
their subsidiaries or affiliates to do so;
e. Failed to test DBCP prior to releasing
these products for sale, or to cause their
subsidiaries or affiliates to do so; and
f. Failed to reveal the results of tests
conducted on DBCP to each plaintiff,
governmental agencies and the public, or to
cause their subsidiaries or affiliate to do so.
8. The illnesses and injuries of each plaintiff are also
due to the FAULT or negligence of defendants Standard Fruit
Company, Dole Fresh Fruit Company, Dole Food Company,
Inc., Chiquita Brands, Inc. and Chiquita Brands International,
Inc. in that they failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent
each plaintiffs harmful exposure to DBCP-containing products
which defendants knew or should have known were
hazardous to each plaintiff in that they, AMONG OTHERS:
a. Failed to adequately supervise and
instruct Plaintiffs in the safe and proper
application of DBCP-containing products;
b. Failed to implement proper methods
and techniques of application of said
products, or to cause such to be
implemented;
c. Failed to warn Plaintiffs of the hazards
of exposure to said products or to cause them
to be so warned;
d. Failed to test said products for adverse
health effects, or to cause said products to be
tested;
e. Concealed from Plaintiffs information
concerning the observed effects of said
products on Plaintiffs;
f. Failed to monitor the health of plaintiffs
exposed to said products;
g. Failed to place adequate labels on
containers of said products to warn them of
the damages of said products; and
 h. Failed to use substitute nematocides for
said products or to cause such substitutes to
[be] used.[62] (Emphasis supplied and words
in brackets ours.)
Quite evidently, the allegations in the Amended Joint-Complaints of
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., attribute to defendant companies certain
acts and/or omissions which led to their exposure to nematocides containing
the chemical DBCP. According to NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., such
exposure to the said chemical caused ill effects, injuries and illnesses,
specifically to their reproductive system.
Thus, these allegations in the complaints constitute the cause of
action of plaintiff claimants a quasi-delict, which under the Civil Code is defined
as an act, or omission which causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence. To be precise, Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there
is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
As specifically enumerated in the amended complaints, NAVIDA, et
al., and ABELLA, et al., point to the acts and/or omissions of the defendant
companies in manufacturing, producing, selling, using, and/or otherwise
putting into the stream of commerce, nematocides which contain DBCP,
without informing the users of its hazardous effects on health and/or without
instructions on its proper use and application. [63]
Verily, in Citibank, N.A. v. Court of Appeals,[64] this Court has always
reminded that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is
determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not
the plaintiffs are entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein. The jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the
defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise,
the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the
defendants. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the
action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The
averments therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be
consulted.
Clearly then, the acts and/or omissions attributed to the defendant
companies constitute a quasi-delict which is the basis for the claim for
damages filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., with individual claims of
approximately P2.7 million for each plaintiff claimant, which obviously falls
within the purview of the civil action jurisdiction of the RTCs.
Moreover, the injuries and illnesses, which NAVIDA, et al., and
ABELLA, et al., allegedly suffered resulted from their exposure to DBCP while
they were employed in the banana plantations located in the Philippines or
while they were residing within the agricultural areas also located in
the Philippines.The factual allegations in the Amended Joint-Complaints all
point to their cause of action, which undeniably occurred in
the Philippines. The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City
obviously have reasonable basis to assume jurisdiction over the cases.
It is, therefore, error on the part of the courts a quo when they
dismissed the cases on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the mistaken
assumption that the cause of action narrated by NAVIDA, et al., and
ABELLA, et al., took place abroad and had occurred outside and beyond the
territorial boundaries of the Philippines, i.e., the manufacture of the pesticides,
their packaging in containers, their distribution through sale or other
disposition, resulting in their becoming part of the stream of commerce,[65] and,
hence, outside the jurisdiction of the RTCs.
Certainly, the cases below are not criminal cases where territoriality,
or the situs of the act complained of, would be determinative of jurisdiction and
venue for trial of cases. In personal civil actions, such as claims for payment
of damages, the Rules of Court allow the action to be commenced and tried in
the appropriate court, where any of the plaintiffs or defendants resides, or in
the case of a non-resident defendant, where he may be found, at the election
of the plaintiff.[66]
In a very real sense, most of the evidence required to prove the claims
of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., are available only in
the Philippines.First, plaintiff claimants are all residents of the Philippines,
either in General Santos City or in Davao City. Second, the specific areas
where they were allegedly exposed to the chemical DBCP are within the
territorial jurisdiction of the courts a quo wherein NAVIDA, et al., and
ABELLA, et al., initially filed their claims for damages. Third, the testimonial
and documentary evidence from important witnesses, such as doctors, co-
workers, family members and other members of the community, would be
easier to gather in the Philippines. Considering the great number of plaintiff
claimants involved in this case, it is not far-fetched to assume that voluminous
records are involved in the presentation of evidence to support the claim of
plaintiff claimants. Thus, these additional factors, coupled with the fact that the
alleged cause of action of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., against the
defendant companies for damages occurred in the Philippines, demonstrate
that, apart from the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City
having jurisdiction over the subject matter in the instant civil cases, they are,
indeed, the convenient fora for trying these cases.[67]
The RTC
of General Santos City an
d the RTC
of Davao City validly
acquired jurisdiction over
the persons of all the
defendant companies
It is well to stress again that none of the parties claims that the courts a
quo lack jurisdiction over the cases filed before them. All parties are one in
asserting that the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City have
validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the defendant companies in
the action below. All parties voluntarily, unconditionally and knowingly
appeared and submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts a quo.
Rule 14, Section 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that [t]he
defendants voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service
of summons. In this connection, all the defendant companies designated and
authorized representatives to receive summons and to represent them in the
proceedings before the courts a quo. All the defendant companies submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts a quo by making several voluntary
appearances, by praying for various affirmative reliefs, and by actively
participating during the course of the proceedings below.
In line herewith, this Court, in Meat Packing Corporation of the
Philippines v. Sandiganbayan,[68] held that jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant in civil cases is acquired either by his voluntary appearance in court
and his submission to its authority or by service of summons. Furthermore, the
active participation of a party in the proceedings is tantamount to an invocation
of the courts jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the
case, and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or bodys
jurisdiction.[69]
Thus, the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City
have validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the defendant
companies, as well as over the subject matter of the instant case. What is
more, this jurisdiction, which has been acquired and has been vested on the
courts a quo,continues until the termination of the proceedings.
It may also be pertinently stressed that jurisdiction is different from the exercise
of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction refers to the authority to decide a case, not the
orders or the decision rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court has
jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants and the subject matter, as in
the case of the courts a quo, the decision on all questions arising therefrom is
but an exercise of such jurisdiction. Any error that the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment, which does not affect
its authority to decide the case, much less divest the court of the jurisdiction
over the case.[70]
Plaintiffs purported bad
faith in filing the subject
civil cases in Philippine
courts
Anent the insinuation by DOLE that the plaintiff claimants filed their
cases in bad faith merely to procure a dismissal of the same and to allow them
to return to the forum of their choice, this Court finds such argument much too
speculative to deserve any merit.
It must be remembered that this Court does not rule on allegations
that are unsupported by evidence on record. This Court does not rule on
allegations which are manifestly conjectural, as these may not exist at all. This
Court deals with facts, not fancies; on realities, not appearances. When this
Court acts on appearances instead of realities, justice and law will be short-
lived.[71] This is especially true with respect to allegations of bad faith, in line
with the basic rule that good faith is always presumed and bad faith must be
proved.[72]
In sum, considering the fact that the RTC of General Santos City and
the RTC of Davao City have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
amended complaints filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., and that the
courts a quo have also acquired jurisdiction over the persons of all the
defendant companies, it therefore, behooves this Court to order the remand of
Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 to the RTC of General Santos City and
the RTC of Davao City, respectively.
On the issue of the
dropping of DOW,
OCCIDENTAL and SHELL
as respondents in view of
their amicable settlement
with NAVIDA, et al., and
ABELLA, et al.
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., are further praying that DOW,
OCCIDENTAL and SHELL be dropped as respondents in G.R. Nos. 125078
and 126654, as well as in Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96. The non-
settling defendants allegedly manifested that they intended to file their cross-
claims against their co-defendants who entered into compromise
agreements. NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., argue that the non-settling
defendants did not aver any cross-claim in their answers to the complaint and
that they subsequently sought to amend their answers to plead their cross-
claims only after the settlement between the plaintiff claimants and DOW,
OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL were executed. NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et
al., therefore, assert that the cross-claims are already barred.
In their Memoranda, CHIQUITA and DOLE are opposing the above
motion of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., since the latters Amended
Complaints cited several instances of tortious conduct that were allegedly
committed jointly and severally by the defendant companies. This solidary
obligation on the part of all the defendants allegedly gives any co-defendant
the statutory right to proceed against the other co-defendants for the payment
of their respective shares. Should the subject motion of NAVIDA, et al., and
ABELLA, et al., be granted, and the Court subsequently orders the remand of
the action to the trial court for continuance, CHIQUITA and DOLE would
allegedly be deprived of their right to prosecute their cross-claims against their
other co-defendants. Moreover, a third party complaint or a separate trial,
according to CHIQUITA, would only unduly delay and complicate the
proceedings.CHIQUITA and DOLE similarly insist that the motion of
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., to drop DOW, SHELL and OCCIDENTAL
as respondents in G.R. Nos. 125078 and 126654, as well as in Civil Case Nos.
5617 and 24,251-96, be denied.
Incidentally, on April 2, 2007, after the parties have submitted their
respective memoranda, DEL MONTE filed a Manifestation and
Motion[73] before the Court, stating that similar settlement agreements were
allegedly executed by the plaintiff claimants with DEL MONTE and CHIQUITA
sometime in 1999. Purportedly included in the agreements were Civil Case
Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96. Attached to the said manifestation were copies of
the Compromise Settlement, Indemnity, and Hold Harmless Agreement
between DEL MONTE and the settling plaintiffs, as well as the Release in Full
executed by the latter.[74] DEL MONTE specified therein that there were only
four (4) plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 5617 who are claiming against the Del Monte
parties[75] and that the latter have executed amicable settlements which
completely satisfied any claims against DEL MONTE. In accordance with the
alleged compromise agreements with the four plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 5617,
DEL MONTE sought the dismissal of the Amended Joint-Complaint in the said
civil case.Furthermore, in view of the above settlement agreements with
ABELLA, et al., in Civil Case No. 24,251-96, DEL MONTE stated that it no
longer wished to pursue its petition in G.R. No. 127856 and accordingly prayed
that it be allowed to withdraw the same.
Having adjudged that Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 should be
remanded to the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City,
respectively, the Court deems that the Consolidated Motions (to Drop Party-
Respondents) filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., should likewise be
referred to the said trial courts for appropriate disposition.
Under Article 2028 of the Civil Code, [a] compromise is a contract whereby the
parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to
one already commenced. Like any other contract, an extrajudicial compromise
agreement is not excepted from rules and principles of a contract. It is a
consensual contract, perfected by mere consent, the latter being manifested
by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause
which are to constitute the contract.[76] Judicial approval is not required for its
perfection.[77] A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority
of res judicata[78] and this holds true even if the agreement has not been
judicially approved.[79] In addition, as a binding contract, a compromise
agreement determines the rights and obligations of only the parties to it.[80]
In light of the foregoing legal precepts, the RTC of General Santos City and
the RTC of Davao City should first receive in evidence and examine all of the
alleged compromise settlements involved in the cases at bar to determine the
propriety of dropping any party as a defendant therefrom.
The Court notes that the Consolidated Motions (to Drop Party-
Respondents) that was filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., only
pertained to DOW, OCCIDENTAL and SHELL in view of the latter companies
alleged compromise agreements with the plaintiff claimants. However, in
subsequent developments, DEL MONTE and CHIQUITA supposedly reached
their own amicable settlements with the plaintiff claimants, but DEL MONTE
qualified that it entered into a settlement agreement with only four of the
plaintiff claimants in Civil Case No. 5617. These four plaintiff claimants were
allegedly the only ones who were asserting claims against DEL
MONTE. However, the said allegation of DEL MONTE was simply stipulated
in their Compromise Settlement, Indemnity, and Hold Harmless Agreement
and its truth could not be verified with certainty based on the records elevated
to this Court.Significantly, the 336 plaintiff claimants in Civil Case No. 5617
jointly filed a complaint without individually specifying their claims against DEL
MONTE or any of the other defendant companies. Furthermore, not one
plaintiff claimant filed a motion for the removal of either DEL MONTE or
CHIQUITA as defendants in Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96.
There is, thus, a primary need to establish who the specific parties to
the alleged compromise agreements are, as well as their corresponding rights
and obligations therein. For this purpose, the courts a quo may require the
presentation of additional evidence from the parties. Thereafter, on the basis
of the records of the cases at bar and the additional evidence submitted by the
parties, if any, the trial courts can then determine who among the defendants
may be dropped from the said cases.

It is true that, under Article 2194 of the Civil Code, the responsibility of
two or more persons who are liable for the same quasi-delict is solidary. A
solidary obligation is one in which each of the debtors is liable for the entire
obligation, and each of the creditors is entitled to demand the satisfaction of
the whole obligation from any or all of the debtors.[81]
In solidary obligations, the paying debtors right of reimbursement is
provided for under Article 1217 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 1217. Payment made by one of the solidary
debtors extinguishes the obligation. If two or more solidary
debtors offer to pay, the creditor may choose which offer to
accept.
He who made the payment may claim from his co-
debtors only the share which corresponds to each, with the
interest for the payment already made. If the payment is made
before the debt is due, no interest for the intervening period
may be demanded.
When one of the solidary debtors cannot, because of
his insolvency, reimburse his share to the debtor paying the
obligation, such share shall be borne by all his co-debtors, in
proportion to the debt of each.
The above right of reimbursement of a paying debtor, and the
corresponding liability of the co-debtors to reimburse, will only arise, however,
if a solidary debtor who is made to answer for an obligation actually delivers
payment to the creditor. As succinctly held in Lapanday Agricultural
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[82] [p]ayment, which means not
only the delivery of money but also the performance, in any other manner, of
the obligation, is the operative fact which will entitle either of the solidary
debtors to seek reimbursement for the share which corresponds to each of the
[other] debtors.[83]
In the cases at bar, there is no right of reimbursement to speak
of as yet. A trial on the merits must necessarily be conducted first in
order to establish whether or not defendant companies are liable for the
claims for damages filed by the plaintiff claimants, which would
necessarily give rise to an obligation to pay on the part of the
defendants.
At the point in time where the proceedings below were prematurely
halted, no cross-claims have been interposed by any defendant against
another defendant. If and when such a cross-claim is made by a non-settling
defendant against a settling defendant, it is within the discretion of the trial
court to determine the propriety of allowing such a cross-claim and if the
settling defendant must remain a party to the case purely in relation to the
cross claim.
In Armed Forces of the Philippines Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals,[84] the Court had the occasion to state that where there are,
along with the parties to the compromise, other persons involved in the
litigation who have not taken part in concluding the compromise agreement
but are adversely affected or feel prejudiced thereby, should not be precluded
from invoking in the same proceedings an adequate relief therefor.[85]
Relevantly, in Philippine International Surety Co., Inc. v.
Gonzales,[86] the Court upheld the ruling of the trial court that, in a joint and
solidary obligation, the paying debtor may file a third-party complaint and/or a
cross-claim to enforce his right to seek contribution from his co-debtors.
Hence, the right of the remaining defendant(s) to seek reimbursement
in the above situation, if proper, is not affected by the compromise agreements
allegedly entered into by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., with some of the
defendant companies.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petitions for review
on certiorari in G.R. Nos. 125078, 126654, and
128398. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order dated May 20, 1996 of the
Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 37, in Civil Case No. 5617,
and the Order dated October 1, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City,
Branch 16, and its subsequent Order dated December 16, 1996 denying
reconsideration in Civil Case No. 24,251-96, and REMAND the records of this
case to the respective Regional Trial Courts of origin for further and
appropriate proceedings in line with the ruling herein that said courts have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the amended complaints in Civil Case
Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96.
The Court likewise GRANTS the motion filed by Del Monte to
withdraw its petition in G.R. No. 127856. In view of the previous grant of the
motion to withdraw the petition in G.R. No. 125598, both G.R. Nos. 127856
and 125598 are considered CLOSED AND TERMINATED.
 18. Araneta v. De Joya (57 SCRA 59)
G.R. No. L-25172 May 24, 1974
LUIS MA. ARANETA, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO R. DE JOYA, respondent.
Araneta, Mendoza & Papa for petitioner.
Jose F. Espinosa for respondent.
CASTRO, J.:p
Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 34277-R
ordering Luis Ma. Araneta (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner) to
indemnify Antonio R. de Joya (hereinafter referred to as the respondent) for
one-third of the sum of P5,043.20 which the latter was adjudged to pay the
Ace Advertising Agency, Inc., the plaintiff in the recovery suit below.
Sometime in November 1952 the respondent, then general manager of the
Ace Advertising, proposed to the board of directors1 that an employee, Ricardo
Taylor, be sent to the United States to take up special studies in television.
The board, however, failed to act on the proposal. Nevertheless, in September
1953 the respondent sent Taylor abroad. J. Antonio Araneta, a company
director, inquired about the trip and was assured by the respondent that
Taylor's expenses would be defrayed not by the company but by other parties.
This was thereafter confirmed by the respondent in a memorandum.
While abroad, from September 1, 1953 to March 15, 1954, Taylor continued
to receive his salaries. The items corresponding to his salaries appeared in
vouchers prepared upon the orders of, and approved by, the respondent and
were included in the semi-monthly payroll checks for the employees of the
corporation. The petitioner signed three of these checks on November 27,
December 15 and December 29, 1953. The others were signed by either the
respondent, or Vicente Araneta (company treasurer) who put up part of the bill
connected with Taylor's trip and also handed him letters for delivery in the
United States. The Ace Advertising disbursed P5,043.20, all told, on account
of Taylor's travel and studies.
On August 23, 1954 the Ace Advertising filed a complaint with the court of first
instance of Manila against the respondent for recovery of the total sum
disbursed to Taylor, alleging that the trip was made without its knowledge,
authority or ratification. The respondent, in his answer, denied the charge and
claimed that the trip was nonetheless ratified by the company's board of
directors, and that in any event under the by-laws he had the discretion, as
general manager, to authorize the trip which was for the company's benefit..
A 3rd-party complaint was also filed by the respondent against Vicente
Araneta, the petitioner and Ricardo Taylor. The respondent proved that
Vicente Araneta, as treasurer of the firm, signed a check representing the
company's share of the transportation expense of Taylor to the United States,
and that a series of payroll checks from September 15, 1953 to December 31,
1953, inclusive, which included the salaries of Taylor, was signed by Vicente
Araneta and the petitioner who is a vice-president of the company. Both
Aranetas disowned any personal liability, claiming that they signed the checks
in good faith as they were approved by the respondent..
On April 13, 1964 the trial court rendered judgment ordering the respondent to
pay the Ace Advertising "the sum of P5,043.20 with interest at the legal rate
from August 23, 1954 until full payment," and dismissing the 3rd-party
complaint.
The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which on August 2, 1965,
rendered a decision affirming the trial court's judgment in favor of the Ace
Advertising but reversing the dismissal of the 3rd-party complaint. The
appellate court found as a fact that Taylor's trip had been neither authorized
nor ratified by the company.
The appellate court's full statement of its categorical and unequivocal findings
of fact on the nature and extent of the participation of the petitioner as well as
Vicente Araneta is hereunder quoted:
The evidence not only is clear, but is even not disputed at all
by Vicente and Luis Araneta who neither of them took the
witness stand to refute appellant's evidence, that as
to Vicente it was to him that appellant first broached the
subject-matter of sending Taylor to America, that Vicente
Araneta evinced unusual interest, and went to the extent of
entrusting Taylor with letters for delivery to certain principals
of Gregorio Araneta, Inc. in the United States, and he even
signed the check for P105.20 to cover expenses for his tax
clearance, documentary stamps and passport fees, in
connection with the trip, on 8 September, 1953, and then on
5 October, 1953, still another check for P868.00 which was
 half the amount for his plane ticket; and as to Luis Araneta, it Teehankee, J., took no part.
not at all being disputed that when Taylor was already in
America, his salaries while abroad were paid on vouchers and
checks signed either by him or by Vicente, or by appellant
himself; because of all these, the conclusion is forced upon
this Court that it could not but have been but that both Vicente
and Luis were informed and gave their approval to Taylor's
trip, and to the payment of his trip expenses and salaries
during his absence, from corporate funds; if this was the case
as it was, there can be no question but that they two were also
privy to the unauthorized disbursement of the corporate
moneys jointly with the appellant; what had happened was in
truth and in fact a venture by them given their stamp of
approval; and as it was an unauthorized act of expenditure of
corporate funds, and it was these three without whose acts
the same could not have happened, the juridical situation was
a simple quasi-delict by them committed upon the corporation,
for which solidary liability should have been imposed upon all
in the first place, Art. 2194, New Civil Code; and only De Joya
having been sued and made liable by the corporation, it was
the right of the latter to ask that his two joint tortfeasors be
made to shoulder their proportional responsibility. (emphasis
supplied)

The basic legal issue is whether the petitioner is guilty of a quasi-delict as held
below.

It is our view, and we so hold, that the judgment of the Court of Appeals should
be upheld. The petitioner's assertion that he signed the questioned payroll
checks in good faith has not been substantiated, he in particular not having
testified or offered testimony to prove such claim. Upon the contrary, in spite
of his being a vice-president and director of the Ace Advertising, the petitioner
remained passive, throughout the period of Taylor's stay abroad, concerning
the unauthorized disbursements of corporate funds for the latter. This plus the
fact that he even approved thrice payroll checks for the payment of Taylor's
salary, demonstrate quite distinctly that the petitioner neglected to perform his
duties properly, to the damage of the firm of which he was an officer. The fact
that he was occupying a contractual position at the Ace Advertising is of no
moment. The existence of a contract between the parties, as has been
repeatedly held by this Court, constitutes no bar to the commission of a tort by
one against the other and the consequent recovery of damages.2

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, at

petitioner's cost.

Makalintal, C.J., Makasiar, Esguerra and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.