DKC Holdings v.

CA
G.R. No. 118248. April 5, 2000

On March 16, 1998, petitioner DKC Holdings Corporation (DKC) entered into a Contract of Lease
with Option to Buy with Encarnacion Bartolome, decedent herein, whereby petitioner was given the
option to lease or lease with purchase the subject land.

Encarnacion died. Thereafter, petitioner coursed its payment to private respondent Victor
Bartolome, being the sole heir of Encarnacion. Victor, however, refused to accept these payments.
On March 14, 1990, petitioner served upon Victor, via registered mail, notice that it was exercising
its option to lease the property, tendering the amount of P15,000.00 as rent. Again, Victor refused
to accept the tendered rental fee and to surrender possession of the property to petitioner. On April
23, 1990, petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against Victor and the
Register of Deeds

ISSUE: Whether or not the rights under a Contact of Lease with Option to Buy were transmissible.

YES. The general rule, therefore, is that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their
predecessors-in-interest except when the rights and obligations arising therefrom are not
transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation or (3) provision of law. The Court held that there is
neither contractual stipulation nor legal provision making the rights and obligations under the lease
contract intransmissible. More importantly, the nature of the rights and obligations therein are, by
their nature, transmissible.

In the case at bar, the subject matter of the contract is a lease, which is a property right. The death
of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a contract which involves a property right, and the
rights and obligations thereunder pass to the personal representatives of the deceased. Similarly,
nonperformance is not excused by the death of the party when the other party has a property
interest in the subject matter of the contract.

Therefore, Victor is bound by the subject Contract of Lease with Option to Buy.

RABADILLA vs. CA

June 29, 2000

FACTS:

In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a
devisee of parcel of land. The Codicil provides that Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he
dies, every year to give Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and
(25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies.

Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died. Private respondent brought a complaint, to enforce the provisions
of subject Codicil.

ISSUE:

WON the obligations of Jorge Rabadilla under the Codicil are inherited by his heirs.
HELD:

Under Article 776 of the NCC, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of
a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by
virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And
since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent;
corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise
transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.

ELEUTERIO, ANATALIA, JOSELITO, ROGELIO, EVANGELINE, NOEL, GUILLERMO,

LORENZO, DOMINGO, AMADO, AND VICTORIA, ALL SURNAMED LOPEZ V THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 127827; MARCH 5, 2003

FACTS: Fermin Lopez filed a homestead application for a land situated in Makatubong, Barrio De
la Paz, Antipolo, Rizal which he occupied, possessed, and declared for taxation purposes.
But his application was not acted upon until his death in 1934. When he died, he was
survived by the following: (1) Hermogenes Lopez, now deceased, leaving his children,
respondents herein; (2) petitioner Eleuterio Lopez; (3) Juan Lopez, now deceased, leaving
his children as his heirs and (4) Nazario, now deceased, leaving his wife, petitioner
Anatalia, and children, herein petitioners heirs.

Following Fermin’s death, Hermogenes, in 1936, inquired before the Bureau of Lands and
was informed that the application remained unacted upon and suggested that he file a
new application. Hermogenes filed a homestead application in his own name and after
ascertaining that the land was free from claim of any private person, the Bureau approved
his application and there was issuance of the corresponding certificate of title in his name.

Unaware that he has been awarded a homestead patent, Hermogenes executed on

February 11, 1956 an Extra-judicial Partition of the disputed land with his brothers -
petitioner Eleuterio, Juan, and Nazario. On September 12, 1958, however, the three
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of their share in the land in favor of Hermogenes.

The succeeding year, Hermogenes applied with the Land Registration Commission for the
registration of the property in his name. To his surprise, he found that the land has been
registered in the names of Fernando Gorospe, Salvador de Tagle, Rosario de Tagle,
Beatriz de Suzuarrequi and Eduardo Santos, who collectively opposed his application. In
December 1959, Hermogenes filed a complaint for the annulment of the free patent and
title against these persons. Some of the defendants moved for its dismissal alleging that
Hermogenes was not a real party in interest since he previously sold his right to the land
to one Ambrocio Aguilar on July 31, 1959. The case was dismissed.

Aguilar instituted on November 18, 1976 a new civil action and was declared by lower
court as the absolute owner of the land. This decision was affirmed in toto by the Court
of Appeals. In G.R. No. 90380, we affirmed the decision of the appellate court in a decision
promulgated on September 13, 1990.

After the declaration that Aguilar was the absolute owner, and while the case was on
appeal, respondent Lopezes, as heirs of Hermogenes, filed a complaint against Aguilar
before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal for the cancellation of the deed of sale executed by
Hermogenes in favor of Aguilar dated July 31, 1959 and/or reconveyance. The lower court
 declared the deed of absolute sale null and void ab initio and the respondents (heirs of
Hermogenes) as the true and absolute owner of the disputed land. Aguilar sought relief
with the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.

On May 31, 1985, petitioners Eleuterio, Anatalia, Joselito, Rogelio, Evangeline and Noel,
all heirs of Nazario Lopez, along with Guillermo, Lorenzo, Domingo, Amado, and Victoria,
all heirs of Juan Lopez, instituted the present action against the respondents before the
RTC. They prayed, among others, that they be declared co-owners of the property subject
matter hereof and that private respondents be ordered to reconvey to them 3/5 thereof
as its co-owners, or in the alternative, to pay its value.

On June 26, 1985, respondents filed their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim alleging
that they are the absolute owners of the contested land on the basis of the homestead
grant to their predecessor-in-interest, Hermogenes.

On June 25, 1987, the court a quo rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners ordering
the division of the disputed lot in equal portions among the four children of Fermin or
their heirs.

While the case was on trial, complainants therein Guillermo, Lorenzo, Domingo, Amado
and Victoria, all children of Juan Lopez, entered into a compromise agreement with the
respondent Lopezes, heirs of Hermogenes, recognizing the latter’s ownership and
possession of the property subject of the case. They confirmed the sale made by their
father Juan to Hermogenes. On July 20, 1992, the court a quo rendered a partial decision
approving the compromise agreement.

ISSUE: Is their co-ownership between the parties rendering partition proper?

RULING: No. At the time Hermogenes applied for a homestead grant over the disputed property,
it was still part of alienable public land. As he applied for it in his own name, his application
inures to his sole benefit. After complying with the cultivation and residency requirements,
he became a grantee of a homestead patent over it, thereby making him its absolute and
exclusive owner.

Prescinding from the lack of co-ownership, petitioners’ argument that they are entitled to
have the land partition must be rejected. Partition, in general, is the separation, division
and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. The
purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership. It seeks a severance of the
individual interests of each co-owner, vesting in each a sole estate in specific property
and giving to each one a right to enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from
the other. Not being co-owners of the disputed lot, petitioners cannot demand its
partition. They do not have any interest or share in the property upon which they can
base their demand to have it divided.

Ramos v Ramos
 Matias v. Salud
L-10751, 23 June 1958

FACTS:

The CFI denied probate of the will of Gabina Raquel. It must be noted that Gabina Raquel was
suffering from herpes zoster that afflicted the right arm and shoulder of the testatrix, which made
writing difficult and a painful act. Thus, upon the insistence of the attorney, Gabina attempted to
sign, but since it was so painful she just managed to thumbmarked the foot of the document and
the left margin at each page. The parties opposing the probate of the will contended that the will
was void due to the irregularities in the execution thereof.

One of the points raised by the oppositors was that the finger mark can not be regarded as the
decedent’s valid signature as it does not show distinct identifying ridgelines. And since the finger
mark was an invalid signature, there must appear in the attestation clause that another person
wrote the testator’s name at his request.

ISSUE:

W/N the will was valid.

HELD:

YES. As to the clarity of the ridge impressions, it is so dependent on aleatory requirements as to

require dexterity that can be expected of very few persons; testators should not be required to
possess the skill of trained officers.

And as to the validity of the thumbprints as signature, the SC held that it has been held in a long
line of cases that a thumbprint is always a valid and sufficient signature for the purpose of complying
with the requirement of the article.

Furthermore, the validity of thumbprints should not be limited in cases of illness or infirmity. A
thumbprint is considered as a valid and sufficient signature in complying with the requirements of
the article.

In the Matter of the will of ANTERO MERCADO, deceased. ROSARIO GARCIA, petitioner,
vs.
JULIANA LACUESTA, ET AL., respondents
90 Phil 489
November 29, 1951

Facts: Antero Mercado left a will dated January 3, 1943. The will is written in the Ilocano dialect
which is spoken and understood by the testator. The will also contained an attestation clause which
is signed by three witnesses. The attestation clause states:
“We, the undersigned, by these presents to declare that the foregoing testament of Antero Mercado
was signed by himself and also by us below his name and of this attestation clause and that of the
left margin of the three pages thereof. Page three the continuation of this attestation clause; this
will is written in Ilocano dialect which is spoken and understood by the testator, and it bears the
corresponding number in letter which compose of three pages and all them were signed in the
presence of the testator and witnesses, and the witnesses in the presence of the testator and all
and each and every one of us witnesses.”

The will appears to have been signed by Atty. Florentino Javier who wrote the name of Antero
Mercado, followed below by "A ruego del testador" and the name of Florentino Javier. Antero
Mercado is alleged also to have written a cross immediately after his name.

Issue: Whether or not the attestation clause in the will is valid.

Ruling: No. The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero Mercado caused
Atty. Florentino Javier to write the testator's name under his express direction, as required by section
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. When the testator expressly caused another to sign the former’s
name, this fact must be recited in the attestation clause. Otherwise, the will is fatally defective.

Moreover, the cross appearing on the will is not the usual signature of Antero Mercado nor is it even
one of the ways by which he signed his name. After mature reflection, the Court is not prepared to
liken the mere sign of the cross to a thumbmark, and the reason is obvious. The cross cannot and
does not have the trustworthiness of a thumbmark. Thus, the cross cannot be considered a valid
signature.

Balonan vs. Abellana GR No. L-15153, August 31, 1960

Facts: A 2-page Will and Testament by the testatrix Anacleta Abellana was sought to be probated
at rhe CFI of Zamboanga City. ON the second page, which is the last page of the Will, on the left
margin appears the signature of Juan Bello under whose name appears handwritten the following
phrase 'Por la Testadora Anacleta Abellana' (for the tetattrix Anacleta Abellana). (The CFI
admitted the probate of the will. Hence, this appeal, the petitioner contending that the signature
of Juan A. Abello on top of the phrase ‘por la tetadora Anacleta Abellana did not comply with the
requirements of the law prescribing the manner in which it ill be executed.)
ISSUE: Does the signature of Dr. Juan A. Abello above the typewritten statement "Por la
Testadora Anacleta Abellana . . ., Ciudad de Zamboanga," comply with the requirements of the
law prescribing the manner in which a will shall be executed?
HELD: The present law, Article 805 of the Civil Code, in part provides as follows:
"Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator
himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his
express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of one another." (Italics supplied.)
In the case of Barut vs. Cabacungan, 21 Phil., 461, we held that the important thing is that it
clearly appears that the name of the testatrix was signed at her express direction; it is
unimportant whether the person who writes the name of the testatrix signs his own or not. Cases
of the same import are as follows: (Ex Parte Juan Ondevilla, 13 Phil., 479, Caluya vs. Domingo, 27
Phil., 330; Garcia vs. Lacuesta, 90 Phil., 489).
In the case at bar the name of the testatrix, Anacleta Abellana, does not appear written under the
will by said Abellana herself, or by Dr. Juan Abello. There is, therefore, a failure to comply with
the express requirement in the law that the testator must himself sign the will, or that his name
be affixed thereto by Some other person in his presence and by his express direction.
It appearing that the above provision of the law has not been complied with, we are constrained
to declare that the said will of the deceased Anacleta Abellana may not be admitted to probate.

Beatriz Nera vs Narcisa Rimando

8 Phil 450 – Succession – What “In the presence of each other” means
When a certain will was being signed, it was alleged that the testator and some subscribing
witnesses were in the inner room while the other subscribing witnesses were in the outer room.
What separates the inner room from the outer room was a curtain. The trial court ignored this fact
in its determination of the case as it ruled that the determination of this specific fact will not affect
the outcome of the case.
ISSUE: What is the true test of the testator’s or the witness’ presence in the signing of a will?
HELD: The Supreme Court emphasized that the true test of presence of the testator and the
witnesses in the execution of a will is not whether they actually saw each other sign, but whether
they might have seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so, considering their mental and
physical condition and position with relation to each other at the moment of inscription of each
signature.
The position of the parties with relation to each other at the moment of the subscription of each
signature, must be such that they may see each other sign if they choose to do so.
The Supreme Court, in this case, determined that all the parties were in the same small room when
each other signed. Hence, they were in each other’s presence (though the facts of the case didn’t
elaborate – the SC just ruled so). The SC ruled that if some of the witnesses were really in the outer
room (a fact which was not established according to the SC) separated by a curtain, then the will is
invalid, the attaching of those signatures under circumstances not being done “in the presence” of
the witness in the outer room.

Icasiano v. Icasiano
11 SCRA 422

FACTS:

Celso Icasiano filed a petition for the allowance and admission to probate of the alleged will of
Josefa Villacorte, and for his appointment as executor thereof. Natividad and Enrique Icasiano, a
daughter and son of the testatrix, filed their opposition thereto. During the course of the trial, on
19 March 1959, Celso, started to present his evidence. But later, on 1 June 1959, he then filed an
amended and supplemental petition, alleging that the decedent had left a will executed in duplicate
and with all the legal requirements, and that he was submitting the duplicate to the court, which he
found only on 26 May 1959. Natividad and Enrique filed their opposition, but the will and its duplicate
was admitted to probate by the trial court. Hence, this appeal by the oppositors.

Oppositors-appellants (Natividad and Enrique) in turn introduced expert testimony to the effect that
the signatures of the testatrix in the duplicate are not genuine, nor were they written or affixed on
the same occasion as the original, and further averthat granting that the documents were genuine,
they were executed through mistake and with undue influence and pressure because the testatrix
was deceived into adopting as her last will and testament the wishes of those who will stand to
benefit from the provisions of the will, as may be inferred from the facts and circumstances
surrounding the execution of the will and the provisions and dispositions thereof, whereby
proponents- appellees stand to profit from properties held by them as attorneys- in-fact of the
deceased and not enumerated or mentioned therein, while oppositors-appellants are enjoined not
to look for other properties not mentioned in the will, and not to oppose the probate of it, on penalty
of forfeiting their share in the portion of free disposal.

ISSUE:

Was the trial court correct in admitting the will and its duplicate to probate given the allegations of
forgery of the testator’s signature, or that the will was executed under circumstances constituting
fraud and undue influence and pressure?

(Not raised by the appellants in the case but discussed by the Court and in Sir’s book) Is the failure
of one of the witnesses to sign a page of the will fatal to its validity?

HELD:

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that both the will and its duplicate are valid in all
respects.

On the allegations of forgery, fraud and undue influence:

The Court is satisfied that all the requisites for the validity of a will have been complied with. The
opinion of a handwriting expert trying to prove forgery of the testatrix’s signature failed to convince
the Court, not only because it is directly contradicted by another expert but principally because of
the paucity of the standards used by him (only three other signatures), considering the advanced
age of the testatrix, the evident variability of her signature, and the effect of writing fatigue.

Similarly, the alleged slight variance in blueness of the ink in the admitted and questioned signatures
does not appear reliable, considering that standard and challenged writings were affixed to different
kinds of paper, with different surfaces and reflecting power. On the whole, the testimony of the
oppositor’s expert is insufficient to overcome that of the notary and the two instrumental witnesses
as to the will’s execution, which were presented by Celso during the trial.

Nor is there adequate evidence of fraud or undue influence. The fact that some heirs are more
favored than others is proof of neither. Diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a
testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate. The testamentary disposition that
the heirs should not inquire into other property and that they should respect the distribution made
in the will, under penalty of forfeiture of their shares in the free part, do not suffice to prove fraud
or undue influence. They appear motivated by the desire to prevent prolonged litigation which, as
shown by ordinary experience, often results in a sizeable portion of the estate being diverted into
the hands of non- heirs and speculators. Whether these clauses are valid or not is a matter to be
litigated on another occasion. It is also well to note that fraud and undue influence are mutually
repugnant and exclude each other; their joining as grounds for opposing probate shows absence of
definite evidence against the validity of the will.

On the failure of a witness to sign a page in the original, but signed all pages in the duplicate:

The records show that the original of the will consists of five pages, and while signed at the end
and in every page, it does not contain the signature of one of the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose V.
Natividad, on page 3 thereof; but the duplicate copy attached to the amended and supplemental
petition is signed by the testatrix and her three attesting witnesses in each and every page.
Witness Atty. Natividad, who testified on his failure to sign page 3 of the original, admits that he
may have lifted two pages instead of one when he signed the same, but affirmed that page 3 was
signed in his presence.

The failure Atty. Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure oversight is shown by
his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set of
signatures in every page. The text of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment before the
Notary Public likewise evidence that no one was aware of the defect at the time. Therefore, Atty.
Natividad’s failure to sign page 3 of the original through mere inadvertence does not affect the will’s
validity.

Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only the fact that the testatrix and two other
witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of
the notary public before whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The
law should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the
inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she had no control, where the purpose of the
law to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages is sufficiently attained, no
intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests to the full observance
of the statutory requisites.

This would not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the
statutory requirements, where the purposes of the law are otherwise satisfied. Thus, despite the
literal tenor of the law, this Court has held that a testament, with the only page signed at its foot
by testator and witnesses, but not in the left margin, could nevertheless be probated (Abangan vs.
Abangan, 41 Phil. 476); and that despite the requirement for the correlative lettering of the pages
of a will, the failure to mark the first page either by letters or numbers is not a fatal defect (Lopez
vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429). These precedents exemplify the Court’s policy to require satisfaction of the
legal requirements in order to guard against fraud and bad faith but without undue or unnecessary
curtailment of the testamentary privilege.

The appellants also argue that since the original of the will is in existence and available, the duplicate
is not entitled to probate. Since they opposed probate of the original because it lacked one signature
in its third page, it is easily discerned that oppositors-appellants run here into a dilemma: if the
original is defective and invalid, then in law there is no other will but the duly signed carbon
duplicate, and the same is probatable. If the original is valid and can be probated, then the objection
to the signed duplicate need not be considered, being superfluous and irrelevant. At any rate, said
duplicate serves to prove that the omission of one signature in the third page of the original
testament was inadvertent and not intentional.

Cargo vs cargo

Cruz v. Judge Villasor, G.R. No. L-32213, November 26, 1973.

14

AUG

[ESGUERRA, J.]
FACTS

The probate of the last will and testament of the late Valente Z. Cruz was opposed by petitioner
Agapita on the ground of fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and undue influence, and that it was not
executed in accordance with law. Of the three instrumental witnesses thereto, namely Deogracias
T. Jamaloas Jr., Dr. Francisco Pañares and Atty. Angel H. Teves, Jr., one of them, the last named,
is at the same time the Notary Public before whom the will was supposed to have been
acknowledged.

ISSUE

Whether or not the probate of a will is valid if one of the three instrumental witnessed is the notary
public to whom the will was acknowledged.

RULING

NO. To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one the attesting and acknowledging
witnesses, would have the effect of having only two attesting witnesses to the will which would be
in contravention of the provisions of Article 80 be requiring at least three credible witnesses to act
as such and of Article 806 which requires that the testator and the required number of witnesses
must appear before the notary public to acknowledge the will. The result would be, as has been
said, that only two witnesses appeared before the notary public for or that purpose. In the
circumstances, the law would not be duly in observed.

Gabucan vs Manta

A notarial will must have a documentary stamp

Without a documentary stamp, it is not admissible in evidence in a probate proceeding
At any rate, the documentary stamp may be affixed at the time the taxable document is presented
in evidence, not necessarily at the execution of the will
95 SCRA 751 – Remedial Law – Special Proceedings – Probate of Will – Documentary Stamp on
Notarial Will

In 1977, Judge Luis Manta dismissed a probate proceeding because the notarial will presented in
the said case lacked a documentary stamp. Judge Manta ruled that the lack of of documentary
stamp made the will inadmissible in evidence and as such there is no will and testament to
probate.
Jose Gabucan, a party in the said case, thereafter affixed the required documentary stamp and
then moved for reconsideration but the judge refused to reconsider his ruling. Hence, Gabucan
filed a petition for mandamus to compel the judge to admit the notarial will.

ISSUE: Whether or not a notarial will presented in court which originally has no documentary
stamp may still be admitted after the required documentary stamp was affixed.

HELD: Yes. It is true that the law (the [old] Tax Code – now Sec. 201 of R.A. 8424) requires a
notarial will to have a documentary stamp:

SEC. 238. Effect of failure to stamp taxable document. — An instrument, document, or paper
which is required by law to be stamped and which has been signed, issued, accepted, or
transferred without being duly stamped, shall not be recorded, nor shall it or any copy thereof or
any record of transfer of the same be admitted or used in evidence in any court until the requisite
stamp or stamps shall have been affixed thereto and cancelled. xxx

Thus, a notarial will without a documentary stamp may not be admitted in evidence. However,
once the said documentary stamp is affixed, then the deficiency is cured and it can now be
admitted in evidence. The documentary stamp may be affixed at the time the taxable document is
presented in evidence.

Javellana v. Ledesma Digest

Javellana vs. Ledesma
G.R. No. L-7179

Facts:
1. The CFI of Iloilo admitted to probate a will and codicil executed by the deceased Apolinaria
Ledesma in July 1953. This testament was deemed executed on May 1950 and May 1952. The
contestant was the sister and nearest surviving relative of the deceased. She appealed from this
decision alleging that the will were not executed in accordance with law.

2. The testament was executed at the house of the testatrix. One the other hand, the codicil was
executed after the enactment of the New Civil Code (NCC), and therefore had to be acknowledged
before a notary public. Now, the contestant, who happens to be one of the instrumental witnesses
asserted that after the codicil was signed and attested at the San Pablo hospital, that Gimotea
(the notary) signed and sealed it on the same occasion. Gimotea, however, said that he did not do
so, and that the act of signing and sealing was done afterwards.
2. One of the allegations was that the certificate of acknowledgement to the codicil was signed
somewhere else or in the office of the notary. The ix and the witnesses at the hospital, was signed
and sealed by the notary only when he brought it in his office.

Issue: Whether or not the signing and sealing of the will or codicil in the absence of the testator
and witnesses affects the validity of the will

RULING: NO. Unlike in the Old Civil Code of 1899, the NCC does not require that the signing of
the testator, the witnesses and the notary be accomplished in one single act. All that is required is
that every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and witnesses. The
subsequent signing and sealing is not part of the acknowledgement itself nor of the testamentary
act. Their separate execution out of the presence of the testator and the witnesses cannot be a
violation of the rule that testaments should be completed without interruption.

Taboada vs rosal
118 SCRA 195 – Succession – Substantial Compliance
Dorotea Perez left a will. The will has two pages. On the first page, which contains the entire
testamentary dispositions, were the signatures of the three instrumental witnesses and that of
Dorotea Perez. The signatures of the three instrumental witnesses were on the left margin while
Perez’ signature was on the bottom. On the second page, which contains the attestation clause and
the acknowledgement, were the signatures of the three attesting witnesses and that of Dorotea
Perez. The attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in the will. Taboada petitioned
for the admission to probate of the said will. The judge who handled the petition was Judge Ramon
Pamatian. He denied the petition. Taboada filed a motion for reconsideration but Pamatian was not
able to act on it because he was transferred to another jurisdiction. The case was inherited by Judge
Rosal who also denied the MFR on the grounds that a) that the testator and the instrumental
witnesses did not all sign on the left margin of the page as prescribed by law; that the testator and
the witnesses should have placed their signature in the same place b) that the attestation clause
failed to state the number of pages used in writing the will – this, according to Judge Rosal violated
the requirement that the attestation clause shall state the number of pages or sheets upon which
the will is written, which requirement has been held to be mandatory as an effective safeguard
against the possibility of interpolation or omission of some of the pages of the will to the prejudice
of the heirs to whom the property is intended to be bequeathed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will should be admitted to probate.
HELD: Yes. The law must be interpreted liberally.
Further, there is substantial compliance with the law. It would be absurd that the legislature
intended to place so heavy an import on the space or particular location where the signatures are
to be found as long as this space or particular location wherein the signatures are found is consistent
with good faith.
The failure to include in the attestation clause of the number of pages used in writing the will would
have been a fatal defect. But then again, the matter should be approached liberally. There were
only two pages in the will left by Perez. The first page contains the entirety of the testamentary
dispositions and signed by the testatrix at the end or at the bottom while the instrumental witnesses
signed at the left margin. The other page which is marked as “Pagina dos” comprises the attestation
clause and the acknowledgment. Further, the acknowledgment itself states that “This Last Will and
Testament consists of two pages including this page.”
 Garcia v. Vasquez
32 SCRA 489

FACTS:

This is a petition for appeal from the CFI of Manila admitting to probate the will of Gliceria Avelino del
Rosario (“Gliceria”) executed in 1960. Likewise, this is also an appeal to remove the current
administrator, Consuelo Gonzales-Precilla( “Consuelo”) as special administratrix of the estate on the
ground of Consuelopossesses interest adverse to the estate and to order the RD of Manila to
annotate on the registered lands a notice of Lis Pendens.
When Gliceria died she had no descendants, ascendants, bros or sisses and 90 yrs old. After which,
her niece, Consuelo petitioned the court to be the administratrix of the properties. The court
approved this because Consuelo has been was already managing the properties of the deceased
during her lifetime. What the respondents allege is that in the last years of the
deceased, Consuelo sought the transfer of certain parcels of land valued at 300k for a sale price of
30k to her husband Alfonso through fraud and intimidation. In addition, the oppositors
presented evidence that Consuelo asked the court to issue new Certificates of Titles to certain
parcels of land for the purpose of preparing the inventory to be used in the probate. Also shown
was that NEW TCTs were issued by the RD for certain lands of the deceased after Consuelo asked
for the old TCTs.
At the end of the probate proceedings, the court ruled that Counsuelo should be made the
administrator, and that the will was duly executed because of these reasons: NO EVIDENCE HAS
BEEN PRESENTED to establish that the deceased was not of sound mind, that eventough the
allegations state that the deceased prepared another will in 1956 (12pages), the latter is not
prevented from executing another will in 1960 (1page), and that inconsistencies in the testimonies
of the witnesses prove their truthfulness.

ISSUE:

Was the will in 1960 (1 page) duly/properly executed?

HELD:

NO. Provision of Article 808 mandatory. Therefore, For all intents and purposes of the rules on
probate, the testatrix was like a blind testator, and the due execution of her will would have required
observance of Article 808. The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator
if he is blind or incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate) , is to make the
provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with
his wishes. Likewise, the 1970 will was done in Tagalog which the deceased is not well versed but
in Spanish. This creates doubt as to the due execution of the will and as well as the typographical
errors contain therein which show the haste in preparing the 1 page will as compared to the 12
page will created in 1956 written in Spanish. ALSO, as to the blindness, there was proof given by
the testimony of the doctor that the deceased could not read at near distances because of cataracts.
(Testatrix’s vision was mainly for viewing distant objects and not for reading print.) Since there is
no proof that it was read to the deceased twice, the will was NOT duly executed.
ALSO, Consuelo should be removed as administrator because she is not expected to sue her own
husband to reconvey the lands to the estate alleged to have been transferred by the deceased to
her own husband.
The notice of lis pendens is also not proper where the issue is not an action in rem, affecting real
property or the title thereto.
 Caneda v. CA
222 SCRA 781

FACTS:

On December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children and already in the twilight
years of his life, executed a last will and testament at his residence before 3 witnesses.

He was assisted by his lawyer, Atty. Emilio Lumontad.

In the will, it was declared that the testator was leaving by way of legacies and devises his real and
personal properties to several people all of whom do not appear to be related to the testator.

4 months later, Mateo Caballero himself filed a case seeking the probate of his last will and
testament, but numerous postponements pushed back the initial hearing of the probate court
regarding the will.

On May 29, 1980, the testator passed away before his petition could finally be heard by the probate
court.

Thereafter one of the legatees, Benoni Cabrera, sought his appointment as special administrator of
the testator’s estate.

Thereafter, the petitioners, claiming to be nephews and nieces of the testator, instituted a second
petition for intestate proceedings. They also opposed the probate of the testator’s will and the
appointment of a special administrator for his estate.

Benoni Cabrera died and was replaced by William Cabrera as special administrator and gave an
order that the testate proceedings for the probate of the will had to be heard and resolved first.

In the course of the proceedings, petitioners opposed to the allowance of the testator’s will on the
ground that on the alleged date of its execution, the testator was already in poor state of health
such that he could not have possibly executed the same. Also the genuineness of the signature of
the testator is in doubt.

On the other hand, one of the attesting witnesses and the notary public testified that the testator
executed the will in question in their presence while he was of sound and disposing mind and that
the testator was in good health and was not unduly influenced in any way in the execution of his
will.

Probate court then rendered a decision declaring the will in question as the last will and testament
of the late Mateo Caballero.

CA affirmed the probate court’s decision stating that it substantially complies with Article 805. Hence
this appeal.

ISSUE:

W/N the attestation clause in the will of the testator is fatally defective or can be cured under the
art. 809.

HELD:
No. It does not comply with the provisions of the law.

Ordinary or attested wills are governed by Arts. 804 to 809. The will must be acknowledged before
a notary public by the testator and the attesting witnesses. The attestation clause need not be
written in a language known to the testator or even to the attesting witnesses.

It is a separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the conduct of execution and once
signed by the witnesses it gives affirmation to the fact that compliance with the essential formalities
required by law has been observed.

The attestation clause, therefore, provides strong legal guaranties for the due execution of a will
and to insure the authenticity thereof.

It is contended by petitioners that the attestation clause in the will failed to specifically state the
fact that the attesting witnesses witnessed the testator sign the will and all its pages in their
presence and that they, the witnesses, likewise signed the will and every page thereof in the
presence of the testator and of each other. And the Court agrees.

The attestation clause does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said witnesses
subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.

The phrase, “and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the space provided for his
signature and on the left hand margin,” obviously refers to the testator and not the instrumental
witnesses as it is immediately preceded by the words” as his last will and testament.”

Clearly lacking is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the
presence of the testator and of one another. That the absence of the statement required by law is
a fatal defect or imperfection which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is
here sought to be probated.

Also, Art. 809 does not apply to the present case because the attestation clause totally omits the
fact that the attesting witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the
testator and of each other. The defect in this case is not only with respect to the form or the
language of the attestation clause. The defects must be remedied by intrinsic evidence supplied by
the will itself which is clearly lacking in this case.

Therefore, the probate of the will is set aside and the case for the intestate proceedings shall be
revived.

Article 809 cannot be used to cure the defects of the will when it does not pertain to the form or
language of the will. This is because there is not substantial compliance with Article 805.