SECOND DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996.]

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERNANDO

C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; MARRIAGES; DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH;

NECESSARY IN ORDER TO CONTRACT A SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE. — There is nothing ambiguous or
difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely
incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous
marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent
provisions of law. In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his
first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Peñaranda. Whether
wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit
submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage.
Under Article 35 of the Family Code, "The following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous
. . . marriages not falling under Article 41."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; INSTANCES WHEN A. MARRIAGE CAN BE HELD OUTSIDE OF THE JUDGE'S
CHAMBERS OR COURTROOM. — Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for
his having solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's
jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom
only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon
request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del
Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the
respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDGES MAY SOLEMNIZE A MARRIAGE ONLY WITHIN HIS COURT'S
JURISDICTION. — More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the
solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing
officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the
judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the
marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding
provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage. A priest who is commissioned and allowed by
his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by
his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize
marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are
appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge
solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down
in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.
4. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; IGNORANCE OF ELEMENTARY PROVISIONS OF
THE LAW; CONSTITUTES GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW. — The Court finds respondent to have acted in
gross ignorance of the law. The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and
uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to lack of comprehension of
the law. The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are
sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying
the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant case. It is
not too much to expect them to know and apply the law intelligently. Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky
foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law. While magistrates may at
times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of
elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.

DECISION

ROMERO, J p:

The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G.
Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial
Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and
ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and
Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma
G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction
in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the
respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the
municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte.
In his letter-comment to the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers that the office and
name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly
concerned with his actuations both as judge and as a private person. The same person had earlier filed Administrative
Matter No. 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter
No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized
the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he
merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr.
Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. 1 With respect to the second charge, he
maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph
1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary
within the court's jurisdiction;" and that Article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted were considered
sufficient for a resolution of the case. 2
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have not been sufficiently
proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and respondent judge's answer thereto will suffice and
can be objectively assessed by themselves to prove the latter's malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states that
Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony was solemnized by respondent
judge. He presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and
sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar. 3 The affidavit was not
issued by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before him. In their affidavit,
the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Peñaranda in September
1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Peñaranda left the conjugal dwelling
in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to
the presumption that she is already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida
Peñaranda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage ceremony. We do not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
"A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under
the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph,
the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance
of the absent spouse." (Italics added.)
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple.
Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding
for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory
requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where
it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead,
in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first
wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Peñaranda. Whether wittingly,
or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by
the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage.
Under Article 35 of the Family Code, "The following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous
. . . marriages not falling under Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's jurisdiction, covered
by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:
"Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
. . . (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open
court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul,
as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of
death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties
request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a
house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect."
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justifications for his having solemnized the
marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted
provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances:
(1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in
writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of
death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by
only one party, Gemma del Rosario. 4
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the solemnizing
judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under
Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's
jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not
alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance
herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so
only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court
has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites
of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings
only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a
resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the
marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. 5
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not
clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and
the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a
lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal principles
applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that
respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are
sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying
the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant case. 6 It
is not too much to expect them to know and apply the law intelligently. 7 Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a
shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law. While magistrate may
at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of
elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there being a
subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-month suspension
and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Considering that one
of the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary
authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect
in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a
period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be deat with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Navarro v. Domagtoy, A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088, [July 19, 1996], 328 PHIL 435-445)
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 187462. June 1, 2016.]

RAQUEL G. KHO, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and VERONICA

B. KHO, respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J p:
Challenged in the present petition for review on certiorari are the Decision 1 and Resolution 2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu City dated March 30, 2006 and January 14, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No.
69218. The assailed CA Decision reversed and set aside the Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court(RTC) of
Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, in Civil Case No. 464, which ruled in petitioner's favor in an action he filed
for declaration of nullity of his marriage with private respondent, while the CA Resolution denied petitioners'
motion for reconsideration.
The present petition arose from a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed by herein petitioner
with the RTC of Oras, Eastern Samar. Pertinent portions of the Petition allege as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
3. Sometime in the afternoon of May 31, 1972, petitioner's parents summoned one
Eusebio Colongon, now deceased, then clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer, instructing
said clerk to arrange and prepare whatever necessary papers were required for the intended
marriage between petitioner and respondent supposedly to take place at around midnight of
June 1, 1972 so as to exclude the public from witnessing the marriage ceremony;
4. Petitioner and Respondent thereafter exchanged marital vows in a marriage
ceremony which actually took place at around 3:00 o'clock before dawn of June 1, 1972, on
account that there was a public dance held in the town plaza which is just situated adjacent to
the church whereas the venue of the wedding, and the dance only finished at around 2:00 o'clock
of same early morning of June 1, 1972;
5. Petitioner has never gone to the office of the Local Civil Registrar to apply for
marriage license and had not seen much less signed any papers or documents in connection
with the procurement of a marriage license;
6. Considering the shortness of period from the time the aforenamed clerk of the
treasurer's office was told to obtain the pertinent papers in the afternoon of May 31, 1972 so
required for the purpose of the forthcoming marriage up to the moment the actual marriage was
celebrated before dawn of June 1, 1972, no marriage license therefore could have been validly
issued, thereby rendering the marriage solemnized on even date null and void for want of the
most essential requisite;
7. For all intents and purposes, thus, Petitioner's and Respondent's marriage
aforestated was solemnized sans the required marriage license, hence, null and void from the
beginning and neither was it performed under circumstances exempting the requirement of such
marriage license;
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable
Court that after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered:
 1. Declaring the contract of marriage between petitioner and respondent held on June
1, 1972, at Arteche, Eastern Samar, null and void ab initioand of no legal effect;
xxx xxx xxx 4
Among the pieces of evidence presented by petitioner is a Certification 5 issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar which attested to the fact that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar has
neither record nor copy of a marriage license issued to petitioner and respondent with respect to their marriage
celebrated on June 1, 1972.
Respondent filed her Answer 6 praying that the petition be outrightly dismissed for lack of cause of
action because there is no evidence to prove petitioner's allegation that their marriage was celebrated without the
requisite marriage license and that, on the contrary, both petitioner and respondent personally appeared before the
local civil registrar and secured a marriage license which they presented before their marriage was solemnized.
Upon petitioner's request, the venue of the action was subsequently transferred to the RTC of Borongan,
Eastern Samar, Branch 2, where the parties submitted their respective pleadings as well as affidavits of witnesses.
On September 25, 2000, the RTC rendered its Decision granting the petition. The dispositive portion of
the said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby declares the marriage
contracted between Raquel G. Kho and Veronica Borata on June 1, 1972 null and void ab initio,
pursuant to Article 80 of the Civil Code and Articles 4 and 5 of the Family Code. The foregoing
is without prejudice to the application of Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche,
Eastern Samar for proper registration of this decree of nullity of marriage.
SO ORDERED. 7
The RTC found that petitioner's evidence sufficiently established the absence of the requisite marriage
license when the marriage between petitioner and respondent was celebrated. As such, the RTC ruled that based
on Articles 53 (4), 58 and 80 (3) of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the absence of the said marriage license
rendered the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.
Respondent then filed an appeal with the CA in Cebu City. On March 30, 2006, the CA promulgated its
assailed Decision, disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated 25 September 2000 of
Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar, isREVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The marriage between the petitioner-appellee Raquel Kho and Veronica Kho is
declared valid and subsisting for all intents and purposes.
SO ORDERED. 8
The CA held that since a marriage was, in fact, solemnized between the contending parties, there is a
presumption that a marriage license was issued for that purpose and that petitioner failed to overcome such
presumption. The CA also ruled that the absence of any indication in the marriage certificate that a marriage
license was issued is a mere defect in the formal requisites of the law which does not invalidate the parties'
marriage.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 9 but the CA denied it in its Resolution data January 14,
2009.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
ASCRIBING A SO-CALLED "ETHICAL DIMENSION" TO PETITIONER'S CAUSE,
ALLUDING TO AN ALLEGED LIAISON WITH ANOTHER WOMAN AS A FACTOR IN
REVERSING THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH VOIDED HIS
MARRIAGE IN QUESTION WITH RESPONDENT;
 2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
APPRECIATING AGAINST PETITIONER THE FACT THAT DESPITE THE LAPSE OF
25 YEARS HE DID NOTHING TO ATTACK, EVEN COLLATERALLY, HIS
APPARENTLY VOID MARRIAGE WITH RESPONDENT;
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
ALTOGETHER DISREGARDING PETITIONER'S OBVIOUSLY OVERWHELMING
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCES OF LACK OF MARRIAGE LICENSE AND GIVING
WEIGHT INSTEAD TO UNSUPPORTED PRESUMPTIONS IN FAVOR OF
RESPONDENT, IN ITS ASSAILED DECISION; and
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SETTING
ASIDE OR REVERSING THE LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT DECLARING THE
MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT A NULLITY FOR ABSENCE
OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE. 10
Petitioner's basic contention in the present petition centers on the alleged failure of the CA to give due
credence to petitioner's evidence which established the absence or lack of marriage license at the time that
petitioner and respondent's marriage was solemnized. Petitioner argues that the CA erred in deciding the case not
on the basis of law and evidence but rather on the ground of what the appellate court calls as ethical considerations
as well as on the perceived motive of petitioner in seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
respondent.
The Court finds for the petitioner.
At the outset, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), raises a procedural question
by arguing that the issues presented by petitioner in the present petition are factual in nature and it is not proper
for this Court to delve into these issues in a petition for review on certiorari.
The Court does not agree.
The issues in the instant petition involve a determination and application of existing law and prevailing
jurisprudence. However, intertwined with these issues is the question of the existence of the subject marriage
license, which is a question of fact and one which is not appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This rule, nonetheless, is not without exceptions, viz.:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is
a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and
the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence
of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.11
In the present case, the findings of the RTC and the CA, on whether or not there was indeed a marriage
license obtained by petitioner and respondent, are conflicting. Hence, it is but proper for this Court to review these
findings.
 The marriage of petitioner and respondent was celebrated on June 1, 1972, prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code. 12 Hence, the Civil Codegoverns their union. Accordingly, Article 53 of the Civil Code spells
out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract, to wit:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied
with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. 13
Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first
being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save
marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75. 14 Under
the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to
79. These marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war; (2) marriages
in remote places; (3) consular marriages; (4) ratification of marital cohabitation; (5) religious ratification of a civil
marriage; (6) Mohammedan or pagan marriages; and (7) mixed marriages. Petitioner's and respondent's marriage
does not fall under any of these exceptions.
Article 80 (3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding
marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the
license is the essence of the marriage contract. 15 The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license
under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper
government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage. 16 Stated differently, the requirement
and issuance of a marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every
marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. 17
In the instant case, respondent claims that she and petitioner were able to secure a marriage license which
they presented to the solemnizing officer before the marriage was performed.
The OSG, on its part, contends that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage and
that any doubt should be resolved to sustain such validity. Indeed, this Court is mindful of this principle as well
as of the Constitutional policy which protects and strengthens the family as the basic autonomous social institution
and marriage as the foundation of the family.
On the other hand, petitioner insists that the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Arteche,
Eastern Samar, coupled with the testimony of the former Civil Registrar, is sufficient evidence to prove the
absence of the subject marriage license.
The Court agrees with petitioner and finds no doubt to be resolved as the evidence is clearly in his favor.
Apropos is the case of Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño. 18 There, it was held that the certification of the
Local Civil Registrar, that their office had no record of a marriage license, was adequate to prove the non-issuance
of said license. 19 It was further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome,
and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that
the required marriage license had been secured. 20
As stated above, petitioner was able to present a Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Arteche, Eastern Samar attesting that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar "has no record nor copy of any
marriage license ever issued in favor of Raquel G. Kho [petitioner] and Veronica M. Borata [respondent] whose
marriage was celebrated on June 1, 1972." 21 Thus, on the basis of such Certification, the presumed validity of
the marriage of petitioner and respondent has been overcome and it becomes the burden of respondent to prove
that their marriage is valid as it is she who alleges such validity. As found by the RTC, respondent was not able
to discharge that burden.
It is telling that respondent failed to present their alleged marriage license or a copy thereof to the court.
In addition, the Certificate of Marriage 22issued by the officiating priest does not contain any entry regarding the
said marriage license, Respondent could have obtained a copy of their marriage contract from the National
Archives and Records Section, where information regarding the marriage license, i.e., date of issuance and license
number, could be obtained. However, she also failed to do so. The Court also notes, with approval, the RTC's
agreement with petitioner's observation that the statements of the witnesses for respondent, as well as respondent
herself, all attest to the fact that a marriage ceremony was conducted but neither one of them testified that a
marriage license was issued in favor of petitioner and respondent. Indeed, despite respondent's categorical claim
that she and petitioner were able to obtain a marriage license, she failed to present evidence to prove such
allegation. It is a settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence. 23
Based on the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled
with respondent's failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license or of any evidence to show that such
license was ever issued, the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was, in fact,
issued. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, it cannot be said that there was a simple defect, not a total absence, in
the requirements of the law which would not affect the validity of the marriage. The fact remains that respondent
failed to prove that the subject marriage license was issued and the law is clear that a marriage which is performed
without the corresponding marriage license is null and void.
As to the sufficiency of petitioner's evidence, the OSG further argues that, on the basis of this Court's
ruling in Sevilla v. Cardenas, 24 the certification issued by the local civil registrar, which attests to the absence
in its records of a marriage license, must categorically state that the document does not exist in the said office
despite diligent search.
However, in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court considered the certification
issued by the Local Civil Registrar as a certification of due search and inability to find the record or entry sought
by the parties despite the absence of a categorical statement that "such document does not exist in their records
despite diligent search." The Court, citing Section 28, 26 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, held that the certification
of due search and inability to find a record or entry as to the purported marriage license, issued by the civil
registrar, enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative
to the issuance of a marriage license. Based on said certification, the Court held that there is absence of a marriage
license that would render the marriage void ab initio.
Moreover, as discussed in the abovestated case of Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño, 27 this Court considered
the marriage of the petitioner and her deceased husband as void ab initio as the records reveal that the marriage
contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the local civil
registrar, their office has no record of such marriage license. The court held that the certification issued by the
local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of the marriage license. Their marriage having been
solemnized without the necessary marriage license and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage
license requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly voidab initio. This ruling was
reiterated in the more recent case of Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan, Jr. 28
Furthermore, in the fairly recent case of Abbas v. Abbas, 29 this Court echoed the ruling in Republic v.
CA 30 that, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking, this Court relied on
the Certification issued by the local civil registrar, which stated that the alleged marriage license could not be
located as the same did not appear in their records. Contrary to petitioner's asseveration, nowhere in the
Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a diligent search. In this respect, this
Court held that Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Courtdoes not require a categorical statement to this effect.
Moreover, in the said case, this Court ruled that:
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that
an official duty has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the
contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." No such affirmative evidence
was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the
records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. . . . 31
In all the abovementioned cases, there was clear and unequivocal finding of the absence of the subject
marriage license which rendered the marriage void.
From these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage
license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or
 at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued
to the parties. 32
Indeed, all the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage
contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. 33 As cited above, Article
80 (3) of the Civil Code clearly provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning,
except marriages of exceptional character under Articles 72 to 79 of the same Code. As earlier stated, petitioner's
and respondent's marriage cannot be characterized as among the exceptions.
As to the motive of petitioner in seeking to annul his marriage to respondent, it may well be that his
motives are less than pure — that he seeks a way out of his marriage to legitimize his alleged illicit affair with
another woman. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they
had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The law must be applied. As
the marriage license, an essential requisite under the Civil Code, is clearly absent, the marriage of petitioner and
respondent is void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals, Cebu City, dated March 30, 2006 and January 14, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 69218,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar,
Branch 2, dated September 25, 2000, in Civil Case No. 464 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Kho v. Republic, G.R. No. 187462, [June 1, 2016])
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000.]

ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE
NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL,
JR., petitioners,vs.NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.

Roldan R. Mangubat for petitioners.

Daryll A. Amante for private respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa
was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter, Pepito and respondent
Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After
their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging
that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity
or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for
"annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code. The lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed
the action to declare null and void their father's marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article
47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of
marriage. Hence, this petition. AcTDaH
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the assailed decision of the trial court. The Court ruled that the
second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license,
therefore, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element. According to the Court, it can not be said that
Pepito and respondent have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding
day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty
months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year
period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is
valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting
marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other,
Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there
was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse
with any third party as being one as "husband and wife." The Court also ruled that petitioners have the personality to
file a petition to declare their father's marriage void because a void marriage can be attacked collaterally and can be
questioned even after the death of either party.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; CIVIL CODE; MARRIAGE; MARRIAGES OF EXCEPTIONAL CHARACTER; THE 5-

YEAR COHABITATION PERIOD CONTEMPLATED BY ARTICLE 76 OF THE CIVIL CODE SHOULD BE
THE YEARS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE DAY OF THE MARRIAGE AND IT SHOULD BE A PERIOD OF
COHABITATION CHARACTERIZED BY EXCLUSIVITY MEANING NO THIRD PARTY WAS INVOLVED
AT ANY TIME WITHIN THE 5 YEARS AND CONTINUITY THAT IS UNBROKEN. — Working on the
assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit of
marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the
only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-
law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal
union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the
day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party
was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during
the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law
relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being
a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that
a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of
the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the
same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from
securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted
that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that
anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local
civil registrar.
2. ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;CASE AT BAR; THE FIVE-YEAR COHABITATION OF PETITIONERS' FATHER
AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT THE COHABITATION CONTEMPLATED BY LAW; THE
SUBSISTENCE OF THE MARRIAGE EVEN WHERE THERE WAS ACTUAL SEVERANCE OF THE FILIAL
COMPANIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SPOUSES CANNOT MAKE ANY COHABITATION BY EITHER SPOUSE
WITH ANY THIRD PARTY AS BEING ONE AS "HUSBAND AND WIFE." — In this case, at the time of Pepito
and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five
years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with
respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact,
and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the
fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the
nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract.
Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when
they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the
marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife."
3. ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;PETITIONERS HAVE THE PERSONALITY TO FILE A PETITION TO DECLARE
THEIR FATHER'S MARRIAGE VOID EVEN AFTER HIS DEATH; VOID MARRIAGES CAN BE ATTACKED
COLLATERALLY AND CAN BE QUESTIONED EVEN AFTER THE DEATH OF EITHER PARTY. — Contrary
to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which
allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at any time before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article
47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void
marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annullable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a
marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place and cannot be the source of rights.
The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be
ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can
be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but
voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case
the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense
for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable
marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects
except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership
through actual joint contribution, and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50
in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property
regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its
annulment are legitimate.
 DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:

May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born
herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months
thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license.
In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19,
1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was
filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional
rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among
the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code. LibLex
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the
petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the
declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially
so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is
null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second
marriage after it was dissolved due to their father's death. 1
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their father's
marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates
the time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage. 2Hence, this petition for
review with this Court grounded on a pure question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's averment that the allegations in
the petition are 'true and correct.'" It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under
Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3 However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal
and reinstated the petition for review. 4
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC),
the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their
celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of
which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The requirement and
issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that
the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social
institution." 10 Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the
foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code considers marriage as
"a special contract of permanent union" 12 and case law considers it not just an adventure but a lifetime
commitment." 13
However there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed
with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five
years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to
humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid
marriage due to the publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage
license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace in the family, avoid the
peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their
names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement. cda
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any
marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and,
being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each
other." 16 The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under
Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from
securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during
the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether
there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared or
intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years
without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband
and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the
five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be
a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity —
meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise, if
that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to
marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties
to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their
spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed.
The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation
of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single
requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There
should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be
united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall
make it known to the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil Code provides:
Article 63:"....This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment
to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. ...."
Article 64:"Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local
civil registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath. ..."
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Article 17 provides in part: "....This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of
any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. ...."
Article 18 reads in part: "....In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar
or brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in
the application for a marriage license. ...." cdrep
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple
marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime
of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, 18 subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior
marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting of two
or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and
adultery. 19 The law sanctions monogamy.
 In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each
other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was
dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that
Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each
other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered
imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started
cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated
in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one
as "husband and wife."
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their father's
marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be applied even by analogy
to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the
trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at any time before the death of either party" is
inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage.
Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annullable is valid until otherwise declared by the
court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place 21 and cannot be the
source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other
can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void
marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either
party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in
which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the
action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties
to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have
no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership
or ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as
provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the
contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children
conceived before its annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital bond
between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a
marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed
as if it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing. cdasia
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity
of a marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to
make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good
order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be
ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the
effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage
had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding
in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any
time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts
rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable
marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties
so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But Article 40 of the
Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though
void, before a party can enter into a second marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment
to that effect. 28 For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the
ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of
a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon
the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a
final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such
final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City,
Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered
REINSTATED. cdtai
SO ORDERED.
||| (Niñal v. Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, [March 14, 2000], 384 PHIL 661-675)
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 204494. July 27, 2016.]

JO-ANN DIAZ-SALGADO and husband DR. GERARD C.

SALGADO, petitioners, vs. LUIS G. ANSON, respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J p:
Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the Decision 2 dated August 6, 2012 and the Resolution 3 dated November 26, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 92989. The CA affirmed the Decision 4 dated July 23, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 155, in Civil Case No. 69611.
The Facts
On September 5, 2003, Luis Anson (Luis) filed a Complaint 5 docketed as Civil Case No. 69611 against
Jo-Ann Diaz-Salgado (Jo-Ann) and Gerard Salgado (Gerard) (Spouses Salgado) along with Maria Luisa Anson-
Maya (Maria Luisa) and Gaston Maya (Spouses Maya), seeking the annulment of the three Unilateral Deeds of
Sale 6 dated January 23, 2002 and the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina De
Asis dated October 25, 2002. 7
Luis alleged in his complaint that he is the surviving spouse of the late Severina de Asis-
Anson (Severina). They were married in a civil ceremony on December 28, 1966. Prior to the celebration of their
marriage, Severina gave birth to their daughter, Maria Luisa on December 30, 1965 while Jo-Ann is Severina's
daughter from a previous relationship. 8
During his marital union with Severina, they acquired several real properties located in San Juan, Metro
Manila, covered by the following Transfer Certificate of Title/s (TCT/s):
1. TCT No. 20618/T-104 (now TCT No. 11105-R),
2. TCT No. 60069/T-301 (now TCT No. 11106-R),
3. TCT No. 5109/T-26 (now TCT No. 11107),
4. TCT No. 8478-R/T-43 (now TCT No. 11076-R),
5. TCT No. 44637/T-224-II (now TCT No. 11078-R), and
6. TCT No. 8003/T-41 (now TCT No. 11077-R). 9
According to Luis, because there was no marriage settlement between him and Severina, the above-listed
properties pertain to their conjugal partnership. But without his knowledge and consent, Severina executed three
separate Unilateral Deeds of Sale on January 23, 2002 transferring the properties covered by TCT Nos. 20618,
60069 and 5109 in favor of Jo-Ann, who secured new certificates of title over the said properties. 10 When
Severina died on September 21, 2002, 11 Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of
Deceased Severina de Asis on October 25, 2002, adjudicating herself as Severina's sole heir. She secured new
TCTs over the properties covered by TCT Nos. 8478-R, 44637 and 8003. 12
Luis claimed that because of the preceding acts, he was divested of his lawful share in the conjugal
properties and of his inheritance as a compulsory heir of Severina. 13
In Jo-Ann's Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, 14 which the trial court considered as the Answer
of her husband, Gerard, 15 Jo-Ann countered that she was unaware of any marriage contracted by her mother
with Luis. She knew however that Luis and Severina had a common-law relationshipwhich they both
acknowledged and formally terminated through a Partition Agreement 16 executed in November 1980. This was
implemented through another Partition Agreement 17 executed in April 1981. Thus, Luis had already received
the properties apportioned to him by virtue of the said agreement while the properties subject of the Unilateral
Deeds of Sale were acquired exclusively by Severina. The TCTs covering Severina's properties were under
Severina's name only and she was described therein as single without reference to any husband. 18 HESIcT
Meanwhile, the Spouses Maya corroborated the Spouses Salgado's stance in their Answer, 19 stating
that Maria Luisa is also not aware that Luis and Severina were married. She is cognizant of the fact that Luis and
Severina lived together as common-law husband and wife — a relationship which was terminated upon execution
of a Partition Agreement. In the Partition Agreement, Luis and Severina were described as single and they
acknowledged that they were living together as common-law spouses. They also mutually agreed to the partition
of the properties they owned in common. Hence, Luis already received his share in the properties 20 and is
estopped from denying the same. 21 After the termination of their cohabitation in 1980, Luis went to United
States of America (USA), married one Teresita Anson and had a son with her; while Maria Luisa was left under
the guardianship and custody of Severina. 22 It was after the death of Severina that Maria Luisa executed a Deed
of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Severina de Asis on October 25, 2002. The Spouses
Maya were also able to obtain a Certificate of No Record of Marriage 23 (between Luis and Severina) from the
Office the Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office. 24
Trial ensued thereafter. After Luis gave his testimony and presented documentary evidence which
included a certified true copy of his marriage contract with Severina, 25 the Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya
filed their respective Demurrers to Evidence. 26 The Spouses Salgado disputed the validity of Luis and Severina's
marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license as borne out by the marriage contract. They further claimed
that Luis himself disclosed on cross-examination that he did not procure a marriage license prior to the alleged
marriage. 27 Luis had also admitted the existence, due execution and authenticity of the Partition
Agreement. 28 The logical conclusion therefore is that the properties disposed in favor of Jo-Ann were owned by
Severina as her own, separate and exclusive properties, which she had all the right to dispose of, without the
conformity of Luis. 29
On February 16, 2006, the trial court denied both demurrers, explaining that the sufficiency of evidence
presented by Luis is evidentiary in nature and may only be controverted by evidence to the contrary. 30 The
Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya filed their separate motions for reconsideration, 31which the trial court
denied. 32 Consequently, both the Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya filed their respective petitions
for certiorari with the CA. 33Meanwhile, the Spouses Salgado were deemed to have waived their presentation of
evidence when they failed to attend the scheduled hearings before the trial court. 34
Resolving the petition for certiorari on the demurrer to evidence filed by the Spouses Salgado, the CA
Second Division directed the trial court "to properly resolve with deliberate dispatch the demurrer to evidence in
accordance with Section 3, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure by stating clearly and distinctly the
reason therefor on the basis of [the Spouses Salgado's] proffered evidence[,]" 35 whereas the CA Ninth Division
dismissed the petition of the Spouses Maya and ordered the trial court to decide the case with deliberate
dispatch. 36
In an Order 37 dated July 16, 2007, the RTC, in compliance with the order of the CA to resolve the
demurrer to evidence in more specific terms, denied the twin demurrers to evidence for lack of merit and held
that the totality of evidence presented by Luis has sufficiently established his right to obtain the reliefs prayed for
in his complaint.
Ruling of the RTC
On July 23, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision 38 in favor of Luis, holding that the marriage between
Luis and Severina was valid. It noted that the marriage contract, being a public document, enjoys the presumption
of regularity in its execution and is conclusive as to the fact of marriage. 39 The trial court also based its ruling
in Geronimo v. CA 40 where the validity of marriage was upheld despite the absence of the marriage license
number on the marriage contract. 41 The trial court thus declared that the properties covered by the Unilateral
Deeds of Sale were considered conjugal which cannot be disposed of by Severina without the consent of her
husband, Luis. 42
The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [Luis]
and against [the Spouses Salgado] ordering as follows:
1. ANNULMENT, VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE and DECLARING OF NO FORCE
AND EFFECT of the three (3) Unilateral Deeds of Sale, all dated January 23, 2002 executed
by [Severina] in favor of [Jo-Ann];
2. ANNULMENT, VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE and DECLARING OF NO FORCE
AND EFFECT of the three (3) [TCT] Nos. 11107-R, 11105-R and 11106-R covering the subject
properties, all issued in the name of [Jo-Ann] by the Registry of Deeds for San Juan, Metro
Manila;
3. RESTITUTION of all properties covered by TCT Nos. 11107-R, 11105-R and
11106-R (formerly TCT Nos. 5109, 20618 and 60069, respectively) to the conjugal community
of properties between [Luis] and [Severina].
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 43
On November 17, 2008, the RTC rendered another Decision 44 which ordered the "ANNULMENT,
VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE and DECLARING OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina De Asis executed by [Maria Luisa] dated October 25, 2002 . . .
." 45 The RTC also ordered the cancellation of new TCTs issued by virtue of the said Deeds. 46
The Spouses Salgado and the Spouses Maya filed their respective motions for reconsideration on
September 11, 2007 47 and August 28, 2007, 48respectively, which the RTC denied in the Omnibus
Order 49 dated October 30, 2007 for lack of merit. This prompted the Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya to file
their separate notices of appeal before the CA on December 13, 2007 50 and April 24, 2009, 51 respectively.
Ruling of the CA
The Spouses Maya and Luis thereafter entered into a Compromise Agreement 52 which was approved
by the CA in its Decision 53 dated October 26, 2011. This resulted in the termination of the Spouses Maya's
appeal. 54 caITAC
On August 6, 2012, the CA rendered a Decision, 55 dismissing the appeal of the Spouses Salgado.
The fallo reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal interposed by [the Spouses Salgado] is DISMISSED. The
Decision dated July 23, 2007 of the [RTC] of Pasig is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED. 56
The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC for the simple reason that the Spouses Salgado did not present
and formally offer any testimonial and documentary evidence to controvert the evidence presented by
Luis. 57 The CA further explained that "the best evidence to establish the absence of a marriage license is a
certification from the Local Civil Registrar that the parties to the Marriage Contract did not secure a marriage
license or at the very least a certification from the said office that despite diligent search, no record of application
for or a marriage license was issued on or before December 28, 1966 in favor of Luis and Severina. Again,
Spouses Salgado failed to prove the same by their failure to secure the said certification and present evidence
during the trial." 58
The Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya filed a motion for reconsideration 59 which the CA denied
through its Resolution 60 dated November 26, 2012.
The Spouses Salgado elevated the matter before the Court raising the core issue of whether the CA
committed reversible error in affirming the RTC decision which declared the marriage between Luis and Severina
valid and the subject lands as conjugal properties.
 Ruling of the Court
The Spouses Salgado argue that the marriage between Luis and Severina is null and void for want of
marriage license based on the Marriage Contract 61 presented by Luis which has adequately established its
absence. 62
Luis, in his Comment, 63 opposes the filing of the present petition on the ground that it raises a question
of fact, which cannot be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. He also countered that the Spouses Salgado
did not present any evidence to support their theory. 64 If the existence of the marriage license is in issue, it is
incumbent upon the Spouses Salgado to show the lack of marriage license by clear and convincing evidence. 65
Before proceeding to the substantive issues brought in this petition, the Court shall first tackle the
procedural issue raised by Luis which pertains to the propriety of the filing of this petition for review on certiorari.
Contrary to Luis' contention, the present petition raises a question of law, mainly, whether the absence
of a marriage license may be proven on the basis of a marriage contract which states that no marriage license was
exhibited to the solemnizing officer on account of the marriage being of an exceptional character.
In any event, while the jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it from the appellate court is, as
a general rule, limited to reviewing errors of law, there are exceptions 66 recognized by the Court, such as when
the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion. 67
Since the marriage between Luis and Severina was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of its
celebration 68 on December 28, 1966.
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 69 of the Civil Code, and the absence
thereof, save for marriages of exceptional character, 70 renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80
(3). It sets forth:
Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional
character;
xxx xxx xxx. (Emphasis ours)
"Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising
Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during
peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (3) consular marriages, (4) ratification of marital cohabitation, (5)
religious ratification of a civil marriage, (6) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (7) mixed marriages." 71 To
reiterate, in any of the aforementioned marriages of exceptional character, the requirement of a valid marriage
license is dispensed with. TAIaHE
The marriage is not of an
exceptional character
A cursory examination of the marriage contract of Luis and Severina reveals that no marriage license
number was indicated therein. It also appears therein that no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing
officer with Article 77 of Republic Act No. 386 (Civil Code) being cited as the reason therefor. The pertinent
portion of the marriage contract is quoted as follows:
[A]nd I further certify that Marriage License No. . . . issued at . . . on . . ., 19 . . . in favor of,
said parties, was exhibited to me or no marriage license was exhibited to me, this marriage
being of an exceptional character performed under Art. 77 of Rep. Act 386; . . . . 72
The reference to Article 77 of the Civil Code in the marriage contract is not dismissible. Being a public
document, the marriage contract is not only aprima facie proof of marriage, but is also a prima facie evidence of
the facts stated therein. This is pursuant to Section 44, Rule 130 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which reads:
 Sec. 44. Entries in official records. — Entries in official records made in the performance of
his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
Consequently, the entries made in Luis and Severina's marriage contract are prima facie proof that at the
time of their marriage, no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer for the reason that their
marriage is of an exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil Code.
Article 77 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 77. In case two persons married in accordance with law desire to ratify their union in
conformity with the regulations, rites, or practices of any church, sect, or religion, it shall no
longer be necessary to comply with the requirements of Chapter 1 of this Title and any
ratification made shall merely be considered as a purely religious ceremony.
The foregoing provision pertains to a religious ceremony performed with the purpose of ratifying a
marriage which was solemnized civilly. In the eyes of the law, the marriage already exists; the subsequent
ceremony is undertaken merely to conform to religious practices. Thus, the parties are exempted from complying
with the required issuance of marriage license insofar as the subsequent religious ceremony is concerned. For this
exemption to be applicable, it is sine qua non that: (1) the parties to the religious ceremony must already be
married to each other in accordance with law (civil marriage); and (2) the ratifying ceremony is purely
religious in nature.
Applied to the present case however, it is clear that Luis and Severina were not married to each other
prior to the civil ceremony officiated on December 28, 1966 — the only date of marriage appearing on the records.
This was also consistently affirmed by Luis in open court:
Atty. Francisco:
Q- You testified that you have a Marriage Contract marked as Exhibit A certifying that you were
married to the late [Severina].
A- Yes, sir.
Q- Do you recall when this marriage took place?
A- As far as I can recall it was sometime two (2) days before my daughter get (sic) one (1)
year old. That was 1966 December something like 28, because she was born December
30, the death of Jose Rizal. I can remember 1965. So, before she turned one (1) year
old two (2) days before we got married here in San Juan.
Q- So, when was she born if you can recall?
A- Maria Luisa was born on December 30, 1965.
Q- If it is two (2) days before, it should be 1966?
A- Yes, sir.
Q- If you can recall who solemnized the marriage?
A- It was the late Mayor Ebona of San Juan. 73
xxx xxx xxx
[Atty. Valenton:]
. . . You alleged during your direct examination that you were married to [Severina]?
A: Yes sir.
Q: When do you say you marr[ied] her?
A: Two (2) days before our daughter turned one year old, so that is December 28,
1966. 74 (Emphasis ours)
 Being that the ceremony held on December 28, 1966 was the only marriage ceremony between the
parties and this was not solemnized pursuant to any ratifying religious rite, practice or regulation but a civil one
officiated by the mayor, this marriage does not fall under the purview of Article 77 of theCivil Code.It is evident
that the twin requirements of the provision, which are: prior civil marriage between the parties and a ratifying
religious ceremony, were not complied with. There is no prior ceremony to ratify. Thus, this marriage is not of
an exceptional character and a marriage license is required for Luis and Severina's marriage to be valid.
Absence of marriage license
The next issue to be resolved is: who has the burden of proving the existence or non-existence of the
marriage license?
Since there was an unequivocal declaration on the marriage contract itself that no marriage license was
exhibited to the solemnizing officer at the time of marriage owing to Article 77 of the Civil Code, when in truth,
the said exception does not obtain in their case, it is the burden of Luis to prove that they secured the required
marriage license. cDHAES
However, instead of proving that a marriage license was indeed issued to them at the time of their
marriage, Luis relied mainly on the presumption of validity of marriage. This presumption does not hold water vis-
à-vis a prima facie evidence (marriage contract), which on its face has established that no marriage license was
presented to the solemnizing officer. If there was a marriage license issued to Luis and Severina, its absence on
the marriage contract was not explained at all. Neither the original nor a copy of the marriage license was
presented. No other witness also testified to prove its existence, whereas Luis is not the best witness to testify
regarding its issuance. He admitted that he did not apply for one, and is uncertain about the documents they
purportedly submitted in the Municipal Hall. As he revealed in his testimony:
ATTY. VALENTON:
Q- How did you prepare for the alleged wedding that took place between you and
[Severina]?
ATTY. FRANCISCO:
May I know the materiality, Your Honor?
ATTY. VALENTON:
We are exploring as to whether there was really a wedding that took place, Your Honor.
COURT:
Answer.
What preparations were done?
A- There was no preparation because we were just visitors of the Mayor during that time
and the Mayor is a close friend of ours. So, when he knew that we are traveling, we
are going to Thailand with the invitation of a friend to work with him in Thailand,
he told us you better get married first before you travel because your daughter will
be illegitimate. 75
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. VALENTON:
Q- Do you remember having applied for a marriage license?
A- We did not.
Q- So, you are telling us that there is no marriage license?
A- No.
CLARIFICATORY QUESTIONS
BY THE COURT TO THE WITNESS
[Q-] There was no marriage license?
A- Well, when you get married you have to get a marriage license.
COURT:
Not necessarily.
A- But, I don't know whether there was an application for the license because it was at the
house of the Mayor.
COURT:
But in this particular case before you went to the house of the Mayor for the solemnization
of your marriage, did you apply for a marriage license?
A- No. 76
xxx xxx xxx
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION OF
[LUIS]:
Q- Mr. Anson, a while ago during your cross-examination you were asked by counsel as well
as a question was raised by the Honorable Court whether or not you applied for a
marriage license when you got married on December 28, 1966 allegedly with
[Severina]. Can you tell the Court what you meant by that?
COURT:
By what?
ATTY. FRANCISCO:
When he was asked, Your Honor, by the Honorable Court.
COURT:
Whether he applied?
ATTY. FRANCISCO:
Whether he applied for a marriage license prior to the solemnization of the marriage, you
answered no.
WITNESS:
I did not apply for such, all what I know is to sign something affidavit or application before
we went to the house of the Mayor to get marry(sic) but that was about — I cannot
recall if that past (sic) a week or 2 days or 3 days ago.
ATTY. FRANCISCO:
Q- You mentioned, we signed an affidavit or application, when you used we, whom are you
referring to?
A- [Severina].
Q- And, yourself?
A- Yes.
Q- In your recollection, where did you file those affidavits with [Severina] before the
solemnization of the marriage?
A- It was in the Municipal Hall. I do not know whether that was the Registrar, Office of the
[M]ayor or Office of the Chief of Police. I cannot recall. It is inside the Munisipyo
of San Juan.
 Q- Who made you sign that Affidavit?
A- The Chief of Police whom we get (sic) to be (sic) witness for our marriage. They let us
signed (sic) an application or affidavit. I cannot recall what it is. 77(Emphasis
ours) ASEcHI
In upholding the supposed validity of the marriage, the RTC and the CA failed to consider the glaring
statements in the marriage contract that no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer and that the
marriage is of an exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil Code, the latter statement being fallacious.
Both the RTC and CA upheld the fact of marriage based on the marriage contract but simply glossed over the part
stating that the marriage is of an exceptional character. It is inevitable to deduce that this is not a case of mere
non-recording of the marriage license number on the marriage contract, as was in Geronimo. 78
The factual antecedents in Geronimo are not on all fours with the case under review, hence, inapplicable.
In Geronimo, despite the absence of the marriage license number on the marriage contract presented by therein
petitioner (brother of the deceased), there was no statement therein that the marriage is of an exceptional character.
Various witnesses also testified that the deceased and her husband were indeed married. More importantly, the
husband of the deceased was able to produce a copy of the marriage contract on file with the National Archives
and Records Section where the marriage license number appears.
"[T]o be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the
absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported
by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the
parties." 79 Considering that the absence of the marriage license is apparent on the marriage contract itself, with
a false statement therein that the marriage is of an exceptional character, and no proof to the contrary was
presented, there is no other plausible conclusion other than that the marriage between Luis and Severina was
celebrated without a valid marriage license and is thus, void ab initio.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Dayot, 80 the Court similarly declared that a marriage solemnized
without a marriage license based on a fabricated claim of exceptional character, is void. In lieu of a marriage
license, therein parties to the marriage executed a false affidavit of marital cohabitation. In declaring the marriage
void, the Court rejected the notion that all the formal and essential requisites of marriage were complied with.
The Court held that to permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject
circumvention of the law. It was further explained:
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the
parties' affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal
requisites were complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied
that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a
marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76,
that they should have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be
excepted from the requirement of a marriage license.
xxx xxx xxx
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage
under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must
a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at
least five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an
irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage
license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the
period of Jose and Felisa's cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an
exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers
to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties
under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of
paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all. 81
The Court cannot turn a blind eye to the statements made in the marriage contract because these refer to
the absence of a formal requisite of marriage. "The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with
every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their
marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall
within the ambit of the exception." 82 "The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's
demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general
public is interested. This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity
of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic 'autonomous social institution.'" 83
Partition Agreement is Valid
Relative to the properties they amassed during the period of their cohabitation, Luis and Severina
executed a notarized Partition Agreement 84 in November 1980, which divided their properties between them
without court intervention. Luis sought to annul such agreement on the ground that "the separation of property is
not effected by the mere execution of the contract or agreement of the parties, but by the decree of the court
approving the same. It, therefore, becomes effective only upon judicial approval without which it is void." 85
The Court does not subscribe to Luis' posture. ITAaHc
In Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City, 86 the Court held that "[i]n a void marriage, regardless of
the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the
provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of
Article 144 of the Civil Code . . . ." 87 It provides:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other,
live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares
and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry,
and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did
not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to
have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in
the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of
the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party
in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of
default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such
share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon
termination of the cohabitation. 88 (Emphasis ours)
As there is no showing that Luis and Severina were incapacitated to marry each other at the time of their
cohabitation and considering that their marriage is void from the beginning for lack of a valid marriage license,
Article 144 of the Civil Code, 89 in relation to Article 147 of the Family Code, are the pertinent provisions of law
governing their property relations. Article 147 of the Family Code "applies to union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for
other reasons, like absence of a marriage license." 90"Under this property regime, property acquired by both
spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who
did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly
if said party's 'efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household.'" 91
Accordingly, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code shall apply in the partition of the
properties co-owned by Luis and Severina. It is stated under Article 1079 of the Civil Code that "partition, in
general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong.
The thing itself may be divided, or its value." As to how partition may be validly done, Article 496 of the Civil
Code is precise that "partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings . . . ."
 The law does not impose a judicial approval for the agreement to be valid. Hence, even without the same, the
partition was validly done by Luis and Severina through the execution of the Partition Agreement.
Moreover, Luis admitted the existence, due execution and authenticity of the Partition Agreement. 92 It
also remains uncontroverted that he already received his share as stipulated in the Partition Agreement. As such,
the Court finds no reason to have the said agreement declared null and void or annulled, in the absence of any
circumstance which renders such contract invalid or at least, voidable.
All things considered, the Court holds that although a certification of no record of marriage license or
certification of "due search and inability to find" a record or entry issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to
prove the non-issuance of the license, 93 such certification is not the only proof that could validate the absence of
a marriage license.
In this case, the categorical statement on Luis and Severina's marriage contract that no marriage license
was exhibited to the solemnizing officer, coupled with a contrived averment therein that the marriage is of an
exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil Code, are circumstances which cannot be disregarded.
Incidentally, it may be well to note that Luis' failure to assert his marriage to Severina during the latter's lifetime
is suspect. Luis left for the USA in 1981, and until Severina's death in 2002, he never saw, much less reconciled
with her. 94 All those years, he never presented himself to be the husband of Severina. Not even their daughter,
Maria Luisa, knew of the marriage. During trial, he never presented any other witness to the marriage. He contends
that his marriage to Severina was valid and subsisting, yet he knowingly contracted a subsequent marriage abroad.
Verily, Luis failed to prove the validity of their marriage based on the evidence he himself had presented. CHTAIc
"The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or
could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the
evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage. The protection
of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an
invalid one as well." 95
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 6, 2012 and the Resolution
dated November 26, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92989 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 69611 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Diaz-Salgado v. Anson, G.R. No. 204494, [July 27, 2016])
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 175581. March 28, 2008.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JOSE A. DAYOT, respondent.

[G.R. No. 179474. March 28, 2008.]

FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, petitioner, vs. JOSE A. DAYOT, respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:

Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for Review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa),
respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-
G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio. CacHES
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall.
The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza. 2 In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed
a sworn affidavit, 3 also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity,
and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint 4 for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a
sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit
stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage
was secured through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the same. According to
Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in Felisa's house,
the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City
Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City
Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They
were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused
to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother
who had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man
who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa.
He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisa's house. When he perused
the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the
latter feigned ignorance. EAIaHD
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose's allegations and defended the validity of their marriage.
She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the legality of marriage in the
early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with him on account of their age difference. 5 In
her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage
with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy
against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman,
since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. 6The Ombudsman
found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of
suspension from service for one year without emolument. 7
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision 8 dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented by
both parties, this Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable
consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs
against [Jose]. 9 caIETS
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose
and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Jose's version of the story as implausible, and rationalized
that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make him
or her sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already detected that something was amiss,
unusual, as they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was
made to sign the pieces of paper for the release of the said package. Another indirect suggestion
that could have put him on guard was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that
her brother would kill them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less,
three months to "discover" that the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the
marriage contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be
"taken in for a ride" by [Felisa.]
[Jose's] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he
acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisa's] name in the duly notarized
statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the
marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D.,
wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of emergency. This Court does
not believe that the only reason why her name was written in his company I.D. was because he
was residing there then. This is just but a lame excuse because if he really considers her not his
lawfully wedded wife, he would have written instead the name of his sister.
When [Jose's] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that she
signed her name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N.,
page 25, November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the signature appearing over the
name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the
marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she was asked
by the Honorable Court if indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her
brother she answered yes. The testimony of his sister all the more belied his claim that his
consent was procured through fraud. 10
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose's action had prescribed. It cited Article 87 11 of
the New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the injured
party within four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus: AECIaD
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by [Felisa]
through fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have filed an annulment or declaration of
nullity of marriage at the earliest possible opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged
sham and false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at the
earliest instance. . . . . 12
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision
dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The dispositive portion of the
appellate court's Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. 13
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was
solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that the circumstances
constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage under Article 86 14 of the Civil Code did not exist in
the marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud
was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided by law. The Court of Appeals struck down Jose's appeal in the
following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in
giving his consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment thereof had already prescribed.
Article 87 (4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for annulment of marriage on
the ground that the consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be
commenced by said party within four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud and within four
(4) years from the time the force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly
discovered by Jose in February, 1987 then he had only until February, 1991 within which to
file an action for annulment of marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed
the complaint for annulment of his marriage to Felisa. 15 TaEIcS
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose's assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab
initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article 76 16 of the Civil
Code as one of exceptional character, with the parties executing an affidavit of marriage between man and woman
who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the
falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for the period
required by Article 76 did not affect the validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled
by the statements contained therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance
of the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side
of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain
the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to their marriage.
Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Jose's argument that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to
which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 56 17 of the Civil Code did
not require that either one of the contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the solemnizing officer's
church or religious sect. The prescription was established only in Article 7 18 of the Family Code which does not
govern the parties' marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. His
central opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a marriage license
under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal
condition that the man and the woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years
before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and
Felisa was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Jose's Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it
rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET
ASIDE and another one entered declaring the marriage between Jose A.Dayot and Felisa C.
Tecson void ab initio. AICHaS
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City. 19
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Niñal v.
Bayadog, 20 and reasoned that:
In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without
a marriage license on the basis of their affidavit that they had attained the age of majority, that
being unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry
each other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
". . . In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted
back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it
not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at any time within
the 5 years and continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
 cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be
sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and
placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements
must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of
the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single
requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to
nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license
unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted
that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be
united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment
to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a marriage
license, save marriages of exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning.
Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab initio because of the absence
of a marriage license. 21 AaHTIE
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate court rendered a
Resolution 22 dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisa's motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals' Amended Decision
dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa
be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474,
similarly assailing the appellate court's Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate
the two Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for
resolution. 23
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of its Petition, to
wit:
I
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF
HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD
NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS
MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E. 24
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Niñal. 25 She differentiates
the case at bar from Niñal by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an existing prior marriage, a
circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought
the annulment of their marriage after a criminal case for bigamy and an administrative case had been filed against
him in order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate
Jose from any liability. cSIADH
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered ruling
on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic of the Philippines and
Felisa.
 The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a
valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this Court's ruling in Hernandez v. Court of
Appeals. 26 To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24
November 1986, attesting that they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, which they
used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republic's position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit
does not affect the validity of the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied with; and the
solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The
Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully
obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated a fabricated statement in
their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that
the parties' marriage contract states that their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also
bears the signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of marriage. To
further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the following documents: (1) Jose's notarized Statement of Assets
and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisa's name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July
1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had
lived together as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Jose's company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating
Felisa's name as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false affidavit under
Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code
spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract: cTIESa
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied
with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. (Emphasis
ours.)
Article 58 27 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by
the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an
exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75.28 Article 80 (3) 29 of the
Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being
nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage
contract. 30 This is in stark contrast to the oldMarriage Law, 31 whereby the absence of a marriage license did
not make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code
is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has
inquired into their capacity to contract marriage. 32
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising
Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during
peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular marriages, 33 (3) ratification of marital cohabitation,
(4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages. 34
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code,
which provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have
attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The
official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he
 took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he
found no legal impediment to the marriage. CHDAEc
The reason for the law, 35 as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending a
marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their
status. 36
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage license.
In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that "they have attained the age of maturity; that being
unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years; and that because of this union,
they desire to marry each other." 37 One of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of
an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year
requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of
the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule,
should be strictly 38 but reasonably construed. 39 They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and
all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. 40 Where a general rule
is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by
implication. 41 For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman
must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read the law
as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no
ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the
law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation
is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid,
this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one
that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting
parties shall state the requisite facts 42 in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths;
and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took
steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment
to the marriage. TaISDA
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they
executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living
together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage. 43 The Court of
Appeals also noted Felisa's testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime
in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution. 44 The appellate court also cited Felisa's own testimony
that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house. 45
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year requisite
is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged
facts. 46 Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this Court's review. 47 It is already well-
settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on
this Court. A recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court,
or in this case the administrative body, make contradictory findings. However, the exception
does not apply in every instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative
body disagree. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if
such findings are supported by the record or based on substantial evidence. 48
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt
them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.
 We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties' affidavit
will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were complied with. The
argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was
celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal
requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as
to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage license. AIDTHC
Anent petitioners' reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds no
applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with reference to
the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into
a lawful contract of marriage. 49 Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. 50 The
present case does not involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is
no question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence,
compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned
the instant consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code 51 that every intendment of law or fact leans towards
the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties' marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a violation of
the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the requisite marriage license or compliance
with the stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage
without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration
of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making
a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage. 52 The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires
not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well. 53 To permit a false
affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to
protect the fabric of the institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal
measures set forth in our laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a license is
not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a
fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is
flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one.
Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating
to the period of Jose and Felisa's cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the
requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law
precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn
affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no
affidavit at all. caTIDE
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity, Jose should
be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a
misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room for application where there is a law. 54 There
is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code.
Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties' marriage is without
prejudice to their criminal liability. 55
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing
the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together
from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose's subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it
took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. 56 Jose and Felisa's marriage was
celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case,
the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law
cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of celebration of
marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a marriage. 57It covers the years
 immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party was
involved at any time within the five years — and continuity that is unbroken. 58
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7
November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab
initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No costs. aAEIHC
SO ORDERED.
||| (Republic v. Dayot, G.R. Nos. 175581 & 179474, [March 28, 2008], 573 PHIL 553-576)
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001.]

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A.

RECIO, respondent.

Olivia Velasco-Jacoba for petitioner.

Gomez & Associates for respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage in the court a quo on the ground of
bigamy, alleging that respondent, an Australian citizen, had a prior subsisting marriage to one Editha Samson,
also an Australian citizen at the time he married her in 1994. Pending trial of the case, respondent obtained a
divorce decree from a family court in Australia. The court held that the Australian divorce had ended the
marriage, thus, there was no more marital union to nullify.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held: that the Australian divorce decree did not absolutely establish
respondent's legal capacity to remarry under his national law, hence, there is no basis for the ruling of the trial
court which assumed that the Australian divorce restored respondent's capacity to remarry; that as it is, there is
no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; that the case should, therefore, be
remanded to the lower court for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondent's legal
capacity to marry petitioner; and that failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground of
bigamy. ADEacC

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY; OFFICIAL RECORD OF A FOREIGN

COUNTRY, HOW PROVED. — Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document
must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself.
Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an
act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a
writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept
in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; AUSTRALIAN DIVORCE DECREE RENDERED ADMISSIBLE DESPITE
NONCOMPLIANCE THEREWITH IN CASE AT BAR. — The divorce decree between respondent and Editha
Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient;
compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated. Fortunately for respondent's cause,
when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its
admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The
trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and
accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as
a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.
3. ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL NOTICE; COURTS CANNOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF AUSTRALIAN
MARITAL LAWS; CASE AT BAR. — The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact
or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the
material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving
the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. Since the divorce was a defense raised by
respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him. It is well-settled
in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged
and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their
judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the
subject should be resolved in the negative.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LACK OF EVIDENCE TO SHOW RESPONDENT'S CAPACITY TO REMARRY;
PROPER REMEDY; CASE AT BAR. — On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that
reads: "1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has
died) commits the offence of bigamy." This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent
may have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law.
Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso
facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter. . . . As it is, there is
absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Hence, we believe that the most
judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show respondents legal
capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quomay declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the
ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the
Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12,
1994.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J p:

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid
according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the
alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and
proven according to our law on evidence. aHTCIc
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999
Decision 1 and the March 24, 1999 Order 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case
No. 3026-AF. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick
A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can
now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties." 3
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on
March 1, 1987. 4 They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, 5 a decree of divorce,
purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian
Citizenship" issued by the Australian government. 6Petitioner — a Filipina — and respondent were married on
January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City. 7 In their applicationfor a marriage
license, respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino." 8
 Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of
their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance
with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. 9
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage 10 in the court a quo,
on the ground of bigamy — respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January
12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997. TDCaSE
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior
marriage and its subsequent dissolution. 11 He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been
validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989; 12 thus, he was legally capacitated to marry
petitioner in 1994.
On July 7, 1998 — or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the declaration of
nullity was pending — respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia
because the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down." 13
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of
action. 14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent. 15 The court marked and admitted the
documentary evidence of both parties. 16 After they submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted
for resolution. 17
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid
and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential
element of the marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision
on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more
marital union to nullify or annul. HDTISa
Hence, this Petition. 18
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
"1
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by
the respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him
to contract a second marriage with the petitioner.
"2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate
of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioner's
marriage to the respondent.
"3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this
case.
"4
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52
and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
"5
 The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the
respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first securing a
recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts." 19
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones:
(1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven
to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up
the rest.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between
Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson.
Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 20 petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any other foreign judgment, may
be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute
divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages solemnized
abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationis). In effect, the Code
requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements
of the place where the marriage was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our discussion. Philippine
law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. 21 A marriage between two Filipinos
cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 22 and 17 23 of the Civil Code. 24 In
mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 25 of the Family Code allows the former to contract
a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry." 26 A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. 27
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van
Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law." 28 Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it. 29 Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient. STHAID
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply with the
registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles read as follows:
"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file
separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall
specify the following:
xxx xxx xxx
"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or
annulled;
xxx xxx xxx"
"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the
applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required in the
last preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the
 absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous
marriage. . . . .
"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children's presumptive
legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise,
the same shall not affect their persons."
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document — a written
official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value,
the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. 30 A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce
decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. 31The decree purports to be a written act
or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country. 32
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public
or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested 33 by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 34
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an
Australian family court. 35 However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on
evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence,
counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local
Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. 36 The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's
qualification. 37 Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to
object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. 38
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no
longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. 39 Naturalization is the
legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. 40 Naturalized
citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming
an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to
Philippine personal laws. aSDCIE
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the
party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the
divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country
for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may
take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." 41 In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the
material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving
the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. 42 Since the divorce was a defense raised
by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. 43 Like any
other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are
supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. 44 The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution,
and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue:
Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry
 Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated
to marry her in 1994. Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence, adequately
established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful
union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce
or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the
second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. 45 There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce
was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree — a conditional or provisional judgment of
divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the
lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected.46
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict
remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce
which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from marrying again. The court may allow a
remarriage only after proof of good behavior. 47
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless
the other party has died) commits the offense of bigamy." 48
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It
did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for
the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's
capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive
evidence as to his civil status based onSection 48, Rule 39 49 of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof
has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code was not
submitted together with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is proof that respondent
did not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party
concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the
legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima
facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license. 50
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner.
A review of the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were presented before the lower court:
(1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" — Complaint; 51 (b) Exhibit "B" — Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A.
Recio (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva
Ecija; 52 (c) Exhibit "C" — Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson
(Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila; 53 (d) Exhibit "D" — Office of the City Registrar of
Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recio and Editha D. Samson
was in its records; 54 and (e) Exhibit "E" — Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio; 55 (2) for
respondent: (a) Exhibit "1" — Amended Answer; 56 (b) Exhibit "2" — Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of
Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia; 57 (c) Exhibit "3" — Certificate of Australian Citizenship
of Rederick A. Recio; 58 (d) Exhibit "4" — Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia
Certificate; 59 and Exhibit "5" — Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace
J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995. 60 EHaASD
 Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian
citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioner's contention that the
court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry
without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at
the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of
bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct
result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court
to receive evidence, if any, which show respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a
quo may declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing
marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1,
1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the
court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry
petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, [October 2, 2001], 418 PHIL 723-739)
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 154380. October 5, 2005.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO

III, respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J p:

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen
and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under
Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this apparently
novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision 1 dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional
Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution 2 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion
for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to
remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of
the Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife,
the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ
in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz
V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano's wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later,
Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married
a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San
Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article
26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The
Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was
denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF
THE FAMILY CODE 4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case
because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien.
The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation. 5 Furthermore,
the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondent's situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation
and not of judicial determination. 6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that when his
naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by
operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. 7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted
a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petition — Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an
action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or
validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
xxx xxx xxx
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal
interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination. 8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens
where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests
of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage
while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief,
has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when
respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the case of
respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first place, and what was the
intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known
as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was
likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to
Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws
in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis
supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It
seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino
citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting
her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings 9 on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops' Conference
of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who
divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while
the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For
those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be
validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into
law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)

Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article
26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse. AETcSa
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr. 10 The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that
a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse
is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals. 11 In Quita, the parties
were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954
and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced
by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph
2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of
the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the
interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the
clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as
necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms,
so long as they come within its spirit or intent. 12

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then
the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26. AHDTIE
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as
follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but
their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
 In this case, when Cipriano's wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage
that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently
obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSG's theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either
a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this
particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity.
On the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence,
the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning
the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent's wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence. 13
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized
as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 14 Such
foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such
laws must be alleged and proved. 15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former
wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that
he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No.
209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a
spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present
petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondent's bare
allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried
an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon
respondent's submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor. CcAHEI
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated
May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch
23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Republic v. Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, [October 5, 2005], 509 PHIL 108-117)
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 152577. September 21, 2005.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CRASUS L. IYOY, respondent.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Singco & Cagara Law Office for respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY; TOTALITY OF EVIDENCE

PRESENTED BY RESPONDENT MISERABLY FAILED TO ESTABLISH ALLEGED PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY OF HIS WIFE. — Using the guidelines established by jurisprudence, this Court finds that the totality
of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his
wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code
of the Philippines. The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his testimony,
which can be easily put into question for being self-serving, in the absence of any other corroborating evidence. He
submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on the recording with the Register of Deeds of the
Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and
(2) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American husband's surname.
Even considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasus's Complaint filed with the
RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that prevented her
from assuming the essential obligations of marriage.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE CONTEMPLATES DOWNRIGHT INCAPACITY
OR INABILITY TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF AND ASSUME THE BASIC MARITAL OBLIGATIONS. — It is
worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates downright incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment,
by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article. As has already been
stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 "is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond
at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE CHARACTERISTICS, BEHAVIOUR AND ACTS OF RESPONDENT'S WIFE DO
NOT SATISFACTORILY ESTABLISH A PSYCHOLOGICAL OR MENTAL DEFECT THAT IS SERIOUS OR
GRAVE AND WHICH HAS BEEN IN EXISTENCE AT THE TIME OF CELEBRATION OF THE MARRIAGE,
AND IS INCURABLE. — Fely's hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of respondent Crasus; her
marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her American family and her American surname, may have hurt
and embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Nonetheless, the afore-described characteristics,
behavior, and acts of Fely do not satisfactorily establish a psychological or mental defect that is serious or grave, and
which has been in existence at the time of celebration of the marriage, and is incurable. Even when the rules have been
relaxed and the personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the totality of evidence
presented during trial by respondent Crasus, as the spouse seeking the declaration of nullity of marriage, must still
prove the gravity, judicial antecedence, and incurability of the alleged psychological incapacity; which, it failed to do
so herein.
 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; BY ITS PLAIN AND LITERAL INTERPRETATION, ARTICLE 26, PARAGRAPH 2 OF
THE FAMILY CODE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE CASE OF RESPONDENT AND HIS WIFE BECAUSE AT
THE TIME THE LATTER OBTAINED HER DIVORCE, SHE WAS STILL A FILIPINO CITIZEN. — As it is
worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the married couple is a foreigner who
divorces his or her Filipino spouse. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the
case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino
citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that
she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she
married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since
1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights
and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and
even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly
obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, AS THE PRINCIPAL LAW OFFICER AND LEGAL
DEFENDER OF THE GOVERNMENT IS AUTHORIZED TO INTERVENE ON BEHALF OF THE REPUBLIC
IN PROCEEDINGS FOR ANNULMENT AND DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE. — That Article
48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office from intervening in proceedings
for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages.Executive Order No. 292,otherwise known as the Administrative
Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor General as the principal law officer and legal defender of the Government. His
Office is tasked to represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and
agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. The Office of the
Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the
services of lawyers. The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the
State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing
collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor
General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the land, then his intervention in such proceedings could
only serve and contribute to the realization of such intent, rather than thwart it.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ONLY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL IS AUTHORIZED TO BRING OR DEFEND
ACTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE OR THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ONCE THE CASE IS
BROUGHT BEFORE THE COURT OR THE COURT OF APPEALS. — The general rule is that only the Solicitor
General is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the
case is brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals. While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively
participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC,
the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it
shall be eventually responsible for taking the case to the appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is only
reasonable and practical that even while the proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor
General can already exercise supervision and control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to
better guarantee the protection of the interests of the State.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; AUTHORITY OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL TO INTERVENE AND TAKE PART IN
PROCEEDINGS FOR ANNULMENT AND DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS WELL-
SETTLED AND INDUBITABLE. — This Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the Solicitor General
in several cases for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages that were appealed before it, summarized as
follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta — In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)],
this Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which
concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State: (8)
The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15)
days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. [Id., at 213] This Court in the case of
Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)] reiterated its pronouncement in Republic v. Court of Appeals [Supra.]
regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State. . .
. Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages, which became effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel any other doubts of respondent
Crasus as to the authority of the Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. The Rule recognizes
the authority of the Solicitor General to intervene and take part in the proceedings for annulment and declaration of
nullity of marriages before the RTC and on appeal to higher courts.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, 1 affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, 2 declaring the marriage between
respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines.
The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint 3 for declaration of nullity of
marriage by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997. According to the said Complaint, respondent Crasus married Fely
on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had
five children — Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos — who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration
of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant." In 1984,
Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the youngest then
being only six years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent
Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request.
Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married
to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her American
family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was
afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several
times more: in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their fourth
child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her American family in New Jersey,
U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the
wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which she was named as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." At the
time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no
more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Fely's acts
brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the
essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration
of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the
Philippines. ITDHSE
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim 4 with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She asserted therein that she was
already an American citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus. While she admitted being
previously married to respondent Crasus and having five children with him, Fely refuted the other allegations made
by respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She explained that she was no more hot-tempered than any normal person,
and she may had been indignant at respondent Crasus on certain occasions but it was because of the latter's
drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find employment and to contribute to the maintenance of their
household. She could not have been extravagant since the family hardly had enough money for basic needs. Indeed,
Fely left for abroad for financial reasons as respondent Crasus had no job and what she was then earning as the sole
breadwinner in the Philippines was insufficient to support their family. Although she left all of her children with
respondent Crasus, she continued to provide financial support to them, as well as, to respondent Crasus. Subsequently,
Fely was able to bring her children to the U.S.A., except for one, Calvert, who had to stay behind for medical reasons.
While she did file for divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus
requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married
her American husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her American husband was
legal because now being an American citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely
also pointed out that respondent Crasus himself was presently living with another woman who bore him a child. She
also accused respondent Crasus of misusing the amount of P90,000.00 which she advanced to him to finance the brain
operation of their son, Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to
respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00 she advanced
to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses.
After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial Briefs, 5 the RTC afforded both parties
the opportunity to present their evidence. Petitioner Republic participated in the trial through the Provincial Prosecutor
of Cebu. 6
Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in support of his Complaint: (1) his own
testimony on 08 September 1997, in which he essentially reiterated the allegations in his Complaint; 7 (2) the
Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the Health Department of Cebu City, on the recording of the Marriage Contract
between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of Deeds, such marriage celebration taking place on 16 December
1961; 8 and (3) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein Fely openly used her American
husband's surname, Micklus. 9
Fely's counsel filed a Notice, 10 and, later on, a Motion, 11 to take the deposition of witnesses, namely, Fely
and her children, Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the consular officers of the Philippines
in New York and California, U.S.A, where the said witnesses reside. Despite the Orders 12 and
Commissions 13 issued by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of New York and California, U.S.A., to take the
depositions of the witnesses upon written interrogatories, not a single deposition was ever submitted to the RTC.
Taking into account that it had been over a year since respondent Crasus had presented his evidence and that Fely
failed to exert effort to have the case progress, the RTC issued an Order, dated 05 October 1998, 14 considering Fely
to have waived her right to present her evidence. The case was thus deemed submitted for decision.
Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of respondent
Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio, on the basis of the following findings —
The ground bearing defendant's psychological incapacity deserves a reasonable
consideration. As observed, plaintiff's testimony is decidedly credible. The Court finds that
defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological incapacity to comply with
her marital duties such as striving for family unity, observing fidelity, mutual love, respect, help
and support. From the evidence presented, plaintiff adequately established that the defendant
practically abandoned him. She obtained a divorce decree in the United States of America and
married another man and has establish [sic] another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous
situation, wherein he is married to a wife who is already married to another man in another
country. ACTESI
Defendant's intolerable traits may not have been apparent or manifest before the
marriage, the FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows the annulment of the marriage provided that
these were eventually manifested after the wedding. It appears to be the case in this instance.
Certainly defendant's posture being an irresponsible wife erringly reveals her very low
regard for that sacred and inviolable institution of marriage which is the foundation of human
society throughout the civilized world. It is quite evident that the defendant is bereft of the mind,
will and heart to comply with her marital obligations, such incapacity was already there at the
time of the marriage in question is shown by defendant's own attitude towards her marriage to
plaintiff.
In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendant's psychological incapacity to
comply with the essential marital obligations which already existed at the time of the marriage in
question has been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein case establishes the
irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.
 Going over plaintiff's testimony which is decidedly credible, the Court finds that the
defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of such psychological incapacity to comply
with her marital obligations. These are her excessive disposition to material things over and above
the marital stability. That such incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in question
is shown by defendant's own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff. And for these reasons there
is a legal ground to declare the marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada Rosal
Iyoy null and void ab initio. 15
Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law and evidence,
filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its Decision, dated 30 July 2001, affirmed
the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible error therein. It even offered additional ratiocination for
declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely null and void, to wit —

Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has remarried, and is now
permanently residing in the United States. Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this as one of his
reasons for seeking the declaration of nullity of their marriage. . .
xxx xxx xxx
Article 26 of the Family Code provides:
"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with
the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5)
and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
"WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A
FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER
VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM
OR HER TO REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE
CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW."
The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision is to avoid the
absurd and unjust situation of a Filipino citizen still being married to his or her alien spouse,
although the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he or she has obtained a
divorce abroad. In the case at bench, the defendant has undoubtedly acquired her American
husband's citizenship and thus has become an alien as well. This Court cannot see why the benefits
of Art. 26 aforequoted can not be extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually embraces
another citizenship and thus becomes herself an alien.
It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances, plaintiff would still be
considered as married to defendant, given her total incapacity to honor her marital covenants to
the former. To condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage that in truth and in fact does
not exist and to remain married to a spouse who is incapacitated to discharge essential marital
covenants, is verily to condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage which this Court finds abhorrent
and will not countenance. Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief by affirming the trial court's
declaration of the nullity of the marriage of the parties. 16
After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002, 17 denied its Motion for Reconsideration,
petitioner Republic filed the instant Petition before this Court, based on the following arguments/grounds —
I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent's wife do not per se constitute
psychological incapacity. SDEHIa
II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in accord with law and
jurisprudence considering that the Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in ruling that
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable to the case at bar. 18
 In his Comment 19 to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that Fely's psychological incapacity was
clearly established after a full-blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines
was indeed applicable to the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely, because the latter had already become an
American citizen. He further questioned the personality of petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General, to institute the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines authorizes
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the
State, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.
After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws and jurisprudence, this Court finds the
instant Petition to be meritorious.
I
The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding of psychological
incapacity of Fely.
Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the Family Code of the Philippines, reads
—
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological incapacity. In a series of cases, this Court laid
down guidelines for determining its existence.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, 20 the term psychological incapacity was defined, thus —
". . . [P]sychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated. . .
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by —
(a) Gravity — It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence — It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability — It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of
the party involved. 21
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines were handed down by this Court inRepublic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, 22 which, although quite
lengthy, by its significance, deserves to be reproduced below —
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state. HaAISC
 The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained
in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological
— not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them,
could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists. 23
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their
"I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. . .
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element
in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. . .
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with
the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from
the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of thedefensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. 24

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos, 25 further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent
spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration
of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to allege expert
opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. 26 Such psychological incapacity,
however, must be established by the totality of the evidence presented during the trial.
 Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this Court finds that the totality of
evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife
Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines. HTDCAS
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his testimony, which can
be easily put into question for being self-serving, in the absence of any other corroborating evidence. He submitted
only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on the recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage
Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the
invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American husband's surname. Even
considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasus's Complaint filed with the RTC,
the evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that prevented her from
assuming the essential obligations of marriage.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect
or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. 27 Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article. 28
As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 "is not to be confused with a divorce
law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume." 29
Fely's hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of respondent Crasus; her marriage to an
American; and even her flaunting of her American family and her American surname, may have hurt and embarrassed
respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Nonetheless, the afore-described characteristics, behavior, and acts of
Fely do not satisfactorily establish a psychological or mental defect that is serious or grave, and which has been in
existence at the time of celebration of the marriage, and is incurable. Even when the rules have been relaxed and the
personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of
their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, 30the totality of evidence presented during trial
by respondent Crasus, as spouse seeking the declaration of nullity of marriage, must still prove the gravity, judicial
antecedence, and incurability of the alleged psychological incapacity; 31 which, it failed to do so herein.
Moreover, this Court resolves any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. 32 No less
than the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and
marriage as the foundation of the family. 33
II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the
Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines —
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the married couple is a
foreigner who divorces his or her Filipino spouse. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot
be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she
was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed
before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in
1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an
American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to
the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine
laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad.
Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely
could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus. cSCTEH
III
The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene,
on behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.
Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent Crasus argued that only the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to the RTC may intervene on behalf of the State in proceedings for annulment or declaration
of nullity of marriages; hence, the Office of the Solicitor General had no personality to file the instant Petition on
behalf of the State. Article 48 provides —
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the
Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State
to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed.
That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office from
intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order No. 292,otherwise
known as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor General as the principal law officer and legal
defender of the Government. 34 His Office is tasked to represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services
of lawyers. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall
discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers. 35
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the State is
represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion
between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor General is
the principal law officer and legal defender of the land, then his intervention in such proceedings could only serve and
contribute to the realization of such intent, rather than thwart it.
Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is authorized to bring or defend actions on
behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or the Court of
Appeals. 36 While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of the State, in a
proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General
takes over when the case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be eventually responsible for
taking the case to the appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and practical that even
while the proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can already exercise
supervision and control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee the protection
of the interests of the State.
In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the Solicitor General in several cases for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages that were appealed before it, summarized as follows in the case
of Ancheta v. Ancheta 37 —
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this Court laid down
the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which
concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed
down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted
in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with
the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within
fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of
 the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. [Id., at 213] IDEHCa

This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)] reiterated its
pronouncement in Republic v. Court of Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State. . .
Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, 38 which became effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel any other doubts of
respondent Crasus as to the authority of the Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. The
Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General to intervene and take part in the proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages before the RTC and on appeal to higher courts. The pertinent provisions of the said
Rule are reproduced below —
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. —
xxx xxx xxx
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the
Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five
days from the date of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the same
period.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 18. Memoranda. — The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in
consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda in support
of their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office
of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the
State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of
the period herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the
memoranda.
Sec. 19. Decision. —
xxx xxx xxx
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be served
with copies of the decision personally or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by
publication failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be published
once in a newspaper of general circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the
parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal
is filed by any of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 20. Appeal. —
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Notice of Appeal. — An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from
the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion
for reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the
adverse parties.
Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and the Court of Appeals,
and sustains the validity and existence of the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely. At most, Fely's
abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent Crasus grounds to file forlegal separation under Article
55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the same
Code. While this Court commiserates with respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is now a
hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of those situations where neither law nor society can provide the specific
answer to every individual problem. 39
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-
20077, dated 30 October 1998, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely
Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting. ISDCaT
SO ORDERED.
||| (Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, [September 21, 2005], 507 PHIL 485-508)
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 196049. June 26, 2013.]

MINORU FUJIKI, petitioner, vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI

MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, and THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J p:

The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails
the Order 1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of
petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay)
in the Philippines 2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner's parents. Thus, Fujiki could not
bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved,
Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan.
However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki. 3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay
obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on
the ground of bigamy. 4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of
Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court
judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab
initio under Articles 35 (4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; 5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local
Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between
Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General
in the National Statistics Office (NSO). 6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition and
withdrawing the case from its active civil docket. 7The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. —
(a) Who may file. — A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife.
xxx xxx xxx
 Sec. 4. Venue. — The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where
the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of
filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at
the election of the petitioner. . . .
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above provisions.
The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5 (4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to
comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the
petition." 8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or
Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil
actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition
for recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular
fact," 9 and not a civil action which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong." 10 In other words, the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki
and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the
Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35 (4) of the Family Code of the Philippines 11 on bigamy and was
therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts. 12
In any case, it was also Fujiki's view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under Article 36 of
the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. 13 Thus, Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides
that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the wife."
To apply Section 2 (a) in bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the
words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage
declared a nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage." 14 Fujiki had material interest and
therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is
applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753) 15 in relation to
Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or
annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the municipality where
the dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized." 17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry
relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning" are subject to cancellation or correction. 18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate the
judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. CaAIES
Fujiki's motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it
dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue
with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own.
Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court 19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the
defendant's prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the
case." 20 Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition under
Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner's motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated
that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage. 21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e., lack of personality to sue and improper venue
under Sections 2 (a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person" 22 in the
proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he
now seeks to be judicially recognized, . . . ." 23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety
of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) . . . as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it
should be taken together with the other ground cited by the Court . . . which is Sec. 2 (a) . . . ." 24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. 25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of
entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction
to nullify marriages . . . ." 26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can
be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as
[a] petition [for correction of entry] . . . ." 27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The
trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the petition. 28 Moreover, the verification and
certification against forum shopping of the petition was not authenticated as required under Section 5 29 of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and
the Letters of Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for review. 30 The public
respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO,
participated through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation and Motion. 31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC's "pronouncement that the petitioner failed to
comply with . . . A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC . . . be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further
proceedings. 32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who
can sue to declare the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-
Llave v. Republic 33 which held that Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy.
In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained: SCHATc
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered
during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss
had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous
marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void
and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the
one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous
marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent
marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior
marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution. 34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment may be made in a
Rule 108 proceeding. 35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas, 36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce
decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact." 37 While Corpuzconcerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment
also affected the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial
decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code.In other
words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a
person's legal capacity and status . . . ." 38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a
Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule
108, citing De Castro v. De Castro 39 andNiñal v. Bayadog 40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage
may be collaterally attacked." 41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to comment on the
petition. 42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to
Fujiki. 43 Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on Marinay. 44 On the other hand, Marinay
wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition. 45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything
she say might cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki. 46 ScTaEA
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one
of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, 47 this Court held that the rule
in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage
"does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy." 48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court.
To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court. 49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese
Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has
custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may
be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by
the seal of office. 50 EaISTD
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial
court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition, 51 the service of
summons, 52 the investigation of the public prosecutor, 53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the trial 55 and the judgment of
the trial court. 56 This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign
judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues." 57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount
to relitigating the case on the merits. InMijares v. Rañada, 58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a
foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action,
rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation." 59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its
parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and
other mandatory laws. 60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to
the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for
effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom
it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine
court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume
to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on
the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus,
Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence. ECcTaS
Section 48 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a person creates
a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title."
Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine
courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign
judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds
external to its merits, i.e., "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations, 61 as
well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states. 62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a
Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence. 64 Divorce involves the
dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law,
Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree
abroad. 65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the
Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared
void from the beginning under Article 35 (4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of theRevised
Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule
132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish
a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person's life which are recorded
by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth,
death or marriage, 66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto.
Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding
itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact." 67 AIaHES
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status
as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the
entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese
Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage
he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation
of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The
interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) 68 his
most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he
contracts marriage. 69These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family" 70 and preserving the property regime of the marriage. 71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, 72 but a spouse's right in a marriage
extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife")
of the Family Code. 73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the
spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage. 74 In any case, Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this
substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law. DHSCTI
Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of
a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2 (a) states that "[a] petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife" 75 — it refers to the
husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35 (4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void
from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The
husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35 (4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, 76which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate
prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes. 77 If anyone
can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage, 78 there is more reason to
confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in
the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of
protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore
interested in the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the
bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most
of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse." 80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled
to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the
Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in
the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court has no
jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court. 81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] . . . can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the
marriage. 82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral
attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara. EAcTDH
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to
invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these
safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage, 83 support pendente
lite of the spouses and children, 84 the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, 85 and
the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. 86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under
the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located." 87 In other
words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the
civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the
recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of
the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify
a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes
a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not
apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen
of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree
to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v.
Orbecido, 88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse" 89 under the laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because
the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to
trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results from a marriage
between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly
consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of
his or her country. The correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree,
which is already effective in the country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code is based on this Court's decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo 90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not
be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served." 91 IDETCA
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who
obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition
abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated
to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino
spouse will be discriminated — the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to correct a situation
where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover,
notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a
foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy.
A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as
expressed in Article 35 (4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has
the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case
was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and
legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the
question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect
to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an
overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to
repel the foreign judgment, i.e., want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine
courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48 (b), Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the parties."
Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the
correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact 92 that needs to be reflected in the civil
registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment
and the public records in the Philippines.
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution
for bigamy under Article 349 of theRevised Penal Code. 93 The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal
Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy]
shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago." CcHDSA
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the questions on venue and
the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance
with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Fujiki v. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, [June 26, 2013], 712 PHIL 524-558)
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 186571. August 11, 2010.]

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, petitioner, vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The
SOLICITOR GENERAL, respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J p:

Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City,
Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review oncertiorari 2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization on November 29, 2000. 3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto.
Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. 4 Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon
after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked
to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada
and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert's petition
for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006. 5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of
marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and
registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn's marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the
divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between
him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be
judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. 6 IHDCcT
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration
of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive
pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to
Gerbert's petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and
personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to
Gerbert's.
In its October 30, 2008 decision, 7 the RTC denied Gerbert's petition. The RTC concluded that
Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he
is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, 8 in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine
law. 9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III; 10 the
provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." 11
 THE PETITION
From the RTC's ruling, 12 Gerbert filed the present petition. 13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed
in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling
unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse
— an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is
a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiancée in the Philippines since two
marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor
General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments, 14both support Gerbert's position. SAcaDE
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends
to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURT'S RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right
under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in
favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages — void 15 and
voidable 16 marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the
marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of
the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage. 17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce
between Filipino citizens. 18
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien,
President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution, 19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present
wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law
this Court's holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 21 In both cases, the Court refused
to acknowledge the alien spouse's assertion of marital rights after a foreign court's divorce decree between the
alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond
between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain . . . that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married
to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations . . . cannot be just. [The Filipino
spouse] should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served. 22 aCHDST
 As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse." 23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital
status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien
spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. 24 Without the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding
instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the
Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; 25 Article 17 of
the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated
in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct
exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino
spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to
the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to
remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No
court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already
established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law. 26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the
Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is
presumptive evidence of a right that
clothes the party with legal interest to
petition for its recognition in this
jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion — i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens — with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not
sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert's petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition
the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity
and conformity with the alien's national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as
a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Courtwhich
provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states: aTEScI
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order
of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order
is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order
is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final
order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with
the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a
divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law. 27
 The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts
do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign
is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." 28 This
means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together
with the alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. 29 The
recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party
invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerbert's case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his
or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies
attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the
Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by
the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required
certificates proving its authenticity, 30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. 31 Under this
situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we
deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent
with the Canadian divorce law. DCASIT
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will
be served and the Filipina wife's (Daisylyn's) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time,
will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner's presumptive
evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a
recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata 32 between
the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. 33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of
foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper
basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect,
as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the
recognition of the foreign divorce
decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already
recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn's marriage certificate based on the mere presentation
of the decree. 34 We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench
and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status
of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees
that produce legal consequences touching upon a person's legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his
personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such
as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not." 35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person's legal capacity
and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires
the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. — A civil register is established for recording the civil status of
persons, in which shall be entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
 (c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces; EHDCAI
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the
following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil
status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register.
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized
but also divorces and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization
register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the
decree by themselves do not ipso factoauthorize the decree's registration. The law should be read in relation with
the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the
context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig
City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn's marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree
presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as
it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, 36 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982 37 —
both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a
marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For
being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is
patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the
Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition
for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for
the cancellation of entries in the civil registry. STHDAc
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected,
without judicial order." The Rules of Courtsupplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing
for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied
with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also
requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located; 38 that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
must be made parties to the proceedings; 39 and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a
newspaper of general circulation. 40As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present
case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
 We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate
proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry — one for recognition of the
foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of theRules of Court. The
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party
or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding 41 by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of
jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30,
2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We
order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let
a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, [August 11, 2010], 642 PHIL 420-438)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 200233. July 15, 2015.]

LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, C.J p:
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago from the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566. 1 The CA affirmed the
Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 7232 2 convicting her of bigamy.
THE FACTS
Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997, 3 Leonila G. Santiago and
Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information 4 for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded "not guilty," while her putative husband
escaped the criminal suit. 5
The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang since 2 June
1974, 6 asked petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who was a 43-year-old widow then, married Santos on 29 July
1997 despite the advice of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law that if she wanted to remarry, she should choose
someone who was "without responsibility." 7
Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an accused in the crime of
bigamy, because she had been under the belief that Santos was still single when they got married. She also averred
that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to her should be proven valid by the prosecution;
but in this case, she argued that their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license.
Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang, testified for the
prosecution. She alleged that she had met petitioner as early as March and April 1997, on which occasions the
former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos. Petitioner denied this allegation and averred that she met
Galang only in August and September 1997, or after she had already married Santos.
THE RTC RULING
 The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos during the subsistence of his
marriage to Galang. Based on the more credible account of Galang that she had already introduced herself as the
legal wife of Santos in March and April 1997, the trial court rejected the affirmative defense of petitioner that she
had not known of the first marriage. It also held that it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to be
easily duped by a person like Santos. 8
The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, "her marriage was celebrated without
a need for a marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code, which is an admission that she
cohabited with Santos long before the celebration of their marriage." 9 Thus, the trial court convicted petitioner
as follows: 10
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused Leonila G.
Santiago GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy, defined and penalized
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code and imposes against her the indeterminate penalty
of six (6) months and one (1) day ofPrision Correctional as minimum to six (6) years and one
(1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum. SDHTEC
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage to Santos was void ab initio for
having been celebrated without complying with Article 34 of the Family Code, which provides an exemption
from the requirement of a marriage license if the parties have actually lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years prior to the celebration of their marriage. In her case, petitioner asserted that she and Santos had
not lived together as husband and wife for five years prior to their marriage. Hence, she argued that the absence
of a marriage license effectively rendered their marriage null and void, justifying her acquittal from bigamy.
The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus: 11
Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused that is null and void
as it was celebrated without a valid marriage license . . . . In advancing that theory, accused
wants this court to pass judgment on the validity of her marriage to accused Santos, something
this court can not do. The best support to her argument would have been the submission of a
judicial decree of annulment of their marriage. Absent such proof, this court cannot declare
their marriage null and void in these proceedings.
THE CA RULING
On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was not based on proof beyond
reasonable doubt. She attacked the credibility of Galang and insisted that the former had not known of the previous
marriage of Santos.
Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution witnesses' narration. It likewise
disbelieved the testimony of Santos. Anent the lack of a marriage license, the appellate court simply stated that
the claim was a vain attempt to put the validity of her marriage to Santos in question. Consequently, the CA
affirmed her conviction for bigamy. 12
THE ISSUES
Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in the instant case, because she
was not aware of Santos's previous marriage. But in the main, she argues that for there to be a conviction for
bigamy, a valid second marriage must be proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Citing People v. De Lara, 13 she contends that her marriage to Santos is void because of the absence of
a marriage license. She elaborates that their marriage does not fall under any of those marriages exempt from a
marriage license, because they have not previously lived together exclusively as husband and wife for at least five
years. She alleges that it is extant in the records that she married Santos in 1997, or only four years since she met
him in 1993. Without completing the five-year requirement, she posits that their marriage without a license is
void.
In the Comment 14 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondent advances the argument
that the instant Rule 45 petition should be denied for raising factual issues as regards her husband's subsequent
marriage. As regards petitioner's denial of any knowledge of Santos's first marriage, respondent reiterates that
credible testimonial evidence supports the conclusion of the courts a quo that petitioner knew about the subsisting
marriage.
The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before
the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in
the proper proceedings.
In Montañez v. Cipriano, 15 this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy as follows:
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married;
(b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved . . .; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent
marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having
all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.
(Emphasis supplied) AScHCD
For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime, People v. Nepomuceno, Jr. 16 instructs
that she should have had knowledge of the previous subsisting marriage. People v. Archilla 17 likewise states that
the knowledge of the second wife of the fact of her spouse's existing prior marriage constitutes an indispensable
cooperation in the commission of bigamy, which makes her responsible as an accomplice.
THE RULING OF THE COURT
The penalty for bigamy and
petitioner's knowledge of Santos's
first marriage
The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who marry each other
while the previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting. As explained in Nepomuceno: 18
In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending
on the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without being aware of
his previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved
marriage of the accused could she be included in the information as a co-
accused. (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner's knowledge of Santos's marriage to Galang.
Both courts consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality of the following
circumstances: 19 (1) when Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in the house of her in-laws, they openly
showed their disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to not know of his true
civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the more credible witness compared with petitioner who had various
inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that she had already told petitioner on two occasions that the
former was the legal wife of Santos.
After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse or modify the factual findings of the
RTC, less so in the present case in which its findings were affirmed by the CA. Indeed, the trial court's assessment
of the credibility of witnesses deserves great respect, since it had the important opportunity to observe firsthand
the expression and demeanor of the witnesses during the trial. 20
Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the ruling that she was validly
charged with bigamy. However, we disagree with the lower courts' imposition of the principal penalty on
her. To recall, the RTC, which the CA affirmed, meted out to her the penalty within the range of prision
correccional as minimum to prision mayor as maximum.
Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla 21 holds that the second spouse, if indicted
in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice. In referring to Viada, Justice Luis B. Reyes, an eminent
authority in criminal law, writes that "a person, whether man or woman, who knowingly consents or agrees to be
married to another already bound in lawful wedlock is guilty as an accomplice in the crime of
bigamy." 22 Therefore, her conviction should only be that for an accomplice to the crime.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for a principal in the crime of
bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six years and one day to twelve years. Since the criminal
participation of petitioner is that of an accomplice, the sentence imposable on her is the penalty next lower in
degree, 23 prision correccional, which has a duration of six months and one day to six years. There being neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, this penalty shall be imposed in its medium period consisting of two
years, four months and one day to four years and two months of imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, 24 petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in
degree, arresto mayor, which has a duration of one month and one day to six months imprisonment.
The criminal liability of petitioner
resulting from her marriage to
Santos
Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or subsequent
marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity. 25 If the accused wants to raise the nullity of the
marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense during the presentation of evidence in the trial proper of the
criminal case. 26 In this case, petitioner has consistently 27 questioned below the validity of her marriage to
Santos on the ground that marriages celebrated without the essential requisite of a marriage license are void ab
initio. 28
Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The RTC stated that it could not pass
judgment on the validity of the marriage. The CA held that the attempt of petitioner to attack her union with
Santos was in vain.
On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked certain issues and facts, 29 and given that
an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review, 30 this Court now resolves to correct the error
of the courts a quo.
After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos took place
without a marriage license. The absence of this requirement is purportedly explained in their Certificate of
Marriage, which reveals that their union was celebrated under Article 34 of the Family Code. The provision reads
as follows:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that
he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the
marriage. AcICHD
Therefore, the marriage of petitioner and Santos would have been exempted from a marriage license had
they cohabited exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years before their marriage. 31
Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in February 1996 32 and
that after six months of courtship, 33 she married him on 29 July 1997. Without any objection from the
prosecution, petitioner testified that Santos had frequently visited her in Castellano, Nueva Ecija, prior to their
marriage. However, he never cohabited with her, as she was residing in the house of her in-laws, 34 and her
children from her previous marriage disliked him. 35 On cross-examination, respondent did not question the claim
of petitioner that sometime in 1993, she first met Santos as an agent who sold her piglets. 36
All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each other for only
less than four years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have cohabited for at least five years prior to
their marriage.
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact. Although the
records do not show that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the Family Code,
it appears that the two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they had actually
cohabited for at least five years before they married each other. Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie was the
issuance of the Certificate of Marriage, 37 in which the solemnizing officer stated under oath that no marriage
license was necessary, because the marriage was solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.
The legal effects in a criminal case
of a deliberate act to put a flaw in the
marriage
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the misrepresentation perpetrated
by them that they were eligible to contract marriage without a license. We thus face an anomalous situation
wherein petitioner seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions of (1) marrying Santos without a
marriage license despite knowing that they had not satisfied the cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2)
falsely making claims in no less than her marriage contract.
We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in an effort
to escape criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an individual's deliberate
disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct character of this special bond between spouses. 38 In Tenebro v. Court
of Appeals, 39 we had the occasion to emphasize that the State's penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered
nugatory by allowing individuals "to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner,
and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women
with the promise of futurity and commitment."
Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner's illegal acts of feigning a marriage and, in the
same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would only make a mockery of the sanctity of
marriage. 40
Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will "lend its aid to . . . one who has consciously
and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is founded." 41 If the cause of
action appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which involves a transgression of positive law, parties shall be left
unassisted by the courts. 42 As a result, litigants shall be denied relief on the ground that their conduct has been
inequitable, unfair and dishonest or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. 43
Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this criminal case of bigamy,
is that her marriage with Santos was void for having been secured without a marriage license. But as elucidated
earlier, they themselves perpetrated a false Certificate of Marriage by misrepresenting that they were exempted
from the license requirement based on their fabricated claim that they had already cohabited as husband and wife
for at least five years prior their marriage. In violation of our law against illegal marriages, 44 petitioner married
Santos while knowing fully well that they had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement under
Article 34 of the Family Code. Consequently, it will be the height of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner
to use her illegal act to escape criminal conviction.
The applicability of People v. De
Lara
Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an acquittal for bigamy on the ground
that the second marriage lacked the requisite marriage license. In that case, the Court found that when Domingo
de Lara married his second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18 August 1951, the local Civil Registrar had yet to issue
their marriage license on 19 August 1951. Thus, since the marriage was celebrated one day before the issuance
of the marriage license, the Court acquitted him of bigamy.
Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public documents in order to contract a
second marriage. In contrast, petitioner and Santos fraudulently secured a Certificate of Marriage, and petitioner
later used this blatantly illicit act as basis for seeking her exculpation. Therefore, unlike our treatment of the
accused in De Lara, this Court cannot regard petitioner herein as innocent of the crime. TAIaHE
No less than the present Constitution provides that "marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." 45 It must be safeguarded from the whims and
caprices of the contracting parties. 46 In keeping therefore with this fundamental policy, this Court affirms the
conviction of petitioner for bigamy.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago
is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566 is AFFIRMED
 with MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of bigamy as an accomplice. She is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months
of arresto mayor as minimum to four years of prision correccional as maximum plus accessory penalties
provided by law.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Santiago v. People, G.R. No. 200233, [July 15, 2015])