PhilComSat v.

Alcuaz
GR No. 84818 December 18, 1989

Facts:
Petitioner Philcomsat was granted to construct and operate such ground facilities to deliver
telecommunications services from the communication satellite system and other terminals by virtue of RA
5514. The petitioner was also signatory to other international telecommunications satellite organization
and they also leased their satellite to other telecommunications company nationwide. Under Sec. 5 of RA
5514, it provides that the petitioner was exempt from jurisdiction of the NTC by pursuant to EO 196 the
petitioner was placed under control, jurisdiction and regulation of the NTC. The respondents required
them to apply a certificate of public convenience and necessity on which the NTC has authority to charge
rates therefor. Consequently, they filed their application for authority and with pending hearing about the
operations of petitioner as public telecommunications without control of respondents. Petitioner was
granted a provisional authority to continue operating for six months when the provisional was ended the
latter extended for another 6 months. On which NTC approved their extended provisional authority
provided they reduced their rates to 15%. But, petitioner assails the order of NTC violates procedural due
process for having been issued without prior notice and hearing also the rate reduction imposes is unjust,
thus constitutive of a violation substantive due process.

Issue:
Whether or not the NTC violates procedural due process and substantive due process?

Ruling:
Yes. Under Sec. 16 of the Public Service Act stated therein proceedings of the commission, upon notice
and hearing the commission shall have the power, upon proper notice and hearing accordance with the
rules and provisions, subject to the limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving provisions. It is clear
with regards of rate fixing; respondent has no authority to make such order without first giving notice and
hearing to petitioner, whether the said order is temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the
same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon a commission’s own motion as in the
present case.

Suntay vs People
GR No. L9430 june 29, 1957

Facts:
On or about June 21, 1954, the accused took the victim which is a minor from St. Paul Colleges in
Quezon City with lewd design and have carnal knowledge of her somewhere near UP compound in
Diliman. On December 15, 1954, after investigation, an assistant city attorney recommended the city
attorney that the complaint should be dismissed for lack of merit. Then the city attorney urged that the
complaint for seduction should be file against the accused. Hence, the petitioner was granted a passport
on which he left the Philippines to study in the USA. On January 1955, the victim swore a complaint
charging the accused for seduction. Private prosecutor filed a motion praying that the accused should be
brought back to the Philippines so that he may be dealt with accordance of law. With the court granted the
motion, instructing the ambassador to the US by ordering the consul general to cancel the passport of the
accused and compel him to return to the Philippines and to answer criminal charges against him.
However, petitioner’s counsel wrote a letter for reconsideration but the court denied the motion. Petitioner
contends that the cancellation of passport of the accused by the DFA, the court cannot take discretionary
power away from Secretary of DFA, and it has the power to cancel the passport. And he also contends
that such discretion cannot be exercised until after hearing because of right to travel or stay is personal
liberty and hence cannot be deprived of his right without due process.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused or petitioner has been deprive of due process of law?

Ruling:
No. The court held that the petitioner whom holds the passport is facing criminal charges in our courts
and left the country to evade criminal charges filed against to him. With the Secretary of DFA exercised
his discretion to revoke the passport of the accused cannot be held acted capriciously. In due process
does not mean it requires hearing, when the officer exercised their discretion vested upon it, in this case,
the serious criminal charge against the petitioner, with hearing may be dispensed as a prerequisite to the
cancellation of his passport. Such lack of hearing does not violate the due process of law and the
exercise of discretion vested upon the officer cannot be deemed acted as capriciously because of such
absence of hearing. If hearing should always be held in order to comply with the due process of clause of
the Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be violative of the said clause.

De Bishop v. Galang
GR No. L-18365 May 31, 1963

Facts:
Petitioner is an American citizen, was allowed to stay in the Philippines for three years and was employed
at Bissmag Production of which he was the President and General Manager of said incorporation. When
the expiration of his stayed in the Philippines, then he applied for extension of stay with the BID, however,
the confidential and damage reports received by the BID that the said incorporation is doing illicit
operations and petitioner is evading the payment of taxes. The BID refused to extend his application to
stay and he should depart within 5 days, but the counsel of petitioner requested a copy of the said
decision of BID. But appellant commissioner raises two main issues: that the commissioners of BID are
required by law to conduct formal hearings on all applications for extension of stay of all aliens, and the
said commissioners are enjoined to promulgate written decisions in such cases on which the court agreed
with appellant’s contention.

Issue:
Whether or not the Commissioners of BID are required to conduct formal hearings on such applications of
stay of all aliens in the Philippines?

Ruling:
No. The court held that the administration of immigration laws is the primary and exclusive responsibility
of the executive branch. The extension of stay of aliens is purely discretionary on the part of the
immigration authorities. Since the CA 613 or Immigration Act of 1940, is silent as to the procedure to be
followed in these cases and the court have no jurisdiction regarding to this matter as the circumstances
may warrant, for reasons of practicability and expediency. In this case, that would not violate due process
because the letter of appellant commissioner advising petitioner to depart within 5 days is a mere
formality, a preliminary step, and, therefore, far from final, because, as alleged in appellant’s answer to
the complaint, the requirement to leave before the start of deportation proceedings is only advice to the
party unless he departs voluntarily, the state will be compelled to take steps for his expulsion. It is already
a settled rule in this jurisdiction that a day in court is no matter or right in administrative proceedings.

Var-Orient Shipping Co. v. Achacoso

GR No. 81805 May 31, 1988

Facts:
Petitioners filed a complaint with the WAAO and POEA for allegedly violated their contracts of
employment against the private respondents. Afterwards the case was heard on March 4, 1987 where the
parties agreed to submit their respective position papers and thereafter would be submitted for decision.
Only the private respondents submitted their position paper. A copy of decision was sent to petitioner’s
counsel in his office but he did not receive the decision and petitioners allegedly learned about the
decision only when writ of execution was served on them. Through their new counsel filed another motion
on the ground they did not received the decision. However, the public respondent denied their motion,
petitioners filed a petition and they alleged that: they were denied of due process of law because there is
no formal hearing of the case.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners were denied of due process because the decision was rendered without formal
hearing?

Ruling:
No. the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the case or
the ruling complained of. The fact is that at the hearing of the case on March 4, 1987, it was agreed by
the parties that they would file their respective memoranda and thereafter consider the case submitted for
decision. This procedure is authorized by law to expedite labor disputes. However, only private
respondents submitted memoranda on which the petitioner did not submit any motion. On June 10, 1987,
the respondents filed a motion to resolve and petitioner’s counsel did not oppose either the “Motion to
Resolve” or respondents “Motion for execution”, both of which were furnished them through counsel. If it
as they had been denied due process in the form of a formal hearing they should have opposed both
motions.

Ang Tibay v. CIR

GR No. L-46496 February 27, 1940

Facts:
Petitioner is the Manager and proprietor of Ang Tibay, on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of
leather soles in said company on which they supply the Philippine Army of the same. With the shortage of
the leather, Toribio caused the layoff of members of National Labor Union. NLU averred the action of
Toribio because it is not valid and it is not within the CBA. In this case they are two labor unions of Ang
Tibay; the NLU and National Worker’s Brotherhood. The NWB is controlled union in Ang Tibay and Toribio
is favour with. But the NLU wants a new trial as they come up with new evidence that they would not
obtain before in the CIR.

Issue:
Whether or not there is due process of law given to the NLU

Ruling:
Yes. The court ruled that there should be new trial in favour of NLU and that all administrative bodies
must exercise the essential requirements of due process. There are primary rights which must be
respected:

1. The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his
own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
2. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evience
presented.
3. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does not imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision.
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
4. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must
be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla it means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
6. The CIR or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of
the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving
at a decision.
7. The CIR should, in all controversial questions, renders its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.