Old-Age Security in Rural Senegal:
The symbolic Baraka motive
Jean-luc Demonsant
A BSTRACT
his paper examines the self-enfor-
cing family contrat between a migrant
son and his ageing father who remained
in the village. Drawing on a survey of
150 households conduted in the Senegal
River Valley, the empirical results sug-
get that the social tatus of the family
is a key to undertand the intergenera-
tional social contrat and its enforce-
ment mechanisms. While the material
bequeathable wealth does not seem to
matter as much as the symbolic pres-
tige of the family, the “Baraka” that
would be transmitted to trutworthy
sons. Hence while belonging to a pres-
tigious family lowers the probability of
a son migrating, it raises the probability
of frequently remitting to the patriarch.
Conversely, sons from disadvantaged
78 DOUNIA, revue d'intelligence stratégique et des relations internationales
groups are more likely to both migrate
and cut ties with their family.
Keywords: Migration; Old-Age
Support; Wet-African Cates; Senegal;
Haalpulaar Society
JEL Classiication: O12; D12; J62
I. INTRODUCTION
Research on aging in Africa is rela-
tively new and explained by two pre-
conceived ideas: Firt, African leaders
are not concerned with ageing issues;
second, the myth of the ‘vieux sage’ (the
wise old man) is till pervasive. In 1994,
the World Bank sent a warning about
global ageing: Africa was no exception
as the share of people over 60 year old
was forecated to double by 2020 (World
Bank, 1994). Respet towards elders
 Old-Age Security in Rural Senegal: The symbolic Baraka motive
is also believed to be working well in
Africa. However, there are more repor-
ted cases of elderly abuse. For example,
Miguel (2005) found in Tanzania that
in times of extreme economic hardship
elderly widows were either killed or ex-
pelled. In a poor agrarian economy, food
scarcity tends to favour the mot pro-
dutive members over young children
or elders. Whereas children will soon
become produtive, elders do not seem
to be in a position to reciprocate. No-
netheless, in developing countries, the
livelihoods of the elderly mainly rely on
the support of the kinship group, espe-
cially the children.
From an economit’s point of view,
there is an informal familial contrat
between the migrant adult child and
the old parents. Love and sense of duty
alone do not provide credible enough in-
centives for the contrat to be self-enfor-
cing. his paper is concerned with iden-
tifying what enforcement mechanisms
exit to make father and migrant son
enter into a contrat. Why do migrants
send subtantial parts of their earnings
to their ageing parents who tayed
behind in the village? What are the
young migrant’s incentives not to renege
on such contrat? What do fathers have
to ofer in return? Based on an original
survey conduted in 2004, around Ma-
tam, Senegal, empirical evidence indi-
cates that within the traditional village
society both migration and remittance
decisions of a son are linked with the
social ranking of his father 1.
In their seminal paper on reciprocity
Coate and Ravallion (1993) developed a
theoretical model of solidarity networks
1. We will indeed focus on father to son relationship as
Haalpulaar is a patrilineal society.
in a village economy, formalizing Faf-
champs (1992), giving the rationale
behind the sutainability of the recipro-
city without any commitment. Facing
the same ex-ante idiosyncratic risks,
villagers help each other today, keeping
in mind that it could well be the other
way around tomorrow. Missing from
the literature is a uniied theoretical
framework for undertanding the enfor-
cement mechanisms that operate when
children provide support to their elderly
parents. Indeed, the reciprocity vanishes,
as old parents are not in a position to re-
ciprocate; yet some commitment exits.
Laferrère and Wolf (2006) for intance
present a great variety of both theoreti-
cal and empirical microeconomic mo-
dels on family transfers in general and
the ‘children as old-age security’ model
in particular. hey recognize that in rea-
lity many mechanisms come into play at
the same time, depending on the phy-
sical contraints as well as the cultural
context.
Ex-ante, economies of scale at the
household level sugget that ageing pa-
rents should co-reside with their child-
ren, and indeed, intergenerational co-re-
sidence is quite common in developing
countries2. However, low-income rural
areas are subjet to risky environments,
and once this feature is taken into ac-
count, sending a family member away
in order to provide support for the fa-
mily in times of hardships seems a much
better response. he ‘new economics
of migration’ led by Oded Stark (1991)
views migration as one of many family
trategies to cope with a risky economic
environment, including crop failures
2. In fat this was the case anywhere, when no reliable
pension sytems exited.
Numéro 7 – Décembre 2013 79
Jean-luc Demonsant
and market imbalances. Often the fa-
mily pay’s the emigrant’s travel expenses
in exchange for remittances from wages
earned. his has been well documented
in theoretical and empirical literature on
the economics of migration and remit-
tances1.
Yet there remains an unsolved ratio-
nality problem: while the gains are ob-
vious from the family viewpoint, they are
less clear from the migrant’s perspetive.
hat is, why wouldn’t a migrant son sim-
ply renege on his obligations to his fami-
ly? he quetion becomes more relevant
when accounting for the motivations of
a young migrant providing support to
his elderly parents, since they are unli-
kely to be in a position to assit him in
return as the mutual insurance contrat
tipulates, in case of unemployment
for intance. One explanation is what
Bernheim, et al (1985) term the ‘Strate-
gic Bequet Motive’ in which children
compete for parents’ inheritance. In this
view, parents can threaten their children
not to bequeath them anything if they
have not been supportive. Accordingly,
young children remit to secure their
bequet. A number of tudies support
the trategic bequet motive. In Bots-
wana, Lucas and Stark (1985) found that
families who own more cattle receive
more remittances than those who do
not. Hoddinott (1992) teted this model
on rural Kenyan data, and found remit-
tances responsive to bequeathable lands.
What happens, then, in a changing
rural society when land or cattle owner-
ship are no longer sought after? What
other variables come into play? I address
these quetions through indings from
1. See Docquier and Rapoport (2006) for a recent review.
80 DOUNIA, revue d'intelligence stratégique et des relations internationales
a ield tudy in Senegal carried out
between 2001 and 2004.
he paper is divided into four sec-
tions. he irt setion begins by descri-
bing the economic and cultural context
of the ieldwork, that is, the Haalpulaa-
ren of the Senegal River middle valley.
he second setion presents the theoreti-
cal framework placing the role of family
pretige as a central enforcement device
for the old-age support arrangements.
he third setion exposes the empirical
trategy - from the data colletion pro-
cess to the econometric speciication -
developed to highlight the relevance of
this hypothesis. After presenting the
results of the household survey, along
with additional qualitative evidence
that support this scenario, some policy
implications on migration and develop-
ment are highlighted.
II. BACKGROUND : M ATAM AND THE
H AALPULAAR SOCIETY
Contraints from the physical envi-
ronment on the one hand and the cultu-
ral context of the area on the other hand
give little credit to the ‘trategic bequet
motive’ thesis. In the Senegal middle
valley migration has long been conside-
red a better trategy than working in the
local agriculture setor. In this context,
the returns to ‘physical’ bequets have
become close to insigniicant for a mi-
grant son.
Less than a century ago, the middle
valley was relatively prosperous and the-
refore economically attrative. he keys
to success were the navigability of the
river, the cattle breeding, and ishing
ativities along with the exitence of
two harvet seasons in Otober and
 Old-Age Security in Rural Senegal: The symbolic Baraka motive
in March. Rain-fed agriculture in the
semi-arid highlands combined with the
lood-fed agriculture by the river banks
allowed such prosperity.
Several fators contributed to render
any agricultural ativity very risky and
almot not proitable at all. Since World
War II, the region has a long tradition
of migration: repeated droughts in the
1970s and 1980s accelerated the phe-
nomenon. To curb rural exodus, the
French during colonization, and the
tate after independence, both inveted
in huge irrigation projets and dams. Ir-
rigation provides year-round crops and
the dam is planned to provide eletricity
to Senegal and the two neighbouring
countries, Mali and Mauritania. Howe-
ver the results are mitigated as the power
supply objetive is not compatible with
natural lood cycles1. Moreover, the cot
of oil and maintenance for motor pumps,
along with the cot of fertilisers and
seeds make it proitable for rich far-
mers or eicient peasant cooperatives
only. he zone is also very remote, and
the national road linking Saint-Louis to
Matam has never been seriously main-
tained so that the local prodution can-
not easily reach the urban setors. For
the vat majority of the peasants of the
valley it remains impossible to make a
self-sutainable business out of it. As a
consequence, nowadays, there are many
schemes and water supplies that are
badly kept. In fat, conventional wis-
dom admits that it is rather diicult to
make a decent living out of agricultural
ativities in the valley. In the mean-
time, migrants engage in conspicuous
consumption either for religious cele-
1. See Adams (2000) for a detailed criticism of the projet.
brations or in housing, after jut a few
years abroad.
he cultural fabric of the Haal-
pulaaren is also ditintive. hey are
rigorous Muslim followers, as they are
responsible for spreading Islam all over
Wet-Africa, and are highly respeted
for that in the country and the sub-re-
gion. his gives an additional argument
againt the ‘trategic bequet motive’, as
Islam has very precise inheritance sha-
ring rules: a son gets one share and a
daughter gets half a share.
he adminitrative sytem is inhe-
rited from the French, but villages have
remained in the hands of the traditio-
nal precolonial chiefs. Descending from
religious or political igureheads of the
Fuuta is the mot sought-after social
recognition. Another very important as-
pet of the family pretige is determined
by which social category the family be-
longs to. Traditional Haalpulaar society,
like many Sahelian societies (see Tamari,
1991), is based on a division into three
main social categories:
1. he ‘free men’ category is the
larget yet the mot heterogeneous
group as both nobles and commo-
ners can be found.
2. he artisans and musicians who
are free but economically dependent
on their patrons. he mot repre-
sentative ones being the griots (in
French): the praise singers.
3. he (descendants of) slaves, who
despite the fat that both Islam and
the 1905 law have abolished slavery,
continue to sufer from much discri-
mination.
Table A.1 in the appendix provides
details about the complexity of this sys-
tem. In reality, the use of the term ‘cate’
Numéro 7 – Décembre 2013 81
Jean-luc Demonsant
is rather controversial, as it usually refers
to the diferent artisan social sub-cate-
gories: les catés in French. In this paper,
‘the cate sytem’ refers to the whole tra-
tiied social organization. It is clear that
all these social categories were not ixed,
but that they evolved as some commo-
ners have trategically been conferred a
title of nobility as a reward for good ser-
vices, or new warriors recruited among
former slaves1. It is important to note
that these categories corresponded to a
genuine need for a speciic job allocation
during the former era. he oicial aboli-
tion of slavery along with the emergence
of the modern market economy render
this classiication outdated on prati-
cal grounds. Likewise, artisans do not
necessarily work in the branch of their
group’s specialization, though both the
artisans and the descendants of slaves
till sufer from discrimination nowa-
days. hey mainly consit of marriage
contraints, as well as denied access to
land, and to political and religious lea-
dership2. Indeed at the political level, if
the adminitrative sytem is absolutely
similar to the French one, villages have
remained in the hands of the traditional
chiefs. It is really triking how relevant
this classiication remains in contempo-
rary Haalpulaar culture.
In this traditional view, your birth
determines your personality (cf., Wane
1969 who depits each cate with a spe-
ciic personal trait). It is said for intance
that you should not trut an artisan be-
cause he may jut be trying to seduce you
in order to receive gifts. he role played
by this cate sytem appears in everyday
1. he well-documented hitorical novel Les Peuls by
Tierno Monénembo perfetly illutrates how mobile
these social categories were over generations.
2. See for intance Sy (2002).
82 DOUNIA, revue d'intelligence stratégique et des relations internationales
life, as there is a set of implicit rules that
each group mut follow, driven by ‘the
sense of honour’ that is speciic to the
nobles. here are many ways for higher
tatus individuals to ditinguish them-
selves from lower tatus ones3. At the
core of the noble’s code of honour is
the importance of always being in the
position of giving and never asking. It
is by giving and being publicly generous
that the noble will be able to demons-
trate his worthiness. When belonging to
such families it is an unbearable shame
to have economic diiculties. here are
great pressures to display generous beha-
viour. Maintaining a high social tatus
is expensive as it means giving to their
griots and many clients (that is, their
former slaves and artisans). he size of
the clientele represents the power of the
family. Along with the warm glow efet
of giving, griots diretly raise the utility
of the giver by advertising his generosity,
which diretly improves his reputation 4.
Aritocratic families till ought to give
to their former clientele during baptisms,
weddings and religious events.
III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: ‘ THE
SYMBOLIC BAR AKA MOTIVE’
In a tratiied society ruled as a ge-
rontocracy, an old man may beneit from
an advantageous position in local poli-
tics if and only if he belongs to a high-
3. Bodily poture, where one sits and how one addresses
others in public meetings are manners of displaying
one’s rank. Typically, although not speciic to Haalpu-
laar society, lengthy traditional greetings are relevant
to the social tatus of protagonits. One aspet is the
repetition of the family name, which is called ‘yetode’
in Pulaar and literally means ‘the name that honours’.
4. See Azam (1995) for an intereting economic interpre-
tation of such norm.
 Old-Age Security in Rural Senegal: The symbolic Baraka motive
ranked family. Few families have a say in
choosing the village leader, and even less
have a chance to become one. Hence, the
family name becomes a valuable sym-
bolic bequet for such important fami-
lies. At the same time, it is well known
that, many former slaves, or bards take
advantage of their position too, and
like to remind their former maters of
their duty to provide them with gifts.
hus, respeting this social pressure to
generously give to anyone requires high
income. Migration appears as a solution
to inance these conspicuous expenses.
In focus group discussions and indi-
vidual interviews in both Senegal and
the diaspora, the researcher was repea-
tedly told that a very trong motivation
for remitting is to earn blessings and
prayers for felicity. Here religion and
traditional beliefs interfere. Indeed
there are some mytical pratices in
Haalpulaar, Wolof and Serer tradi-
tions, consiting in calling the migrant
to come back home (Sylla & M’Baye,
1991). here are legends about migrants
coming back home in a rush and losing
memory of how this happened and then
going insane. his is said to be adapted
as a lat resort, as retaliation for an unre-
liable son. Repeatedly the importance of
being near your dying parents as they
will transmit the Baraka of the whole
dynaty through their lat blessing was
raised1. Indeed a dying old man will
call his beloved sons, and give them his
inal blessing: the duhahu - in Pulaar -
which transmits barka - in Pulaar. his
Islamic word could roughly be transla-
1. he importance of the parent’s lat blessing is not
speciic to Islam, though. It is mentioned in many parts
of the Bible, and particularly in the Genesis. hink of
Jacob’s tory: he valued so much his father’s blessing that
he managed to get blessed intead of his brother Esaü.
ted as Allah’s blessing, and it has trong
inluence throughout the whole Islamic
world. It is important to bear in mind
that it is trongly linked to good luck,
wealth, happiness, health, fertility, and
social success. Baraka can be acquired
hereditarily through genealogical link
to saints, or their contats (see Schmitz,
2000), but also by a trit observance of
the ive pillars of Islam. It can be trans-
mitted by blessings. Being old and a
well-known good Muslim puts oneself
in a good position to have some.
Since living abroad makes it impos-
sible to be physically near one’s dying
parents, sending money appears as one
pratical alternative. Of course, the
value of this Baraka in the eyes of the
migrant trongly depends on the nota-
bility of his patriarch and consequently
on the tatus of the family. Obviously
belonging to a pretigious family yields
considerable returns in terms of pros-
pets for marriage and political position
back in the village. While abroad or in
the capital city, he could also beneit
from the tatus of the family to rely on
migrants from the same village. Besides,
migrants from the same village usually
live in neighbouring rooms in workers’
hotels - foyers de travailleurs in French -
recontituting the village society. It has
been repeatedly suggeted that this is
a way of reproducing hierarchic village
society (for example, see Ba, 1996: 207).
In other geographic areas, Whitehouse
(1994) describes Baraka as one motive
for returning migrants among Soninke
in Mali. Again, remitting can be a way
for the migrant to pay tribute to the vil-
lage tratiied sociopolitical truture.
Other scholars have long remarked
on the important role that social repu-
tation plays in the migrant contrat to
Numéro 7 – Décembre 2013 83
Jean-luc Demonsant
his family. Lucas and Stark (1985) reco-
gnized that the migrant may remit ‘to
enhance pretige or political inluence’
for the days when he will return. Taking
good care of one’s parents is a hallmark
of reliability. his could, for example,
be an incentive for migrants seeking
wives within the community. he loss
of pretige incurred by defaulting sons
could also prevent their return for retire-
ment, which is central to many African
migrants. Lat but not leat, the desire
to be buried at home is an additional
motive to maintain the social tatus of
the family. It is essential for many Mus-
lim migrants, and in particular those
from the Senegal River Valley. Many
migrants associations were indeed crea-
ted in order to collet money for the
repatriation of dead bodies1.
his theoretical framework empha-
sizes the role of social tatus in enforcing
the contrat between father and migrant
sons. Within the Haalpulaar family
the patriarch is the decision maker. At
the village level, there are two groups
of families: the nobles and the others
(non-nobles). Only the patriarchs from
noble families can accede to inluential
positions. To deserve their advantageous
dominant position, the nobles mut pay
non-nobles subtantial gifts in monetary
terms. he non-nobles who beneit from
these transfers mut in return renounce
basic human rights: not choose a spouse
among the nobles, give up their politi-
cal ambitions, and admit the superiority
of the nobles in community decision
making. here is an implicit family
contrat between the patriarch and his
adult sons. he patriarch sends his mot
1. See Petit (2002) regarding this pratice in Marseille,
France.
84 DOUNIA, revue d'intelligence stratégique et des relations internationales
promising sons abroad (or to the capi-
tal city), expeting them to remit. he
motivation of migrant sons is to obtain
the father’s position on their return. In
this view, remittances should be obser-
ved for high-ranked migrants only. he
migration of the lower-tatus migrants
relates to other motivations: trading
monetary gifts for social mobility. hey
will loosen ties with their community,
and make their new life abroad or in the
capital, taking advantage of the anony-
mity of city life.
IV. THE DATA COLLECTION AND
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
he ieldwork followed a mixed
methods projet as advocated by Chris-
topher Udry2: confronting economic
theory with other social sciences and
diret observations from repeated ield-
works in Senegal and among Senegalese
immigrants in France. Since the irt
ield trip in rural Senegal, the resear-
cher had the opportunity to witness the
inluence that the former cate sytem
till has in the decision-making process
of any villager in both public and private
spheres. However, economic tudies in
Africa have usually put the emphasis on
ethnic diversity, rarely incorporating so-
cial divisions within ethnic groups (with
the notable exceptions of Gubert, 2000;
Azam and Gubert, 2005). Control over
the entire data colletion process (inclu-
ding seletion of interviewers) provides
precise knowledge of the reliability of
such sensitive variables as cate tatus.
2. Talk downloaded from his personal webpage : http://
www.econ.yale.edu/~cru2/pdf/conversations.pdf
 Old-Age Security in Rural Senegal: The symbolic Baraka motive
he survey 1 was conduted jut be-
fore the rainy season (from April to June
2004), a time of drought and food scar-
city. he good thing is that since pea-
sants are preparing the ields for the rain
cultivations, all members of the house-
hold who are away, but within reach,
come back to give a hand.
he survey covered 149 patriarchs
over six villages randomly chosen
around Matam2. hree were located by
the Senegal river, in the so-called waalo
region, the other three were located
approximately 10 km from the river, in
the jeeri region, one of them being right
by the highway (the others being 4km
away on a dirt track). Waalo villages
were isolated (at leat) 3 months a year
during the rainy season as roads become
unit for vehicles, which can only be
reached by pirogues (2-3 hour intead
of 20 minute ride during the dry sea-
son). Jeeri villagers do not own irrigated
lands, which are located near the river,
but some noble families do own waalo
lands by the river.
All men in the seleted villages who
met the tudy criteria were seleted.
he criteria are that they mut be born
before 1939, and that their eldet living
son should have been born before 1979.
Information was gathered at three levels:
• he patriarch level: Information on
both his social tatus and his living
conditions were gathered. To mea-
sure social tatus, information on
the family background was gathe-
1. he author is grateful to Ousmane Ba, Moussa Ly,
Abou Sow, Abou hiam and Hamath hiam for doing a
great job in data colletion and providing assitance with
the survey design.
2. Jeeri villages are: hiambe, Galoyabe Toucouleur,
Hombo. Waalo villages are: Bow, hiemping and hial-
ly Souballo.
red such as which cate it belongs
to, the family tenure in the village,
the political and religious role played
by the patriarch and his father. hen
much emphasis was put on where the
patriarch gets support from, but also
on his wealth (housing, ields, cattle,
belongings and so forth), health,
nutrition, education, pat migrations
and economic ativities.
• he household level: a ‘household’
is deined as a unit of consumption
and income sharing (as sometimes
several households can co-reside in
the same compound), which can be
made of several nuclear family units3.
Very precise family links between
household members were colleted,
and some basic information on each
one, such as education level, econo-
mic ativity, sources of revenue.
• Finally, information on each child
has been colleted. Special attention
was given to children living outside
the household, for which indiret in-
formation through spouses, mother,
siblings, or the father was gathered.
he main focus was on remittances
sent by migrant sons to their old
father, and the ret of the family. In-
formation on news and visits given to
the family were also colleted.
Eforts were made to ensure that
data colleted were of high quality. For
double checking purposes, the tatus of
the family was gathered twice. Firt, the
information was obtained diretly by as-
king the patriarch, then indiretly, on a
second round, asking informants (main-
ly the village chief). As it can be a very
sensitive subjet, the following quetion
3. he Pulaar word is foyre (plural: poye).
Numéro 7 – Décembre 2013 85
Jean-luc Demonsant
TABLE 1
caste composition of samples of interest
categories Patriarchs (%)
  (N=147)
Free Men 70.1
Artisans 12.9
Slaves 17.0
Dignitaries 40.9
was asked towards the end of the survey,
in order to prevent the patriarch from
being ofended or upset, or even from
refusing to be surveyed:
Quelle et l’ «origine sociale» de votre
famille? (in English: What is the “social
origin” of your family)
his quetion was asked among a
series of quetions on hitorical back-
ground of the family. For the same rea-
sons, we asked the village chief about
the tatus of the surveyed families only
on a second round in September.
A detailed table of descriptive tatis-
tics for the initial sample, the migrants
and the remitters is shown in Table A.2
in the appendix.
Only the sons of the patriarchs above
16 years old were considered as potential
old-age support providers. here are 470
adult sons in the initial sample. Forty-
ive per cent have migrated. Among the
migrants, 62 per cent regularly remit. It
is noteworthy that only 66 per cent of
the migrants belong to ‘free men’ fami-
lies, whereas they represent 71 per cent
of the remitters. he diference is even
more notable for dignitaries. Table 1 dis-
plays the cate composition of the dif-
ferent samples tudied:
86 DOUNIA, revue d'intelligence stratégique et des relations internationales
All sons Migrants (%) remitters (%)
(N=470) (N=213) (N=133)
72.1 65.7 70.7
11.7 16.9 15.8
16.2 17.4 13.5
44.0 49.3 59.4
As mentioned earlier, the larget
cate is the ‘free men’ category, which
encompasses aritocrats as well as com-
moners. To diferentiate them, the lit of
dignitaries - deined as the members of
the conseil des sages representing the advi-
sory board of the village chief - was col-
leted from our informants. It appeared
that barely 40 per cent of the patriarchs
were designed as ‘dignitaries’1. hey
represent the atual and only decision
makers in the village.
Concerning migrants’ detinations,
the ditribution is very similar to pre-
vious tudies of Haalpulaar migration:
mainly dometic, the international
migration is mainly African, and very
few have left the continent. Forty-four
per cent of all migration is dometic, or
migration to the neighbouring countries,
that is, Mauritania, Mali, Gambia and
Guinea. Dakar concentrates 77 per cent
of these ‘dometic’ (Senegal or neigh-
bouring countries) detinations. Howe-
ver, the capital city is often a temporary
top on the way to further detinations.
hirty-eight per cent of migrants went to
1. Very few artisans and slaves may be dignitaries too:
they are former clients of mot pretigious families.
 Old-Age Security in Rural Senegal: The symbolic Baraka motive
another African country. Mot of Afri-
can migration (73%) is direted towards
Central Africa: Gabon, Congo, and
Cameroon. here is a long tradition of
Senegal River valley migration in this
area. here are accounts of diamantaire
who made quite a good fortune in these
countries1. Côte d’Ivoire has also been a
frequent detination of choice, but since
2000 because of the political intabi-
lity and xenophobic pratices many have
led. In the end, only 18 per cent of the
migrants left the African continent (they
represent 39 migrants): not surprisingly,
mot went to France (26 migrants). he
United States is the second detination
(9 migrants) a few migrants being in
Spain or Italy (5). he United States is an
increasingly attrative detination, but
many can’t aford the cot of travel and
the social networks are not in place in
the United States to ease the cots of mi-
gration. During the ield invetigations,
I met returning or visiting migrants from
Germany and Denmark, and also surpri-
singly ditant detinations like Autra-
lia and even China. Even if this is not
tatitically signiicant, it indicates that
diversiication of detinations is used to
circumvent tough migration policies.
It is important to bear in mind that
information about migrants is only se-
cond hand. he bet information about
them was assumed to be from the mother
or the wife of the migrant. he brothers
and the father were also asked if neces-
sary. As a consequence, one common
criticism of the indings is that low rank
migrants are simply not in a position to
remit as they could not beneit from the
1. Starting in the mid-1950s in Sierra-Leone, near both
sides of the Congo rivers by the 1960s, they have reached
Angola and Zambia, triving to avoid being expelled
(Bredeloup, 1994).
network. his is rather diicult to ind
out from the data at hand. At the same
time, a recent popular saying circulates
in the villages: ‘Migrations are blind to
cates’. Indeed, among migrants out-
side the continent (mainly Europe-US),
where expeted earnings are higher, the
proportion of non-dignitaries is greater
than that of dignitaries (there 58% non-
dignitaries in Europe vs. 51% in Senegal
and 47% in the ret of Africa), and yet
the proportion of dignitaries is higher
than non-dignitaries to regularly remit
(among migrant sons, 75% of dignitaries
remit vs. 50% non dignitaries).
he descriptive tatitics evidence
found in the previous setion needs to be
checked ‘all things being equal’. Hence,
let us now turn to the regression results.
Since only those who have migrated
can make transfers, a two-tep Heck-
man model generalised for probit mo-
dels was used to take into account the
seletion bias2. he quetion is: do the
ones with a higher probability of having
migrated have a higher or lower proba-
bility of remitting? As pointed out in
the appendix Table A-3, no such efets
are found: both decisions to migrate and
then to remit are not correlated, which
implies that these two regressions can
be tudied separately.
Furthermore, since there are migrants
from the same families (up to 7 brothers),
the correlation within the family was
accounted for using a robut etimator of
tandard errors with family cluters.
Regressions with diferent model
speciications are displayed to show the
robutness of the results, putting much
2. Sometimes called ‘Heckit’ model, with STATA it is
the ‘hecprob’ procedure.
Numéro 7 – Décembre 2013 87
 Le tableau 2 était nommé tableau 3 par erreur. Mais je crains que, dans le texte, il y ait des occur-
rences erronées. J'ai essayé de rétablir, mais merci de vériier.
TABLE 2
Probability of having migrated (marginal effects)

Migration 1 2 3 4
(adult son)        
Age 0.065 0.073 0.074 0.072
  (2.94)*** (3.69)*** (3.61)*** (3.54)***
(age)² -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
  (-2.51)** (-2.98)*** (-2.97)*** (-2.90)***

Birth order -0.003

  (-0.13)
=1 if married 0.02

  (0.32)
=1 if has ever been to formal school -0.033

  (0.48)
# of brothers who have migrated -0.03

(-1.04)
(patriarch)
Age 0.009 0.006 0.005 0.006
  (1.23) (1.14) (0.9) (1.16)

Size of the household 0.008

  (0.72)
Migration length (in years) 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
  (2.39)** (3.00)*** (2.76)*** (2.91)***

=1 if receives a pension 0.025

  (0.28)

=1 if has received bequeathable wealth 0.013

  (0.67)

=1 if landless -0.118
  (-1.02)

=1 if doesn’t possess any cattle -0.157 -0.177 -0.173

  (-2.21)** (-2.55)** (-2.47)**

=1 if belongs to the ‘free man’ caste -0.163 -0.142

  (-2.50)** (-2.11)**

=1 if belongs to a family with political power 0.089

      (1.42)  
Wald Chi-square 45.6 48.8 50.9 43.9
Pseudo R2 0.102 0.121 0.131 0.127

Observations: 470; 147 clusters (families)

88 Robust z statistics
DOUNIA in,parentheses;
revue d'intelligence
* signiicant atstratégique et des
10%; ** signiicant relations
at 5%; internationales
*** signiicant at 1%
Note: villages dummies are included in the regression, but not displayed (non signiicant)
 Old-Age Security in Rural Senegal: The symbolic Baraka motive
efort on the speciication of the family
social tatus and (proxies for) wealth.
V. R ESULTS ON MIGRATING AND
R EMITTING BEHAVIOURS
Several model speciications are dis-
played in table 2: the irt two columns
aim at identifying the relevant wealth
variables, while the lat ones identify the
social tatus efet.
In the lat column, only signiicant
variables are kept in order to avoid mul-
ticolinearity problems. he main results
are consitent throughout diferent mo-
del speciications.
Overall this model corretly predits
74 per cent of migrating behaviour. In
contrat to previous tudies, the number
of migrating brothers appears not to be
signiicant. In reality, there are two op-
posite efets: a network and a saturation
efet. Having a brother can facilitate
migration: older brothers can inance
their cadets, creating shifts of migrants1.
On the other hand, when there are
already migrants in the family, the pa-
triarch may require other sons to tay to
help him manage the household. Here it
seems that both efets are neutralised.
he age of the father has no signii-
cant efet, but the older the son is, the
higher the probability of having migra-
ted, though with a decreasing efet, as
the signiicantly negative squared age
variable indicates.
he fat that having attended formal
schooling is not signiicant is relevant
to the fat that migrants do not need
to hold literacy skills for the job they
1. In French this is called ‘noria’ (see Ba 1996: 30). his
can no longer hold for detinations that have become
very diicult to reach such as Europe.
will ind in migration. One mut keep
in mind that mot migrants work in the
informal setor, in Dakar and elsewhere
in Africa, and in unskilled jobs in indus-
trialised countries (mainly in the hotel
or catering trades).
Variables capturing wealth of the fa-
mily all seem to be not signiicant except
for two. Firt, the fat of owning cattle
increases the chance of having migra-
ted. Second, the fat that his father spent
many years abroad (or in the capital city)
increases the chance of the son migra-
ting. here are two intertwined positive
efets: a wealth and a network efet. All
migrations are cotly but especially for
ditant detinations: fares, bribing to get
documents, or to get across the border
safely. It usually represents far more than
what a basic rural household can aford.
hen there are some high cots of accom-
modation: even in Dakar renting a room
has become very expensive. Of patriarchs
who have migrated around 55 per cent
receive a pension. However, patriarchs
who did not get a formal job usually ma-
naged to invet in produtive ativities
inancing their own sons’ migration and
settlement. Consequently, it appears that
sons of economically better-of families
have a higher chance of migrating. here
are also network efets. Fathers who
have migrated have been able to build
networks abroad and ease the labour
market entry of their sons. Many of those
in earlier migrant treams worked in the
hotel trade in Dakar or as a houseboy or
cook for French colonisers who then took
them to France to work for them.
Finally, sons of families belonging
to the higher cates are less inclined to
migrate than those of lower cates. his
result contradits Azam and Gubert’s
(2005) indings among Soninke: they
Numéro 7 – Décembre 2013 89
Jean-luc Demonsant
found that aritocrats are more likely to
migrate than those of lower social rank.
It is necessary to turn to migrant remit-
ting behaviour to undertand if migrants
from high and low tatus have the same
behaviour once in migration.
Among the migrants, let us turn now
to their probability of frequently remit-
ting. his model has a good preditive
power as overall nearly 77 per cent of mi-
grants are properly predited to remit or
not. Table 2 displays ive diferent model
speciications.
Firt, the age of the migrant appears
not to be signiicant for his remitting
behaviour. More surprisingly, the size of
the patriarchal household has no impat
on his probability of remitting.
Some expeted ‘wealth efets’ are
found: data on the migrant’s earnings
were not available, but there are some
proxies. he migration length appears to
be signiicantly positive, which relets
the idea that it usually takes time for a
migrant to obtain a table job and regu-
lar wages. Similarly, living in a deve-
loped country positively afets his pro-
bability of remitting. his is obviously
linked to the higher earnings available
there: he earns more than his own living
expenses and can accordingly send back
a part of his earning.
Naturally, having a spouse who re-
mained in the household of the father
increases signiicantly the probability of
remitting.
When turning to the trategic
bequet motive, results similar to Hod-
dinott (1992) are found: if the father
owns land, it increases the probability of
remitting.
Surprisingly, no monitoring efets
are found here: having brothers living in
the same place of migration has no signi-
90 DOUNIA, revue d'intelligence stratégique et des relations internationales
icant efet on the remitting behaviour.
More surprising till, the number of years
of completed formal schooling decreases
the probability of remitting. his is not
due to sons tudying abroad, as only se-
ven migrants are atually inishing their
tudies, which represents less than three
per cent of migrants. As shown in the
appendix Table A-2, the average years of
schooling is very low: around two. But
till, few years of formal schooling could
be enough to acquire such basic skills as
reading and writing, and lead to better
job opportunity. his could in turn give
the migrant more incentive to settle in
the hot detination, and cut ties with
the hierarchical village society.
Finally, central to the main point of
this article: belonging to a politically
powerful family in the village makes the
migrant more likely to remit than belon-
ging to a lower cate. Indeed, this tatus
dummy variable is trongly signiicant at
the 1 per cent level. Here what seems to
be central is the fat that the patriarch
plays a signiicant role in the village
belonging to the circle of inluential di-
gnitaries. Indeed, belonging to the free
men category is not precise enough, as
this is a heterogeneous category. For ins-
tance, newly arrived free men families
may not have regained a dominant posi-
tion in the village1. On the contrary, a
few families from the artisans or former
slaves groups may have acquired a poli-
tical position being linked with a very
pretigious family as mentioned earlier.
Unfortunately the lack of social ta-
tus variables in other quantitative sur-
veys makes it impossible to compare
1. It is the case of many Mauritanian refugees (from the
1989 unret) who despite being Fulbe have rarely gained
a position as dignitary in their new Senegalese settle-
ment.
 Old-Age Security in Rural Senegal: The symbolic Baraka motive

TABLE 3

Probability of remitting among migrants (marginal effects)

Remitting 1 2 3 4 5

(adult son)  
Ages -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005
  (0.55) (0.55) (0.59) (0.71) (0.81)

Birth order (among patriarch’s sons) 0.002

  (0.07)
=1 if has ever been to formal school -0.223 -0.244 -0.244 -0.192 -0.198
  (2.46)** (2.55)** (2.55)** (2.07)** (2.17)**
Migration length (years) 0.017 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.018
  (1.90)* (1.63) (1.68)* (1.76)* (2.00)**
=1 if lives outside the African continent 0.361 0.371 0.372 0.378 0.377
  (3.48)*** (3.84)*** (3.90)*** (4.34)*** (4.20)***

# of brothers who have migrated -0.004

  (0.13)
=1 if one spouse lives with the patriarch 0.16 0.146 0.147 0.194 0.181
  (1.72)* (1.68)* (1.69)* (2.22)** (2.05)**
(patriarch)
Age 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.018 0.017
  (2.10)** (2.60)*** (2.60)*** (2.45)** (2.36)**
Household size 0.001
  (0.06)
Migration length (years) 0.006
  (1.54)
=1 if has received bequeathable wealth -0.018
  (0.61)
=1 if landless -0.288 -0.291 -0.28 -0.281
  (1.93)* (1.95)* (1.90)* (1.94)*
=1 if doesn’t possess any cattle -0.026
  (0.25)
=1 if belongs to family of higher caste 0.111
        (1.11)  
=1 if belongs to family with local power 0.234 0.257
  (2.68)*** (2.99)***
Wald Chi-square 54.3 47.0 47.0 52.7 54.7
Pseudo R2 0.204 0.204 0.204 0.250 0.244
Observations: 213; 102 clusters (families)
Robust z statistics in parentheses * signiicant at 10%; ** signiicant at 5%; *** signiicant at 1%
Note: villages dummies are included in the regression, but not displayed here (non signiicant)

Numéro 7 – Décembre 2013 91

Jean-luc Demonsant
this result with other tudies so far. As
a complement to the empirical evidence
there are some other qualitative pieces
of evidence that conirm the hypothesis
made in this paper: some are lited here.1
To gain respetability in the village
the mot eicient way is to contribute to
the building of a mosque. here are seve-
ral anecdotes the researcher heard during
my tay in the valley, about the boycott
of mosques built by migrant slaves. he
Imam who is necessarily a noble, simply
refused to lead the prayers. he resear-
cher heard a similar tory about a well
built by a successful slave that the nobles
boycotted, opting for the more ditant
well. hese anecdotes show that it is
rather ineicient for a slave to invet in
order to raise his respetability in the
village: he will always be considered as
a slave and accordingly will be reminded
to keep his low-proile rank. he only
way to get rid of these social tigmas is to
migrate. In anonymous cities or foreign
countries, he will more easily merge into
society and be free in his ats.
It is noticeable that during my repea-
ted visits at diferent workers’ hotels, I
met very few descendants of slaves or
artisans2. his is consitent, with repor-
ted cases of continuing discrimination
againt slaves even abroad within com-
munities of same village of origin. he
pattern is that slaves are excluded from
any decision making position in the mi-
grants’ association. Ba (1996: 238) reports
such a case in Cameroon.
In Dakar, many people with Haal-
pulaaren names who do not speak Pu-
laar happen to be of slave or artisan ori-
1. And others (in French) in Demonsant (2007).
2. Except the descendants of slaves of the village chief ’s
family, which would tend to prove that former slaves of
important families have some kind of respetability too.
92 DOUNIA, revue d'intelligence stratégique et des relations internationales
gins. hey seem to be the produt of this
melting pot.
In previous tudies on migration
among the Haalpulaaren it has been
mentioned that the desire to escape
from rigid social contraints was among
the main motives for migration. As they
usually refer to the position of younger
brothers seeking to escape the tyranny
of older brothers, it could easily be ex-
tended to lower tatus migrants. he tu-
dy of Delaunay (1984) goes in the same
diretion as these results. He inds that
any type of cate can be found among
the migrants from the Senegal Valley,
but recognises that the former slaves are
more likely to settle deinitively, whereas
the nobles would rather migrate tempo-
rarily and send remittances while away,
and then eventually return to the village.
VI. CONCLUDING R EMARKS
hese indings sugget that migration
is available to any social category, but for
diferent aims: it can either be seen as an
individual decision to escape from a poor
social position with dire prospets in the
village or, conversely, as a family decision
to maintain its dominant local position.
As a consequence, it is obvious that the
irt type of migrants will not be in-
tereted in inveting in the development
of the village but will beneit from the ur-
ban melting pot to get rid of their social
tigmas. he good side of this is that they
are fators of change as they move from a
network-based to a modern market eco-
nomy. hese results are very similar to
those of Luke and Munshi (2011), who
found that the mot discriminated group,
that is women from hitorically disadvan-
taged cates, seek to migrate and mingle
 Old-Age Security in Rural Senegal: The symbolic Baraka motive
in the modern economy weakening fami-
lies’ ties to the ancetral community and
the traditional economy. In order to pre-
vent rural exodus and urban concentra-
tions, an eicient policy would then be to
invet in intensive consciousness-raising
campaigns to get rid of the obsolete cate
sytem. his will probably take time and
be hard to implement as I found out that
the cate issue was till a highly taboo
subjet in contemporary Senegal.
Central to political debates in France,
republican values of racial integration
and assimilation may diferently appeal
to both types of migrants previously
described. France’s model of integration
aims to assimilate immigrants by intil-
ling French cultural values. As a result,
keeping trong ties with the country of
origin is not well received. According to
the results found here, any attempt to
assimilate the migrants of noble origins
will fail. Indeed, they see themselves
as temporary migrants and have sound
plans to return to the village. When
returning they will genuinely keep silent
their shameful subordinate occupations1
while abroad and turn into powerful and
well respeted dignitaries. Alternatively,
the migrants from lower social catego-
ries will display trong motivations to it
in the hot society, and would probably
be more likely to marry outside their
community and adopt more quickly
local cutoms and language. Unfortuna-
tely I don’t know of any dataset which
would allow me to tet it2.
1. I can conirm that it is absolutely taboo to ask a vi-
siting migrant about his job in the hot country (or in the
capital city). As one might guess such work was not pres-
tigious, it is generally accepted to keep it silent... or to
tell it only to a total foreigner away from other villagers!
2. his would require data on the cate origin of Haalpu-
laar immigrants. Concerning France as data on ethnic
his tudy also has methodological
implications. he aim of this tudy was
primarily to draw attention to the local
intitutions when trying to undertand
migration in a non-Wetern environ-
ment. Economits and econometricians
too often draw conclusions from sur-
veys that were lacking social context.
As this was a limited tudy, it would be
intereting to pursue on a broader range.
Unfortunately it is a rather delicate task
to gather information on such sensitive
information as cate origin and hence it
is rather diicult to condut similar sur-
veys at a larger scale. But to the bet of
my knowledge, the work of Flore Gubert
among Soninke of Mali (Gubert, 2000;
Azam and Gubert, 2005) and this one are
the only quantitative attempts to show
the contemporary impat of the Wet
African cate sytem. Migration is an
interdisciplinary subjet and social scien-
tits could beneit from the methodolo-
gical trengths of each discipline. his
tudy supports the World Bank (2006)
publication, which recognises that grea-
ter co-operation between economits,
and socio-anthropologits allow a more
subtle analysis. While the socio-an-
thropologits can help identify the me-
chanisms through which development
occurs, the economits can quantify the
phenomenon under tudy. Unfortunately
the limitation of this tudy is the dii-
culty or maybe even the impossibility to
collet sensitive information (the hito-
rical cate ailiation) on a larger scale.
However this irt tep in this diretion
is an invitation to continue exploring the
interplay between the cate sytem and
contemporary migrations.
origin is prohibited by law access to cate origin is even
harder to get...
Numéro 7 – Décembre 2013 93
 Jean-luc Demonsant
94
Main Social
Strata (sub-division) ‘Caste’ sub-divisions Occupation and Title
Categories

A PPENDIX
1. Yaya Wane voluntarily excluded the tock breeders (in Pulaar: Pullo) from the Haalpulaar cate sytem.
Rimbe ardiibe
Toorobe Lawakoobe or ileteebe Temporal power
(free)
DOUNIA, revue d'intelligence stratégique et des relations internationales

Jangube or ardiibe diine Spiritual power : ceerno

TABLE A-1 The Haalpulaar complex caste system (translated from Wane, 1969: 33)1
Miiskineebe Free men, farmers: demoowo
Worgankoobe Former monarchs: farba ceddo
Rimbe (free Kolyaabe Koly’s soldiers : jagaraf
men)
Sebe Mbonaabe
Rimbe huunybe
Awgalnaabe Local variants of kolyaabe
(courtiers)
Helgalagel, and so forth
Jaawambe Courtiers and advisers: sooma
Subalbe Fishermen: jaaltaabe
Maabube sanyoobe Weavers: jarno
Baleebe Blacksmiths: farba baylo
Waylibe
Sayakoobe Jewelers: farba baylo
Alawbe Shoemakers: foosiri
Fecciram golle (artisans) Sakebe
Wodeebe or garankoobe Cobblers
Laade Pirogue builders: kalmbaan
Nyenbe Laobe
(artisans Worworbe (bobi) Kitchen tools’ makers: maalaw
and ‘griots’) Buurnaabe Potters and ceramicists
Wambaabe Traditional guitar players
‘Griots’: Naalankoobe Maabube suudu Paate
(entertainers) or
Maabube jaawambe Singers
nyaagotoobe (praise
singers) Laobe gumbala (kontimpaaji)
Aolube Griots genealogists : farba gawlo
Jyaabe Soottiibe (freed slaves) Maccube Free but servile
(slaves) Halfaabe (dependants) Maccube Slaves and servants: jagodiin
95 Numéro 7 – Décembre 2013

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Descriptive statistics for the initial sample, the migrants and the remitters
TABLE A-2

Old-Age Security in Rural Senegal: The symbolic Baraka motive

Jean-luc Demonsant

TABLE A-3
Probability of remitting conditional on having migrated: “Heckit” regression results

1st step: Having migrated : cf. (5) table 2

2nd step : remit (conditional on having migrated)

(adult son)
Age -0.008
  (1.31)
=1 if has ever been to formal school -0.185
  (1.93)*
Migration length (years) 0.018
  (1.94)*
=1 if lives outside the African continent 0.342
  (3.42)***
=1 if one spouse lives with the patriarch 0.177
  (2.02)**
(patriarch)
Age 0.016
  (2.01)**
=1 if landless -0.278
  (1.96)*
=1 if belongs to Family of higher caste 0.256
  (2.85)***
Rho -0.282

Wald test H0:(rho = 0) chi2(1) =0.85 p-value= 0.3561

Presenting only the most suited speciication

R EFERENCES tances on heir Recipients in Africa.

Adams, A. 2000. River Senegal:
Flood management and the future of the
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af

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 Migrants’ remittances and living
conditions of households at the origin:
evidence from Kinshasa

Jose Mangalu Mobhe

I. BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES If we know that unfavorable condi-

he implication of households and
other large communities in the migra-
tion process of their members is jutiied
by the expeted impats of migration on
their living conditions. his implication
also jutiies the emergence of new theo-
ries in tudies of international migration.
So, relying on migration from the De-
mocratic Republic of Congo, this paper
aims to tudy the main uses to which
households of Kinshasa put the money
they receive from their members living
abroad and the efets that this money
can have on their living conditions. he
paper aims to answer the following
quetions: How do households use the
inancial remittances received from
their members living outside the DRC?
Are the receipt of remittances and the
amounts received linked to the living
conditions of these households?
tions in the home country lead people
to migrate, we also know that migra-
tion has, among others, the ability to
modify the conditions that prevailed
before it begins, including facilitating
access of migrant households to certain
resources that it would have been dii-
cult to access otherwise (Durand et al.,
1996). his change in living conditions
of households, far from topping migra-
tion, can also serve as an incentive to
new migration and lead to what Massey
(1990, p.4) calls “the cumulative cau-
sation of migration,” or what Reichert
(1981, p.57) calls “migrant syndrome”.
Several consequences are assumed to
result from these migrations. On the
one hand, they can exacerbate the dif-
ferences in living tandards between
households according to whether or not
they have migrants. On the other hand,
given that networks of migrants contri-

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