Professional Documents
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B. P. MATHUR
the end of the line of accountability relations, stand the citizens who judge
the performance of the government and can sanction their political
representatives by voting them out of power, at the time of elections held
at periodical intervals. The second important function of public
accountability is ensuring integrity of govemmental operations. There
should be safeguards against corruption, nepotism, abuse of power and
other forms of unacceptable behaviour. The third function is improvement
in performance. Accountability is not only about control and punishing
malfeasance, but efficient conduct of governmental operations and
delivering services which people want.
Public accountability has three dimensions: Political Accountability:
broadly means that in a democracy, the elected representatives who form
the government-the political executive, is accountable to Parliament.
Political accountability also covers accountability of an elected
representative to his party, to his constituency and observing a code of
conduct laid down for legislatures. Financial accountability implies an
obligation of the persons handling financial resources to report on the
intended and actual use of the resources. Administrative accountability
implies a system of control internal to the government including civil
service rules, standards and incentives and administrative reviews and
oversight.
Civil Services are expected to be politically neutral and therefore this
article deals with issues relating to financial and administrative
accountability.
The Financial Accountability Architecture
In a democracy the Executive-in the Government of the day, is
accountable to the Parliament. It is in legislature, that government's policies
are reviewed, its performance checked, and detailed operations particularly
relating to public expenditure are put under scrutiny. One of the principal
instrument in the hand of legislature to make executive accountable, is the
control over the purse. This power has two elements: the granting of the
money by the legislature an~ the supervision of the expenditure by State
Audit institution. The Indian Constitution has an elaborate system of
parliamentary financial control. Under Article 112 to 117 (parallel provision
Article 202 to 207 for the States) prescribe the method of presentation and
passing of the Annual Financial Statement (Budget) by the Parliament.
Union budgets perform the role of generating accountability for the actions
taken by the government. It gives an opportunity to the legislature to
comment and question the policy of the government on various issues of
national importance. However, Parliament has a very limited time at its
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VOL LVlll, NO. 4, OCTOBER-DECEMBER 2012
disposal, nor its members are experts to scrutinise how well public money
has been spent. For this the Parliament has at its disposal an independent
functionary-the Comptroller & Auditor General (CAG) who submits its
Audit Reports (Article 148 to 151), which are subsequently examined by a
committee of Parliament, called Public Accounts Committee (PAC).
The system of financial control laid down in our Constitution is based
on the British parliamentary traditions. Parliamentary financial control in
Britain has a long and chequered history. After years of struggle, the existing
financial control mechanism was created, through an Exchequer and Audit
Department Act of 1866, largely due to missionary zeal of W.E. Gladstone,
who was Finance Minister and later became Prime Minster. The Act created
the office of C&AG and his reports were required to be submitted to
Parliament, to be examined by a select committee of its members, called
Committee on Public Accounts. This solved the dilemma which had baffled
parliament for a long time, 'whether expenditure should be controlled by
inexpert parliamentarians or expert non-parliamentarians'. Gladstone2 had
observed, "The finance of the country is ultimately associated with liberties
of the country. It is a powerful leverage by which the English liberty has
been gradually acquired. If the House of Commons by any chance loses
the control of the grant of public money, depend upon it, your very liberty
will be worth very little in comparison."
The CAG works on behalf of the Parliament and is key instrument in
enforcing accountability of the Executive. To fulfill this responsibility, the
scope and technique of audit has undergone major changes during last six
decades. In addition to audit of expenditure, CAG now conducts audit of
Revenues (Income-tax, Excise, Customs, etc.), as well as Commercial
Enterprises of the government. CAG has also entered the area of
Performance Audit-an evaluation of government programmes, schemes
and activities and Whether they are being carried on with due regard to
economy, efficiency and effectiveness. The Parliament and the public wants
to know how well they are being executed and whether they are producing
the intended results. Every year CAG submits a large number of reports to
Parliament and State Legislatures on development schemes, such as poverty
alleviation programmes, national literacy mission, national rural health
mission, irrigation projects, etc. Some of the CAG's reports have also
generated a great deal of national and media attention such as disinvestment
of PSU's, ONGC's joint venture with Reliance-Enron Consortium for
exploration of oil, purchase of coffin during Kargil war and the most recent
2 G spectrum sale.
2Paul Einzig, "Control of the Purse", Secker and Warburg, London, 1959.
ACCOUNTABILITY OF CIVIL SERVICES I 619
B. P. MATHUR
competence of the officer for the job. ARC has suggested introduction of
competition for senior positions in the Senior Administrative Grade (Joint
Secretary level) and above by opening these positions to all the Services.
For Higher Administrative Grade posts (Additional Secretary and above)
recruitment for some of the posts could be done from open m~ket. It has
suggested constitution of a statutory Central Ci vii Services Authority which
should deal with matters of assignment of domain, preparing panel for
posting of officers at different levels, fixing tenures, and detennining which
posts should be advertised for lateral entry.
The First Administrative Refonns Commission, far back in 1969, had
emphasised the need for specialisatio n by civil servants as a pre-
qualification for holding senior level posts and had suggested that all the
Services should have an opportunity to enter middle and senior level
management levels in Central Secretariat and selection should be made by
holding mid-career competitive examination, which should include
Interview, to be conducted by UPSC. The Surendra Nath Committee8 (2003)
and Hota Committee9 (2004 ) have also emphasised domain knowledge
and merit as the basis for appointment to the posts of Joint Secretary and
above in the Government.
Act, under which an Office of Government Ethics has been set up, to
exercise leadership in Executive branch and to prevent conflict of interest
on the part of government employees. Commonwealth countries such as
Australia, Canada, Singapore have all prescribed Ethics Code for their
employees.
In India we do not have, as yet, an Ethics Code for public officials.
Government has prescribed Conduct Rules, which are more in the nature
of "do's" and " don'ts" and do not lay down a set of values that public
officials should imbibe. The UPA government had issued a draft of Public
Service Bill in 2005, which included a set of Values for public servants,
but so far no progress on its enactment has been made. The Second ARC
has also recommended a Code of Ethics for Civil Servants and has observed,
"Civil Service Values which all public servants should aspire, should be
defined and made applicable to all tiers of government and parastatal
organisations. Any transgression of these values should be treated as
misconduct, inviting punishment". 10 It has suggested that Code of Ethics
should include: integrity, impartiality, commitment to public service, open
accountability, devotion to duty and exemplary behaviour.
Enforce an Effective Disciplinary Regime
Presently the provisions of discipline rule are so cumbersome and
tortuous that it becomes very difficult to take action against a delinquent
employee for insubordin ation and misbehaviour. A large number of
government employees develop a cavalier attitude towards work and some
of them indulge in corruption, secure "in the fact that no action can be taken
against them, as the provisions of Civil Service Conduct and Discipline
Rules (CCA Rules), are porous and complicated with numerous loopholes
and weighted in favour of the defaulter. While corruption cases involve
criminal liability and attract the provisions of Anti-corruption Act, there
are numerous cases of dereliction of duty and misbehaviour which needs
to be dealt departmentally.
The Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution 11 headed
by Justice Venkatchalih~ has observed that, "The services have largely
remained immune from imposition of penalties due to complicate d
procedures that have grown out of constitutional guarantees- against arbitrary
and vindictive action. The constitutional safeguards have in practice acted
to shield the guilty against swift and certain punishment for abuse of public
office for private gain". The Commission has suggested a review of the
10Second Administrative Refonns Commission, ibid, pp 44-45; para 2.7.12.
Commission to Review. The Working of the Constitution ,Vol I, March 2002, p. 186,
11
Section 6.7.4.
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PERFORMANCE ACCOUNTABILITY-PHil.OSOPHY OF
NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT
citizens needs and staff needs, clean, objective and agile. This it
promises to do basically by transforming bureaucratic management
into profess ional, stakeho lders sensitiv e, perform ance oriented
management". The Central Public Sector Undertakings (PSU), which
enjoy great deal of autonomy, have a system of MOU (Memorandum
of Understanding) which envisages annual targets of performance in
terms of product ion, profit, cost and energy savings , and other
measurable parameters. This has helped greatly in improving their
performance, profitability and efficiency.
We should embrace the philosop hy of New Public Manage ment,
successfully adopted by UK and other countries in order to provide efficient
timely services to the people.
While parliam entary control and public audit are importa nt for
enforcin g account ability of the Executi ve in a democra tic polity, the
improve ment in performance of public services will come only when
accountability goes beyond 'institution' to 'individuals'. Individual public
employees should be held responsible for performing the task entrusted to
them and delivering result and made accountable in case of failure. For
this it is necessary to reform personnel management systems in government.
Stephen Covey the motivational guru says that Management often make
the mistake of assuming that if they correct the structures, systems and
organisation, the problem will get resolved. He says that in order to improve,
first improve the people who produce the strategy, structure, system and
styles of an organisation. As discussed earlier accountability of public
services may be brought by linking promotion and career advancement of
an officer with actual performance on the job. An Ethics Code should be
enacted, which should enunciate the core values which public employees
should imbibe, the violatio n of which should involve sanction and
punishment. There is need to bring an effective Disciplinary Rule so that
delinquent public servants ·are quickly brought to book and reprimanded.
There is· also a need to imbibe tenets of New Public Management which
has dramatically transformed the British civil service. All senior posts (say
Joint Secretary upwards) should be thrown open to competition, to which
persons outside the civil services may also be eligible and the persons
selected should guarantee delivery of services as per the target fixed for
his department.