CASE NAME: Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.

CITATION: 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960)

RULE: An implied warranty of merchantability chargeable to either an automobile manufacturer
or a dealer extends to the purchaser of the car, members of his family, and to other persons
occupying or using it with his consent. It would be wholly opposed to reality to say that use by
such persons is not within the anticipation of parties to such a warranty of reasonable suitability
of an automobile for ordinary highway operation. Those persons must be considered within the
distributive chain.
FACTS: Plaintiffs were injured when a car they had recently purchased from defendant dealer,
made by defendant manufacturer, veered into a highway sign because of its defective
manufacture.
ISSUE: Is an implied warranty of merchantability of a car invalid when the original date of
purchase is not disclosed to the buyer?
ANSWER: Yes.
CONCLUSION: It is considered a disclaimer of implied warranties where the original date of
purchase must be brought to the attention of the buyer. Even if the parties are free to contract,
there is still the obligation to inform the buyer of such. The trial court found defendants liable for
a breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and dismissed the negligence claim. On
appeal, the court found that the express warranty, which was limited to replacement of parts sent
to the factory, did not negate the implied warranty of fitness, given the inequality of bargaining
power between manufacturers and purchasers of consumer goods.

URL: https://advance.lexis.com/document/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=ce89f97e-4179-4b06-
a609-
3e22a66d8641&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fcases%2Furn%3AcontentIte
m%3A3RRM-Y5S0-003C-N0DB-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A3RRM-Y5S0-
003C-N0DB-00000-
00&pdcontentcomponentid=9073&pdshepid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A7XW4-F4S1-2NSF-
C2MR-00000-
00&pdteaserkey=sr0&pditab=allpods&ecomp=5ypck&earg=sr0&prid=01cca886-5a30-
4f53-acb9-b80ea4f12215
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3RRM-Y5S0-003C-N0DB-00000-00
CASE NAME: Hill v. Nat'l Grid
CITATION: 11 A.3d 110 (R.I. 2011)
RULE: It is the burden of the nonmoving party in a summary judgment proceeding to prove the
existence of a disputed issue of material fact by competent evidence; it cannot rest on allegations
or denials in the pleadings or on conclusions or legal opinions.

FACTS: While the son was running on the property during the game, he tripped over an unseen
metal pole that was protruding from the ground. He fell on the ground and struck a second metal
pole, lacerating his left thigh. The owner argued that the parents raised no material facts from
which a jury could conclude (1) that the owner knew or had reason to know children were likely
to trespass on the property or (2) that there was any dangerous condition on its land of which it
knew or had reason to know.

ISSUE: Is there a requirement for the defendant to prove that children may trespass his property?

ANSWER: Yes.
CONCLUSION: The doctrine of attractive nuisance makes it a burden on the defendant to prove
to have a reason to know that there is a chance children would trespass on its property. However,
Hills failed to prove the knowledge that children were trespassing. The facts gave rise to a genuine
factual dispute about whether the owner knew or had reason to know that children were likely to
trespass on the lot for purposes of the attractive nuisance doctrine. An employee of the owner
testified that he personally had visited the property five or six times over two years. He also
described monthly maintenance by a grounds-keeping crew that mowed the grass and removed
debris. Based on these activities by a variety of the owner's agents, a reasonable jury could have
concluded that the owner knew or had reason to know of the metal stakes protruding from the
ground. The entry of summary judgment was improper.

URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=d3ac1ac2-41ea-4061-
ac95-
bae6c5f92b8a&pdsearchterms=Hill+v.+National+Grid%2C+11+A.3d+110+(R.I.+2011)&pdst
artin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqtt
ype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=ce89f97e-4179-4b06-a609-
3e22a66d8641
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:520N-0WS1-652P-B00X-00000-00
CASE NAME: Exec. Software N. Am. v. United States Dist. Court
CITATION: 24 F.3d 1545 (9th Cir. 1994)
RULE: 28 U.S.C.S. § 1367(c)(4) permits a discretionary remand of pendent claims when in
exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.
"Compelling reasons" for the purposes of 28 U.S.C.S. § (c)(4) are those that lead a court to
conclude that declining jurisdiction best accommodates the values of economy, convenience,
fairness, and comity.

FACTS: The employee filed federal and state law claims for employment discrimination against
petitioners. Petitioners removed the action to federal court. When the district court remanded the
pendent state law claims, petitioners requested a writ of mandamus.

ISSUE: Is there a compelling reason for a jurisdiction to be declined when there is no specification
of the circumstances of the case?

ANSWER: Yes.
CONCLUSION: The court granted the writ, holding that the district court clearly erred in not
maintaining supplemental jurisdiction over the pendent state claims. The district court did not rely
on the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C.S. § 1367(c), in making its decision and failed
to articulate how the circumstances that warranted declining jurisdiction were exceptional and
compelling under the statute. The district court clearly erred by articulating a basis for declining
jurisdiction that was unauthorized by statute. The district court's errors were significant and the
question was an important question of first impression. Petitioners faced unrectifiable prejudice if
not granted the writ and there were no other adequate means for relief.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=2ba07d19-1b74-482d-b105-
afaa689cba91&pdsearchterms=Exec.+Software+N.+Am.+v.+United+States+Dist.+Court%2C+2
4+F.3d+1545+(9th+Cir.+1994)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pds
earchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=d3ac1ac2-
41ea-4061-ac95-bae6c5f92b8a
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-63K0-003B-P4GD-00000-00
CASE NAME: KEEL v. HAINLINE
CITATION: 1958 OK 201, 331 P.2d 397
RULE: Where, however, the basis of an action is assault and battery, the intention with which the
injury was done is immaterial so far as the maintenance of the action is concerned, provided the
act causing the injury was wrongful, for if the act was wrongful, the intent must necessarily have
been wrongful. The fact that an act was done with a good intention, or without any unlawful
intention, cannot change that which, by reason of its unlawfulness, is essentially an assault and
battery into a lawful act, thereby releasing the aggressor from liability.
FACTS: Defendants were playing, specifically throwing an eraser at each other. Plaintiff was
injured when the eraser hit her and lost an eye.
ISSUE: Is the defendant liable for the injury caused to the victim?
ANSWER: Yes.
CONCLUSION: There was no intent on the part of the respondent to harm the victim. The court
noted that the fact that an act was done with a good intention, or without any unlawful intention,
could not change that which, by reason of its unlawfulness, was essentially an assault and battery
into a lawful act, thereby releasing the aggressor from liability.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/document/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=f4ec9958-9198-4aae-
8864-
2d547efa6bea&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fcases%2Furn%3AcontentIte
m%3A3RRN-06G0-0046-4268-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A3RRN-06G0-
0046-4268-00000-
00&pdcontentcomponentid=9269&pdshepid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A7XWX-4HJ1-2NSD-
N1T8-00000-
00&pdteaserkey=sr0&pditab=allpods&ecomp=5ypck&earg=sr0&prid=e4953a13-2ecd-
47dc-af47-ca3579d987e5
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3RRN-06G0-0046-4268-00000-00
CASE NAME: Jackson v. Nestle-Beich, Inc.,
CITATION: 147 Ill. 2d 408, 168 Ill. Dec. 147, 589 N.E.2d 547 (1992)
RULE: The reasonable expectation test provides that, regardless whether a substance in a food
product is natural to an ingredient thereof, liability will lie for injuries caused by the substance
where the consumer of the product would not reasonably have expected to find the substance in
the product.
FACTS: The injured party purchased a sealed can of the manufacturer's chocolate-covered
pecan and caramel candies, bit into one of the candies and allegedly broke a tooth on a pecan
shell embedded in the candy. She filed a complaint asserting breach of implied warranty and strict
products liability.
ISSUE: Is the manufacturer liable for the broken tooth of the injured party?
ANSWER: Yes.
CONCLUSION: The court instead applied a consumer's reasonable expectations as to the
contents test. The court further noted that even if the candy merited classification as an
unavoidably unsafe product, the court would nonetheless find it subject to strict liability due to the
absence of a warning of the unavoidable risk of injury it posed.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=70ac55ef-0846-4a34-b0b4-
b6c2742062f1&pdsearchterms=589+N.E.2d+547+(Ill.+1992)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pd
typeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytempla
teid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=f4ec9958-9198-4aae-8864-2d547efa6bea
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3RX4-1W40-003D-H36F-00000-00
CASE NAME: Jackson v. Brantley
CITATION: 378 So. 2d 1109 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979)
RULE: Where a defendant knows that the consequences of his act are certain or substantially
certain to result from his intentional conduct, and he still proceeds, it is considered that he in fact
intended to produce the consequences which in fact occurred.

FACTS: In recovering four horses that had gone onto a neighbor's land, one of the owners and a
helper led two of the animals, bridled, and two that had earlier refused to be bridled onto the
shoulder of a highway. The horses were apparently startled by the headlights of the motorist's
oncoming car and the two unbridled animals bolted into the road. The motorist's car struck and
killed one of the animals.

ISSUE: Is the motorist liable for the death of one of the animals?
ANSWER: No.
CONCLUSION: The fact that the animals were on the road makes the motorist not liable for
startling the horses that led them to run to the highway. The court found no merit in the contention
that the animals were being led alongside the paved portion of the highway and thus were not
technically "upon the highway." The defense of contributory negligence was not available to the
horse owners because contributory negligence, as a matter of law, was not a defense to an
intentional tort such as the wrong set forth in § 3-5-3.

URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=4ef65d42-96c8-4176-821a-
96752199c17e&pdsearchterms=Jackson+v.+Brantley%2C+378+So.+2d+1109+(Ala.+Civ.+
App.+1979)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=
SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=70ac55ef-0846-
4a34-b0b4-b6c2742062f1
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3RX4-BCJ0-003C-94HR-00000-00
CASE NAME: Goss v. Allen
CITATION: 70 N.J. 442, 360 A.2d 388 (1976)
RULE: Eighteen years would appear to be the age at which a person should be held to adult
responsibility in tort matters.

FACTS: On February 21, 1972, plaintiff, an experienced skier, was serving as a first aid advisor
on the ski patrol at the Mad River Glen ski resort in Vermont. The facility includes a beginners
slope which near its end makes an abrupt left turn. The accident occurred some 60 feet beyond
the end of the slope in a flat area where plaintiff and a friend happened to be standing taking
pictures. Plaintiff had been working in the first aid room which is adjacent to the area where plaintiff
and her friend were standing.

Defendant, then 17 years of age, was a beginning skier who had limited cross-country skiing
experience but had never attempted a downhill run. Nor had he ever been to Mad River Glen
before. Upon arrival, defendant was sent to the beginners' slope. However, instead of riding the
mechanical T-bar lift to the top, defendant confined his first run to the lower portion of the slope.
He walked a quarter of the way up the hill and started to ski down, successfully completing the
comparatively short run of 30 feet or so until he came to the abrupt left turn. In attempting to
negotiate the turn, defendant lost control over his momentum and direction. He saw the two girls
ahead of him but because of the short distance remaining, his efforts to regain control and his
lack of experience, he did not call out until he was almost upon the girls. Plaintiff attempted to get
out of the way but was unable to do so and was struck and knocked down by defendant.

ISSUE: Is the appellant liable for the injuries sustained in the skiing accident?
ANSWER: No.
CONCLUSION: The trial court charged the jury that the applicable standard of care was that
degree of care which a reasonably prudent person of the same age and experience as appellant
would have exercised under the circumstances. The jury returned a verdict, which specifically
found that appellant was not. Appellee sought review and the superior court reversed on the
ground that the proper standard of care was that of a reasonably prudent adult under similar
circumstances because skiing was primarily an adult activity. On appeal, the court reversed and
reinstated the jury's verdict in favor of appellant. The court held that the proper standard of care
was as the trial court stated, that of a person of similar age, intelligence, and experience.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=ce220f67-32e6-485c-835b-
a6c1b82c9e60&pdsearchterms=Goss+v.+Allen%2C+70+N.J.+442%2C+360+A.2d+388+(19
76)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchB
ox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=4ef65d42-96c8-4176-821a-
96752199c17e&cbc=0
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3RRM-X9G0-003C-N2VR-00000-00
CASE NAME: Estate of Cilley v. Lane
CITATION: 2009 ME 133, 985 A.2d 481
RULE: A plaintiff who brings a cause of action for negligence must establish a prima facie case
that the defendant owed him a duty of care, the defendant breached that duty, and the breach
was a proximate cause of some injury to the plaintiff.
FACTS: The estate's decedent and the former girlfriend had broken up, and the decedent went
to the former girlfriend's home and confronted her. The decedent obtained a rifle and, while the
former girlfriend was walking away, it discharged. The former girlfriend continued walking away
having heard the decedent express that he did not mean to do it. The decedent had actually shot
himself and later died from the gunshot wound.
ISSUE: Was the plaintiff able to establish proof that there was negligence on the part of the
defendant to act on a duty of care?
ANSWER: No.
CONCLUSION: The trial court reasoned that the decedent was a trespasser and, absent a special
relationship, a person owed no duty to rescue a person notwithstanding how dire the imperiled
person's circumstances are and irrespective of how slight an effort would be required to
accomplish the rescue. On appeal, the estate asserted that its decedent was a guest, not a
trespasser, and sought to have the court adopt a new common law duty of seeking affirmative
emergency assistance. The court upheld the trial court's finding that the decedent was a
trespasser and refused to adopt a new common law duty to rescue.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=137b6e9f-49cf-4824-afa7-
32e901c9c983&pdsearchterms=Estate+of+Cilley+v.+Lane%2C+985+A.2d+481+(Me.+2009)
&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&
pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=ce220f67-32e6-485c-835b-
a6c1b82c9e60
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:7XDY-4P90-YB0R-R002-00000-00
CASE NAME: Holler v. Holler
CITATION: 364 S.C. 256, 612 S.E.2d 469 (Ct. App. 2005)
RULE: Unconscionability is the absence of meaningful choice on the part of one party due to one-
sided contract provisions, together with terms that are so oppressive that no reasonable person
would make them and no fair and honest person would accept them. In determining
unconscionability, courts are limited to considering facts and circumstances existing when the
contract was executed. In order to determine whether the agreement was unconscionable, a court
examines its terms and their application to the parties.
FACTS: The wife, a Ukrainian, traveled to the U.S. to marry the husband. She became pregnant
with his child; he was her sole source of support. He told her he would not marry her until she
signed the premarital agreement he tendered; she claimed she did not understand the agreement
and had no funds to hire an attorney or translator. She signed the agreement eight days before
her visa was to expire, at which time, as both parties knew, she would have to leave the country
unless married to a U.S. citizen. The parties married five days later.
ISSUE: Is it considered valid and binding if a contract was signed under duress?
ANSWER: No.
CONCLUSION: The trial court held the agreement was invalid because it was signed under
duress and was unconscionable. The appellate court agreed. As determining the agreement's
enforceability arose in the course of marital litigation, it was within the family court's jurisdiction
under S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-420(2) to rule on its validity. The wife amply proved duress. Further,
provisions in the agreement denying her the right to alimony were unconscionable, in view of
evidence that the husband had assets of $ 150,000 with $ 30,000 in annual income, while she
had no income or assets and had earned $ 1,400 per year as a music teacher in Ukraine.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=a8d53eb0-19db-44c1-
a435-
cc36567e68b8&pdsearchterms=Holler+v.+Holler%2C+364+S.C.+256%2C+612+S.E.2d+469
+(Ct.+App.+2005)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearcht
ype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=137b6e9f-
49cf-4824-afa7-32e901c9c983
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:4G0D-CCC0-0039-40Y8-00000-00
CASE NAME: Harris v. Anderson Cty. Sheriff's Office,
CITATION: 381 S.C. 357, 673 S.E.2d 423 (2009)
RULE: The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the
South Carolina Legislature. A court will give words their plain and ordinary meaning, and will not
resort to a subtle or forced construction that would limit or expand a statute's operation.
FACTS: A sheriff's deputy kenneled his police dog at a veterinary clinic while the deputy was on
vacation. The deputy and the sheriff's office knew that the dog had a recent history of multiple
unprovoked attacks. While kenneled at the clinic, the dog attacked the veterinary assistant in an
unprovoked attack, severely injuring the veterinary assistant.
ISSUE: Is the interpretation of the state supreme court proper to hold those in violation liable?
ANSWER: Yes.
CONCLUSION: The state supreme court, construing the language of S.C. Code Ann. § 47-3-
110(1987), found that a person injured by a dog could pursue a claim against the owner of the
dog when the injury occurred while the dog was in the care or keeping of another. The South
Carolina Legislature made a policy decision to hold dog owners strictly liable when the dog bit or
otherwise attacked a person who was lawfully on the premises, except when the injured person
provoked the attack. The Legislature further statutorily imposed liability on those who assumed
the care or keeping of a dog. Thus, the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of
the sheriff's office.

URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=45c646ae-5fb2-4157-88f5-
b3ab88668551&pdsearchterms=Harris+v.+Anderson+Cty.+Sheriff%27s+Office%2C+673+
S.E.2d+423+(S.C.+2009)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pd
searchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=a8d53
eb0-19db-44c1-a435-cc36567e68b8
DOC ID:urn:contentItem:4VK2-SB10-TXFW-M25S-00000-00
CASE NAME: Keith v. Buchanan
CITATION: 173 Cal. App. 3d 13, 220 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1985)
RULE: An implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose arises only where (1) the purchaser
at the time of contracting intends to use the goods for a particular purpose, (2) the seller at the
time of contracting has reason to know of this particular purpose, (3) the buyer relies on the seller's
skill or judgment to select or furnish goods suitable for the particular purpose, and (4) the seller
at the time of contracting has reason to know that the buyer is relying on such skill and judgment.

FACTS: Plaintiff buyer purchased a boat from defendant sellers after he reviewed the
representations in the sales brochure and spoke with sales representatives. After the boat was
delivered a dispute arose as to the seaworthiness of the boat. Plaintiff brought suit and alleged a
breach of an express warranty and breach of am implied warranty.

ISSUE: Is express warranty proven through an actual showing of a warranty statement?

ANSWER: No.
CONCLUSION: The determination of whether a statement is an express warranty under the
commercial code of California, it is the duty of the court to consider if the seller was able to make
an affirmation of a fact or a promise that is stated in the description of goods sold. The trial court
dismissed the action at the close of plaintiff's case and held that there was no express warranty
and there was no implied warranty of fitness. The court held that the representations regarding
the boat's seaworthiness made in sales brochures were affirmations of fact relating to the quality
or condition of the vessel. The court stated that a warranty statement made by defendants was
presumptively part of the basis of the bargain, and defendants carried the burden to prove that
bargain did not rest on the representation. The court held defendants failed to overcome this
burden. The court affirmed the trial court's holding that there was no implied warranty of fitness
because there was substantial evidence that plaintiff did not rely on the skill or judgment
defendants in the selection of the vessel in question.

URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=c7b65615-350a-4746-
ae5b-
54c42f1717ba&pdsearchterms=Keith+v.+Buchanan%2C+173+Cal.+App.+3d+13+(1985)&p
dstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pd
qttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=45c646ae-5fb2-4157-88f5-
b3ab88668551
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3RX6-KCP0-003D-J4GC-00000-00
CASE NAME: James v. Wormuth
CITATION: 2013 NY Slip Op 4839, 21 N.Y.3d 540, 974 N.Y.S.2d 308, 997 N.E.2d 133
RULE: Ordinarily, a plaintiff asserting a medical malpractice claim must demonstrate that the doctor
deviated from acceptable medical practice, and that such deviation was a proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injury.
FACTS: The doctor informed the patient that he had not been able to find a localization guide wire
after taking a biopsy of her lung, and that he had determined that it was better to leave it rather than
continue the search procedure. The patient subsequently returned to the doctor complaining of pain she
attributed to the lodged wire, and was so significant that it disrupted her ability to work. Approximately
two months after the first procedure, the doctor performed a second operation, wherein he successfully
located and removed the wire with the use of a special x-ray machine. Thereafter, the patient sued the
doctor for malpractice based on res ipsa loquitur.
ISSUE: If a foreign object has been left inside the body of a patient for his good, is res ipsa loquitur
applicable?
ANSWER: No.
CONCLUSION: Res ipsa loquitur is only applicable when a foreign object is left in a patient’s
body unintentionally during a medical operation. The Court of Appeals found, inter alia, that whether
the doctor was in control of the operation did not address the question of whether he was in exclusive
control of the wire, since several others participated in the procedure. The doctor exercised his
professional judgment when he chose to leave the wire in the patient after the first surgery, and the
patient did not present any expert evidence that by so doing, the doctor departed from accepted
standards of medical care. Therefore, the directed verdict was properly entered.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=62513c2b-e39b-4db7-
930c-
168460e4725f&pdsearchterms=James+v.+Wormuth%2C+997+N.E.2d+133+(N.Y.+2013)&p
dstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pd
qttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=c7b65615-350a-4746-ae5b-
54c42f1717ba
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:58S0-RSV1-F04J-60H6-00000-00
CASE NAME: Gyerman v. United States Lines Co.,
CITATION: 7 Cal. 3d 488, 102 Cal. Rptr. 795, 498 P.2d 1043 (1972)
RULE: The doctrine of "law of the case" deals with the effect of the first appellate decision on the
subsequent retrial or appeal: The decision of an appellate court, stating a rule of law necessary to the
decision of the case, conclusively establishes that rule and makes it determinative of the rights of the
same parties in any subsequent retrial or appeal in the same case. But, the discussion or determination
of a point not necessary to the disposition of a question that is decisive of the appeal is generally
recorded as obiter dictum and not as the law of the case. It is fundamental that the point relied upon
as law of the case must have been necessarily involved in the case.

FACTS: Plaintiff longshoreman, employed by a stevedoring company, was injured by falling sacks of
fishmeal while operating a forklift in defendant shipping company's warehouse. When he first arrived at
the warehouse, plaintiff noticed that some of the sacks he was to move with the forklift were stacked in
a manner he considered hazardous. He testified that he called the condition to the attention of
defendant's chief clerk who said there was nothing he could do about it.

ISSUE: Is the proof of plaintiff’s contributory negligence as proximate cause required in an

affirmative defense against liability?
ANSWER: Yes.
CONCLUSION: There was negligence on the part of the warehouse because it failed to prove
that Gyerman’s injuries were cause by his own negligence. The court held that the trial judge did
not ignore the doctrine of law of the case. The court found that the decision on the first appeal left the
issue of contributory negligence for the determination of the trier of fact upon retrial. The court held
that defendant was not estopped from asserting plaintiff's contributory negligence, because plaintiff's
contention that defendant's employee misled plaintiff about the dangerous condition was a question of
fact that could not be raised for the first time on appeal. The court held that defendant failed to prove
plaintiff's contributory negligence because, although there was sufficient support for finding that plaintiff
failed to use ordinary care, the record did not establish that plaintiff's failure was a substantial factor in
bringing about the accident.

URL: https://advance.lexis.com/document/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=f867cd3b-9f65-4f0e-
aabd-
d54f0ffe1b4a&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fcases%2Furn%3AcontentItem
%3A3RRK-HKK0-003C-H0HM-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A3RRK-HKK0-
003C-H0HM-00000-
00&pdcontentcomponentid=4861&pdshepid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A7XWP-9XH1-2NSD-
R519-00000-
00&pdteaserkey=sr0&pditab=allpods&ecomp=5ypck&earg=sr0&prid=9ff3329b-e42d-
4e4b-9411-c69e2be26576
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3RRK-HKK0-003C-H0HM-00000-00
CASE NAME: Helling v. Carey
CITATION: 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974)
RULE: Reasonable prudence requires the timely giving of a pressure test for glaucoma to patients
under 40 years of age. The precaution of giving this test to detect the incidence of glaucoma to patients
under 40 years of age is so imperative that irrespective of its disregard by the standards of the
ophthalmology profession, it is the duty of the courts to say what is required to protect patients under
40 from the damaging results of glaucoma.
FACTS: The patient, who was 32 years of age when she was diagnosed with glaucoma, sued the
ophthalmologists, alleging that she suffered severe and permanent damage to her eyes as the proximate
result of the ophthalmologists' negligence in failing timely administer a pressure test for glaucoma. Both
the trial and appellate courts ruled in favor of the ophthalmologists.
ISSUE: Is mere compliance with standards of medical specialty exclude the defendants from
liability?
ANSWER: No.

CONCLUSION: Even if there are a lot of glaucoma patients, each and every one has to have
equal and same protection. The court held that under the facts of this case, reasonable prudence
required the timely administration of the pressure test to the patient. In failing to do so, the
ophthalmologists were negligent, which proximately resulted in the blindness sustained by the patient
for which the ophthalmologists were liable.

URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=cfe30f56-2bf2-4e7e-a797-
c747561c1d88&pdsearchterms=Helling+v.+Carey%2C+83+Wn.2d+514%2C+519+P.2d+981
+(1974)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=Sear
chBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=f867cd3b-9f65-4f0e-
aabd-d54f0ffe1b4a

DOC ID:urn:contentItem:3S3J-WGK0-003F-W33Y-00000-00
CASE NAME: Loveless v. Diehl
CITATION: 235 Ark. 805, 364 S.W.2d 317 (1962)
RULE: Specific performance -- discretion of court. -- In the exercise of sound discretion, courts of
equity may award damages and refuse specific performance where the damages are clear.
FACTS: The lessees entered into a lease that contained an option to purchase the property for a certain
amount. The lessees also entered into a separate agreement for the lessors to sell the lessees certain
equipment in exchange for the lessees' promissory note. During the lease term, the lessees became
unable to exercise the option themselves, but they found a third party that would buy the property for
the amount of option and a profit to the lessees. The lessors announced that they would not allow the
lessees to exercise the option, and the third party was never able to complete the purchase. The lessees
brought an action for specific performance or damages and the lessors counterclaimed for the unpaid
promissory note. The trial court entered a decree of specific performance and awarded the lessors
judgment on the note.
ISSUE: In cases involving real property, is specific performance awarded when there is breach?
ANSWER: Yes.
CONCLUSION: The innocent party should be awarded with his request as award to provide a
complete relief. The trial court entered a decree of specific performance and awarded the lessors
judgment on the note. The court reversed the decree, holding that the lessees never intended to
purchase the property, so the trial court should have entered a decree for damages in the amount of
the profit lost to the lessees. The court remanded the case with directions to enter a decree awarding
damages to the lessees and that those damages would be offset against the lessors' judgment.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/document/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=c24e7984-e53e-445a-
b288-
ddc68f008133&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fcases%2Furn%3AcontentIte
m%3A3RRJ-19Y0-003V-R0PB-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A3RRJ-19Y0-
003V-R0PB-00000-
00&pdcontentcomponentid=4300&pdteaserkey=sr0&pditab=allpods&ecomp=5ypck&earg
=sr0&prid=fd12949d-0b83-45d4-b5ea-e2950c2be09c
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3RRJ-19Y0-003V-R0PB-00000-00
CASE NAME: Kenai Chrysler Ctr., Inc. v. Denison
CITATION: 167 P.3d 1240 (Alaska 2007)
RULE: The Supreme Court of Alaska independently reviews the superior court's interpretation of
Alaska's Unfair Trade Practices Act's, Alaska Stat. § 45.50.471 et seq., attorney's fee provision. But the
court reviews the amount of the fee award itself for abuse of discretion.
FACTS: David Denison is a developmentally disabled young man who has been under the legal
guardianship of his parents since 1999, when he turned eighteen. In October 2002 David was living in
his own apartment, but his parents strictly controlled his finances. They visited him at least once each
week to make sure he had a clean and safe place to live and was budgeting his food money properly.
They also visited him socially several times every week. They spoke with David nearly every day.
The Denisons first learned that David wanted to buy a car when David called his father, Michael, from
Kenai Chrysler and asked him to cosign for a used car; David did not tell his father where he was when
he called. Michael refused to cosign. The next day, David again tried to purchase a car from Kenai
Chrysler. This time, he was trying to buy a new car, a Dodge Neon, which he could finance without a
cosigner. David called his mother, Dorothy, [**3] to ask for money for a down payment. Dorothy
refused and told him not to buy a car. She assumed her word would be final because she did not realize
that David could obtain any appreciable amount of money with his debit card. David used his debit card
and bought the Neon. Kenai Chrysler charged $ 16,614 for the car and $ 945 for the dealership's
extended service plan. With additional charges, fees, and taxes, the total price came to $ 17,802. Kenai
Chrysler gave David credit for trading in his 1994 Pontiac Grand Am, and applied a $ 2,000 factory
rebate to the down payment, which allowed David to buy the new Neon with only $ 500 in cash. Kenai
Chrysler financed the remaining $ 12,851.77 at 11.99% APR for five years. One or two days after David
signed the contract, Dorothy came to Kenai Chrysler with David and informed the salesman who had
sold David the car and a Kenai Chrysler manager that David was under the legal guardianship of his
parents and had no legal authority to enter into a contract to buy the Neon. Dorothy showed the manager
David's guardianship papers and asked him to take back the car. The manager refused; according to
Dorothy, he told her that Kenai Chrysler would not take [**4] back the car, and that the company sold
cars to "a lot of people who aren't very smart." Dorothy insisted that the contract was void, but the
Kenai Chrysler manager ignored her and handed the keys to David over Dorothy's objection. David
drove off in the new car. Dorothy contacted Duane Bannock, the general manager of Kenai Chrysler,
the next day; he told her that he had seen the guardianship papers, but he still thought that the contract
was valid and that David was bound by it.

ISSUE: Is a ward limited from entering a valid contract with another if it is under legal
guardianship?

ANSWER: Yes.

CONCLUSION: The existence of legal guardianship limits another contract being formed. Appellee
guardians sued appellant automobile dealer and its insurance agency, seeking to void a contract entered
into by their ward and alleging a violation of Alaska's Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA), Alaska Stat. §
45.50.471 et seq. The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Kenai,, granted the
guardians summary judgment, awarded them treble damages, but denied sanctions against the dealer.
The parties cross-appealed.

URL: https://advance.lexis.com/document/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=e8699599-9dfc-4bab-
9633-
d91882572bc2&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fcases%2Furn%3AcontentIte
m%3A4PRG-M7K0-TXFJ-V2B9-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A4PRG-M7K0-
TXFJ-V2B9-00000-
00&pdcontentcomponentid=3825&pdshepid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A7XWP-3KR1-2NSD-
P476-00000-
00&pdteaserkey=sr0&pditab=allpods&ecomp=5ypck&earg=sr0&prid=4decd099-9912-
4275-989a-f030c08346c7
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:4PRG-M7K0-TXFJ-V2B9-00000-00
CASE NAME: H. R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co.
CITATION: 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928)
RULE: If conduct has gone forward to such a stage that inaction would commonly result, not negatively
merely in withholding a benefit, but positively or actively in working an injury, there exists a relation
out of which arises a duty to go forward. The query always is whether the putative wrongdoer has
advanced to such a point as to have launched a force or instrument of harm, or has stopped where
inaction is at most a refusal to become an instrument for good.
FACTS: A large fire occurred in which plaintiff owner's warehouse was substantially damaged. During
the fire, defendant water company ran out of supplies, and plaintiff contended that such a mistake
resulted in increased damages to his building. Accordingly, litigation ensued where plaintiff sought
negligence damages on a theory that defendant breached its duty of care within the presiding city.
ISSUE: Is a city resident considered to be a beneficiary of a contract agreement of a water
company to provide for city’s fire hydrants?
ANSWER: No.
CONCLUSION: It should be proven that the parties to the contract show sufficient evidence that
an individual is a beneficiary to it. At the trial level, defendant's motion to dismiss was denied. The
intermediate appellate court reversed, holding that a duty existed between defendant and the city, but
plaintiff had no privity in the relationship. The court affirmed on the basis that under N.Y. Transp. Corp.
Law § 81, defendant was never intended to be held liable for incidental damages from performing its
services.
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fa522cc4edc4&pdsearchterms=H.R.+Moch+Co.+v.+Rensselaer+Water+Co.%2C+159+N.E.
+896+(N.Y.+1928)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearcht
ype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=e8699599-
9dfc-4bab-9633-d91882572bc2
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3RRM-SFT0-003F-610K-00000-00
CASE NAME: Hudson v. Craft
CITATION: 33 Cal. 2d 654, 204 P.2d 1 (1949)
RULE: Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 18600- 18782 created a State Athletic Commission with power to
supervise and regulate all boxing matches and all phases of such activity.
FACTS: Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that defendants were conducting a carnival where one of the
concessions consisted of boxing exhibitions, conducted in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 412and the Cal.
Bus. & Prof. Code, in that defendants did not obtain a license for the boxing bouts, nor conducted the
bouts in accordance with the state's regulatory agency. Plaintiff minor was solicited to participate in a
boxing match and suffered personal injuries during the bout.
ISSUE: Is a promoter liable for injury caused to participants of an illegal event?
ANSWER: Yes.
CONCLUSION: An illegal boxing event that is promoted by Craft where Hudson was inflicted with
injury makes Craft liable. In plaintiffs' suit for damages, the trial court sustained defendants' demurrer
and dismissed plaintiffs' suit. On appeal, the court reversed, holding that plaintiffs' complaint clearly
alleged that defendants wholly disregarded the prize fight and boxing regulations, whether found in the
statutes or the commission's rules. Thus, after applying the rule of liberal construction, the complaint
sufficiently apprized defendants of the issues to be met in the suit.
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b234-
e8c91358e165&pdsearchterms=Hudson+v.+Craft%2C+33+Cal.2d+654+(Cal.+1949)&pdsta
rtin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqtty
pe=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=23c43afa-ecdc-4888-a28e-
fa522cc4edc4
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3RRK-RVF0-003C-H01G-00000-00
CASE NAME: Garcia v. Hilton Hotels International, Inc.,
CITATION: 97 F. Supp. 5
RULE: On motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the complaint must be construed in the light
most favorable to plaintiff with all doubts resolved in his favor and the allegation taken as true. That
being so, when allegations are sufficient to sustain the defense of conditional privilege they will be,
generally, sufficient to permit the introduction of evidence tending to prove abuse of the privilege or
actual malice. Save in some extraordinary situation, allegations which are adequate for the admission
of evidence to prove the defense of qualified privilege are adequate for the admission of evidence to
negative that defense.

FACTS: The action here is for damages for defamation brought by plaintiff, a citizen and resident of
Puerto Rico, against defendant, a Delaware corporation, in the District Court of Puerto Rico and removed
to this Court by defendant corporation. The complaint sets forth two causes of action and the paragraphs
considered herein are identical in each cause. Defendant has moved to dismiss the complaint for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and, in the alternative, to strike Paragraphs 5, 6, 7
and 8 and for a more definite statement.
ISSUE: Can failure to state a claim be granted if evidence is admitted as a qualified defense and
be a basis for motion to dismiss?
ANSWER: No.
CONCLUSION: It cannot be granted if the plaintiff is able to produce evidence to go against the
defense raised. The court found that the complaint failed to state, in so many words, that there was a
publication of the alleged slanderous utterance. The court determined that, despite the fact that the
cause of action was defectively stated, the court concluded that it did not follow that the allegations did
not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court found that defendant was entitled to a
more definite statement and that certain paragraphs of the complaint should be stricken, because
defendant was entitled to an absolute privilege with regard to utterances made during legislative
hearings.
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9db0975ad521&pdsearchterms=Garcia+v.+Hilton+Hotels+International%2C+Inc.%2C+97+
F.Supp.+5+(D.P.R.+1951)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pd
searchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=3772d
797-85d1-4ee8-b234-e8c91358e165
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3S4V-V8D0-003B-221M-00000-00
CASE NAME: Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc.
CITATION: 28 Cal. 3d 807, 171 Cal. Rptr. 604, 623 P.2d 165 (1981)
RULE: Generally speaking, there are two judicially imposed limitations on the enforcement of adhesion
contracts or provisions thereof. The first is that such a contract or provision that does not fall within the
reasonable expectations of the weaker or "adhering" party will not be enforced against him. The second
-- a principle of equity applicable to all contracts generally -- is that a contract or provision, even if
consistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties, will be denied enforcement if, considered in
its context, it is unduly oppressive or "unconscionable."
FACTS: Appellant, a promoter of musical concerts, challenged a trial court order that confirmed an
arbitrator's award in favor of appellees, a successful musical group and a corporation through which the
group's services were marketed. Appellant contracted to promote concerts by appellee musicians under
a contract of adhesion that required arbitration through a labor union to which appellee musicians
belonged. A dispute arose over whether the loss in the first concert could be offset against the profits
of the second. Appellant, asserting that industry practice and custom required such offset, sued
appellees for breach of contract, declaratory relief, and rescission. Appellees' petition to compel
arbitration was granted, and the arbitrator ruled in favor of appellees.
ISSUE: Is the contract considered unenforceable as a contract of adhesion and the arbitration
provision unconscionable?
ANSWER: Yes.
CONCLUSION: The court reversed the judgment confirming the award and directed the lower court
to vacate its order compelling arbitration because, especially in contracts of adhesion, minimum levels
of integrity were required of arbitration procedures if the arrangement was to pass judicial muster. The
court held the arbitration agreement at issue failed to achieve that level of integrity because it
designated appellees' labor union as sole arbitrator.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=126829b6-443a-46bd-
b49b-6813ad0b8d98&pdsearchterms=Graham+v.+Scissor-
Tail%2C+Inc.%2C+28+Cal.+3d+807+(1981)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=s
earchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=5
32bk&prid=960ccec5-4bda-4eef-a0d1-9db0975ad521
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3S11-RY60-003C-R0GP-00000-00
CASE NAME: Kennedy v. Parrott
CITATION: 243 N.C. 355, 90 S.E.2d 754 (1956)
RULE: A judge or court may take judicial notice of any fact in the field of any particular science which
is either so notoriously true as not to be the subject of reasonable dispute or is capable of demonstration
by resort to readily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy. Judges may inform themselves as to
such facts by reference to standard works on the subject.
FACTS: Plaintiff consulted defendant as a surgeon. Defendant diagnosed plaintiff's ailment as
appendicitis and recommended an operation to which plaintiff agreed. During the operation, defendant
discovered some enlarged cysts on her left ovary, and he punctured them. Subsequently, plaintiff
developed phlebitis in her leg. At trial, plaintiff testified that defendant told her that while he was
puncturing the cyst he had to cut a blood vessel, which in turn caused plaintiff's phlebitis. Plaintiff
underwent another surgical procedure by a different surgeon to correct the damage.
ISSUE: Is the surgeon liable for battery for extending a scope of operation without the consent of
the patient?
ANSWER: No.
CONCLUSION: A consent is deemed general in nature unless otherwise expressed by the
patient. In plaintiff's action for negligence arising from the allegedly unauthorized operation on the
cysts, the judge granted defendant's motion for involuntary nonsuit. On appeal, the court affirmed
holding that because plaintiff voluntarily submitted herself to defendant for diagnosis and treatment of
an ailment, defendant's surgical procedure was, absent evidence to the contrary, presumably either
expressly or by implication authorized by plaintiff, as good surgery demanded.

URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=310e3908-2e6b-48a5-9afd-
9e94a712e0bf&pdsearchterms=Kennedy+v.+Parrott%2C+243+N.C.+355%2C+90+S.E.2d+7
54+(1956)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=Se
archBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=126829b6-443a-46bd-
b49b-6813ad0b8d98
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3RRN-1180-000G-K421-00000-00
****NO FACTS****
CASE NAME: Ill. C. R. Co. v. Illinois
CITATION: 146 U.S. 387, 13 S. Ct. 110 (1892)
RULE: The ownership of and dominion and sovereignty over lands covered by tide waters, within the
limits of the several states, belong to the respective states within which they are found, with the
consequent right to use or dispose of any portion thereof, when that can be done without substantial
impairment of the interest of the public in the waters, and subject always to the paramount right of
Congress to control their navigation so far as may be necessary for the regulation of commerce with
foreign nations and among the states. This doctrine is applicable to lands covered by fresh water in the
Great Lakes over which is conducted an extended commerce with different states and foreign nations.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
ANSWER:
CONCLUSION:
URL:
DOC ID:
CASE NAME: Keydata Corp. v. United States
CITATION: 205 Ct. Cl. 467, 504 F.2d 1115 (1974)
RULE: Contracts of the federal government are normally governed, not by the particular law of the
states where they are made or performed, but by a uniform federal law.
FACTS: Defendant United States entered into a lease for commercial space occupied by plaintiff, which
provided that plaintiff would surrender the premises by a given date. Plaintiff failed to vacate, and
defendant rescinded the lease. The landlord assigned its rights to plaintiff, and plaintiff sued defendant,
alleging illegal rescission, waiver, and estoppel. Both parties sought summary judgment on the
rescission claim, and defendant sought summary judgment on the waiver and estoppel claims.
ISSUE: At the start of a term of lease, is there an obligation on the part of the lessor to provide
the lessee with actual possession?
ANSWER: Yes.
CONCLUSION: It is an obligation on the part of the lessor to show actual possession of the
premises. The rule that applies in this case is that the lessor should deliver actual possession of
the premises to the lessee. As expected, the lessor is to be more in the know of the status of the
premises and rights entitled to those occupying the premises. The court granted defendant U.S.
summary judgment, holding that it had right to rescind lease, since court had the power to choose
"English" rule requiring a landlord to take prompt action to remove a holdover tenant within a reasonable
time, as it was necessary that federal government leases be governed by a uniform federal law. The
court denied summary judgment on plaintiff assignee's waiver and estoppel claims since fact issues
remained.
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8ed4-
eb9e113e5498&pdsearchterms=504+F.2d+1115+(1974)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtyp
eofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid
=&ecomp=532bk&prid=1f43cd1a-66a3-49b1-9acc-288218f86694
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-9640-003B-83XX-00000-00
CASE NAME: Getchell v. Lodge
CITATION: 65 P.3d 50 (Alaska 2003)
RULE: A refusal to grant a new trial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard; accordingly, an
appellate court reviews the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. The appellate
court disturbs the trial court's exercise of discretion only in the most exceptional circumstances to
prevent a miscarriage of justice. An abuse of discretion exists when evidence to support the verdict was
completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and
unjust.

FACTS: On the morning of January 16, 1998, Joyce Getchell and Barbara Lodge drove to work on the
Kenai Spur Highway. Getchell headed south on the highway towards Kenai. Lodge headed north towards
Nikiski. A thin layer of ice covered the unsanded road; the morning was dark. There was a dispute at
trial about what happened next. However, because we draw all factual inferences in favor of the non-
moving party when reviewing motions for JNOV and new trial, what follows is Lodge's account. Because
of the darkness, the icy road conditions, and the possibility of moose crossing the highway, Lodge was
driving at about forty-five miles per hour, even though the speed limit was fifty-five. A moose emerged
out of the darkness from Lodge's right and tried to cross the road as Lodge neared Mile 20 of the
highway. Lodge hit her brakes as hard as she could. She testified that her car skidded immediately and
began to rotate in a counterclockwise direction. Lodge lost control of her car as it continued to rotate
and slide. Ultimately, the car crossed the center line of the road. The car finished rotating and came to
a stop in the southbound lane. As Getchell headed south towards Mile 20, driving between forty-five
and fifty-five miles per hour, she saw a car in her lane. Getchell hit the passenger side of Lodge's car.
The impact injured Getchell's ankle, requiring surgery. State Trooper Harold Leichliter investigated the
accident and completed an accident report based upon his observations of the scene and witness
interviews. Getchell brought a personal injury negligence action against Lodge.

ISSUE: Is an emergency, not caused by the actor, being the cause of a statutory violation, be
considered excused?

ANSWER: Yes.

CONCLUSION: A statute violation constitutes negligence, but an emergency excuses

negligence. Based upon that testimony, reasonable jurors could have concluded that defendant was
unable after reasonable care to comply with regulations prohibiting crossing into oncoming traffic.
The judgment was affirmed.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=c23315b1-e036-4d37-
843e-
367a708d0f59&pdsearchterms=Getchell+v.+Lodge%2C+65+P.3d+50+(Alaska+2003)&pdst
artin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqtt
ype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=3f3524d8-5dcb-42c1-8ed4-
eb9e113e5498
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:4828-91M0-0039-43HD-00000-00
CASE NAME: Kiefer v. Fred Howe Motors, Inc.
CITATION: 39 Wis. 2d 20, 158 N.W.2d 288 (1968)
RULE: To be actionable a false representation must consist, first of a statement of fact which is untrue;
second, that it was made with intent to defraud and for the purpose of inducing the other party to act
upon it; third, that he did in fact rely on it and was induced thereby to act, to his injury or damage.

FACTS: On August 9, 1965, the plaintiff, Steven Kiefer, entered into a contract with the defendant,
Fred Howe Motors, Inc. ("dealer" hereinafter) for the purchase of a 1960 Willys station wagon. Kiefer
paid the contract price of $ 412 and took possession of the car. At the time of the sale Kiefer was twenty
years old, married, and the father of one child.

Kiefer had difficulty with the car which he claimed was caused by a cracked block. Kiefer contacted the
dealer and asked it to take the car back. Several other attempts to secure some adjustment with the
dealer failed and Kiefer contacted Attorney Paul C. Konnor. The attorney wrote a letter to the dealer
advising it that Kiefer was under twenty-one at the time of the sale. The letter declared the contract
void, tendered return of the automobile and demanded repayment of the purchase price. There was no
response so this action was commenced to recover the $ 412 purchase price. After a trial to the court,
a judgment for the plaintiff was entered and the defendant appeals.

ISSUE: Is a contract entered by an emancipated minor voidable?

ANSWER: Yes.
CONCLUSION: A contract entered by a minor are void or voidable depending on the option of
the minor under the infancy doctrine. The court held that an effective disaffirmance of the contract
was clearly established through the minor's testimony and a letter from his attorney. The court held
that the minor was not liable for misrepresentation because the trial court's finding that he had not
orally represent that he was 21 was not contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the
evidence, and no evidence was adduced to show that the minor intended to defraud the car dealership.

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192523e24001&pdsearchterms=Kiefer+v.+Fred+Howe+Motors%2C+Inc.%2C+158+N.W.2d
+288+(Wis.+1968)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearch
type=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=c23315b1-
e036-4d37-843e-367a708d0f59
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3S3J-WTD0-003G-3209-00000-00
CASE NAME: Langer v. Superior Steel Corp.
CITATION: 105 Pa. Super. 579, 161 A. 571 (1932)
RULE: A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a
definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or
forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
FACTS: Defendant company promised to pay plaintiff employee $ 100 per month for the rest of his life
after his retirement if he agreed to not work in any competitive occupation. After four years, defendant
company stopped paying plaintiff employee the monthly payment. Plaintiff employee sued for breach of
contract.
ISSUE: Is it sufficient for one party to agree to do something or deprive to do anything for a
contract to be enforceable?
ANSWER: Yes.
CONCLUSION: The court ruled that there was good consideration that established a contract
between the parties. By accepting the monthly payment, plaintiff employee accepted the conditions
imposed by defendant company and thus was restrained from doing something he had a right to do.
This was sufficient consideration to support the contract.

URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=3908c8f1-0ad9-4642-8ff4-
cd394b2b21fe&pdsearchterms=161+A.+571+(Pa.+Super.+1932)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A
1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdqueryte
mplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=6c4f0c3b-f3f0-47c0-9807-192523e24001
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3W5S-BFT0-00KR-C3BD-00000-00
CASE NAME: 178 A. 490 (Penn. 1935)
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CASE NAME: Kienzle v. Myers
CITATION: 2006-Ohio-2765, 167 Ohio App. 3d 78, 853 N.E.2d 1203
RULE: An easement by estoppel may be found when an owner of property misleads or causes another
in any way to change the other's position to his or her prejudice. Where an owner of land, without
objection, permits another to expend money in reliance upon a supposed easement, when in justice and
equity the former ought to have disclaimed his conflicting rights, he is estopped to deny the easement.

FACTS: The adjoining property owners were required by law to connect to the public sewer system
after it was constructed. Appellants' predecessor installed her sewer through a connection to appellee's
predecessor's property, based on an agreement between the owners. Subsequently, appellee informed
appellants that he was terminating the "revocable license" by which appellants' sewer pipe crossed
appellee's property. Appellee sued appellants to, inter alia, quiet title with respect to the
"encroachment," and appellants counterclaimed.

ISSUE: If a property owner influences another to change course of supposed easement without
misleading, is there an existing easement by estoppel?
ANSWER: Yes.
CONCLUSION: The trial court granted summary judgment to appellee, rejected appellants' assertion
of an easement, and granted damages to appellee for the "cost of capping the sewer line." On appeal,
the court found no evidence of an express, implied, or prescriptive easement. However, the trial court
erred in finding that an easement by estoppel did not exist, as appellants' predecessor had changed her
position in reliance on the sewer pipe arrangement and any change would disadvantage appellants. The
damages to appellee were moot, and there was evidence to support the trial court's denial of the
counterclaim regarding appellants' intentional destruction of vegetation.

URL: https://advance.lexis.com/document/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=a264a3b4-cf06-4e75-
b75e-
d247bcb7c2bf&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fcases%2Furn%3AcontentIte
m%3A4K3F-3GC0-TVW7-G2NC-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A4K3F-3GC0-
TVW7-G2NC-00000-
00&pdcontentcomponentid=9250&pdshepid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A7XX5-S8K1-2NSD-
P32K-00000-
00&pdteaserkey=sr0&pditab=allpods&ecomp=5ypck&earg=sr0&prid=0ac2bd4c-a58e-
4302-9296-bb75ed689982
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:4K3F-3GC0-TVW7-G2NC-00000-00
CASE NAME: Hammerstein v. Jean Dev. W.
CITATION: 111 Nev. 1471, 907 P.2d 975 (1995)
RULE: To recover under a negligence theory, the complainant must prove four elements: (1) that
defendant owed him a duty of care; (2) that defendant breached this duty of care; (3) that the breach
was the legal cause of plaintiff's injury; and (4) that the complainant suffered damages.

FACTS: The invitee was a diabetic septuagenarian who, with his wife, was spending New Year's Eve at
the hotel. He asked for a room on the main floor due to his medical condition, and was told that there
was only space available on the fourth floor, but that the fourth floor was accessible by elevator. Shortly
after the invitee returned to his room, a fire alarm went off and the invitee twisted his ankle while
descending the stairs, which resulted in a gangrenous infection. There was evidence that the fire alarm
at the hotel had a history of malfunctioning by going off when there was no fire.

ISSUE: Is the respondent liable for negligence?

ANSWER: Yes.
CONCLUSION: There was evidence that the fire alarm at the hotel had a history of malfunctioning by
going off when there was no fire. The court held that the invitee adequately alleged the hotel's
negligence as: (1) the hotel owed the invitee a duty of care; (2) the hotel could be found to have
breached that duty by not acting reasonably to remedy the faulty alarm as it was reasonably foreseeable
that someone would be injured trying to escape; and (3) a question of fact remained as to whether the
hotel's breach of duty might have been the proximate cause of the invitee's injuries. The remainder of
the invitee's claims had no merit.

URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=c5a7d8fe-3f6d-4ca1-a85e-
e461e5bdba83&pdsearchterms=Hammerstein+v.+Jean+Dev.+West%2C+111+Nev.+1471+(
1995)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=Search
Box&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=a264a3b4-cf06-4e75-b75e-
d247bcb7c2bf
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3RXR-0V90-003D-C09T-00000-00
CASE NAME: Kilgore v. State
CITATION: 251 Ga. 291, 305 S.E.2d 82 (1983)
RULE: Generally, evidence of other criminal acts by a defendant is inadmissible because it tends to
place the defendant's character in issue. Ga. Code Ann. § 24-9-20. However, exceptions to this rule
have arisen, and evidence of independent crimes is admissible for limited purposes if two conditions are
met: First, there must be evidence that the defendant was in fact the perpetrator of the independent
crime. Second, there must be sufficient similarity or connection between the independent crime and the
offense charged, that proof of the former tends to prove the latter. If these conditions are satisfied,
evidence concerning the independent crimes may be admitted for the purposes of showing, among other
things, identity, motive, plan, scheme, bent of mind, intent, and course of conduct.

FACTS: Kilgore was convicted in the Dade County Superior Court on April 29, 1982 for the murder of
Roger Norman and was given a life sentence. He appeals.

In the early morning hours of July 8, 1981, the victim, Roger Norman, was traveling south on Interstate
59 (I-59) through Dade County to his home in Alabama. While driving, he was shot in the head and
killed. George Lee, a trucker, testified that on this morning he was driving north on I-59 when he
observed two cars traveling beside each other going south. He testified that he heard a shot and saw
Norman's car veer off the highway. Norman was driving a 1980 burgundy colored Lincoln.

ISSUE: Is it a valid inference that there was conspiracy even if there is no proof of communication
among conspirators?
ANSWER: Yes.
CONCLUSION: There was sufficient evidence that there was conspiracy among Oldaker, Benton
and Carden. However, the question is how it was possible for Oldaker and Kilgore if there was no
communication between them. The court found that defendant's admissions that related specifics of
the murder were corroborated by the identical actual facts of the murder. Although evidence of other
criminal acts was inadmissible, exceptions existed if two conditions were met: First, there had to be
evidence that defendant was in fact the perpetrator of the independent crime, and second, there had to
be sufficient similarity or connection between the independent crime and the offense charged, that proof
of the former tended to prove the latter. Here, evidence concerning the prior attempts on the victim's
life was properly admitted for the purposes of showing, among other things, identity, motive, plan, and

URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=8c88288f-922b-4738-96e8-
d7b149a40274&pdsearchterms=305+S.E.2d+82+(1983)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtyp
eofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid
=&ecomp=532bk&prid=c5a7d8fe-3f6d-4ca1-a85e-e461e5bdba83
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3RRM-2VM0-003F-J2VD-00000-00
CASE NAME: Goddard v. Winchell
CITATION: 86 Iowa 71, 52 N.W. 1124 (1892)
RULE: Whatever is affixed to the soil belongs to the soil. A permanent annexation to the soil, of a
thing in itself personal, makes it a part of the realty.
FACTS: An aerolite fell out of the sky and became imbedded in the possessor's soil. One of the
posessor's neighbors saw it fall, dug it up, and sold it to the buyer. The possessor initiated an action
against the buyer.
ISSUE: Is it valid for a meteorite ownership be vested on the real property owner on which it
lands?
ANSWER: Yes.
CONCLUSION: A meteorite is considered to be owned by the first person to find it and claim
possession of. The lower court found that the aerolite became part of the possessor's soil on which it
fell and, therefore, the possessor was the owner of the aerolite. The lower court also stated that the
neighbor's act of removing the aerolite was wrongful. The court affirmed the lower court. The court
reasoned that the aerolite was not a movable object because it was imbedded in the land and had to
be dug up. Further, the court stated that it was basically a stone and despite the way it arrived, it was
related to the soil. The court stated that the aerolite was the property of the owner of the fee upon
which it fell.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=9500d42d-7367-476a-
96ca-
7405eef7f0ed&pdsearchterms=Goddard+v.+Winchell%2C+52+N.W.+1124+(Iowa+1892)&p
dstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pd
qttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=8c88288f-922b-4738-96e8-
d7b149a40274
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3YR1-44T0-00KR-F233-00000-00
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