CASE NAME: Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.

CITATION: 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960)

RULE: An implied warranty of merchantability chargeable to either an automobile manufacturer or a
dealer extends to the purchaser of the car, members of his family, and to other persons occupying or using
it with his consent. It would be wholly opposed to reality to say that use by such persons is not within the
anticipation of parties to such a warranty of reasonable suitability of an automobile for ordinary highway
operation. Those persons must be considered within the distributive chain.
FACTS: Plaintiffs were injured when a car they had recently purchased from defendant dealer, made by
defendant manufacturer, veered into a highway sign because of its defective manufacture.
ISSUE: Is an implied warranty of merchantability of a car invalid when the original date of purchase is not
disclosed to the buyer?
ANSWER: Yes.
CONCLUSION: It is considered a disclaimer of implied warranties where the original date of purchase must
be brought to the attention of the buyer. Even if the parties are free to contract, there is still the obligation
to inform the buyer of such. The trial court found defendants liable for a breach of the implied warranties
of merchantability and dismissed the negligence claim. On appeal, the court found that the express
warranty, which was limited to replacement of parts sent to the factory, did not negate the implied
warranty of fitness, given the inequality of bargaining power between manufacturers and purchasers of
consumer goods.

URL: https://advance.lexis.com/document/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=ce89f97e-4179-4b06-a609-
3e22a66d8641&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fcases%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A3RRM-
Y5S0-003C-N0DB-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A3RRM-Y5S0-003C-N0DB-00000-
00&pdcontentcomponentid=9073&pdshepid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A7XW4-F4S1-2NSF-C2MR-00000-
00&pdteaserkey=sr0&pditab=allpods&ecomp=5ypck&earg=sr0&prid=01cca886-5a30-4f53-acb9-
b80ea4f12215
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3RRM-Y5S0-003C-N0DB-00000-00
CASE NAME: Hill v. Nat'l Grid
CITATION: 11 A.3d 110 (R.I. 2011)
RULE: It is the burden of the nonmoving party in a summary judgment proceeding to prove the existence
of a disputed issue of material fact by competent evidence; it cannot rest on allegations or denials in the
pleadings or on conclusions or legal opinions.

FACTS: While the son was running on the property during the game, he tripped over an unseen metal pole
that was protruding from the ground. He fell on the ground and struck a second metal pole, lacerating his
left thigh. The owner argued that the parents raised no material facts from which a jury could conclude
(1) that the owner knew or had reason to know children were likely to trespass on the property or (2) that
there was any dangerous condition on its land of which it knew or had reason to know.

ISSUE: Is there a requirement for the defendant to prove that children may trespass his property?

ANSWER: Yes.
CONCLUSION: The doctrine of attractive nuisance makes it a burden on the defendant to prove to have a
reason to know that there is a chance children would trespass on its property. However, Hills failed to
prove the knowledge that children were trespassing. The facts gave rise to a genuine factual dispute about
whether the owner knew or had reason to know that children were likely to trespass on the lot for
purposes of the attractive nuisance doctrine. An employee of the owner testified that he personally had
visited the property five or six times over two years. He also described monthly maintenance by a grounds-
keeping crew that mowed the grass and removed debris. Based on these activities by a variety of the
owner's agents, a reasonable jury could have concluded that the owner knew or had reason to know of
the metal stakes protruding from the ground. The entry of summary judgment was improper.

URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=d3ac1ac2-41ea-4061-ac95-
bae6c5f92b8a&pdsearchterms=Hill+v.+National+Grid%2C+11+A.3d+110+(R.I.+2011)&pdstartin=hlct%
3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytempl
ateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=ce89f97e-4179-4b06-a609-3e22a66d8641
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:520N-0WS1-652P-B00X-00000-00
CASE NAME: Exec. Software N. Am. v. United States Dist. Court
CITATION: 24 F.3d 1545 (9th Cir. 1994)
RULE: 28 U.S.C.S. § 1367(c)(4) permits a discretionary remand of pendent claims when in exceptional
circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. "Compelling reasons" for the
purposes of 28 U.S.C.S. § (c)(4) are those that lead a court to conclude that declining jurisdiction best
accommodates the values of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

FACTS: The employee filed federal and state law claims for employment discrimination against
petitioners. Petitioners removed the action to federal court. When the district court remanded the
pendent state law claims, petitioners requested a writ of mandamus.

ISSUE: Is there a compelling reason for a jurisdiction to be declined when there is no specification of the
circumstances of the case?

ANSWER: Yes.
CONCLUSION: The court granted the writ, holding that the district court clearly erred in not maintaining
supplemental jurisdiction over the pendent state claims. The district court did not rely on the
supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C.S. § 1367(c), in making its decision and failed to articulate how
the circumstances that warranted declining jurisdiction were exceptional and compelling under the
statute. The district court clearly erred by articulating a basis for declining jurisdiction that was
unauthorized by statute. The district court's errors were significant and the question was an important
question of first impression. Petitioners faced unrectifiable prejudice if not granted the writ and there
were no other adequate means for relief.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=2ba07d19-1b74-482d-b105-
afaa689cba91&pdsearchterms=Exec.+Software+N.+Am.+v.+United+States+Dist.+Court%2C+24+F.3d+15
45+(9th+Cir.+1994)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchB
ox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=d3ac1ac2-41ea-4061-ac95-bae6c5f92b8a
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-63K0-003B-P4GD-00000-00
CASE NAME: KEEL v. HAINLINE
CITATION: 1958 OK 201, 331 P.2d 397
RULE: Where, however, the basis of an action is assault and battery, the intention with which the injury
was done is immaterial so far as the maintenance of the action is concerned, provided the act causing the
injury was wrongful, for if the act was wrongful, the intent must necessarily have been wrongful. The fact
that an act was done with a good intention, or without any unlawful intention, cannot change that which,
by reason of its unlawfulness, is essentially an assault and battery into a lawful act, thereby releasing the
aggressor from liability.
FACTS: Defendants were playing, specifically throwing an eraser at each other. Plaintiff was injured when
the eraser hit her and lost an eye.
ISSUE: Is the defendant liable for the injury caused to the victim?
ANSWER: Yes.
CONCLUSION: There was no intent on the part of the respondent to harm the victim. The court noted that
the fact that an act was done with a good intention, or without any unlawful intention, could not change
that which, by reason of its unlawfulness, was essentially an assault and battery into a lawful act, thereby
releasing the aggressor from liability.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/document/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=f4ec9958-9198-4aae-8864-
2d547efa6bea&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fcases%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A3RRN-
06G0-0046-4268-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A3RRN-06G0-0046-4268-00000-
00&pdcontentcomponentid=9269&pdshepid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A7XWX-4HJ1-2NSD-N1T8-00000-
00&pdteaserkey=sr0&pditab=allpods&ecomp=5ypck&earg=sr0&prid=e4953a13-2ecd-47dc-af47-
ca3579d987e5
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3RRN-06G0-0046-4268-00000-00
CASE NAME: Jackson v. Nestle-Beich, Inc.,
CITATION: 147 Ill. 2d 408, 168 Ill. Dec. 147, 589 N.E.2d 547 (1992)
RULE: The reasonable expectation test provides that, regardless whether a substance in a food product is
natural to an ingredient thereof, liability will lie for injuries caused by the substance where the consumer
of the product would not reasonably have expected to find the substance in the product.
FACTS: The injured party purchased a sealed can of the manufacturer's chocolate-covered pecan and
caramel candies, bit into one of the candies and allegedly broke a tooth on a pecan shell embedded in the
candy. She filed a complaint asserting breach of implied warranty and strict products liability.
ISSUE: Is the manufacturer liable for the broken tooth of the injured party?
ANSWER: Yes.
CONCLUSION: The court instead applied a consumer's reasonable expectations as to the contents test.
The court further noted that even if the candy merited classification as an unavoidably unsafe product,
the court would nonetheless find it subject to strict liability due to the absence of a warning of the
unavoidable risk of injury it posed.
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b6c2742062f1&pdsearchterms=589+N.E.2d+547+(Ill.+1992)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsear
ch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&p
rid=f4ec9958-9198-4aae-8864-2d547efa6bea
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3RX4-1W40-003D-H36F-00000-00
CASE NAME: Jackson v. Brantley
CITATION: 378 So. 2d 1109 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979)
RULE: Where a defendant knows that the consequences of his act are certain or substantially certain to
result from his intentional conduct, and he still proceeds, it is considered that he in fact intended to
produce the consequences which in fact occurred.

FACTS: In recovering four horses that had gone onto a neighbor's land, one of the owners and a helper
led two of the animals, bridled, and two that had earlier refused to be bridled onto the shoulder of a
highway. The horses were apparently startled by the headlights of the motorist's oncoming car and the
two unbridled animals bolted into the road. The motorist's car struck and killed one of the animals.

ISSUE: Is the motorist liable for the death of one of the animals?
ANSWER: No.
CONCLUSION: The fact that the animals were on the road makes the motorist not liable for startling the
horses that led them to run to the highway. The court found no merit in the contention that the animals
were being led alongside the paved portion of the highway and thus were not technically "upon the
highway." The defense of contributory negligence was not available to the horse owners because
contributory negligence, as a matter of law, was not a defense to an intentional tort such as the wrong
set forth in § 3-5-3.

URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=4ef65d42-96c8-4176-821a-
96752199c17e&pdsearchterms=Jackson+v.+Brantley%2C+378+So.+2d+1109+(Ala.+Civ.+App.+1979)&p
dstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&
pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=70ac55ef-0846-4a34-b0b4-b6c2742062f1
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3RX4-BCJ0-003C-94HR-00000-00
CASE NAME: Goss v. Allen
CITATION: 70 N.J. 442, 360 A.2d 388 (1976)
RULE: Eighteen years would appear to be the age at which a person should be held to adult responsibility
in tort matters.

FACTS: On February 21, 1972, plaintiff, an experienced skier, was serving as a first aid advisor on the ski
patrol at the Mad River Glen ski resort in Vermont. The facility includes a beginners slope which near its
end makes an abrupt left turn. The accident occurred some 60 feet beyond the end of the slope in a flat
area where plaintiff and a friend happened to be standing taking pictures. Plaintiff had been working in
the first aid room which is adjacent to the area where plaintiff and her friend were standing.

Defendant, then 17 years of age, was a beginning skier who had limited cross-country skiing experience
but had never attempted a downhill run. Nor had he ever been to Mad River Glen before. Upon arrival,
defendant was sent to the beginners' slope. However, instead of riding the mechanical T-bar lift to the
top, defendant confined his first run to the lower portion of the slope. He walked a quarter of the way up
the hill and started to ski down, successfully completing the comparatively short run of 30 feet or so until
he came to the abrupt left turn. In attempting to negotiate the turn, defendant lost control over his
momentum and direction. He saw the two girls ahead of him but because of the short distance remaining,
his efforts to regain control and his lack of experience, he did not call out until he was almost upon the
girls. Plaintiff attempted to get out of the way but was unable to do so and was struck and knocked down
by defendant.

ISSUE: Is the appellant liable for the injuries sustained in the skiing accident?
ANSWER: No.
CONCLUSION: The trial court charged the jury that the applicable standard of care was that degree of care
which a reasonably prudent person of the same age and experience as appellant would have exercised
under the circumstances. The jury returned a verdict, which specifically found that appellant was not.
Appellee sought review and the superior court reversed on the ground that the proper standard of care
was that of a reasonably prudent adult under similar circumstances because skiing was primarily an adult
activity. On appeal, the court reversed and reinstated the jury's verdict in favor of appellant. The court
held that the proper standard of care was as the trial court stated, that of a person of similar age,
intelligence, and experience.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=ce220f67-32e6-485c-835b-
a6c1b82c9e60&pdsearchterms=Goss+v.+Allen%2C+70+N.J.+442%2C+360+A.2d+388+(1976)&pdstartin
=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquery
templateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=4ef65d42-96c8-4176-821a-96752199c17e&cbc=0
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3RRM-X9G0-003C-N2VR-00000-00
CASE NAME: Estate of Cilley v. Lane
CITATION: 2009 ME 133, 985 A.2d 481
RULE: A plaintiff who brings a cause of action for negligence must establish a prima facie case that the
defendant owed him a duty of care, the defendant breached that duty, and the breach was a proximate
cause of some injury to the plaintiff.
FACTS: The estate's decedent and the former girlfriend had broken up, and the decedent went to the
former girlfriend's home and confronted her. The decedent obtained a rifle and, while the former
girlfriend was walking away, it discharged. The former girlfriend continued walking away having heard the
decedent express that he did not mean to do it. The decedent had actually shot himself and later died
from the gunshot wound.
ISSUE: Was the plaintiff able to establish proof that there was negligence on the part of the defendant to
act on a duty of care?
ANSWER: No.
CONCLUSION: The trial court reasoned that the decedent was a trespasser and, absent a special
relationship, a person owed no duty to rescue a person notwithstanding how dire the imperiled person's
circumstances are and irrespective of how slight an effort would be required to accomplish the rescue.
On appeal, the estate asserted that its decedent was a guest, not a trespasser, and sought to have the
court adopt a new common law duty of seeking affirmative emergency assistance. The court upheld the
trial court's finding that the decedent was a trespasser and refused to adopt a new common law duty to
rescue.
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32e901c9c983&pdsearchterms=Estate+of+Cilley+v.+Lane%2C+985+A.2d+481+(Me.+2009)&pdstartin=
hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdqueryt
emplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=ce220f67-32e6-485c-835b-a6c1b82c9e60
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:7XDY-4P90-YB0R-R002-00000-00
CASE NAME: Holler v. Holler
CITATION: 364 S.C. 256, 612 S.E.2d 469 (Ct. App. 2005)
RULE: Unconscionability is the absence of meaningful choice on the part of one party due to one-sided
contract provisions, together with terms that are so oppressive that no reasonable person would make
them and no fair and honest person would accept them. In determining unconscionability, courts are
limited to considering facts and circumstances existing when the contract was executed. In order to
determine whether the agreement was unconscionable, a court examines its terms and their application
to the parties.
FACTS: The wife, a Ukrainian, traveled to the U.S. to marry the husband. She became pregnant with his
child; he was her sole source of support. He told her he would not marry her until she signed the
premarital agreement he tendered; she claimed she did not understand the agreement and had no funds
to hire an attorney or translator. She signed the agreement eight days before her visa was to expire, at
which time, as both parties knew, she would have to leave the country unless married to a U.S. citizen.
The parties married five days later.
ISSUE: Is it considered valid and binding if a contract was signed under duress?
ANSWER: No.
CONCLUSION: The trial court held the agreement was invalid because it was signed under duress and was
unconscionable. The appellate court agreed. As determining the agreement's enforceability arose in the
course of marital litigation, it was within the family court's jurisdiction under S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-420(2)
to rule on its validity. The wife amply proved duress. Further, provisions in the agreement denying her the
right to alimony were unconscionable, in view of evidence that the husband had assets of $ 150,000 with
$ 30,000 in annual income, while she had no income or assets and had earned $ 1,400 per year as a music
teacher in Ukraine.
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cc36567e68b8&pdsearchterms=Holler+v.+Holler%2C+364+S.C.+256%2C+612+S.E.2d+469+(Ct.+App.+2
005)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype
=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=137b6e9f-49cf-4824-afa7-32e901c9c983
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:4G0D-CCC0-0039-40Y8-00000-00
CASE NAME: Harris v. Anderson Cty. Sheriff's Office,
CITATION: 381 S.C. 357, 673 S.E.2d 423 (2009)
RULE: The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the South
Carolina Legislature. A court will give words their plain and ordinary meaning, and will not resort to a
subtle or forced construction that would limit or expand a statute's operation.
FACTS: A sheriff's deputy kenneled his police dog at a veterinary clinic while the deputy was on vacation.
The deputy and the sheriff's office knew that the dog had a recent history of multiple unprovoked attacks.
While kenneled at the clinic, the dog attacked the veterinary assistant in an unprovoked attack, severely
injuring the veterinary assistant.
ISSUE: Is the interpretation of the state supreme court proper to hold those in violation liable?
ANSWER: Yes.
CONCLUSION: The state supreme court, construing the language of S.C. Code Ann. § 47-3-110(1987),
found that a person injured by a dog could pursue a claim against the owner of the dog when the injury
occurred while the dog was in the care or keeping of another. The South Carolina Legislature made a policy
decision to hold dog owners strictly liable when the dog bit or otherwise attacked a person who was
lawfully on the premises, except when the injured person provoked the attack. The Legislature further
statutorily imposed liability on those who assumed the care or keeping of a dog. Thus, the trial court erred
by granting summary judgment in favor of the sheriff's office.

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b3ab88668551&pdsearchterms=Harris+v.+Anderson+Cty.+Sheriff%27s+Office%2C+673+S.E.2d+423+(S
.C.+2009)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdq
ttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=a8d53eb0-19db-44c1-a435-cc36567e68b8
DOC ID:urn:contentItem:4VK2-SB10-TXFW-M25S-00000-00
CASE NAME: Keith v. Buchanan
CITATION: 173 Cal. App. 3d 13, 220 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1985)
RULE: An implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose arises only where (1) the purchaser at the
time of contracting intends to use the goods for a particular purpose, (2) the seller at the time of
contracting has reason to know of this particular purpose, (3) the buyer relies on the seller's skill or
judgment to select or furnish goods suitable for the particular purpose, and (4) the seller at the time of
contracting has reason to know that the buyer is relying on such skill and judgment.

FACTS: Plaintiff buyer purchased a boat from defendant sellers after he reviewed the representations in
the sales brochure and spoke with sales representatives. After the boat was delivered a dispute arose as
to the seaworthiness of the boat. Plaintiff brought suit and alleged a breach of an express warranty and
breach of am implied warranty.

ISSUE: Is express warranty proven through an actual showing of a warranty statement?

ANSWER: No.
CONCLUSION: The determination of whether a statement is an express warranty under the commercial
code of California, it is the duty of the court to consider if the seller was able to make an affirmation of a
fact or a promise that is stated in the description of goods sold. The trial court dismissed the action at the
close of plaintiff's case and held that there was no express warranty and there was no implied warranty
of fitness. The court held that the representations regarding the boat's seaworthiness made in sales
brochures were affirmations of fact relating to the quality or condition of the vessel. The court stated that
a warranty statement made by defendants was presumptively part of the basis of the bargain, and
defendants carried the burden to prove that bargain did not rest on the representation. The court held
defendants failed to overcome this burden. The court affirmed the trial court's holding that there was no
implied warranty of fitness because there was substantial evidence that plaintiff did not rely on the skill
or judgment defendants in the selection of the vessel in question.

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54c42f1717ba&pdsearchterms=Keith+v.+Buchanan%2C+173+Cal.+App.+3d+13+(1985)&pdstartin=hlct
%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytem
plateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=45c646ae-5fb2-4157-88f5-b3ab88668551
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3RX6-KCP0-003D-J4GC-00000-00
CASE NAME: James v. Wormuth
CITATION: 2013 NY Slip Op 4839, 21 N.Y.3d 540, 974 N.Y.S.2d 308, 997 N.E.2d 133
RULE: Ordinarily, a plaintiff asserting a medical malpractice claim must demonstrate that the doctor
deviated from acceptable medical practice, and that such deviation was a proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injury.
FACTS: The doctor informed the patient that he had not been able to find a localization guide wire after
taking a biopsy of her lung, and that he had determined that it was better to leave it rather than continue
the search procedure. The patient subsequently returned to the doctor complaining of pain she attributed
to the lodged wire, and was so significant that it disrupted her ability to work. Approximately two months
after the first procedure, the doctor performed a second operation, wherein he successfully located and
removed the wire with the use of a special x-ray machine. Thereafter, the patient sued the doctor for
malpractice based on res ipsa loquitur.
ISSUE: If a foreign object has been left inside the body of a patient for his good, is res ipsa loquitur
applicable?
ANSWER: No.
CONCLUSION: Res ipsa loquitur is only applicable when a foreign object is left in a patient’s body
unintentionally during a medical operation. The Court of Appeals found, inter alia, that whether the doctor
was in control of the operation did not address the question of whether he was in exclusive control of the
wire, since several others participated in the procedure. The doctor exercised his professional judgment
when he chose to leave the wire in the patient after the first surgery, and the patient did not present any
expert evidence that by so doing, the doctor departed from accepted standards of medical care.
Therefore, the directed verdict was properly entered.
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168460e4725f&pdsearchterms=James+v.+Wormuth%2C+997+N.E.2d+133+(N.Y.+2013)&pdstartin=hlct
%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytem
plateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=c7b65615-350a-4746-ae5b-54c42f1717ba
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:58S0-RSV1-F04J-60H6-00000-00
CASE NAME: Gyerman v. United States Lines Co.,
CITATION: 7 Cal. 3d 488, 102 Cal. Rptr. 795, 498 P.2d 1043 (1972)
RULE: The doctrine of "law of the case" deals with the effect of the first appellate decision on the
subsequent retrial or appeal: The decision of an appellate court, stating a rule of law necessary to the
decision of the case, conclusively establishes that rule and makes it determinative of the rights of the
same parties in any subsequent retrial or appeal in the same case. But, the discussion or determination of
a point not necessary to the disposition of a question that is decisive of the appeal is generally recorded
as obiter dictum and not as the law of the case. It is fundamental that the point relied upon as law of the
case must have been necessarily involved in the case.

FACTS: Plaintiff longshoreman, employed by a stevedoring company, was injured by falling sacks of
fishmeal while operating a forklift in defendant shipping company's warehouse. When he first arrived at
the warehouse, plaintiff noticed that some of the sacks he was to move with the forklift were stacked in
a manner he considered hazardous. He testified that he called the condition to the attention of
defendant's chief clerk who said there was nothing he could do about it.

ISSUE: Is the proof of plaintiff’s contributory negligence as proximate cause required in an affirmative
defense against liability?
ANSWER: Yes.
CONCLUSION: There was negligence on the part of the warehouse because it failed to prove that
Gyerman’s injuries were cause by his own negligence. The court held that the trial judge did not ignore
the doctrine of law of the case. The court found that the decision on the first appeal left the issue of
contributory negligence for the determination of the trier of fact upon retrial. The court held that
defendant was not estopped from asserting plaintiff's contributory negligence, because plaintiff's
contention that defendant's employee misled plaintiff about the dangerous condition was a question of
fact that could not be raised for the first time on appeal. The court held that defendant failed to prove
plaintiff's contributory negligence because, although there was sufficient support for finding that plaintiff
failed to use ordinary care, the record did not establish that plaintiff's failure was a substantial factor in
bringing about the accident.

URL: https://advance.lexis.com/document/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=f867cd3b-9f65-4f0e-aabd-
d54f0ffe1b4a&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fcases%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A3RRK-
HKK0-003C-H0HM-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A3RRK-HKK0-003C-H0HM-00000-
00&pdcontentcomponentid=4861&pdshepid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A7XWP-9XH1-2NSD-R519-00000-
00&pdteaserkey=sr0&pditab=allpods&ecomp=5ypck&earg=sr0&prid=9ff3329b-e42d-4e4b-9411-
c69e2be26576
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3RRK-HKK0-003C-H0HM-00000-00
CASE NAME: Helling v. Carey
CITATION: 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974)
RULE: Reasonable prudence requires the timely giving of a pressure test for glaucoma to patients under
40 years of age. The precaution of giving this test to detect the incidence of glaucoma to patients under
40 years of age is so imperative that irrespective of its disregard by the standards of the ophthalmology
profession, it is the duty of the courts to say what is required to protect patients under 40 from the
damaging results of glaucoma.
FACTS: The patient, who was 32 years of age when she was diagnosed with glaucoma, sued the
ophthalmologists, alleging that she suffered severe and permanent damage to her eyes as the proximate
result of the ophthalmologists' negligence in failing timely administer a pressure test for glaucoma. Both
the trial and appellate courts ruled in favor of the ophthalmologists.
ISSUE: Is mere compliance with standards of medical specialty exclude the defendants from liability?
ANSWER: No.

CONCLUSION: Even if there are a lot of glaucoma patients, each and every one has to have equal and
same protection. The court held that under the facts of this case, reasonable prudence required the timely
administration of the pressure test to the patient. In failing to do so, the ophthalmologists were negligent,
which proximately resulted in the blindness sustained by the patient for which the ophthalmologists were
liable.

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c747561c1d88&pdsearchterms=Helling+v.+Carey%2C+83+Wn.2d+514%2C+519+P.2d+981+(1974)&pds
tartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pd
querytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=f867cd3b-9f65-4f0e-aabd-d54f0ffe1b4a

DOC ID:urn:contentItem:3S3J-WGK0-003F-W33Y-00000-00
CASE NAME: Loveless v. Diehl
CITATION: 235 Ark. 805, 364 S.W.2d 317 (1962)
RULE: Specific performance -- discretion of court. -- In the exercise of sound discretion, courts of equity
may award damages and refuse specific performance where the damages are clear.
FACTS: The lessees entered into a lease that contained an option to purchase the property for a certain
amount. The lessees also entered into a separate agreement for the lessors to sell the lessees certain
equipment in exchange for the lessees' promissory note. During the lease term, the lessees became
unable to exercise the option themselves, but they found a third party that would buy the property for
the amount of option and a profit to the lessees. The lessors announced that they would not allow the
lessees to exercise the option, and the third party was never able to complete the purchase. The lessees
brought an action for specific performance or damages and the lessors counterclaimed for the unpaid
promissory note. The trial court entered a decree of specific performance and awarded the lessors
judgment on the note.
ISSUE: In cases involving real property, is specific performance awarded when there is breach?
ANSWER: Yes.
CONCLUSION: The innocent party should be awarded with his request as award to provide a complete
relief. The trial court entered a decree of specific performance and awarded the lessors judgment on the
note. The court reversed the decree, holding that the lessees never intended to purchase the property,
so the trial court should have entered a decree for damages in the amount of the profit lost to the lessees.
The court remanded the case with directions to enter a decree awarding damages to the lessees and that
those damages would be offset against the lessors' judgment.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/document/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=c24e7984-e53e-445a-b288-
ddc68f008133&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fcases%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A3RRJ-
19Y0-003V-R0PB-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A3RRJ-19Y0-003V-R0PB-00000-
00&pdcontentcomponentid=4300&pdteaserkey=sr0&pditab=allpods&ecomp=5ypck&earg=sr0&prid=f
d12949d-0b83-45d4-b5ea-e2950c2be09c
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3RRJ-19Y0-003V-R0PB-00000-00
CASE NAME: Kenai Chrysler Ctr., Inc. v. Denison
CITATION: 167 P.3d 1240 (Alaska 2007)
RULE: The Supreme Court of Alaska independently reviews the superior court's interpretation of Alaska's
Unfair Trade Practices Act's, Alaska Stat. § 45.50.471 et seq., attorney's fee provision. But the court
reviews the amount of the fee award itself for abuse of discretion.
FACTS: David Denison is a developmentally disabled young man who has been under the legal
guardianship of his parents since 1999, when he turned eighteen. In October 2002 David was living in his
own apartment, but his parents strictly controlled his finances. They visited him at least once each week
to make sure he had a clean and safe place to live and was budgeting his food money properly. They also
visited him socially several times every week. They spoke with David nearly every day.
The Denisons first learned that David wanted to buy a car when David called his father, Michael, from
Kenai Chrysler and asked him to cosign for a used car; David did not tell his father where he was when he
called. Michael refused to cosign. The next day, David again tried to purchase a car from Kenai Chrysler.
This time, he was trying to buy a new car, a Dodge Neon, which he could finance without a cosigner. David
called his mother, Dorothy, [**3] to ask for money for a down payment. Dorothy refused and told him
not to buy a car. She assumed her word would be final because she did not realize that David could obtain
any appreciable amount of money with his debit card. David used his debit card and bought the Neon.
Kenai Chrysler charged $ 16,614 for the car and $ 945 for the dealership's extended service plan. With
additional charges, fees, and taxes, the total price came to $ 17,802. Kenai Chrysler gave David credit for
trading in his 1994 Pontiac Grand Am, and applied a $ 2,000 factory rebate to the down payment, which
allowed David to buy the new Neon with only $ 500 in cash. Kenai Chrysler financed the remaining $
12,851.77 at 11.99% APR for five years. One or two days after David signed the contract, Dorothy came
to Kenai Chrysler with David and informed the salesman who had sold David the car and a Kenai Chrysler
manager that David was under the legal guardianship of his parents and had no legal authority to enter
into a contract to buy the Neon. Dorothy showed the manager David's guardianship papers and asked him
to take back the car. The manager refused; according to Dorothy, he told her that Kenai Chrysler would
not take [**4] back the car, and that the company sold cars to "a lot of people who aren't very smart."
Dorothy insisted that the contract was void, but the Kenai Chrysler manager ignored her and handed the
keys to David over Dorothy's objection. David drove off in the new car. Dorothy contacted Duane Bannock,
the general manager of Kenai Chrysler, the next day; he told her that he had seen the guardianship papers,
but he still thought that the contract was valid and that David was bound by it.

ISSUE: Is a ward limited from entering a valid contract with another if it is under legal guardianship?

ANSWER: Yes.

CONCLUSION: The existence of legal guardianship limits another contract being formed. Appellee
guardians sued appellant automobile dealer and its insurance agency, seeking to void a contract entered
into by their ward and alleging a violation of Alaska's Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA), Alaska Stat. §
45.50.471 et seq. The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Kenai,, granted the
guardians summary judgment, awarded them treble damages, but denied sanctions against the dealer.
The parties cross-appealed.

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d91882572bc2&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fcases%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A4PRG-
M7K0-TXFJ-V2B9-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A4PRG-M7K0-TXFJ-V2B9-00000-
00&pdcontentcomponentid=3825&pdshepid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A7XWP-3KR1-2NSD-P476-00000-
00&pdteaserkey=sr0&pditab=allpods&ecomp=5ypck&earg=sr0&prid=4decd099-9912-4275-989a-
f030c08346c7
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:4PRG-M7K0-TXFJ-V2B9-00000-00
CASE NAME: H. R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co.
CITATION: 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928)
RULE: If conduct has gone forward to such a stage that inaction would commonly result, not negatively
merely in withholding a benefit, but positively or actively in working an injury, there exists a relation out
of which arises a duty to go forward. The query always is whether the putative wrongdoer has advanced
to such a point as to have launched a force or instrument of harm, or has stopped where inaction is at
most a refusal to become an instrument for good.
FACTS: A large fire occurred in which plaintiff owner's warehouse was substantially damaged. During the
fire, defendant water company ran out of supplies, and plaintiff contended that such a mistake resulted
in increased damages to his building. Accordingly, litigation ensued where plaintiff sought negligence
damages on a theory that defendant breached its duty of care within the presiding city.
ISSUE: Is a city resident considered to be a beneficiary of a contract agreement of a water company to
provide for city’s fire hydrants?
ANSWER: No.
CONCLUSION: It should be proven that the parties to the contract show sufficient evidence that an
individual is a beneficiary to it. At the trial level, defendant's motion to dismiss was denied. The
intermediate appellate court reversed, holding that a duty existed between defendant and the city, but
plaintiff had no privity in the relationship. The court affirmed on the basis that under N.Y. Transp. Corp.
Law § 81, defendant was never intended to be held liable for incidental damages from performing its
services.
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fa522cc4edc4&pdsearchterms=H.R.+Moch+Co.+v.+Rensselaer+Water+Co.%2C+159+N.E.+896+(N.Y.+1
928)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype
=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=e8699599-9dfc-4bab-9633-d91882572bc2
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3RRM-SFT0-003F-610K-00000-00
CASE NAME: Hudson v. Craft
CITATION: 33 Cal. 2d 654, 204 P.2d 1 (1949)
RULE: Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 18600- 18782 created a State Athletic Commission with power to
supervise and regulate all boxing matches and all phases of such activity.
FACTS: Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that defendants were conducting a carnival where one of the
concessions consisted of boxing exhibitions, conducted in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 412and the Cal.
Bus. & Prof. Code, in that defendants did not obtain a license for the boxing bouts, nor conducted the
bouts in accordance with the state's regulatory agency. Plaintiff minor was solicited to participate in a
boxing match and suffered personal injuries during the bout.
ISSUE: Is a promoter liable for injury caused to participants of an illegal event?
ANSWER: Yes.
CONCLUSION: An illegal boxing event that is promoted by Craft where Hudson was inflicted with injury
makes Craft liable. In plaintiffs' suit for damages, the trial court sustained defendants' demurrer and
dismissed plaintiffs' suit. On appeal, the court reversed, holding that plaintiffs' complaint clearly alleged
that defendants wholly disregarded the prize fight and boxing regulations, whether found in the statutes
or the commission's rules. Thus, after applying the rule of liberal construction, the complaint sufficiently
apprized defendants of the issues to be met in the suit.
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e8c91358e165&pdsearchterms=Hudson+v.+Craft%2C+33+Cal.2d+654+(Cal.+1949)&pdstartin=hlct%3A
1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplate
id=&ecomp=532bk&prid=23c43afa-ecdc-4888-a28e-fa522cc4edc4
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3RRK-RVF0-003C-H01G-00000-00
CASE NAME: Garcia v. Hilton Hotels International, Inc.,
CITATION: 97 F. Supp. 5
RULE: On motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the complaint must be construed in the light most
favorable to plaintiff with all doubts resolved in his favor and the allegation taken as true. That being so,
when allegations are sufficient to sustain the defense of conditional privilege they will be, generally,
sufficient to permit the introduction of evidence tending to prove abuse of the privilege or actual malice.
Save in some extraordinary situation, allegations which are adequate for the admission of evidence to
prove the defense of qualified privilege are adequate for the admission of evidence to negative that
defense.

FACTS: The action here is for damages for defamation brought by plaintiff, a citizen and resident of Puerto
Rico, against defendant, a Delaware corporation, in the District Court of Puerto Rico and removed to this
Court by defendant corporation. The complaint sets forth two causes of action and the paragraphs
considered herein are identical in each cause. Defendant has moved to dismiss the complaint for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and, in the alternative, to strike Paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and
8 and for a more definite statement.
ISSUE: Can failure to state a claim be granted if evidence is admitted as a qualified defense and be a basis
for motion to dismiss?
ANSWER: No.
CONCLUSION: It cannot be granted if the plaintiff is able to produce evidence to go against the defense
raised. The court found that the complaint failed to state, in so many words, that there was a publication
of the alleged slanderous utterance. The court determined that, despite the fact that the cause of action
was defectively stated, the court concluded that it did not follow that the allegations did not state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. The court found that defendant was entitled to a more definite
statement and that certain paragraphs of the complaint should be stricken, because defendant was
entitled to an absolute privilege with regard to utterances made during legislative hearings.
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9db0975ad521&pdsearchterms=Garcia+v.+Hilton+Hotels+International%2C+Inc.%2C+97+F.Supp.+5+(
D.P.R.+1951)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&
pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=3772d797-85d1-4ee8-b234-e8c91358e165
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3S4V-V8D0-003B-221M-00000-00
CASE NAME: Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc.
CITATION: 28 Cal. 3d 807, 171 Cal. Rptr. 604, 623 P.2d 165 (1981)
RULE: Generally speaking, there are two judicially imposed limitations on the enforcement of adhesion
contracts or provisions thereof. The first is that such a contract or provision that does not fall within the
reasonable expectations of the weaker or "adhering" party will not be enforced against him. The second
-- a principle of equity applicable to all contracts generally -- is that a contract or provision, even if
consistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties, will be denied enforcement if, considered in
its context, it is unduly oppressive or "unconscionable."
FACTS: Appellant, a promoter of musical concerts, challenged a trial court order that confirmed an
arbitrator's award in favor of appellees, a successful musical group and a corporation through which the
group's services were marketed. Appellant contracted to promote concerts by appellee musicians under
a contract of adhesion that required arbitration through a labor union to which appellee musicians
belonged. A dispute arose over whether the loss in the first concert could be offset against the profits of
the second. Appellant, asserting that industry practice and custom required such offset, sued appellees
for breach of contract, declaratory relief, and rescission. Appellees' petition to compel arbitration was
granted, and the arbitrator ruled in favor of appellees.
ISSUE: Is the contract considered unenforceable as a contract of adhesion and the arbitration provision
unconscionable?
ANSWER: Yes.
CONCLUSION: The court reversed the judgment confirming the award and directed the lower court to
vacate its order compelling arbitration because, especially in contracts of adhesion, minimum levels of
integrity were required of arbitration procedures if the arrangement was to pass judicial muster. The court
held the arbitration agreement at issue failed to achieve that level of integrity because it designated
appellees' labor union as sole arbitrator.
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6813ad0b8d98&pdsearchterms=Graham+v.+Scissor-
Tail%2C+Inc.%2C+28+Cal.+3d+807+(1981)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick
&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=960ccec5-
4bda-4eef-a0d1-9db0975ad521
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3S11-RY60-003C-R0GP-00000-00
CASE NAME: Kennedy v. Parrott
CITATION: 243 N.C. 355, 90 S.E.2d 754 (1956)
RULE: A judge or court may take judicial notice of any fact in the field of any particular science which is
either so notoriously true as not to be the subject of reasonable dispute or is capable of demonstration
by resort to readily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy. Judges may inform themselves as to such
facts by reference to standard works on the subject.
FACTS: Plaintiff consulted defendant as a surgeon. Defendant diagnosed plaintiff's ailment as appendicitis
and recommended an operation to which plaintiff agreed. During the operation, defendant discovered
some enlarged cysts on her left ovary, and he punctured them. Subsequently, plaintiff developed phlebitis
in her leg. At trial, plaintiff testified that defendant told her that while he was puncturing the cyst he had
to cut a blood vessel, which in turn caused plaintiff's phlebitis. Plaintiff underwent another surgical
procedure by a different surgeon to correct the damage.
ISSUE: Is the surgeon liable for battery for extending a scope of operation without the consent of the
patient?
ANSWER: No.
CONCLUSION: A consent is deemed general in nature unless otherwise expressed by the patient. In
plaintiff's action for negligence arising from the allegedly unauthorized operation on the cysts, the judge
granted defendant's motion for involuntary nonsuit. On appeal, the court affirmed holding that because
plaintiff voluntarily submitted herself to defendant for diagnosis and treatment of an ailment, defendant's
surgical procedure was, absent evidence to the contrary, presumably either expressly or by implication
authorized by plaintiff, as good surgery demanded.

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9e94a712e0bf&pdsearchterms=Kennedy+v.+Parrott%2C+243+N.C.+355%2C+90+S.E.2d+754+(1956)&p
dstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&
pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=126829b6-443a-46bd-b49b-6813ad0b8d98
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3RRN-1180-000G-K421-00000-00
CASE NAME: Ill. C. R. Co. v. Illinois
CITATION: 146 U.S. 387, 13 S. Ct. 110 (1892)
RULE: The soil under navigable waters being held by the people of the state in trust for the common use and as a portion of
their inherent sovereignty, any act of legislation concerning their use affects the public welfare. It is, therefore, appropriately
within the exercise of the police power of the state.
FACTS: In 1869, there was an act passed by the Illinois legislature giving Central Railroad Company title
to the submerged lands in the harbor of Chicago consisting of 1,000 acres used by the public for different
purposes such as navigation, commercial and fishing. The State of Illinois sued the company. The state
sought a decree that confirmed the state’s title to the submerged lands to confirm title and their right to
develop improvements. The appeal reached the United States Supreme Court to decide on the
legislature’s authority to grant such title.
ISSUE: Is the public-trust doctrine valid to prevent the legislature from granting the title?
ANSWER: Yes.
CONCLUSION: The State alleged that the railroad company had encroached upon the domain of the State, and its original
ownership and control of the waters of the harbor and of the lands thereunder, by claiming rights acquired under a grant from
the State and ordinance of the city to enter the city and appropriate land and water two hundred feet wide in order to construct
its facilities, and by claiming riparian rights acquired by virtue of ownership of lands originally bordering on the lake in front of
the city. The State prayed for a decree establishing its title to the bed of Lake Michigan and exclusive rights to develop and
improve the harbor of the city against the claim that the railroad company had an absolute title to the submerged lands by virtue
of the State's legislative act. The Court affirmed the decree in each of the three cases on appeal, with costs against the railroad
company. The railroad company had, upon the land reclaimed, rights as riparian proprietor. As for the ownership of submerged
lands in the harbor, and the right to construct, the court found that the State was the fee owner of the land in its sovereign
capacity and that modification of that sovereignty was inoperative.
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bee6546829c2&pdsearchterms=146+U.S.+387+(1892)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=se
archboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=1
e83c897-5f25-4660-9d49-d6afe080aa64&cbc=0
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-FKW0-003B-H44X-00000-00
CASE NAME: Keydata Corp. v. United States
CITATION: 205 Ct. Cl. 467, 504 F.2d 1115 (1974)
RULE: Contracts of the federal government are normally governed, not by the particular law of the states
where they are made or performed, but by a uniform federal law.
FACTS: Defendant United States entered into a lease for commercial space occupied by plaintiff, which
provided that plaintiff would surrender the premises by a given date. Plaintiff failed to vacate, and
defendant rescinded the lease. The landlord assigned its rights to plaintiff, and plaintiff sued defendant,
alleging illegal rescission, waiver, and estoppel. Both parties sought summary judgment on the rescission
claim, and defendant sought summary judgment on the waiver and estoppel claims.
ISSUE: At the start of a term of lease, is there an obligation on the part of the lessor to provide the lessee
with actual possession?
ANSWER: Yes.
CONCLUSION: It is an obligation on the part of the lessor to show actual possession of the premises. The
rule that applies in this case is that the lessor should deliver actual possession of the premises to the
lessee. As expected, the lessor is to be more in the know of the status of the premises and rights entitled
to those occupying the premises. The court granted defendant U.S. summary judgment, holding that it
had right to rescind lease, since court had the power to choose "English" rule requiring a landlord to take
prompt action to remove a holdover tenant within a reasonable time, as it was necessary that federal
government leases be governed by a uniform federal law. The court denied summary judgment on
plaintiff assignee's waiver and estoppel claims since fact issues remained.
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eb9e113e5498&pdsearchterms=504+F.2d+1115+(1974)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=s
earchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=
1f43cd1a-66a3-49b1-9acc-288218f86694
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-9640-003B-83XX-00000-00
CASE NAME: Getchell v. Lodge
CITATION: 65 P.3d 50 (Alaska 2003)
RULE: A refusal to grant a new trial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard; accordingly, an
appellate court reviews the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. The appellate
court disturbs the trial court's exercise of discretion only in the most exceptional circumstances to prevent
a miscarriage of justice. An abuse of discretion exists when evidence to support the verdict was completely
lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust.

FACTS: On the morning of January 16, 1998, Joyce Getchell and Barbara Lodge drove to work on the Kenai
Spur Highway. Getchell headed south on the highway towards Kenai. Lodge headed north towards Nikiski.
A thin layer of ice covered the unsanded road; the morning was dark. There was a dispute at trial about
what happened next. However, because we draw all factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party
when reviewing motions for JNOV and new trial, what follows is Lodge's account. Because of the
darkness, the icy road conditions, and the possibility of moose crossing the highway, Lodge was driving
at about forty-five miles per hour, even though the speed limit was fifty-five. A moose emerged out of the
darkness from Lodge's right and tried to cross the road as Lodge neared Mile 20 of the highway. Lodge hit
her brakes as hard as she could. She testified that her car skidded immediately and began to rotate in a
counterclockwise direction. Lodge lost control of her car as it continued to rotate and slide. Ultimately,
the car crossed the center line of the road. The car finished rotating and came to a stop in the southbound
lane. As Getchell headed south towards Mile 20, driving between forty-five and fifty-five miles per hour,
she saw a car in her lane. Getchell hit the passenger side of Lodge's car. The impact injured Getchell's
ankle, requiring surgery. State Trooper Harold Leichliter investigated the accident and completed an
accident report based upon his observations of the scene and witness interviews. Getchell brought a
personal injury negligence action against Lodge.

ISSUE: Is an emergency, not caused by the actor, being the cause of a statutory violation, be considered
excused?

ANSWER: Yes.

CONCLUSION: A statute violation constitutes negligence, but an emergency excuses negligence. Based
upon that testimony, reasonable jurors could have concluded that defendant was unable after reasonable
care to comply with regulations prohibiting crossing into oncoming traffic.
The judgment was affirmed.
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367a708d0f59&pdsearchterms=Getchell+v.+Lodge%2C+65+P.3d+50+(Alaska+2003)&pdstartin=hlct%3
A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplat
eid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=3f3524d8-5dcb-42c1-8ed4-eb9e113e5498
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:4828-91M0-0039-43HD-00000-00
CASE NAME: Kiefer v. Fred Howe Motors, Inc.
CITATION: 39 Wis. 2d 20, 158 N.W.2d 288 (1968)
RULE: To be actionable a false representation must consist, first of a statement of fact which is untrue;
second, that it was made with intent to defraud and for the purpose of inducing the other party to act
upon it; third, that he did in fact rely on it and was induced thereby to act, to his injury or damage.

FACTS: On August 9, 1965, the plaintiff, Steven Kiefer, entered into a contract with the defendant, Fred
Howe Motors, Inc. ("dealer" hereinafter) for the purchase of a 1960 Willys station wagon. Kiefer paid the
contract price of $ 412 and took possession of the car. At the time of the sale Kiefer was twenty years old,
married, and the father of one child.

Kiefer had difficulty with the car which he claimed was caused by a cracked block. Kiefer contacted the
dealer and asked it to take the car back. Several other attempts to secure some adjustment with the dealer
failed and Kiefer contacted Attorney Paul C. Konnor. The attorney wrote a letter to the dealer advising it
that Kiefer was under twenty-one at the time of the sale. The letter declared the contract void, tendered
return of the automobile and demanded repayment of the purchase price. There was no response so this
action was commenced to recover the $ 412 purchase price. After a trial to the court, a judgment for the
plaintiff was entered and the defendant appeals.

ISSUE: Is a contract entered by an emancipated minor voidable?

ANSWER: Yes.
CONCLUSION: A contract entered by a minor are void or voidable depending on the option of the minor
under the infancy doctrine. The court held that an effective disaffirmance of the contract was clearly
established through the minor's testimony and a letter from his attorney. The court held that the minor
was not liable for misrepresentation because the trial court's finding that he had not orally represent that
he was 21 was not contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence, and no evidence
was adduced to show that the minor intended to defraud the car dealership.

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192523e24001&pdsearchterms=Kiefer+v.+Fred+Howe+Motors%2C+Inc.%2C+158+N.W.2d+288+(Wis.+
1968)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttyp
e=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=c23315b1-e036-4d37-843e-367a708d0f59
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3S3J-WTD0-003G-3209-00000-00
CASE NAME: Langer v. Superior Steel Corp.
CITATION: 105 Pa. Super. 579, 161 A. 571 (1932)
RULE: A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a
definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or
forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
FACTS: Defendant company promised to pay plaintiff employee $ 100 per month for the rest of his life
after his retirement if he agreed to not work in any competitive occupation. After four years, defendant
company stopped paying plaintiff employee the monthly payment. Plaintiff employee sued for breach of
contract.
ISSUE: Is it sufficient for one party to agree to do something or deprive to do anything for a contract to be
enforceable?
ANSWER: Yes.
CONCLUSION: The court ruled that there was good consideration that established a contract between the
parties. By accepting the monthly payment, plaintiff employee accepted the conditions imposed by
defendant company and thus was restrained from doing something he had a right to do. This was
sufficient consideration to support the contract.

URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=3908c8f1-0ad9-4642-8ff4-
cd394b2b21fe&pdsearchterms=161+A.+571+(Pa.+Super.+1932)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofs
earch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk
&prid=6c4f0c3b-f3f0-47c0-9807-192523e24001
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3W5S-BFT0-00KR-C3BD-00000-00
CASE NAME: 178 A. 490 (Penn. 1935)
CITATION:
RULE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
ANSWER:
CONCLUSION:
URL:
DOC ID:
CASE NAME: Kienzle v. Myers
CITATION: 2006-Ohio-2765, 167 Ohio App. 3d 78, 853 N.E.2d 1203
RULE: An easement by estoppel may be found when an owner of property misleads or causes another in
any way to change the other's position to his or her prejudice. Where an owner of land, without objection,
permits another to expend money in reliance upon a supposed easement, when in justice and equity the
former ought to have disclaimed his conflicting rights, he is estopped to deny the easement.

FACTS: The adjoining property owners were required by law to connect to the public sewer system after
it was constructed. Appellants' predecessor installed her sewer through a connection to appellee's
predecessor's property, based on an agreement between the owners. Subsequently, appellee informed
appellants that he was terminating the "revocable license" by which appellants' sewer pipe crossed
appellee's property. Appellee sued appellants to, inter alia, quiet title with respect to the "encroachment,"
and appellants counterclaimed.

ISSUE: If a property owner influences another to change course of supposed easement without
misleading, is there an existing easement by estoppel?
ANSWER: Yes.
CONCLUSION: The trial court granted summary judgment to appellee, rejected appellants' assertion of an
easement, and granted damages to appellee for the "cost of capping the sewer line." On appeal, the court
found no evidence of an express, implied, or prescriptive easement. However, the trial court erred in
finding that an easement by estoppel did not exist, as appellants' predecessor had changed her position
in reliance on the sewer pipe arrangement and any change would disadvantage appellants. The damages
to appellee were moot, and there was evidence to support the trial court's denial of the counterclaim
regarding appellants' intentional destruction of vegetation.

URL: https://advance.lexis.com/document/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=a264a3b4-cf06-4e75-b75e-
d247bcb7c2bf&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fcases%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A4K3F-
3GC0-TVW7-G2NC-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A4K3F-3GC0-TVW7-G2NC-00000-
00&pdcontentcomponentid=9250&pdshepid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A7XX5-S8K1-2NSD-P32K-00000-
00&pdteaserkey=sr0&pditab=allpods&ecomp=5ypck&earg=sr0&prid=0ac2bd4c-a58e-4302-9296-
bb75ed689982
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:4K3F-3GC0-TVW7-G2NC-00000-00
CASE NAME: Hammerstein v. Jean Dev. W.
CITATION: 111 Nev. 1471, 907 P.2d 975 (1995)
RULE: To recover under a negligence theory, the complainant must prove four elements: (1) that
defendant owed him a duty of care; (2) that defendant breached this duty of care; (3) that the breach was
the legal cause of plaintiff's injury; and (4) that the complainant suffered damages.

FACTS: The invitee was a diabetic septuagenarian who, with his wife, was spending New Year's Eve at the
hotel. He asked for a room on the main floor due to his medical condition, and was told that there was
only space available on the fourth floor, but that the fourth floor was accessible by elevator. Shortly after
the invitee returned to his room, a fire alarm went off and the invitee twisted his ankle while descending
the stairs, which resulted in a gangrenous infection. There was evidence that the fire alarm at the hotel
had a history of malfunctioning by going off when there was no fire.

ISSUE: Is the respondent liable for negligence?

ANSWER: Yes.
CONCLUSION: There was evidence that the fire alarm at the hotel had a history of malfunctioning by going
off when there was no fire. The court held that the invitee adequately alleged the hotel's negligence as:
(1) the hotel owed the invitee a duty of care; (2) the hotel could be found to have breached that duty by
not acting reasonably to remedy the faulty alarm as it was reasonably foreseeable that someone would
be injured trying to escape; and (3) a question of fact remained as to whether the hotel's breach of duty
might have been the proximate cause of the invitee's injuries. The remainder of the invitee's claims had
no merit.

URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=c5a7d8fe-3f6d-4ca1-a85e-
e461e5bdba83&pdsearchterms=Hammerstein+v.+Jean+Dev.+West%2C+111+Nev.+1471+(1995)&pdst
artin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pd
querytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=a264a3b4-cf06-4e75-b75e-d247bcb7c2bf
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3RXR-0V90-003D-C09T-00000-00
CASE NAME: Kilgore v. State
CITATION: 251 Ga. 291, 305 S.E.2d 82 (1983)
RULE: Generally, evidence of other criminal acts by a defendant is inadmissible because it tends to place
the defendant's character in issue. Ga. Code Ann. § 24-9-20. However, exceptions to this rule have arisen,
and evidence of independent crimes is admissible for limited purposes if two conditions are met: First,
there must be evidence that the defendant was in fact the perpetrator of the independent crime. Second,
there must be sufficient similarity or connection between the independent crime and the offense charged,
that proof of the former tends to prove the latter. If these conditions are satisfied, evidence concerning
the independent crimes may be admitted for the purposes of showing, among other things, identity,
motive, plan, scheme, bent of mind, intent, and course of conduct.

FACTS: Kilgore was convicted in the Dade County Superior Court on April 29, 1982 for the murder of Roger
Norman and was given a life sentence. He appeals.

In the early morning hours of July 8, 1981, the victim, Roger Norman, was traveling south on Interstate 59
(I-59) through Dade County to his home in Alabama. While driving, he was shot in the head and killed.
George Lee, a trucker, testified that on this morning he was driving north on I-59 when he observed two
cars traveling beside each other going south. He testified that he heard a shot and saw Norman's car veer
off the highway. Norman was driving a 1980 burgundy colored Lincoln.

ISSUE: Is it a valid inference that there was conspiracy even if there is no proof of communication among
conspirators?
ANSWER: Yes.
CONCLUSION: There was sufficient evidence that there was conspiracy among Oldaker, Benton and
Carden. However, the question is how it was possible for Oldaker and Kilgore if there was no
communication between them. The court found that defendant's admissions that related specifics of the
murder were corroborated by the identical actual facts of the murder. Although evidence of other criminal
acts was inadmissible, exceptions existed if two conditions were met: First, there had to be evidence that
defendant was in fact the perpetrator of the independent crime, and second, there had to be sufficient
similarity or connection between the independent crime and the offense charged, that proof of the former
tended to prove the latter. Here, evidence concerning the prior attempts on the victim's life was properly
admitted for the purposes of showing, among other things, identity, motive, plan, and

URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=8c88288f-922b-4738-96e8-
d7b149a40274&pdsearchterms=305+S.E.2d+82+(1983)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=s
earchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=c
5a7d8fe-3f6d-4ca1-a85e-e461e5bdba83
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3RRM-2VM0-003F-J2VD-00000-00
CASE NAME: Goddard v. Winchell
CITATION: 86 Iowa 71, 52 N.W. 1124 (1892)
RULE: Whatever is affixed to the soil belongs to the soil. A permanent annexation to the soil, of a thing in
itself personal, makes it a part of the realty.
FACTS: An aerolite fell out of the sky and became imbedded in the possessor's soil. One of the posessor's
neighbors saw it fall, dug it up, and sold it to the buyer. The possessor initiated an action against the buyer.
ISSUE: Is it valid for a meteorite ownership be vested on the real property owner on which it lands?
ANSWER: Yes.
CONCLUSION: A meteorite is considered to be owned by the first person to find it and claim possession
of. The lower court found that the aerolite became part of the possessor's soil on which it fell and,
therefore, the possessor was the owner of the aerolite. The lower court also stated that the neighbor's
act of removing the aerolite was wrongful. The court affirmed the lower court. The court reasoned that
the aerolite was not a movable object because it was imbedded in the land and had to be dug up. Further,
the court stated that it was basically a stone and despite the way it arrived, it was related to the soil. The
court stated that the aerolite was the property of the owner of the fee upon which it fell.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=9500d42d-7367-476a-96ca-
7405eef7f0ed&pdsearchterms=Goddard+v.+Winchell%2C+52+N.W.+1124+(Iowa+1892)&pdstartin=hlc
t%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytem
plateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=8c88288f-922b-4738-96e8-d7b149a40274
DOC ID: urn:contentItem:3YR1-44T0-00KR-F233-00000-00
Case Name: King v. Commonwealth
Citation: 6 Va. App. 351, 368 S.E.2d 704 (1988)
Facts: Nelson James King appeals his conviction of second degree murder under the statute. He argues
that he could not be convicted of second degree murder for the accidental death of a cofelon occurring
during the commission of a felony. He also argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the
elements of the offense. We hold that because the death was not caused by an act of the felons in
furtherance of the felony, appellant is not criminally liable for the death.

Rule: In adjudging a felony-murder, it is to be remembered at all times that the thing which is imputed to
a felon for a killing incidental to his felony is malice and not the act of killing. The mere coincidence of
homicide and felony is not enough to satisfy the requirements of the felony-murder doctrine. Death must
be a consequence of the felony and not merely coincidence. The causation requirement for responsibility
in a felony-murder is that the homicide stem from the commission of the felony. The malice of the
underlying felony attaches to whatever else the criminal may do in connection with the felony. Therefore,
the killing must have been done by the defendant or by an accomplice or confederate or by one acting in
furtherance of the felonious undertaking.
Issue: Is death of a victim required as well as the time and place to commit felony-murder?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The court held that because the death was not caused by an act of the felons in furtherance
of the felony, defendant was not criminally liable for the co-felon's death. The court held that no causal
connection existed between the felony and the killing by the plane crash. The court held that the
accidental death was not a part or a result of the criminal enterprise. The court found that the co-felon,
who was flying the plane, was not killed by defendant or by any act of defendant, which was in furtherance
of the felony. The court held that the courts could not impute the act of killing where an accidental death
resulted from fortuitous circumstances and the only connection with the felony was temporal. The court
reversed and dismissed defendant's conviction for felony-murder.

URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search?crid=120a9a60-38fa-41b5-b1d9-
8059a45b09e9&pdsearchterms=King+v.+Commonwealth%2C+368+S.E.2d+704+(1988)&pdtypeofsearc
h=urlapi&pdfiltertext=urn%3Ahlct%3A5%2Curn%3Ahlct%3A15%2Curn%3Ahlct%3A3%2Curn%3Ahlct%
3A2%2Curn%3Ahlct%3A4%2Curn%3Ahlct%3A1%2Curn%3Ahlct%3A10%2Curn%3Ahlct%3A16%2Curn%
3Ahlct%3A14%2Curn%3Ahlct%3A8%2Curn%3Ahlct%3A13%2Curn%3Ahlct%3A12%2Curn%3Ahlct%3A9
%2Curn%3Ahlct%3A6%2Curn%3Ahlct%3A7%2Curn%3Ahlct%3A18%2Curn%3Ahlct%3A11&pdsearchty
pe=dynand&pdmfid=1000516&pdisurlapi=true
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S3J-X590-003D-5446-00000-00
Case Name: First Am. Bank, N.A. v. Woods
Citation: 734 S.W.2d 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987)

Facts: In early 1968, Chester B. Atkins and others owned property at 3813 Nolensville Road in Nashville,
Tennessee. The Guarantors had a franchise to operate a Minnie Pearl restaurant. They approached the
owners of the Nolensville Road property and asked them to build a Minnie Pearl restaurant building on
the property and lease it to them for fifteen years. Mr. Atkins agreed and acquired the interests of the
other owners in the property. He then transferred title to First American as Trustee for his daughter. The
Guarantors desired that the lease be between the Trustee and their corporation, Chicken System of
America, Inc., (Chicken System). The Trustee agreed to lease to Chicken System if the Guarantors would
personally guarantee the lease. This was agreeable, and the lease between Chicken System and the
Trustee was executed on May 28, 1968.

Rule: It is a well recognized legal principle that the statute of limitations is for the benefit of individuals,
and not to secure general objects of policy; hence a statute of limitations may be waived by express
contract or by necessary implications, or its benefits may be lost by conduct invoking the established
principles of estoppel in pais.
Issue: Was there a privity of contract even if PSI did not assume the lease?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: PSI did not assume the lease, hence, there is no privity of contract, but instead, there is privity
of estate between PSI and the Trustee, that when the Trustee leased the premises to Sir Pizza, PSI's right
to occupy the premises was terminated and "privity of estate" between the Trustee and PSI ceased to
exist. The suit as to PSI was dismissed and the case remanded for further proceedings against Chicken
System. The guarantors agreed by the letter that if the lessor would exhaust its remedies against the
attempted assignee before filing suit against them on their guaranty, the lessor would not waive or
prejudice any and all rights as lessor against them. Thus the letter by necessary implication waived the
statute of limitations, and the guarantors could not assert it as a defense. The court held that the
Chancellor erred in finding that the statute of limitations had run.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/document/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=d378d766-36f5-4227-990e-
b9d85dded8ce&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fcases%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A3RRJ-
5SF0-003V-D4K2-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A3RRJ-5SF0-003V-D4K2-00000-
00&pdcontentcomponentid=10645&pdshepid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A7XWV-V9B1-2NSD-R43S-
00000-00&pdteaserkey=sr0&pditab=allpods&ecomp=5ypck&earg=sr0&prid=d24f5042-b89d-49be-
a1f6-0df7dab2cd93
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RRJ-5SF0-003V-D4K2-00000-00
Case Name: GMC v. Sanchez
Citation: 997 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. 1999)
Facts: Lee Sanchez, Jr. left his home to feed a pen of heifers in March 1993. The ranch foreman found his
lifeless body the next morning and immediately called Sanchez's father. Apparently, Sanchez's 1990 Chevy
pickup had rolled backward with the driver's side door open pinning Sanchez to the open corral gate in
the angle between the open door and the cab of the truck. Sanchez suffered a broken right arm and
damaged right knee where the gate crushed him against the door pillar, the vertical metal column to
which the door is hinged. He bled to death from a deep laceration in his right upper arm.

Rule: A design defect renders a product unreasonably dangerous as designed, taking into consideration
the utility of the product and the risk involved in its use. A plaintiff must prove that there is a safer
alternative design in order to recover under a design defect theory. An alternative design must
substantially reduce the risk of injury and be both economically and technologically feasible.
Issue: Is the plaintiff liable for damages caused by their conduct causing negligence which resulted to
discovering a product defect?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: There may not be a failure to discover a product defect, but plaintiff is responsible reduced
by his or her own percentage of responsibility. The court reversed and rendered judgment to reduce
actual damages by the jury's finding of comparative responsibility, and to allow no recovery for punitive
damages. The court held that comparative responsibility applied in strict liability when decedent's
negligence was more than the failure to discover or guard against a product defect and that punitive
damages were not appropriate when there was no gross negligence by defendant car company.

URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=2f345f9b-71a2-4f26-86ae-
03678058a41c&pdsearchterms=General+Motors+Corp.+v.+Sanchez%2C+997+S.W.2d+584+(Tex.+1999
)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=an
d&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=8f02c1f1-e33d-4923-8517-5e47df10f537
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3WVC-5K30-0039-40JW-00000-00
Case Name: Lee v. Weisman
Citation: 505 U.S. 577, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992)
Facts: In the public school system, principals were permitted to invite members of the clergy to offer
invocation and benediction prayers as part of formal school graduation ceremonies. Respondent parent,
whose daughter was scheduled to graduate from middle school, sought a temporary restraining order in
the district court to prohibit school officials from including invocation or benediction in the graduation
ceremony. The Court denied the motion for lack of adequate time for consideration. The parent then
amended the complaint, seeking a permanent injunction barring the officials from inviting the clergy to
deliver invocations and benedictions at future graduations, which the district court granted, and the court
of appeals affirmed.

Rule: The principle that government may accommodate the free exercise of religion does not supersede
the fundamental limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause. It is beyond dispute that, at a
minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate
in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which establishes a state religion or religious faith, or
tends to do so.
Issue: Is it a violation of Establishment Clause of the First Amendment when there is delivery of prayers
at public schools by public school officials of clergy?
Answer: Yes
Conclusion: There is a limit to the accommodation of religion and it must be compliant to the
Establishment Clause. The Court affirmed, holding that including clerical members who offered prayers as
part of the official school graduation ceremony was inconsistent with the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment, which the Fourteenth Amendment made applicable with full force to the states and their
school districts.

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65912b5926ad&pdsearchterms=Lee+v.+Weisman%2C+505+U.S.+577+(1992)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A
1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&e
comp=532bk&prid=2f345f9b-71a2-4f26-86ae-03678058a41c
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S65-KDT0-003B-R20H-00000-00
Case Name: Kirkland v. Archbold
Citation: 113 N.E.2d 496 (Ohio Ct. App. 1953)
Facts: Appellant entered into an agreement with appellee whereby appellant agreed to construct certain
alterations and repairs to a dwelling house. After working several months on the project, appellant was
forcefully ejected from the premises by appellee. Appellee claimed that appellant's work was in
contradiction of the contract terms and was unsatisfactory. Appellant brought suit to recover the
reasonable value of the work and materials he had expended on the site before his expulsion.
Rule: An ever-increasing number of decisions of courts of last resort now permit defaulting contractors,
where their work has contributed substantial value to the other contracting party's property, to recover
the value of the work and materials expended on a quantum meruit basis, the recovery being diminished,
however, to the extent of such damage as the contractor's breach causes the other party.
Issue: Can a contractor breaching a contract be able to recover on the basis of quantum meruit, labor
value and materials?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: A complete performance is a condition precedent to payment. This is an additional exception
providing by the basis of quantum meruit. The trial court held that appellant was entitled to recover the
balance due only on the first payment since the payment provisions were severable. On appeal, the court
held that the trial court's judgment was contrary to law as to the method by which the right to judgment
was determined. Since appellant's work contributed substantial value to appellee's property, he should
recover the value of his work.
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7faf8bbbcd2c&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fcases%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A3RRM-
WR50-003C-64WN-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A3RRM-WR50-003C-64WN-00000-
00&pdcontentcomponentid=9250&pdshepid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A7XW6-V0J1-2NSD-W13F-00000-
00&pdteaserkey=sr0&pditab=allpods&ecomp=5ypck&earg=sr0&prid=1da6a876-7d00-4af5-aeac-
cb0894c02bfb
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RRM-WR50-003C-64WN-00000-00
Case Name: In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig.
Citation: 197 F.R.D. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
Facts: Class action lawsuits protect plaintiffs' rights and promote accountability by permitting dispersed,
disorganized plaintiffs who may have suffered only small injuries to find redress by acting as a group where
they would lack sufficient incentive to do so individually. At the same time, however, the relationship
between a plaintiff class and its attorney may suffer from a structural flaw, a divergence of economic
interests of the class and its counsel. The class action mechanism can redound more to the benefit of the
attorney than to that of the class, as counsel has an incentive to act in its own best interest, rather than
that of the class. Thus, the class action mechanism on occasion has proved to be Janus-faced.

Rule: Lead counsel typically is responsible for working with other counsel to develop positions on
substantive and procedural issues in the case, presenting arguments to the court, initiating discovery
requests and responses, employing expert witnesses, conducting depositions and insuring that schedules
are met.

Issue: Is it valid to ask for a former employee be compelled to respond to interrogatories?

Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: There is a duty to respond to interrogatories especially when one’s knowledge can be
obtained through investigation that would have a lead for this case. The court undertook to establish a
method of counsel selection and a fee structure that, in the context of the case, would align attorney-
client interests more closely, reduce agency costs, and help ensure that the class action mechanism acted
as an effective mechanism of justice. The court sought to act as a fiduciary to the class in selecting counsel.
In the final bid selection process, bidders submitted their qualifications, an evaluation of risks and
rewards, the basis for their bid, and stated the value of X in the following fee structure: 100 percent of
the gross recovery up to and including X to go to the class, 25 percent of any recovery in excess of X to go
to counsel inclusive of expenses with the remainder to the class. Bidders were prohibited from revealing
their bids to others bidders. The winning bid was not to be revealed to defendants until the adjudication
was final.

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4cd1aaecb8dc&pdsearchterms=In+re+Auction+Houses+Antitrust+Litig.%2C+197+F.R.D.+71+(S.D.N.Y.+
2000)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttyp
e=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=03998edb-ca1f-4d5f-8f97-7faf8bbbcd2c
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:4195-06B0-0038-Y4MS-00000-00
Case Name: Kansas v. Hendricks
Citation: 521 U.S. 346, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997)
Facts: Inmate was committed as a sexually violent predator after the trial court found that pedophilia was
a mental abnormality as defined by Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a02(b)(1994). The court held that the Act
satisfied due process requirements because it unambiguously required a finding of dangerousness either
to one's self or to others as a prerequisite to involuntary confinement. Commitment proceedings were
initiated only when a person had been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and suffered
from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that made the person likely to engage in the predatory
acts of sexual violence. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a02(a)(1994). As the Act did not establish criminal
proceedings and because the involuntary confinement pursuant to the Act was not punitive, inmate's
involuntary detention did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, even though the confinement followed
a prison term. Because the Act did not impose punishment, did not criminalize conduct legal before its
enactment, or deprive inmate of any defense that was available to him at the time of his crimes, the Act
was not impermissible under the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Rule: The Ex Post Facto Clause, which forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a crime
already consummated, has been interpreted to pertain exclusively to penal statutes.
Issue: Is there a law providing for civil commitment of any pedophile create criminal proceedings that may
be subject to Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The Act addresses persons who are not able to control their conduct with the littlest chance
for them to be deterred influenced by fear of commitment. The Act does not involve criminal proceeding
which makes Ex Post Facto Clauses and Double Jeopardy not applicable. Hendrick’s cross petition is
denied.
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c1e6e7bb8a3e&pdsearchterms=521+U.S.+346+(1997)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=se
archboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=d
2d519bc-a728-4399-b22f-4cd1aaecb8dc
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S65-HY00-003B-R16R-00000-00
Case Name: Hustler Magazine v. Falwell
Citation: 485 U.S. 46, 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988)
Facts: A magazine of nationwide circulation, parodying a series of liquor advertisements in which
celebrities speak about their "first time," published an advertisement parody--labeled on the bottom, in
small print, as an "ad parody not to be taken seriously"--in which a nationally known minister and
commentator on politics and public affairs was presented as recalling, in a supposed interview, that his
"first time" was during a drunken incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse. The minister,
claiming that the publication of the ad parody entitled him to damages for libel, invasion of privacy, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress, brought a diversity action against the magazine and its
publisher in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia.
Rule: Public figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress by reason of publications without showing in addition that the publication contains a false
statement of fact which was made with "actual malice," i.e., with knowledge that the statement was false
or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true.
Issue: Is a public figure entitled to recover damages for infliction of emotional distress without actual
malice?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: American citizens have the right to criticize public men. Public officials and public figures may
be exposed to criticisms that cause emotional distress. The Court found that respondent, as a public figure,
was required to show that the statements published in the advertisement parody were made with actual
malice or reckless disregard of the truth. The Court found that the award of damages was inconsistent
with the Court's longstanding refusal to allow damages just because a particular form of speech may have
had an adverse emotional impact on the audience. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was accordingly
reversed.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=aedc83e3-b29d-4eb4-bf4a-
1ea4ca134b34&pdsearchterms=Hustler+Magazine+v.+Falwell%2C+485+U.S.+46%2C+108+S.+Ct.+876+
(1988)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqtty
pe=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=282c392b-9834-419d-bba0-c1e6e7bb8a3e
Doc ID:urn:contentItem:3S4X-FPS0-003B-40G2-00000-00
Case Name: First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cty. of L.A.
Citation: 482 U.S. 304, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987)
Facts: In 1957, appellant church purchased land on which it operated a campground, known as
"Lutherglen," as a retreat center and a recreational area for handicapped children. The land is located in
a canyon along the banks of a creek that is the natural drainage channel for a watershed area. In 1978, a
flood destroyed Lutherglen's buildings. In response to the flood, appellee Los Angeles County, in 1979,
adopted an interim ordinance prohibiting the construction or reconstruction of any building or structure
in an interim flood protection area that included the land on which Lutherglen had stood. Shortly after
the ordinance was adopted, appellant filed suit in a California court, alleging, inter alia, that the ordinance
denied appellant all use of Lutherglen, and seeking to recover damages in inverse condemnation for such
loss of use.

Rule: Where the government's activities have already worked a taking of all use of property, no
subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period
during which the taking was effective.

Issue: Is compensation a requirement in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as a remedy for temporary
regulatory takings?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The government cannot take a private property with the payment of just compensation to
the owner. Regardless of whether the taking is temporary or permanent, there must still be payment of
just compensation for the period of time if temporary. The Court found that U.S. Const. amends.
V and XIVrequired that appellee compensate appellant for that period of time. The Court concluded that
appellee's actions already constituted a taking and, therefore, no subsequent action by appellee could
relieve it of the duty to compensate appellant for the period during which the taking was effective.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=5000926e-1acc-4973-85da-
69066d8489d5&pdsearchterms=First+English+Evangelical+Lutheran+Church+v.+Cty.+of+L.A.%2C+482
+U.S.+304%2C+107+S.+Ct.+2378+(1987)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&
pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=or&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=aedc83e3-b29d-
4eb4-bf4a-1ea4ca134b34
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-H700-003B-4505-00000-00
Case Name: Finley v. United States
Citation: 490 U.S. 545, 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989)
Facts: Petitioner's decedents were killed when their plane struck electric power lines on its approach to a
city-run airfield in San Diego. She filed the present action against the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U. S. C. § 1346(b), claiming that the Federal Aviation Administration had been
negligent in its operation and maintenance of runway lights and in its performance of air traffic control
functions. Petitioner subsequently moved to amend her complaint to add state tortlaw claims against
both the city and the utility company that maintained the power lines.

Rule: The determination that federal and nonfederal claims derive from a common nucleus of operative
fact and are such that a plaintiff would ordinarily be expected to try them in one judicial proceeding does
not end the inquiry into whether a federal court has power to hear the nonfederal claims along with the
federal ones. Beyond this constitutional minimum, there must be an examination of the posture in which
the nonfederal claim is asserted and of the specific statute that confers jurisdiction over the federal claim.

Issue: Can the federal court claim jurisdiction under the FTCA even when there are parties over to whom
the court does not have jurisdiction?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The federal court may not claim jurisdiction for such if there is no independent basis for the
additional party. In cases of pendent-claims jurisdiction, federal courts were allowed to assume
jurisdiction over state claims when the claims derived from a common nucleus of operative fact and
plaintiffs would ordinarily be expected to try them in one judicial proceeding. Where, as here, no
independent basis of jurisdiction existed over the non-federal parties, the case was one of pendent-party
jurisdiction and demanded careful attention to the relevant statutory language. The FTCA conferred
jurisdiction only over civil actions on claims against the United States. Since it expressed no intention to
include jurisdiction over other parties, pendent-party jurisdiction was not available.

URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=afda4580-6126-43e8-830a-
b4eb34634672&pdsearchterms=Finley+v.+United+States%2C+490+U.S.+545%2C+109+S.+Ct.+2003+(1
989)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype
=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=5000926e-1acc-4973-85da-69066d8489d5
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-B620-003B-41VN-00000-00
Case Name: Foster v. Preston Mill Co.
Citation: 44 Wash. 2d 440, 268 P.2d 645 (1954)

Facts: Blasting operations conducted by Preston Mill Company frightened mother mink owned by B. W.
Foster, and caused the mink to kill their kittens. Foster brought this action against the company to recover
damages. His second amended complaint, upon which the case was tried, sets forth a cause of action on
the theory of absolute liability, and, in the alternative, a cause of action on the theory of nuisance. After
a trial to the court without a jury, judgment was rendered for plaintiff in the sum of $ 1,953.68. The theory
adopted by the court was that, after defendant received notice of the effect which its blasting operations
were having upon the mink, it was absolutely liable for all damages of that nature thereafter sustained.
The trial court concluded that defendant's blasting did not constitute a public nuisance, but did not
expressly rule on the question of private nuisance. Plaintiff concedes, however, that, in effect, the trial
court decided in defendant's favor on the question of nuisance.

Rule: The doctrine of absolute liability applies where the damage from blasting is caused, not by the
casting of rocks and debris, but by concussion, vibration, or jarring.

Issue: May a blasting company be strictly liable for vibration and noise causing wild animals kill its youngs?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The ultrahazardous activity is not the cause of the wild animals to kill their young, but the
vibration and noise. What is considered to be a risk of the ultrahazardous activity could be any vibration
injuring someone or flying debris for that matter. he supreme court reversed holding it was the
exceedingly nervous disposition of mink, rather than the normal risks inherent in blasting operations,
which was required, as a matter of sound policy, to bear the responsibility for the loss suffered by plaintiff.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=9ee68193-f166-4a8a-8f53-
c40dff46080f&pdsearchterms=Foster+v.+Preston+Mill+Co.%2C+268+P.2d+645+(Wash.+1954)&pdstart
in=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdque
rytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=afda4580-6126-43e8-830a-b4eb34634672
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RRN-0CN0-003F-R3MM-00000-00
Case Name: 361 Bankr. 675 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007)
Citation:
Facts:
Rule:
Issue:
Answer:
Conclusion:
URL:
Doc ID:
Case Name: Littlefield v. McGuffey
Citation: 954 F.2d 1337 (7th Cir. 1992)
Facts: Defendant landlord refused to rent an apartment to plaintiff when he found out that her boyfriend
was not of the same race as she was. Plaintiff filed suit alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress
and violations of the Equal Opportunity in Housing provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fair
Housing Act as amended by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 1982, 3604, 3613,
and 3617.
Rule: In Illinois, physical manifestation of emotional distress is not an element of the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Under Illinois common law the tort comprises three elements. First, the
conduct involved must be truly extreme and outrageous. Second, the actor must either intend that his
conduct inflict severe emotional distress, or know that there is at least a high probability that his conduct
will cause severe emotional distress. Third, the conduct must in fact cause severe emotional distress. A
plaintiff need not allege physical injury to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Issue: Is the determination of liability against McGuffey valid?
Answer: Yes.

Conclusion: The claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress does not require proof physically. In
Illinois, it is enough that the conduct of the defendant was extreme and outrageous not knowing what
effect if would cause such as severe emotional distress. The court found that there was sufficient evidence
to support an award of $ 50,000 actual damages and $ 100,000 punitive damages. The court held that an
award of $ 140,000 in attorney's fees was not unreasonable considering plaintiff's actual damages, awards
in similar cases, and defendant's conduct. The court also affirmed the trial court's denial of plaintiff's
request for a fee multiplier based on contingent risk.

URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=70d1ed90-037e-4b36-afc7-
848888561c58&pdsearchterms=Littlefield+v.+McGuffey%2C+954+F.2d+1337+(1992)&pdstartin=hlct%
3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytempl
ateid=&ecomp=5pfLk&prid=17b67309-5e55-40fc-ad6e-09ce364b8359
Doc ID:urn:contentItem:3S4X-6320-008H-V3TD-00000-00
Case Name: Fisch v. Manger
Citation: 24 N.J. 66, 130 A.2d 815 (1957)
Facts: The plaintiff suffered serious injuries in an automobile accident and, after trial, received a jury
verdict in the sum of $ 3,000. He applied for a new trial because of the inadequacy of the verdict but his
application was denied when the defendants consented that the damages awarded to the plaintiff be
increased to the sum of $ 7,500. The plaintiff appealed and we thereafter certified on our own motion.
Rule: The practices of remittitur and additur do not violate the right to trial by jury, N.J. Const. art. I, par.
9 (1947), and, if fairly invoked, serve the laudable purpose of avoiding a further trial where substantial
justice may be attained on the basis of the original trial.
Issue: Does a court have the power to condition the granting of a new trial on whether the defendant
agrees or disagrees to an additur?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The practice of additur is a a promotion of justice and efficiency without having to violate the
Seventh Amendment in a way the disallowance of a new trial and agreeing to a more reasonable amount
of damages. The court held that the trial court erred when it concluded that plaintiff was not entitled to
a great sum because plaintiff had a preexisting back injury. The court reviewed the evidence and found
that plaintiff's prior back injury had cleared up and that the prior injury had no relation to the severe
injuries plaintiff received from the accident at issue which included a ruptured disk that required surgery
and caused plaintiff to be unable to work full-time until approximately a year after the accident.

URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=69ea70a2-0c64-44bc-bd75-
fd303df1eb16&pdsearchterms=Fisch+v.+Manger%2C+24+N.J.+66%2C+130+A.2d+815+(1957)&pdstarti
n=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquer
ytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=70d1ed90-037e-4b36-afc7-848888561c58
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RRM-YC90-003C-N0XV-00000-00
Case Name: In re Fraley
Citation: 1910 OK CR 97, 3 Okla. Crim. 719, 109 P. 295
Facts: The prisoner shot a man to death outside a drug store, stating that the shooting was in revenge for
the victim's killing of the prisoner's son. After he was arrested and placed in jail on a murder charge, the
prisoner filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus requesting his release on bail pending disposition
of the charge against him. The writ was allowed, and a hearing was held at which the prisoner neither
testified nor offered witnesses in his behalf.
Rule: For purposes of determining whether a killing was committed in the heat of passion and was without
premeditation, and therefore was not murder, the question is not alone whether a defendant's passion
in fact cooled, but also was there sufficient time in which the passion of a reasonable man would cool. If
in fact the defendant's passion did cool, which may be shown by circumstances, such as the transaction
of other business in the meantime, rational conversations upon other subjects, and evidence of
preparation for the killing., then the length of time intervening is immaterial. But if in fact it did not cool,
yet if such time intervened between the provocation and the killing that the passion of the average man
would have cooled and his reason have resumed its sway, then still there is no reduction of the homicide
to manslaughter.If a fatal wound is inflicted immediately following a sufficient provocation given, then
the question is one of fact to be determined upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances in
evidence, but when an unreasonable period of time has elapsed between the provocation and the killing,
then the court is authorized to say as a matter of law that the cooling time was sufficient.
Issue: Can the crime of homicide be reduced to manslaughter if a defendant did not cool between the
time of provocation and killing as compared to an ordinary man’s cooling time?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: It must be considered whether the time between the provocation and the killing was enough
time to cool a reasonable man. As legal authority imposes, half a day to a day is considered more than
enough for an average man’s passion to cool. The court held that the uncontradicted testimony
demonstrated that the proof of the prisoner's guilt of a capital offense was evident and that he was not
entitled to bail as a matter of right because (1) there was no reduction of homicide to manslaughter given
sufficient time in which the passion of a reasonable man would have cooled and (2) a deliberate killing
committed in revenge for an injury inflicted in the past, however near or remote, was murder. The court
held that the prisoner failed to meet his burden of showing that he was illegally deprived of his liberty and
that factually unsupported opinions by physicians about the prisoner's health did not entitle him to bail.

URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=902bb153-e105-44d2-88d7-
e46d5c3eb49d&pdsearchterms=Ex+Parte+Fraley%2C+109+P.+295+(1910)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&
pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&eco
mp=532bk&prid=69ea70a2-0c64-44bc-bd75-fd303df1eb16
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3YMF-4CW0-00KR-D0DJ-00000-00
Case Name: Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n
Citation: 505 U.S. 88, 112 S. Ct. 2374 (1992)
Facts: The trade association's members were subject to the OSH Act and Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) regulations. Thus, the trade association was responsible for training and certifying
hazardous waste remediation workers. To conduct hazardous waste operations in Illinois, the trade
association members had to additionally comply with the Illinois' licensing acts that regulated hazardous
waste for the purpose of protecting the environment.
Rule: Preemption may be either expressed or implied, and is compelled whether Congress' command is
explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose. Absent
explicit pre-emptive language, the United States Supreme Court has recognized at least two types of
implied preemption: field preemption, where the scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it, and conflict
preemption, where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility, or
where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress. The court's ultimate task in any preemption case is to determine whether state
regulation is consistent with the structure and purpose of the statute as a whole.
Issue: Is a state law regulating occupational health and safety preempted by the federal Occupational
Safety and Health Act?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The intent of the Congress in passing the federal law is the answer as to whether the federal
law pre-empts the state law. On appeal, the Court concluded that the OSH Act § 18(b), 29 U.S.C.S. § 667(b),
preempted any state law or regulations that established an occupational health and safety standard on
an issue for which OSHA had already promulgated a standard, unless the State had obtained the Secretary
of Labor's approval for its own plan. The Court also determined that the Illinois' licensing acts did not
escape preemption merely because the state agency maintained that its regulation was concerned with
the safety of the general public, not just worker safety.

URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=29168cda-f06f-4ebe-a6ba-
24b09811a92b&pdsearchterms=Gade+v.+Nat%27l+Solid+Wastes+Mgmt.+Ass%27n%2C+505+U.S.+88
%2C+112+S.+Ct.+2374+(1992)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearcht
ype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=902bb153-e105-44d2-
88d7-e46d5c3eb49d
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S65-KFC0-003B-R271-00000-00
Case Name: Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co.
Citation: 69 Ohio St. 2d 460, 432 N.E.2d 814 (1982)
Facts: The machine operator was using the punch press when she leaned on the bolster plate in order to
move the foot pedal back in place with her foot. While doing so, she activated the foot pedal, and the
machine descended on her hand, amputating two fingers. A button-tripping device, which required two
hands, had been disconnected, and the operator did not have a pullback guard attached to her wrists. The
operator alleged that the press was sold in a defective condition, which was dangerous to the user.
Rule: A product design is in a defective condition to the user or consumer if (1) it is more dangerous than
an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner, or (2)
if the benefits of the challenged design do not outweigh the risk inherent in such design. Factors relevant
to the evaluation of the defectiveness of the product design are the likelihood that the product design will
cause injury, the gravity of the danger posed, and the mechanical and economic feasibility of an improved
design.
Issue: Is it considered a defect when a product design is dangerous than expected?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The product design’s benefit should not be outweighed by the danger it may cause. In
reversing the summary judgment for the manufacturer, the court applied the risk-benefit test and held
that the operator presented genuine issues of fact, based on expert opinions, as to whether the press
design was defective by allowing accidental tripping of the foot pedal control and in failing to provide a
point of operation guard when the foot pedal was operative.

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3701d49756af&pdsearchterms=Knitz+v.+Minster+Mach.+Co.%2C+69+Ohio+St.+2d+460%2C+432+N.E.
2d+814+(1982)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox
&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=29168cda-f06f-4ebe-a6ba-24b09811a92b
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RRS-P360-0054-C2M0-00000-00
Case Name: Fink v. Miller
Citation: 896 P.2d 649 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)
Facts: The neighbor and homeowners owned property in a subdivision that was subject to a set of
restrictive covenants. One of those restrictions recited that wood shingles were required on the roofs of
all homes. The homeowners sought but were denied permission from a committee to use a roofing
material other than wood shingles. They commenced using a different material anyway, and the neighbor
brought this enforcement action.
Rule: Property owners who have purchased land in a subdivision, subject to a recorded set of restrictive
covenants and conditions, have the right to enforce such restrictions through equitable relief against
property owners who do not comply with the stated restrictions. However, property owners may lose this
right if the specific covenant they seek to enforce has been abandoned, thereby rendering the covenant
unenforceable.
Issue: Is it considered an abandonment of covenant when there are violations that are severe enough to
lead to an average person concluding that there was no adherence nor enforcement of the covenant?
Answer: Yes.

Conclusion: When an average person observes a property and sees sufficient violation to infer that the
owners do not adhere to or enforce the covenant then that is considered an abandonment. The trial court
initially entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting the homeowners from constructing their roof;
however, upon further hearings and a viewing of the subdivision, the trial court quashed all injunctive
relief against the homeowners and granted their motion for summary judgment. The court held that
where 23 out of 81 homes in the subdivision did not have wood shingle roofs, the violations of the
covenant were sufficiently widespread that the court deemed the restriction abandoned as a matter of
law and ruled that it was no longer enforceable.

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3f690b6cc125&pdsearchterms=896+P.2d+649&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchbox
click&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=or&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=85b29bf2-
4ddf-466a-8bf6-3701d49756af
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RXP-6VK0-003G-F39N-00000-00
Case Name: Koch v. Norris Pub. Power Dist.
Citation: 10 Neb. App. 453, 632 N.W.2d 391 (2001)
Facts: Verdell Koch (Koch) and Priscilla Koch sued the Norris Public Power District (Norris) for damages
they suffered from a fire that started when a high voltage powerline maintained by Norris fell into their
field and started a fire. The Koches appeal from the trial court's order granting a directed verdict in favor
of Norris upon the basis that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply to establish Norris' negligence
as the cause of the powerline falling.
Rule: The essence of res ipsa loquitur is that the facts speak for themselves and lead to a proper inference
of negligence by the fact finder without further proof.
Issue: Is Norris Public Power District liable for res ipsa loquitur?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The court of appeals held that the trial court had erred because: (1) the evidence showed
without dispute that the wire which fell was placed high into the air by the district and it was obviously
regularly charged with high voltage, the district admitted that it was up to the district to take care of the
line, its customers did not climb the line poles and it was common knowledge that people did not do so,
no one except the district's employees and those entities it had contracts with were allowed to have any
control over the line, so, except for the possibility of vandalism, there was no reasonable possibility that
the wire fell as the result of anything other than the district not properly building or maintaining the line;
and (2) to allow the district to escape liability solely upon the unsupported claim that vandals caused the
break seemed to allow the finder of fact to decide an important question on guess and speculation. The
judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial.

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e9f3a7de1aab&pdsearchterms=Koch+v.+Norris+Pub.+Power+Dist.%2C+10+Neb.+App.+453%2C+632+
N.W.2d+391+(2001)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=Searc
hBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=73080c06-802f-40fc-828c-
3f690b6cc125
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:43TP-HD40-0039-405D-00000-00
Case Name: Evans v. Pollock
Citation: 796 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. 1990)
Facts: In September of 1947 Stanley and Sarah Agnes Hornsby (the Hornsbys), together with Charles and
Bernice McCormick (McCormicks) platted a subdivision around Lake Travis from their commonly owned
property in Travis County. They named the subdivision "Beby's Ranch Subdivision No. 1." The plat itself
did not state any restrictions on land-use. The plat divided the property into seven blocks designated
alphabetically "A" through "G". The plat did not further subdivide blocks C, D, E and F, but blocks A, B, and
G were divided into thirty-one lots. The subdivision is on a peninsula-like tract that extends into the lake,
so that much of it has lake frontage. All of the platted lots are lakefront lots. Block G is located on the
point of the peninsula. Block F is located on a hill and is surrounded by lake-front lots.
Rule: Where a common grantor develops a tract of land for sale in lots and pursues a course of conduct
which indicates that he intends to inaugurate a general scheme or plan of development for the benefit of
himself and the purchasers of the various lots, and by numerous conveyances inserts in the deeds
substantially uniform restrictions, conditions and covenants against the use of the property, the grantees
acquire by implication an equitable right, variously referred to as an implied reciprocal negative easement
or an equitable servitude, to enforce similar restrictions against that part of the tract retained by the
grantor or subsequently sold without the restrictions to a purchaser with actual or constructive notice of
the restrictions and covenants.
Issue: Does a general development plan with an implied restrictive negative easement apply to the whole
subdivision?
Answer: No.

Conclusion: The general development plan may apply to the entire subdivision but does not necessarily
have to. Lots within the subdivision do not always have the same restrictions, hence, they do not apply to
all lots. Court holds that there needed only be a clearly defined, restricted district to which the restrictions
applied as part of the plan of development, for the implied reciprocal negative easement doctrine to
apply. The case was remanded for further consideration consistent with the court's opinion. The court
held that the doctrine was applicable even when restrictions applied only to certain well defined, similarly
situated lots. The court remanded for further consideration.

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51e4d590b2a6&pdsearchterms=Evans+v.+Pollock%2C+796+S.W.2d+465+(Tex.+1990)&pdstartin=hlct
%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytem
plateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=05c1a0df-d79b-4ed5-bb75-e9f3a7de1aab
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S3J-W9J0-003C-219J-00000-00
Case Name: 568 U.S. 1080 ** A lot of cases came up
Citation:
Facts:
Rule:
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Case Name: Grimes v. Saban
Citation: 173 So. 3d 919 (Ala. 2014)
Facts: Sarah Grimes (offended party) got into a squabble with Kristen Saban (respondent) in Saban's flat.
The squabble wound up physical, bringing about Grimes enduring wounds. Grimes brought suit against
Saban for threatening behavior. Saban asserted self-protection, affirming that she was in her room with
the entryway bolted when Grimes raised the quarrel by slamming against the entryway and hollering.
Saban guaranteed that when she opened her entryway, Grimes got inside crawls of Saban's face and kept
hollering. Saban affirmed that she at that point pushed Grimes since she sensibly trusted that Grimes
would unavoidably utilize physical power against her. Grimes affirmed that when Saban opened the room
entryway, Grimes at first moved in an opposite direction from the entryway before Saban pushed her.
The preliminary court allowed Saban's movement for outline judgment.
Rule: Mere conclusory allegations that a fact exists will not defeat a properly supported summary
judgment motion.
Issue: Is a person reasonable for using physical force against another as a means to defend herself?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: A person is only justified to an extent where she only uses force enough to defend herself.
On a motion of summary judgment, it should be viewed in a way that Grime’s said in her testimony that
she had already backed away from Saban. This raises the question of whether Saban was reasonable for
thinking that Grime was about to use physical force. The Court finds that the disposition of Grime’s claim
is not appropriate for summary judgment. The decision of the trial court is reversed and case is remanded.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=369f1605-14bb-4645-86d4-
8c984ecb644c&pdsearchterms=Grimes+v.+Saban%2C+173+So.+3d+919+(Ala.+2014)&pdstartin=hlct%
3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=or&pdquerytemplat
eid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=7eef0720-8ae7-4178-9b4e-28acb4cbd416
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:5DTP-7P71-F048-C0SY-00000-00
Case Name: Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands
Citation: 124 Colo. 122, 235 P.2d 592 (1951)
Facts: Plaintiffs Rylands and Reid owned a parcel of land fronting on West Colfax Avenue, Jefferson
County, upon which were located their residence and garage and some rental cottages. Defendant Golden
Press, Inc., constructed a one-story brick and cinder block business building on its property which adjoined
plaintiffs' property on the east. According to plaintiffs' survey here unchallenged, the west wall of
defendant's building is two inches clear of the lot line at the front or south end, is exactly on the line at
the north end, and is approximately 160 feet in length.
Rule: Where the encroachment is deliberate and constitutes a willful and intentional taking of another's
land, equity may well require its restoration regardless of the expense of removal as compared with
damage suffered therefrom; but where the encroachment was in good faith, the court should weigh the
circumstances so that it shall not act oppressively. While the mere balance of convenience is not the
proper test, yet relative hardship may properly be considered and the court should not become a party
to extortion. Where defendant's encroachment is unintentional and slight, plaintiff's use not affected and
his damage small and fairly compensable, while the cost of removal is so great as to cause grave hardship
or otherwise make its removal unconscionable, mandatory injunction may properly be denied and plaintiff
relegated to compensation in damages.
Issue: Is the denial of the mandatory injunction on the removal of a building encroachment valid?
Answer: Yes.

Conclusion: Denial of mandatory injunction is valid when the encroachment is unintentional, slight and
does not affect the plaintiff’s use of land. In this case, the encroachment was found to be unintentional
and good faith is presumed unless otherwise proven. The encroachment was very slight, but the remedial
cost would be high. The court also reversed the portion of the injunction requiring defendant to remove
signs that may have mislead visitors and caused them to trespass on plaintiffs' property. That portion of
the injunction was too indefinite.

URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=02ad0383-46e5-4442-9c96-
bd8a3c350efd&pdsearchterms=Golden+Press%2C+Inc.+v.+Rylands%2C+235+P.2d+592+(Colo.+1951)&
pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and
&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=369f1605-14bb-4645-86d4-8c984ecb644c
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RRM-XM10-0040-0419-00000-00
Case Name: J. N. A. Realty Corp. v. Cross Bay Chelsea, Inc.,
Citation: 42 N.Y.2d 392, 397 N.Y.S.2d 958, 366 N.E.2d 1313 (1977)
Facts: Appellant tenant leased a building from respondent landlord. The lease agreement contained an
option to renew the lease, which stated that appellant was to notify respondent by certified mail six
months prior to the last day of the term of the lease if appellant desired renewal. Subsequently,
respondent sent a letter to appellant informing it that the option had expired and that appellant was to
vacate the premises. Appellant then sent notice of intention to renew the option, which was refused by
respondent. Respondent commenced suit to recover the premises, and appellant replied that it was
entitled to equity to relieve it from a forfeiture.
Rule: A notice exercising an option is ineffective if it is not given within the time specified. At law, time is
always of the essence of the contract.
Issue: Is it valid for a tenant to be rewarded, even if there is failure to comply with the lease with regard
to specified time for exercising the option?
Answer: Yes.

Conclusion: Time is very important when addressing options. However, strict implementation of such may
cause a tenant forfeiture to which a tenant is entitled to equitable relief without prejudicing the landlord.
The trial court found for appellant, and the lower appellate court reversed. The court remanded for a new
trial, holding that an equitable interest was recognized and protected against forfeiture if the landlord
was not harmed by the delay in the giving of the notice and the tenant would have sustained substantial
loss. A tenant was entitled to the benefit of equity where default in notice did not prejudice the landlord.
Thus, the case was remanded for a determination of whether respondent was prejudiced by appellant's
failure to give notice.

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a1b8-
afda5b6a2f73&pdsearchterms=366+N.E.2d+1313&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=search
boxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=02ad0
383-46e5-4442-9c96-bd8a3c350efd
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RRS-B4J0-003C-F4C1-00000-00
***SAME CASE AS PREVIOUS ONE***
Case Name: J. N. A. Realty Corp. v. Cross Bay Chelsea, Inc.,
Citation:
Facts:
Rule:
Issue:
Answer:
Conclusion:
URL:
Doc ID:
Case Name: Designer Direct, Inc. v. Deforest Redevelopment Auth.
Citation: 368 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2004)
Facts: The parties entered into a contract concerning a development plan created by the developer, the
construction of the infrastructure, the sale of land, and the subsequent construction. The authority had a
contractual obligation to provide a full-time liaison to work with the developer, but the authority failed to
do so. Instead, the authority reimbursed the developer for outside liaison sources. The parties also
experienced problems regarding the purchase of a particular parcel of land and the plans to build a public
library.
Rule: An injured party has a right to damages based on expenditures made in preparation for
performance. Thus, reliance damages are not limited to those expenses made in relation to duties spelled
out in the contractual agreement.
Issue: Whether or not a party’s breach is material presents a question of fact.
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: Plaintiff cannot recover that portion of overhead costs which is attributable to those other
projects. To clarify, let us say, hypothetically, that an employee of Designer Direct spent 80% of his working
hours on the redevelopment project. That would mean that 20% of his salary and benefits is not
recoverable as damages. In other words, we simply do not know what percentage of the overall working
hours were spent on Phase III of the DRA project and what percentage of time was spent on other projects.
Without such information, we cannot determine the percentage of benefits, and other overhead expenses
that should be allocated to the breached contract. Allowing Designer Direct to recover those overhead
expenses not allocated to the breached contract would result in a windfall for Plaintiff.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=167cda19-9fb4-4c89-89d9-
00f92f16bd9d&pdsearchterms=Designer+Direct%2C+Inc.+v.+Deforest+Redevelopment+Auth.%2C+36
8+F.3d+751+(2004)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=Searc
hBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=5d1fb844-d1b0-4061-b694-
8a916744fbd2
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:4CCR-9B90-0038-X09X-00000-00
Case Name: Designer Direct v. Deforest Redevelopment Auth.,
Citation: 313 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir. 2002)
Facts: The parties entered into a contract concerning a development plan created by the developer, the
construction of the infrastructure, the sale of land, and the subsequent construction. The authority had a
contractual obligation to provide a full-time liaison to work with the developer, but the authority failed to
do so. Instead, the authority reimbursed the developer for outside liaison sources. The parties also
experienced problems regarding the purchase of a particular parcel of land and the plans to build a public
library.
Rule: An injured party has a right to damages based on expenditures made in preparation for
performance. Thus, reliance damages are not limited to those expenses made in relation to duties spelled
out in the contractual agreement.
Issue: Is Levin entitled to claim for reliance damages?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The expenses Levin incurred were made in reliance to its duties under Phase III of the
redevelopment plan. If Levin had not undertaken these expenses when it did, the project would have
been severely delayed. This redevelopment project was a complex, expensive, long-term undertaking. The
parties interacted frequently and relied upon each other to achieve the goals of the redevelopment plan.
Levin's duties included architectural work, infrastructure work, and design work which is highly technical
and arduous. The expenses it incurred are a reflection of this process and the nature of the work. Without
reliance damages, Levin would suffer a loss of expenses made in preparation for the Phase III
redevelopment. Thus, we find the district court erred in denying reliance damages to Levin. We reverse
and remand for a determination of an award of reliance damages consistent with the facts of the record.
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5315d46966ed&pdsearchterms=Designer+Direct%2C+Inc.+v.+DeForest+Redevelops+Authority%2C+31
3+F.3d+1036+(2002).&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=Sear
chBox&pdqttype=and&pdpsf=&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=z8-L9kk&earg=pdpsf&prid=d428a955-
8f2b-4b64-a500-20369a080641
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:47FF-CXP0-0038-X1WC-00000-00
Case Name: Cruz v. Daimlerchrysler Motors Corp
Citation: 66 A.3d 446 (R.I. 2013)
Facts: The husband alleged he was cleaning a minivan he bought from defendant when both front airbags
unexpectedly deployed, injuring him. Plaintiffs argued that in dismissing their negligence claim, the trial
court erred in failing to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The high disagreed. It noted that the
accident occurred three years after defendant sold plaintiffs the minivan. While the spontaneous
deployment of air bags ordinarily did not occur in the absence of negligence, other responsible causes
had not been sufficiently eliminated by the evidence to justify applying res ipsa loquitur. Plaintiffs' claim
for negligent misrepresentation also failed because none of the evidence suggested that the statements
of defendant's employee that the minivan was a safe vehicle and had no accident history were false when
they were made.
Rule: The tort of negligent misrepresentation has four elements: (1) a misrepresentation of a material
fact; (2) the representor must either know of the misrepresentation, must make the misrepresentation
without knowledge as to its truth or falsity or must make the representation under circumstances in which
he or she ought to have known of its falsity; (3) the representor must intend the representation to induce
another to act on it; and (4) injury must result to the party acting in justifiable reliance on the
misrepresentation.
Issue: Is Damierchyrsler Motors Corp. liable for negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: In this case, the court found that only the first requirement of res ipsa loquitur is present. The
duty of selling used cars that Smith owed to Cruz has long expired, and was three years ago, there is no
valid claim of res ipsa loquitur for Cruz.
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b96fc21b7228&pdsearchterms=Cruz+v.+Daimlerchrysler+Motors+Corp.%2C+66+A.3d+446+(R.I.+2013)
&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=an
d&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=b40a3df0-fd65-45da-8ff8-5315d46966ed
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:58FX-2FX1-F04J-X007-00000-00
Case Name: Brown v. Shyne
Citation: 151 N.E. 197 (N.Y. 1926)
Facts: Plaintiff employed defendant to provide her with chiropractic treatments. As a result, plaintiff
became paralyzed after she had received nine treatments. Plaintiff brought suit claiming that the paralysis
was caused by the treatment she received. When plaintiff recovered judgment for the damages caused
by said injury, defendant appealed based upon the trial court's charge to the jury.
Rule: Breach or neglect of duty imposed by statute or ordinance may be evidence of negligence only if
there is logical connection between the proven neglect of statutory duty and the alleged negligence.
Issue: Does a violation of a statute constitute liability for negligence if the violation itself is not the
proximate cause of any resulting injury?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: Shyne is only liable for negligence if there was a violation of the law causing the injuries on
Brown. To protect the general public for the harm caused of unskilled physicians, a license is needed to
practice medicine. The trial court had instructed the jury that from defendant's violation of the Public
Health Laws of New York, which prohibited the practice of medicine without a license, the jury might infer
negligence which produced injury to the plaintiff. The appellate court reversed plaintiff's judgment
because it found that the trial court had erred when it charged the jury that from the violation of the
statute the jury might infer negligence which produced injury to the plaintiff. Unless the plaintiff's injury
was caused by carelessness or lack of skill, the defendant's failure to obtain a license was not connected
with the injury.

URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=6a292b61-ce41-4509-b870-
e338cace84a6&pdsearchterms=Brown+v.+Shyne%2C+151+N.E.+197+(N.Y.+1926)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1
%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplatei
d=&ecomp=532bk&prid=ddbe87f9-5261-4987-af04-b96fc21b7228
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RRM-SNP0-003F-62CY-00000-00
Case Name: Cohen v. Smith
Citation: 269 Ill. App. 3d 1087, 207 Ill. Dec. 873, 648 N.E.2d 329 (1995)
Facts: Patricia Cohen was admitted to St. Joseph Memorial Hospital ("Hospital") to deliver her baby. After
an examination, Cohen was informed that it would be necessary for her to have a cesarean section. Cohen
and her husband allegedly informed her physician, who in turn advised the Hospital staff, that the couple's
religious beliefs prohibited Cohen from being seen unclothed by a male. Cohen's doctor assured her
husband that their religious convictions would be respected.
Rule: An actor commits a battery if (a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the
person of an other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and (b) a harmful
contact with the person of an other directly or indirectly results.
Issue: Is Smith liable for offensive touching as he knew that Cohen’s religion did not allow any man to see
her naked even while giving birth?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: It is considered an offensive touching when one already knew the susceptibility to the
touching and still touches the offended party. The battery and the intentional infliction of emotional
distress counts were properly alleged. There was nothing in the record that indicated that the patient's
beliefs were less than sincere or that they did not have some relation to her belief in God. The patient was
entitled to present her claim under the Right of Conscience Act.

URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=4c1ee94e-dc8b-4fb0-97d5-
14794561a104&pdsearchterms=648+N.E.2d+329+(1995)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=
searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=
6a292b61-ce41-4509-b870-e338cace84a6
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RX4-2DH0-003D-H0T9-00000-00
Case Name: Bowsher v. Synar
Citation: 478 U.S. 714, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986)
Facts: Congress passed the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, under which the
Comptroller General was responsible for preparing and submitting to the President a report specifying
deficit reductions for a fiscal year. The President in turn was to order the reductions specified by the
Comptroller General. The Comptroller General was removable from office only by Congress. Respondents,
Congressmen and others, initiated an action challenging the Act's constitutionality. The trial court ruled
that the Comptroller General's role in the deficit reduction process violated the constitutionally imposed
separation of powers.
Rule: The executive nature of the Comptroller General's functions under the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 is revealed in § 252(a)(3) which gives the Comptroller General the
ultimate authority to determine the budget cuts to be made.
Issue: Is there a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers?
Answer: Yes.

Conclusion: The trial court ruled that the Comptroller General's role in the deficit reduction process
violated the constitutionally imposed separation of powers. On direct appeal, the court affirmed.
Responsibility for execution of the Act was placed in the hands of the Comptroller General. Congress
retained control over such execution and thus intruded into the executive function in violation of
separation of powers. The Act was unconstitutional because it gave the Comptroller General, an officer of
the legislative branch over whom Congress retained removal power, the ultimate authority to determine
the budget cuts to be made, functions plainly entailing execution of the law in constitutional terms.

URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=dc34cd89-5813-44de-94f2-
f727c99d43a2&pdsearchterms=Bowsher+v.+Synar%2C+478+U.S.+714+(1986)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3
A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=
&ecomp=532bk&prid=4c1ee94e-dc8b-4fb0-97d5-14794561a104
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-60P0-0039-N2XD-00000-00
Case Name: Brzoska v. Olson
Citation: 668 A.2d 1355 (Del. 1995)
Facts: The decedent was a dentist who died from Acquired Immune Deficiency disease (AIDS). The
patients were treated after the decedent learned of his infection. They filed an action to recover damages
under negligence, battery, and misrepresentation theories. The trial court granted the administrator and
insurer's motion for summary judgment. On appeal the court held that: (1) there could be no recovery for
fear of contracting AIDS in the absence of a showing of physical harm, (2) there was no battery caused by
the decedent's touching in the course of treatment without a physical injury or "outrageous" conduct, (3)
the mere fear of AIDS was insufficient as a matter of law to raise a fact issue in the absence of actual
rather than potential exposure to HIV, (4) there was no battery based upon a lack of informed consent
where the patients received the procedures they had consented to, (5) there was no basis for a mental
anguish recovery where none of the patients had tested positive for HIV, and (6) a material fact issue
remained as to whether some of the patients received false representations and whether the patients
had a duty to take a free "public" AIDS test.
Rule: Without actual exposure to HIV the risk of its transmission is so minute that any fear of contracting
AIDS is per se unreasonable. The court therefore holds, as a matter of law, that the incidental touching of
a patient by an HIV-infected dentist while performing ordinary, consented-to dental procedures is
insufficient to sustain a battery claim in the absence of a channel for HIV infection. In other words, such
contact is "offensive" only if it results in actual exposure to the HIV virus. The court therefore adopts an
"actual exposure" test, which requires a plaintiff to show "actual exposure to a disease-causing agent as
a prerequisite to prevail on a claim based upon fear of contracting disease. Attenuated and speculative
allegations of exposure to HIV do not give rise to a legally cognizable claim in Delaware.
Issue: Is it valid for plaintiff to claim of battery for the fear that they might have contracted a disease from
a disease-causing agent?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The court held that the fear of contracting a disease without exposure to a disease-causing
agent is per se unreasonable and, therefore, affirmed the summary judgment as to the battery allegations.
The court reversed and remanded as to the misrepresentation claims as to any patients who had received
false representations, with any recovery limited to economic damages.

URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=7bd7e158-0098-4049-a409-
3849a9000567&pdsearchterms=Brzoska+v.+Olson%2C+668+A.2d+1355+(Del.+1995)&pdstartin=hlct%
3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytempl
ateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=dc34cd89-5813-44de-94f2-f727c99d43a2
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RRT-6V30-003C-K13K-00000-00
Case Name: Bartlett v. N.M. Welding Supply, Inc.
Citation: 1982-NMCA-048, 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579
Facts: Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident involving an unknown driver, who quickly turned in
front of plaintiff causing her to stop suddenly, and defendant, who struck plaintiff's car from behind. The
jury was instructed to determine the proportions of fault among the parties and found defendant 30
percent at fault and the unknown driver 70 percent at fault.
Rule: The term "joint and several liability," means that either of two persons whose concurrent negligence
contributed to cause plaintiff's injury and damage may be held liable for the entire amount of the damage
caused by them.
Issue: Can joint and several liability apply in pure comparative negligence system?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: There are two reasons that need to be present to apply the joint and several liability and
neither were present. NM Welding is not liable for the entire damage. The trial court ordered a new trial
because the jury was not instructed on joint and several liability. On appeal, the court held that in a
comparative negligence case, a concurrent tortfeasor was liable only for the percentage of damages for
which he was held accountable. The court reversed the order granting a new trial. The court held that the
trial court properly instructed the jury to ascertain the percentage of negligence of each participant and
that a concurrent tortfeasor could not be held liable for damages caused by an unknown concurrent
tortfeasor.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=c2ce99be-4656-4795-8d51-
504e163954d1&pdsearchterms=Bartlett+v.+N.M.+Welding+Supply%2C+Inc.%2C+646+P.2d+579+(N.M.
+Ct.+App.+1982)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchB
ox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=7bd7e158-0098-4049-a409-
3849a9000567
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S3J-X7M0-003D-D0HC-00000-00
Case Name: Buckley v. Valeo
Citation: 424 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 612 (1976)
Facts: Plaintiffs, candidates, contributors, political parties, and others, brought suit against defendant
government officials, in their official capacity and as members of the Federal Election Commission.
Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Act, related Tax Code provisions, and the validity of the
Commission. The court of appeals upheld the Act. The Court found that the individual and political
committee contribution limits, the disclosure and reporting provisions, and the public financing scheme
were justified by weighty interests in restricting influences stemming from the dependence of candidates
on large campaign contributions.
Rule: The expenditure limitations contained in the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 86 Stat. 3,
amended by 88 Stat. 1263, represent substantial rather than merely theoretical restraints on the quantity
and diversity of political speech. The $ 1,000 ceiling on spending "relative to a clearly identified
candidate," 18 U.S.C.S. § 608(e)(1), would appear to exclude all citizens and groups except candidates,
political parties, and the institutional press from any significant use of the most effective modes of
communication.
Issue: Are the provisions of the Act in question violating the Constitution?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The provisions of the Act which vested primary responsibilities for conducting civil litigation
in the courts of the United States for vindicating public rights violates the Constitution, specifically, Article
II, Section 2, cl. 2. The Court held, however, that the limitations on campaign expenditures were
unconstitutional because they placed substantial and direct restrictions on the ability of candidates,
citizens, and associations to engage in political expression that was protected by the First Amendment.
The Court found that U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, required that most of the powers conferred by the Act
upon the Commission could be exercised only by officers of the United States. The court held that the
Commission's present membership was invalid.

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2e1f151c87de&pdsearchterms=Buckley+v.+Valeo%2C+424+U.S.+1%2C+96+S.+Ct.+612+(1976)&pdstart
in=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdque
rytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=c2ce99be-4656-4795-8d51-504e163954d1
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-B270-003B-S4B9-00000-00
Case Name: Elledge v. Richland/Lexington Sch. Dist. Five
Citation: 341 S.C. 473, 534 S.E.2d 289 (Ct. App. 2000)
Facts: The trial court precluded plaintiff's evidence of the Consumer Products Safety Commission's (CPSC)
guidelines and the American Society for Testing and Materials' (ASTM) standards for playground safety
based on the mistaken belief that defendant school district had to have adopted those national protocols
before such evidence was admissible. Implementation of national industry standards was not necessary
prior to their admission in a negligence case. While such proof might be necessary in attempting to
establish negligence per se, it was not required when the evidence was offered to demonstrate an
applicable standard of care. Plaintiff proffered video deposition testimony from an expert concerning
industry standards as outlined in the CPSC and ASTM. Moreover, plaintiff intended to offer evidence that
defendant had notice of those standards, and that they were fully enforced regarding defendant's
purchases of new playground equipment.
Rule: Evidence of industry standards, customs, and practices is often highly probative when defining a
standard of care. Safety standards promulgated by government or industry organizations in particular are
relevant to the standard of care for negligence. Evidence of custom within a particular industry, group, or
organization is admissible as bearing on the standard of care in determining negligence. A safety code
ordinarily represents a consensus of opinion carrying the approval of a significant segment of an industry,
and is not introduced as substantive law but most often as illustrative evidence of safety practices or rules
generally prevailing in the industry that provides support for expert testimony concerning the proper
standard of care.
Issue: Is it valid for negligence to be determined by the jury by basing it through evidence of industry
standards and practices?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The evidence of which the jury may consider is offered to be able to illustrate what safety
practices prevail in the industry. This is used as a basis of what proper standard care is in relation to the
case. The judgment of the lower court in favor of defendant was reversed and remanded because the trial
court committed reversible error in refusing to admit relevant evidence of industry standards.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=64b038ff-99bd-4926-a651-
2d84749cddb9&pdsearchterms=341+S.C.+473+(S.C.+2001)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearc
h=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&pri
d=98a61bee-6e46-4888-9ae9-2e1f151c87de
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:40JN-TXY0-0039-420F-00000-00
***SAME CASE AS THE PREVIOUS ONE***
Case Name: 534 S.E.2d 289 (S.C. App. 2001)
Citation:
Facts:
Rule:
Issue:
Answer:
Conclusion:
URL:
Doc ID:
Case Name: Burke v. Schaffner,
Citation: 114 Ohio App. 3d 655, 683 N.E.2d 861 (1996)
Facts: Appellant brought an action against the driver and the passenger to recover from injuries sustained
when he was pinned by the driver's truck. Appellant settled his claim with the driver and tried his case
against the passenger. Appellant did not call the passenger as a witness, and the passenger offered no
evidence. Appellant's motions for a directed verdict and to reopen his case to call the passenger as a
witness were denied, and the trial court entered judgment in favor of the passenger.
Rule: The doctrine of alternative liability provides: Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious,
and it is proved that harm has been caused to a plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncertainty as
to which one has caused it, the burden is upon each such actor to prove that he has not caused the harm.
Issue: Is the doctrine of alternative liability applicable in this case?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The doctrine of alternative liability rests in the requirement that all individuals believed to
have committed the harmful act to be the defendants. This is to prevent a tortfeasor from escaping
liability. If Malone had been named as a party, then the doctrine would apply in this case. n review, the
court affirmed, finding that (1) a directed verdict was not warranted because reasonable minds could have
differed as to whether the passenger negligently caused the injuries by stepping on the truck's accelerator;
(2) the doctrine of alternative liability did not apply to shift to the passenger the burden of proving that
she did not cause the harm because appellant claimed that only the passenger acted tortiously, to the
exclusion of the driver; (3) because the burden did not shift from appellant, the passenger was not
required to present any evidence that she did not cause the harm; and (4) appellant was required to
present all of his evidence during his case in chief.
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b7432ab7f391&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fcases%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A3S0V-
JTN0-003C-80TN-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A3S0V-JTN0-003C-80TN-00000-
00&pdcontentcomponentid=9250&pdshepid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A7XWN-0C01-2NSF-C0GX-00000-
00&pdteaserkey=sr0&pditab=allpods&ecomp=5ypck&earg=sr0&prid=a6104dfa-466f-41aa-b394-
a407b05abd0f
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S0V-JTN0-003C-80TN-00000-00
Case Name: Dadurian v. Underwriters at Lloyd's
Citation: 787 F.2d 756 (1st Cir. 1986)
Facts: Defendant insurer refused to indemnify plaintiff insured after he claimed that he lost jewelry which
he allegedly owned and that had been insured by defendant's insurance policy. Defendant argued that
plaintiff's claim was fraudulent and that he had knowingly made false statements about facts that were
material to his claim. The jury held for plaintiff in the amount of $ 267,000 plus interest.
Rule: To be considered material, a statement need not relate to a matter or subject which ultimately
proves to be decisive or significant in the ultimate disposition of the claim; rather, it is sufficient if the
statement is reasonably relevant to the insurance company's investigation of a claim.
Issue: Is it valid for a party’s motion for a new trial be granted even if the evidenced produced is contrary
to the decision of the jury?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The trial court denied defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the
alternative, for a new trial. The court held that the jury's verdict was against the great weight of the
evidence because the evidence indicated overwhelmingly that plaintiff knew that he was giving false
testimony at a formal examination while under oath. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in
denying defendant's motion for a new trial, and remanded the case for retrial by a new jury.
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442a96a0c19f&pdsearchterms=Dadurian+v.+Underwriters+at+Lloyd%27s%2C+787+F.2d+756+(1st+Cir.
+1986)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqtty
pe=or&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=21187eaa-21a4-419d-8a8b-b7432ab7f391
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-7KH0-0039-P0BM-00000-00
Case Name: Burlington N. R. Co. v. Woods
Citation: 480 U.S. 1, 107 S. Ct. 967 (1987)
Facts: Respondents brought this tort action in Alabama state court to recover damages for injuries
sustained in a motorcycle accident. Petitioner removed the case to a Federal District Court having diversity
jurisdiction. A jury trial resulted in a judgment of $ 300,000 for respondent Alan Woods and $ 5,000 for
respondent Cara Woods. Petitioner posted bond to stay the judgment pending appeal, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed without modification. 768 F.2d 1287 (CA11 1985).
Rule: In resolving conflicts between state law and the federal rules, the initial step is to determine
whether, when fairly construed, the scope of the federal rule is "sufficiently broad" to cause a "direct
collision" with the state law or, implicitly, to "control the issue" before the court, thereby leaving no room
for the operation of that law. The rule must then be applied if it represents a valid exercise of Congress'
rulemaking authority, which originates in the U.S. Constitution and has been bestowed on the court by
the Rules Enabling Act.
Issue: Is it valid to apply state procedural rule in a federal diversity suit which is opposing to a federal
procedural rule of the same purpose?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The federal rule can be considered as a procedural will preemptive to the state rule. The court
of appeals then granted respondents' motion pursuant to Ala. Code § 12-22-72 (1986), for a mandatory
affirmance penalty. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari to review the applicability of the
mandatory affirmance penalty. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the mandatory
affirmance penalty had no application to the judgment entered by a federal court sitting in diversity
because it conflicted with Fed. R. App. P. 38.

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b23e-
e77394fcd63b&pdsearchterms=480+U.S.+1+(1987)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searc
hboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=7a7a
e3d8-769c-4bdd-867b-a73f1fd75dc9
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-HVT0-003B-41X8-00000-00
Case Name: Day v. Caton,
Citation: 119 Mass. 513 (1876)
Facts: The owner of lot 29 built a party wall on the property line with lot 27. The owner of lot 29 alleged
that the owner of lot 27 agreed to pay one half the value when he used it for his own building. The owner
of lot 27 denied this agreement. The owner of lot 29 brought an action against the owner of lot 27 to
recover half of the value of the wall. The judge instructed the jury that it could infer a promise to pay part
of the value of the wall if the party knew that the other party expected payment and allowed him to act
without objecting. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the owner of lot 29. On the appeal of the owner
of lot 27, the court overruled the exceptions and affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Rule: The fact that a party expects to be paid for work done is not sufficient of itself to establish the
existence of a contract, when the question between the parties is whether one is made. It must be shown
that, in some manner, the party sought to be charged has assented to it. If a party, however, voluntarily
accepts and avails himself of valuable services rendered for his benefit, when he has the option whether
to accept or reject them, even if there is no distinct proof that they were rendered by his authority or
request, a promise to pay for them may be inferred. His knowledge that they were valuable, and his
exercise of the option to avail himself of them, justify this inference. When one stands by in silence and
sees valuable services rendered upon his real estate by the erection of a structure, such silence,
accompanied with the knowledge on his part that the party rendering the services expects payment
therefor, may fairly be treated as evidence of an acceptance of it, and as tending to show an agreement
to pay for it.
Issue: Is silence of another party may be evidence of acceptance and agreement to pay for services?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: In this case, court found that Day’s wall was a benefit to Caton. The latter could have said
something in disagreement or decline the wall, but he did not. Caton had knowledge that Day is expecting
to be paid. Hence, the court considers that as an agreement between them. The court affirmed the
decision of the trial court, overruling the exceptions to the judge's instructions to the jury about inferring
a promise to pay and a completed contract by the silence of the owner of lot 27 in face of the actions of
the owner of lot 29. The court held that there was an inferred agreement on the part of the owner of lot
27 to pay for the wall.
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dd7f28104a1e&pdsearchterms=Day+v.+Caton%2C+119+Mass.+513+(1876)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1
&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ec
omp=532bk&prid=238ac924-4242-4148-b23e-e77394fcd63b
Doc ID:urn:contentItem:3WGR-2670-00KR-F118-00000-00
Case Name: Beach v. Hancock
Citation: 27 N.H. 223 (1853)
Facts: The defendant, being engaged in an angry altercation with the plaintiff, aimed a gun at him in an
excited and threatening manner, and snapped it twice. It was not, in fact, loaded, but the plaintiff did not
know whether it was loaded or not.
Rule:
Issue:
Answer:
Conclusion:
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63ec1c0923d3&pdsearchterms=Beach+v.+Hancock%2C+27+N.H.+223&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdt
ypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp
=532bk&prid=76986c10-a4c4-4b8a-b1fe-dd7f28104a1e
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3TX8-SR50-0039-400B-00000-00
Case Name: Df Activities Corp. v. Brown
Citation: 851 F.2d 920 (7th Cir. 1988)
Facts: The plaintiff, DF Activities Corporation (owner of the Domino's pizza chain), is controlled by a
passionate enthusiast for the work of Frank Lloyd Wright. The defendant, Dorothy Brown, a resident of
Lake Forest (a suburb of Chicago) lived for many years in a house designed by Frank Lloyd Wright -- the
Willits House -- and became the owner of a chair that Wright had designed, the Willits Chair. This is a
stark, high-backed, uncomfortable-looking chair of distinguished design that DF wanted to add to its art
collection. In September and October 1986, Sarah-Ann Briggs, DF's art director, negotiated with Dorothy
Brown to buy the Willits Chair. DF contends -- and Mrs. Brown denies -- that she agreed in a phone
conversation with Briggs on November 26 to sell the chair to DF for $ 60,000, payable in two equal
installments, the first due on December 31 and the second on March 26. On December 3 Briggs wrote
Brown a letter confirming the agreement, followed shortly by a check for $ 30,000. Two weeks later Brown
returned the letter and the check with the following handwritten note at the bottom of the letter: "Since
I did not hear from you until December and I spoke with you the middle of November, I have made other
arrangements for the chair. It is no longer available for sale to you." Sometime later Brown sold the chair
for $ 198,000, precipitating this suit for the difference between the price at which the chair was sold and
the contract price of $ 60,000.
Rule: A plaintiff cannot withstand summary judgment by arguing that although in pretrial discovery he
has gathered no evidence of the defendant's liability, his luck may improve at trial.
Issue: May a plaintiff seek additional discovery to gain admission from the defendant of the contract under
oath?
Answer: No.

Conclusion: The fact that Brown submitted a sworn affidavit denying that she formed a contral to sell, DF
may not seek additional discovery. The lower court granted defendant's motion and plaintiff appealed.
Plaintiff argued that the dismissal was improper since plaintiff had not had an opportunity to depose
defendant. The court disagreed. The court found that plaintiff in a suit involving a contract covered by the
statute of frauds should not be allowed to resist a motion to dismiss, backed by an affidavit that defendant
denied the contract was made, by arguing that his changes of success might improve in discovery. The
court ruled that once defendant denied the contract under oath, the exception to the statute of frauds
found inUniform Commercial Code § 2-201(3)(b) was closed.

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a22ad694ee0b&pdsearchterms=Df+Activities+Corp.+v.+Brown%2C+851+F.2d+920+(7th+Cir.+1988)&p
dstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&
pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=527c0c8f-df81-4dc0-b04a-63ec1c0923d3
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-03H0-001B-K0MT-00000-00
Case Name: C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co.
Citation: 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975)
Facts: Plaintiff operated a fertilizer plant that he insured against burglary under the policies issued by
defendant. When the plant was broken into defendant refused to pay for the loss and plaintiff brought an
action to recover for the loss. Defendant argued that the break in did not comport with the definition of
"burglary" in the policy, which envisaged a violent breaking that left a visible mark or physical damage to
the door.
Rule: The question of interpretation or the meaning to be given contractual words, is one to be
determined by the court unless the interpretation depends on extrinsic evidence or on a choice among
reasonable inferences to be drawn from extrinsic evidence.
Issue: Is it valid for an insurance policy’s explicit language to be enforced beyond the reasonable
expectations of one of the parties?
Answer: No.

Conclusion: Only those reasonable expectations of parties to the contract are those that shall be enforced,
even in cases where there are words that would negate such. The lower court found on behalf of
defendant. On appeal, plaintiff claimed relief under the doctrine of reasonable expectations, implied
warranty, and unconscionability. The court reversed the lower court's decision, holding that
interpretation was a matter to be determined by the court and that the meaning of the word in the policy
differed widely from its legal or normal meaning. The court held that plaintiff was entitled to a judgment
in his favor because the provision of the policy was unconscionable and departed from the reasonable
expectation of an ordinary person.

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5546e448a947&pdsearchterms=C+%26+J+Fertilizer%2C+Inc.+v.+Allied+Mutual+Insurance+Co.%2C+22
7+N.W.2d+169+(1975)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=Se
archBox&pdqttype=or&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=96ad1d5d-b69b-4c1f-b12f-
a22ad694ee0b
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RX4-37F0-003G-54BD-00000-00
Case Name: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
Citation: 563 U.S. 333, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011)

Facts: In February 2002, Vincent and Liza Concepcion entered into an agreement for the sale and servicing
of cellular telephones with AT&T Mobility LLC (AT&T). The contract provided for arbitration of all disputes
between the parties, but required that claims be brought in the parties' “individual capacity, and not as a
plaintiff or class member in any purported class or representative proceeding.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 61a.
The agreement authorized AT&T to make unilateral amendments, which it did to the arbitration provision
on several occasions. The version at issue in this case reflects revisions made in December 2006, which
the parties agree are controlling. The revised agreement provides that customers may initiate dispute
proceedings by completing a one-page Notice of Dispute form available on AT&T's Web site.

Rule: When state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is
straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). But the inquiry
becomes more complex when a doctrine normally thought to be generally applicable, such as duress or
unconscionability, is alleged to have been applied in a fashion that disfavors arbitration. The FAA's
preemptive effect may extend even to grounds traditionally thought to exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract. A court may not rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis
for a state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would enable the court to
effect what the state legislature cannot.
Issue: Is the Federal Arbitration Act preemptive of any conflicting state law?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The Supreme Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempted the Discover Bank
rule. The saving clause under 9 U.S.C.S. § 2 did not permit application of the California rule; nothing in the
saving clause suggested an intent to preserve state law rules that stood as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the FAA's objectives. The overarching purpose of the FAA was to ensure the
enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined
proceedings; requiring the availability of class arbitration was inconsistent with the FAA. The Ninth
Circuit's judgment was reversed and remanded. 5-4 Decision; 1 concurrence; 1 dissent.
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314cf28051d8&pdsearchterms=AT%26T+Mobility+v.+Concepcion%2C+563+U.S.+333+(2011)&pdstarti
n=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquer
ytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=5ea4480c-783d-460b-9c7c-5546e448a947
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:52R4-3PV1-F04K-F2VW-00000-00
Case Name: C.R. Klewin, Inc. v. Flagship Props., Inc.
Citation: 955 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1992)
Facts: Plaintiff C.R. Klewin, Inc. (Klewin), a Connecticut corporation, against defendants Flagship
Properties, Inc. (Flagship), an Ohio corporation, and DKM Properties Corp. (DKM), a New Jersey
corporation. Flagship and DKM together engage in the business of real estate development in Connecticut
under the trade name "ConnTech." Klewin, a provider of construction management services, allegedly
entered into an oral agreement with the defendants that Klewin would serve as construction manager on
a massive multi-structure project at the University of Connecticut to be built in phases over an unspecified
period of time. Count One of the complaint alleged breach of contract based on the oral agreement.
Counts Two and Three sought costs incurred for preconstruction services performed.
Rule: The existence of an enforceable contract is not a necessary precondition to recovery under either
quantum meruit or promissory estoppel doctrines. Whether an agreement obnoxious to the Statute of
Frauds is void or merely unenforceable, one who has partly performed the agreement and who is not in
default in continuing performance should be compensated for any benefit which he has furnished the
other party if the latter refuses to perform.
Issue: Is a verbal agreement unenforceable under statute of frauds if there is no period of time stated of
which the contract must be performed?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: There is a one-year provision of the Statute of Frauds requiring contracts that are not going
to be performed within one year to be in writing to consider it enforceable. Unless otherwise stated that
it is not to be performed within one year, then it does not fall under the one-year provision of the statute.
The court reversed and remanded because the district court incorrectly held that the contract at issue
was within the statute of frauds and was therefore unenforceable by appellant management corporation,
when the contract was indefinite and outside the statute's purview. Additionally, in ruling on the
preconstruction services claims, the district court made a factual finding which was inappropriate on
summary judgment.
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3a8bf7bbfbda&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fcases%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A3S4X-
6500-008H-V409-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A3S4X-6500-008H-V409-00000-
00&pdcontentcomponentid=6386&pdshepid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A7XWN-YW71-2NSD-R04Y-
00000-00&pdteaserkey=sr0&pditab=allpods&ecomp=5ypck&earg=sr0&prid=f470c3bf-b5c1-4af0-b6f1-
ce4103195618
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-6500-008H-V409-00000-00
Case Name: E. Providence Credit Union v. Geremia
Citation: 103 R.I. 597, 239 A.2d 725 (1968)
Facts: Defendants gave plaintiff credit union a promissory note secured by a mortgage on defendants'
automobile. The mortgage obligated defendants to maintain insurance and stipulated that plaintiff could
pay the premium and add the cost to defendants' loan. Defendants procured the required insurance, but
failed to make premium payments. Defendants and plaintiff received a notice of impending cancellation
from the insurer. Plaintiff sent a letter to defendants stating that if the premium was not paid, plaintiff
would renew the policy and apply this amount to the loan. Defendant wife contacted plaintiff and
indicated that plaintiff should pay the premium. Plaintiff did not pay the premium and, when the
automobile was demolished, the insurer refused indemnification. Plaintiff sued to recover the balance on
the promissory note. The court held that plaintiff was precluded from recovering on its loan contract
because of its failure to fulfill the promise to pay the overdue premium.
Rule: Promissory estoppel is defined as a promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does
induce such action or forbearance and is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of its
promise.
Issue: Is a promise of gratuity by one to procure insurance on a promisee’s property enforceable by
promisee’s forbearance to procure?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: Under promissory estoppel, a gratuitous promise is enforceable. EPCU’s promise was
enforceable making them liable for the cost of the totaled vehicle. Court affirmed judgment dismissing
complaint, where defendants relied on plaintiff's promise to pay insurance premium on automobile and
plaintiff failed to make such payment.
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3aa82cb91303&pdsearchterms=East+Providence+Credit+Union+v.+Geremia%2C+239+A.2d+725+(196
8)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=a
nd&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=d4bfc8f4-04b6-4e63-8916-3a8bf7bbfbda
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S3J-YPW0-003D-F3DC-00000-00
Case Name: C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown
Citation: 511 U.S. 383, 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994)
Facts: Respondent built a solid waste recycling center and passed an ordinance that required all solid
waste generated in the town to pass through its new center. This was done so that the town could assess
a handling fee and recoup its cost to build the center. Petitioner was in the business of processing solid
waste and did not use respondent's facility. Petitioner was cited for violating the town's ordinance, and
petitioner filed suit in federal court challenging it. The town filed a state court action, and the ordinance
was ruled constitutional.
Rule: Discrimination against interstate commerce in favor of local business or investment is per se invalid,
save in a narrow class of cases in which the municipality can demonstrate, under rigorous scrutiny, that it
has no other means to advance a legitimate local interest.
Issue: Is it valid to enact an ordinance that favors local businesses even if there are other ways to promote
local interests?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: In this case, the purpose of striking down the law of the flow control ordinance is because it
would impair interstate commerce. The state appellate courts affirmed that ruling. The court reversed
because the ordinance violated theCommerce Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, as it favored local
enterprises and discriminated against non-local entities. The state court decision was reversed and
remanded because local government could not use its regulatory powers to favor local enterprises and
discriminate against non-local entities.
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b2145699cf18&pdsearchterms=C+%26+A+Carbone+v.+Town+of+Clarkstown%2C+511+U.S.+383+(1994
)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=an
d&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=ed2bcede-dea5-4068-8981-3aa82cb91303
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S65-JWF0-003B-R1BT-00000-00
Case Name: Booth v. State
Citation: 398 P.2d 863
Facts: John Fletcher Booth, Jr., was charged by information in the District Court of Oklahoma County with
the crime of Receiving Stolen Property, and was found guilty of the lesser crime of Attempt to Receive
Stolen Property. The jury assessed his penalty at Two Years in the Oklahoma State Penitentiary, and to
pay a fine in the amount of $ 150.00. From said judgment and sentence the defendant appeals.
Rule: When stolen goods are recovered by owner or his agent before they are sold, goods are no longer
to be considered stolen, and the purchaser cannot be convicted of receiving stolen goods.
Issue: Is the defendant guilty of attempted receipt of stolen goods?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: When stolen goods have been found or recovered by their owners or authorities, they are no
longer stolen. Hence, a defendant cannot be guilty of such because the crime is impossible. The court
found that the law was clear that defendant could not have been convicted of receiving stolen property
as the property had lost its character as stolen property. The court held that if defendant could not be
convicted of the substantive charge, because the coat had lost its character as stolen property; neither
could he be convicted of an attempt because the coat was not in the category of stolen property at the
time he received it.
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6687483f3530&pdsearchterms=BOOTH+v.+STATE%2c+398+P.2d+863+(1964).&pdstartin=hlct%3a1%3
a1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&
ecomp=532bk&prid=7c2684b0-5b3f-4930-a2c6-b2145699cf18&aci=la&cbc=0&lnsi=ef733967-ef8a-
41bd-a9a2-2f86c0534b9c&rmflag=0&sit=1534337381298.439
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RVC-0JY0-003G-61NS-00000-00
Case Name: Cundick v. Broadbent
Citation: 383 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1967)
Facts: Irma Cundick, guardian ad litem for her husband, Darwin Cundick, brought this diversity suit in
Wyoming to set aside an agreement for the sale of (1) livestock and equipment; (2) shares of stock in a
development company; and (3) base range land in Wyoming. The alleged grounds for nullification were
that at the time of the transaction Cundick was mentally incompetent to execute the agreement; that
Broadbent, knowing of such incompetency, fraudulently represented to Cundick that the purchase price
for the property described in the agreement was fair and just and that Cundick relied upon the false
representations when he executed the agreement and transferred the property. The complaint further
states that the guardian ad litem had offered to restore and does now offer to do so, but Broadbent has
refused.
Rule: There are recognized three classes of testimony in determining mental competency, (1) the
testimony of those who observed the speech and conduct of the person on the day of execution of the
instrument whose validity is challenged; (2) the testimony of those who observed the speech and conduct
of the person a reasonable time before and after the day of execution of the instrument; (3) the testimony
of those who never observed the speech and conduct of the person. In the first two classes, every witness,
whether lay or expert, recites what he or she observed and then draws from the observation of such
behavior an inference as to competency or incompetency which is called an opinion. In the last class, the
inference is drawn after reading or hearing someone's recital of the person's speech and conduct, reliance
being placed not on the observations of the witness but on the observations of another party. Obviously,
the last class of testimony is not entitled to much weight.
Issue: Is a contract binding when a mentally deficient person is a party to it?
Answer: No.
Conclusion:
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e2483174883a&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fcases%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A3S4W-
WX50-0039-Y3BG-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A3S4W-WX50-0039-Y3BG-00000-
00&pdcontentcomponentid=6394&pdshepid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A7XX0-5WK1-2NSD-N00S-00000-
00&pdteaserkey=sr0&pditab=allpods&ecomp=5ypck&earg=sr0&prid=9acddeed-7bc1-446d-a525-
c9b815db8bd9
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4W-WX50-0039-Y3BG-00000-00
Case Name: Califano v. Webster
Citation: 430 U.S. 313, 97 S. Ct. 1192 (1977)
Facts: Under 215 of the Social Security Act (42 USCS 415) prior to a 1972 amendment, the computation
for old age insurance benefits was such that a woman obtained larger benefits than a man of the same
age having the same earnings record. The 1972 amendment altered the formula for computing benefits
so as to eliminate the previous distinction between men and women, but only as to men reaching the age
of 62 in 1975 or later. After he had pursued his administrative remedies, a man who had reached the age
of 62 before 1975, and who was dissatisfied with the amount of his benefits under 215 as amended,
brought an action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York to challenge the
constitutionality of 215. The single-judge District Court held that the statutory scheme for determining
old age benefits under 215 violated the equal protection component of the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment (413 F Supp 127).
Rule: To withstand scrutiny under the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause, classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to achievement of those objectives. Reduction of the disparity in economic condition between
men and women caused by the long history of discrimination against women has been recognized as such
an important governmental objective.
Issue: Is the Social Security Act’s provision for women and the insurance benefits calculation in
comparison to men a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The Court held that old-age benefit payments were not constitutionally immunized against
alterations of the kind at issue in the case and that Congress was authorized to replace one constitutional
computation formula with another and to make the new formula prospective only. The former version of
the challenged statute operated directly to compensate women for past economic discrimination and was
deliberately enacted to compensate women for the particular economic disabilities they suffered. The
subsequent amendment of § 415 was not a Congressional admission that its previous policy was
invidiously discriminatory. The retired male worker's Fifth Amendmentrights were not violated by the
prospective application of § 415, as the Constitution did not forbid statutory changes to have a beginning
and thus to discriminate between the rights of an earlier and later time.

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078e213188b8&pdsearchterms=Califano+v.+Webster%2C+430+U.S.+313%2C+97+S.+Ct.+1192+(1977)
&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=an
d&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=72c8cee0-2e51-4df5-8e58-e2483174883a
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-9J90-003B-S35B-00000-00
Case Name: Dall. Cowboys Football Club, Inc. v. Harris
Citation: 348 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961)
Facts: Appellant Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc., hereinafter called the Club, a member of the National
Football League, brought this action against James B. Harris for injunction to restrain Harris from playing
professional football, or engaging in any activities related to professional football for anyone except the
Club. Appellant alleged that Harris was bound by the terms of a written contract to play football for the
Club and no one else, but that in violation of his contract he was playing football for the Dallas Texans
Football Club, a member of the American Football League. The suit was for injunction only. No money
judgment was sought.

Rule: Injunctive relief will be granted to restrain violation by an employee of negative covenants in a
personal service contract if the employee is a person of exceptional and unique knowledge, skill and ability
in performing the service called for in the contract.

Issue: Is injunctive relief validly granted to the football team?

Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: In reversing the judgment on the merits, the court held that while it could not have agreed
with the football team that there was no evidence in the record of probative force to support the fact
finding of the jury to the effect that the player did not have exceptional and unique knowledge, skill and
ability as a football player, the evidence was "insufficient" to support the jury finding, and thus, the
football team was entitled to a new trial. The court also held that the contract had not expired under its
own terms. The court affirmed the grant of the temporary injunction in favor of the football team because
it preserved the status quo until a final determination on the merits.
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c1c89e264a3b&pdsearchterms=Dallas+Cowboys+Football+Club%2C+Inc.+v.+Harris.+348+S.W.2d+37+(
Tex.Civ.App.+1961)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=Searc
hBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=781ce2bc-4906-40e0-9520-
078e213188b8
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S11-T1T0-003D-R237-00000-00
Case Name: Bell v. Novick Transfer Co.
Citation: 17 F.R.D. 279 (D. Md. 1955)
Facts: The declaration alleged that while the infant was riding in an automobile on certain public
highways, the automobile was run into and struck by the tractor-trailer truck owned by defendants and
operated by the agent in a careless, reckless, and negligent manner so that the infant was injured. The
declaration also alleged that the infant's injuries and damages were the direct result of the negligence on
the part of defendants without any negligence on the part of the plaintiffs contributing thereto.
Rule: Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 requires only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.
Issue: Is it valid for a claim to be granted even if it is known that there was negligence in the operation of
the truck that caused injury to the plaintiff?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: he court denied defendants' motion to dismiss and for a more definite statement. The court
reasoned that, although the declaration might not be sufficient under state practice, it met the
requirements, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, of a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief. Further, defendants were not entitled to a more definite statement by motion
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). The court explained that defendants could obtain by interrogatories or other
discovery procedure the facts upon which plaintiffs based their allegations that the truck was being
operated in a careless, reckless, and negligent manner.
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a6a81c150995&pdsearchterms=Bell+v.+Novick+Transfer+Co.%2C+17+F.R.D.+279+(D.+Md.+1955)&pds
tartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pd
querytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=023459a7-8bbf-416d-b0fe-c1c89e264a3b
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4V-S200-003B-22TK-00000-00
Case Name: Bradley v. Am. Smelting & Ref. Co.
Citation: 104 Wash. 2d 677, 709 P.2d 782 (1985)
Facts: Plaintiffs Michael O. Bradley and Marie A. Bradley, husband and wife, are owners and occupiers of
real property on the southern end of Vashon Island in King County, Washington. The Bradleys purchased
their property in 1978. Defendant ASARCO, a New Jersey corporation doing business in Washington,
operates a primary copper smelter on real property it owns in Ruston, which is an incorporated
municipality surrounded by the city of Tacoma, Washington. On October 3, 1983, plaintiffs brought this
action against [*680] defendant alleging a cause of action for intentional trespass and for nuisance.
Rule: One is subject to liability to another for trespass, irrespective of whether he thereby causes harm to
any legally protected interest of the other, if he intentionally (a) enters land in the possession of the other,
or causes a thing or a third person to do so, or (b) remains on the land, or (c) fails to remove from the land
a thing which he is under a duty to remove.
Issue: Is it a valid application of the theories of trespass and nuisance at the same time?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The court ruled that defendant had requisite intent to commit intentional trespass; an
intentional deposit of microscopic particulates, undetectable by the human senses, could be the basis of
a trespass action and a nuisance action but required proof of actual and substantial damages and a three-
year limitation period.
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4a935e668454&pdsearchterms=Bradley+v.+American+Smelting+%26+Refining+Co+709+P.2d+782+(W
ash.+1985)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pd
qttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=6cfeb803-9826-41e3-b500-a6a81c150995
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S3J-W510-003F-W0KV-00000-00
Case Name: Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC
Citation: 430 U.S. 442, 97 S. Ct. 1261 (1977)
Facts: Petitioners were cited by the Secretary of Labor (Secretary) and ordered to immediately abate
pertinent hazards after inspections of their respective work sites revealed conditions that violated a
mandatory occupational safety standard promulgated by the Secretary under § 5(a)(2) of
OSHA, 29 U.S.C.S. § 654(a)(2). The appeals court affirmed the orders of the Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission, rejecting petitioners' contention that the failure to afford the employer a jury
trial on the question of whether he had violated OSHA was in violation of U.S. Const. amend. VII.
Petitioners contended that a suit in federal court by the government for civil penalties for violation of a
statute was a suit for a money judgment that was classically a suit at common law.
Rule: When Congress creates new statutory "public rights," it may assign their adjudication to an
administrative agency with which a jury trial would be incompatible, without violating U.S. Const. amend.
VII's injunction that jury trial is to be preserved in suits at common law. Congress is not required by U.S.
Const. amend. VII to choke the already crowded federal courts with new types of litigation or prevented
from committing some new types of litigation to administrative agencies with special competence in the
relevant field. This is the case even if U.S. Const. amend. VII would have required a jury where the
adjudication of those rights is assigned to a federal court of law instead of an administrative agency.
Issue: Is it valid for Congress to create a cause of action before a party and is not a jury without violating
the Constitution?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The court affirmed, holding that U.S. Const. amend. VII did not prevent Congress from
assigning to an administrative agency the task of adjudicating violations of OSHA without a jury
because U.S. Const. amend. VII was never intended to establish the jury as the exclusive mechanism for
factfinding in civil cases.
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62025df34932&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fcases%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A3S4X-
9J70-003B-S354-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A3S4X-9J70-003B-S354-00000-
00&pdcontentcomponentid=6443&pdshepid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A7XWN-0BY1-2NSF-C3DD-
00000-00&pdteaserkey=sr0&pditab=allpods&ecomp=5ypck&earg=sr0&prid=2628adf6-9a9c-4ce1-
8fa2-98662499026e
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-9J70-003B-S354-00000-00
Case Name: Deep Water Brewing, LLC v. Fairway Res. Ltd.
Citation: 152 Wash. App. 229, 215 P.3d 990 (2009)

Facts: Cindy Smith and Robert Ahlquist (Ahlquist) are siblings. They owned and operated the Cosina del
Lago Restaurant overlooking Lake Chelan in Washington State. The dining room was on the second floor
of the building and the lounge was on the first floor. The land between the restaurant building and the
lake was a mature apple orchard. Jack Johnson is the sole shareholder and president of Key Development
Corporation. David Milne was president of Fairway Resources, Ltd. They wanted to develop the property
between the restaurant and the lake for single family housing. But any development required access over
Ahlquist's property. Toward that end, Mr. Johnson presented Ahlquist with a signed easement that
included a provision that “[a] restrictive covenant shall be placed on the face of the plat to be developed
by Fairway stating the [sic] no building will be constructed that will obscure the view from Cosina del Lago
Restaurant.” Ex. 37; Clerk's Papers (CP) at 639 (I Finding of Fact (FF) 1.18). The proposed easement
covered only the upper floor (the restaurant) view and so Ahlquist refused to sign.

Rule: The elements of a running real covenant are: (1) the covenants must have been enforceable
between the original parties, such enforceability being a question of contract law except insofar as the
covenant must satisfy the statute of frauds; (2) the covenant must "touch and concern" both the land to
be benefitted and the land to be burdened; (3) the covenanting parties must have intended to bind their
successors in interest; (4) there must be vertical privity of estate, i.e., privity between the original parties
to the covenant and the present disputants; and (5) there must be horizontal privity of estate, or privity
between the original parties.

Issue: Are the requisites of a covenant also observed in Washington?

Answer: Yes.

Conclusion: The parties had intended to protect the view of the lake from both the restaurant and its
lounge. The homes in the development that exceeded 16 feet interfered with that view. The president
acted unreasonably, if not dishonestly, by knowingly and deliberately ignoring the height restriction
provisions in the agreement. The association failed in its duty to evaluate building plans for compliance
with the covenants. It allowed lot owners to build in violation of the agreement and thereby impair the
view from the lounge. The association was subject to joint and several liability.

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425190c9e627&pdsearchterms=215+P.3d+990&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchbox
click&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=or&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=547b5bc8-
7499-4454-ad5e-62025df34932
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:4X6M-CCW0-TXFX-X2SP-00000-00
Case Name: Emerson v. Magendantz
Citation: 689 A.2d 409 (R.I. 1997)
Facts: Following the birth of their first child, the Emersons decided for financial reasons to limit their family
to one child. Having made this decision, Diane consulted defendant, who was a gynecological specialist,
concerning sterilization procedures. The defendant agreed to perform a surgical tubal ligation and did so
upon Diane on January 10, 1991. Subsequently, on or about May 31, 1991, Diane was seen by an
obstetrician, who determined that she was pregnant in spite of the preceding tubal ligation. Diane gave
birth to a child on January 11, 1992. The child, who was named Kirsten, is alleged to have congenital
problems that are only generally described in the complaint. Following Kirsten's birth, Diane underwent a
second tubal ligation. In March 1994 the Emersons filed a complaint in the Superior Court for the County
of Providence, alleging that Kirsten's birth was proximately caused by defendant's negligent performance
of the tubal-ligation procedure. The complaint also alleged that defendant had failed properly to inform
Diane and to obtain her consent prior to surgery.
Rule: In the event of the birth of a child who suffers from congenital defects, which birth is a result of an
unwanted pregnancy arising out of a negligently performed sterilization procedure, where there is a
physically or a mentally handicapped child, special medical and educational expenses beyond normal
rearing costs should be allowed. The financial and emotional drain associated with raising such a child is
often overwhelming to the affected parents and the special costs associated with bringing up a
handicapped child would be recoverable.
Issue: Can a patient be granted damages for unwanted pregnancy resulting from a physician’s negligence?
Answer: No.

Conclusion: The court then considered the elements of damages allowed by other states and adopted a
modification of the limited-recovery rule followed by the majority, under which parents could recover the
medical expenses of the ineffective sterilization procedure, the medical and hospital costs of the
pregnancy, the expense of a subsequent sterilization procedure, loss of wages, loss of consortium to the
spouse arising out of the unwanted pregnancy, and medical expenses for prenatal care, delivery, and
postnatal care but, as modified, no recovery would be allowable for emotional distress arising out of the
birth of a healthy child. The court further held that emotional distress could be recovered for a physically
or mentally handicapped child and that if the physician had actual or implied notice of the likelihood of
the probability of such a birth, the physician could be liable for the child-rearing costs and living expenses
of the child for its life.

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aa33aa3ccc91&pdsearchterms=Emerson+v.+Magendantz%2C+689+A.2d+409+(R.I.+1997)&pdstartin=h
lct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdqueryte
mplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=404b9254-33dc-4712-978f-425190c9e627
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S3J-XNP0-003D-F051-00000-00
Case Name: Barron v. Baltimore
Citation: 32 U.S. 243 (1833)

Facts: This case was instituted by the plaintiff in error against the city of Baltimore, under its corporate
title of "The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore," to recover damages for injuries to the wharf-property
of the plaintiff, arising from the acts of the corporation. Craig and Barron, of whom the plaintiff is survivor,
were owners of an extensive and highly productive wharf in the eastern section of Baltimore, enjoying, at
the period of their purchase of it, the deepest water in the harbour.

The city, in the asserted exercise of its corporate authority over the harbour, the paving of streets, and
regulating grades for paving, and over the health of Baltimore, directed from their accustomed and natural
course, certain streams of water which flow from the range of hills bordering the city, and diverted them,
partly by adopting new grades of streets, and partly by the necessary results of paving, and partly by
mounds, embankments and other artificial means, purposely adapted to bend the course of the water to
the wharf in question. These streams becoming very full and violent in rains, carried down with them from
the hills and the soil over which they ran, large masses of sand and earth, which they deposited along,
and widely in front of the wharf of the plaintiff. The alleged consequence was, that the water was
rendered so shallow that it ceased to be useful for vessels of any important burthen, lost its income, and
became of little or no value as a wharf.

Rule: The provision in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, U.S. Const. amend. V, declaring that
private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, is intended solely as a
limitation on the exercise of power by the government of the United States, and is not applicable to the
legislation of the states.
Issue: Does the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment allow the city to make constructions that destroy’s
a private property without just compensation?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: he United States Supreme Court dismissed the claim for want of jurisdiction. The Court found
that the provision in the Fifth Amendmentdeclaring that private property should not be taken for public
use without just compensation was intended solely as a limitation on the exercise of power by the
government of the United States and was not applicable to the legislation of the states.
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19c896569c71&pdsearchterms=Barron+v.+Baltimore%2C+32+U.S.+243+(1833)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%
3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=
&ecomp=532bk&prid=f5eb2a7c-d81d-4e05-ba78-aa33aa3ccc91
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-KJ90-003B-H505-00000-00
Case Name: Berry v. Sugar Notch Borough
Citation: 191 Pa. 345, 43 A. 240 (1899)
Facts: The plaintiff was a motorman in the employ of the Wilkes-Barre and Wyoming Valley Traction
Company on its line running from Wilkes-Barre to the borough of Sugar Notch. The ordinance by virtue of
which the company was permitted to lay its track and operate its cars in the borough of Sugar Notch
contained a provision that the speed of the cars while on the streets of the borough should not exceed
eight miles an hour. On the line of the road, and within the borough limits, there was a large chestnut
tree, as to the condition of which there was some dispute at the trial. The question of the negligence of
the borough in permitting it to remain must, however, be considered as set at rest by the verdict. On the
day of the accident the plaintiff was running his car on the borough street in a violent wind-storm, and as
he passed under the tree it was blown down, crushing the roof of the car and causing the plaintiff's injury.
There is some conflict of testimony as to the speed at which the car was running, but it seems to be fairly
well established that it was considerably in excess of the rate permitted by the borough ordinance.
Rule: **** NO HEADNOTES IN THE CASE ****
Issue: Is contributory negligence of the plaintiff a reason for him to be barred from recovering for an injury
that was not caused by plaintiff’s actions?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The court found that the speed at which the motorman was traveling did not contribute to
the cause of the accident. The court found that although the motorman may have been in violation of the
speed provisions of the ordinance, his right to be on the street was not affected.

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d8126201a060&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fcases%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A3RRH-
XMP0-003G-X0KY-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A3RRH-XMP0-003G-X0KY-00000-
00&pdcontentcomponentid=9296&pdteaserkey=sr0&pditab=allpods&ecomp=5ypck&earg=sr0&prid=
bfb06e99-3ad6-4cfd-95d3-c9d4e6fff161
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RRH-XMP0-003G-X0KY-00000-00
Case Name: Dillon v. Evanston Hosp.
Citation: 199 Ill. 2d 483, 264 Ill. Dec. 653, 771 N.E.2d 357 (2002)
Facts: The doctor left a portion of a catheter in the patient's chest. Medical experts agreed that removing
the catheter was more risky than leaving it in, but the latter course entailed risks (albeit small) of possibly
serious complications. The supreme court found no error in the trial court's (1) allowing plaintiff to amend
the complaint to allege improper insertion of the catheter, as the jury returned a general verdict against
defendants on the negligence claim, and defendants failed to submit any special interrogatories; (2)
instructing the jury on res ipsa loquitur against the doctor, as the jury returned separate verdicts against
him on both negligence and res ipsa loquitur, and the evidence supported the negligence verdict.
Rule: When a trial court excludes evidence, no appealable issue remains unless a formal offer of proof is
made. The failure to do so results in a waiver of the issue on appeal. The purpose of an offer of proof is to
inform the trial court, opposing counsel, and a reviewing court of the nature and substance of the
evidence sought to be introduced. However, an offer of proof is not required where it is apparent that the
trial court clearly understood the nature and character of the evidence sought to be introduced.
Issue: Is the award for damages valid in this case?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The supreme court adopted the minority rule and followed Anderson, which held that a tort
claimant could recover for an increased risk of future injury, even if such injury were improbable. But the
award of such damages in the case could not stand, as the jury instruction failed to advise the jury that
the increased risk had to be based on evidence and not speculation, and that the size of the award had to
reflect the probability of occurrence.
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d10c97245eb4&pdsearchterms=Dillon+v.+Evanston+Hosp.%2C+199+Ill.+2d+483%2C+264+Ill.+Dec.+65
3%2C+771+N.E.2d+357+(2002)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearcht
ype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=db37afe3-f8a4-4059-
a859-d8126201a060
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:45WX-J140-0039-41DC-00000-00
Case Name: Carpenter v. Huffman
Citation: 294 Ala. 189, 314 So. 2d 65 (1975)
Facts: The adverse possessor's brother bought a tract of land and erected a fence along what he believed
to be the correct property line, though the actual boundary was several feet to the south. The brother
sold a portion of the land to the adverse possessor and she built a house on the property. Half of her
house was on the disputed strip of land. The adverse possessor conveyed the property back to her
brother, and several years later he reconveyed it to her. The property owners filed suit to quiet title to
the land when the adverse possessor refused to sign an agreement to have her house moved.
Rule: Ala. Code tit. 7, § 828 (1940, recomp. 1958), provides that it does not apply to cases involving a
question as to boundaries between coterminous owners. The three alternative prerequisites deed or
other color of title, annual listing of land for taxation, or title by descent, cast, or devise from a
predecessor, therefore, are not necessary to sustain claim to title by a coterminous owner. That is to say,
although the claimant is relieved of these three alternative conditions prescribed by § 828, he may still
acquire title by the exercise of adverse possession for a period of ten years. However, the requirements
that possession be open, notorious, hostile, continuous and exclusive are still applicable.
Issue: Was there sufficient evidence to sustain the trial court’s holding privity possession between the
parties?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The trial court found in favor of the adverse possessor. On appeal, the court affirmed. The
court found that there was sufficient privity between the adverse possessor and her brother to allow her
to tack her periods of possession to his in order to establish adverse possession.
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8d7c0cd36647&pdsearchterms=Carpenter+v.+Huffman+314+So.+2d+65&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&p
dtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecom
p=532bk&prid=bbf718b3-1786-4561-948b-d10c97245eb4Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RX4-1MT0-003C-
91KW-00000-00
Case Name: Carpenter v. Ruperto
Citation: 315 N.W.2d 782 (Iowa 1982)
Facts: Plaintiff Virginia Carpenter appeals from an adverse decree in her action to quiet title to land
adjacent to her residential premises based on a theory of adverse possession. Defendants Charles L.
Ruperto, Edith C. Ruperto, and Tom McCormick cross-appeal from a portion of the decree awarding
plaintiff limited relief on equitable grounds. We affirm on the merits of the appeal and dismiss the cross-
appeal for want of jurisdiction. The determinative question on the appeal is whether the trial court
misinterpreted the law governing the claim of right element in finding plaintiff failed to carry her burden
of proof. The determinative question on the cross-appeal is whether it was timely.
Rule: When knowledge of lack of title is accompanied by knowledge of no basis for claiming an interest in
the property, a good faith claim of right cannot be established. For example, a mere exchange of quitclaim
deeds by persons who know legal title is in another will not support a claim of right.
Issue: Is it valid for a person to acquire a real property by adverse possession despite the fact that
someone else holds the title of said property?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: She knew her lot did not include the cornfield north of it. At the time she entered possession
of the disputed land, plaintiff knew she had no legal right to do so. Possession for the statutory period
could not be bootstrapped into a basis for claiming a right to possession. Defendants' cross-appeal was
untimely and compliance with he time limitations for taking a cross-appeal was mandatory and
jurisdictional. The court affirmed the decree holding that plaintiff failed to prove a good faith claim of
right and dismissed the cross-appeal for want of jurisdiction.
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b297a7785f6a&pdsearchterms=Carpenter+v.+Ruperto%2C+315+N.W.2d+782+(Iowa+1982)&pdstartin
=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquery
templateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=ea51ae83-33eb-4d28-879b-8d7c0cd36647
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RX4-2TH0-003G-51TN-00000-00
Case Name: Carteret Sav. & Loan Asso., F.A. v. Jackson
Citation: 812 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 1987)
Facts: Defendants-appellants Dr. Jackson and his wife were led into an allegedly painless get-rich
enterprise by one Garfinkel, now absent. Simply by signing a few papers they expected to achieve gains
in the form of substantial deductions on their income tax returns. However, as a result of our present
affirmance of the district court, regardless of whatever view the IRS may take, they will realize some
unexpected, and very tangible, losses.
Rule: Fed. R. Civ. P. 1's general principle is that the rules are to be construed to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action. As the court said earlier, the policy of the federal rules
favors resolving all disputes between the parties in a single litigation.
Issue: Does a subsequent action disallow assertion of claims that could have been raised as counterclaims
from a previous suit?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The first or the counterclaim prior should have been taken to file a pleading, however, they
failed to do so. The transfer was made on October 5, 1985. One month before that the Florida court had
entered a judgment for $204,000. While this was to be reduced by whatever could be obtained for the
yacht, less than three months before, a California District Court had entered a judgment for $438,000.
While, as to both, defendants claimed that the courts lacked personal jurisdiction, both judgments were
based upon promissory notes, and manifestly had substance behind them. The court affirmed the ruling
for plaintiff, because the evidence showed that defendants, in violation of the law, transferred their
residence to avoid paying plaintiff.
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ceb599ce3b7b&pdsearchterms=Carteret+Sav.+%26+Loan+Asso.%2C+F.A.+v.+Jackson%2C+812+F.2d+3
6+(1st+Cir.+1987)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchB
ox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=9ec26560-0df1-40f6-8da3-
b297a7785f6a
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-C8Y0-001B-K50K-00000-00
Case Name: Durfee v. Duke
Citation: 375 U.S. 106, 84 S. Ct. 242 (1963)
Facts: The main channel of the Missouri River, the middle of which forms the Missouri-Nebraska boundary
line, shifted so that certain bottom land, once an island in the river, was on the Missouri side rather than
on the Nebraska side of the boundary. Two Nebraska citizens, who claimed the land by virtue of a
Nebraska sheriff's tax foreclosure deed, brought suit in a Nebraska state court against a Missouri citizen
who claimed the land by virtue of a Missouri swampland patent. A principal issue litigated was whether
the shift in the river's course resulted from avulsion, so that under Nebraska law the land remained a part
of Nebraska, or from accretion, so that under Nebraska law the land became a part of Missouri.
Rule: A court in one state, when asked to give effect to the judgment of a court in another state, may
constitutionally inquire into the foreign court's jurisdiction to render that judgment. A judgment is entitled
to full faith and credit -- even as to questions of jurisdiction -- when the second court's inquiry discloses
that those questions have been fully and fairly litigated and finally decided in the court which rendered
the original judgment.
Issue: Is a ruling on a jurisdiction matter entitled to full faith and credit in other courts?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the judgment because the
federal court in Missouri had the power and, upon proper averments, the duty to inquire into the
jurisdiction of the Nebraska courts to render the decree quieting title to the land in petitioners. The Court
held that when that inquiry disclosed, as it did, that the jurisdictional issues had been fully and fairly
litigated by the parties and finally determined in the Nebraska courts, the federal court in Missouri was
correct in ruling that further inquiry was precluded.
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f4bc716f3d7b&pdsearchterms=Durfee+v.+Duke%2C+375+U.S.+106+(1963)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1
&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ec
omp=532bk&prid=3939faf2-1715-4caf-bb1c-ceb599ce3b7b
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-GXX0-003B-S0MJ-00000-00
Case Name: Catron v. Lewis
Citation: 271 Neb. 416, 712 N.W.2d 245 (2006)
Facts: The accident in question occurred on July 5, 2002. On that day, Catron took his boat out on Center
Lake to take Rader and Stuart riding on towable tubes. Rader and Stuart were friends of Catron's daughter
and were not related to him. The towropes which attached the tubes that Rader and Stuart were riding
to Catron's boat were approximately 61 feet long. The tubes generally stayed within 1 1/2 feet of each
other on the water. Rader and Stuart rode the tubes sitting facing away from the boat. The lake is circular
with a center island and two narrower and shallower channels connecting the two sides of the "circle."
Boat traffic travels in a counterclockwise direction. After going around the lake twice, pulling the tubes in
which Rader and Stuart rode, Catron decided to go onto shore, where Rader and Stuart had camped the
night before with Catron's daughter and some other girls. After having gone through one of the narrow
channels, and heading counterclockwise, Catron testified that he made his customary loop maneuver to
go in straight toward the shore. This involved slowing down so that the tubes did not swing to the side of
the boat and making a small circle in which he briefly traveled clockwise before traveling perpendicular
to the traffic flow in order to nose straight onto the beach. As he was traveling straight east toward the
shore, Catron stated that he noticed two jet skis heading north (counterclockwise) toward the right side
of Catron's boat. One of the jet skis was being ridden by Panek.
Rule: The class of potential plaintiffs in cases for negligent infliction of emotional distress has been
extended to "bystanders" outside the zone of danger who have a close familial relationship with a
seriously injured victim because persons bearing close familial or other relationship to the directly injured
third person comprise a discrete and well-defined class, membership in which is determined by
preexisting relationships. For witnesses having no such close relationship with the victim, however,
recoverability is limited to those persons who are within the zone of danger of the negligent conduct
which resulted in the incident in question.
Issue: In a claim for damages for infliction of emotional distress, must it be the direct victim of the
defendant’s negligence for being within the zone of danger by the negligence?
Answer: Yes.

Conclusion: The evidence was undisputed that the motorboat operator suffered no physical impact or
injury from the accident that he attributed to the negligence of defendants. Furthermore, he made no
argument that he had an intimate familial relationship with the victim. Viewing the evidence in a light
most favorable to the motorboat operator, he was clearly not within the zone of danger. He was not a
bystander or a direct victim of the alleged acts that resulted in the victim's death.

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9fba5d63da59&pdsearchterms=712+N.W.2d+245+(Neb.+2006)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofs
earch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk
&prid=eeea1636-3ab8-4b69-b25a-f4bc716f3d7b
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:4JRK-0YP0-0039-43MW-00000-00
Case Name: Eagle Enters., Inc. v. Gross
Citation: 39 N.Y.2d 505, 384 N.Y.S.2d 717, 349 N.E.2d 816 (1976)
Facts: Respondent purchased land under a deed containing a covenant whereby the owner of the land
would purchase water from appellant. Respondent constructed a well and refused to buy appellant's
water.
Rule: The affirmative covenant is disfavored in the law because of the fear that this type of obligation
imposes an undue restriction on alienation or an onerous burden in perpetuity. Such a result militates
strongly against its enforcement.
Issue: Is the covenant in this case still enforceable to subsequent owners even when agreed covenant was
of the original grantors and grantees?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed the appellate court's dismissal of the complaint,
holding that the covenant for water supply did not sufficiently touch and concern the land to be
enforceable. The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed, holding that the covenant for water supply did
not sufficiently touch and concern the land to be enforceable.

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e32e60c26b7a&pdsearchterms=Eagle+Enters.%2C+Inc.+v.+Gross%2C+39+N.Y.2d+505%2C+384+N.Y.S.
2d+717%2C+349+N.E.2d+816+(1976)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pds
earchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=c19d2cc8-6b7f-
465f-adef-9fba5d63da59
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RRS-B7H0-003C-F08G-00000-00
Case Name: Cay v. Dep't of Transp. & Dev.
Citation: 93-C-0887 ( La. 1/14/94), 631 So. 2d 393

Facts: Cay, a twenty-seven year-old single offshore worker, returned to his home in Sandy Lake from a
seven-day work shift on November 3, 1987. Later that afternoon his sister drove him to Jonesville, thirteen
miles from his home, to obtain a hunting license and shotgun shells for a hunting trip the next day. Cay
cashed a check for $ 60.00 and paid for the hunting items, but remained in Jonesville when his sister
returned to Sandy Lake about 7:00 p.m. Around 10:00 p.m. Cay entered a barroom and stayed until about
11:00 p.m., when he left the barroom on foot after declining an offer for a ride to his home. He carried an
opened beer with him. Five days later, Cay's body was discovered on a rock bank of the Little River, thirty-
five feet below the bridge across the river. Cay would have had to cross the bridge in order to travel from
Jonesville to his home. Cay's body was found in a thicket of brambles and brush. The broken brush above
the body and the lack of a path through the brush at ground level indicated that Cay had fallen from the
bridge. There was no evidence suggesting suicide or foul play. There was evidence, however, that Cay,
who was wearing dark clothes, was walking on the wrong side of the road for pedestrian traffic and was
intoxicated. The bridge, built in 1978, was forty feet wide, with two twelve-foot lanes of travel and an
eight-foot shoulder on each side. The side railings were thirty-two inches high, the minimum height under
existing standards for bridges designed for vehicular traffic. There were no curbs, sidewalks or separate
railings for pedestrian traffic, although it was well known that many pedestrians had used the old bridge
to cross the river to communities and recreation areas on the other side.

Rule: Cause-in-fact is the initial inquiry in a duty-risk analysis. Cause-in-fact is usually a "but for" inquiry
which tests whether the injury would not have occurred but for a defendant's substandard conduct. The
cause-in-fact issue is usually a jury question unless reasonable minds could not differ.

Issue: Is a showing of preponderance of evidence a requirement in a negligence action?

Answer: Yes.

Conclusion: The court found that the department failed to build the bridge in accordance with standards
and that the failure was a cause-in-fact of the accidental fall. Accordingly, the court held that concurrent
fault in causing the accident rendered the department liable for damages, subject to a reduction for
contributory negligence. However, the court amended the judgment, concluding that the trial court
manifestly erred in allocating 60 percent of the fault to the department. The court amended to quantify
the decedent as 90 percent at fault and the department as 10 percent at fault. The court determined that
the decedent's intoxication and his negligence in failing to follow rules for pedestrian travel at night were
significant factors in his fall.

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466ab221a916&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fcases%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A3RX4-
8V10-003G-N3KW-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A3RX4-8V10-003G-N3KW-00000-
00&pdcontentcomponentid=7258&pdshepid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A7Y4P-2RF1-2NSF-C1FJ-00000-
00&pdteaserkey=sr0&pditab=allpods&ecomp=5ypck&earg=sr0&prid=b8b08865-a0b1-4a2e-9a26-
4fb90451d37d
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RX4-8V10-003G-N3KW-00000-00
Case Name: Edgewater Motels, Inc. v. Gatzke
Citation: 277 N.W.2d 11 (Minn. 1979)

Facts: The fire in question broke out on August 24, 1973, in a room at the Edgewater Motel in Duluth,
Minnesota, occupied by Arlen Gatzke. In July 1973, Gatzke, a 31-year Walgreen employee and then district
manager, spent approximately three weeks in Duluth supervising the opening of a new Walgreen's
restaurant. During that time, he stayed at the Edgewater Motel at Walgreen's expense. On about August
17, 1973, Gatzke returned to Duluth to supervise the opening of another Walgreen-owned
restaurant. Again, he lived at the Edgewater at the company's expense. While in Duluth, Gatzke normally
would arise at 6:00 a.m. and work at the restaurant from about 7:00 a.m. to 12:00 or 1:00 a.m. In addition
to working at the restaurant, Gatzke remained on call 24 hours per day to handle problems arising in other
Walgreen restaurants located in his district. Gatzke thought of himself as a "24 hour a day man." He
received calls from other Walgreen restaurants in his district when problems arose. He was allowed to
call home at company expense. His laundry, living expenses, and entertainment were items of
reimbursement. There were no constraints as to where he would perform his duties or at what time of
day they would be performed.

Rule: To support a finding that an employee's negligent act occurred within his scope of employment, it
must be shown that his conduct was, to some degree, in furtherance of the interests of his employer. An
act of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is done with no intention to perform it as a
part of or incident to a service on account of which he is employed. Other factors to be considered in the
scope of employment determination are whether the conduct is of the kind that the employee is
authorized to perform and whether the act occurs substantially within authorized time and space
restrictions. No hard and fast rule can be applied to resolve the "scope of employment" inquiry. Rather,
each case must be decided on its own individual facts.

Issue: Is the employer liable for its employee’s negligent cigarette smoking at the time of negligent act?
Answer: Yes.

Conclusion: The court held that an employer could be vicariously liable for its employee's negligent
cigarette smoking at the time of his negligent act. The court further held that it was reasonable for the
jury to find the employee acted within the scope of his employment while completing his expense report.
But the court affirmed the finding that providing plastic wastebaskets was contributorily negligent
because evidence that a person would dispose of a cigarette in a wastebasket provided a reasonable basis
for the jury's finding of proximate cause.

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8d85232ecca2&pdsearchterms=Edgewater+Motels%2C+Inc.+v.+Gatzke%2C+277+N.W.2d+11+(Minn.+
1979)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttyp
e=or&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=9b167756-ec07-4673-82fd-466ab221a916
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RRM-3280-003G-V42V-00000-00
Case Name: Cecarelli v. Maher
Citation: 12 Conn. Supp. 240 (1943)
Facts: The victim alleged that the assailants beat and assaulted him with intense ferocity to produce
serious physical consequences. As a result, the victim required emergency hospital treatment and a
complete restoration of the dental structures with the replacement of five teeth. In addition, the victim
was forced to absent himself from his employment for a complete week, experiencing acute pain for an
extended period after his return to work. The assailants were subsequently arrested, and they offered
guilty pleas to assault charges. A third assailant was unknown to the victim and his identity was never
disclosed.
Rule: A plaintiff may recover against a defendant for an intentional, harmful, and wrongful physical attack.
Issue: Is the plaintiff entitled to recover from defendant for intentional and harmful physical attack?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The court found that by way of special damage, the victim lost wages and was obligated to
expend for dental and medical treatment. To those damages, the court added a sum representing fair and
reasonable compensation for his pain, suffering, and permanent injury.

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5c4f4b9f740e&pdsearchterms=Cecarelli+v.+Maher%2C+12+Conn.+Supp.+240+(1943)&pdstartin=hlct
%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytem
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Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3X27-M760-00KR-F335-00000-00