RECITATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS OF
ATTY. ADONIS GABRIEL
Q: Is the fruit of the poisonous tree the same
as the exclusionary principle?
A: No. Under the exclusionary principle, it
presupposes that the primary evidence was
obtained in violation of constitutional
principles. Fruit of the poisonous tree refers
to derivative evidence, which means it was
derive from a poisonous tree which refers to
the primary evidence which was obtained in
violation of the constitutional principles.
Justice Frankfurter: Evidence excluded
would be considered as the primary evidence
and any evidence derived therefore is also
excluded.
*Prior to its inclusion to the Constitution, the
exclusionary principle is only applied in case
law.
Judge Learned Hand ( Stonehill v. Diokno)
“Only in case the prosecution which itself
controls the seizing officials, knows that it
cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be
repressed.”
Q: Is it not enough that sanctions will be
imposed on erring law enforcement officers?
A: It is not enough in order to procure the
violation of the constitutional guarantee. The
courts must exclude in order to strengthen the
constitutional guarantees.
Q: What are the different constitutional
guarantees in Sec.4 Art.3?
A: 1) Freedom of speech 2) Freedom of
expression 3) Freedom of the press 4)
Freedom of assembly 5) Freedom of petition
Q: Are these important constitutional
guarantees?
A: Yes. As the Supreme Court said in the case
of Bayan v. Ermita, ruled that the right of the
people to peaceably assemble and right of
people free speech, expression and the press is
included among the rights that are given the
Aila Nicko V. Santelices
preferential status and a right that enjoys the
primacy in the realm of constitutional
protection. These rights constitute the very
basis of a functional democratic polity, without
which all other rights would be meaningless
and unprotected.
Q: The Supreme Court said that all other rights
depend on these rights, without which all other
rights will fall. Why?
A: Without free speech, the right of due
process is a meaningless right. Without free
speech, the constitutional guarantees against
unreasonable searches and seizures will be
meaningless without the guarantees of free
speech.
Q: Why are they lodge only one constitutional
provision?
A: In the case of Reyes v. Bagatsing, it was
not by accident or coincidence that these rights
were coupled in a single guarantee because
these rights although not identical, they are
inseparable and they co exist.
Q: Does freedom of expression allows citizens
to discuss any subject matters without
censorship or punishment?
A: Allows only of matters of public concern
does not allow discussions beyond the realm of
public concern (private matters).
Q: Does the freedom of expression in general
exist for the protection of majority group or
popular group?
A: The freedoms of press, expression, speech,
assembly and petition are included among the
immunities reserved by the sovereign people.
In the rhetorical aphorisms of Justice
Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or
hate more than the ideas that we cherish.
According to Socrates, not only to protect the
minority who want to talk but also the majority
who refuse to listen. And as Justice Douglas
cogently stresses, liberties of one are liberties
of all. Liberties of one are not safe unless
liberties of all are protected.
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It does not exist for the majority group, for
they not need protection. What needs
protection is the minority. So much this
constitutional guarantees exist according to
Justice Holmes, for the ideas that we abhor or
hate with more than the ideas that we cherish.
Q: What is the importance of free movement of
ideas in a democratic institution?
A: Liberty of the expression of thoughts in so
doing, the Constitution values the public
opinion.
Q: Does the constitution protect criticisms on
the conduct of public officers?
A: Yes. As held in the case of U.S. v. Bustos,
The interest of society and the maintenance of
good government demand a full discussion of
public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on
the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the
case of free speech. The sharp incision of its
probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom.
Men in public life may suffer under hostile and
unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged
with the balm of a clear conscience. A public
officer must not be too thin skinned with
reference to comment upon his official acts.
Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of
the individual be exalted.
Q: How about criticisms on judicial officers?
A: Yes. The administration of the law is a
matter of vital public concern. Whether the law
is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit
subject to proper comment. If the people
cannot criticize a justice of peace or a judge
the same as any public officer, public opinion
will be effectively muzzled. Attempted
terrorization of public opinion on the part of
judiciary would be tyranny of the basest sort.
The sword of Damocles in the hands of a
judge does not hang suspended over the
individual who dares to assert his
prerogative as a citizen and to stand up
bravely before any official.
Q: Can judicial officers be criticized like all
other public officers?
Aila Nicko V. Santelices
A: In People v. Alarcon, Criticisms of
judgment of courts are protected by the
freedom of speech, but criticisms on matters
still pending with the court constitutes
contempt. As stated, the rule imported into
this jurisdiction is that newspaper publications
tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass,
or influence the courts in administering
justice in a pending suit or proceeding
constitute criminal contempt which is
summarily punishable by the courts; that
the rule is otherwise after the case is
ended.
Q: Are there any group of public individuals
that can be subjected to public criticisms in the
exercise of constitutional guarantee of free
speech?
A: Public figure. A public figure is defined as a
person who, by his accomplishments, fame or
mode of living, or by adopting a profession or
calling which gives the public a legitimate
interest in his doings, his affairs, and his
character, has become a public personage. He
is, in other words, a celebrity. (Ayer v.
Capulong)
Q; What are the three reasons that the
Supreme Court have given in the case of Ayer
v. Capulong in subjecting public figures to
public discussions?
A:
1) They had sought publicity and consented to
it, and so could not complain when they
received it
2) That their personalities and their affairs had
already become public and could no longer be
regarded as their own private business
3) That the press had a privilege, under the
Constitution, to inform the public about those
who have become legitimate matters of public
interest.
Q: May a citizen in his exercise of free speech
discuss the lifestyle of Janet Lim Napoles? Can
she be a subject of public discussion without
violating her constitutional right to privacy?
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She is neither a public officer nor a judicial
officer?
A: Yes. Applying the case of Borjal v. Court
of Appeals, the Supreme Court sustaining the
validity of the petitioners commentaries
because he is a private individual involved in a
public issue or national issue. So there are
three groups of individuals that can be
subjected to public discussion, criticisms a)
public officers b) public figures c) individuals
who are involved in national or public issues.
Q: How about motion pictures? Are they
protected speeches? Does it matter that the
motion pictures are for historical purposes or
for entertainment?
A: Motion pictures are important both as a
medium for the communication of ideas and
the expression of the artistic impulse. Their
effects on the perception by our people of
issues and public officials or public figures as
well as the prevailing cultural traits is
considerable. The importance of motion
pictures as an organ of public opinion lessened
by the fact that they are designed to entertain
as well as to inform. There is no clear dividing
line between what involves knowledge and
what affords pleasure. If such a distinction
were sustained, there is diminution of the basic
right of free expression.
Q: What are the unprotected speeches?
A: Nude, obscene, profane and fighting words,
libelous and which will bring about the danger
or risk in the society.
Q: What is obscene according to Supreme
Court in Pita v. Court of Appeals?
A: In Miller v. California, the Court
specifically laid down the guidelines on the test
of obscenity.
A)Whether an average person, applying
contemporary standards, would find the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest
Aila Nicko V. Santelices
B)Whether the work depicts or describes, in
patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law
C)Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious, literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value
Q: Are they conclusive?
A: No. The determination of the character of
the article or literary depends on the Court.
Definition of obscenity is a judicial question
which was to be determined by the factual
circumstances of every case.
Q: In Social Weather Stations v. COMELEC,
the Supreme Court applied O’Brien test as
distinguished from other test in determining
valid regulation of the free exercise clause,
what is the difference of this test among the
other test particularly the clear and present
danger rule, dangerous tendency test and
balance of interest test?
A: It is the most influential test to determine
whether the regulation is content based or
content neutral. It must be considered as the
canonical test according to the Supreme Court.
Q: What are the factors that must be
determined in weighing the validity of
government regulation under the O’Brien test?
A:
1)It is within the constitutional power of the
Government.
2)If it furthers an important or substantial
interest
3)If the governmental interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression
4)If the incidental restriction on alleged First
amendment freedoms of speech,expression
and press is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest
Q: The Supreme Court in the case of US v.
Bustos, said that the right to assembly and
petition is a necessary consequence of a
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republican institution and complimentary in
right of free speech, why?
A: The right to assemble and petition is the
necessary consequence of republican
institutions and complement of the right of free
speech. Assembly means a right on the part
of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation
in respect to public affairs. Petition means
that any person or group of persons can apply,
without fear of penalty, to the appropriate
branch or office of the government for a
redress of grievances. The persons assembling
and petitioning must, of course, assume
responsibility for the charges made.
Q: Right to assembly and petition is not an
absolute right. Supposing an ordinance
authorizes the municipal council to regulate the
use of public plaza, public streets, parks in
assemblies and petition. Does the authority
conferred with the ordinance on the local
government unit to regulate includes the
power to prohibit outright?
A: No. In Primicias v. Fugoso, the power
conferred on to the mayor may contemplate
two things, a) deny outright b) regulate the
manner, time and place. The Supreme Court
ruled that the provision of the said ordinance
only means that it does not confer upon the
Mayor the power to refuse to grant permit, but
only discretion, in issuing the permit, to
determine or specify the streets or public
places where the parade or procession may
pass or the meeting may be held.
*in presence of clear and present danger in
which the State has a right to prevent, the
local government may prevent a holding of
assembly and petition.
Q: Do students have a right to exercise this
constitutional guarantee, the right to assembly
and petition?
A: Yes. In Malabanan v. Ramento, the Court
citing Justice Fortas in Tinker v. De Moines
Community School District, “Students do
not shed their constitutional rights to freedom
of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate.”
Aila Nicko V. Santelices
Q: Sec. 4 of Article 3 can only be invoked
against the government because of the
expressed constitutional provision that says
“no law shall be passed abridging freedom of
speech (sic) and when we say no law it only
applies to the government only. So why did the
Supreme Court applied the freedom of
assembly and petition which is covered by
sec.4 art.3 in a private institution Malabanan
v. Ramento as well as in the case of PBM
Employees Association v. Philippine
Blooming Mills?
A:The Supreme Court only discuss the
provision in this cases in order to determine
the gravity of the penalty. In Malabanan v.
Ramento, the penalty is too heavy to penalize
an exercise a constitutional right. But
nonetheless, the Supreme Court has
recognized the authority of the school to
impose disciplinary sanctions only that it is too
heavy. In PBM Employees Association v.
Philippine Blooming Mills, Supreme Court
said that dismissal is too grave a penalty on
the exercise of the constitutional right. It is not
in order to determine whether these private
institutions can regulate freedom of expression
but in order to determine the penalty imposed
by these private institutions.
Q: This right to assembly and petition is a right
enjoyed by a group of people. Right to strike is
a concerted right. An individual cannot claim
assembly and petition? Right to strike?
A: Yes
Q: When can we say that the persons are
exercising a right to assembly and petition and
right to strike?
A: In Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals,
concerted action was declared as a strike
because they were raising their issues about
better pay, employment and they were engage
in strike against their employer, incidentally,
the government. The concerted action is to
raise employer/employee relationship issues.
PBM Employees Association v. Philippine
Blooming Mills, their petition is about the
abuses of the police. If the concerted effort is
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to bring about the issues in the government
which refer to general welfare, the concerted
effort is the exercise of petition and
assembly. Supreme Court held that in the
hierarchy of rights, freedom of expression is
primary over the property rights of the owner.
Q: When property rights can be regulated?
Right to assembly and petition?
A: Apply the two tests, lawful means and
lawful subject. If these two rights concur then
property rights can be regulated. In assembly
and petition, when there is a clear and present
danger of an evil the State has a right to
prevent.
Q: What is public assembly according to B.P.
880?
A: Public assembly means any rally,
demonstration, march, parade, procession or
any other form of mass or concerted action
held in a public place for the purpose of
presenting a lawful cause; or expressing an
opinion to the general public on any particular
issue; or protesting or influencing any state of
affairs whether political, economic or social; or
petitioning the government for redress of
grievances.
Q: Under B.P.880, may assemblies in private
places be considered as public assembly?
A: No, but nonetheless exempted from getting
a permit as long as there is consent of the
owner. (the definition is not within the
contemplation of public assembly in B.P. 880)
Q: What are the other public assemblies which
do not require a permit?
A: government owned and operated
educational institutions which only require the
compliance of the rules and regulations of the
school and assemblies in freedom parks in
which under B.P.880; it must be constituted
within six months from the validity of the law.
In Bayan v. Ermita, after 20 years, there are
only two freedom parks constituted by the
ordinance. The Supreme Court said, enough is
enough, in order to compel them, after 30
Aila Nicko V. Santelices
days if the local government unit does not
establish a freedom park, all public parks
within that local government unit can be used
as Freedom Park and no permit shall be
required to hold public assemblies.
Q: Under B.P. 880 where should the permit be
secured?
A: It should be filed in the mayor’s office five
working days prior to the assembly and should
be acted upon two to three working days
otherwise the permit is deemed granted. But
the action of the city government shall be
communicated to the applicant within 24 hours
after the 2-3 days period otherwise they may
conduct assembly without a permit.
Q: Supposing the Office of the Mayor knows
that when it accepts the application the two
day period to act on the application starts so
the Mayor knowing this legal obligations under
the law instructed his secretary saying
“whenever an application is filed for a permit
to hold a rally do not accept it so the two day
period will not start to run.” So what is the
recourse of the applicant?
A: The application must be posted in the office
of the mayor and that will be considered as
filed.
Q: Law discourages the participation of law
enforcement officers in public assemblies. But
the presence may be contained in order to
maintain the safety and security. Under the
law, how far should the law enforcement
officers from the participants of public
assemblies?
A: It should not be less than 100 meters.
Q: Supposing there was already a sign of
violence, what should the police officers do?
A: Under B.P.880, after the police officers can
disperse the rally there must be three notices
that must be issued. At the first sign of
looming violence, the officer should notify the
organizers. If the violence persist that causes
danger and damage to property, the officer
shall issue a second warning to stop it but if it
Page 5
continues the third warning and that warning is
to disperse.
Q: Supposing the public assembly was
attended by violence, does it make it unlawful?
A: No. It would only make the persons who
committed violent act culpable of violation of
law but assembly is still lawful.
Q: Is B.P.880 content based or content
neutral? Why?
A: It is content neutral. B.P.880 is not an
absolute ban of public assemblies but a
restriction that simply regulates the time, place
and manner of assemblies.
A fair and impartial reading of B.P.880 thus
readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public
assemblies that would use public places. The
reference lawful cause does not make it
content based because assemblies really have
to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would
not be “peaceable” and entitled to protection.
Neither are the words opinion, protesting
nor influencing in the definition of public
assembly content based, since they can refer
to any subject. The words petitioning for
redress of grievances come from the
wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot
be avoided.
Q: Supposing instead of the maximum
tolerance mandated by law in regulating public
assembly the President mandates the law
enforcement officers to use calibrated
preemptive response can that pass
constitutional challenge?
A: The Supreme Court said in Bayan v.
Ermita that CPR has no place in the legal
firmament and must be struck down as
darkness that shrouds freedom.
Q: What is religion?
A: Religion is a profession of faith to an active
power that binds and elevates man to his
Creator. (Aglipay v. Ruiz)
Q: A system of belief that does not espouse a
belief in the Supreme Being is not a religion?
Aila Nicko V. Santelices
A: No. In the case of Estrada v. Escritor, the
Supreme Court cited a decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court which espouses a non theistic
concept of religion as long as there are 4
factors that must concur in order that a system
of belief may be considered as religion and
these are
1)Belief in God or parallel belief that takes a
place in the believer’s life.
2)Demonstrable degree of sincerity without
delving in to the truthfulness of the belief.
3)It must involve a moral code
4)Associational ties
Q: Section 5 of Art. 3 establishes two
important religious clauses and these are?
A: Non establishment of religion clause and
free exercise clause
Q: What does non establishment clause mean?
A: Non establishment clause prohibits the
government from favoring one religion or
favoring all religion and discriminating one
religion or discriminating against all religion.
Q: Any use of public funds or property with
some religious color is prohibited by the
Constitution?
A: No. In Aglipay v. Ruiz, the stamps were
made for a secular activity in which the
Supreme Court ruled that it only tends to
promote the site of National Eucharistic
Congress and not any religious activity. It only
used the activity in order to promote a secular
activity to promote tourism.
Q: Is the purchase of the wooden image of
patron saint violates the principle of the
Church and State?
A: No. In the case of Garces v. Estenzo, the
funds used for the acquisition of the image
was from private funds and does not directly or
indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge
religious liberty, nor appropriate money for the
benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman.
Page 6
Q: What are the two aspects of religious
freedom according to the Supreme Court in
Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals?
A:
1)Freedom to Believe- the individual is free to
believe or disbelieve as he pleases concerning
the hereafter.(absolute as long as it remains
within the realm of thought)
2)Freedom to act on One’s Beliefs- where the
individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or
omissions that affect the public, his freedom to
do so becomes subject to the authority of the
State.
Q:In Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals,
petitioner contends that its shows cannot be
reviewed by MTRCB because they are merely
exercising their religious freedom, did the
Supreme Court agree?
A: Supreme Court citing Justice Frankfurter,
the constitutional provision on religious
freedom terminated disabilities, it did not
create new privileges. It gave religious liberty,
not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from
conformity to religious dogma, not freedom
from conformity to law because of religious
dogma. Mere invocation of religious freedom
will not exempt the activity from governmental
regulation.
Q: Petitioner contends the issue regarding on
attacks on another religion is between the two
religions so the State should not interfere. Did
the Supreme Court agree?
A: No. When religion divides and its exercise
destroys, the State should not stand still. In
Taruc v. Dela cruz and Fonacier v. Court of
Appeals, the Supreme Court ruled that there
is only one aspect of religion that the State
cannot interfere, that is doctrinal and
disciplinary. In Fonacier case the issue there
is who among the two groups is the duly
elected leader. The Court interfered because it
involves property rights. In Taruc case, the
issue is the validity of the expulsion of the
member who disobeyed the order of the
elders, the Court did not interfere because the
Aila Nicko V. Santelices
disciplinary matters are governed by internal
rules.
Q: What would be the test to be applied in
order the religious freedom be regulated by the
State?
A: Clear and present danger test and
Compelling State interest test can be applied
simultaneously.
Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals and
American Bible Society v. City of Manila, in
these two cases they apply clear and present
danger test because apart from religious
freedom there are other constitutional rights
involve, religious freedom is invoked in
conjunction with another constitutional rights
like freedom of speech, press and expression.
In Estrada v. Escritor case pure and
exclusive use of religious freedom. The
Compelling State Interest test is applied
because where the conduct is involved for the
whole gamut of human conduct has different
interest; some effects may be immediate and
short term while others delayed and far
reaching.
Q: What are the three questions that must be
asked in applying the Compelling Interest test?
A:
1)Has the statute or government action
created a burden on the free exercise of
religion?
2)Is there a sufficiently compelling state
interest to justify this infringement of religious
liberty?
3)Has the state in achieving its legitimate
purposes used the least intrusive means
possible so that the free exercise is not
infringed any more than necessary to achieve
the legitimate goal of the state?
Q: In Estrada v. Escritor, may these
objectives of the laws be able to be achieved
other than prohibiting the religious beliefs of
the respondents?
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A: In the case at bar, the State has not
evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the
concubinage or bigamy charges against
respondent or her partner. The state has never
sought to prosecute respondent nor her
partner. The state’s asserted interest thus
amounts only to the symbolic preservation of
unenforced prohibition.
Q: Can the government prevent the
distribution of religious articles?
A: In the case of American Bible Society v.
City of Manila, imposing tax on religious
activity violates the constitutional guarantee of
religious freedom. Supreme Court ruled that
the power to tax in exercise of privilege is
power to control or suppress the enjoyment of
a right. The right becomes meaningless,
useless and at times burdensome if the
government imposes the same in the
enjoyment of the right.
Q: Religious organizations are exempt from
taxation?
A: Incidental use not exempted
Q: Can the government require the priests and
ministers to pass the government qualification
test?
A: No because no religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil and political
rights.
Q: Compensation of priest exempted from
taxation?
A: Privilege of accepting the compensation
(excise tax) not exempted to tax. Lladoc v.
CIR
Q: What is right of Liberty of abode?
A: The right to choose once residence and to
leave it whenever he pleases.
Q: How would it be impaired?
A: Law may limit this guarantee and upon
lawful order of court
Aila Nicko V. Santelices
Q: Supposing A purchase a lot in city of manila
but unfortunately the City of Manila classified
the area as highly industrialized area. Can A
insist to build his home in spite the
classification of the local government unit?
A: No. Law may limit the guarantee of liberty
of abode
Q: In Villavicencio v. Lukban, is the liberty of
abode violated?
A: Without a law implementing that, although
with noblest intention the conduct of mayor is
illegal. For ours is government of laws and not
of men.
Q: Right to travel within the Philippines is
covered by the constitutional right to travel?
A: Yes
Q: Right to return to one’s country is covered
by the international human rights and on
political and civil rights?
A: Right to return to one’s country is not
among the rights specifically guaranteed in the
Bill of Rights, which treats only one of the
liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is
our well considered view that the right to
return may be considered as a generally
accepted principle of international laws and
under our Constitution, is part of the law of the
land. (Doctrine of incorporation)
Q: Why did the Supreme Court make a
distinction if the right to travel and right to
return is both an exercisable right in our
Constitution?
A: It is distinct and separate from the right to
travel and enjoys different protection under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.
Q: What is a residual power?
A: Excess powers granted by the Constitution
to the President. Powers that are neither
executive, legislative nor judicial in character
and inherent in the government.
Page 8
Q: May the right to travel be impaired? What
are the factors that can impair right to travel?
A: Yes. Right to travel may be impaired by the
interest of national security, public safety, or
public health as may be provided by law.
Q: What is the meaning of the phrase “as may
be provided by law”?
A: Law. There must be a law impairing the
right to travel. The impairment in the case of
Marcos v. Manglapus would be invalid if
there is no law conferring such impairment.
Administrative officers have no right to impair.
There must be a law.
Had the Supreme Court considered the
difference between right to return in the
country and right to travel, the order of the
President impairing the right to return is invalid
because there is no law conferring the
President to impair in the interest of national
security, public safety or public health. Since it
is not included but covered by a different
protection under the international law, this
order is a valid impairment to return to one’s
country because while right to return to one’s
country is accorded in International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, these rights cannot
be impaired arbitrarily. These rights can be
impaired only if there’s legal basis. The
impairment of the right to return to one’s
country imposed by the President is valid as
long as there is a legal basis or grounds. As
different from right to travel that can be
impaired only in interest of national security,
public safety or public health or as may be
provided by law.
Q: Supposing a former President wishes to
seek medical attention in France, Italy,
Singapore and Japan. But there are pending
criminal complaints against her before the
Office of the Ombudsman. The Office of the
Ombudsman is conducting preliminary
investigation in order to determine whether
there is a probable cause to initiate information
against the former President. There was no
information filed yet for violation of law. But
because of the intention of the President to
Aila Nicko V. Santelices
leave the Philippines, Secretary of Justice
issued a department secular prohibiting her to
leave the Philippines. On the basis of secular
no. 41, she issued a hold departure order or
lookout order. Is the right involve include the
right to travel? Is the order of Justice
Secretary a valid impairment of right to travel?
(Arroyo v. De Lima)
A: Yes. It is invalid because there is no law
conferring the Secretary of Justice to impair
the right to travel.
Q: What is the basis why the authority of the
courts to impair the right to travel was
recognized by the Supreme Court
notwithstanding the fact that the 1987
Constitution no longer includes the phrase
“lawful order of the court.”?
A: In Silverio v. Court of Appeals, Art 3
sec.6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no
means be construed as delimiting the inherent
power of the Courts to use all means necessary
to carry their orders into effect in criminal
cases pending before them. When by law
jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial
officer, all auxiliary writs, process and other
means necessary to carry it into effect may be
employed by such Court or officer.
Q: May a person released on bail cannot leave
the country? Is this a valid impairment?
A: Yes the right to travel is impaired. The
person is prevented to leave the Philippines.
Q: In Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,
The public respondent contends that there is a
need for implementing legislation before this
constitutional right be exercised. Did the
Supreme Court agree?
A: The right to information on matters of public
concern is a self executing right. They supply
the rules by means of which the right to
information may be enjoyed by guaranteeing
the right and mandating the duty to afford
access to sources of information.
Q: Petitioner contends that they are not self
executing because of the phrase “as may be
provided by law” that can be found in sec.7
Page 9
art.3 and sec.28 art.2, what does “as may be
provided by law” means?
A: It means that the legislature may provide
reasonable conditions and limitations upon the
access to be afforded which must, of necessity,
be consistent with the declared State policy of
full public disclosure of all transactions
involving public interest.
Q: In Province of Cotabato v. The
Government of the RP Peace Panel on
Ancestral Domain, the Supreme Court ruled
that the right to information is in splendid
symmetry with the constitutional guarantee of
public disclosure, why?
A: The Supreme Court ruled that the policy of
full disclosure enunciated in sec.28
art.(people’s guarantee) complements the
right to access information on matters of public
concern because the right to information
guarantees the right of the people to demand
information while sec.28 recognizes the duty of
officialdom to give information even if nobody
demands. Indubitably, the effectivity of the
policy of public disclosure need not await the
passing of a statute.
Q: If the guarantee of the government is not
present do you think that the right to
information is still meaningful?
A: No. if the individuals claim the right and
that there is no guarantee that the government
would disclose such information then it would
be meaningless.
Q: In Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,
there must be questions asked and be
answered and these questions are?
1)Being a public concern or one that involves
public interest
2)Not being exempted by law from the
operation of the constitutional guarantee
Q: Does the right to information include the
right to demand copies or to demand
summaries?
Aila Nicko V. Santelices
A: In Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr., the
Supreme Court ruled that although citizens are
afforded the right to information and, pursuant
thereto, are entitled to access to official
records, the constitution does not accord them
a right to compel custodians of official records
to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the
like in their desire to acquire information on
matters of public concern. It is essential for a
writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant
has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right
to the thing demanded and that it is imperative
duty of defendant to perform the act required.
Q: Only law or legislative act can exclude a
particular information or transaction from
public inspection?
A: Yes and does not cover administrative
regulations. Administrative agencies which are
the custodian of the information has only the
authority to regulate access in order to end
that damage to or loss of public records
may be avoided, undue interference with
the duties of said agencies may be
prevented and the exercise of the same
constitutional right by other person shall
be assured.
Q: As you said earlier, there must be a law in
order to prohibit the release of information but
in the case of In Re: Production of court
records and documents and the
attendance of court officials and
employees as witnesses under the
subpoenas of February 10,2012 and the
various letters for the impeachment
prosecution panel dated January 19 and
25 2012, does it mean that the ruling of
Supreme Court is unconstitutional because in
this case the Court prohibit outright the release
of information?
A: No. The Supreme Court ruled that they
cannot disclose the information because of
deliberative process privilege; it is not
based on law but is based on legal principle,
the Principle of Comity. Any information that
is within the internal judicial function is not
subject for a subpoena.
Page 10
Apart from the restriction of the Congress,
there are other restrictions that are imposable.
There are acceptable restrictions.
Q: May an administrative agency which is a
custodian of an information issue a regulation
that only certified true copies can be inspected
and not the original?
A: Yes. In order to end that damage to or
loss of public records may be avoided.
Q: May an administrative agency impose a
regulation that the inspection of the materials
can be viewed only at 8-12 noon? What
purpose?
A: Yes. The purpose is undue interference
with the duties of said agencies may be
prevented.
Q: How about the viewing of the said material
is one hour per person?
A: Yes. So that exercise of the same
constitutional right by other person shall
be assured.
Q: In the case of Chavez v. PCGG, the
Supreme Court ruled that there are four
groups of information or transaction that are
excluded from right to information, what are
these four groups?
A: 1) National security matters 2) Trade
secrets and banking transactions 3) Criminal
matters 4) Other confidential information
(diplomatic correspondence, closed door
cabinet meetings, executive sessions of either
house of Congress and internal deliberations of
the Supreme Court)
Q: Why are criminal matters excluded?
A:Criminal matters such as those relating to
apprehension, the prosecution and detention of
criminals are excluded because efforts and
effective law enforcement would be seriously
jeopardized by free public access to, for
example, police information regarding rescue
operation, the whereabouts of the fugitives, or
leads an covert criminal activities.
Aila Nicko V. Santelices
Q: sec.28 art.2 and sec.7 art.3 both cover
transactions, does transaction as a guaranteed
right to information covers not consummated
transactions?
A: Yes. In the case of Chavez v. PCGG and
Province of Cotabato v. RP peace panel on
Ancestral domain, the court ruled that it is
not required that the transaction shall be fully
consummated so that the people can exercise
their right to information and have access to
this information. If the people have to wait for
the consummation of the transaction, it would
be too late for them to nullify or to rescind or
voice out their concern regarding the
transaction.
Q: Does the right to information include the
steps leading to the consummation? Are they
allowed to have access in the information?
A: Yes. In Chavez v. PCGG, the Supreme
Court ruled that it is incumbent upon the PCGG
and its officers, as well as other government
representatives to disclose sufficient public
information on any proposed settlement they
have decided to take up with ostensible owners
and holders of ill gotten wealth.
Q: Congress can prohibit some information
from the exercise of right of information. So
whenever there is a law exempting an
information or transaction from public
disclosure, the right to information can no
longer be exercised? Is the right to information
can be defeated by any legislative act?
A: No. any law which restricts or impairs the
right to information is issued in the exercise of
police power because it regulates liberty we
should apply the two test, lawful subject and
lawful means. In the case of Echagaray v.
Secretary of Justice, the Supreme Court
ruled that the requirement of confidentiality of
the contents of the manual even with respect
to the convict is unduly suppressive. It sees no
legal impediment for the convict should he so
desire to obtain a copy of the manual. The
contents of the manual are matters of public
concern which the public may want to know,
either because these directly affect their lives
Page 11
or simply because such matters naturally regardless of religious beliefs, he must be a
arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. member of the collective bargaining union.
However, RA 3550 introduced an
Q: Under sec.8 of art.3 applies to all persons exception that it excludes ipso jure from
whether working or jobless? the application and coverage of the closed
shop agreement the employees belonging
A: The right to association can only be enjoyed
to any religious sects which prohibit
by working individuals.
affiliation of their members with any labor
organization.
Q: Is the right to association in private sector
the same in public sector?
Q: What if a member of the union does not
agree to the CBA and if he will not sign he’ll
A: The right to strike is not available in public
lose his job, how can you cure this defect?
sector. In the case of SSS Employees
Association v. Court of Appeals,
A: CBA is contract between the union officers
memorandum circular no. 6 series of 1987
and the management. All CBAs are required to
issued by the civil service commission in
be ratified by the members.
relation on executive order no. 1, prohibits the
conduct of strike regardless whether proprietal Q: As we said earlier, in the case of
or governmental function. Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Worker’s
Union, the right to associate includes the right
Q: Why does the law prohibit government
not to associate and that is the premise,
employees the right to strike?
however in the case of In re: Matter of the
IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of
A: As held in the case of Alliance of
Atty. Marcial Edilion, the petitioner herein
Government Workers v. Minister of Labor,
invoked the premise enunciated in the case of
the Court ruled that since the terms and
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Worker’s
conditions of government employment are
Association, how did the Supreme Court
fixed by law, government workers cannot use
ruled?
the same weapons employed by workers in the
private sector to secure concessions from their
A: The Supreme Court ruled that integration
employers. In private sector, industrial peace
does not make a lawyer a member of any
cannot be secured by compulsion by law.
group of which he is not already a member. He
Relations between private employers and their
become a member of the Bar when he passed
employees rest on essentially voluntary basis.
the Bar examinations.
The terms and conditions of employment in the
unionized private sector are settled through Atty. Gabriel: I beg to disagree. A person
the process of collective bargaining. In automatically becomes a member of the Bar
government employment, it is the legislature upon passing the examination, but he does not
and where properly given delegated power, the become automatically a member of an
administrative heads of government which fix integrated bar. Membership in the Bar and
the terms and conditions of employment. Integrated Bar are two different things. Before
you can get your roll of attorney’s number, you
Q: Right to associate includes the right not to
should be a member of the Integrated bar. For
associate, is this absolute?
you to be a member, you should pay
membership dues. Is that tantamount in
A: No. The legal protection granted to such
compelling or coercing one to join?
right from not joining is withdrawn by
operation of law, where a labor union and an
Atty. Gabriel: The Supreme Court should have
employer have agreed on a closed shop. By
attack the issue in this tenor, like any
virtue thereof, of a closed shop agreement
constitutional right, right to associate is not
before enactment of R.A. no. 3550 if an
absolute. It may be regulated by the state.
employee who wishes to be still an employee

Aila Nicko V. Santelices Page 12

Supreme Court is given the authority under
sec.5 par.5 of Art.8 of the Constitution to
regulate the Integrated bar or practice of law.
In that regard, even if the right to associate
includes the right not to associate, this right
may be impaired by the Supreme Court in the
exercise of its rule making power as
guaranteed by the Constitution instead of
skirting in the issue.
Q: What is impairment according to Supreme
Court in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workers Association?
A: Any statute which introduces a change in
express terms of the contract, or its legal
construction, or its validity, or its discharge, or
the remedy for its enforcement, impairs the
contract.
Q: Is the extent of the change in the contract
relative in determining the impairment of the
contract?
A: In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers
Association, the Supreme Court held that the
extent of change is not material. It is not a
question of degree or manner or cause, but of
encroaching in any respect on its obligation or
dispensing with any part of its force. There is
an impairment of the contract if either party is
absolved by law from its performance.
Q: Does non impairment of contract prohibit all
changes?
A: No. Permissible changes are reasonable
changes.
Q: Why did the Constitution guarantee that it
will not interfere in contractual relationship?
What is the interest of the government in
maintaining the integrity of the contracting
parties?
A: They should be respected by the legislature
and not tampered with by subsequent laws
that will change the intention of the parties or
modify their rights and obligations to respect
the integrity of valid contractual agreements
entered into by the contracting parties. Right
Aila Nicko V. Santelices
to non impairment of contract does not
preclude the government from introducing a
change, as long as it is reasonable.
Q: In the cases of Rutter v. Esteban and
Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Feati
Bank & Trust Co., what are the two
justifications that made the government vary
the contract of the stipulating parties as given
by the Supreme Court?
A: 1) In every arrangement all existing laws
are deemed included to the extent that the
parties cannot stipulate such agreements
which are contrary to law public moral, health
or public policy.
2)All contracts are made subject to an implied
reservation of the protective power of the state
Q: In Rutter v. Esteban, the Supreme Court
exercises the police power in interfering to the
contractual relationship by virtue of
moratorium law. Generally, are all moratorium
laws valid as an impairment of obligations and
contracts? Moratorium laws are constitutional?
A: Yes, provided that the period of extent is
definite and reasonable.
Q: Applying these conditions in the case of
Rutter v. Esteban, did the Supreme Court
sustain the validity of moratorium law?
A: No. The period of the suspension is
unreasonable. While the purpose of congress is
plausible and should be commended, the relief
accorded works injustice to the creditors who
are practically left at the mercy of the debtors.
Their hope to effect collection becomes
extremely remote, more so if the credits are
unsecured and the injustice is more patent
when, ender the law, the debtor is not even
required to pay interest during the operation of
relief. Nonetheless the Supreme Court
sustained that the authority of the government
in interfering in the exercise of police power in
Rutter v. Esteban and Ortigas v. Feati
Bank are examples of police power that may
validly interfere in contractual relationship.
Example in exercise of Eminent domain
Page 13
A entered in a contract of lease with B of 10
years. Government conducted expropriation
proceedings on the land of B with payment of
just compensation, the parties cannot invoke
their contractual stipulations.
Power of taxation
A entered on contract of lease with B, payment
of 5000 a month and 10% vat for ten years.
Congress enacted a law increasing the vat
from 10% to 12%. The parties cannot invoke
their stipulations on the contract.
Q: Under Sec.10 of Art.3 it is specifically stated
that “no law impairing obligations and
contracts shall be passed” does the term law
refer only to legislative acts?
A: No. The “law” includes statutes enacted by
the national legislature, executive orders and
administrative regulations promulgated under
a valid delegation of power, and municipal
ordinances passed by local legislative bodies. It
does not include judicial decisions or
adjudications made by administrative bodies in
the exercise of their quasi judicial powers.
Q: In the case of Ganzon v. Inserto, the
court promulgated a decision, changing the
security from mortgage to surety because it is
not covered by constitutional guarantee, is it a
valid exercise of judicial discretion?
A: No, all laws passed by Congress, issuance of
orders by virtue of the ordinance power of the
President, decisions of the Courts are included.
The substitution would in effect change the
terms and conditions of the mortgage contract,
thus will invalidly impair it.
Q: Under Sec.11 Art.3, the Constitution
guarantees that persons shall be given a right
to free access to court. Does it mean when
people go to court to seek legal remedies they
cannot be assess any filing fees because
Constitution says, “free access to courts”?
A: No. It only means that without
discrimination, any person can go to court to
seek legal remedy. Free access does not imply
that courts cannot assess fees.
Aila Nicko V. Santelices
Q: May the rules of court and laws exempting
indigent litigants to from paying filing fees can
be applied to corporate entities?
A: No. In the case of In Re: query of Mr.
Roger Prioreschi, the Supreme Court ruled
that Good Shepherd Foundation, being a
corporation invested by the State with a
juridical personality separate and distinct from
that of its members. It has a power to acquire
and possess property of all kinds as well as
incur obligations. As a juridical person, it
cannot be accorded the exemption from legal
and filing fees granted to indigent clients. For
the reason that they are working for
underprivileged and indigent is of no moment.
The Constitution has explicitly premised the
free access clause on a person’s poverty, a
condition that only a natural person can
suffer.
Q: What is custodial investigation (in custody
interrogation)?
A: It is the questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way.
(People v. Judge Ayson)
Q: Applying this in the case of Gamboa v.
Cruz, wherein the petitioner participated in a
police lineup in the custody of the police, which
means that custodial investigation, has begun?
A: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the
accused herein was not interrogated yet by the
Q: In the case of People v. Bolanos, when
does custodial investigation begin?
A: Custodial investigation begins when the
investigation or interrogation ceases to be a
general inquiry to an unsolved crime but focus
to a specific person as a suspect.
Q: Applying the definition of custodial
investigation in the case of People v. Judge
Ayson and part when custodial begins in
People v. Bolanos, we can say that there are
two conditions wherein custodial investigation
is deemed to have been complied on when?
Page 14
A: Law enforcement takes custody over the
suspect and the officers starts to ask question
involving the subject of offense and focus on
suspect as person of interest.
Q: Supposing officer A is investigating an
incident involving the death of B, B died of stab
wounds on February 1, 2014 at 10 in the
evening, and all leads in the investigation
points to C as the suspect. Police officer A
when to the house of C introduce himself as an
officer and said that he is investigating the
death of B and all said that all the information
that he has gathered may have something to
do with the incident. A asked C if he could
come in to the house of C and ask questions
that may shed light to the incident. C said “
yes but do you mind because I still have to
finish my chores while you are conducting your
investigation” , A agreed. Under the factual
circumstances, Officer A conducted an
investigation and because of his effectiveness
he was able to obtain a confession from C
without benefit of a counsel and without
informing him of his Miranda rights. Is the
confession admissible? Is that part of custodial
investigation?
A: It was already part of custodial investigation
because the officer already started to ask
questions pertaining to the crime that occurred
and ceases to be only a general inquiry. It is
not admissible as evidence for it violated Sec.
12 Art.3, confession was made during in a
custodial investigation without the benefit of a
counsel.
Q: Officer A is conducting an investigation of
the death of B who died because of stab
wounds on Feb.1,2014. C was invited to the
police precinct in order to shed light on the
death of B. Is the invitation part of custodial
investigation? What does Art. 7438 provides
regarding the custodial investigation?
A: It provides that custodial investigation
includes the practice includes the issuing of
invitation. The person suspected of crime in
connection of the investigation of which is
suspected to have been committed. It is not
required that the taking custody of the person
is mandatory or compulsory it may be made
Aila Nicko V. Santelices
through voluntary action on the part of the
suspect.
Q: Continuing the factual circumstances, C
went to precinct voluntarily and Officer A
started to ask questions, so the first question
is “how are you this morning? How’s the crime
rate in your baranggay? Where were you at
10:00 in the evening of Feb.1,2014?” based on
these three questions when can we say that
the custodial investigation begun?
A: Question 3. Custodial investigation begins
when police officers started to ask specific
questions regarding the crime.
Q: In People v. Judge Ayson Supreme Court
divided these proceedings in two phases and
after dividing these two phases the Supreme
Court supplant the specific constitutional rights
pertaining to these two phases so first what
are the two phases in legal proceedings?
A: First phase: Before the case is filed in court
(custodial investigation phase)
Second phase: After the case is filed court
(Sec.14)
Q: What are the constitutional rights subjected
in the custodial investigation? Section 12
A: 1)Right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice
2)Right to be informed of his rights
3)Not to be subjected to violence, force, threat
or intimidation or any means which vitiates the
free will shall be used against him. Secret
detention places, solitary in communicado, or
other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
4)To have evidence obtained in the violation of
these rights excluded as evidence
Q: Right of a person under custodial
investigation is deemed to be incorporated
through importation, the Miranda Rights which
is penned by Justice Warren. Is the Miranda
Rights in the case of Miranda v. Arizona co
Page 15
extensive (same span of protection) of a rights
of a person under custodial investigation?
A: Art. 12 Art.3 of the 1987 Constitution is
broader than the Miranda rights because the
exclusionary principle under the Constitution is
different from the Miranda rights because in
the Constitution it is broader.
Q: Are the rights under custodial investigation
a waivable right?
A: Right to remain silent. After the warnings
have been given, such opportunity afforded
him, the individual may knowingly and
intelligently waive these rights and agree to
answer or make a statement.
Q: In People v. Macam, the accused prior to
this requirement that he participates in police
lineup proceedings was already questioned can
he be required to participate in police lineup
proceedings without according him his
constitutional right. The accused herein were
already interrogated in the factory of the father
of the accused and police officers already
asked them about the involvement in the said
crime prior to being presented in the hospital.
One of the issues in the case is that whether or
not the uncounseled identification is admissible
in evidence?
A: When prior to the police lineup if there has
been a interrogation then the police lineup is
deemed to be included in custodial
investigation. (People v. Macam)
Q: How about public investigations are these
part of custodial investigation?
A: No. In the case of Navallo v.
Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court ruled
that a person under a normal audit
examination is not under custodial
investigation. An audit examiner himself can
hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement
officer contemplated in Sec.12.
Q: Is the spontaneous statement not elicited
through questioning is part of custodial
investigation?
Aila Nicko V. Santelices
A: In the case of People v. Dy, the Supreme
Court ruled that the declaration of an accused
acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged
may be given in evidence against him. Any
person, otherwise competent as a witness, who
heard the confession, is competent to testify as
to the substance of what he heard if he heard
and understood all of it.
Atty. Gabriel: Any vitiated consent including
confession and admission without
voluntariness cannot be admitted in any courts
of justice because of the lack of consent. This
was the issue in the case of People v. Andan
wherein the accused confessed to the Mayor.
The Supreme Court ruled that when the
appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant
and not as a law enforcement officer, his
uncounselled confession to him did not violate
his constitutional rights. Constitutional
procedures on custodial investigation do
not apply to a spontaneous statement not
elicited through questioning by
authorities, but given in an ordinary
manner whereby appellant orally
admitted having committed the crime.
Q: One of the constitutional rights under
custodial investigation is that he must be
informed of his rights meaning the right to
remain silent and to counsel. Is it enough to
read only the rights enshrined in Sec.12 Art.3?
A: In People v. Pinlac, the Supreme Court
ruled that when the Constitution requires a
person under investigation “to be informed” of
his right to remain silent and to counsel, it
must be presumed to contemplate the
transmission of a meaningful information
rather than just the ceremonial and
perfunctory recitation of an abstract
constitutional principle.
Q: Does custodial investigation include
reenactment? In People v. Pinlac, the
accused was forced to reenact the crime. The
prosecution contends that the reenactment
was voluntarily made although without a
counsel.
A: Yes. Any uncounselled re enactments are
inadmissible as evidence. Before requiring an
Page 16
accused to reenact the incident, he must be
accorded with the constitutional right under
custodial investigation.
Q: What is the difference between exclusionary
principle and fruit of poisonous tree?
A: In People v. Alicando, primary evidence is
the confession is the tree and the derivative
evidence is the fruit.
Fruit of poisonous tree connotes that evidences
that can only be excluded are secondary
evidence. How about evidences obtained from
secondary evidence?
A: Yes. The principle that will be applied is the
exclusionary principle. Once tainted with
illegality, it cannot produce admissible
evidence.
Q: What is bail?
A: Bail is a security given for the release of a
person in custody of law, furnished by him or a
bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before
any court as required under the conditions
hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in the
form of corporate surety, property bond,
cash deposit, or recognizance.
Reason: To ensure that he appears before the
proper court at the scheduled time and place
to answer the charges brought against him and
her. (Basco v. Rapatalo)
Q: What are the four mandatory provisions
under sec.2 of Rule 114?
a)Undertaking shall be effective upon approval,
and unless cancelled, shall remain in force at
all stages of the case until promulgation of the
judgment of the RTC, irrespective of whether
the case was originally filed in or appealed to
it;
b)The accused shall appear before the proper
court whenever required
c)The failure of the accused to appear at the
trial without justification and despite due
process shall be deemed a waiver of his right
Aila Nicko V. Santelices
to be present thereat. In such case, the trail
may proceed in absentia.
d)Bondsman shall surrender the accused to the
court of execution for final judgment
Q: May an accused who is not arrested can
apply for bail?
A: Yes. When a person is in custody of law,
custody of law does not mean that he is being
arrested.
Q: Ordinarily, bail is posted by an accused. The
right to bail in criminal proceedings can be
availed only by an accused. May the court
impose bail to a person who is not an accused?
A: Yes. Under Sec. 14 of Rule 119, “When the
court is satisfied, upon proof or oath, that
a material witness will not testify when
required, it may upon motion of either
party, order the witness to post bail in
such sum as may be deemed proper. Upon
refusal to post bail, the court shall commit
him to prison until he complies or is
legally discharged after his testimony has
been taken.
Q: Does it violate Sec.13 Art. 3 because the
right to post bail was accorded only those
persons who are accused?
A: (NO ANSWER)
Q: What are the four fold duties of the court?
A: In Basco v. Rapatalo, the Supreme Court
laid down the four fold duties of the court;
1)Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation
2)Conduct a hearing for the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution
refuses to present evidence to show that the
guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its sound
discretion
3)Decide whether the evidence of the guilt of
the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution.
Page 17
4)If the guilt of the accused is not strong,
discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bail bond
Q: It appears that this four fold obligation
applies only when bail is a matter of discretion.
When bail is a matter of right it does not
apply?
A: No, another reason why hearing for petition
for bail was for the fixing of amount of bail.
After the hearing, the court’s order granting or
refusing bail must contain a summary of
evidence for the prosecution. On the basis
thereof, the judge should then formulate his
own conclusion as to whether the evidence so
presented is strong enough as to indicate the
guilt of the accused.
Q: Supposing an accused charged with an
offense punishable by Prision Mayor, the name
of the accused is Juan Zobel De Ayala,
information was transmitted to court, the court
noted that the name of the accused is striking
with the impression that the latter is a very
rich person. The court thinks that it is proper
to impose an amount of P100,000,000.00
considering he is a Zobel De Ayala, in that
regard I am rest assured that he won’t jump
bail. Is that a valid interpretation in amount of
bail?
A: No. First the court must conduct a hearing
for the determination of the bail bond that will
be imposed. Summary hearing is mandatory
even if bail is a matter of right.
Q: What are the factors that the court should
consider in determining the amount of bail?
a)Financial ability of the accused to give bail
b)Nature and circumstances of the offense
c)Penalty for the offense charged
d)Character and reputation of the accused
e)Age and health of the accused
f)Weight of the evidence against the accused
g)Probability of the accused appearing at the
trial
Aila Nicko V. Santelices
h)Forfeiture of the bail
i)The fact that the accused was a fugitive from
justice when arrested
j)Pendency of other cases where the accused is
on bail
Q: Under the Constitution, it prohibits
excessive bail. In one case it was characterized
as a teasing illusion like a magnificent
request in a pauper’s will. Why?
A: Imposition of an excessive bail is like
denying a person his constitutional right to bail
because it would be in such a manner that the
person cannot afford to bail.
Q: When is bail a matter of right?
A: All persons in custody shall be admitted to
bail as a matter of right, with sufficient
sureties, or released on recognizance as
prescribed by law or this Rule;
a)Before or after conviction by the MTC
b)Before conviction of the RTC of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment
Q: How about after conviction of the RTC?
A: No. In People v. Fortes the Supreme Court
ruled that the accused is charged with a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted
by trial court and sentenced to suffer such
penalty, bail is neither a matter of right or
discretion on the part of the court. The court
would not have only determined that the
evidence of guilt is strong, sufficient to deny
bail even before conviction. It would have
likewise ruled that the accused’s guilt has been
proved beyond reasonable doubt. Bail must not
be granted to the accused during the pendency
of his appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Q: Considering the expressed declaration
under the Constitution note that under Sce.13
Art.3, the provision provides that “All persons”
the guarantee applies to all except those falling
under the exception and there are two
conditions first is the penalty of the offense
Page 18
charged and weight of evidence of guilt. Are
these two conditions required to occur in order
to deny a person to bail? Or one condition is
enough?
A:
General rule: All persons are entitled to bail.
Exceptions: charged with an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment or death and when the evidence
of guilt is strong
Supposing that the penalty for the offense
charged is reclusion perpetua, and the
evidence of guilt is lacking, is the person
entitled to bail as a matter of right?
A: In the case of People v. Judge Donato,
bail is a either a waivable right or of discretion.
It is a matter of right when the offense
charged is punishable by any penalty lower
than reclusion perpetua regardless of the
weight of evidence. If the offense charged is
punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes
a matter of discretion. But once the evidence
of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a
matter of right.
But under the Rules of court there are two
circumstances when bail is a matter of right;
a)Before or after conviction by the MTC
After conviction by the MTC, which the court’s
jurisdiction are to cases wherein the offense
charged is punishable by 6 years and below.
Bail is matter of right, condition pending
appeal.
b)Before conviction of the RTC of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment.
Q: Where does the discretion lies?
A: The discretion lies is limited to the
determination of whether the evidence of guilt
is strong. Lord’s Mansfield “discretion when
applied to court of justice means sound
discretion guided by law. It must be governed
by rule, not by humour; it must not be
Aila Nicko V. Santelices
arbitrary, vague and fanciful; but legal and
regular.
Atty. Gabriel: If the offense charged is
punishable by reclusion perpetua, the court
has discretion to determine the weight of the
evidence of guilt, if it is strong the court ceases
its discretion and have no choice but to deny
bail. If it is weak then the court ceases its
discretion and has no choice but to grant bail.
Q: As stated in Sec. 5 rule 114 of the rules of
Court, bail is a matter of discretion when the
penalty for the crime charged is less than
reclusion perpetua but the penalty imposed by
the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six
(6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or
his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by
the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of
the following or other similar circumstances?
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or
habitual delinquent, or has committed the
crime aggravated by the circumstance of
reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under
probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate
the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may
commit another crime during the pendency of
the appeal.
Q: Application for motion for bail shall follow
the 3 day motion rule?
A: Yes. In Baylon v. Judge Sison the
Supreme court ruled that the reason given by
the respondent judge that the non observance
of the three day motion rule is justified
because of the urgent motion for the petition
for bail and time is of the essence is untenable.
Such raciconation, which espouses and reveals
distorted notion as to the true nature and
conditions does violence to the well established
rule of law that bail is not a matter of right and
requires hearing where the accused is charged
Page 19
with an offense which is punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Q: Character of bail shall be determined when?
A: In the case of People v. Judge Donato,
the Supreme Court ruled that the character of
bail shall be determined by the law in force at
the time that the application is pending.
Q: Supposing a crime charged is punishable by
reclusion temporal and upon examining, an
attendant aggravating circumstance is present.
Will the court consider it? Inversely, if the
offense charged is punishable by reclusion
perpetua and an attendant mitigating
circumstance is present, will the court consider
it?
A: No. The court will not consider any
attendant circumstances. The determination of
the right to bail whether a right or discretion
lies on the penalty imposed in the crime
charged.
Q: Is the right to bail a waivable right?
A: Yes. In the case of People v. Judge
Donato, Supreme Court held that it is a
waivable right provided that it is not contrary
to law, public policy, public order, morals, or
good customs, or prejudicial to a third person
with a right recognized by law.
Q: In the case of People v. Judge Donato,
the prosecution that the accused impliedly
wiaved his right by remaining in custody but
the accused said that the waiver must be
express and explicit. Did the Supreme Court
agree with the accused?
A: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the
accused herein impliedly waived his right to
bail and an implied waiver is allowed in right to
bail.
Q: Is right to bail to available to members of
Armed Forces?
A: No, in the case of Commendador v. De
Villa the right to speedy trial is given more
emphasis in the military where the right to bail
does not exist because of the unique structure
of the military should be enough reason to
Aila Nicko V. Santelices
exempt military mean from the constitutional
coverage on the right to bail.
Atty. Gabriel : Right to bail to members of AFP
are not accorded to them because of their
pecuniary structure, they carry firearms and
operate within the government therefore they
cannot demand for the same right as any
private citizen entitled to.
Note: In Commendador v. De Villa, the
accused herein are under court martial
proceedings. Right to bail are not entitled if
the offense is administrative or under court
martial but when it is a criminal in nature they
can post bail.
Q: What is the reason given by the Supreme
Court in limiting the application of right to bail
in criminal proceedings and not to extradition
proceedings?
A: The extradition proceedings do not
determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused. The court only determines if there is
an extradition treaty or the case is
extraditable.
Q: Is the penalty of the offense charged in the
requesting jurisdiction relevant in extradition
proceedings?
A: No. The penalty for the offense charged in
the court of origin is irrelevant as well as the
weight of evidence of guilt.
Q: What are the five postulates of extradition
proceedings as enumerated in the case of
Government of U.S. v. Puruganan?
A:1)Extradition is a major instrument for
suppression of crime
2)The requesting State will accord due process
to the accused
3)The proceedings are sui generis
4)Compliance shall be in good faith
5)There is underlying risk of flight
Q: Did the Supreme Court abandon the ruling
in the case of Puruganan in the case of Govt.
of Hong Kong v. Hon. Olalia?
Page 20
A: No. as stated in both cases right to bail
does not apply to criminal proceedings. Even in
extradition also in deportation because the
penalty for the offense charged and weight of
guilt is irrelevant. In both cases the right to
bail under sec.13, are not applicable. The right
to bail granted in the case of Govt. of Hong
Kong v. Hon. Olalia is not grounded on
Sec.13 but on Sec.1 of Art 3, the due process
clause and the presumption lies in favor of
human liberty.
Q: What is the required quantum of evidence?
A: Clear and convincing evidence
Q: What are factors that must be taken into
consideration whenever an application for bail
is filed before an extradition court?
A: 1)That once granted bail, the applicant will
not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community
2)There exist a humanitarian, special and
compelling circumstances including as a matter
of reciprocity those cited by the highest court
in requesting state when grants provisional
liberty in extradition cases therein.
Q: What are the constitutional rights of an
accused in sec. 14?
A: right of the accused to be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, right to
be heard by himself and counsel, right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, right to have speedy,
impartial and public trial, right of confrontation
and right to compulsory process.
Q: What are the rights granted to the accused
after a case is filed in court as enumerated by
Supreme Court in the case of People v. Judge
Ayson?
A: 1)To refuse to be a witness
2oNit have any prejudice whatsoever result to
him by such refusal
3)Testify in his own behalf, subject to cross
examination by the prosecution
Aila Nicko V. Santelices
4) While testifying, to refuse to answer a
specific question which tends to incriminate
him for some crime
Q: What is the difference of the guarantee of
due process in sec.1 par.1 of Art.3 and Sec.14
par.1 Art.3?
A:The due process granted in Sec.14 par.1 is
procedural in nature for criminal proceedings.
While in due process in Sec.1 Art.3 are both
substantive and procedural and covers all
proceedings.
Q: In Allonte v. Savellano, what are the
elements of criminal due process?
A: 1)Court or tribunal trying the case is
properly clothed with judicial power to hear
and determine the matter before it
2)Jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the
person of the accused
3)That the accused is given an opportunity to
be heard
4)Judgment is rendered only upon lawful
hearing
Q: Elements of due process were taken in the
concept on the law of the land was the early
form due process. What is the relevance of
preliminary investigation to a right of the
accused in a criminal due process?
A: In Aniag v. COMELEC the respondent
contends that preliminary investigation is not
an essential element in criminal due process
because it is statutory in its inception. The
Supreme Court ruled that preliminary
investigation is essential because regardless of
its origin once the procedure is provided for,
that procedure must be complied with
otherwise there is a violation in criminal due
process.
Q: Which is better delay in preliminary
investigation or lack of preliminary
investigation?
A: Lack of preliminary investigation. The
Supreme Court ruled in Tatad v.
Sandiganbayan that the long delay in the
termination of preliminary investigation by
Tanodbayan as violative of the constitutional
Page 21
right of due process. Substantial adherence to
the requirements of law governing the conduct
of preliminary investigation including the
substantial compliance with the time limitation
prescribed by the law for resolution of the case
by the prosecutor, is part of procedural due
process constitutionally granted by the
fundamental law.
Atty. Gabriel: Lack of PI is a correctible defect
but the delay is not a correctible defect. This
principle is also applied in the case of Perez v.
Sandiganbayan.
Q: What is wrong with a presiding justice of
Sandiganbayan attending a meeting called by
the President together with the prosecution to
discuss a case before a pending case in
Sandiganbayan?
A: In the case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan,
the Supreme Court ruled that any avowal of
independent action or resistance to presidential
pressure become illusory from the very
moment they stepped inside the Malacanang
palace. The Supreme Court cannot permit such
sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice
to stand unrectified. The courts of the land
under its aegis are courts of law and justice
and equity.
Q: What is the right to be presumed innocent?
A: Person is presumed to be innocent until his
guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Q: Disputable or conclusive?
A: It is a disputable presumption or prima facie
presumption.
Q: How is this prima facie presumption
disputable?
A: it can only destroyed by guilt of evidence of
proof of beyond reasonable doubt.
Q:Does proof of beyond reasonable doubt
required absolute certainty?
A: It only requires moral certainty.
Q: What does reasonable doubt mean
according to People v. Dramayo?
Aila Nicko V. Santelices
A: Is meant that which of possibility may arise
but it is doubt endangered by an investigation
of the whole proof and an inability after such
investigation to let the mind rest easy on
certainty of guilt.
Atty. Gabriel: Reasonable doubt cannot co
exist with judgment of conviction. A person
cannot be convicted with an iota of reasonable
doubt?
A: No. to doubt is to acquit. But there is one
doubt that can co exist with judgment of
conviction, when there is unreasonable doubt.
If there is unreasonable doubt, the court has
no choice but to render a judgment of
conviction.
Q: Is accusation the same as guilt?
A: No, the Supreme Court ruled that in the
case of Dumlao v. COMELEC and People v.
Dramayo, that a person merely charged with
an offense cannot be treated like a person who
has been found guilty to an offense.
Q: But in the case of Marquez v. COMELEC,
the Supreme Court said that limitation of the
definition of “fugitive from justice” from those
already convicted after trial is unduly
circumscriptive. The Supreme Court said that
fugitive from justice was likewise be applied to
persons who flee to avoid prosecution. In that
regard, the Supreme Court is saying that the
persons who are already convicted should be
treated the same manner as to persons who
are merely charged. In that regard is it a
violation of presumption of innocence?
A:
Q: What is equipoise rule?
A: it is applicable where the evidence of the
parties is evenly balanced, in which case the
constitutional presumption of innocence should
tilt the scales in favor of the accused.
Q: What are the duties of a counsel during
arraignment? (People v. Holgado)
A: 1)The court shall inform the defendant that
it his right to have an attorney before being
arraigned
Page 22
2)After giving him such information the court
must ask him if he desires the aid of an
attorney
3)If he desires and is unable to employ an
attorney, the court must assign the aid of
counsel de officio
4)If the accused desires to procure an attorney
of his own, the court must grant him
reasonable time therefore
Q: If upon compliance on the second
requirement, if the answer of the accused is in
the negative the 3rd and 4th will no longer be
operative? Is the right to counsel during trial
waivable? As we learned that in custodial
investigation an accused may waive his right to
counsel as long as the waiver is in writing and
expressly made and made in the presence of a
counsel.
A: The four fold duties mentioned in People v.
Holgado is already modified. It was taken on
the old rules of criminal procedure. The court
must appoint counsel de officio under two
circumstances; 1)If the accused afford the
services of a counsel the court must appoint
him one 2)If the accused doesn’t want to
appoint a counsel, then the court must appoint
a counsel de officio
The ruling in People v. Holgado that the right
to counsel is not a waivable right, is already
modified by the rules of criminal procedure
particularly rule 115 sec 1 par.c
c) To be present and defend in person and by
counsel at every stage of the proceedings,
from arraignment to promulgation of the
judgment. The accused may, however, waive
his presence at the trial pursuant to the
stipulations set forth in his bail, unless his
presence is specifically ordered by the court for
purposes of identification. The absence of the
accused without justifiable cause at the trial of
which he had notice shall be considered a
waiver of his right to be present thereat. When
an accused under custody escapes, he shall be
deemed to have waived his right to be present
on all subsequent trial dates until custody over
him is regained. Upon motion, the accused
may be allowed to defend himself in
person when it sufficiently appears to the
court that he can properly protect his
right without the assistance of counsel.
Aila Nicko V. Santelices
Q: In People v. Agbayani, the accused
contends that the four fold obligations of the
court was violated because of the transcript or
the minutes therein the judge failed to comply
with the four fold obligations. Did the Supreme
Court agree?
A: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the
failure of the records to disclose that the
accused was informed of his right to counsel
does not violate his constitutional rights
because of the presumptions that the law has
been obeyed and the official duty has been
regularly performed by the trial court. It is
incumbent upon the accused to prove
otherwise, without any evidence presented by
the accused that his right to counsel has been
violated then the court may rely on the
presumption on the regularity in the
performance of public function. The Supreme
Court likewise noted that often times it is
easier to do things correctly than to put it in
record.
Q: The right to counsel under custodial
investigation is qualified by the phrase
“preferably of his own choice” is it also the
same as to the right to counsel during trial?
A: In Amion v. Judge Chiongson, the
Supreme Court ruled that the preference in the
choice of a counsel pertains more aptly and
specifically to person under custodial
investigation rather than one who is the
accused in criminal prosecution. Even if we
were to extend the application of the concept
of “preference of his own choice” to an accused
in criminal prosecution, such preferential
discretion cannot partake of discretion as
absolute and arbitrary as would make the
choice of counsel refer exclusively to the
predilection of the accused.
Q: What are the reasons given by Supreme
Court in the case of People v. Quitlong why
should the accused be informed of the nature
and the cause of accusation against him?
A:1)Furnish the accused with such a
description of the charge against him as will
enable him to make his defense
2)To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal
for protection against a further prosecution for
the same cause
Page 23
3)Inform the court of the facts alleged so that
it may decide whether they are sufficient in law
to support a conviction if one should he had
Q: When is information sufficient in order to
comply with this guarantee? (NDSOTP)
A: 1)Must state the name of the accused
2)Designation given to the offense by the
state
3)Statement of the acts or omissions so
complained of as constituting the offense
4)Name of the offended party
5)Approximate time and date of commission
of the offense
6)Place where offense has been committed
Q: An accused can be convicted only on the
offense charged stated on the complaint and
proven during trial. An accused cannot be
convicted other than that stated or alleged in
the complaint. In the same manner the
accused cannot be convicted of an offense not
proven. The general rule is: an accused can be
convicted only of the offense charged in the
information and proven in trial. Supposing
there is a variance between in the complaint
charged in information and not proven at trial.
Shall it mean that the accused shall be
acquitted?
A: The Supreme Court ruled in the case of
Pecho v. People, the accused was not
convicted of the crime charged, the violation of
Sec.3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended
because the said section penalizes only
consummated offenses and the offense
charged in this case was not consummated. He
could nevertheless, be convicted of the
complex crime of attempted estafa through
falsification of official and commercial
documents, which is necessarily included in the
crime charged. Applying Sec 4 and Sec 5 of the
Rules of Court which provides:
Section 4. Judgment in case of variance
between allegation and proof. — When there is
variance between the offense charged in the
complaint or information and that proved, and
the offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved, the
Aila Nicko V. Santelices
accused shall be convicted of the offense
proved which is included in the offense
charged, or of the offense charged which is
included in the offense proved.
Section 5. When an offense includes or is
included in another. — An offense charged
necessarily includes the offense proved when
some of the essential elements or ingredients
of the former, as alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter. And an
offense charged is necessarily included in the
offense proved, when the essential ingredients
of the former constitute or form a part of those
constituting the latter
Q: Supposing the offense charged is homicide
and the offense proved is murder, the accused
shall be convicted of?
A: Homicide, because if the accused shall be
convicted of murder his right to be informed of
the nature and cause of accusation will be
violated. If he is only informed that he is
charged with homicide, then he will be
convicted only of homicide. That is the rule
when there is a variance with the offense
charged and the offense proved.
Q: Supposing the variance is between the title
and the designation of the offense and the
recital of the acts or omissions in the
information. Which will prevail?
A: In the case of Soriano v. Sandiganbayan,
the designation of the offense is violation of
RA3019 Anti Graft and corrupt practices act
but the recital of acts of omission make out of
bribery. The Supreme Court ruled that it is
obvious that the investigation conducted by
the petitioner was not a contract. Neither was
it a transaction. A reading of the information
which has been reproduced herein clearly
make out a case for bribery hence the
petitioner cannot claim of deprivation of right
to be informed of the nature and the cause of
accusation.
Q: What is the relevance of arraignment to the
right to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation?
A: In Borja v. Mendoza the Supreme Court
ruled that during arraignment, it is the stage,
wherein an accused for the first time, is
granted the opportunity to know the precise
charge that confronts him. He must be fully
Page 24
aware of possible loss of freedom even of his
life, depending on the nature of the crime
imputed to him. At the very least, he must be
fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of
the state is mobilized against him. It is not a
useless formality, much less an idle
ceremony.
Q: What is speedy trial?
A: Means a trial conducted according to the
law of criminal procedure and the rules and
regulations, free from vexatious, capricious
and oppressive delays. (People v. Tee)
Q: Speedy trial is a relative concept and the
right to speedy trial can be violated when?
A: 1)The proceedings are attended by
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays
2)When unjustified postponements are asked
for and secured
3)When without cause or justifiable motive of
long period of time is allowed to elapse without
the party having his case tried (People v.
Tee)
Q: What are the factors as to determination as
to whether the right has been
violated?(LRCEP) People v. Tee
A: 1)Length of the delay
2)Reason for the delay
Failure to present the material witness in the
trial
3)The conduct of prosecution and accused
The prosecution exerted all efforts to produce
the witness. Defense did not make any move
to invoke the constitutional right of the
accused to a speedy trial
4)Efforts exerted by the defendant to assert
his right
5)Prejudice and damage caused to the
accused
Aila Nicko V. Santelices
Q: Applying these factors, can we say that
there was a violation to right to speedy trial in
People v. Tee?
A: No. The Supreme Court ruled that although
the absences of prosecution witness Abratique
totaled to 20 hearing days, there is no showing
whatsoever that prosecution capriciously
caused Abratique’s absences as to vex or
oppress appellant and deny him his rights.
Under the rules, appellant could have moved
the trial court to require the witness to post
bail to ensure that the latter would testify
when required. Appellant could have moved to
have Abratique found in contempt and duly
sanctioned. Appellant did neither. It is a bit too
late in the day for the appellant to invoke now
his right to speedy trial.
Q: Right under Sec.14 is the right to speedy
trial. Can we say that this right is only
applicable during trial?
A: No. The Supreme Court in the case of
Flores v. People citing Justice Laurel, “An
accused is entitled to a trial at the earliest
opportunity. He cannot be oppressed by
delaying the commencement of trial for an
unreasonable length of time. If the
proceedings pending trial are deferred, the trial
itself is necessarily delayed.
Q: How about on appeal?
A: No. Right to speedy trial applies to the
proceedings anterior to the trial. Delay in the
appeal is covered by a different constitutional
guarantee covered by Sec.16 Art.3.
Q: In the case of Conde v. Rivera, for a
period of one year she was required to a dance
attendance to the Court. Why?
A: She is required to attend at the trial
whether the trial is postponed. The Supreme
Court dismissed the case because of the
violation of the right to speedy trial of the
accused.
Q: What is an impartial trial?
A: Hearing before an impartial and
disinterested tribunal and that every litigant is
entitled nothing less than the cold neutrality of
a judge.
Page 25
Q: In Mateo Jr. v. Villaluz, described an
impartial judge. Who is an impartial judge?
A: A cerebral man deliberately holds in cheek
the tag and pull of purely personal preferences
and prejudices which he shares with the rest of
his fellow mortals.
Q: is it enough that the trial judge impartial?
Supposing the judge is indeed impartial and
renders decision based on evidence. Is that
enough? What if he is seen socializing with one
of the party in a case he is handling after
work?
A: No it is not enough. The judge or justice of
Courts must appear to be impartial. Even if
they penned their decision based on evidence
they must have semblance of impartiality.
They cannot just associate with any parties in
the case because it will bring a semblance of
partiality.
Q: Mateo Jr. in Vilalauz, the respondent
judge is the one who attested to the affidavit
of one of the witnesses. But when the witness
is presented, he reacted and said that he was
forced to sign the affidavit,. After the claim
made by the witness,the defendant
immediately filed for an inhibition of the
respondent judge. According the defense they
cannot longer expect an impartial and cold
neutrality on the presiding judge. Why?
A: The Supreme Court ruled that having the
extrajudicial statement was attested before
him, such repudiation was hardly flattering to
the judge. His sense of fairness under the
circumstances could easily be blunted. The
absence of the requisite of due process
element is thus noticeable.
Q: In our judicial system, are trial court judges
required to leap lie hermits detached with
world? Because in the case of People v.
Teehankee, the accused contends that his
right to impartial trial is violated because of
the pervasive publicity of the case.
A: In People v. Teehankee, the Supreme
Court ruled that pervasive publicity is not per
se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair
trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant
was given a day to day, gavel to gavel,
coverage does not by itself prove that the
publicity so permeated the mind of a trial
judge and impaired his impartiality. Our idea
Aila Nicko V. Santelices
of a fair and impartial judge is not that of
a hermit who is out of touch with the
world. We have not installed the jury
system whose members are overly
protected from publicity lest they lose
their impartiality. Our judges are learned in
law and trained to disregard off court evidence
and on camera performances of parties in
litigation. Their mere exposure to publications
and publicity stunts do not per se fatally infect
their impartiality.
Q: What is the purpose of this constitutional
guarantee of public trial according to the case
of Garcia v. Domingo?
A: Justice Laurel: Trial should be in public in
order to offset any danger of conducting it in
an illegal or unjust manner.
Atty. Gabriel: Necessary to prevent abuses
that may be committed by the court to the
prejudice of the defendant.
Q: In the case of Garcia v. Domingo, this
right to due process in order to offset any
danger of conducting it in an illegal or unjust
manner. The right to public trial in order to
ship the accused form the arbitrariness of the
judge, how can it protect the accused form
arbitrariness?
A: Based on experience. Public officers are
more prudent when the trial is witnessed by
the public.
Q: Right to public trial is a right that belongs to
the accused. Can an accused waive it? Meaning
can he exclude the public from the witnessing
his trial?
A: Prosecution can invoke the right to public
trial by the virtue of the due process clause.
Q: Would the proceedings in the chamber of
the judge considered as public trial?
A: No. The Supreme Court in the case of
Garcia v. Domingo, ruled that there is no
showing that the public was excluded. It is to
be admitted that the size of the room allotted
by the Judge would reduce the number of
those who could be present. Such a fact
though is not indicative of any transgression of
this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform
dimensions. Some are smaller than others.
Page 26
Moreover as what Justice Black opined, it
suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial
being public if the accused could have his
friends, relatives and counsel present, no
matter what offense he may be charged.
Atty. Gabriel: In the case of In re: Petition
for radio and television coverage of
multiple murder case against
Maguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan,
the Supreme Court discussed the evolution on
the right of impartial trial on the one hand and
right to information on the other hand. From
the outright denial in the case of Aquino to
the filming for the purposes of recording in the
case of Estrada and to a restricted and to
regulated public airing in the case of
Maguindanao massacre, but note as well in
the decision of the SC in the case of In re:
Petition for radio and television coverage
of multiple murder case against
Maguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan
was modified in its resolution because in its
decision it allowed the TV and radio coverage
of the trial under restrictive and more
prohibitive procedure. But in its resolution
modified its , by denying live TV and radio
coverage and allowing only live streaming from
an extension in the premises of the court
because of the balancing interest of the
accused and the people. Note as well and the
resolution and decision of the SC in the
Maguindanao case is a pro hac vice case
meaning it cannot be considered as
judicial precedent under the doctrine of
stare decisis. Applicable in that particular
case only.
Atty. Gabriel : Waiver of public trial
Section 21. Exclusion of the public. — The
judge may, motu proprio, exclude the public
from the courtroom if the evidence to be
produced during the trial is offensive to
decency or public morals. He may also, on
motion of the accused, exclude the public from
the trial, except court personnel and the
counsel of the parties
Q: What is right to confrontation?
A: Right of the accused to see the witness face
to face
Aila Nicko V. Santelices
Q: What are the two reasons as mentioned in
the case of US v. Javier why the courts
cannot allow the affidavit of a deceased who is
not cross examined as admissible in evidence?
A: 1)To allow the accused to exercise his right
to cross examination of the witness
2)A tribunal may have before it the
deportment and appearance of the witness
while testifying
Q: Substantively these are the two reasons
why the affidavit cannot be admitted without
presenting the affiant as a witness.
Procedurally, what is the basis of the
exclusion? An ex parte cannot be presented as
evidence because?
A: Intended to prevent the conviction of the
accused upon deposition or ex parte affidavits.
Q: Supposing A was presented a s a witness
during his testimony he produced the affidavit
of B in order to prove that he is telling the
truth. Can the defense object to that
evidence?
A: Yes. The affidavit would be considered as a
hearsay evidence.
Atty. Gabriel: Procedurally, ex parte affidavits
cannot be admitted because on the rule of
hearsay evidence.
Q: Supposing the accused are tried separately
on the same criminal information on the same
acts or omissions. Supposing A B C tried on the
same criminal information may the testimony
of a witness in the case of A who was a
exhaustively cross examined by the accused
can be used as a witness to other cases
without presenting the witness in the other
case. D was presented as a witness in the case
of A can D be presented as a witness in the
case of B and C without presenting as witness
in B and C’s case?
Atty. Gabriel: No. It would deprive the court to
observe the deportment of the witness during
the trial. If we say automatically that the
second court will admit the evidence of the
witness who is presented in another case
would not that be a deprivation of the right of
the second court to determine whether the
witness is lying or telling the truth? Even if the
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parties are the same if the court trying the
parties are not the same the right to
confrontation requires that the witness
presented in one case be presented in the
other case.
Q: What are the tow compulsory processes
available to the accused?
A: 1)Subpoena ad testificandum
Person is required by the court to testify
2)Subpoena duces tecum
Required by the court for the production of
books, records, things or documents therein
specified
Q: May a subpoena ad testificandum be issued
by the court without issuing subpoena duces
tecum?
A: Yes. Subpoena duces tecum cannot be
issued by the court without subpoena ad
testificandum but subpoena ad testificandum
can be issued without Subpoena duces tecum.
It is not enough that the documents which is
the subject of subpoena duces tecum to just
bring it before the court. It must be testified
and authenticated by the custodian. In that
regard, the complete term for subpoena duces
tecum ad testificandum
Atty. Gabriel: did not pass because it cannot
be used as to determine the guilt or innocence
of the accused. The petitioner used this only to
fish for evidence.
Q: What are the two tests in order to
determine the propriety of the issuance of
subpoena duces tecum?
A: 1)The books and documents or other things
required must appear prima facie relevant to
the issue subject of the controversy (Test of
relevancy)
When are they relevant? Like in the case of
Roco v. Contreras, the Supreme Court ruled
that the production of book and documents
requested by the petitioner are not
indispensable to prove his defense of payment.
We do not find any justifiable reason and
petitioner has not shown any, why this court
must have to disbelieve the factual findings of
Aila Nicko V. Santelices
the appellate court. Thus the issuance of
subpoena duces tecum subpoena ad
testificandum would serve no purpose but to
further the delay of the proceedings in pending
criminal cases.
2)Such books must be reasonably described by
the parties to be readily identified (Test of
definiteness)
In Roco v. Contreras, the Supreme Court
ruled that the books and documents that the
petitioner requested to be subpoenaed are
designated and described in his request with
definiteness and readily identifiable.
Q: Sec. 14 Art.3 enumerates the rights of the
accused expect for one which is?
A: The provision on trial by absentia. This right
favors the prosecution so that the trial won’t
be delayed.
Q: What are the three requirements so that
trial in absentia may proceed?
A:1)There has been an arraignment
2)That the accused had been notified
3)That he fails to appear and his failure to do
so is unjustified
Q: What is the consequence of trial in
absentia?
A: The accused waived his right to appear in
the trial. He cannot present evidence.
Q: The presence of the accused is needed
during arraignment the presence of the
accused is mandatory during trial and during
the promulgation. Does that mean that the
court cannot during trial during trial in absentia
if the purpose of the trial is to identify the
accused?
A: During trial, the accused can expressly
waive his appearance through his counsel by
making a manifestation, that whenever a
witness is to be presented to identify the
accused, the defense is admitting that the
accused will be identified by the witness. In
that regard to be dispense with the appearance
of the accused in identification purposes.
Page 28
On the third instance, during the promulgation
of the judgment, it is the issue in the case of
People v. Valeriano, whether the court can
promulgate a decision when the accused flee
from justice. The Supreme Court ruled that the
accused jumped bail after he had been
arraigned just before the retaking of evidence
commenced, one who jumps bail can never
offer a justifiable reason for his non
appearance during trial. Accordingly, after the
trial in absentia, the court can render
judgment in the case and the
promulgation may be made by simply
recording the judgment in the criminal
docket with a copy thereof served upon
his counsel provided that the notice
requiring him to be present at the
promulgation is served through his
bondsmen or warden and counsel.
Atty. Gabriel: Only during the arraignment, the
presence of the accused is not waivable but
only to the two instances it is waivable.
Q: May an accused tried in absentia be
convicted in absentia likewise appeal in
absentia?
A: This is one the issue in the case of People
v. Mapalao, the Supreme court ruled that the
accused while at large, cannot seek relief from
the court as he is deemed to have waived his
right and has no standing in court. Upon
promulgation of the judgment, he failed to
appear without justifiable cause although his
bondsmen and counsel were given notice, he is
therefore waived his right to appeal.
Q: What is Habeas Corpus(you have the
body)?
A:
A writ requiring a person to be brought before
a judge or court, especially for investigation of
a restraint ofthe person's liberty,
used as a protection against illegal
imprisonment.
Q:May the writ of habeas corpus be
suspended? The writ itself?
A: Only the privilege only.
Q: What is the difference on the suspension of
the privilege writ of habeas corpus and writ of
habeas corpus?
Aila Nicko V. Santelices
A: Writ of Habeas Corpus- application for
habeas corpus is filed and the court finds the
petition in proper form, it will issue the writ as
a matter of course, ordering the production of
the person allegedly detained and requiring the
respondent to justify the detention.
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus- where
the return of the respondent shows that the
person in custody is being held for a crime
covered by the proclamation suspending the
privilege and in a place where it is effective will
the court dismiss the petition.
Q: What are the two instances wherein writ of
habeas corpus can be issued or available?
A: 1) In cases of illegal detention in order to
test the validity of detention.
Reckoning period: as of the filing for the
petition of the writ of habeas corpus at the
earliest time and if there are supervening
events that will supersede the petition of the
writ of habeas corpus and bar his release from
custody.
2) Speedy trial
Q: Consequence in the petition for bail of a
person who filed a petition for habeas corpus?
A: This is the issue in the case of Jackson v.
Macalino, wherein the Supreme Court ruled
that by offering of the petitioner to post bail
bond, the petitioner thereby admitted that he
was under custody of CID and voluntarily
accepted the jurisdiction of CID.
Q: Can the court continue to hear the petition
of writ of habeas corpus after the petitioner
filed for bail?
A: If the accused applied for bail, it is an
expressed admission or recognition of the
validity of his detention and would render the
petition for habeas corpus moot and academic.
Q: Only the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus may be suspended and not the writ.
Who may suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus? What are the valid grounds of
the suspension?
A: The president and the grounds are in cases
of invasion when public safety requires it and
Page 29
in cases of rebellion when public safety
requires it.
Q: How about imminent threat of rebellion or
invasion? Is this a valid ground of suspension?
A: Yes, in the case of Lansang v. Garcia
interpreting the 1935 Constitution. Under
1987 Constitution, mere threat of rebellion is
not a valid ground.
Q: Sec.18 Art. 7 enumerate the powers of the
President. Supreme Court in the Sanlakas
case said that the enumeration in Sec.18 Art.7
was deliberately made from an order, to the
most benign to the least benign. (Can be used
although not in succession)
A: 1)Calling out power
2)Suspension of the privilege of the writ
Habeas Corpus
3)Declaration of martial law
Sec. 18 only enumerates the power wherein
the President may call martial law or suspend
the privilege in invasion when public safety
requires it and in cases of rebellion when public
safety requires it. Can the President exercise
or proclaim martial law without the presence of
rebellion, invasion or lawless violence?
A: Even if there is no actual rebellion, invasion
or lawless violence the President may exercise
his calling out power in order to avert or to
stop it from happening.
Q: What are the constitutional limitations in
the suspension of the privilege of the writ?
A: He may for a period not exceeding sixty
days suspend to privilege and only the
Congress can extend it. Upon the suspension
of the privilege his duty is to submit a report
within 48 hours from the suspension in person
or in writing.
Q: Prior to the 1987 Constitution, whether the
Supreme Court can review the sufficiency of
the factual circumstances in the suspension.
Can the Supreme Court review?
A: In the case of Lansang v. Garcia, the
Supreme Court ruled that Art. 7 vest the
Aila Nicko V. Santelices
executive the power to suspend, but not
absolute, it goes hand in hand with the system
of checks and balances under which the
Executive is supreme as regards to the
suspension of the privilege but only if and
when he acts within the sphere allotted to him
by the Basic law, authority to determine
whether he has so acted is vested in the
Judicial Department. Check only and not to
supplant.
Q: What are the offenses covered by the
suspension of the privilege?
A: Rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly
connected with invasion.
Q: Under Sec. 15 art.3 constitution provides
that the privilege of writ habeas corpus shall
not be suspended except in cases of invasion
or rebellion when the public safety requires it.
The use of term invasion and rebellion are they
taken within the context of criminal law?
A: No. They are only used as a sense of a state
or condition of the nation and not in concept of
statutory offense.
Q: For how long a person may be suspected to
have committed an offense of rebellion or
offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion be detained?
A: Person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially charged within 3 days of otherwise he
shall be released.
Atty. Gabriel: Supposing A was arrested for
being a suspected rebel at the time that he
was arrested the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus was suspended. On the 3rd day of his
arrest, police officers who arrested him filed a
criminal complaint before a public prosecutor
for preliminary investigation, would that suffice
to bar the 3 day period in order to be said that
the detention of A is justified?
A: A must be judicially charged. Mere filing
criminal complaint before a public prosecutor
for preliminary investigation is not sufficient to
bar the running of the 3 day period. It can only
be interrupted by filing criminal information
before the court.
Q: What happens to the person who post bail
in suspension of the privilege of habeas
Page 30
corpus? Can he still exercise the right to bail?
What is the purpose for the suspension?
A: The purpose is to quash or stop rebellion or
invasion.
Atty. Gabriel: Let’s assume that the penalty for
rebellion is reclusion temporal. Supposing after
the President suspended the privilege, all the
members of a group were arrested being
suspected rebels. Supposing there are 100
rebels can they post bail? As we said earlier
right to bail is a matter of right if the penalty
of the offense is lower than reclusion perpetua
regardless of the weight of the evidence of
guilt? Remember, right to post bail shall not be
impaired in the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus.
A: This is the issue in the case of In re: The
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus for
Dr. Aurora Parong, et.al. Ponce Enrile,
wherein the Supreme Court ruled that
transcends in the importance that if these
person would be given the right to bail, after
they are released, they may rejoin the rebels
and continue their furtherance of invasion or
rebellious activities. The constitutional
guarantee provided in Sec.13, does not apply
in offenses of rebellion or offenses inherent or
directly connected with invasion. They cannot
post bail as a matter of right, regardless of the
penalty and the weight of evidence of guilt.
Q: We said earlier that the purpose of the writ
of habeas corpus is to test the validity of the
arrest and detention of the accused and
ultimately retain the liberty of the person.
Aside from the writ of habeas corpus there are
other high prerogative writ that produce the
same effect like writ of amparo. Five types of
writ of amparo as enumerated in the case of
Secretary of defense v. Manalo
A:
1)amparo libertad for the protection of
personal freedom, equivalent to the habeas
corpus writ; (2) amparo contra leyesfor the
judicial review of the constitutionality of
statutes; (3) amparo casacion for the judicial
review of the constitutionality and legality of a
judicial decision; (4) amparo
administrativo for the judicial review of
administrative actions; and (5) amparo
agrario for the protection of peasants’ rights
derived from the agrarian reform process
Aila Nicko V. Santelices
Out of these amparo cases one is equivalent to
habeas corpus and it is amparo libertad.
Supposing that the privilege was suspended by
the President can it be vailidly obtained
through this writ of amparo?
A: No. although the constitution provides only
for the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus, all similar writs are also suspended
because if it is allowed then the provision in
the constitution would be useless.
Q: Speedy disposition of cases covers
proceedings previous to trial or those after
trial?
A: speedy disposition applies to all stages of
the trial.
Q:Which means that there are two rights
operating during the trial stage, the right to
speedy trial and right to speedy disposition of
cases. Both of which prohibits any
unreasonable delay. How can we identify which
operates?
A: Right to speedy trial applies to trial proper
and proceedings anterior to the trial. Right to
speedy disposition applies to all stages of the
criminal proceedings. The latter covers criminal
administrative, civil, quasi judicial proceedings
while the former covers only criminal
proceedings. Prosecution is not entitled in
speedy trial while in speedy disposition the
prosecution and the accused.
If the trial is attended by vexatious, capricious
and oppressive delays caused by prosecution
the accused may claim the right to speedy
trial. If the right claimed is speedy disposition
of cases, the only objective is to expedite the
disposition the case.
Q: Supposing the trial is attended with
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays at
the instance of the accused. What right may be
invoked by the prosecution?
A: Sec. 16. Right to speedy trial and speedy
disposition operates during the trial but the
person invoking should be different.
Q: What is right against self incrimination?
A: No person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself
Page 31
Q: What is the common law basis of this right?
A: nemo tenetur se ipsum accusare (no
man is bound to accuse himself)
It is considered as a revolt against as a
thumbscrew and a rock (inquisitorial devices
applied in order to extract a confession in the
defendant)
Q: According to the Supreme Court in the case
of Chavez v. Court of Appeals, this
constitutional guarantee is founded upon the
broad basis of public policy and humanity.
Why?
A: Public policy because the witness is placed
in the strongest temptation to commit perjury
and humanity because to extract a confession
of truth by a kind of duress every species and
degree of which the law abhors.
Q: So this constitutional guarantee according
to Supreme Court in the case of Chavez v.
Court of Appeals is not only intended to
protect the guilty and imprudent but the
innocent and foresighted. What does it mean?
A:
Q: Substance of this guarantee?
A: Stated in the case of US v. Tan Teng citing
Justice Holmes, the prohibition of the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from him, not an exclusion of
his body as evidence, when it may be material.
Q: Does that mean an accused may be
compelled under pain of contempt tom produce
evidence as long as it is not testimonial in
character without violating the constitutional
guarantee on right against self incrimination?
Supposing the accused is charged with
homicide. The prosecution moved for the
production of the knife used by the accused to
kill the victim. Can the prosecution compel the
accused to produce as such?
A: No. It means that the constitutional
guarantee does not cover only testimonial
evidence but also object and documentary
evidence.
Q: What are the documentary evidence that
the accused must produce even against his
Aila Nicko V. Santelices
will? Supposing the person is charged with tax
evasion can he be compelled to produce
income tax return?
A: Even if he will be incriminated he is required
to produce such documents. This are
reportorial documents which are required for
every tax payers therefore this documents are
needed to be filed to government agencies are
not covered by constitutional guarantee of
right against self incrimination.
Q: Can the Court compel the accused to write
the fiscal’s dictation for the purpose of
comparison allowed?
A: No. Writing is something more than moving
the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing
is not purely a mechanical act, because it
requires the application of intelligence and
attention. In Beltran v. Samson, the
Supreme Court rule that privilege is not limited
to testimony, but extends to all giving or
furnishing of evidence. The constitutional
inhibition is directed not merely to giving of
oral testimony but embraces as well as the
furnishing of evidence by other means than by
the word of mouth, the divulging in short of
any fact which the accused has a right to hold
secret.
Q: In the case of Chavez v. Court of Appeals
prosecution believes that they can call the
accused as witness and the court believes the
prosecution. Did the Supreme Court agree?
A: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the court
may not extract from a defendant’s own lips
and against his will an admission of his guilt.
Nor a court as much as resort to compulsory
disclosure, directly or indirectly of facts usable
against him as confession of the crime or the
tendency of which is to prove the commission
of a crime. Because it is his right to forego
testimony, to remain silent, unless he
chooses to take the witness stand with
undiluted, unfettered exercise of his free
genuine will.
Q: What is the extent of the constitutional
protection as to the witness?
A: A witness can be compelled to testify
against his will and can invoke only such right
when an incriminating question is asked.
Page 32
Q: Is the right against self incrimination
available during preliminary investigation
before the public prosecutor?
A: Yes. In Beltran v. Samson the Supreme
Court ruled that if the prosecutor will be
allowed to compel the respondent to produce
incriminating evidence which later on be
introduced as evidence in trial proper itself,
then this constitutional guarantee will be a
meaningless protection.
Q: How about in administrative proceedings? Is
this constitutional guarantee available?
A: Yes. In the case of Pascual v. Board of
Medical Examiners , the Supreme Court
ruled this right does not apply to all
administrative proceedings and similar
proceedings. Applies to Administrative and
civil proceedings but with qualification,
constitutional guarantee applies with
administrative and civil proceedings which are
penal in character or where there is an
attached penalty.
*Constitutional guarantee does not apply in all
proceedings. Rule 25, rules of court (Modes of
discovery)
Q: In cases where a constitutional issue is
involved it is always a balancing of interest of
the state and an individual. Insofar as issues
involving right against self incrimination it is a
conflicting interest of the state to penalize the
violation of laws. It is the interest of the
accused to keep to himself an information that
may incriminate him. Does that meaning given
this conflicting interest, there is no way the
state can compel a person to incriminate
himself?
A: No, by granting immunity of the State to
the person.
Q: What are the two kinds of immunity
statutes granted to a witness?
A: 1)Transactional immunity – a witness can
no longer be prosecuted for any offense
whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction
2)Used and derivative use immunity – A
witness is only assured that his or her
particular testimony and evidence derived from
Aila Nicko V. Santelices
it will not be used against him or her in a
subsequent prosecution
Q: Under Sec. 18 Art. 3 is a constitutional
guarantee is more specific in political beliefs
and aspirations. Supposing a person believes
that all governments are evil because it
restricts the full liberty an individual. In order
to attain his belief, he is urging people to arms
against government. Can that person be
prosecuted to inciting rebellion?
A: If such belief would be allowed then it would
disturb the peace and would be detrimental to
the public and to the State.
Q: What are two aspects of involuntary
servitude?
A:1)Compulsion to perform or work in
consideration of debt against his will
2)concept of slavery
A: Like in the case of Caunca v. Salazar it is
a case wherein a habeas corpus was filed by a
house helper who was being detained and
required to render domestic services in
payment for the money advanced for her
transportation from the province. Is this
allowed?
A: No. A person cannot be compelled to work
against his will in payment of a debt.
Q: Under the constitution, this right is not
absolute. The exceptions are?
A: 1)punishment of a crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted
2)render service to defend the state
3)Return to work order in assumption
jurisdiction cases
4)Naval enlistment
5)Posse comitatus – command to help them
find some criminals
6)Patria potestas
Page 33
Q: What are the prohibited punishments?
A: Excessive fines, cruel, degrading, inhuman
punishment
Q: Does the constitution prohibit excessive
punishment?
A: This is the issue in the case of People v.
Estoista, wherein the Supreme Court ruled
that the excessiveness of the penalty shall not
refer to the duration but to the method or
mechanism of imposing the penalty. Not the
term but the method. Excessive penalty is not
prohibited.
Q: What is the obligation of the court
whenever the court feels that the penalty
imposed by law is excessive?
A: The Court can give the copy of the decision
be furnished to the President, thru the
Secretary of Justice, with the recommendation
that the imprisonment imposed be lowered.
Q: Is death penalty or death by lethal injection
a cruel punishment?
A: No. The Supreme Court ruled in the case of
Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice is that
the cruelty against which the Constitution
protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in
the method of punishment not necessary the
suffering involved in any method employed to
extinguish life humanely.
Q: Does the constitution prohibit unusual
punishment?
A: No. It may impose new punishment as long
as long it is not cruel, degrading, inhuman.
Q: Does the 1987 constitution prohibit death
penalty?
A: Only a limitation on the imposition of death
penalty
Q: In the cases of People v. Valeriano and
People v. Mapalo, we have learned that a
person who without justifiable reason fails to
appear during trial may be tried in absentia.
What if the accused is convicted of a crime
with a penalty of death? Does it mean that he
waived his right to appeal?
Aila Nicko V. Santelices
A: No it is not waivable. The Supreme Court
will have an automatic review of the judgment.
Atty. Gabriel : The role of the trial court only
acts as a commissioner and all judgment of
trial court are merely recommendations. Which
needs the approval of the Supreme court in
order to attain the character of finality.
Q: Why does the constitution protects a
faulting debtor by guaranteeing him that he
will not be subjected to imprisonment?
A: This provision is one of the social justice
provisions. The inability of the person to pay is
due to his dismal contractual condition. In
short the Constitution presumes good faith in
part of the debtor.
Q: What does debt mean?
A: Civil obligation arising from contract,
expressed or implied.
Q: Under R.A. 9262, a man is under to support
his wife and children. If he fails to provide
support to his family, the man can be
convicted for violation of financial violence and
violation of this law can make the person
imprisoned. Is the law unconstitutional?
A: No. In the case of Lozano v. Martinez, the
Supreme Court ruled that the debt intended to
be covered by the constitutional guarantee are
liabilities arising from ex contractu. Since this
is an obligation arising from law, the failure of
the father to pay financial obligation may result
in imprisonment.
Q: In the case of Lozano v. Martinez
petitioner contends that B.P.22 is
unconstitutional because it imposes the penalty
of imprisonment of the failure of the drawer to
pay the face value of the check. Did the
Supreme Court agree?
A: No. The Supreme Court ruled that it is not
the non payment of an obligation which the
law punishes. The law is not intended or
designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt.
The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain
of penal sanctions, the making of worthless
checks and putting them in circulation the law
punishes the act not as an offense against
property but an offense against public order.
Page 34
Q: Supposing A is the drawer and B is the
payee. A issued a check in payment for
services rendered by B. At the time a issued
the check, he already knows that his checking
account is closed and when B will present the
check for encashment, A knows that it will
bounce or dishonored. B deposited the check;
the drawee bank dishonored the check. Under
BP22 the payee has the obligation to notify the
drawer that his check bounce and the drawer is
given 5 days to make good of the face value of
the check, otherwise he becomes criminally
liable. So in the example given, supposing b
notified A that his check bounced, and A pays
the check within 5 days, is he criminally liable?
A: If A does not issue a check he may not be
criminally liable under an obligation based on
contract. Since he issues the check, he is
subjected to the rules of bp 22, he has to
make sure that it is sufficiently funded on the
date of due otherwise he runs the risk of being
imprisoned.
Q: Under the law, the drawer has 5 days form
notice of dishonor to pay the check. Is the
obligation of the drawer to pay the face value
of the check arises from same obligation which
is the contract?
A: It is already an obligation arising from law
which is BP 22.
Supposing A and B again, A is expecting a
money from a business partner and issued the
check expecting that it will be funded when it
becomes due. Unfortunately, the money did
not arrive. So when B deposited the check, it
was dishonored. At the time A receives the
notice of dishonor; he exhausted all efforts to
make the face value of the check but
unfortunately failed to produce as such. Is he
criminally liable?
A: Yes. The obligation now is arising from law,
which is not protected by this constitutional
guarantee.
Q: What is a poll tax?
A: They are taxes assessed on the ability of
the person to pay tax.
Q: What is Double Jeopardy?
Aila Nicko V. Santelices
A: When a person is charged with an offense
and the case is terminated either by acquittal
or conviction or in any other manner without
the consent of the accused, the latter cannot
again be charged with the same or identical
offense.
Q: Why does the constitution prohibits double
jeopardy?
A: No one is tried twice . Under the common
law principle of Ne bis in idem which means
that not twice in the same.
Q: What are the two kinds of double jeopardy?
A: 1) No person shall be twice put in jeopardy
of punishment for the same offense(Double
jeopardy for the punishment of the same
offense)
2)The act is punished by law and an ordinance
conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act. ( Double jeopardy for the
punishment of the same act)
Q: So far as the Double jeopardy for the
punishment of the same act, the Supreme
Court said in the case of People v. Relova,
the determining factor is the identity of the
act. How can we determine the same act which
gives rise to two or more offenses are covered
by constitutional guarantee against double
jeopardy?
A: The constitutional protection against double
jeopardy is available so long as the acts which
constitute or have given rise to the first
offense under a municipal ordinance are the
same acts which constitute or have given rise
to the offense charged under the statute.
(same criminal design)
Q: What are the elements of double jeopardy
in punishment of the same offense according
to the case of People v. Tampal?
A:1)A first jeopardy must have attached prior
to second
It is attached upon valid complaint of
information sufficient in form and substance
sufficient to sustain conviction and that it was
file before a competent court
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2)The first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated
There must be acquittal, conviction or
dismissal
3)A second jeopardy must be for the same
offense as that in the first
Q: Bestfriends A and B wanted to ensure
they’ll win the case. the public prosecutor
saying that I have a best friend judge who sits
in branch 1 of MTC, under the law the crime of
concubinage are cognizable by RTC, but A and
B want to initiate the proceedings in the MTC in
order to ensure the victory of A. The complaint
was initiated before MTC. Because of lack of
evidence, the MTC dismissed and acquitted D
and C. Can A and B initiate a second complaint
before RTC?
A: Although the MTC has no jurisdiction over
the case, A and B being estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the court
because A and B knew that the MTC had no
jurisdiction over the case but induced it to
have a jurisdiction; hence they are barred from
an appeal under the principle of estoppel.
Q: Supposing A is being indicted for homicide ,
he pleaded guilty for the offense charged and
when asked by the court if he is going to
present any mitigating circumstances to which
he said yes. He produced an evidence of self
defense; because of this the court acquitted
him. Can the judgment of acquittal be
appealed in the appellate court?
A: In the case of People v. Balisacan, a new
of plea of not guilty must be entered for him
but it was not done. It follows the effect there
having been no standing plea at the time the
court a quo rendered its acquittal, there can be
no double jeopardy with respect to appeal
herein.
Q: Is dismissal based on the right to speedy
trial is dismissal on the merits?
A: Yes. The dismissal of a criminal case upon
option of the accused because the prosecution
was not prepared for trial since the
complainant and his witnesses did not appear
at the trial is a dismissal equivalent to an
acquittal that would bar further prosecution of
the defendant for the same offense. (Esmena
v. Pogoy)
Aila Nicko V. Santelices
Q: What is the presumption why prosecution
delays a trial?
A: They do not have evidence. They only fish
for evidence.
Q: Punishment of the same offense
presupposes that there are two charges
against a complaint based on the same offense
that is the presumption when double jeopardy
for the same act becomes operative. Can
double jeopardy of the same offense apply
even if there is only one charged? Supposing A
is indicted for homicide and after the trial of
the merits, prosecution failed to present
sufficient evidence to convict A. Can the
prosecution appeal the judgment of acquittal?
A: No. The accused has the right of repose.
The prosecution is barred from appealing
judgment of acquittals, the accused is entitled
to rest. Therefore he may not be continuously
or successively prosecuted by the State for the
hope that the fate of the accused in the
appellate court may be overturned. (Lejano v.
People)
Q: Can a motion of reconsideration (same
court will review its decision) be filed in order
to review its decision of acquittal?
A: Not allowed because of the right of final
acquittal rule or right of repose.
Q: Supposing the judge before whom the case
is filed was administratively charged for
rendering partial decisions, gross partiality and
gross ignorance of the law. It was filed in the
Supreme Court , after trial the SC dismissed
the complaint for lack of merit. What the
complainant did filed a criminal complaint
based on the same act or omission. Can the
respondent judge invoke double jeopardy?
A: No. Supreme Court ruled in the case of
Icasiano v. Sandiganbayan, that double
jeopardy does not attach when the first action
is administrative in nature. It is, therefore,
correct for the Sandiganbayan to hold that
double jeopardy does not apply in the present
controversy because the SC case was
administrative in character while the
Sandiganbayan case is criminal in nature.
Q: Supposing after the filing of the criminal
complaint after the dismissal of the
administrative complaint, the criminal
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complaint was also dismissed by the
ombudsman for lack of merit. The complainant
initiated a second criminal complaint based on
the same act or omission against the
respondent judge. Can he claim now double
jeopardy?
Adil but these are the wrong application, the
SC should invoked the Melo doctrine. Under
rule 120 of the revised rules of court, the
doctrine of supervening event can be applied
when the accused was convicted for the lesser
offense.

A: No. double jeopardy does not attach in
preliminary investigation. There is no
arraignment so therefore there is no first
jeopardy that is attached.
Q: Supposing, A was indicted for killing B and
after arraignment, A pleaded not guilty. After
the arraignment of A, second criminal
information was initiated by the public
prosecutor for killing B. Can A claim double
jeopardy?
A: No. The Supreme Court ruled in the case of
People v. Pineda, the mere filing of two
information charging the same offense is not
and appropriate basis for invocation of double
jeopardy since the first jeopardy has not yet
set in by a previous conviction, acquittal or
termination of the case without the consent of
the accused.
Q: What is the same evidence rule in the case
of People v. Adil?
A: The offense 1 is considered as the same as
to the offense 2 under the same evidence test
if the evidence is necessary to convict the
accused in the first offense for the conviction
of the accused to the second offense. But the
Supreme Court ruled in Adil that the same
evidence test is not sufficient to under the first
jeopardy, because double jeopardy for the
same offense is not only applicable to similar
offense but also covers offenses considered as
an attempt or frustration or included or
includes in the former complaint or
information.
END 

Q: Supposing upon the filing of the first

information was for slight physical injuries,
after the filing of the criminal complaint the
accused pleaded not guilty the prosecution
noted that the injury marks a deformity
because of this discovery, the prosecution filed
a second information based on this act or
omission for grave physical injuries. Is there
double jeopardy?

A: The ruling of Supreme Court in the case of

People v. Adil, that the rule of identity does
not apply, however, when the second offense
was not in existence at the time of the first
prosecution, for the simple reason that in such
case there is no possibility for the accused
during the first prosecution, to be convicted of
an offense that was then inexistent. Thus,
were the accused was charged with physical
injuries and after conviction the injured dies,
the charge of homicide against the same
accused does not put him twice in jeopardy.

Q: Why not apply Pineda doctrine instead of

doctrine of supervening event in the
aforementioned case?

Atty. Gabriel: The Sc applied the doctrine of

supervening event in the cases of Melo and

Aila Nicko V. Santelices Page 37

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