RA 1199

NATURE OF TENANCY LAW

[G.R. No. L-10594. May 29, 1957.]

PONCIANO PRIMERO, Petitioner, v. COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS and SINFOROSO QUION, Respondents.

Tereso Ma. Montoya for Petitioner.

Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres, Nora G. Notratis and Cayetano
Santrico for respondent Court of Agrarian Relations.

Jesus M. Dator for respondent Sinforoso (Proso) Quion.

SYLLABUS

1. TENANCY; LEASE OF PROPERTY HELD IN TENANCY, EFFECT OF; DISPOSSESSION OF TENANT OF LANDHOLDINGS, ONLY
FOR CAUSES PROVIDED BY LAW. — The dispossession of a tenant in an agricultural land can only be allowed for any of the
causes enumerated in Section 50 of the Tenancy Law. Lease of a holding to another person who will convert it to a zacatal is
not one of those causes; consequently, the lease of the land in question does not extinguish the relationship of landlord and
tenant between the parties, and the lessee should assume the obligations of the former landholder in relation to his tenant.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; TENANCY LAW IS REMEDIAL LEGISLATION; PROVISIONS DO NOT IMPAIR RIGHT OF ALIENATION. —
Republic Act 1199 is a remedial legislation promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the Constitution and in the
exercise of the police power of the State to promote the common weal. Its provisions do not impair the right of the
landowner to dispose or alienate his property or prohibit him to make such transfer or alienation; they only provide that in
case of transfer or in case of lease, as in the present case, the tenancy relationship between the landowner and his tenant
should be preserved in order to secure the well-being of the tenant or protect him against unjustified dismissal from their
landholdings.

DECISION

ENDENCIA, J.:

Petitioner Ponciano Primero is the owner of a riceland situated in the barrio of San Juan, municipality of Gen. Trias, province
of Cavite, containing an area of 27,837 square meters, with Torrens title registered in the Registry of Deeds for the province
of Cavite, while respondent Sinforoso Quion is his tenant in said land. Desiring to lease said riceland to one Porfirio Potente
for the purpose of raising thereon ZACATE (a species of grass for horses’ feed), on March 3, 1956, petitioner served a written
notice thereof to respondent and requested him to vacate the premises, but the latter refused to do so. On March 7, 1956,
the petitioner executed the contract of lease in favor of Porfirio Potente, but the respondent still continued in the land
thereby hindering its delivery to the lessee, hence the petitioner filed with the Court of Agrarian Relations the petition under
consideration to secure an order directing the respondent to vacate the premises in question so that it may be delivered to
the lessee. After summons, the respondent filed his answer to the petition and on March 20, 1956, moved for the dismissal
of the petition on the ground (1) that it states no cause of action, the facts stated therein not being constitutive of any of the
causes for the dispossession of a tenant enumerated in section 50 of Republic Act No. 1199; (2) that under section 49 of the
same Act, no tenant could be dispossessed of his holding except for any of the causes enumerated in section 50 of said Act,
and (3) that under section 9 of the same Act, the lease of the land in question did not of itself extinguish the relationship
between the respondent as tenant and the petitioner as landowner. After due hearing, the motion was granted, Executive
Judge Guillermo S. Santos ruling as follows: jgc:c hanro bles. com.ph

". . . that the petition states no cause of action - because petitioner seeks the dispossession of respondent-tenant on a
ground which is not one of the causes recognized by law. As a rule, dispossession of a tenant in an agricultural land can only
be allowed for any of the causes enumerated in Sec. 50 of Rep. Act No. 1199. Lease of a holding to another person who will
convert it to a zacatal is not one of those grounds. Neither is the conversion of the holding into a zacatal. The reason
advanced by petitioner is without merit." cralaw virt ua1aw lib ra ry

Thereupon, petitioner appealed from the order of dismissal, and in this instance claims (1) that he has the right to dispossess
his tenant in case he leases his land for purposes of converting it into a ZACATAL; (2) that the lessee Potente, as new
landholder, has the right to employ a man of his choice in the ZACATAL; and (3) that ZACATE (horses’ feed) is not an
agricultural product within the purview of Republic Act No. 1199.
Carefully considered, the question involved in this case is simply whether, under the facts stated in the petition, the
petitioner has right to secure from the Court of Agrarian Relations authority to eject the respondent tenant from the riceland
held in tenancy by him only because said land was leased to one Porfirio Potente who will convert the same into a ZACATAL,
and said respondent refused to vacate it thereby hampering its delivery to the lessee.

The controlling law on the case are sections 9, 49 and 50 of Republic Act No. 1199, which read as follows: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

"SEC. 9. Severance of Relationship. — The tenancy relationship is extinguished by the voluntary surrender of the land by, or
the death or incapacity of, the tenant, but his heirs or the members of his immediate farm household may continue to work
the land until the close of the agricultural year. The expiration of the period of the contract as fixed by the parties, and the
sale or alienation of the land do not of themselves extinguish the relationship. In the latter case, the purchaser or transferee
shall assume the rights and obligations of the former-landholder in relation to the tenant. In case of death of the landholder,
his heir or heirs shall likewise assume his rights and obligations.

"SEC. 49. Ejectment of Tenant. — Notwithstanding any agreement or provision of law as to the period, in all cases where
land devoted to any agricultural purpose is held under any system of tenancy, the tenant shall not be dispossessed of his
holdings except for any of the causes hereinafter enumerated and only after the same has been proved before, and the
dispossession is authorized by, the court.

"SEC. 50. Causes for the Dispossession of a Tenant. — Any of the following shall be a sufficient cause for the dispossession of
a tenant from his holdings: chan rob1e s virtua l 1aw lib rary

(a) The bona fide intention of the landholder to cultivate the land himself personally or through the employment of farm
machinery and implements: . . .

(b) When the tenant violates or fails to comply with any of the terms and conditions of the contract or any of the provisions
of this Act: Provided, however, That this subsection shall not apply when the tenant has substantially complied with the
contract or with the provisions of this Act.

(c) The tenant’s failure to pay the agreed rental or to deliver the landholder’s share: Provided, however, That this shall not
apply when the tenant’s failure is caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure.

(d) When the tenant uses the land for a purpose other than that specified by agreement of the parties.

(e) When a share-tenant fails to follow those proven farm practices which will contribute towards the proper care of the land
and increased agricultural production.

(f) When the tenant through negligence permits serious injury to the land which will impair its productive capacity.

(g) Conviction by a competent court of a tenant or any member of his immediate family or farm household of a crime against
the landholder or a member of his immediate family." cralaw vi rtua1aw l ibra ry

Under the foregoing clear provisions of law, we find that the agrarian court committed no reversible error when it dismissed
the petition, firstly, because under the aforequoted section 9 of Rep. Act 1199, the contract of lease entered into by the
petitioner and Porfirio Potente did not of itself extinguish the relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner and
the respondent, and the lessee Potente should assume the obligations of the former landholder, the herein petitioner, in
relation to his tenant, the herein respondent; secondly, because under section 49, a tenant cannot be dispossessed of his
holding except for any of the causes enumerated in said section 50, and certainly the lease of the land in question to Potente
is not one of those causes for the dispossession of a tenant enumerated in section 50 of the Tenancy Law quoted above.
Consequently, we hold that under the provisions of law governing the case, the petition under consideration is completely
untenable, for once a tenancy relationship is established, the tenant is entitled to security of tenure with right to continue
working on and cultivating the land until he is dispossessed of his holdings for just cause provided by law or the tenancy
relationship is legally terminated.

Petitioner contends, however, that sections 9 and 50 of Republic Act 1199 are unconstitutional and void for they are against
paragraph 1, section 1 of Article III — Bill of Rights of our Constitution. It is argued that the petitioner has a perfect right to
dispossess his tenant because he wants to lease his land to a third person for the purpose of converting it into a ZACATAL
and that "the lessee has a perfect right to employ laborers of his own choice and to deny a lessee that right will be
tantamount to a deprivation of the right of the owner to lease his land for a better income, for no lessee will enter into a
contract of lease of a riceland to convert the same into a ZACATAL if he will be denied the freedom to employ a tenant of his
own choice." We find no merit in this contention. The provisions of law assailed as unconstitutional do not impair the right of
the landowner to dispose or alienate his property nor prohibit him to make such transfer or alienation; they only provide that
in case of transfer or in case of lease, as in the instant case, the tenancy relationship between the landowner and his tenant
should be preserved in order to insure the well-being of the tenant or protect him from being unjustly dispossessed by the
transferee or purchaser of the land; in other words, the purpose of the law in question is to maintain the tenants in the
peaceful possession and cultivation of the land or afford them protection against unjustified dismissal from their holdings.
Republic Act 1199 is unquestionably a remedial legislation promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the
Constitution and in the exercise of the police power of the State to promote the common weal. It is a statute relating to
public subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers of the State and involving the public rights and public
welfare of the entire community affected by it. Republic Act 1199, like the previous tenancy laws enacted by our lawmaking
body, was passed by Congress in compliance with the constitutional mandates that "the promotion of social justice to insure
the well-being and economic security of all the people should be the concern of the State" (Art. II, sec. 5) and that "the State
shall regulate the relations between landlord and tenant . . . in agriculture . . ." (Art. XIV, sec. 6).

As to the last question raised by the petitioner, to wit, whether the ZACATE is an agricultural product as contemplated by Act
1199, we find unnecessary to discuss it in view of the foregoing conclusion we arrived at, for the true question involved in
the case is whether the lease of petitioner’s land to Porfirio Potente constitutes just cause for dispossessing the respondent of
his holding on the land as tenant thereof.

Wherefore, finding no error in the order appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed with costs against the Petitioner-
Appellant.

SCOPE OF RA 1199

G.R. No. L-17649 July 31, 1963

ESTEBAN TAWATAO and LOURDES DEL ROSARIO, petitioners,

vs.
EUGENIO GARCIA, VIRGINIA DE VERA and HON. LEON P. DACAYO, Judge of the Court of Agrarian
Relations (First Regional District) Lingayen, Pangasinan, respondents.

Perfecto R. Bautista for petitioners.

Pepito R. Bautista and Vicente D. Millora for respondents Eugenio Garcia, et al.
Nostratis and Estrada for respondent Judge Leon P. Dacayo.

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to annul judgment rendered by the Court of Agrarian Relations Lingayen,
Pangasinan, in CAR case No. 539-P-58, and for a writ of preliminary injunction, under section 7 of Rule 67, Rules of
Court, to preserve the status quo of the parties in relation to the litigated matter pending these proceedings.

On 14 February 1958 Eugenio Garcia and Virginia de Vera filed a petition (Annex A) in the Court of Agrarian
Relations, First Regional District, Lingayen, Pangasinan alleging that since 1935 they have been the tenants of
parcel of nipa land containing an area of one-half hectare situated in the barrio Of Camaley, municipality of
Binmaley, province of Pangasinan, owned by the spouses Juliana Claudio and Pablo Tawatao, residents of Muñoz,
Nueva Ecija; that in 1950 they agreed to convert the nipa land into a fishpond, the expenses for such conversion to
be shared equally by both parties, as well as the products of the fishpond; that for the construction of the fishpond
the then petitioners, now respondents, spent the sum of P830, P330 of which was their own money and P500, a
loan from one Lucio Ramirez; that after the construction of the fishpond Juliana Claudio and Pablo Tawatao failed
and refused to pay their share of P400 despite demands for payment; that up to February, 1955 they had divided
share and share alike bangus and other kinds of fishes caught in the fishpond; that in February 1955, for and in
consideration of the sum of P700, Juliana Claudio and Pablo Tawatao leased for two years the fishfond to Salvador
Bautista of Camaley, Binmaley, Pangasinan, in spite of the objection by the then petitioners, now respondents, who
claimed that the lease would deprive them of their annual share amounting to P350; that sometime in 1956 the
owners of the fishpond donated it propter nuptias to their children Esteban Tawatao and Lourdes del Rosario, the
herein petitioners, who immediately took possession thereof, introduced improvements and refused to restore
possession thereof to then petitioners, respondents herein, despite demands; and that as a result of their
dispossession from the fishpond they suffered losses and damages. The then petitioners prayed that they be
reinstated as tenants of the fishpond, be paid the amount of P400, the share of the former owners of the parcel of
nipa land in the expenses incurred in converting it into fishpond, P750 as their share in the products of the fishpond
for the years from 1955 to 1957, P300 as attorney's fees and incidental expenses and P1,300 as moral, nominal
and exemplary damages.

In their answer the herein petitioners, then respondents, and their co-respondents, predecessors-in-interest, denied
each and every material allegation of the petition (CAR case No. 539-P-58) and claimed that in 1955 the then
petitioners, now respondents, Garcia and De Vera left the fishpond; that Juliana Claudio and Pablo Tawatao leased
it to Salvador Bautista and after the termination of the lease in 1956 donated it to their son Esteban Tawatao, herein
petitioner, in consideration of his marriage to Lourdes del Rosario. By way of counterclaim the then respondents
claimed that the then petitioners Garcia and De Vera failed and refused to render an accounting for the harvests in
the agricultural years 1953-1955 amounting to P450; that to defend themselves against the complaint of the then
petitioners they paid P250 for attorney's fees; and that they suffered moral and exemplary damages in the sum of
P1,500.

Notwithstanding the notice of the date and time of hearing duly served upon and received by counsel of the then
respondents, their counsel failed to appear. Thereupon, the then petitioners moved to be allowed to present their
evidence and the motion was granted.

The evidence presented by the then petitioners substantially supports the allegations of their petition.

After trial, the Court of Agrarian Relations rendered judgment, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the respondents are hereby ordered to reinstate the petitioners as tenants in the
landholding-fishfond located (situated) at Bo. Camaley, Binmaley, Pangasinan, having an area of one-half
(1/2) hectare, more or less, and to maintain them in the peaceful possession and cultivation of the same.
The respondents are likewise ordered to pay to the petitioners the amount of P1,200.00 as damages for
unlawful dispossession and P300.00 yearly from 1959 until the petitioners are actually reinstated. (Annex B).

In their petition the herein petitioners contend that Republic Act No. 1199, as amended by Republic Act No. 2263,
that governs the relations between landholders and tenants under both the share and leasehold tenancies of
agricultural lands for cultivation does not apply to fishponds, for in the latter there is no cultivation of the land to
speak of, and insist that section 42 of Republic Act No. 1199 and section 7 of Republic Act No. 1267 do not apply to
fishponds and residential lots but to agricultural lands only subject to cultivation. Corollary to the issue of lack of
jurisdiction, the herein petitioners also maintain that the basis of the complaint or petition is not a contract of a share
or leasehold tenancy but at most is one of partnership under article 1767 of the Civil Code.

In their answer to the petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, the herein respondents Garcia and De Vera
aver that their complaint is not predicated merely upon a contract of conversion of the nipa land into fishpond and
recovery of half of the amount spent for such conversion as agreed upon, but one for reinstatement under section
21, Republic Act No. 1199, as tenants of the herein petitioners, and damages arising from their unlawful
dispossession from and of the fishpond; that it is correct that they never entered into a contract of tenancy with the
petitioners herein, but the fact is that there was an implied tenancy relation between them from 1935 to 1955 which
was disturbed when in 1955 the fishpond was leased and in 1956 donated to the herein petitioners, a donation or
transfer that cannot deprive the respondent tenants of their right to continue as such. Only for causes enumerated
by law and only after the same shall have been proved before and the dispossession shall have been authorized by
the court may a tenant be dispossessed of his holding.1

The answer of the judge who presided over the respondent Court is to the same effect on the issue of jurisdiction. 1äwphï1.ñët

The point to determine in this case is, are the herein respondents Eugenio Garcia and Virginia de Vera entitled to
reinstatement in the fishpond under section 27 of Republic Act No. 1199, is amended by Republic Act No. 2263, and
damages?

The petitioners' argument that Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, applies only to agricultural lands fit for
cultivation and not to fishponds, because by nature the latter are not susceptible of cultivation, is without merit, for
section 46 of said Act, as amended, which partly provides that —

(c) The consideration for the use of sugar lands, fishponds, saltbeds and of lands devoted to the raising of
livestock shall be governed by stipulation between the parties.

is clear and need no interpretation. The law does not require actual cultivation of the land so that disputes affecting
tenancy relation involving a landholding fall under it. While the above section provides that the consideration for the
use of fishpond shall be governed by stipulation between the parties, yet the same does not strip the Court of
Agrarian Relations of its jurisdiction over tenancy disputes involving such kind of landholding. Furthermore, this
Court already has held that land in which fish is produced is classified as agricultural land and that the words "real
estate" include fisheries as used in article 55 of the Hague Conventions of 1907.2 In this case involving, as it does,
unlawful dispossession of the respondent tenants from their fishpond holding upon no legal cause, as provided for in
sections 27, 49 and 50 of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended by Republic Act No. 2263, the Court of Agrarian
Relations has exclusive jurisdiction to order the reinstatement and payment of damages for losses suffered by them,
and for that reason the proceedings and the judgment rendered in this case being in accordance with law are valid
and binding.

The claim that because "they (herein petitioners) have been in actual possession of the land for a period of two
years prior to the filing of the complaint by the respondent spouses," "the respondent court has no jurisdiction over
the case," is without merit, because such jurisdiction over the subject matter does not depend on whether or not at
the time of the filing of the proper action there was a tenancy relation between the parties. Neither does the bringing
of the action three years after the respondent tenants had been unlawfully dispossessed of the fishpond negate the
existence of tenancy relation nor does it constitute or amount to a waiver of the right to reinstatement, for Republic
Act No. 1199, as amended, does not provide for a prescriptive period within which to file a complaint for unlawful
dispossession.

The writ prayed for is denied, with costs against the petitioners.

G.R. No. L-14573 May 18, 1962

CONCEPCION FELICIANO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, ET AL., respondents.

Vicente R. Macasaet for petitioner.

Nora G. Nostratis for respondent Court of Agrarian Relations.
Meliton C. Parducho for respondent Amado Afable.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Concepcion Feliciano filed a petition before the Court of Agrarian Relations asking for authority to dispossess her
tenant Amado Afable of his holding situated in barrio Libtong, Meycauayan, Bulacan, on the ground that (1) she
desires to cultivate it personally under Section 50 (a), Republic Act No. 1199, and (2) said tenant failed to pay in full
the agreed annual rental for the agricultural years 1951 to 1955.

The tenant, thru counsel, after admitting his tenancy relationship with petitioner, disclaimed knowledge of the truth of
the allegations contained in the petition.

After both parties had presented their evidence, the court, on September 8, 1958, rendered judgment denying the
petition. Petitioner was required to maintain her tenancy relationship with respondent and to respect his peaceful
possession of his landholding in accordance with law. Petitioner interposed the present petition for review.

The issues posed by petitioner are:

(a) Whether a cultivation with aid of, or through, a son and son-in-law, complies with Section 50 (a),
Republic Act No. 1199, as ground for dispossession of the tenant.

(b) Whether the petitioner has evidence to support her claim of non-payment of the rentals for the years
1951 to 1954.

(c) Whether the finding that petitioner 'did not show that the "agreed" rental is legal and proper', is supported
by the evidence.

With regard to the first issue, it was proven that petitioner gave notice to her tenant that she intended to work the
land with the aid of her son Marcelino Feliciano and son-in-law Pastor Bervoso. She notified her tenant of such
intention on July 12, 1956. In another letter, dated February 26, 1957, she advised him of her intention to get back
the land for the reason that he was not complying with his obligation to pay the rental agreed upon. And on March
18, 1957, she notified the court of her intention to personally cultivate the land. The agrarian court found that
petitioner complied with the law relative to the notice requirement prior to the grant of authority to cultivate the land
on the part of the owner, but reached the conclusion that petitioner cannot avail of the right granted by law to get
back the land for that purpose because, according to the evidence, she will not be the one to personally cultivate the
holding but will deliver it to her son and son-in-law considering that she is already aged and sickly and is incapable
to do manual work. In the opinion of the agrarian court, to warrant authority to eject a tenant from his landholding on
the ground of personal cultivation it is indispensable that petitioner be capable of farming the land but will only do so
with the aid of her son or son-in-law, the same is contrary to the spirit and purpose of a law.

We disagree with this view. While the law provides that the bona fide intention of the land holder to cultivate the land
personally, or thru the employment of farm machinery of implements, is a sufficient cause for dispossession of a
tenant from his holding, this provision should not be taken literally. A landholder who owns a small parcel of land
which is farmed by a tenant and desires to get it back because he has a son who can do the farming for him comes
within the spirit of this provision, provided that he does not have any other property and the one to do the cultivation
is a member of his family. The idea is to give the landholder an opportunity to attend to the cultivation of his farm to
improve his financial condition. To hold otherwise would be to advance the fortune of an outsider to the detriment of
the member of his own family.

Moreover, considering the cohesion existing among the members of a Filipino family because of the intimate
spiritual ties that bind them one can hardly dispute that the work of one is the work of the rest. This is the same
philosophy we expressed in a case involving the desire of a wife-landholder to work the land thru her husband even
if she herself was not in a position to do the farming. We said, in upholding the right of the wife to get back the
landholding, that by the contract of marriage, a man and a woman enter a joint life, acting, living and working as
one. Upon marriage, the husband and the wife become one single, moral, spiritual, and social being, not only for
purposes of procreation, but also for purposes of mutual help and protection. There is between them a full and
complete community of existence.1

The same community of life and of interest exist between the members of the same family. We can even say that
the spiritual tie is greater when it comes to the relation of a mother and a son. If a wife is given the privilege of
working a farmland thru her husband, no valid reason is seen why a mother cannot be given the same privilege. 1äwphï1.ñët

Moreover, the law allows a tenant to cultivate a piece of agricultural land held under a contract of tenancy either
personally or with the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm household (Republic Act No. 1199,
Section 4, paragraph 3, as amended by Republic Act No. 2263). Note that he is not even required to have said
cultivation undertaken by immediate members of his family, but only by his immediate farm household, who may or
may not belong to the family. Surely, no reason exists why the same right should be denied to the landowner
himself. If the purpose of the law is to establish the tenancy relation between landlord and tenant upon the principle
of social justice, and to afford adequate protection to the rights of both tenant and landholder (Section 2, Republic
Act No. 1199), the protective arm of the law must be extended equally to the tenant as well as to the landlord.

Having reached the above conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised by petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Petitioner is hereby granted authority to dispossess
respondent in order that she may cultivate her landholding under Section 50 (a) of Republic Act No. 1199. No costs.

PURPOSE OF LAW

G.R. No. L-15192 October 24, 1960

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,

vs.
TEOFILO RAMIREZ, ET AL., respondents.

Ramon B. de los Reyes for petitioner.

Jorito C. Peralta for respondent.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal taken by the Philippine National Bank from the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations in its Case No.
558-P-58.

The facts leading to the filing of the action in the Court below were found by said Court to be as follows:

That since 1953 Agustin Pecio had been cultivating the two hectares of land in question located at Bo.
Capulaan, Balungao, Pangasinan, belonging to Jose Castillo y Refuerzo; that when the Philippine National
Bank became the administrator of the estate of the late Jose Castillo y Refuerzo, its Trust Officer, through
his representative, Atty. Jose Manalansan, executed contracts of tenancy with the tenants of the hacienda;
that for his purpose, Atty. Manalansan went in 1955 to Balungao, Rosales, and Umingan, Pangasinan, to
contact the tenants and he stayed there for two months; that Atty. Manalansan met the tenants in the
municipal building of Balungao and there executed the tenancy contracts; that Atty. Manalansan did not
know any of the tenants then and so what he did was to rely on the information given to him by the tenants;
that one morning, while Atty. Manalansan was in front of the municipal building under the acacia tree, Teofilo
Ramirez approached him and told him that he was the tenant in two parcels of land located in Bos.
Esmeralda and Capulaan, Bulangao; that Teodorico Dirije then filled in the blank in the contract forms by
typing the information dictated by Teofilo Ramirez; that the finished contract of tenancy (Exhibit "A") was
registered in the municipal treasurer's office of Balungao on the same date of execution, June 25, 1955; that
according to the contract, Ramirez was to cultivate four hectares of land situated at Bos. Esmeralda and
Capulaan, Balungao, Pangasinan; that a few days thereafter Agustin Pecio appeared and reported to Atty.
Manalansan that he was the actual tenant in the landholding in Capulaan included in the contract of tenancy
executed by the Philippine National Bank and Teofilo Ramirez; that Atty. Manalansan then referred the
matter to the Chief of Police to bring them to the municipal mayor for conciliation; that as a result a
"katulagan" or agreement was entered into by and between Ramirez and Pecio; that by virtue of the
"katulagan" Ramirez cultivated one-hectare portion of the same agricultural year 1955-1956; that Ramirez
harvested 40 cavanes in said year, with the seeds, threshing and harvesting expenses already deducted,
while Pecio harvested 35 cavanes; and that after the agricultural year 1955-1956 the entire two-hectare
landholding in Capulaan was, by virtue of the "katulagan" or agreement, delivered to Agustin Pecio who
cultivated the same since then up to the present time.

Later, Teofilo Ramirez filed the aforestated case against the Philippine National Bank in the Agrarian Court, alleging
that he had been illegally ousted from one-half of the land in question during the agricultural year 1956-1957, and
from the whole of it thereafter, and asking for reinstatement and for the payment of the value of his unrealized
shares of the harvest of the land during the period of his dispossession, plus moral damages and attorney's fees.
The bank answered, denying liability under the complaint, and, with the authority of the court, brought in Agustin
Pecio as third-party defendant, who likewise denied any liability. The case was then tried, and on September 29,
1958, the Agrarian Court rendered judgment, holding, on the basis of the above-quoted findings of fact, that
although the tenancy contract between the bank and Ramirez was executed through fraud and mispresentation on
the part of the latter, the "katulagan" or agreement Exhibit "1" between Ramirez and Agustin Pecio was an express
ratification by the latter of said tenancy contract and had the effect of a surrender by Pecio of his right as tenant over
one-half of the land in question and of constituting Ramirez as the tenant over such portion, so that thereafter, he
was entitled to security of tenure under section 49 of Republic Act No. 1199; whereupon, the bank was ordered to
reinstate Ramirez to one-half of the land in question, and to pay him damages of 12 cavanes of palay yearly from
the agricultural year 1956-1957 until his reinstatement. From this judgment, the bank as already stated in the first
part of this decision, appealed.

The appeal should be sustained.

First of all, we agree with the petitioner bank that the lower court having found that third-party defendant Agustin
Pecio was the true tenant of the land in question and not respondent Ramirez, Pecio is entitled to security of tenure
under section 7, Republic Act No. 1199, and may not be dispossessed of his landholding except for any of the
causes enumerated in Section 19 of the same Act, and without the cause having been proved before and the
dispossession authorized by the Agrarian Court, in accordance with section 49, same law. Consequently, the
tenancy contract Exhibit "A" signed between the petitioner bank and appellee Ramirez is illegal and void since it
deprives Pecio of his tenure over the land in question; and being a nullity, said contract did not create any tenancy
relation between the bank Ramirez, nor could the latter acquire any rights thereunder.
What is more, the Agrarian Court conclusively found that respondent Ramirez was guilty of fraud and
misrepresentation in the signing of the tenancy contract Exhibit "A", having falsely identified himself to the
representative of the bank as the tenant of the land in question, and it consent to said tenancy contract. This
contract is, consequently, not only void ab initio for being contrary to the law giving Pecio, the true tenant, security of
tenure, but also annullable or voidable on the part of the bank whose consent thereto was given through fraud and
mistake. Thus, the bank was justified refusing to recognize said contract after it learned of Ramirez' deceitful act,
and in giving the land to Pecio, the lawful and true tenant. The Court below, in ordering the reinstatement of
Ramirez, was, in effect, legalizing his imposture. Such a decree is against morals and public policy and can not be
allowed to stand.

As for the "katulagan" or agreement (Exhibit "1") entered into by Pecio and Ramirez merely to settle their dispute
over the tenantry of the land in question that arose form the latter's fraud, the only effect that could be given this
agreement was, as stipulated therein by the parties, for Ramirez to share the cultivation of the land in question
equally with Pecio during the agricultural year 1955-1956. Obviously, said agreement could not have created
between Ramirez and the petitioner bank the relationship of landlord and tenant so as to entitle the latter to the
security of tenure guaranteed by Republic Act No. 1199. Besides, the tenancy law, conceived as it was to redeem
the tenant from the onerous terms of his tenancy and uplift his social and financial status (Pineda vs. Pingul and
C.I.R., 92 Phil., 89; 48 Off. Gaz. [9] 3901), can not be invoked to protect one who is not a true and lawful tenant but
who became so only through deceitful and insidious acts.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint dismissed, with costs against respondent
Teofilo Ramirez.

DEFINITION OF AGRICULTURAL TENANCY / COCONUT LAND; CHARACTERISTICS OF SHARE TENANCY

G.R. No. L-28280-81 November 28, 1969

GERONIMO DE LOS REYES, petitioner,

vs.
GREGORIO ESPINELI, RUPERTO ALCANTARA, JORGE LOBREN, PEDRO AMANTE, MATEO GUTIERREZ,
ISIDRO RAMOS, SANTOS DANGUE, MIGUEL RAMOS, CORNELIO GARCIA, MARGARITO BELARMINO,
IRENEO BATRALO, SIMPLICIO CASTRO, VICENTE ANIVES, MIGUEL HERNANDEZ, EUGENIO DALISAY,
LEON LACSAMANA, and BELEN ALVAREZ, respondents.

Luis A. L. Javellana and Yolanda Q. Javellana for petitioner.

Manuel A. Cordero for respondents.

CASTRO, J.:

Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. No. 37689-R and C.A.-G.R. No. 37690-R
modifying that of the Court of Agrarian Relations in CAR cases 1185 and 1186.

The petitioner Geronimo de los Reyes is the owner of a 200-hectare coconut plantation located in Calauan, Laguna.
In 1958 his overseer ("katiwala") therein was Gonzalo Belarmino, who took into the land the 17 respondents under
an agreement that the latter were to receive 1/7 portion of every coconut harvest. Sometime in October, 1962, the
petitioner dismissed Belarmino, upon the suspicion that the latter had been deceiving him, in connivance with the
respondents.

On March 2, 1963 Ruperto Alcantara, et al., and Gregorio Espineli (respondents here) filed separate petitions
(subsequently amended) against De los Reyes in the Court of Agrarian Relations, seeking the delivery to them of
the difference between the 1/7 share which the petitioner had been giving them and the 30% share to which they, as
share tenants, were allegedly entitled. Upon the finding that the respondents were mere agricultural workers of the
petitioner, the CAR ordered the latter to retain them as such and to pay them the sum of P4,559.07 "which is the
total of their unpaid share of 1/7 of the net coconut harvests for the period from September 13 to December 23,
1962 and February 25 to May 28, 1963," plus P500 as attorney's fees. Upon respondents' appeal, the Court of
Appeals modified the decision of the CAR, by declaring the respondents tenants of the petitioner and ordering the
latter to pay them "the difference between the one-seventh (1/7) share of the crops and the thirty (30%) per cent
provided for in the Tenancy Law from the year 1958 up to the filing of the petitions and so on; the resulting amount
for this purpose to be arrived at in a liquidation to be submitted, if and when this judgment shall have become final
and the record remanded to the lower court."

Basically, the petitioner contends that (1) there existed no contractual relationship between him and the
respondents; (2) the respondents were not his tenants; and (3) the decision of the Court of Appeals deprives him of
his property without due process of law.

The respondents attempted to have the present appeal dismissed on the ground that it involves questions of fact. If
indeed the issues posed by the petitioner necessarily invite calibration of the entire evidence,1 then the appeal
should be dismissed since issues only of law may be raised in an appeal from the Court of Appeals to this Court.2 It
seems to us clear, however, that the petitioner accepts the findings of fact made by the appellate court, but takes
exception to the conclusions drawn therefrom. Such being the case, the questions here tendered for resolution are
purely of law.3

At the outset, we must resolve the question of existence of a contract, the petitioner alleging, as he does, that his
consent, express or implied, had never been given. His position, simply stated, is that at the time the respondents
were taken into his land by Belarmino, the latter was a mere laborer and therefore without the requisite authority to
contract in his behalf, and it was only later that he was promoted to the position of overseer. However, in his
"Amended Complaint" of April 22, 1968,4 the petitioner prayed that "judgment be rendered ... finding the defendants
guilty of a breach of their contractual obligation with the plaintiff," and in the body thereof he incorporated statements
from which it can plainly be seen that a contractual relationship existed between the parties.

Verily, there was and still is a contractual relationship between the petitioner and the respondents. In our view the
pith of the problem is, actually, whether the relationship is that of agricultural share tenancy (as averred by the
respondents) or that of farm employer and agricultural laborer (as asserted by the petitioner). On a determination of
this question depends the respective rights of the parties, more particularly the proper assessment of the share of
the respondents under the law.

Of fundamental relevance in this discussion are definitions of basic terms.

"Agricultural tenancy" is the physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture belonging to, or legally
possessed by, another for the purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the members of his
immediate farm household, in consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter, or to pay
a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in both.5 "Share tenancy" exists whenever two
persons agree on a joint undertaking for agricultural production wherein one party furnishes the land and the other
his labor, with either or both contributing any one or several of the items of production, the tenant cultivating the land
personally with the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm household, and the produce thereof
to be divided between the landholder and the tenant in proportion to their respective contributions.6 And a "share
tenant" is a person who, himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the
land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent, for purposes of production, sharing the produce
with the landholder."7

It is to be readily deduced from the foregoing definitions that aside from the usual essential requisites of a
contract,8the characteristics of a share tenancy contract are: (1) the parties are a landholder, who is a natural or
juridical person and is the owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of agricultural land,9 and a tenant who,
himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land which is the subject-
matter of the tenancy; (2) the subject-matter is agricultural land; (3) the purpose of the contract is agricultural
production; and (4) the cause or consideration is that the landholder and the share tenant would divide the
agricultural produce between themselves in proportion to their respective contributions.

While the Agricultural Tenancy Act did not define the term "agricultural laborer" or "agricultural worker," the
Agricultural Land Reform Code does. A "farm worker" is "any agricultural wage, salary or piece worker but is not
limited to a farm worker of a particular farm employer unless this Code explicitly states otherwise, and any individual
whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, a current agrarian dispute or an unfair labor
practice and who has not obtained a substantially equivalent and regular employment." The term includes "farm
laborer and/or farm employees."10 An "agricultural worker" is not a whit different from a "farm worker."
From the definition of a "farm worker" thus fashioned, it is quite apparent that there should be an employer-
employee relationship between the "farm employer"11 and the farm worker. In determining the existence of an
employer-employee relationship, the elements that are generally considered are the following: (1) the selection and
engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the employer's power to
control the employee's conduct. It is this last element that constitutes the most important index of the existence of
relationship.12

This is not to say that agricultural workers or farm laborers are industrial workers. Not by any means, although they
may both appear in the same establishment. The difference lies in the kind of work they do. Those whose labor is
devoted to purely agricultural work are agricultural laborers. All others are industrial workers.13 Nonetheless, they
belong to the same class. Both are workers. Both are employees.

We are here primarily interested in the basic differences between a farm employer-farm worker relationship and an
agricultural sharehold tenancy relationship. Both, of course, are leases, but there the similarity ends. In the former,
the lease is one of labor, with the agricultural laborer as the lessor of his services, and the farm employer as the
lessee thereof.14 In the latter, it is the landowner who is the lessor, and the sharehold tenant is the lessee of
agricultural land. As lessee he has possession of the leased premises.15 But the relationship is more than a mere
lease. It is a special kind of lease, the law referring to it as a "joint undertaking."16 For this reason, not only the
tenancy laws are applicable, but also, in a suppletory way, the law on leases, the customs of the place and the civil
code provisions on partnership.17 The share tenant works for that joint venture. The agricultural laborer works for the
farm employer, and for his labor he receives a salary or wage, regardless of whether the employer makes a
profit.18On the other hand, the share tenant participates in the agricultural produce. His share is necessarily
dependent on the amount of the harvest.

Since the relationship between farm employer and agricultural laborer is that of employer and employee, the
decisive factor is the control exercised by the former over the latter. On the other hand, the landholder has the "right
to require the tenant to follow those proven farm practices which have been found to contribute towards increased
agricultural production and to use fertilizer of the kind or kinds shown by proven farm practices to be adapted to the
requirements of the land." This is but the right of a partner to protect his interest, not the control exercised by an
employer. If landholder and tenant disagree as to farm practices, the former may not dismiss the latter. It is the court
that shall settle the conflict according to the best interests of both parties.19

The record is devoid of evidentiary support for the notion that the respondents are farm laborers. They do not
observe set hours of work. The petitioner has not laid down regulations under which they are supposed to do their
work. The argument tendered is that they are guards. However, it does not appear that they are under obligation to
report for duty to the petitioner or his agent. They do not work in shifts. Nor has the petitioner prescribed the manner
by which the respondents were and are to perform their duties as guards. We do not find here that degree of control
and supervision evincive of an employer-employee relationship. Furthermore, if the respondents are guards, then
they are not agricultural laborers, because the duties and functions of a guard are not agricultural in nature.20 It is
the Industrial Court that has jurisdiction over any dispute that might arise between employer and employee. Yet, the
petitioner filed his complaint against the respondents in the Court of Agrarian Relations.

We now proceed to determine if there are present here the salient characteristics of an agricultural share tenancy
contract. The subject-matter is coconut land, which is considered agricultural land under both the Agricultural Land
Tenancy ACT21 and the Agricultural Land Reform Code.22 The purpose of the contract is the production of coconuts;
the respondents would receive 1/7 of the harvest. The petitioner is the landholder of the coconut plantation.

The crucial factors are that the tenant must have physical possession of the land for the purpose of production23 and
he must personally cultivate the land. If the tenant does not cultivate the land personally he cannot be considered a
tenant even if he is so designated in the written agreement of the parties.24

"Cultivation" is not limited to the plowing and harrowing of the land. It includes the various phrases of farm labor
described and provided by law, the maintenance, repair and weeding of dikes, paddies and irrigation canals in the
holding. Moreover, it covers attending to the care of the growing plants.25 Where the parties agreed that they would
"operate a citrus nursery upon the condition that they would divide the budded citrus in the proportion of 1/3 share of
respondents and 2/3 as share of petitioner," and that the "petitioner would furnish all the necessary seedlings and
seeds, as well as the technical know-how in the care, cultivation, budding and balling of the budded citrus, while
respondents would furnish the land necessary for the nursery, the farm labor that may be needed to plant and
cultivate, and all the chemicals, fertilizers, and bud tapes that may be necessary for such cultivation," then "the
tenancy agreement entered into between the parties has relation to the possession of agricultural land to be devoted
to the production of agricultural products thru the labor of one of the parties, and as such comes within the purview
of the term 'agricultural tenancy' as defined in section 3 of Republic Act No. 1199 as amended."26

In one instance,27 the landholder claimed that his caretaker was not an agricultural tenant because he "does not till
or cultivate the land in order to grow the fruit bearing trees because they are already full grown," and "he does not
even do the actual gathering of the fruits" but "merely supervises the gathering, and after deducting the expenses,
he gives one-half of the fruits to plaintiff all in consideration of his stay in the land." This Court's answer was to the
point:

Anyone who has had fruit trees in his yard will disagree with the above description of the relationship. He
knows the caretaker, must water the trees, even fertilize them for better production, uproot weeds and turn
the soil, sometimes fumigate to eliminate plant pests, etc. Those chores obviously mean "working or
cultivating" the land. Besides, it seems that defendant planted other crops, [i.e., cultivated the lot] giving the
landowner his corresponding share.

The Court of Appeals made some essential findings of fact. The respondents were called "kasama." They have
plowing implements. The respondent Pedro Amante even used to have a carabao which he subsequently
exchanged for a horse. Almost all of the respondents have banana plantations on the land. They live in the
landholding. They are charge with the obligation to clean their respective landholdings. Certain portions of the land
are planted to palay.

These factual findings may not be reviewed by the Supreme Court.28 Furthermore, the said facts are supported by
the testimony of the petitioner himself, who admitted that the respondents are his "kasama," although he tried to
minimize the effect of this admission by alleging that although called "kasama," the respondents "do not perform the
work of a "kasama," and that in Quezon the "kasama" plow the land, they plant rice, but here in Laguna, they do not
do anything." The appellate court was correct in concluding that "kasama" means "tenant,"29 not worker or laborer,
which is translated into our national language as "manggagawa."30 Respecting farm implements, the petitioner
admitted that "they have the implements," but again he tried to minimize the significance of his statement by adding
that "they have not used it in the farm." However, the report of the CAR clerk of court, based on his ocular
inspection, pertinently states that he found "certain portions planted with palay."

The petitioner cannot deny that the respondents were all living in the landholding and that "all of them have banana
plantation, small or big, "though he averred," not one single banana was given to me as my share."

We now come to the all-important question of whether the respondents have the duty to cultivate the land in order
that the trees would bear more coconuts. The petitioner's answers on cross-examination are quite revealing. Thus:

Q. Where these petitioners duty bound to do any cleaning or clearing of the underbrush within the
coconut land?

A. These laborers clean the land from where . . . They are getting their food and subsistence.

COURT: The question is that, are they duty bound to clean the landholding in question?

A. To make my answer short, I say that the responsibility is to Gonzalo Belarmino, to him, because he is
the one who engaged them.

xxx xxx xxx

A. One, to guard the property and use their names as threat to people who might ... have the intention of
stealing my coconuts, and two, to assist in the clearing of the land because that is the responsibility of
Gonzalo Belarmino. . . .31

Undeniably, the petitioner considers it one of the duties of the respondents to clear and clean the land. Additionally,
in his complaint the petitioner claimed that "the defendants have abandoned their posts at the plaintiff's plantation
and have likewise failed and refused to comply with their contractual obligation with the plaintiff to keep the areas
respectively assigned to them clean and clear of undergrowths and cogonal grass at all times, with the result that it
is now impossible for the plaintiff to harvest the mature coconuts as these would only be lost amid the undergrowth
and cogonal which have now grown to unreasonable heights, thereby causing further damage and prejudice to the
plaintiff." (Emphasis supplied).

The petitioner clearly expected the respondents to perform the duties of a tenant, especially, to maintain the land
clean and clear "at all times," which not only would facilitate harvesting but, more importantly, would necessarily
result in greater production. As found by the CAR clerk of court during the ocular inspection,

the planting of palay has a direct effect on the growing of the coconuts because in the places he found
planted with palay, the coconut trees displayed white leaves gray in color with plenty of nuts or fruits,
compared to the portion in the hacienda where we encountered cogon grasses, under brushes and ipil-ipil
tress, there is a need for thorough cleaning, especially the ipil-ipil trees which are growing high for years
already in-between the rows of coconut trees.32

Therefore, the parties to the contract understood, in sum and substance, that the respondents were to "cultivate" the
land. Whether the latter had been remiss in the performance of their contractual obligations, does not affect the
nature of the contract which the appellate court analyzed and found to be that of share tenancy. It is the principal
features and stipulations which determine the true essence of a contract.33 Considering then that the respondents
are duty bound to cultivate their respective holdings (of which they have possession), and that they share in the
harvest, the Court of Appeals' conclusion must be upheld. This, especially in the light of the facts that the
respondents raise secondary crops and have their homes in their respective holdings.

The petitioner having entered into a share tenancy contract with the respondents, it certainly cannot be seriously
claimed that the relationship of landlord and tenant is unjustifiably being imposed on him without due process of law.
It was the petitioner himself who voluntarily entered the relationship, and, therefore, should shoulder the
consequences thereof, one of which is that the tenants must be given, as they are entitled to, a 30% share in the
produce.34

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is affirmed, at petitioner's cost.

CHARACTERISTICS OF SHARE TENANCY

G.R. No. L-12902 July 29, 1959

CEFERINO MARCELO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
NAZARIO DE LEON, defendant-appellee.

Pedro D. Maldia and San Vicente and Jardiel for appellant.

Inciong and Bacalso for appellee.

BENGZON, J.:

The plaintiff has appealed from the order of judge Jose N. Leuterio of the Nueva Ecija court of first instance,
dismissing his complaint whereby he had asked that defendant be required to vacate a parcel of land and to pay
damages. The dismissal rested on two grounds, (a) the case pertained to the Court of Agrarian Relations; and (b) as
attorney-in-fact of the true owner of the land, the plaintiff had no right to bring the action.

The record disclose that on February 4, 1957, Ceferino Marcelo, filed in the justice of the peace court of San
Antonio, Nueva Ecija, a complaint to recover possession of a lot of 2,000 square meters belonging to Severino P.
Marcelo (who had given him a full power-of-attorney) which was held by defendant "on the understanding that one-
half of all the products raised in the occupied area, would be given" to the landowner. The complaint alleged that
after plaintiff had assumed the administration of Severino Marcelo's properties, defendant delivered the products
corresponding to the owner; but when in September 1956, plaintiff notified defendant that in addition to giving half of
the produce, he would have to pay a rental of two pesos per month, the latter refused, and continued refusing to pay
such additional charges. Wherefore, complainant prayed for judgment ordering defendant to leave the premises and
to pay damages and costs.

The defendant questioned the court's jurisdiction, arguing that the matter involved tenancy relations falling within the
authority of the Agrarian Court; he also challenged the capacity of plaintiff to sue. He lost in the justice of the peace
court; however, on appeal to the court of first instance, he raised the same issues on a motion to dismiss, and then
his views prevailed.

In this appeal, plaintiff insists he merely filed ejectment or detainer proceedings, which fall within the justice of the
peace court's jurisdiction. He claims the lot to be residential, and not agricultural. On this point, His Honor noted that
"the land covered by the title of plaintiff's principal covers an area of 59,646 square meters situated in the barrio of
San Mariano, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija. This land obviously is agricultural, and it is too much to presume that barrio
folks would occupy an area of 2,000 square meters more or less of land for a residence. The cultivation of the land
by the defendant and the sharing of the products thereof with the owner of the land characterize the relationship
between the defendant and the plaintiff's principal as one of the landlord and tenant.

Indeed, from the allegations of the complaint, one could conclude that defendant had physical possession of the
land for the purpose of cultivating it and giving the owner a share in the crop. This was agricultural tenancy of the
kind called "share tenancy". In judging this relationship, the 2-pesos-a-month-rental alleged in the complaint may be
disregarded, because defendant never having agreed to such imposition, it may not be held a part of the
compensation payable for holding the land. The circumstance that defendant built a dwelling on the agricultural lot
does not ipso facto make it residential — considering specially that the dwelling — photograph submitted with brief
— does not occupy more than 80 square meters occupied by him. In this connection, plaintiff argues as follows:

The defendant does not till or cultivate the land in order to grow the fruit bearing trees because they are
already full grown. He does not even do the actual gathering, and after deducting the expenses, he gives
one-half of the fruits to the plaintiff all in consideration of his stay in the land. He is not, therefore, a tenant
within the meaning of that term as used in Republic Act. No. 1199 for "A tenant shall mean a person who,
himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivate the land for purposes
of production . . ."

Anyone who had fruit trees in his yard, will disagree with the above description of the relationship. He knows the
caretaker must water the trees, even fertilize them for better production, uproot weeds and turn the soil, sometimes
fumigate to eliminate plants pests, etc. Those chores obviously mean "working or cultivating" the land. Besides, it
seems that defendant planted other crops, (i.e. cultivated the lot) giving the landowner his corresponding share.

Now, the statutes provide that "All cases involving dispossession of a tenant by the landholder . . . shall be under
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of such court as may now or hereafter be authorized by law to take cognizance
of tenancy relations and disputes". Sec. 2, Republic Act 1199); and the court (Agrarian Relations) "shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction to consider, investigate, decide and settle all questions and matters involving all
those relationships established by law which determine the varying rights of persons in cultivation and use of
agricultural land where one of the parties works the land". (Sec. 7, Republic Act 1267 as amended by Republic Act
1409.)

In Tumbagan vs. Vasquez, L-8719, July 17, 1956, we impliedly held that where a farmland occupies agricultural
land and erects a house thereon, the tenancy relationship continues subject to tenancy laws — not to those
governing leases.

In fact, the Agricultural Tenancy Law (Republic Act 1199) requires the landholder to give his tenant an area wherein
the latter may construct his dwelling (sec. 26), of course without thereby changing the nature of their relationship,
from landowner and tenant to lessor and lessee.

At any rate, this action must fail upon the second ground of defendant's motion to dismiss: the plaintiff is a
mere apoderado of the owner, Severino P. Marcelo.1 The rule is that every action must be prosecuted in the name
of the real party in interest, (sec 2, Rule 3).

However, plaintiff quotes that part of sec. 1 of Rule 72, permitting "the legal representative" of any landlord to bring
an action of ejectment, and insists in his right now to litigate. Supposing that "legal representative" as used in sec. 1,
includes attorneys-in-fact, we find that plaintiff's power attached to the complaint, authorizes him to sue for and in
the name of Severino Marcelo, to "pursue any and all kinds of suits and actions for me and in my name in the courts
of the land". This action is not in the name of plaintiff's principal.

For all the foregoing, the appealed order is affirmed with costs chargeable against appellant.

G.R. No. L-20098 January 31, 1966

SILVERIO LATAG, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
MARCELO BANOG, defendant-appellee.

Endaya, Caleasal and Delgado for the plaintiff-appellant.

Suanes, Barbosa and Atienza for the defendant-appellee.

ZALDIVAR, J.:

This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Batangas dismissing the complaint in its Civil Case
No. 1263, on the ground that said court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case.

On February 13, 1962 the plaintiff-appellant filed a complaint against the defendant-appellee alleging, in substance:
that the defendant is the absolute owner of two parcels of land situated in Barrio Quilib, Rosario, Batangas; that on
December 7, 1960, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a written contract whereby it was agreed that the
former was to act as manager, cultivator and caretaker of the two parcels of land owned by the latter, and of all the
useful plants planted, and to be planted, on said lands, with the understanding that all the products of the orange
and the calamansi trees planted thereon would be divided into three equal parts; two-thirds of which would be the
share of the plaintiff and one-third would be the share of the defendant, while the sharing in the other products like
coffee, bananas, mangoes, black pepper and others would be on the fifty-fifty basis; and it was further agreed that
said relationship and sharing would continue for a period of five years from December 7, 1960; that pursuant to said
agreement the plaintiff entered into the management, cultivation and care of the above-mentioned properties, and
had built a house costing P70.00 on one of the two parcels of land, that the plaintiff had incurred actual expenses in
the total amount of P2,286.80 aside from other miscellaneous expenses for food and viand of his laborers; that on
January 11, 1962, without any legal ground nor justification whatsoever the defendant drove the plaintiff out of the
lands and even destroyed the house that the plaintiff had built thereon; that notwithstanding all efforts of the plaintiff
to make the defendant comply with his part of the agreement in their written contract, the defendant had adamantly
refused. The complaint prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff actual damages
in the amount of P2,656.80, unrealized profits in the amount that the court would fix after hearing the evidence,
moral damages in the amount of at least P5,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of at least P5,000.00, plus
attorney's fees equivalent to 20% of the total amounts collected and the costs of the suit. A copy of the written
agreement in question was attached to the complaint as Annex "A".

On March 2, 1962 the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court has no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case and that the complaint did not state a cause of action. It is contended by
the defendant that, based on the allegations in the complaint and as stated in the written agreement which was
attached to the complaint as Annex "A", a relationship of landlord and tenant had existed between the plaintiff and
the defendant—the plaintiff being the tenant and the defendant being the landlord, and the complaint being one that
seeks to secure a decision or settlement of differences or disputes in connection with the relationship of landlord
and tenant involving the cultivation and use of agricultural land, it is the Court of Agrarian Relations and not the
Court of First Instance that has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. The defendant points out that the complaint
of the plaintiff poses the question of whether the act of the defendant, as landlord, in dispossessing the plaintiff, as
tenant, of the two parcels of land was justified or not under the law.

On March 5, 1962, the plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss the complaint and at the same time
moved to amend the original complaint by striking out the words "cultivator" and "cultivation" in paragraphs 3 & 4, of
the original complaint, claiming that the one who drafted the original complaint was not well versed in Tagalog such
that the phrase "tagapamahala at tagapagalaga" was translated into "manager, cultivator and caretaker" whereas
that phrase "tagapamahala at tagapagalaga" ought to be translated into English only as "manager and caretaker"
without including any statement about cultivation. In his opposition to the motion to dismiss the plaintiff contends that
in the contract, Annex A to the complaint, no tenancy relationship was agreed upon and the complaint was intended
to recover damages so that it is the court of general jurisdiction, which is the Court of First Instance, and not the
Court of Agrarian Relations, which is a court of limited jurisdiction, that has competence to hear and decide the
case.1äwphï1.ñët

On March 27, 1962 the Court of First Instance of Batangas, acting on the motion to dismiss the complaint, issued an
order dismissing the case. In its order of dismissal the court a quo stated:

This Court believes and so holds that the argument of the defendant is well-taken, and agrees with him that
the document, Annex "A", indicates the existence of tenancy relationship between the plaintiff and the
defendant, considering the ruling of our Supreme Court in the case of Teodorico B. Santos vs. Court of
Industrial Relations, et al., G.R. No. L-17196, prom. Dec. 28, 1961, "that any matter that may pertain to the
relation of tenant and landlord comes under the Agricultural Tenancy and any controversy that may arise
between them as an incident of their Act (Republic Act No. 1199, as amended by Republic Act No. 2263)
and any controversy that may arise between them as an incident of their relationship comes under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations created by Republic Act. No. 1267. It was created for
enforcement of all laws and regulations governing the relation of capital and labor on all agricultural lands
under any system of cultivation (Section 1, Rep. Act No. 1267, as amended by Republic Act No. 1409) and
was given exclusive jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to consider, disputes established by law which
determine the varying rights of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land where one of the
parties works the land", and so this Court believes and so declares that it has no jurisdiction to pass upon
the issues of the case at bar, falling as they do, according to the above citation under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.

Before this Court, plaintiff-appellant insists that the contract (Annex A) does not establish any tenancy relationship,
or if it did, such relationship had already ceased inasmuch as he does not ask for reinstatement as tenant. He
claims that this case is a simple suit for damages which the Court of Agrarian Relations cannot take cognizance of,
it being a court of special and limited jurisdiction.

The contract (Annex A) contains the following pertinent stipulations:

Na si Silverio Latag, ganap sa gulang, Filipino, asawa ni Cipriana Alday at naninirahan sa Tambo, Lipa City
ay aking ginawang tagapamahala at tagapag-alaga sa naulit na lupa; na siya rin ang mamomosession,
mamamahala sa mga halamang nakatanim at itatanim sa lupang naulit sa loob ng limang taon.

Na si Silverio Latag, ang mag-aalaga sa mga halaman ng lupang nabanggit; na ang lahat ng kagastusang
maaaring makamit o kailanganin sa pag-aalaga ay siyang lahat ang nakakaalam; at walang PAKIALAM ang
may-ari ng lupa.

Na ang kasunduan naming ito ay tatagal sa loob ng limang (5) taon simula ngayon; na ang kasunduang ito
ay nagpapatunay din na ang bahagi ay akong may-ari ng lupa ay sa ikatlo (1/3) sa sinturis at kalamansing
aanihin dito; at hati (50-50) parte sa bunga ng mga halamang sumusunod, (1) kape; (2) saging; (3) mangga;
(4) at paminta at sa mga ibang halamang itatanim pa ng naulit na si Silverio Latag.

In the original complaint the plaintiff used the words "manager, cultivator and caretaker" of the two parcels of land
concerned, but on the excuse that the one who prepared the complaint was not well versed in Tagalog, the
complaint was subsequently amended whereby the word "cultivator" was deleted in the allegations of the complaint.
We note, however that in the contract, Annex "A" to the complaint, it is clearly provided that the plaintiff would take
care of the plants that are planted and those still to be planted on the lands within a period of five years
("mamamahala sa mga halamang nakatanim at itatanim sa lupang naulit sa loob ng limang taon").

This Court believes that the allegations of the complaint (even as amended) and the stipulations of the contract
(Annex A) unmistakably show that an agricultural tenancy of the kind called "share tenancy" was established
between the parties. It has been declared that "an agricultural tenancy classified as `share tenancy' exists where a
person has physical possession of another's land for the purpose of cultivating it and giving the owner a share in the
crop" (Marcelo vs. De Leon, L-12902, July 29, 1959). This Court in the same case held:
 x x x x He knows the caretaker must water the trees, even fertilize them for better production, uproot weeds
and turn the soil, sometimes fumigate to eliminate plant pests, etc. Those chores obviously mean "working
or cultivating" the land. x x x x

It may thus be stated that the "caretaker" of an agricultural land is also considered the "cultivator" of the land.

As regards plaintiff-appellant's contention that the tenancy relationship, if any, had been terminated because his
claim was only for damages without reinstatement to his status as tenant, suffice it to say that in the instant case the
plaintiff-appellant's claim for damages was based on his having been allegedly dispossessed unlawfully or
unjustifiably by the defendant-appellee of the two parcels of land under his care and management sometime on
January 1, 1962. It is clear that the action relates to an incident arising from the landlord and tenant relationship
which existed shortly before the filing of the complaint on February 13, 1962. Under the circumstance, the Court of
Agrarian Relations has the original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case, even if the tenancy relationship no
longer existed at the time of the filing of the action. On this point this Court ruled as follows:

Indeed, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 1199, provides that "all cases involving the dispossession of a tenant
by the landlord or by a third party and/or the settlement and disposition of disputes arising from the
relationship of landlord and tenant . . . shall be under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of
Agrarian Relations." This jurisdiction does not require the continuance of the relationship of landlord and
tenant — at the time of the dispute. The same may have arisen, and often times arise, precisely from the
previous termination of such relationship. If the same existed immediately, or shortly before the controversy
and the subject-matter thereof is whether or not said relationship has been lawfully terminated, or if the
dispute otherwise springs or originates from the relationship of landlord and tenant, the litigation is
cognizable only by the Court of Agrarian Relations, . . . (Basilio vs. De Guzman, et al., L-12762, April 22,
1959).

On the point that the present case comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations even if
the action is only for the recovery of damages based on the unlawful dispossession of the tenant, this Court held:

Section 7, Republic Act No. 1267, as amended, vests in the Court of Agrarian Relations exclusive and
original jurisdiction to determine controversies arising from landlord-tenant relationship. From this it may be
inferred that it also has jurisdiction to hear and determine actions for recovery of damages arising from the
unlawful dismissal or dispossession of tenant by the landlord, as provided in Act No. 4054 and Republic Act
No. 1199, as amended. To hold otherwise could result in multiplicity of suits and expensive litigations
abhorred by the law . . . . (Militar vs. Torcillero, et al., L-15065, April 28, 1961).

We hold, therefore, that the lower court did not commit error when it dismissed the complaint in the present case.

Wherefore, the order of dismissal appealed from is affirmed, with costs against plaintiff-appellant.

MEANING OF AGRICULTURAL LAND

G.R. No. L-29381 September 30, 1969

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS and PANTALEON BINGABING, petitioners,

vs.
HON. VALERIANO A. DEL VALLE, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Court of Agrarian Relations and
PAMPILO DOLTZ, respondents

Marcelino B. Bermudez for petitioners.

Nostratis and Estrada for respondent Judge V. A. Del Valle.
Abelardo Flores for respondent Pampilo Doltz.

SANCHEZ, J.:
The decisive issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not strips of land owned by Philippine National Railways
(PNR) which are on both sides of its railroad track, and are part of its right of way for its railroad operations but
temporarily leased, are agricultural lands within the purview of the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the Agricultural
Land Reform Code, such as would come within the jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.

The facts of this particular case are these:

PNR, a government-owned corporation, is the registered owner of three (3) strips of land with a uniform width of 30.
meters adjoining one another longitudinally, the same being part of its railroad right of way running from Manila to
Legazpi. These strips of land lie within the municipalities of Oas and Polangui, Province of Albay. At the center
thereof is a track measuring ten (10) to twelve (12) meters in width where railroad ties are placed and rails built for
running locomotives. On both sides of the track, or about (2) to five (5) meters away from the embarassment of the
track, are telegraph and telephone posts office (50) meters apart from each other, which maintain communication
wires necessary in the operation of PNR trains. PNR draws earth from these sides to fill up the railroad track
whenever it is destroyed by water during rainy days; and uses them as depository of railroad materials for the repair
of destroyed lines, posts, bridges during washouts, or other damaged parts of the line occasioned by derailments or
other calamities.

The portions of these lands not actually occupied by the railroad track had been a source of trouble. People
occupied them; they reap profits therefrom. Disputes among those desiring to occupy them cropped up. It is on the
face of all these that, with adequate provisions to safeguard railroad operations, PNR adopted temporary rules and
regulations, as follows: (a) the possession and enjoyment of the property should be awarded to interested persons
thru competitive public bidding; (b) the rental of the premises is to be determined from the amount offered by the
highest bidder; (e) the duration of the lease shall be for a limited period, not to exceed three (3) years; (d) the lessee
cannot sublease the premises; (e) the lease contract is revocable at any time upon demand by the owner, whenever
it needs the same for its own use or for a more beneficial purpose; (f) the owner can enter the leased premises
during the period of the lease to make necessary repairs; and (g) the lessee shall not use the premises in a manner
prejudicial to the operation of the trains.

Sometime in 1963, PNR awarded the portions of the three strips of land aforementioned which are on both sides of
the track, after a competitive public bidding, to petitioner Pantaleon Bingabing for a period of three (3) years and
under conditions hereinbefore set forth. A civil law lease contract in printed form was, on April 15, 1963, entered into
by and between PNR and Bingabing. That contract expressly stipulates that Bingabing was "to occupy and use the
property ... temporarily for agriculture." Consideration therefor was P130.00 per annum. Bingabing, however, failed
to take possession because respondent Pampilo Doltz was occupying the land, had a house thereon. Doltz claims
to be a tenant of previous awardees, and later, of Bingabing himself.

Sometime in March 1965, PNR and Bingabing filed suit against Doltz for recovery of possession of the premises in
the Court of First Instance of Albay. 1 They there averred that sometime in January 1963, Doltz illegally entered the
land, constructed a house thereon occupying about fifty (50) square meters, and planted palay on the other portions
thereof. They prayed that Doltz remove his house, vacate the premises, restore possession to PNR or Bingabing,
pay PNR P160 per annum as reasonable compensation for the occupation of the premises from January 1963, and
P2,000 as expenses of litigation, pay Bingabing P500 annually from 1963, and shoulder the costs of suit.

Doltz' answer in that case averred inter alia that the had been a tenant on the property for over twenty years; that he
had been placed thereon by the deceased Pablo Gomba who leased the property from the then Manila Railroad
Company (now PNR); that he became the tenant of Demetrio de Vera, Gomba's successor; that he is the tenant of
Bingabing, having given the latter's share of 1/3 during the last two harvests; and that the case is properly
cognizable by the Court of Agrarian Relations. Upon the court's request, Doltz and Bingabing agreed to temporarily
liquidate the harvest on a sharing ratio of 70-30 in Doltz' favor.

It has been suggested in the record that said case — Civil Case 3021 — was dismissed by the Court of First
Instance of Albay upon the ground that the subject matter of the action is tenancy; that petitioners have appealed.
That case, parenthetically, has not yet reached this Court.

While the aforesaid Civil Case 3021 was pending in the Albay court of first instance, Doltz registered with the Court
of Agrarian Relations (CAR) a petition against Bingabing for security of tenure, the adoption of a sharing ratio of 70-
30 of the crops, and reliquidation of past harvests. This is the present case — CAR Case 692, Albay '67, Court of
Agrarian Relations, Ninth Regional District, Legazpi City, Branch II, entitled "Pampilo Doltz, Petitioner, versus
Pantaleon Bingabing, Respondent." PNR intervened in the case. Petitioners herein there maintained the position
that the premises in controversy are not an agricultural land within the contemplation of the Agricultural Tenancy Act
(Republic Act 1199) or the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act 3844); that no tenancy relationship existed
between the parties; that CAR, therefore, lacked jurisdiction over the case; and that there is a pending case
between the same parties in another court involving the same subject matter and the same cause of action.

After trial, the CAR promulgated its decision of June 10, 1968. It upheld its jurisdiction over the case, maintained
Doltz in the peaceful possession of the parcels of land as tenant on a 70-30 sharing ratio in Doltz' favor, ordered
Bingabing to pay Doltz P250 attorneys' fees and the costs, but dismissed the latter's claim for reliquidation of past
harvests for lack of substantial evidence. Petitioners' move to reconsider the said decision failed. They now come to
this Court. They specifically question CAR's jurisdiction.

1. Is the land here involved in agricultural land within the meaning of the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the
Agricultural Land Reform Code?

According to Section 3 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, "[a]gricultural tenancy is the physical possession by a person
of land devoted to agriculture belonging to, or legally possessed by, another for the purpose of production through
the labor of the former and of the members of his immediate farm household, in consideration of which the former
agrees to share the harvest with the latter, or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money,
or in both." 2 The term "agricultural land" as understood by the Agricultural Land Reform Code is not as broad in
meaning as it is known in the constitutional sense. As interpreted in Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461,
471, the phrase "agricultural land," constitutionally speaking, includes all lands that are neither mineral nor timber
lands and embraces within it wide sweep not only lands strictly agricultural or devoted to cultivation for agricultural
purposes but also commercial, industrial, residential lands and lands for other purposes. On the other hand, by
Section 166(1) of the Agricultural Land Reform Code, " "[a]gricultural land" means land devoted to any growth
including but not limited to crop lands, salt beds, fishponds, idle land and abandoned land as defined in paragraphs
18 and 19 of this section, respectively." 3

It is obvious then that under the law, the land here in controversy does not fit into the concept of agricultural land.
PNR cannot devote it to agriculture because by its own charter, Republic Act 4156, PNR cannot engage in
agriculture.

Indeed, the land — which adjoins the railroad track on both sides — is part of PNR's right of way. That right of way
is not limited to the particular space occupied by the roadbed or its main track. It also includes the portions occupied
by the telephone and telegraph posts. It extends to a width of 30 meters which reasonably gives the train locomotive
engineer a clear commanding view of the track and its switches ahead of him.

The entire width is important to PNR's railroad operations. Which should not be hampered. And, communication
lines must not be disturbed. Buildings should not be constructed so close to the track. Because, it is not so easy to
prevent people from walking along the track; animals, too, may stray into the area; obstructions there could be along
the track itself which might cause derailment. All of these could prevent the locomotive engineer from taking the
necessary precautions on time to avert accidents which may cause damage to the trains, injury to its passengers,
and even loss of life.

Besides, the use of the strips of land on both sides of the track in railroad operation is inconsistent with agricultural
activities. The contract of lease authorizes the railroad company to enter upon the premises to make repairs, place
its materials on the land. It may even take soil from the land to fill up any part of the railroad track destroyed by
water during rainy days. What if PNR should decide to construct another parallel track on the land leased? The
occupant of the land cannot prevent or stop PNR from doing any of these. Security of tenure so important in
landlord-tenant relationship may not thus be attained.

The foregoing are considerations sufficient enough to deter us from adopting the view that the disputed land — in
narrow strips — is agricultural land within the meaning of the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the Agricultural Land
Reform Code. By destination, it is not agricultural.

2. Nor may Pampilo Doltz be considered as a true and lawful tenant.

To be borne in mind is the fact that PNR executed with Pantaleon Bingabing a civil law lease contract, not an
agricultural lease. This distinction is expressly recognized by the law. 4 That contract is temporary, at best for a
1awphîl.nèt

short term. It is revocable any time upon demand by PNR whenever it needs the same for its own use or for a more
beneficial purpose.

Even on the assumption that the land is agricultural, there is the circumstance that PNR prohibits the sublease of
the premises. PNR's lessees cannot give what they are not allowed to give. Any contract then of sublease between
Doltz, the supposed tenant, and Pablo Gomba or Demetrio de Vera, the previous awardees, or even of Pantaleon
Bingabing, the present awardee — without PNR's consent — cannot bind the latter. No such consent was here
given.

This ushers us to a principle shaped out by jurisprudence that the security of tenure guaranteed by our tenancy law
may be invoked only by tenants de jure, not by those who are not true and lawful tenants. 5 In Pabustan vs. De
Guzman, L-12898, August 31, 1960, the tenant sublet the landholding to a third person without the knowledge and
consent of the landowner. In an ejectment suit brought by the landowner against said third person in the CAR, this
Court held that the CAR had no jurisdiction over the case because no tenancy relationship existed between the
parties, as the third person was, in reality, an unlawful squatter or intruder. Correlating Pabustan to the present
case, the lessee here had no power to sublet. There is also thus no legally cognizable relationship of tenancy
between the parties.

We, accordingly, rule that CAR does not have jurisdiction over the case at bar and the proceedings below are thus
null and void.

For the reasons given, the judgment of the Court of Agrarian Relations of June 10, 1968 in its Case 692, Albay '67,
under review is hereby reversed, and said case is hereby dismissed.

Costs against private respondent Pampilo Doltz. So ordered.