G.R. No.

L-10594 May 29, 1957

PONCIANO PRIMERO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS and SINFOROSO QUION, respondents.
Tereso Ma. Montoya for petitioner.
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres, Nora G. Notratis and Cayetano
Santrico for respondent Court of Agrarian Relations.
Jesus M. Dator for respondent Sinforoso (Proso) Quion.
ENDENCIA, J.:

Petitioner Ponciano Primero is the owner of a riceland situated in the barrio of San Juan, municipality of Gen. Trias,
province of Cavite, containing an area of 27,837 square meters, with Torrens title registered in the Registry of Deeds for
the province of Cavite, while respondent Sinforoso Quion is his tenant in said land. Desiring to lease said riceland to one
Porfirio Potente for the purpose of raining thereon ZACATE (a species of grass for horses' feed), on March 3, 1956,
petitioner served a written notice thereof to respondent and requested him to vacate the premises, but the latter refused
to do so. On March 7, 1956, the petitioner executed the contract of lease in favor of Porfirio Potente, but the respondent
still continued in the land thereby hindering its delivery to the lessee, hence the petitioner filed with the Court of Agrarian
Relations the petition under consideration to secure an order directing the respondent to vacate the premises in question
so that it may be delivered to the lessee. After summons, the respondent filed his answer to the petition and on March
20, 19456, moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground (1) that it states no cause of action, the facts stated
therein not being constitutive of any of the causes for the dispossession of a tenant enumerated in section 50 of Republic
Act No. 1199; (2) that under section 49 of the same Act, no tenant could be dispossessed of his holding except for any of
the causes enumerated in section 50 of said Act, and (3) that under section 9 of the same Act, the lease of the land in
question did not of itself extinguish the relationship between the respondent as tenant and the petitioner as landowner.
After due hearing, the motion was granted, Executive Judge Guillermo S. Santos ruling as follows:

. . . that the petition states no cause of action — because petitioner seeks the dispossession or respondent-tenant on a
ground which is not one of the causes recognized by law. As a rule, dispossession of a tenant in an agricultural land can
only be allowed for any of the causes enumerated in Sec. 50 of Rep. Act No. 1199. Lease of a holding to another person
who will convert it to a zacatal is not one of those grounds. Neither is the conversion of the holding into a zacatal. The
reason advanced by petitioner is without merit.

Thereupon, petitioner appealed from the order of dismissal, and in this instance claims (1) that he has the right to
disposses his tenant in case he leases his land for purposes of converting it into a ZACATAL; (2) that the lessee Potente, as
new landholder, his the right to employ a man of his choice in the ZACATAL; and (3) that ZACATE (horses' feed) is not an
agricultural produce within the purview of Republic Act No. 1199.

Carefully considered, the question involved in this case is simply whether, under the facts stated in the petition, the
petitioner has right to secure from the Court of Agrarian Relations authority to eject the respondent tenant from the
riceland held in tenancy by him only because said land was leased to one Porfirio Potente who will convert the same into
a ZACATAL, and said respondent refused to vacate it thereby hampering its delivery to the lessee.

The controlling law on the case are sections 9, 49 and 50 of Republic Act No. 1199, which read as follows:

SEC. 9. Severance of Relationship. — The tenancy relationship is extinguished by the voluntary surrender of the land by,
or the death or incapacity of, the tenant, but his heirs or the members of his immediate farm household may continue to
work the land until the close of the agricultural year. The expiration of the period of the contract as fixed by the parties,
and the sale or alienation of the land do not of themselves extinguish the relationship. In the latter case, the purchaser or
transferee shall assume the rights and obligations of the former-landholder in relation to the tenant. In case of death of
the landholder, his heirs or heirs shall likewise assume his rights and obligations.

SEC. 49. Ejectment of Tenant. — Notwithstanding any agreement or provision of law as to the period, in all cases where
land devoted to any agricultural purpose is held under any system of tenancy, the tenant shall not be dispossessed of his
holdings except for any of the causes hereinafter enumerated and only after the same has been proved before, and the
dispossession is authorized by, the court.

SEC. 50. Causes for the Dispossession of a Tenant. — Any of the following shall be a sufficient cause for the dispossession
of a tenant from his holdings:

(a) The bona fide intention of the landholder to cultivate the land himself personally or through the employment of farm
machinery and implements: . . . .

(b) When the tenant violates or fails to comply with any of the terms and conditions of the contract or any of the provisions
of this Act: Provided, however, That this subsection shall not apply when the tenant has substantially complied with the
contract or with the provisions of this Act.

(c) The tenant's failure to pay the agreed rental or to deliver the landholder's share: Provided, however, That this shall not
apply when the tenant's failure is caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure.

(d) When the tenant uses the land for a purpose other than that specified by agreement of the parties.

(e) When a share-tenant fails to follow those proven farm practices which will contribute towards the proper care of the
land and increased agricultural production.

(f) When the tenant through negligence permits serious injury to the land which will impair its productive capacity.

(g) Conviction by a competent court of a tenant or any member of his immediate family or farm household of a crime
against the landholder or a member of his immediate family.

Under the foregoing clear provisions of law, we find that the agrarian court committed no reversible error when it
dismissed the petition, firstly, because under the aforequoted section 9 of Rep. Act 1199, the contract of lease entered
into by the petitioner and Porfirio Potente did not of itself extinguish the relationship of landlord and tenant between the
petitioner and the respondent, and the lessee Potente should assume the obligations of the former landholder, the herein
petitioner, in relation to his tenant, the herein respondent; secondly, because under section 49, a tenant cannot be
dispossessed of his holding except for any of the causes enumerated in said section 50, and certainly the lease of the land
in question to Potente is not one of those causes for the dispossession of a tenant enumerated in section 50 of the Tenancy
Law quoted above. Consequently, we hold that under the provisions of law governing the case, the petition under
consideration is completely untenable, for once a tenancy relationship is established, the tenant is entitled to security of
tenure with right to continue working on and cultivating the land until he is dispossessed of his holdings for just cause
provided by law or the tenancy relationship is legally terminated.

Petitioner contends, however, that sections 9 and 50 of Republic Act 1199 are unconstitutional and void for they are
against paragraph 1, section 1 of Article III — Bill of Rights of our Constitution. It is argued that the petitioner has a perfect
right to dispossess his tenant because he wants to lease his land to a third person for the purpose of converting it into a
ZACATAL and that "the lessee has a perfect right to employ laborers of his own choice and to deny a lessee that right will
be tantamount to a deprivation of the right of the owner to lease his land for a better income, for no lessee will enter into
a contract of lease of a riceland to convert the same into a ZACATAL if he will be denied the freedom to employ a tenant
of his own choice." We find no merit in this contention The provisions of law assailed as unconditional do not impair the
right of the landowner to dispose or alienate his property nor prohibit him to make such transfer or alienation; they only
provide that in case of transfer or in case of lease, as in the instant case, the tenancy relationship between the landowner
and his tenant should be preserved in order to insure the well-being of the tenant or protect him from being unjustly
dispossessed by the transferee or purchaser of the land; in other words, the purpose of the law in question is to maintain
the tenants in the peaceful possession and cultivation of the land from their holdings. Republic Act 1199 is unquestionably
a remedial legislation promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the Constitution and in the exercise of the
police power of the State to promote the common weal. It is a statute relating to public subjects within the domain of the
general legislative powers of the State and involving the public the public rights and public welfare of the entire community
affected by it. Republic Act 1199, like the previous tenancy laws enacted by our lawmaking body, was passed by Congress
in compliance with the constitutional mandates that "the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people should be the concern of the State" (Art. II, sec. 5) and that "the State shall regulate the relations
between landlord and tenant . . . in agriculture. . . ." (Art XIV, sec. 6).

As to the last question raised by the petitioner, to wit, whether the ZACATE is an agricultural product as contemplated by
Act 1199, we find unnecessary to discuss it in view of the foregoing conclusion we arrived at, for the true question involved
in the case is whether the lease of petitioner's land to Porfirio Potente constitutes just cause for dispossessing the
respondent of his holding on the land as tenant thereof.

Wherefore, finding no error in the order appealed from the same is hereby affirmed with costs against the petitioner-
appellant.
G.R. No. L-17649 July 31, 1963
ESTEBAN TAWATAO and LOURDES DEL ROSARIO, petitioners,
vs.
EUGENIO GARCIA, VIRGINIA DE VERA and HON. LEON P. DACAYO, Judge of the Court of Agrarian Relations (First
Regional District) Lingayen, Pangasinan, respondents.
Perfecto R. Bautista for petitioners.
Pepito R. Bautista and Vicente D. Millora for respondents Eugenio Garcia, et al.
Nostratis and Estrada for respondent Judge Leon P. Dacayo.
PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to annul judgment rendered by the Court of Agrarian Relations Lingayen,
Pangasinan, in CAR case No. 539-P-58, and for a writ of preliminary injunction, under section 7 of Rule 67, Rules of Court,
to preserve the status quo of the parties in relation to the litigated matter pending these proceedings.

On 14 February 1958 Eugenio Garcia and Virginia de Vera filed a petition (Annex A) in the Court of Agrarian Relations, First
Regional District, Lingayen, Pangasinan alleging that since 1935 they have been the tenants of parcel of nipa land
containing an area of one-half hectare situated in the barrio Of Camaley, municipality of Binmaley, province of Pangasinan,
owned by the spouses Juliana Claudio and Pablo Tawatao, residents of Muñoz, Nueva Ecija; that in 1950 they agreed to
convert the nipa land into a fishpond, the expenses for such conversion to be shared equally by both parties, as well as
the products of the fishpond; that for the construction of the fishpond the then petitioners, now respondents, spent the
sum of P830, P330 of which was their own money and P500, a loan from one Lucio Ramirez; that after the construction of
the fishpond Juliana Claudio and Pablo Tawatao failed and refused to pay their share of P400 despite demands for
payment; that up to February, 1955 they had divided share and share alike bangus and other kinds of fishes caught in the
fishpond; that in February 1955, for and in consideration of the sum of P700, Juliana Claudio and Pablo Tawatao leased
for two years the fishfond to Salvador Bautista of Camaley, Binmaley, Pangasinan, in spite of the objection by the then
petitioners, now respondents, who claimed that the lease would deprive them of their annual share amounting to P350;
that sometime in 1956 the owners of the fishpond donated it propter nuptias to their children Esteban Tawatao and
Lourdes del Rosario, the herein petitioners, who immediately took possession thereof, introduced improvements and
refused to restore possession thereof to then petitioners, respondents herein, despite demands; and that as a result of
their dispossession from the fishpond they suffered losses and damages. The then petitioners prayed that they be
reinstated as tenants of the fishpond, be paid the amount of P400, the share of the former owners of the parcel of nipa
land in the expenses incurred in converting it into fishpond, P750 as their share in the products of the fishpond for the
years from 1955 to 1957, P300 as attorney's fees and incidental expenses and P1,300 as moral, nominal and exemplary
damages.

In their answer the herein petitioners, then respondents, and their co-respondents, predecessors-in-interest, denied each
and every material allegation of the petition (CAR case No. 539-P-58) and claimed that in 1955 the then petitioners, now
respondents, Garcia and De Vera left the fishpond; that Juliana Claudio and Pablo Tawatao leased it to Salvador Bautista
and after the termination of the lease in 1956 donated it to their son Esteban Tawatao, herein petitioner, in consideration
of his marriage to Lourdes del Rosario. By way of counterclaim the then respondents claimed that the then petitioners
Garcia and De Vera failed and refused to render an accounting for the harvests in the agricultural years 1953-1955
amounting to P450; that to defend themselves against the complaint of the then petitioners they paid P250 for attorney's
fees; and that they suffered moral and exemplary damages in the sum of P1,500.

Notwithstanding the notice of the date and time of hearing duly served upon and received by counsel of the then
respondents, their counsel failed to appear. Thereupon, the then petitioners moved to be allowed to present their
evidence and the motion was granted.

The evidence presented by the then petitioners substantially supports the allegations of their petition.
After trial, the Court of Agrarian Relations rendered judgment, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the respondents are hereby ordered to reinstate the petitioners as tenants in the landholding-fishfond
located (situated) at Bo. Camaley, Binmaley, Pangasinan, having an area of one-half (1/2) hectare, more or less, and to
maintain them in the peaceful possession and cultivation of the same. The respondents are likewise ordered to pay to the
petitioners the amount of P1,200.00 as damages for unlawful dispossession and P300.00 yearly from 1959 until the
petitioners are actually reinstated. (Annex B).

In their petition the herein petitioners contend that Republic Act No. 1199, as amended by Republic Act No. 2263, that
governs the relations between landholders and tenants under both the share and leasehold tenancies of agricultural lands
for cultivation does not apply to fishponds, for in the latter there is no cultivation of the land to speak of, and insist that
section 42 of Republic Act No. 1199 and section 7 of Republic Act No. 1267 do not apply to fishponds and residential lots
but to agricultural lands only subject to cultivation. Corollary to the issue of lack of jurisdiction, the herein petitioners also
maintain that the basis of the complaint or petition is not a contract of a share or leasehold tenancy but at most is one of
partnership under article 1767 of the Civil Code.

In their answer to the petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, the herein respondents Garcia and De Vera aver
that their complaint is not predicated merely upon a contract of conversion of the nipa land into fishpond and recovery
of half of the amount spent for such conversion as agreed upon, but one for reinstatement under section 21, Republic Act
No. 1199, as tenants of the herein petitioners, and damages arising from their unlawful dispossession from and of the
fishpond; that it is correct that they never entered into a contract of tenancy with the petitioners herein, but the fact is
that there was an implied tenancy relation between them from 1935 to 1955 which was disturbed when in 1955 the
fishpond was leased and in 1956 donated to the herein petitioners, a donation or transfer that cannot deprive the
respondent tenants of their right to continue as such. Only for causes enumerated by law and only after the same shall
have been proved before and the dispossession shall have been authorized by the court may a tenant be dispossessed of
his holding.1

The answer of the judge who presided over the respondent Court is to the same effect on the issue of
jurisdiction.1äwphï1.ñët

The point to determine in this case is, are the herein respondents Eugenio Garcia and Virginia de Vera entitled to
reinstatement in the fishpond under section 27 of Republic Act No. 1199, is amended by Republic Act No. 2263, and
damages?

The petitioners' argument that Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, applies only to agricultural lands fit for cultivation and
not to fishponds, because by nature the latter are not susceptible of cultivation, is without merit, for section 46 of said
Act, as amended, which partly provides that —

(c) The consideration for the use of sugar lands, fishponds, saltbeds and of lands devoted to the raising of livestock shall
be governed by stipulation between the parties.

is clear and need no interpretation. The law does not require actual cultivation of the land so that disputes affecting
tenancy relation involving a landholding fall under it. While the above section provides that the consideration for the use
of fishpond shall be governed by stipulation between the parties, yet the same does not strip the Court of Agrarian
Relations of its jurisdiction over tenancy disputes involving such kind of landholding. Furthermore, this Court already has
held that land in which fish is produced is classified as agricultural land and that the words "real estate" include fisheries
as used in article 55 of the Hague Conventions of 1907.2 In this case involving, as it does, unlawful dispossession of the
respondent tenants from their fishpond holding upon no legal cause, as provided for in sections 27, 49 and 50 of Republic
Act No. 1199, as amended by Republic Act No. 2263, the Court of Agrarian Relations has exclusive jurisdiction to order the
reinstatement and payment of damages for losses suffered by them, and for that reason the proceedings and the
judgment rendered in this case being in accordance with law are valid and binding.

The claim that because "they (herein petitioners) have been in actual possession of the land for a period of two years prior
to the filing of the complaint by the respondent spouses," "the respondent court has no jurisdiction over the case," is
without merit, because such jurisdiction over the subject matter does not depend on whether or not at the time of the
filing of the proper action there was a tenancy relation between the parties. Neither does the bringing of the action three
years after the respondent tenants had been unlawfully dispossessed of the fishpond negate the existence of tenancy
relation nor does it constitute or amount to a waiver of the right to reinstatement, for Republic Act No. 1199, as amended,
does not provide for a prescriptive period within which to file a complaint for unlawful dispossession.

The writ prayed for is denied, with costs against the petitioners.
G.R. No. L-14573 May 18, 1962
CONCEPCION FELICIANO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, ET AL., respondents.

Vicente R. Macasaet for petitioner.

Nora G. Nostratis for respondent Court of Agrarian Relations.
Meliton C. Parducho for respondent Amado Afable.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Concepcion Feliciano filed a petition before the Court of Agrarian Relations asking for authority to dispossess her tenant
Amado Afable of his holding situated in barrio Libtong, Meycauayan, Bulacan, on the ground that (1) she desires to
cultivate it personally under Section 50 (a), Republic Act No. 1199, and (2) said tenant failed to pay in full the agreed annual
rental for the agricultural years 1951 to 1955.

The tenant, thru counsel, after admitting his tenancy relationship with petitioner, disclaimed knowledge of the truth of
the allegations contained in the petition.

After both parties had presented their evidence, the court, on September 8, 1958, rendered judgment denying the
petition. Petitioner was required to maintain her tenancy relationship with respondent and to respect his peaceful
possession of his landholding in accordance with law. Petitioner interposed the present petition for review.

The issues posed by petitioner are:

(a) Whether a cultivation with aid of, or through, a son and son-in-law, complies with Section 50 (a), Republic Act No.
1199, as ground for dispossession of the tenant.
(b) Whether the petitioner has evidence to support her claim of non-payment of the rentals for the years 1951 to 1954.
(c) Whether the finding that petitioner 'did not show that the "agreed" rental is legal and proper', is supported by the
evidence.
With regard to the first issue, it was proven that petitioner gave notice to her tenant that she intended to work the land
with the aid of her son Marcelino Feliciano and son-in-law Pastor Bervoso. She notified her tenant of such intention on
July 12, 1956. In another letter, dated February 26, 1957, she advised him of her intention to get back the land for the
reason that he was not complying with his obligation to pay the rental agreed upon. And on March 18, 1957, she notified
the court of her intention to personally cultivate the land. The agrarian court found that petitioner complied with the law
relative to the notice requirement prior to the grant of authority to cultivate the land on the part of the owner, but reached
the conclusion that petitioner cannot avail of the right granted by law to get back the land for that purpose because,
according to the evidence, she will not be the one to personally cultivate the holding but will deliver it to her son and son-
in-law considering that she is already aged and sickly and is incapable to do manual work. In the opinion of the agrarian
court, to warrant authority to eject a tenant from his landholding on the ground of personal cultivation it is indispensable
that petitioner be capable of farming the land but will only do so with the aid of her son or son-in-law, the same is contrary
to the spirit and purpose of a law.

We disagree with this view. While the law provides that the bona fide intention of the land holder to cultivate the land
personally, or thru the employment of farm machinery of implements, is a sufficient cause for dispossession of a tenant
from his holding, this provision should not be taken literally. A landholder who owns a small parcel of land which is farmed
by a tenant and desires to get it back because he has a son who can do the farming for him comes within the spirit of this
provision, provided that he does not have any other property and the one to do the cultivation is a member of his family.
The idea is to give the landholder an opportunity to attend to the cultivation of his farm to improve his financial condition.
To hold otherwise would be to advance the fortune of an outsider to the detriment of the member of his own family.
Moreover, considering the cohesion existing among the members of a Filipino family because of the intimate spiritual ties
that bind them one can hardly dispute that the work of one is the work of the rest. This is the same philosophy we
expressed in a case involving the desire of a wife-landholder to work the land thru her husband even if she herself was
not in a position to do the farming. We said, in upholding the right of the wife to get back the landholding, that by the
contract of marriage, a man and a woman enter a joint life, acting, living and working as one. Upon marriage, the husband
and the wife become one single, moral, spiritual, and social being, not only for purposes of procreation, but also for
purposes of mutual help and protection. There is between them a full and complete community of existence.1

The same community of life and of interest exist between the members of the same family. We can even say that the
spiritual tie is greater when it comes to the relation of a mother and a son. If a wife is given the privilege of working a
farmland thru her husband, no valid reason is seen why a mother cannot be given the same privilege.1äwphï1.ñët

Moreover, the law allows a tenant to cultivate a piece of agricultural land held under a contract of tenancy either
personally or with the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm household (Republic Act No. 1199,
Section 4, paragraph 3, as amended by Republic Act No. 2263). Note that he is not even required to have said cultivation
undertaken by immediate members of his family, but only by his immediate farm household, who may or may not belong
to the family. Surely, no reason exists why the same right should be denied to the landowner himself. If the purpose of
the law is to establish the tenancy relation between landlord and tenant upon the principle of social justice, and to afford
adequate protection to the rights of both tenant and landholder (Section 2, Republic Act No. 1199), the protective arm of
the law must be extended equally to the tenant as well as to the landlord.

Having reached the above conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised by petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Petitioner is hereby granted authority to dispossess respondent in
order that she may cultivate her landholding under Section 50 (a) of Republic Act No. 1199. No costs.
G.R. No. L-15192 October 24, 1960
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,
vs.
TEOFILO RAMIREZ, ET AL., respondents.
Ramon B. de los Reyes for petitioner.
Jorito C. Peralta for respondent.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal taken by the Philippine National Bank from the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations in its Case No. 558-P-
58.

The facts leading to the filing of the action in the Court below were found by said Court to be as follows:

That since 1953 Agustin Pecio had been cultivating the two hectares of land in question located at Bo. Capulaan, Balungao,
Pangasinan, belonging to Jose Castillo y Refuerzo; that when the Philippine National Bank became the administrator of
the estate of the late Jose Castillo y Refuerzo, its Trust Officer, through his representative, Atty. Jose Manalansan, executed
contracts of tenancy with the tenants of the hacienda; that for his purpose, Atty. Manalansan went in 1955 to Balungao,
Rosales, and Umingan, Pangasinan, to contact the tenants and he stayed there for two months; that Atty. Manalansan
met the tenants in the municipal building of Balungao and there executed the tenancy contracts; that Atty. Manalansan
did not know any of the tenants then and so what he did was to rely on the information given to him by the tenants; that
one morning, while Atty. Manalansan was in front of the municipal building under the acacia tree, Teofilo Ramirez
approached him and told him that he was the tenant in two parcels of land located in Bos. Esmeralda and Capulaan,
Bulangao; that Teodorico Dirije then filled in the blank in the contract forms by typing the information dictated by Teofilo
Ramirez; that the finished contract of tenancy (Exhibit "A") was registered in the municipal treasurer's office of Balungao
on the same date of execution, June 25, 1955; that according to the contract, Ramirez was to cultivate four hectares of
land situated at Bos. Esmeralda and Capulaan, Balungao, Pangasinan; that a few days thereafter Agustin Pecio appeared
and reported to Atty. Manalansan that he was the actual tenant in the landholding in Capulaan included in the contract
of tenancy executed by the Philippine National Bank and Teofilo Ramirez; that Atty. Manalansan then referred the matter
to the Chief of Police to bring them to the municipal mayor for conciliation; that as a result a "katulagan" or agreement
was entered into by and between Ramirez and Pecio; that by virtue of the "katulagan" Ramirez cultivated one-hectare
portion of the same agricultural year 1955-1956; that Ramirez harvested 40 cavanes in said year, with the seeds, threshing
and harvesting expenses already deducted, while Pecio harvested 35 cavanes; and that after the agricultural year 1955-
1956 the entire two-hectare landholding in Capulaan was, by virtue of the "katulagan" or agreement, delivered to Agustin
Pecio who cultivated the same since then up to the present time.

Later, Teofilo Ramirez filed the aforestated case against the Philippine National Bank in the Agrarian Court, alleging that
he had been illegally ousted from one-half of the land in question during the agricultural year 1956-1957, and from the
whole of it thereafter, and asking for reinstatement and for the payment of the value of his unrealized shares of the
harvest of the land during the period of his dispossession, plus moral damages and attorney's fees. The bank answered,
denying liability under the complaint, and, with the authority of the court, brought in Agustin Pecio as third-party
defendant, who likewise denied any liability. The case was then tried, and on September 29, 1958, the Agrarian Court
rendered judgment, holding, on the basis of the above-quoted findings of fact, that although the tenancy contract
between the bank and Ramirez was executed through fraud and mispresentation on the part of the latter, the "katulagan"
or agreement Exhibit "1" between Ramirez and Agustin Pecio was an express ratification by the latter of said tenancy
contract and had the effect of a surrender by Pecio of his right as tenant over one-half of the land in question and of
constituting Ramirez as the tenant over such portion, so that thereafter, he was entitled to security of tenure under section
49 of Republic Act No. 1199; whereupon, the bank was ordered to reinstate Ramirez to one-half of the land in question,
and to pay him damages of 12 cavanes of palay yearly from the agricultural year 1956-1957 until his reinstatement. From
this judgment, the bank as already stated in the first part of this decision, appealed.
The appeal should be sustained.

First of all, we agree with the petitioner bank that the lower court having found that third-party defendant Agustin Pecio
was the true tenant of the land in question and not respondent Ramirez, Pecio is entitled to security of tenure under
section 7, Republic Act No. 1199, and may not be dispossessed of his landholding except for any of the causes enumerated
in Section 19 of the same Act, and without the cause having been proved before and the dispossession authorized by the
Agrarian Court, in accordance with section 49, same law. Consequently, the tenancy contract Exhibit "A" signed between
the petitioner bank and appellee Ramirez is illegal and void since it deprives Pecio of his tenure over the land in question;
and being a nullity, said contract did not create any tenancy relation between the bank Ramirez, nor could the latter
acquire any rights thereunder.

What is more, the Agrarian Court conclusively found that respondent Ramirez was guilty of fraud and misrepresentation
in the signing of the tenancy contract Exhibit "A", having falsely identified himself to the representative of the bank as the
tenant of the land in question, and it consent to said tenancy contract. This contract is, consequently, not only void ab
initio for being contrary to the law giving Pecio, the true tenant, security of tenure, but also annullable or voidable on the
part of the bank whose consent thereto was given through fraud and mistake. Thus, the bank was justified refusing to
recognize said contract after it learned of Ramirez' deceitful act, and in giving the land to Pecio, the lawful and true tenant.
The Court below, in ordering the reinstatement of Ramirez, was, in effect, legalizing his imposture. Such a decree is against
morals and public policy and can not be allowed to stand.
As for the "katulagan" or agreement (Exhibit "1") entered into by Pecio and Ramirez merely to settle their dispute over
the tenantry of the land in question that arose form the latter's fraud, the only effect that could be given this agreement
was, as stipulated therein by the parties, for Ramirez to share the cultivation of the land in question equally with Pecio
during the agricultural year 1955-1956. Obviously, said agreement could not have created between Ramirez and the
petitioner bank the relationship of landlord and tenant so as to entitle the latter to the security of tenure guaranteed by
Republic Act No. 1199. Besides, the tenancy law, conceived as it was to redeem the tenant from the onerous terms of his
tenancy and uplift his social and financial status (Pineda vs. Pingul and C.I.R., 92 Phil., 89; 48 Off. Gaz. [9] 3901), can not
be invoked to protect one who is not a true and lawful tenant but who became so only through deceitful and insidious
acts.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint dismissed, with costs against respondent Teofilo
Ramirez.
 G.R. No. L-28280-81 November 28, 1969
GERONIMO DE LOS REYES, petitioner,
vs.
GREGORIO ESPINELI, RUPERTO ALCANTARA, JORGE LOBREN, PEDRO AMANTE, MATEO GUTIERREZ, ISIDRO RAMOS,
SANTOS DANGUE, MIGUEL RAMOS, CORNELIO GARCIA, MARGARITO BELARMINO, IRENEO BATRALO, SIMPLICIO
CASTRO, VICENTE ANIVES, MIGUEL HERNANDEZ, EUGENIO DALISAY, LEON LACSAMANA, and BELEN ALVAREZ,
respondents.

Luis A. L. Javellana and Yolanda Q. Javellana for petitioner.

Manuel A. Cordero for respondents.

CASTRO, J.:

Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. No. 37689-R and C.A.-G.R. No. 37690-R modifying
that of the Court of Agrarian Relations in CAR cases 1185 and 1186.

The petitioner Geronimo de los Reyes is the owner of a 200-hectare coconut plantation located in Calauan, Laguna. In
1958 his overseer ("katiwala") therein was Gonzalo Belarmino, who took into the land the 17 respondents under an
agreement that the latter were to receive 1/7 portion of every coconut harvest. Sometime in October, 1962, the petitioner
dismissed Belarmino, upon the suspicion that the latter had been deceiving him, in connivance with the respondents.

On March 2, 1963 Ruperto Alcantara, et al., and Gregorio Espineli (respondents here) filed separate petitions
(subsequently amended) against De los Reyes in the Court of Agrarian Relations, seeking the delivery to them of the
difference between the 1/7 share which the petitioner had been giving them and the 30% share to which they, as share
tenants, were allegedly entitled. Upon the finding that the respondents were mere agricultural workers of the petitioner,
the CAR ordered the latter to retain them as such and to pay them the sum of P4,559.07 "which is the total of their unpaid
share of 1/7 of the net coconut harvests for the period from September 13 to December 23, 1962 and February 25 to May
28, 1963," plus P500 as attorney's fees. Upon respondents' appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the decision of the CAR,
by declaring the respondents tenants of the petitioner and ordering the latter to pay them "the difference between the
one-seventh (1/7) share of the crops and the thirty (30%) per cent provided for in the Tenancy Law from the year 1958 up
to the filing of the petitions and so on; the resulting amount for this purpose to be arrived at in a liquidation to be
submitted, if and when this judgment shall have become final and the record remanded to the lower court."

Basically, the petitioner contends that (1) there existed no contractual relationship between him and the respondents; (2)
the respondents were not his tenants; and (3) the decision of the Court of Appeals deprives him of his property without
due process of law.

The respondents attempted to have the present appeal dismissed on the ground that it involves questions of fact. If indeed
the issues posed by the petitioner necessarily invite calibration of the entire evidence,1 then the appeal should be
dismissed since issues only of law may be raised in an appeal from the Court of Appeals to this Court.2 It seems to us clear,
however, that the petitioner accepts the findings of fact made by the appellate court, but takes exception to the
conclusions drawn therefrom. Such being the case, the questions here tendered for resolution are purely of law.3

At the outset, we must resolve the question of existence of a contract, the petitioner alleging, as he does, that his consent,
express or implied, had never been given. His position, simply stated, is that at the time the respondents were taken into
his land by Belarmino, the latter was a mere laborer and therefore without the requisite authority to contract in his behalf,
and it was only later that he was promoted to the position of overseer. However, in his "Amended Complaint" of April 22,
1968,4 the petitioner prayed that "judgment be rendered ... finding the defendants guilty of a breach of their contractual
obligation with the plaintiff," and in the body thereof he incorporated statements from which it can plainly be seen that
a contractual relationship existed between the parties.

Verily, there was and still is a contractual relationship between the petitioner and the respondents. In our view the pith
of the problem is, actually, whether the relationship is that of agricultural share tenancy (as averred by the respondents)
or that of farm employer and agricultural laborer (as asserted by the petitioner). On a determination of this question
depends the respective rights of the parties, more particularly the proper assessment of the share of the respondents
under the law.

Of fundamental relevance in this discussion are definitions of basic terms.

"Agricultural tenancy" is the physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture belonging to, or legally
possessed by, another for the purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the members of his immediate
farm household, in consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter, or to pay a price certain
or ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in both.5 "Share tenancy" exists whenever two persons agree on a joint
undertaking for agricultural production wherein one party furnishes the land and the other his labor, with either or both
contributing any one or several of the items of production, the tenant cultivating the land personally with the aid of labor
available from members of his immediate farm household, and the produce thereof to be divided between the landholder
and the tenant in proportion to their respective contributions.6 And a "share tenant" is a person who, himself and with
the aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by another,
with the latter's consent, for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder."7

It is to be readily deduced from the foregoing definitions that aside from the usual essential requisites of a contract,8 the
characteristics of a share tenancy contract are: (1) the parties are a landholder, who is a natural or juridical person and is
the owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of agricultural land,9 and a tenant who, himself and with the aid
available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land which is the subject-matter of the tenancy; (2)
the subject-matter is agricultural land; (3) the purpose of the contract is agricultural production; and (4) the cause or
consideration is that the landholder and the share tenant would divide the agricultural produce between themselves in
proportion to their respective contributions.

While the Agricultural Tenancy Act did not define the term "agricultural laborer" or "agricultural worker," the Agricultural
Land Reform Code does. A "farm worker" is "any agricultural wage, salary or piece worker but is not limited to a farm
worker of a particular farm employer unless this Code explicitly states otherwise, and any individual whose work has
ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, a current agrarian dispute or an unfair labor practice and who has not
obtained a substantially equivalent and regular employment." The term includes "farm laborer and/or farm
employees."10 An "agricultural worker" is not a whit different from a "farm worker."

From the definition of a "farm worker" thus fashioned, it is quite apparent that there should be an employer-employee
relationship between the "farm employer"11 and the farm worker. In determining the existence of an employer-employee
relationship, the elements that are generally considered are the following: (1) the selection and engagement of the
employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the employer's power to control the employee's
conduct. It is this last element that constitutes the most important index of the existence of relationship.12

This is not to say that agricultural workers or farm laborers are industrial workers. Not by any means, although they may
both appear in the same establishment. The difference lies in the kind of work they do. Those whose labor is devoted to
purely agricultural work are agricultural laborers. All others are industrial workers.13 Nonetheless, they belong to the
same class. Both are workers. Both are employees.
We are here primarily interested in the basic differences between a farm employer-farm worker relationship and an
agricultural sharehold tenancy relationship. Both, of course, are leases, but there the similarity ends. In the former, the
lease is one of labor, with the agricultural laborer as the lessor of his services, and the farm employer as the lessee
thereof.14 In the latter, it is the landowner who is the lessor, and the sharehold tenant is the lessee of agricultural land.
As lessee he has possession of the leased premises.15 But the relationship is more than a mere lease. It is a special kind
of lease, the law referring to it as a "joint undertaking."16 For this reason, not only the tenancy laws are applicable, but
also, in a suppletory way, the law on leases, the customs of the place and the civil code provisions on partnership.17 The
share tenant works for that joint venture. The agricultural laborer works for the farm employer, and for his labor he
receives a salary or wage, regardless of whether the employer makes a profit.18 On the other hand, the share tenant
participates in the agricultural produce. His share is necessarily dependent on the amount of the harvest.

Since the relationship between farm employer and agricultural laborer is that of employer and employee, the decisive
factor is the control exercised by the former over the latter. On the other hand, the landholder has the "right to require
the tenant to follow those proven farm practices which have been found to contribute towards increased agricultural
production and to use fertilizer of the kind or kinds shown by proven farm practices to be adapted to the requirements of
the land." This is but the right of a partner to protect his interest, not the control exercised by an employer. If landholder
and tenant disagree as to farm practices, the former may not dismiss the latter. It is the court that shall settle the conflict
according to the best interests of both parties.19

The record is devoid of evidentiary support for the notion that the respondents are farm laborers. They do not observe
set hours of work. The petitioner has not laid down regulations under which they are supposed to do their work. The
argument tendered is that they are guards. However, it does not appear that they are under obligation to report for duty
to the petitioner or his agent. They do not work in shifts. Nor has the petitioner prescribed the manner by which the
respondents were and are to perform their duties as guards. We do not find here that degree of control and supervision
evincive of an employer-employee relationship. Furthermore, if the respondents are guards, then they are not agricultural
laborers, because the duties and functions of a guard are not agricultural in nature.20 It is the Industrial Court that has
jurisdiction over any dispute that might arise between employer and employee. Yet, the petitioner filed his complaint
against the respondents in the Court of Agrarian Relations.

We now proceed to determine if there are present here the salient characteristics of an agricultural share tenancy
contract. The subject-matter is coconut land, which is considered agricultural land under both the Agricultural Land
Tenancy ACT21 and the Agricultural Land Reform Code.22 The purpose of the contract is the production of coconuts; the
respondents would receive 1/7 of the harvest. The petitioner is the landholder of the coconut plantation.

The crucial factors are that the tenant must have physical possession of the land for the purpose of production23 and he
must personally cultivate the land. If the tenant does not cultivate the land personally he cannot be considered a tenant
even if he is so designated in the written agreement of the parties.24

"Cultivation" is not limited to the plowing and harrowing of the land. It includes the various phrases of farm labor described
and provided by law, the maintenance, repair and weeding of dikes, paddies and irrigation canals in the holding. Moreover,
it covers attending to the care of the growing plants.25 Where the parties agreed that they would "operate a citrus nursery
upon the condition that they would divide the budded citrus in the proportion of 1/3 share of respondents and 2/3 as
share of petitioner," and that the "petitioner would furnish all the necessary seedlings and seeds, as well as the technical
know-how in the care, cultivation, budding and balling of the budded citrus, while respondents would furnish the land
necessary for the nursery, the farm labor that may be needed to plant and cultivate, and all the chemicals, fertilizers, and
bud tapes that may be necessary for such cultivation," then "the tenancy agreement entered into between the parties has
relation to the possession of agricultural land to be devoted to the production of agricultural products thru the labor of
one of the parties, and as such comes within the purview of the term 'agricultural tenancy' as defined in section 3 of
Republic Act No. 1199 as amended."26
In one instance,27 the landholder claimed that his caretaker was not an agricultural tenant because he "does not till or
cultivate the land in order to grow the fruit bearing trees because they are already full grown," and "he does not even do
the actual gathering of the fruits" but "merely supervises the gathering, and after deducting the expenses, he gives one-
half of the fruits to plaintiff all in consideration of his stay in the land." This Court's answer was to the point:

Anyone who has had fruit trees in his yard will disagree with the above description of the relationship. He knows the
caretaker, must water the trees, even fertilize them for better production, uproot weeds and turn the soil, sometimes
fumigate to eliminate plant pests, etc. Those chores obviously mean "working or cultivating" the land. Besides, it seems
that defendant planted other crops, [i.e., cultivated the lot] giving the landowner his corresponding share.

The Court of Appeals made some essential findings of fact. The respondents were called "kasama." They have plowing
implements. The respondent Pedro Amante even used to have a carabao which he subsequently exchanged for a horse.
Almost all of the respondents have banana plantations on the land. They live in the landholding. They are charge with the
obligation to clean their respective landholdings. Certain portions of the land are planted to palay.

These factual findings may not be reviewed by the Supreme Court.28 Furthermore, the said facts are supported by the
testimony of the petitioner himself, who admitted that the respondents are his "kasama," although he tried to minimize
the effect of this admission by alleging that although called "kasama," the respondents "do not perform the work of a
"kasama," and that in Quezon the "kasama" plow the land, they plant rice, but here in Laguna, they do not do anything."
The appellate court was correct in concluding that "kasama" means "tenant,"29 not worker or laborer, which is translated
into our national language as "manggagawa."30 Respecting farm implements, the petitioner admitted that "they have the
implements," but again he tried to minimize the significance of his statement by adding that "they have not used it in the
farm." However, the report of the CAR clerk of court, based on his ocular inspection, pertinently states that he found
"certain portions planted with palay."

The petitioner cannot deny that the respondents were all living in the landholding and that "all of them have banana
plantation, small or big, "though he averred," not one single banana was given to me as my share."

We now come to the all-important question of whether the respondents have the duty to cultivate the land in order that
the trees would bear more coconuts. The petitioner's answers on cross-examination are quite revealing. Thus:

Q. Where these petitioners duty bound to do any cleaning or clearing of the underbrush within the coconut land?

A. These laborers clean the land from where . . . They are getting their food and subsistence.

COURT: The question is that, are they duty bound to clean the landholding in question?

A. To make my answer short, I say that the responsibility is to Gonzalo Belarmino, to him, because he is the one who
engaged them.

xxx xxx xxx

A. One, to guard the property and use their names as threat to people who might ... have the intention of stealing my
coconuts, and two, to assist in the clearing of the land because that is the responsibility of Gonzalo Belarmino. . . .31

Undeniably, the petitioner considers it one of the duties of the respondents to clear and clean the land. Additionally, in
his complaint the petitioner claimed that "the defendants have abandoned their posts at the plaintiff's plantation and
have likewise failed and refused to comply with their contractual obligation with the plaintiff to keep the areas respectively
assigned to them clean and clear of undergrowths and cogonal grass at all times, with the result that it is now impossible
for the plaintiff to harvest the mature coconuts as these would only be lost amid the undergrowth and cogonal which have
now grown to unreasonable heights, thereby causing further damage and prejudice to the plaintiff." (Emphasis supplied).

The petitioner clearly expected the respondents to perform the duties of a tenant, especially, to maintain the land clean
and clear "at all times," which not only would facilitate harvesting but, more importantly, would necessarily result in
greater production. As found by the CAR clerk of court during the ocular inspection,

the planting of palay has a direct effect on the growing of the coconuts because in the places he found planted with palay,
the coconut trees displayed white leaves gray in color with plenty of nuts or fruits, compared to the portion in the hacienda
where we encountered cogon grasses, under brushes and ipil-ipil tress, there is a need for thorough cleaning, especially
the ipil-ipil trees which are growing high for years already in-between the rows of coconut trees.32

Therefore, the parties to the contract understood, in sum and substance, that the respondents were to "cultivate" the
land. Whether the latter had been remiss in the performance of their contractual obligations, does not affect the nature
of the contract which the appellate court analyzed and found to be that of share tenancy. It is the principal features and
stipulations which determine the true essence of a contract.33 Considering then that the respondents are duty bound to
cultivate their respective holdings (of which they have possession), and that they share in the harvest, the Court of
Appeals' conclusion must be upheld. This, especially in the light of the facts that the respondents raise secondary crops
and have their homes in their respective holdings.

The petitioner having entered into a share tenancy contract with the respondents, it certainly cannot be seriously claimed
that the relationship of landlord and tenant is unjustifiably being imposed on him without due process of law. It was the
petitioner himself who voluntarily entered the relationship, and, therefore, should shoulder the consequences thereof,
one of which is that the tenants must be given, as they are entitled to, a 30% share in the produce.34

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is affirmed, at petitioner's cost.

G.R. No. L-12902 July 29, 1959
CEFERINO MARCELO, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. NAZARIO DE LEON, Defendant-Appellee.
Pedro D. Maldia and San Vicente and Jardiel for appellant.
Inciong and Bacalso for appellee.
BENGZON, J.:

The plaintiff has appealed from the order of judge Jose N. Leuterio of the Nueva Ecija court of first instance, dismissing his
complaint whereby he had asked that defendant be required to vacate a parcel of land and to pay damages. The dismissal
rested on two grounds, (a) the case pertained to the Court of Agrarian Relations; and (b) as attorney-in-fact of the true
owner of the land, the plaintiff had no right to bring the action.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The record disclose that on February 4, 1957, Ceferino Marcelo, filed in the justice of the peace court of San Antonio,
Nueva Ecija, a complaint to recover possession of a lot of 2,000 square meters belonging to Severino P. Marcelo (who had
given him a full power-of-attorney) which was held by defendant "on the understanding that one-half of all the products
raised in the occupied area, would be given" to the landowner. The complaint alleged that after plaintiff had assumed the
administration of Severino Marcelo's properties, defendant delivered the products corresponding to the owner; but when
in September 1956, plaintiff notified defendant that in addition to giving half of the produce, he would have to pay a rental
of two pesos per month, the latter refused, and continued refusing to pay such additional charges. Wherefore,
complainant prayed for judgment ordering defendant to leave the premises and to pay damages and
costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The defendant questioned the court's jurisdiction, arguing that the matter involved tenancy relations falling within the
authority of the Agrarian Court; he also challenged the capacity of plaintiff to sue. He lost in the justice of the peace court;
however, on appeal to the court of first instance, he raised the same issues on a motion to dismiss, and then his views
prevailed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In this appeal, plaintiff insists he merely filed ejectment or detainer proceedings, which fall within the justice of the peace
court's jurisdiction. He claims the lot to be residential, and not agricultural. On this point, His Honor noted that "the land
covered by the title of plaintiff's principal covers an area of 59,646 square meters situated in the barrio of San Mariano,
San Antonio, Nueva Ecija. This land obviously is agricultural, and it is too much to presume that barrio folks would occupy
an area of 2,000 square meters more or less of land for a residence. The cultivation of the land by the defendant and the
sharing of the products thereof with the owner of the land characterize the relationship between the defendant and the
plaintiff's principal as one of the landlord and tenant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Indeed, from the allegations of the complaint, one could conclude that defendant had physical possession of the land for
the purpose of cultivating it and giving the owner a share in the crop. This was agricultural tenancy of the kind called
"share tenancy". In judging this relationship, the 2-pesos-a-month-rental alleged in the complaint may be disregarded,
because defendant never having agreed to such imposition, it may not be held a part of the compensation payable for
holding the land. The circumstance that defendant built a dwelling on the agricultural lot does not ipso facto make it
residential - considering specially that the dwelling - photograph submitted with brief - does not occupy more than 80
square meters occupied by him. In this connection, plaintiff argues as follows:

The defendant does not till or cultivate the land in order to grow the fruit bearing trees because they are already full
grown. He does not even do the actual gathering, and after deducting the expenses, he gives one-half of the fruits to the
plaintiff all in consideration of his stay in the land. He is not, therefore, a tenant within the meaning of that term as used
in Republic Act. No. 1199 for "A tenant shall mean a person who, himself and with the aid available from within his
immediate farm household, cultivate the land for purposes of production . . ."
Anyone who had fruit trees in his yard, will disagree with the above description of the relationship. He knows the caretaker
must water the trees, even fertilize them for better production, uproot weeds and turn the soil, sometimes fumigate to
eliminate plants pests, etc. Those chores obviously mean "working or cultivating" the land. Besides, it seems that
defendant planted other crops, (i.e. cultivated the lot) giving the landowner his corresponding
share.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Now, the statutes provide that "All cases involving dispossession of a tenant by the landholder . . . shall be under the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of such court as may now or hereafter be authorized by law to take cognizance of
tenancy relations and disputes". Sec. 2, Republic Act 1199); and the court (Agrarian Relations) "shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to consider, investigate, decide and settle all questions and matters involving all those relationships
established by law which determine the varying rights of persons in cultivation and use of agricultural land where one of
the parties works the land". (Sec. 7, Republic Act 1267 as amended by Republic Act 1409.) chanrobles virtual law library

In Tumbagan vs. Vasquez, L-8719, July 17, 1956, we impliedly held that where a farmland occupies agricultural land and
erects a house thereon, the tenancy relationship continues subject to tenancy laws - not to those governing
leases.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In fact, the Agricultural Tenancy Law (Republic Act 1199) requires the landholder to give his tenant an area wherein the
latter may construct his dwelling (sec. 26), of course without thereby changing the nature of their relationship, from
landowner and tenant to lessor and lessee.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

At any rate, this action must fail upon the second ground of defendant's motion to dismiss: the plaintiff is a mere
apoderado of the owner, Severino P. Marcelo. 1 The rule is that every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest, (sec 2, Rule 3).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

However, plaintiff quotes that part of sec. 1 of Rule 72, permitting "the legal representative" of any landlord to bring an
action of ejectment, and insists in his right now to litigate. Supposing that "legal representative" as used in sec. 1, includes
attorneys-in-fact, we find that plaintiff's power attached to the complaint, authorizes him to sue for and in the name of
Severino Marcelo, to "pursue any and all kinds of suits and actions for me and in my name in the courts of the land". This
action is not in the name of plaintiff's principal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

For all the foregoing, the appealed order is affirmed with costs chargeable against appellant.
G.R. No. L-20098 January 31, 1966
SILVERIO LATAG, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MARCELO BANOG, defendant-appellee.
Endaya, Caleasal and Delgado for the plaintiff-appellant.
Suanes, Barbosa and Atienza for the defendant-appellee.
ZALDIVAR, J.:

This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Batangas dismissing the complaint in its Civil Case No.
1263, on the ground that said court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case.

On February 13, 1962 the plaintiff-appellant filed a complaint against the defendant-appellee alleging, in substance: that
the defendant is the absolute owner of two parcels of land situated in Barrio Quilib, Rosario, Batangas; that on December
7, 1960, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a written contract whereby it was agreed that the former was to act
as manager, cultivator and caretaker of the two parcels of land owned by the latter, and of all the useful plants planted,
and to be planted, on said lands, with the understanding that all the products of the orange and the calamansi trees
planted thereon would be divided into three equal parts; two-thirds of which would be the share of the plaintiff and one-
third would be the share of the defendant, while the sharing in the other products like coffee, bananas, mangoes, black
pepper and others would be on the fifty-fifty basis; and it was further agreed that said relationship and sharing would
continue for a period of five years from December 7, 1960; that pursuant to said agreement the plaintiff entered into the
management, cultivation and care of the above-mentioned properties, and had built a house costing P70.00 on one of the
two parcels of land, that the plaintiff had incurred actual expenses in the total amount of P2,286.80 aside from other
miscellaneous expenses for food and viand of his laborers; that on January 11, 1962, without any legal ground nor
justification whatsoever the defendant drove the plaintiff out of the lands and even destroyed the house that the plaintiff
had built thereon; that notwithstanding all efforts of the plaintiff to make the defendant comply with his part of the
agreement in their written contract, the defendant had adamantly refused. The complaint prayed that judgment be
rendered ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff actual damages in the amount of P2,656.80, unrealized profits in the
amount that the court would fix after hearing the evidence, moral damages in the amount of at least P5,000.00, exemplary
damages in the amount of at least P5,000.00, plus attorney's fees equivalent to 20% of the total amounts collected and
the costs of the suit. A copy of the written agreement in question was attached to the complaint as Annex "A".

On March 2, 1962 the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the case and that the complaint did not state a cause of action. It is contended by the defendant
that, based on the allegations in the complaint and as stated in the written agreement which was attached to the
complaint as Annex "A", a relationship of landlord and tenant had existed between the plaintiff and the defendant—the
plaintiff being the tenant and the defendant being the landlord, and the complaint being one that seeks to secure a
decision or settlement of differences or disputes in connection with the relationship of landlord and tenant involving the
cultivation and use of agricultural land, it is the Court of Agrarian Relations and not the Court of First Instance that has
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. The defendant points out that the complaint of the plaintiff poses the question
of whether the act of the defendant, as landlord, in dispossessing the plaintiff, as tenant, of the two parcels of land was
justified or not under the law.

On March 5, 1962, the plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss the complaint and at the same time moved to
amend the original complaint by striking out the words "cultivator" and "cultivation" in paragraphs 3 & 4, of the original
complaint, claiming that the one who drafted the original complaint was not well versed in Tagalog such that the phrase
"tagapamahala at tagapagalaga" was translated into "manager, cultivator and caretaker" whereas that phrase
"tagapamahala at tagapagalaga" ought to be translated into English only as "manager and caretaker" without including
any statement about cultivation. In his opposition to the motion to dismiss the plaintiff contends that in the contract,
Annex A to the complaint, no tenancy relationship was agreed upon and the complaint was intended to recover damages
so that it is the court of general jurisdiction, which is the Court of First Instance, and not the Court of Agrarian Relations,
which is a court of limited jurisdiction, that has competence to hear and decide the case.1äwphï1.ñët

On March 27, 1962 the Court of First Instance of Batangas, acting on the motion to dismiss the complaint, issued an order
dismissing the case. In its order of dismissal the court a quo stated:

This Court believes and so holds that the argument of the defendant is well-taken, and agrees with him that the document,
Annex "A", indicates the existence of tenancy relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, considering the ruling
of our Supreme Court in the case of Teodorico B. Santos vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., G.R. No. L-17196, prom.
Dec. 28, 1961, "that any matter that may pertain to the relation of tenant and landlord comes under the Agricultural
Tenancy and any controversy that may arise between them as an incident of their Act (Republic Act No. 1199, as amended
by Republic Act No. 2263) and any controversy that may arise between them as an incident of their relationship comes
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations created by Republic Act. No. 1267. It was created for
enforcement of all laws and regulations governing the relation of capital and labor on all agricultural lands under any
system of cultivation (Section 1, Rep. Act No. 1267, as amended by Republic Act No. 1409) and was given exclusive
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to consider, disputes established by law which determine the varying rights of
persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land where one of the parties works the land", and so this Court believes
and so declares that it has no jurisdiction to pass upon the issues of the case at bar, falling as they do, according to the
above citation under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.

Before this Court, plaintiff-appellant insists that the contract (Annex A) does not establish any tenancy relationship, or if
it did, such relationship had already ceased inasmuch as he does not ask for reinstatement as tenant. He claims that this
case is a simple suit for damages which the Court of Agrarian Relations cannot take cognizance of, it being a court of
special and limited jurisdiction.

The contract (Annex A) contains the following pertinent stipulations:

Na si Silverio Latag, ganap sa gulang, Filipino, asawa ni Cipriana Alday at naninirahan sa Tambo, Lipa City ay aking ginawang
tagapamahala at tagapag-alaga sa naulit na lupa; na siya rin ang mamomosession, mamamahala sa mga halamang
nakatanim at itatanim sa lupang naulit sa loob ng limang taon.

Na si Silverio Latag, ang mag-aalaga sa mga halaman ng lupang nabanggit; na ang lahat ng kagastusang maaaring makamit
o kailanganin sa pag-aalaga ay siyang lahat ang nakakaalam; at walang PAKIALAM ang may-ari ng lupa.

Na ang kasunduan naming ito ay tatagal sa loob ng limang (5) taon simula ngayon; na ang kasunduang ito ay nagpapatunay
din na ang bahagi ay akong may-ari ng lupa ay sa ikatlo (1/3) sa sinturis at kalamansing aanihin dito; at hati (50-50) parte
sa bunga ng mga halamang sumusunod, (1) kape; (2) saging; (3) mangga; (4) at paminta at sa mga ibang halamang itatanim
pa ng naulit na si Silverio Latag.

In the original complaint the plaintiff used the words "manager, cultivator and caretaker" of the two parcels of land
concerned, but on the excuse that the one who prepared the complaint was not well versed in Tagalog, the complaint was
subsequently amended whereby the word "cultivator" was deleted in the allegations of the complaint. We note, however
that in the contract, Annex "A" to the complaint, it is clearly provided that the plaintiff would take care of the plants that
are planted and those still to be planted on the lands within a period of five years ("mamamahala sa mga halamang
nakatanim at itatanim sa lupang naulit sa loob ng limang taon").

This Court believes that the allegations of the complaint (even as amended) and the stipulations of the contract (Annex A)
unmistakably show that an agricultural tenancy of the kind called "share tenancy" was established between the parties. It
has been declared that "an agricultural tenancy classified as `share tenancy' exists where a person has physical possession
of another's land for the purpose of cultivating it and giving the owner a share in the crop" (Marcelo vs. De Leon, L-12902,
July 29, 1959). This Court in the same case held:

x x x x He knows the caretaker must water the trees, even fertilize them for better production, uproot weeds and turn the
soil, sometimes fumigate to eliminate plant pests, etc. Those chores obviously mean "working or cultivating" the land. x x
xx

It may thus be stated that the "caretaker" of an agricultural land is also considered the "cultivator" of the land.

As regards plaintiff-appellant's contention that the tenancy relationship, if any, had been terminated because his claim
was only for damages without reinstatement to his status as tenant, suffice it to say that in the instant case the plaintiff-
appellant's claim for damages was based on his having been allegedly dispossessed unlawfully or unjustifiably by the
defendant-appellee of the two parcels of land under his care and management sometime on January 1, 1962. It is clear
that the action relates to an incident arising from the landlord and tenant relationship which existed shortly before the
filing of the complaint on February 13, 1962. Under the circumstance, the Court of Agrarian Relations has the original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the case, even if the tenancy relationship no longer existed at the time of the filing of the action.
On this point this Court ruled as follows:

Indeed, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 1199, provides that "all cases involving the dispossession of a tenant by the landlord
or by a third party and/or the settlement and disposition of disputes arising from the relationship of landlord and tenant
. . . shall be under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations." This jurisdiction does not
require the continuance of the relationship of landlord and
tenant — at the time of the dispute. The same may have arisen, and often times arise, precisely from the previous
termination of such relationship. If the same existed immediately, or shortly before the controversy and the subject-
matter thereof is whether or not said relationship has been lawfully terminated, or if the dispute otherwise springs or
originates from the relationship of landlord and tenant, the litigation is cognizable only by the Court of Agrarian Relations,
. . . (Basilio vs. De Guzman, et al., L-12762, April 22, 1959).

On the point that the present case comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations even if the
action is only for the recovery of damages based on the unlawful dispossession of the tenant, this Court held:

Section 7, Republic Act No. 1267, as amended, vests in the Court of Agrarian Relations exclusive and original jurisdiction
to determine controversies arising from landlord-tenant relationship. From this it may be inferred that it also has
jurisdiction to hear and determine actions for recovery of damages arising from the unlawful dismissal or dispossession of
tenant by the landlord, as provided in Act No. 4054 and Republic Act No. 1199, as amended. To hold otherwise could result
in multiplicity of suits and expensive litigations abhorred by the law . . . . (Militar vs. Torcillero, et al., L-15065, April 28,
1961).

We hold, therefore, that the lower court did not commit error when it dismissed the complaint in the present case.
Wherefore, the order of dismissal appealed from is affirmed, with costs against plaintiff-appellant.
G.R. No. L-29381 September 30, 1969
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS and PANTALEON BINGABING, petitioners,
vs.
HON. VALERIANO A. DEL VALLE, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Court of Agrarian Relations and PAMPILO DOLTZ,
respondents
Marcelino B. Bermudez for petitioners.
Nostratis and Estrada for respondent Judge V. A. Del Valle.
Abelardo Flores for respondent Pampilo Doltz.
SANCHEZ, J.:

The decisive issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not strips of land owned by Philippine National Railways (PNR)
which are on both sides of its railroad track, and are part of its right of way for its railroad operations but temporarily
leased, are agricultural lands within the purview of the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the Agricultural Land Reform Code,
such as would come within the jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.

The facts of this particular case are these:

PNR, a government-owned corporation, is the registered owner of three (3) strips of land with a uniform width of 30.
meters adjoining one another longitudinally, the same being part of its railroad right of way running from Manila to
Legazpi. These strips of land lie within the municipalities of Oas and Polangui, Province of Albay. At the center thereof is a
track measuring ten (10) to twelve (12) meters in width where railroad ties are placed and rails built for running
locomotives. On both sides of the track, or about (2) to five (5) meters away from the embarassment of the track, are
telegraph and telephone posts office (50) meters apart from each other, which maintain communication wires necessary
in the operation of PNR trains. PNR draws earth from these sides to fill up the railroad track whenever it is destroyed by
water during rainy days; and uses them as depository of railroad materials for the repair of destroyed lines, posts, bridges
during washouts, or other damaged parts of the line occasioned by derailments or other calamities.

The portions of these lands not actually occupied by the railroad track had been a source of trouble. People occupied
them; they reap profits therefrom. Disputes among those desiring to occupy them cropped up. It is on the face of all these
that, with adequate provisions to safeguard railroad operations, PNR adopted temporary rules and regulations, as follows:
(a) the possession and enjoyment of the property should be awarded to interested persons thru competitive public
bidding; (b) the rental of the premises is to be determined from the amount offered by the highest bidder; (e) the duration
of the lease shall be for a limited period, not to exceed three (3) years; (d) the lessee cannot sublease the premises; (e)
the lease contract is revocable at any time upon demand by the owner, whenever it needs the same for its own use or for
a more beneficial purpose; (f) the owner can enter the leased premises during the period of the lease to make necessary
repairs; and (g) the lessee shall not use the premises in a manner prejudicial to the operation of the trains.

Sometime in 1963, PNR awarded the portions of the three strips of land aforementioned which are on both sides of the
track, after a competitive public bidding, to petitioner Pantaleon Bingabing for a period of three (3) years and under
conditions hereinbefore set forth. A civil law lease contract in printed form was, on April 15, 1963, entered into by and
between PNR and Bingabing. That contract expressly stipulates that Bingabing was "to occupy and use the property ...
temporarily for agriculture." Consideration therefor was P130.00 per annum. Bingabing, however, failed to take
possession because respondent Pampilo Doltz was occupying the land, had a house thereon. Doltz claims to be a tenant
of previous awardees, and later, of Bingabing himself.

Sometime in March 1965, PNR and Bingabing filed suit against Doltz for recovery of possession of the premises in the
Court of First Instance of Albay. 1 They there averred that sometime in January 1963, Doltz illegally entered the land,
constructed a house thereon occupying about fifty (50) square meters, and planted palay on the other portions thereof.
They prayed that Doltz remove his house, vacate the premises, restore possession to PNR or Bingabing, pay PNR P160 per
annum as reasonable compensation for the occupation of the premises from January 1963, and P2,000 as expenses of
litigation, pay Bingabing P500 annually from 1963, and shoulder the costs of suit.

Doltz' answer in that case averred inter alia that the had been a tenant on the property for over twenty years; that he had
been placed thereon by the deceased Pablo Gomba who leased the property from the then Manila Railroad Company
(now PNR); that he became the tenant of Demetrio de Vera, Gomba's successor; that he is the tenant of Bingabing, having
given the latter's share of 1/3 during the last two harvests; and that the case is properly cognizable by the Court of Agrarian
Relations. Upon the court's request, Doltz and Bingabing agreed to temporarily liquidate the harvest on a sharing ratio of
70-30 in Doltz' favor.

It has been suggested in the record that said case — Civil Case 3021 — was dismissed by the Court of First Instance of
Albay upon the ground that the subject matter of the action is tenancy; that petitioners have appealed. That case,
parenthetically, has not yet reached this Court.

While the aforesaid Civil Case 3021 was pending in the Albay court of first instance, Doltz registered with the Court of
Agrarian Relations (CAR) a petition against Bingabing for security of tenure, the adoption of a sharing ratio of 70-30 of the
crops, and reliquidation of past harvests. This is the present case — CAR Case 692, Albay '67, Court of Agrarian Relations,
Ninth Regional District, Legazpi City, Branch II, entitled "Pampilo Doltz, Petitioner, versus Pantaleon Bingabing,
Respondent." PNR intervened in the case. Petitioners herein there maintained the position that the premises in
controversy are not an agricultural land within the contemplation of the Agricultural Tenancy Act (Republic Act 1199) or
the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act 3844); that no tenancy relationship existed between the parties; that
CAR, therefore, lacked jurisdiction over the case; and that there is a pending case between the same parties in another
court involving the same subject matter and the same cause of action.

After trial, the CAR promulgated its decision of June 10, 1968. It upheld its jurisdiction over the case, maintained Doltz in
the peaceful possession of the parcels of land as tenant on a 70-30 sharing ratio in Doltz' favor, ordered Bingabing to pay
Doltz P250 attorneys' fees and the costs, but dismissed the latter's claim for reliquidation of past harvests for lack of
substantial evidence. Petitioners' move to reconsider the said decision failed. They now come to this Court. They
specifically question CAR's jurisdiction.

1. Is the land here involved in agricultural land within the meaning of the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the Agricultural
Land Reform Code?

According to Section 3 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, "[a]gricultural tenancy is the physical possession by a person of
land devoted to agriculture belonging to, or legally possessed by, another for the purpose of production through the labor
of the former and of the members of his immediate farm household, in consideration of which the former agrees to share
the harvest with the latter, or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in both." 2 The
term "agricultural land" as understood by the Agricultural Land Reform Code is not as broad in meaning as it is known in
the constitutional sense. As interpreted in Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461, 471, the phrase "agricultural land,"
constitutionally speaking, includes all lands that are neither mineral nor timber lands and embraces within it wide sweep
not only lands strictly agricultural or devoted to cultivation for agricultural purposes but also commercial, industrial,
residential lands and lands for other purposes. On the other hand, by Section 166(1) of the Agricultural Land Reform Code,
" "[a]gricultural land" means land devoted to any growth including but not limited to crop lands, salt beds, fishponds, idle
land and abandoned land as defined in paragraphs 18 and 19 of this section, respectively." 3

It is obvious then that under the law, the land here in controversy does not fit into the concept of agricultural land. PNR
cannot devote it to agriculture because by its own charter, Republic Act 4156, PNR cannot engage in agriculture.
Indeed, the land — which adjoins the railroad track on both sides — is part of PNR's right of way. That right of way is not
limited to the particular space occupied by the roadbed or its main track. It also includes the portions occupied by the
telephone and telegraph posts. It extends to a width of 30 meters which reasonably gives the train locomotive engineer a
clear commanding view of the track and its switches ahead of him.

The entire width is important to PNR's railroad operations. Which should not be hampered. And, communication lines
must not be disturbed. Buildings should not be constructed so close to the track. Because, it is not so easy to prevent
people from walking along the track; animals, too, may stray into the area; obstructions there could be along the track
itself which might cause derailment. All of these could prevent the locomotive engineer from taking the necessary
precautions on time to avert accidents which may cause damage to the trains, injury to its passengers, and even loss of
life.

Besides, the use of the strips of land on both sides of the track in railroad operation is inconsistent with agricultural
activities. The contract of lease authorizes the railroad company to enter upon the premises to make repairs, place its
materials on the land. It may even take soil from the land to fill up any part of the railroad track destroyed by water during
rainy days. What if PNR should decide to construct another parallel track on the land leased? The occupant of the land
cannot prevent or stop PNR from doing any of these. Security of tenure so important in landlord-tenant relationship may
not thus be attained.

The foregoing are considerations sufficient enough to deter us from adopting the view that the disputed land — in narrow
strips — is agricultural land within the meaning of the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the Agricultural Land Reform Code. By
destination, it is not agricultural.

2. Nor may Pampilo Doltz be considered as a true and lawful tenant.

To be borne in mind is the fact that PNR executed with Pantaleon Bingabing a civil law lease contract, not an agricultural
lease.1awphîl.nèt This distinction is expressly recognized by the law. 4 That contract is temporary, at best for a short term.
It is revocable any time upon demand by PNR whenever it needs the same for its own use or for a more beneficial purpose.

Even on the assumption that the land is agricultural, there is the circumstance that PNR prohibits the sublease of the
premises. PNR's lessees cannot give what they are not allowed to give. Any contract then of sublease between Doltz, the
supposed tenant, and Pablo Gomba or Demetrio de Vera, the previous awardees, or even of Pantaleon Bingabing, the
present awardee — without PNR's consent — cannot bind the latter. No such consent was here given.

This ushers us to a principle shaped out by jurisprudence that the security of tenure guaranteed by our tenancy law may
be invoked only by tenants de jure, not by those who are not true and lawful tenants. 5 In Pabustan vs. De Guzman, L-
12898, August 31, 1960, the tenant sublet the landholding to a third person without the knowledge and consent of the
landowner. In an ejectment suit brought by the landowner against said third person in the CAR, this Court held that the
CAR had no jurisdiction over the case because no tenancy relationship existed between the parties, as the third person
was, in reality, an unlawful squatter or intruder. Correlating Pabustan to the present case, the lessee here had no power
to sublet. There is also thus no legally cognizable relationship of tenancy between the parties.

We, accordingly, rule that CAR does not have jurisdiction over the case at bar and the proceedings below are thus null and
void.

For the reasons given, the judgment of the Court of Agrarian Relations of June 10, 1968 in its Case 692, Albay '67, under
review is hereby reversed, and said case is hereby dismissed.

Costs against private respondent Pampilo Doltz. So ordered

ACT NO. 4054 – AN ACT TO PROMOTE THE WELL-BEING OF TENANTS (APARCEROS) IN AGRICULTURAL LANDS DEVOTED
TO THE PRODUCTION OF RICE AND TO REGULATE THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM AND THE LANDLORDS OF SAID
LANDS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

PART I
Share tenancy contract in general

Section 1. Title of Act. – This Act shall be known as “The Philippine Rice Share Tenancy Act.”

Sec. 2. Share tenancy Contracts defined. – A contract of share of tenancy is one whereby a partnership between a landlord and a
tenant is entered into, for a joint pursuit of rice agricultural work with common interest in which both parties divide between them the
resulting profits as well as the losses.

Sec. 3. Landlord and tenant interpreted. – For the purposes of this Act, the word “landlord” shall mean and includes either a natural or
juridical person who is the real owner of the land which is the subject-matter of the contract, as well as a lessee, a usufructuary or any
other legitimate possessor of agricultural land cultivated by another; and the word “tenant” shall mean a farmer or farm laborer who
undertakes to work and cultivate land for another or a person who furnishes the labor.

Sec. 4. Form of contract. – The contract on share tenancy, in order to be valid and binding, shall be drawn in triplicate in the language
or dialect known to all the parties thereto, to be signed or thumb-marked both by the landlord or his authorized representative and by
the tenant, before two witnesses, one to be chosen by each party. The party who does not know how to read and write may request
one of the witnesses to read the contents of the document. Each of the contracting parties shall retain a copy of the contract and the
third copy shall be filed with, and registered in the office of the municipal treasurer of the municipality, where the land, which is the
subject-matter of the contract, is located: Provided, however, That in order that a contract may be considered registered, both the copy
of the landlord and that of the tenant shall contain an annotation made by the municipal treasurer to the effect that same is registered in
his office.

Sec. 5. Registry of tenancy contract. – For the purposes of this Act, the municipal treasurer of the municipality wherein the land, which
is the subject-matter of a contract, is situated, shall keep a record of all contracts made within his jurisdiction, to be known as Registry
of Tenancy Contracts. He shall keep this registry together with a copy of each contract entered therein, and make annotations on said
registry in connection with the outcome of a particular contract, such as the way same is extinguished: Provided, however, That the
municipal treasurer shall not charge fees for the registration of said contract which shall be exempt from the documentary stamp tax.

Sec. 6. Duration of contract. – Any contract on rice tenancy entered into between landlord and tenant or farm laborer according to this
Act shall last in accordance with the stipulation of the parties: Provided, however, That in the absence of stipulation, same shall be
understood to last only during one agricultural year: Provided, further, That unless the contract is renewed in writing and registered as
provided in section four hereof within thirty days after the expiration of the original period, the same shall be presumed to be
extinguished: Provided, finally, That in case of renewing the contract without changing the stipulations therein it is sufficient that the
municipal treasurer shall annotate the word “renewed” in the three copies of the contract and in the Registry of Tenancy Contracts.

For the purposes of this section, one agricultural year shall mean the length of time necessary for the preparation of the land, sowing,
planting and harvesting a crop, although it may be shorter or longer than a calendar year.

Sec. 7. Rules governing tenancy contracts. – In any contract of tenancy mentioned in this Act, the contracting parties shall be free to
enter into any or all kinds of agreement or stipulations so long as they are not contrary to existing laws, customs, morals and public
policy: Provided, That such contract shall be conclusive evidence of what has been agreed upon between the contracting parties, if
their stipulations are not denounced or impugned within thirty days from its registration in the office of the municipal treasurer, as
provided in section five of this Act.

Sec. 8. Share basis. – In the absence of any written agreement to the contrary and when the necessary implements and the work
animals are furnished by the tenant; and the expenses for planting, harvesting, threshing, irrigation and fertilizer, if any, as well as other
expenses incident to the proper cultivation of the land, are born equally by both the landlord and tenant, the crop shall be divided
equally. The division shall be made in the same place where the crop has been threshed and each party shall transport his share to his
warehouse, unless the contrary is stipulated by the parties: Provided, however, That when the landlord furnishes the work animal
gratuitously it shall be deemed as a special consideration, and the tenant shall be obliged to transport the share of the landlord to his
warehouse if it is within the municipality where the land cultivated is situated.
Sec. 9. Auxiliary industry. – In the absence of any written agreement to the contrary, the profits of any other industry carried on the
holding for the common benefit shall belong in equal shares to both landlord and tenant, after making the necessary deduction for
expenses which shall be returned to the party who advanced it.

Auxiliary industry shall not, however, be construed to include the crops or products raised from a garden, poultry, and such other
industries carried on a lot specially provided for the residence of the tenant.

PART II
Accounts and their liquidation

Sec. 10. Loans. – All advances obtained by the tenant from the landlord in connection with the cultivation, planting, harvesting, and
such other incidental expenses for the improvement of the crop planted, shall bear interest not exceeding ten per centum per
agricultural year and shall be evidenced by a written contract to this effect, otherwise they shall not bear any interest: Provided,
however, That on all loans other than money, such as grain or other agricultural products made to the tenant by the landlord, no interest
in excess of ten per centum shall be added to the invoice price of the article thus loaned, and any inflation of the original price of said
article shall be considered as usurious and penalized according to the provisions of the Usury Law.

Sec. 11. Limit of loans. – The limit of the loan that can be requested by a tenant shall be fifty per centum of the average yearly tenant’s
share on the particular piece of land allotted to said tenant for cultivation during the last three years: Provided, That in the case of land
to be cultivated for the first time, the limit of the loan shall depend upon the agreement of the parties until the third year.

Sec. 12. Memorandum of advances. – Any obligation referring to any amount, either in money or in kind, which the tenant may have
received in advance from time to time from the landlord, shall be unenforceable by action unless the same; or some note or
memorandum thereof, be in writing, in a language or dialect known to the party charged, and subscribed by the said party, or by his
agent. Said memorandum or note shall be signed by both parties and made in duplicate, one copy to remain with the landlord and the
other with the tenant.

Sec. 13. Form of final accounting. – The final accounting between landlord and tenant at the end of each agricultural year, shall be
effected within fifteen days after the threshing of the harvested crop and the same shall be made to appear on a note or memorandum
written in a language known to the tenant and signed by both parties in the presence of two witnesses, who shall be selected by each
party. Each of the contracting parties shall be furnished with a copy of said note or memorandum, and such final accounting, once duly
signed by both parties and two witnesses, shall be deemed conclusive evidence of its contents, except in case of fraud.

Sec. 14. Settlement of debts. – Once the accounting is made, any amount of money which the landlord may have advanced to the
tenant as expenses of cultivation or for his own private use, as well as any amount of grain or agricultural products advanced for his
support and that of his family, shall be paid by the tenant out of his share, except fifteen per centum of same which is hereby declared
exempt from the landlord’s lien: Provided, That such grain or agricultural products shall be appraised in money according to their
current market value at the place where the land is located at the time of their delivery to the tenant: Provided, further, That in case his
share is not sufficient, his outstanding debt shall be reduced in money and shall bear an interest of not more than twelve per centum
per annum: And provided, finally, That the remaining debt of the tenant once converted into money shall not again be converted into
kind. Said outstanding debt may, however, be paid in money or in agricultural products appraised at the current market price at the time
of payment.

Sec. 15. Use of official measurement. – In all transactions entered into between landlords and tenants on agricultural products, whether
contracting a debt or making payment thereof, the official measure of the Government shall be used.

PART III
Rights and obligations of landlord

Sec. 16. Landlord as manager. – For the purpose of this Act, the management of the farm rests with the landlord, to be exercised either
directly or indirectly, through a representative.

Sec. 17. Special lien on share of tenant. – The landlord shall have a special and preferential lien over the share of the tenant in the
product of the farm cultivated by him: Provided, however, That such lien over the product of the farm shall be enforceable only to as
much as eighty-five per centum of the total share of the tenant in case the latter has an outstanding debt after the accounting is made.
Sec. 18. Land taxes, burden and contribution. – The landlord shall be responsible for the payment of taxes imposed by the Government
upon the land which is the subject matter of the contract and it shall be illegal to make the tenant bear a part of such tax, burden and
contribution, either directly or indirectly.

Sec. 19. Landlord cannot dismiss his tenant for good causes. – The landlord shall not dismiss his tenant without just and reasonable
cause, otherwise the former shall be liable to the latter for losses and damages to the extent of his share in the product of the farm
entrusted to the dismissed tenant.

Any one of the following shall be considered just and reasonable cause for dismissing a tenant by the landlord before the expiration of
the period:

(1) Gross misconduct or willful disobedience on the part of the tenant to the orders of the landlord or of his representative in connection
with his work.

(2) Negligence on the part of the tenant to do the necessary farm work expected of him so as to insure a good harvest.

(3) Non-compliance with any of the obligations imposed upon the tenant by this Act or by the contract.

(4) Fraud or breach of trust in connection with work entrusted to him.

(5) When the tenant leases it or lets to another the use of the land entrusted to him by the landlord, without the consent of the latter.

(6) Commission of a crime against the person of the landlord or his representative, or any member of the family of the same.

PART IV
Rights and obligations of a tenant

Sec. 20. Freedom of tenant at certain time. – The tenant shall be free to work elsewhere during the intervals of the working season in
the farm where he is a tenant: Provided, That if he is requested by the landlord to perform other work not connected with his duties as
tenant, he shall be paid accordingly by said landlord, unless otherwise stipulated in the contract.

Sec. 21. Right of tenant in case of dismissal. – In case of dismissal the tenant shall not be dispossessed of the land he cultivates until
he is previously reimbursed of his advances if any, incurred in the cultivation, planting or harvesting, and such other incidental
expenses for the improvement of the crop cultivated, even if such dismissal is for just cause.

Sec. 22. Lot for dwelling. – The tenant shall be entitled to construct a dwelling on the land cultivated by him, if he so chooses, and once
a dwelling is constructed, he shall also be entitled to a fixed residential lot if there is any available, not exceeding ten per centum of the
total area cultivated by him, but in no case shall it exceed five hundred square meters, wherein he can have a garden, poultry and such
other minor industries necessary for his livelihood: Provided, however, That the tenant shall be given forty-five days within which to
remove his house from the land of the landlord in case of cancellation of the contract of tenancy for any reason: Provided, however,
That in case he fails to devote the lot allotted him for the purposes herein mentioned for a period of six months, it shall revert again to
the cultivation of rice.

Sec. 23. Standard of conduct to be observed by tenant. – The tenant shall be under obligation to cultivate the farm as a good father of
the family, by doing all the work necessary to obtain the greatest possible returns from the farm entrusted to him, such as the proper
preparation of the soil, the cutting of shrubs and grasses that may be growing on the land as well as the repair of dikes.

The tenant shall also be obliged to take reasonable care of the work animals that may be delivered to him by the landlord, otherwise, he
shall be liable for their death or physical incapacity by reason of his negligence.

The tenant shall likewise be liable for any damage caused by his animal for letting it loose, in case it feeds upon or destroys the crop of
another.

Sec. 24. Trespass by third person. – The tenant shall inform the landlord at once of any trespass committed by a third person upon the
farm entrusted to him, otherwise it may be considered as negligence on his part.

Sec. 25. Tenant cannot leave landlord at any time except for good cause. – The tenant cannot leave his landlord without just and
reasonable cause, otherwise the former shall be liable to the latter for losses and damages to the extent of eighty-five per cent of his
share in the product of the farm cultivated by him.
Any one of the following shall be considered just and reasonable cause on the part of the tenant for leaving the service before the
expiration of the period:

(1) Cruel and inhuman treatment on the part of the landlord or his representative toward the tenant or his family.

(2) Non-compliance on the part of the landlord with any of the obligations imposed upon him by the provisions of this Act or by the
contract.

(3) Compelling the tenant to do any work against his will, which is not in any way connected with his farm work nor stipulated in the
contract.

(4) Commission of a crime by the landlord against the person of the tenant, or any member of the family of the latter.

PART V
Extinguishing of contract

Sec. 26. How extinguished. – The contract of farm tenancy is extinguished:

(1) At the end of each agricultural year, unless otherwise stipulated by the parties.

(2) By the agreement of the parties.

(3) By the death or physical incapacity of the tenant or farmer, in which case his heirs if any, shall be given a proportional share in the
products in accordance with the service rendered by the deceased.

(4) By the sale or alienation of the land which is the subject matter of the contract, in which case the purchaser shall assume the rights
and obligations of the former landlord in relation with the tenant or farmer.

(5) When the estate is no longer fit for agriculture or becomes public property.

(6) By merger in the same person of the personality of landlord and tenant and tenant or landlord and farmer.

PART VI
Penal and final provisions

Sec. 27. Violations. – All violations of the provisions of this Act involving deceit, malice, or fraud shall be punished in accordance with
article three hundred and eighteen of the Revised Penal Code.

If the violation is committed by means of falsification or alteration of private documents, the provisions of article one hundred and
seventy-two of the same Code shall be applied.

Sec. 28. Repealing provisions. – All laws or parts of laws inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.

Sec. 29. Final provisions. – This Act shall be applicable to the relations between landlords and tenants of rice lands only, and shall take
effect on May first, nineteen hundred and thirty-three: Provided, however, That this Act shall take effect only in the provinces where the
majority of the municipal councils shall, by resolution, have petitioned for its application to the Governor-General, who thereupon shall,
by proclamation, fix the date when this law shall take effect in said provinces: And provided, further, That this Act shall be translated
into the dialects of the localities to which its provisions shall apply, and a sufficient number of copies shall be printed for free distribution
by the municipal treasurer concerned to the persons asking for them.
Republic Act No. 1199 August 30, 1954

AN ACT TO GOVERN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN LANDHOLDERS AND TENANTS OF AGRICULTURAL

LANDS (LEASEHOLDS AND SHARE TENANCY)

PART I

GENERAL PROVISIONS

SECTION 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines."

Section 2. Purposes. - It is the purpose of this Act to establish agricultural tenancy relations between landholders
and tenants upon the principle of school justice; to afford adequate protection to the rights of both tenants and
landholders; to insure an equitable division of the produce and income derived from the land; to provide tenant-
farmers with incentives to greater and more efficient agricultural production; to bolster their economic position and to
encourage their participation in the development of peaceful, vigorous and democratic rural communities.

Section 3. Agricultural Tenancy Defined. - Agricultural tenancy is the physical possession by a person of land
devoted to agriculture belonging to, or legally possessed by, another for the purpose of production through the labor
of the former and of the members of his immediate farm household, in consideration of which the former agrees to
share the harvest with the latter, or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in both.

Section 4. Systems of Agricultural Tenancy; Their Definitions. - Agricultural tenancy is classified into leasehold
tenancy and share tenancy.

Share tenancy exists whenever two persons agree on a joint undertaking for agricultural production wherein one
party furnishes the land and the other his labor, with either or both contributing any one or several of the items of
production, the tenant cultivating the land personally with the aid of labor available from members of his immediate
farm household, and the produce thereof to be divided between the landholder and the tenant in proportion to their
respective contributions.

Leasehold tenancy exists when a person who, either personally or with the aid of labor available from members of
his immediate farm household, undertakes to cultivate a piece of agricultural land susceptible of cultivation by a
single person together with members of his immediate farm household, belonging to or legally possessed by,
another in consideration of a price certain or ascertainable to be paid by the person cultivating the land either in
percentage of the production or in a fixed amount in money, or in both.

Section 5. Definitions of Terms. - As used in this Act:

(a) A tenant shall mean a person who, himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm
household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by, another, with the latter's consent for purposes
of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the
landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy
system.

(b) A landholder shall mean a person, natural or juridical, who, either as owner, lessee, usufructuary, or legal
possessor, lets or grants to another the use or cultivation of his land for a consideration either in shares
under the share tenancy system, or a price certain or ascertainable under the leasehold tenancy system.

(c) Agricultural year is the period of time necessary for the raising of seasonal agricultural products,
including the preparation of the land, and the sowing, planting and harvesting of the crop: Provided,
however, That in the case of coconuts, citrus, coffee, ramie, and other crops where more than one harvest is
obtained from one planting, the words "agricultural year" shall mean the period of time from the preparation
of land to the first harvest and thereafter from harvest to harvest. In both cases, the period of time may be
shorter or longer than a calendar year.

(d) Farm implements include hand tools or machines ordinarily employed in a farm enterprise.
 (e) Work animals include animals ordinarily employed in a farm enterprise. The words include carabaos,
horses, bullocks, etc.

(f) Pulling of the seedlings is a phase of farm work in which seedlings are uprooted from the seed beds
immediately before transplanting.

(g) Final harrowing in the last stage in pulverizing the soil into fine particles in readying the field for the
transplanting of the seedlings.

(h) Reaping is the cutting of rice stalks.

(i) Harvesting shall mean the gathering of the fruits or produce of a crop other than rice.

(j) Piling into small stacks used as a term in rice share tenancy shall mean the piling into several small
stacks within the tenant's holdings of reaped and bundled stalks containing the grain, preparatory to their
transportation to the place designated for their threshing.

(k) Piling into big stacks used as a term in rice share tenancy shall mean the piling into one huge stack of
the several small stacks of reaped and bundled stalks containing grain, which constitute the entire harvest of
the tenant from his holdings, preparatory to threshing.

(l) Proven farm practices include those sound farming practices which have attained general acceptance
through usage or are officially recommended by the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

(m) Fair rental value is an amount of money not in excess of allowable depreciation plus six per cent interest
per annum on the investment computed at its market value: Provided, however, That the fair rental value for
the work animal or animals and farm implements required to produce the crop shall not exceed five per cent
of the gross harvest for the animal or animals and five per cent for implements: And, provided, further, That
whenever a tractor or power and the necessary implements are utilized interchangeably with work animals in
the same holding during the same agricultural year the rental shall not exceed ten per cent for the combined
services.

(n) Immediately after as used in this Act shall be inclusive of the last day of harvesting, threshing or
processing and the next five days thereafter.

(o) Immediate farm household includes the members of the family of the tenant, and such other person or
persons, whether related to the tenant or not, who are independent upon him for support and who usually
help him operate the farm enterprise.

(p) Incapacity means any cause or circumstances which prevents the tenant from fulfilling his contractual
obligations and those imposed by this Act.

(q) Inspect means to examine and observe. However, such examinations and observations shall not include
any acts of intimidation or coercion.

(r) Auxiliary crop is any product raised other than the crop to which the cultivation of the land is principally
devoted; and excluding the produce of the lot referred to in Section twenty-six.

Section 6. Tenancy Relationship; Its Definition. - Tenancy relationship is a juridical tie which arises between a
landholder and a tenant once they agree, expressly or impliedly, to undertake jointly the cultivation of land belonging
to the former, either under the share tenancy or leasehold tenancy system, as a result of which relationship the
tenant acquires the right to continue working on and cultivating the land, until and unless he is dispossessed of his
holdings for any of the just causes enumerated in Section fifty or the relationship is terminated in accordance with
Section nine.
Section 7. Tenancy Relationship; How established; Security of Tenure. - Tenancy relationship may be
established either verbally or in writing, expressly or impliedly. Once such relationship is established, the tenant
shall be entitled to security of tenure as hereinafter provided.

Section 8. Limitations of Relation. - The relation of landholder and tenant shall be limited to the person who
furnishes land, either as owner, lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and to the person who actually works the
land himself with the aid of labor available from within his immediate farm household.

Section 9. Severance of Relationship. - The tenancy relationship is extinguished by the voluntary surrender of the
land by, or the death or incapacity of, the tenant, but his heirs or the members of his immediate farm household may
continue to work the land until the close of the agricultural year. The expiration of the period of the contract as fixed
by the parties, and the sale or alienation of the land do not of themselves extinguish the relationship. In the latter
case, the purchaser or transferee shall assume the rights and obligations of the former landholder in relation to the
tenant. In case of death of the landholder, his heir or heirs shall likewise assume his rights and obligations.

Section 10. Contracts; Nature and Continuity of Conditions. - The terms and conditions of tenancy contracts, as
stipulated by the parties or as provided by law, shall be understood to continue until modified by the parties.
Modifications of the terms and conditions of contracts shall not prejudice the right of the tenant to the security of his
tenure on the land as determined in Section six, seven, and forty-nine.

Section 11. Freedom to Contract in General. - The landholder and the tenant shall be free to enter into any or all
kinds of tenancy contract, as long as they are not contrary to law, morals or public policy. Except in case of fraud,
error, force, intimidation or undue influence, when such contract is reduced to writing and registered as hereinafter
provided, the latter shall be conclusive evidence of what has been agreed upon between the contracting parties, if
not denounced or impugned within thirty days after its registration.

Said contract shall be contrary to law, morals and public policy;

A. In Share Tenancy

(a) If the tenant is to receive less than the corresponding share for the different contributions be made to the
production of the farm as hereinafter provided.

(b) If it is stipulated that the tenant or any member or his immediate farm household shall without
compensation perform any work or render any service not connected with the tenant's duties and obligations
provided under this Act.

B. In Leasehold Tenancy

(a) If the tenant-lessee is to pay to the landholder, lessor, as a consideration for the use of the land, an
amount in excess of that hereinafter provided for the kind and class of land involved.

(b) If the tenant-lessee is to pay the landholder-lessor a consideration in excess of the amount prescribed as
fair rental value, as determined pursuant to the provisions of this Act, for the use of work animals, services
and/or farm implements belonging to the landholder-lessor, in case it is agreed between the parties that the
latter shall furnish any or all of these items of production.

(c) If it is stipulated that, as a condition precedent to the commencement or continuance of the lease, the
tenant-lessee shall rent work animals, services or farm implements, or shall make use of any store or
services operated by the landholder-lessor or any other person, or that the landholder-lessor may impose
fines, deductions and/or assessments, or that the tenant-lessee shall, without compensation, perform any
work or render any service not connected with the tenant's duties and obligations provided under this Act.

Section 12. Form and Registration of Contract. - A contract of tenancy in writing, in order to be conclusive as
evidence, shall be drawn in quadruplicate in the language or dialect known to all the parties thereto and signed or
thumb-marked both by the landholder or his authorized representative, and the tenant himself, before two
witnesses, one to be chosen by each party. If any of the parties does not know to read, one of the witnesses, to be
chosen by him, shall read the contents of the document to him. Each of the contracting parties shall retain a copy of
the contract and the third and fourth copies shall be delivered to the municipal treasurer of the municipality where
the land which is the subject-matter of the contract is located, who shall file and register the third copy in his office
and forward the fourth copy to the court: Provided, That in order that a tenancy contract may be registered, it shall
be the duty of the municipal treasurer and tenant, respectively, and to place an annotation on each copy of the fact
of registration in his office, stating the date, time and place of registration as well as the entry or registration number.

The form of contract shall be uniform and shall be prepared and furnished by the court. The contracting parties shall
acknowledge the execution of the contracting before the municipal treasurer or justice of the peace or the mayor of
the municipality where the land is situated. No fees or stamps of any kind shall be paid or required.

When one of the parties is unable to read, in case of doubt the burden of proof to show that he understood the terms
of the contract shall rest upon the other party who is able to read.

Section 13. Registry of Tenancy Contracts. - For the purposes of this Act, the municipal treasurer of the
municipality wherein the land which is the subject-matter of a tenancy contract is situated shall keep a record of all
such contracts entered into within his jurisdiction, to be known as "Registry of Tenancy Contracts." He shall keep
this registry together with a copy of each contract entered therein, and make annotations on said registry of all
subsequent acts relative to each contract, such as its renewal, novation, cancellation, etc.: Provided, That the
municipal treasurer shall not charge any fee for the registration of said contracts or of any subsequent acts relative
thereto, none of which shall be subject to the documentary stamp tax.

Section 14. Change of System. - The tenant shall have the right to change the tenancy contract from one of share
tenancy to the leasehold tenancy and vice versa and from one crop-sharing arrangement to another of the share
tenancy. If the share tenancy contract is in writing and is duly registered, the right may be exercised at the expiration
of the period of the contract. In the absence of any written contract, the right may be exercised at the end of the
agricultural year. In both cases the changed to the leasehold system shall be effective one agricultural year after the
tenant has served notice of his intention to change upon the landholder.

Section 15. Interest on Loans or Advances. - On all loans or advances obtained by the tenant from the landholder
in connection with the cultivation, planting, harvesting and other incidental expenses for the improvement of the crop
planted, as well as loans or advances for the subsistence of the tenant and his family, the interest which may be
stipulated shall not exceed eight per centum per calendar year: Provided, That on all loans or advances other than
money, such as grain or other agricultural products, made computed on the basis of the current price of the produce
at the time it was loaned. Violation of the provisions of this section shall be punished in accordance with the Usury
Law.

Section 16. Memorandum of Loans or Advances. - Any obligation referring to any amount either in money or in
kind, including the payment of interest, which the tenant may have received from time to time as loan or advance
from the landholder, shall be void unless the same, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing in a
language or dialect known to the party charged, and subscribed by said party, or by his authorized agent.

Section 17. Form of Final Accounting. - The final accounting between landholder and tenant at the end of each
agricultural year shall be effected within ten days after the threshing in case of rice and within the same period of
time after the harvest or gathering of the fruits in the case of crops. In case of crops which have to be said in
processed form, the final accounting shall be within five days after the sale is consummated and the sales receipt
shall be exhibited to the tenant.

The accounting shall be made to appear in a not or memorandum written in a language or dialect known to the
tenant and signed by both parties in the presence of two witnesses who shall be selected by each party. Each of the
contracting parties shall be furnished with a copy of said note or memorandum and such final accounting, once duly
signed by both parties and two witnesses, shall be deemed conclusive evidence of its contents, except in case of
fraud, error, force, intimidation or undue influence. When one of the parties is unable to read, the burden of proof, in
case of doubt, to show that he understood the accounting, shall rest upon the other party who is able to read.

In the absence of a written accounting in accordance with the preceding paragraph, the tenant may, within three
years from the date of the threshing of the crop in question, petition the Court to compel the landholder to render an
accounting of the same in accordance with this section.
Section 18. Settlement of Debts. - Once the accounting is made, any amount of money which the landholder may
have advanced to the tenant for expenses of cultivation, harvesting or gathering of the crop or for his own private
use, as well as any amount of grain or agricultural products advanced for his subsistence and that of his family, shall
be paid by the tenant out of his share either in grain or in money, at the option of the latter; Provided, That such
grain or agricultural products shall be appraised in money according to their current market value at the place where
the land is located at the time of their delivery to the tenant: Provided, further, That in case his share is not sufficient,
his outstanding debt shall be reduced to money and shall bear an interest of not more than ten per cent per annum:
And provided, finally, That the remaining debts of the tenant once converted into money shall not again be
converted into kind. Said outstanding debt money may, however, be paid in money or in agricultural products
appraised at the local current market price at the time of payment.

Section 19. Exemption from Lien and/or Attachment. - Twenty-five per centum of the tenant's share of the
produce of the land in share tenancy, or of the entire produce in leasehold tenancy, one work animal and one of
each kind of farm implement belonging to the tenant, provided that the value of such work animal and implements
do not exceed five hundred pesos, shall be exempt from lien and attachment.

Section 20. Use of Official Weights and Measures. - In all transactions entered into between the landholder and
the tenant concerning agricultural products the official weights and measures of the Government shall be used.

Section 21. Ejectment: Violation; Jurisdiction. - All cases involving the dispossession of a tenant by the
landholder or by a third party and/or the settlement and disposition of disputes arising from the relationship of
landholder and tenant, as well as the violation of any of the provisions of this Act, shall be under the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of such court as may now or hereafter be authorized by law to take cognizance of tenancy
relations and disputes

PART II

THE SHARE SYSTEM

CHAPTER I - Common Provisions

SECTION 22. Rights of the Tenant. -

(1) The tenant shall be free to work elsewhere whenever the nature of his farm obligation warrants his
temporary absence from his holdings.

(2) The tenant shall, aside from his labor, have the right to provide any of the contributions for production
whenever he can do so adequately and on time.

(3) The tenant's dwelling shall not, without his consent, be removed from the lot assigned to him by the
landholder, unless there is a severance of the tenancy relationship between them as provided under Section
nine, or unless the tenant is ejected for cause, and only after the expiration of forty-five days following such
severance of relationship or dismissal for cause.

If the tenant is dismissed without just cause and he is constrained to work elsewhere, he may choose either
to remove his dwelling at the landholder's cost or demand the value of the same from the landholder at the
time of the unjust dismissal.

(4) The tenant shall have the right to be indemnified for his labor and expenses in the cultivation, planting, or
harvesting and other incidental expenses for the improvement of the crop raised in case he is dispossessed
of his holdings, whether such dismissal is for a just cause and not, provided the crop still exists at the time of
the dispossession.

Section 23. Obligations for the tenant. - It shall be the obligation of the tenant:

(1) To cultivate and take care of the farm, the growing crop and other improvements entrusted to him as a
good father of a family, by doing all the work necessary in accordance with proven farming practices.
 (2) To inform the landholder at once of any trespass committed by a third person upon the farm.

(3) To take reasonable care of the work animals and farm implements used in the point undertaking. He
shall not use the work animals and farm implements entrusted to him by the landholder for purposes other
than those intended, or allowed their use by other persons without the knowledge and consent of the
landholder.

The tenant shall not abandon or surrender his holdings and leave the farm and growing crop and other
improvements unattended during the watch season, except for just and reasonable cause. In case of such
unjustified abandonment or surrender, any or all of his expected share in the crop may, in the discretion of the court,
be forfeited in favor of the landholder to the extent of the damage caused thereby.

Any of the following shall be considered just and reasonable cause for the tenant to terminate the tenancy
relationship;

(a) Cruel, inhuman or offensive treatment on the part of the landholder of his representative toward the
tenant or any member of his immediate farm household.

(b) Non-compliance on the part of the landholder with any of the obligations imposed upon him by the
provisions of this Act or by the contract.

(c) If the landholder or his representative compels the tenant or any member of his immediate farm
household to do any work or render any service not in any way connected with his farm work, or even
without compulsion if no compensation is paid.

(d) Commission of a crime by the landholder or his representative against the tenant or any member of his
immediate farm household.

Section 24. Prohibitions to Tenant: -

(1) It shall be unlawful for the tenant, whenever the area of his holdings is five hectares or more, or is
sufficient size to make him and the members of his immediate farm household fully occupied in its
cultivation, to contract to work at the same time on two or more separate holdings belonging to different
landholders under any system of tenancy, without the knowledge and consent of the land-holder with whom
he first entered into tenancy relationship.

(2) It shall be unlawful for a share-tenant to employ a sub-tenant to furnish labor or any phase of the work
required of him under this Act, except in cases of illness or any temporary incapacity on his part, in which
eventuality the tenant or any member of his immediate farm household is under obligation to report such
illness or incapacity to the landholder. Payment to the sub-tenant, in whatever form, for services rendered on
the land under this circumstance, shall be for the account of the tenant.

(3) Subject to provisions of the next preceding paragraph, land entrusted for cultivation to a leasehold tenant
shall not be sub-let nor shall the lease be assigned by the tenant to another person, except with the written
consent of the lessor.

Section 25. Rights of the Landholder: -

(1) The landholder shall have the right to choose the kind of crop and the seeds with the tenant shall plant in
his holdings: Provided, however, That if the tenant should subject, the court shall settle the conflict,
according to the best interest of both parties.

(2) The landholder shall have the right to require the use of fertilizer of the kind or kinds shown by proven
farm practices to be adapted to the requirements of the land.

(3) The landholder shall have the right to inspect and observe the extent of compliance on the part of the
tenant with the terms and conditions of their contract and the provisions of this Act.
 (4) In cases where the crop has to be sold in processed form before division and the tenant has no
representative, the landholder, shall have the right to deal with millers or processors in representation of the
tenant.

Section 26. Obligations of the Landholder:

(a) The landholder shall furnish the tenant an area of not less than one thousand square meters where the
latter may construct his dwelling, raise vegetables, poultry, pigs, and other animals and engage in minor
industries, the products of which shall accrue to the tenant exclusively.

(b) The landholder shall keep the tenant in the peaceful possession and cultivation of his landholdings which
are the subject matter of the contract.

Section 27. Prohibitions to the Landholder:

(1) The landholder shall not dispossess the tenant of his holdings except for any of the causes enumerated
in Section fifty, and without the cause having been proved before, and the dispossession authorized by, the
court; otherwise, he shall, aside from the penalty of fine and/or imprisonment provided for any violation of
this Act, be liable to the tenant for damages to the extent of the landholder's right under Section twenty-two
of this Act.

(2) The landholder shall be responsible for the payment of taxes levied by the Government upon the land
which is the subject-matter of the contract and it shall be unlawful to make the tenant bear in part of all of the
same, either directly or indirectly.

(3) The landholder shall not require the tenant to bear, directly or indirectly, any part of the rent, "canon" or
other consideration which he, the former, may be under obligation to pay to a third person for the use of the
land.

Section 28. Expenses for Seeds; Fertilizer; Pest and Weed Control Expenses.

(1) The same amount of seeds or seedlings used in the production of any crop shall be deducted from the
gross harvest and returned to the party who furnished the same.

(2) The cost of fertilizer and expenses for pest and weed control as evidenced by sales invoices shall be
paid out of the gross harvest and returned to the party who advanced the cost and expenses.

Section 29. Irrigation System. - The cost of the construction of an irrigation system, including the distributory
canals, shall be borne exclusively by the landholder. The cost of maintenance and operation of the system shall,
however, be borne by the landholder and the tenant in proportion to their respective shares in the harvest.

Section 30. Auxiliary Crop. - In case the land is planted to an auxiliary crop, the tenant shall receive eighty per
centum and the landholder twenty per centum of the net produce, provided all expenses of production are borne by
the tenant.

Auxiliary crops shall, not, however, be construed to include the crops or products raised from the garden, poultry
and other industries carried on the lot specifically provided for the tenant under Section 26(a) hereof.

Section 31. Cost of Fertilizer, etc.; when to be Advanced by the landholder. - Whenever the use of fertilizer or
the application of insect, disease and rodent control measures is directed by the landholder, he shall advance their
cost, which shall be deducted from the gross produce.

CHAPTER II - Rice Share Tenancy

SECTION 32. Share Basis. - The parties shall, on ricelands which produces a normal average of more than forty
cavanes per hectare for the three agricultural years next preceding the current harvest, receive as shares in the
gross produce, after setting aside the same amount of palay used as seed, and after deducting the cost of fertilizer,
pest and weed control, reaping and threshing, the amount corresponding to the total equivalent of their individual
contributions, computed as follows;

Contribution Participation
1. Land 30%
2. Labor 30%
3. Farm implements 5%
4. Work Animals 5%
Final harrowing of the field immediately
5. before transplanting 5%
6. Transplanting 25%

Section 33. Share basis on Second Class Land. - On ricelands, which produce a normal average of forty cavans
or less per hectare for the three agricultural years next preceding the current harvest, the participation for the
contribution of the land shall be twenty-five per centum and that of labor, thirty-five per centum.

Section 34. Reimbursement Not Allowed. - Contributions or shares in the contribution to the production of the
crop in the form of cash, grain or services, once shouldered or rendered alone by one party may not be reimbursed
by the other party after the phase or phases of work required in the joint undertaking shall have been completed.

Section 35. Sharing of Expenses. - In case the landholder and the tenant agree to share equally in the expenses
of final harrowing of field and transplanting, the latter may engage the services of persons or helpers to perform
these phases of farm work, provided the rates for each shall have been previously determined and agreed upon
between the landholder and the tenant. In case of disagreement upon said rates, the party who undertakes to the
corresponding share in the harvest, after deducting the expenses of reaping.

Section 36. Further Rights of the Tenant. - In addition to the provision of Section twenty-two, the tenant shall have
the right to:

1. Determine when to scatter the seeds, to transplant the seedlings, and to reap the harvest, provided they
shall be in accordance with proven farm practices and after due notice to the landholder.

2. Choose the thresher which shall thresh the harvest whenever it is the best available in the locality and the
best suited to the landholder's and tenant's needs and provided the rate charged is equal to or lower than
the rate charged by the owner of other threshers under similar circumstances: Provided, further, That in
cases where there are more than tenant the selection of the majority of the tenants shall prevail: Provided,
finally, That if the landholder is the owner of a thresher and is ready and willing to grant equal or lower rates
under the same conditions, the use of the landholder's thresher shall be given preference.

3. Apply appropriate pest, insect, disease and rodent control measures whenever in his judgment such
action is necessary: Provided, however, That if a tenant fails to apply any of the above control measures
after the landholder has made a request in writing for such action, he shall be liable for any loss resulting
from such failure.

4. Apply fertilizer of the kind or kinds shown by proven farm practices to be adapted to the requirements of
the land, provided the landholder has not exercised his right under Section twenty-five to require the use of
such fertilizer.

Section 37. Further Rights of the Landholder. - In addition to the provisions of Section twenty-five, the
landholder, by himself or through his representative, may determined:

1. The proper height of pilapils or dikes according to the local practices.

2. The location and size of irrigation canals.

 3. The site for the stacking of the harvest, provided it shall not be farther than one kilometer from the center
of the area cultivated by a majority of the tenants.

4. The date of threshing.

Provided, however, That in case of disagreement by the tenant in any of the foregoing instances, the court shall
determine whatever may be in the interest or both parties.

Section 38. Labor; What It Constitutes. - The tenant shall perform the following as the labor contributed by him
under Section thirty-two;

1. The preparation of the seedbed which shall include plowing, harrowing, and watering of the seedbed, the
scattering of the seeds, and the care of the seedlings.

2. The plowing, harrowing, and watering of the area he is cultivating, except final harrowing of the field as an
item of contribution specified in Section thirty-two of this Act.

3. The maintenance, repair and weeding of dikes, paddies, and irrigation canals in his holdings.

4. The pulling and bundling of the seedlings preparatory to their transplanting.

5. Care of the growing plants.

6. Gathering and bundling of the reaped harvest.

7. The piling of the bundles into small stacks.

8. The preparation of the place where the harvest is to be stacked.

9. Gathering of the small stacks and their transportation to the place where they are to be stacked.

10. Piling into a big stack preparatory to threshing.

Section 39. Prohibition on Pre-Threshing. - It shall be unlawful for either the tenant or the landholder, without
mutual consent, to reap or thresh a portion of the crop at any time previous to the date set for its threshing. Any
violation by either party shall be treated and penalized in accordance with this Act and/or under the general
provisions of law applicable to the act committed.

Section 40. Place of Crop Division. - The division of the crop shall be made in the same place where the harvest
has been threshed and each party shall transport his share to his warehouse or barn, unless the contrary is
stipulated by the parties.

CHAPTER III - Share Tenancy on Crops other than Rice

SECTION 41. Basis of Shares in Crops other than Rice. - The landholder and the tenant on lands which produce
crops either than rice shall be free to enter into any contract stipulating the ratio of crop division. In the absence of a
stipulation, the customs of the place shall govern: Provided, That whether the basis of division of the crop is the
contract between the parties or the customs of the place, the share of the tenant for his labor in the production shall
not less than thirty per cent of the harvest or produce, after deducting the expenses for harvesting and/or initial
processing: Provided, further, That in cases where the share of the tenant is, according to local practices or customs
prevailing at the time of the approval of this Act, more than the minimum herein set, the tenant's share thus
established by local practices or customs shall prevail and be considered the minimum.

PART III

THE LEASEHOLD TENANCY

SECTION 42. Landholder-Lessor and Tenant-Lessee, Defined. Any person, natural or juridical, either as owner,
lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor or agricultural land, who lets, leases or rents to another said property for
purposes of agricultural production and for a price certain or ascertainable either in an amount of money or produce,
shall be known as the landholder-lessor; and any person who, with the consent of the former, tills, cultivates or
operates said land, susceptible of cultivation by one individual, personally or with the aid of labor available from
among his own immediate farm household, is a tenant-lessee.

Section 43. Rights and Obligations of Tenant-Lessee. - With the creation of the tenancy relationship arising out
of the contract between the landholder-lessor and tenant-lessee, the latter shall have the right to enter the premises
of the land, and to the adequate and peaceful enjoyment thereof. He shall have the right to work the land according
to his best judgment, provided this manner and method of cultivation and harvest are in accordance with proven
farm practices. Upon termination of the relationship, he shall be entitled to one half of the value of the improvements
made by him, provided they are reasonable and adequate to the purposes of the lease.

The tenant-lessee shall pay the consideration stipulated in the lease contract provided it shall not exceed the limit
fixed in Section forty-six. In the absence of stipulation, the consideration shall be that established in said Section
forty-six. He shall make proper use of the land and the improvements thereon and shall be under obligation to
cultivate it as a good father of a family, by doing all the work considered reasonable and necessary in accordance
with proven farm practices. He is likewise obliged to take reasonable care of the work animals and farm implements
that may be delivered to him by the land-holder, in case it is agreed between the parties that the landholder-lessor
shall furnish any or all of them.

Section 44. Rights of Landholder-lessor. - The landholder-lessor or his duly authorized representatives shall have
the right to inspect the premises of the land which is the subject of the lease for the purpose of ascertaining the
tenant's compliance with the provisions of the contract and of this Act, but in no case shall he exercise any coercion,
intimidation or violence in word or deed.

Section 45. Manner of Rental Payment. - Payment of the consideration for the use of land may be made either in
an amount certain or ascertainable in money or in produce, or both.

Section 46. Consideration for the Use of Land. -

(a) The consideration for the use of ricelands, shall not be more than thirty per centum of the gross produce
for first class lands and not more than twenty-five per centum for second class lands. Classification of
ricelands shall be determined by productivity: first class lands being those which yield more than forty
cavanes per hectare and second class lands being those which yield forty cavanes or less, the same to be
computed upon the normal average harvest of the three preceding years.

(b) The consideration for agricultural land where exist fruit trees and other useful trees and plants, from
which the whole or any portion of the produce of the said land is taken, shall not be more than what have
been specified in the preceding section: Provided, however, That additional considerations for the
employment of said trees and useful plants, if the principal product is rice or other crops, shall be decided
and specified by negotiation between the landholder-lessor and the tenant-lessee; Provided, further, That
where the tenant-lessee, during the period of the lease and/or in consideration thereof, plants and/or takes
care of said trees and plants, with the consent of the landholder-lessor, the tenant-lessee shall be
compensated by the latter in the manner agreed between them.

(c) The consideration for the use of sugar lands, fishponds, saltbeds and of lands devoted to the raising of
livestock shall be governed by stipulation between the parties.

Section 47. Rental of Work Animals, etc., and Applicability of Schedules. - Upon agreement of the parties, the
tenant- lessee may make use of such work animals, farm implements or services belonging to the landholder-lessor
as are available for hire, the consideration of which shall be based on their fair rental value.

The rates on the fair rental value for the use of work animals, farm implements and services, belonging to the
landholder-lessor shall be those provided in Schedules "A", "B", and "C", which shall apply upon approval of this Act
and shall remain in force, unless the Secretary of Agricultural and Natural Resources revises the same in
accordance with Section fifty-two.
Section 48. Loans and Interests. - Loans, either in money or in kind, obtained by a tenant-lessee from the
landholder lessor shall be payable at the time stipulated: Provided, however, That this shall not be construed as
prejudicing the right of the borrower to repay his obligation before the date of maturity. The loan, unless it is
otherwise stipulated, shall be payable in money at not more than eight per cent interest per annum, computed from
the date of the indebtedness was contracted up to and including the date of payment. A note or memorandum to
evidence such indebtedness shall be executed in accordance with the provisions of Section sixteen.

PART IV

SECURITY OF TENURE

SECTION 49. Ejectment of Tenant. - Notwithstanding any agreement or provision of law as to the period, in all
cases where land devoted to any agricultural purpose is held under any system of tenancy, the tenant shall not be
dispossessed of his holdings except for any of the causes hereinafter enumerated and only after the same has been
proved before, and the dispossession is authorized by, the court.

Section 50. Causes for the Dispossession of a Tenant. - Any of the following shall be a sufficient cause for the
dispossession of a tenant from his holdings:

(a) The bona fide intention of the landholder to cultivate the land himself personally or through the
employment of farm machinery and implements: Provided, however, That should the landholder not cultivate
the land himself or should fail to employ mechanical farm implements for a period of one year after the
dispossession of the tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and the land and damages for
any loss incurred by him because of said dispossession: Provided, further, That the land-holder shall, at
least one year but not more than two years prior to the date of his petition to dispossess the tenant under
this subsection, file notice with the court and shall inform the tenant in wiring in a language or dialect known
to the latter of his intention to cultivate the land himself, either personally or through the employment of
mechanical implements, together with a certification of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
that the land is suited for mechanization: Provided, further, That the dispossessed tenant and the members
of his immediate household shall be preferred in the employment of necessary laborers under the new set-
up.

(b) When the current tenant violates or fails to comply with any of the terms and conditions of the contract or
any of the provisions of this Act: Provided, however, That this subsection shall not apply when the tenant
has substantially complied with the contract or with the provisions of this Act.

(c) The tenant's failure to pay the agreed rental or to deliver the landholder's share: Provided, however, That
this shall not apply when the tenant's failure is caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure.

(d) When the tenant uses the land for a purpose other than that specified by agreement of the parties.

(e) When a share-tenant fails to follow those proven farm practices which will contribute towards the proper
care of the land and increased agricultural production.

(f) When the tenant through negligence permits serious injury to the land which will impair its productive
capacity.

(g) Conviction by a competent court of a tenant or any member of his immediate family or farm household of
a crime against the landholder or a member of his immediate family.

Section 51. Burden of Proof. - The burden of proof to show the existence of a lawful cause for the ejectment of a
tenant shall rest upon the landholder.

PART V

SPECIAL PROVISIONS
SECTION 52. Duties of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. - It shall be the duty of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to:

1. Conduct such educational programs as circumstances may require adequately to acquaint tenants and
landholders with their rights and responsibilities under this Act.

2. Revise the rental rates provided for in Schedules "A", and "B", whenever such revision is made necessary
by changes in values and prices, so that the rental rates shall conform to the standard of fair rental value as
defined in Section 5(m).

3. Facilities the preparation and registration of land- holder-tenant contracts through the distribution of
appropriate printed forms and instructions to guide the interested parties in drafting and executing rental
agreements. The forms of contracts must bear the approval of the court.

4. Conduct surveys and researches to determine the extent of compliance, adaptability to different crops and
areas and the fairness of this Act to all parties affected by its implementation.

5. Submit an annual report to the President containing an analysis showing the progress made toward
attaining the objectives enumerated in Section two of this Act and recommendations concerning methods of
improving the implementation and general effectiveness of this Act. Copies of this report shall be provided to
members of the Congress.

Section 53. Duties of Secretary of Justice. - The Secretary of Justice, through the Executive Judge of the Court,
shall be responsible for formulating a national enforcement program, among other things, through the assignment of
judges and personnel, which will insure the full enforcement of the provisions of this Act.

Section 54. Representation by Counsel. - In all cases wherein a tenant cannot afford to the represented by
counsel, it shall be the duty of the Public Defender of the Department of Labor to represent him, upon proper
notification by the party concerned, or the court of competent jurisdiction shall assign or appoint counsel de oficio for
the indigent tenant.

Section 55. Applicability of General Laws. - The provisions of existing laws which are not inconsistent herewith
shall apply to the contracts governed by this Act as well as to acts or omissions by either party against each other
during, and in connection with, their relationship.

Section 56. Doubts to Be Solved in Favor of the Tenant. - In the interpretation and enforcement of this Act and
other laws as well as of the stipulations between the landholder and the tenant, the courts and administrative
officials shall solve all grave doubts in favor of the tenant.

Section 57. Penal Provision. - Violation of any of the provisions of this Act shall be punished with a fine not
exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both in the discretion of the Court.

Section 58. Separability of Provisions. - If for any reason, any section or provision of this Act shall be questioned
in any court, and shall be held to be unconstitutional or invalid, no other section or provision of this Act shall be
effected thereby.

Section 59. Repealing Provisions. - Public Act Numbered Four thousand fifty-four, as amended by Republic Act
Numbered Thirty-four, Commonwealth Act Numbered Fifty-three, Commonwealth Act Numbered Four hundred
sixty-one as amended by Republic Act Numbered Forty- four, and all laws, rules and regulations inconsistent
herewith are hereby repealed.

Section 60. Effective Date. - This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved: August 30, 1954

 SCHEDULE "A"

The rental value of work animals and farm implements other than machinery, shall not exceed the allowable
depreciation charges plus six per cent (6%) interest per annum computed on the market value of the said work
animals and farm implements not fixed in this Schedule shall be those prevailing in the locality where the said
animals and implements are rented.

Item Market Period of Allowable Allowable Fair Rental

Value depreciation depreciation in interest at value per
years charge 6 annum
per cent
Carabao P300.00 10 P30.00 P18.00 P48.00
Bullock 600.00 7 85.91 36.00 121.00
Horse, native 150.00 8 18.75 9.00 27.75
Cattle 200.00 7 28.57 12.00 40.57
Plow, iron 40.00 5 8.00 2.40 10.40
Plow wooden 25.00 2 12.50 1.50 14.00
Harrow iron 18.00 5 3.60 1.00 4.68
Carreton (native 400.00 10 40.00 24.00 64.00
cart)

SCHEDULE "B"

The rental value for farm machineries inclusive of tractors, tractor equipment, engines, motors, and pumps shall not
exceed the allowable depreciation equal to one-tenth (1/10) of the current market value plus interest at six per cent
(6% per annum.

SCHEDULE "C"

The amounts to be charged by the landholder when he performs services in the operation of the farm enterprise
shall not current the rates in the locality where such services are rendered.

Approved: August 30, 1954