POLICE POWER

1.
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION ET. AL. VS. CITY OF MANILA, January 20, 2009

Facts:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed
entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission,
Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging
Establishments in the City of Manila” (the Ordinance).”
corporation who will allow the admission and charging of
renting of rooms more than twice a day.
into law Manila City Ordinance No. 7774
Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-
Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar
The ordinance sanctions any person or
room rates for less than 12 hours or the

The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC), and Sta. Mesa Tourist
and Development Corporation (STDC), who own and operate several hotels and motels in Metro
Manila, filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that
the ordinance will affect their business interests as operators. The respondents, in turn, alleged that
the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.

RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it “strikes at the personal liberty of the individual
guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution.” Reference was made to the provisions of the
Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed investment, as well as the
right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships the
Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour
stay,
When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power
pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities the power to
regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels,
motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist
guides and transports. Also, they contended that under Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter, they
have the power to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and
safety, the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order,
comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants and to fix penalties for the
violation of ordinances.

Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy
and freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is unreasonable and
oppressive interference in their business.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the ordinance. First, it
held that the ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only
penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time stays.
Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having a lawful object
obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the ordinance is satisfied since it aims to
curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to operate.
Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in
general.

Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC.

Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power of the State.

Held:
No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise of police power, and as such, it is
unconstitutional.

The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila v Laguio Jr ruling, but the
1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of
Manila. The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the
singularity of the localities covered under the respective ordinances. All three ordinances were
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enacted with a view of regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in transient lodging
establishments. This could be described as the middle case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on
motels and hotels but the services offered by these establishments have been severely restricted. At
its core, this is another case about the extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate the lives
of its citizens

The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has
held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also
conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not
prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must
not be unreasonable.

The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate
admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in
the police power as conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code through such
implements as the general welfare clause.

Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to
protect itself and its people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied
actions by the State.

The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are
unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability
of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align with
the Constitution.

SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an ordinance should be analyzed strictly
as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the
law that they were capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners. Yet,
they also recognized the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their
patrons – those persons who would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the
lodging establishments in question. The rights at stake herein fell within the same fundamental rights
to liberty. Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include “the
right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed
into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the
right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to
such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare,

Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be recognized and the invasion of it should
be justified by a compelling state interest. Jurisprudence accorded recognition to the right to privacy
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.
Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.

An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the
petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the
ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the
means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment
of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must
exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for
even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.

Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary
intrusion into private rights.
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be
diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation
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of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the
situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and
drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and
other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the ordinance can easily be circumvented by
merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities.
Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect “wash rates” from their clientele by charging
their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.

SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be
required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that
must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well¬-intentioned
the ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the
establishments as well as their patrons. The ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the
businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient
justification. The ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day
with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is
hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.

2.

G.R. No. 179554 December 16, 2009

Petitioner: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority VS.
Respondent: Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions, Inc.

Facts: In 1997, the Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications,
entered into a build-lease-transfer agreement (BLT agreement) with Metro Rail Transit Corporation,
Limited (MRTC) pursuant to Republic Act No. 6957 (Build, Operate and Transfer Law), under which
MRTC undertook to build MRT3 subject to the condition that MRTC would own MRT3 for 25 years,
upon the expiration of which the ownership would transfer to the Government. In 1998, respondent
Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending & Promotions, Inc. (Trackworks) entered into a contract
for advertising services with MRTC. Trackworks thereafter installed commercial billboards, signages
and other advertising media in the different parts of the MRT3. In 2001, however, MMDA requested
Trackworks to dismantle the billboards, signages and other advertising media pursuant to MMDA
Regulation No. 96-009, whereby MMDA prohibited the posting, installation and display of any kind or
form of billboards, signs, posters, streamers, in any part of the road, sidewalk, center island, posts,
trees, parks and open space. After Trackworks refused the request of MMDA, MMDA proceeded to
dismantle the former’s billboards and similar forms of advertisement.

Issue: Whether MMDA has the power to dismantle, remove or destroy the billboards, signages and
other advertising media installed by Trackworks on the interior and exterior structures of the MRT3.

Ruling: That Trackworks derived its right to install its billboards, signages and other advertising
media in the MRT3 from MRTC’s authority under the BLT agreement to develop commercial
premises in the MRT3 structure or to obtain advertising income therefrom is no longer debatable.
Under the BLT agreement, indeed, MRTC owned the MRT3 for 25 years, upon the expiration of
which MRTC would transfer ownership of the MRT3 to the Government.
Considering that MRTC remained to be the owner of the MRT3 during the time material to this case,
and until this date, MRTC’s entering into the contract for advertising services with Trackworks was a
valid exercise of ownership by the former. In fact, in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v.
Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending & Promotions, Inc., this Court expressly recognized
Trackworks’ right to install the billboards, signages and other advertising media pursuant to said
contract. The latter’s right should, therefore, be respected.
It is futile for MMDA to simply invoke its legal mandate to justify the dismantling of Trackworks’
billboards, signages and other advertising media. MMDA simply had no power on its own to
dismantle, remove, or destroy the billboards, signages and other advertising media installed on the
MRT3 structure by Trackworks. In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village

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Association, Inc., Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co.,
Inc., and Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin, the Court had the occasion to rule that
MMDA’s powers were limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation,
preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system, and administration.
Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.

The Court also agrees with the CA’s ruling that MMDA Regulation No. 96-009 and MMC
Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks’ billboards, signages and other
advertising media. The prohibition against posting, installation and display of billboards, signages and
other advertising media applied only to public areas, but MRT3, being private property pursuant to the
BLT agreement between the Government and MRTC, was not one of the areas as to which the
prohibition applied.

3.

G.R. No. 100152 March 31, 2000; Petitioner: Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. VS.
Respondent: The Honorable Court of Appeals

Facts: Petitioner applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit. After
consideration of petitioner's application and the opposition interposed thereto by local optometrists,
respondent City Mayor issued Business Permit No. 5342 subject to the following conditions: (1) Since
it is a corporation, Acebedo cannot put up an optical clinic but only a commercial store; (2) It cannot
examine and/or prescribe reading and similar optical glasses for patients, because these are
functions of optical clinics; (3) It cannot sell reading and similar eyeglasses without a prescription
having first been made by an independent optometrist or independent optical clinic. Acebedo can only
sell directly to the public, without need of a prescription, Ray-Ban and similar eyeglasses; (4) It cannot
advertise optical lenses and eyeglasses, but can advertise Ray-Ban and similar glasses and frames;
(5) It is allowed to grind lenses but only upon the prescription of an independent optometrist.
On December 5, 1988, private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist Sa Pilipinas (SOPI lodged a
complaint against the petitioner alleging that Acebedo had violated the conditions set forth in its
business permit and requesting the cancellation and/or revocation of such permit. On July 19, 1989,
the City Mayor sent petitioner a Notice of Resolution and Cancellation of Business Permit effective as
of said date and giving petitioner three (3) months to wind up its affairs.

Issue: Whether the City Mayor has the authority to impose special conditions, as a valid exercise of
police power, in the grant of business permits

Ruling: Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the
people. It is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or grant business permits,
if exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit of this power. The
authority of city mayors to issue or grant licenses and business permits is beyond cavil. However, the
power to grant or issue licenses or business permits must always be exercised in accordance with
law, with utmost observance of the rights of all concerned to due process and equal protection of the
law.
In the case under consideration, the business permit granted by respondent City Mayor to petitioner
was burdened with several conditions. Petitioner agrees with the holding by the Court of Appeals that
respondent City Mayor acted beyond his authority in imposing such special conditions in its permit as
the same have no basis in the law or ordinance. Public respondents and private respondent SOPI are
one in saying that the imposition of said special conditions is well within the authority of the City
Mayor as a valid exercise of police power.
The issuance of business licenses and permits by a municipality or city is essentially regulatory in
nature. The authority, which devolved upon local government units to issue or grant such licenses or
permits, is essentially in the exercise of the police power of the State within the contemplation of the
general welfare clause of the Local Government Code.

What is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a permit to engage in the business of
running an optical shop. It does not purport to seek a license to engage in the practice of
optometry. The objective of the imposition of subject conditions on petitioner's business permit could

4
be attained by requiring the optometrists in petitioner's employ to produce a valid certificate of
registration as optometrist, from the Board of Examiners in Optometry. A business permit is issued
primarily to regulate the conduct of business and the City Mayor cannot, through the issuance of such
permit, regulate the practice of a profession. Such a function is within the exclusive domain of the
administrative agency specifically empowered by law to supervise the profession, in this case the
Professional Regulations Commission and the Board of Examiners in Optometry.

EMINENT DOMAIN

4.
Association Of Small Landowners In The Phils. Vs. Sec. Of The DAR, 175 scra 343

FACTS:

These are consolidated cases involving common legal questions including serious challenges to the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657 also known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988"

In G.R. No. 79777, the petitioners are questioning the P.D No. 27 and E.O Nos. 228 and 229 on the
grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional
limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.

In G.R. No. 79310, the petitioners in this case claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to the Congress and not to the
President, the also allege that Proclamation No. 131 and E.O No. 229 should be annulled for violation
of the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process and equal protection. They
contended that the taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation which such
payment is not contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O No. 229.

In G.R. No. 79744, the petitioner argues that E.O Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the
President and that the said executive orders violate the constitutional provision that no private
property shall be taken without due process or just compensation which was denied to the petitioners.

In G.R. No 78742 the petitioners claim that they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy
their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the
implementing rules of the decree. They therefore ask the Honorable Court for a writ of mandamus to
compel the respondents to issue the said rules.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the laws being challenged is a valid exercise of Police power or Power of Eminent
Domain.

RULING:

Police Power through the Power of Eminent Domain, though there are traditional distinction between
the police power and the power of eminent domain, property condemned under police power is
noxious or intended for noxious purpose, the compensation for the taking of such property is not
subject to compensation, unlike the taking of the property in Eminent Domain or the power of
expropriation which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner of the property
expropriated.

175 SCRA 343 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Bill of Rights – Equal Protection – Valid
Classification
5
 Eminent Domain – Just Compensation

These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).

Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call
for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an
agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless,
to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just
share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to
provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to
specify maximum retention limits for landowners. In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No.
228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation
of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P.
No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No.
229, providing the mechanics for its (PP131’s) implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is the
enactment of R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while
considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect
insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.

[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]

G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land
distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of
ricelands and cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since their
landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to distribute their land to their
tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown willingness to till their own land. In short,
they want to be exempted from agrarian reform program because they claim to belong to a different
class.

G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)

Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and 229) on the
ground that these laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program and that the
specific amount must be determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Manaay averred
that this violated the principle in eminent domain which provides that only courts can determine just
compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated due process for under the constitution, no property
shall be taken for public use without just compensation.

Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for their land in
bonds and not necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just compensation has always been in the
form of money and not in bonds.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms of cash.

HELD:
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt from the
agrarian reform program. Under the law, classification has been defined as the grouping of persons
or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same
particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:
6
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.

Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both
as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The Association have not shown that they
belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only
landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing
land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners
that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In
any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is
accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to
the detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in classifying small
landowners as part of the agrarian reform program.
2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts. However,
there is no law which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from determining just
compensation. In fact, just compensation can be that amount agreed upon by the landowner and the
government – even without judicial intervention so long as both parties agree. The DAR can
determine just compensation through appraisers and if the landowner agrees, then judicial
intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law however is that, the just compensation
determined by an administrative body is merely preliminary. If the landowner does not agree with the
finding of just compensation by an administrative body, then it can go to court and the determination
of the latter shall be the final determination. This is even so provided by RA 6657:

Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the
court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.

3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional exercise of
eminent domain. The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The
program will require billions of pesos in funds if all compensation have to be made in cash – if
everything is in cash, then the government will not have sufficient money hence, bonds, and other
securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just compensation.

5.
Philippine Press Institute vs. COMELEC, 244 scra 272

Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directingnewspapers to provide free

Comelec space of not less than one-half page for the common use of political parties and candidates.
The Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to
enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their platforms of
government. The Comelec space shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital
election information.

Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine
publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and
void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government
against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. On behalf of the
respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of
the power of supervision (police power) of the Comelec over the information operations of print media
enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.

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Issue:

Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to compel
print media companies to donate “Comelec space” amounts to “taking” of private personal property
without payment of the just compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the element
of necessity for the taking has not been established by respondent Comelec, considering that
the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of private property for public
use is authorized by the constitution, but not without payment of just compensation. Also Resolution
No. 2772 does not constitute a validexercise of the police power of the state. In the case at bench,
there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to take private property of newspaper or
magazine publishers.

6.
Forform Development Corporation vs. PNR, December 10, 2008

Facts:

Petitioner Forfom Development Corporation (Forfom) is a domestic corporation duly organized

and existing under the laws of the Philippines with principal office at Cabuyao, Laguna, while
respondent Philippine National Railways (PNR) is a government corporation engaged in proprietary
functions with principal office at the PNR Railway Station, C.M. Recto Avenue, Tutuban, Binondo,
Manila. Forfom is the registered owner of several parcels of land in San Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna
under Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-34384, T-34386 and 34387, all of the Registry of
Deeds of Laguna. Said parcels of land were originally registered in the name of Felix Limcaoco,
predecessor-in-interest of Forfom, under Original Certificates of Title (OCT) Nos. (0-326) 0-384 and
(0-328) 0-386. President Ferdinand E. Marcos approved the Presidential Commuter Service Project,
more commonly known as the Carmona Project of the President of PNR. Forfom's property portion of
100 sq.m. were traversed as right of way. 24 August 1990, Forfom filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Binan, Laguna a complaint for Recovery of Posssession of Real Property and/or
Damages. It alleged that PNR, with the aid of military men, and without its consent and against its
will, occupied 100,128 square meters of its property located in San Pedro, Laguna and installed
thereon railroad and railway facilities and appurtenances. It further alleged that PNR rented out
portions of the property to squatters along the railroad tracks. Despite repeated verbal and written
demands for the return of the property or for the payment of its price, PNR failed to comply. t prayed
that PNR be ordered to vacate the property and to cause the eviction of all shanties and squatters
that PNR had taken in as lessees, and that it be restored to the peaceful occupation and enjoyment
thereof. It likewise asked that Forfom be ordered to pay (a) P1,000.00 per month per hectare from
occupation of the property until the same is vacated as rentals plus interest at 24% per annum;
(b) P1,600,000.00 as unrealized income from occupation of the property up to the present plus 12%
interest per annum until fully paid; (c) P150,000.00 for actual damages on account of the destruction
of crops and improvements on the property when the occupation of the property commenced plus
12% interest per annum until fully paid; (d) at least P100,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(e) P100,000.00 plus 15% of the amount and properties to be recovered as attorneys fees; and (f)
costs of the suit.

PNR alleged that, per authority granted by law (Presidential Decree No. 741), it acquired parcels of
land used in the construction of the railway track to Carmona, Cavite. It, however, denied that the
property acquired from Forfom was leased to tenants. It likewise denied that the acquisition of
Forfoms property was made without the consent of Dr. Felix Limcaoco, the former owner of the
property. It stressed that the acquisition of the properties used in the project was done through
negotiations with the respective owners. It asserted that no crop was damaged when it acquired the
8
property subject of the case. Further, it denied liability for unrealized income, exemplary damages
and attorneys fees. PNR explained that former President Ferdinand E. Marcos approved what was
known to be the Carmona Project -- a 5.1 kilometer railroad extension line from San Pedro, Laguna
to San Jose, Carmona, Cavite to serve the squatters resettlement area in said localities. It claimed
that it negotiated with the respective owners of the affected properties and that they were paid just
compensation. Dr. Felix Limcaoco, it said, was not paid because he failed to present the
corresponding titles to his properties. It claimed that the right to and just compensation for the subject
property was the declared fair market value at the time of the taking which was P0.60 per square
meter. It disclosed that in a meeting with the representatives of Dr. Limcaoco, the price agreed upon
was P1.25 per square meter, the amount the adjoining owners was paid. It prayed that the instant
complaint be dismissed, and that the owner of the properties involved be compelled to accept the
amount of P1.25 per square meter as price for the properties.

The following witnesses testified for Forfom: (1) Leon Capati; (2) Marites Dimaculangan; (3) Marilene
L. de Guzman; (4) Gavino Rosas de Claro; and (5) Jose Elazegui.

1. Mr. Leon Capati - employee of Forfom, testified that he knew Dr. Felix Limcaoco, Sr. because he
worked for him since 1951 until his death. He knew Forfom Development Corporation to be a
corporation formed by the children of Dr. Limcaoco and owner of the properties left behind by said
doctor. He said he worked as overseer in Hacienda Limcaoco in San Pedro, Laguna owned by Dr.
Limcaoco. Said hacienda was converted to the Olympia Complex Subdivision now owned by
Forfom. Being a worker of Forfom, he disclosed that in 1972, the PNR forcibly took portions of the
property of Forfom. Armed men installed railroads and even used bulldozers which caused the
destruction of around eleven hectares of sugar land. Since 1972, he said PNR used the property for
its benefit and even leased part of it to people living near the railroad. At that time, he claimed that the
value of sugarcane was P200.00 per piko and that the plantation harvested sixty (60) tons annually
worth P224,000.00. In all, from 1972 to 1985, he claimed Forfom lost P2,917,200.00 in ruined sugar,
unrealized harvest, excluding unrealized harvest for nine mango trees which yielded 60 kaings per
tree per harvest.

2. Ms. Marites Dimaculangan - an officer of Forfom, corroborated the testimony of Mr. Leon
Capati. She presented documents showing that Hacienda Limcaoco was previously owned by Dr.
Felix Limcaoco, then the ownership was transferred to Forfom. As proof that Hacienda Limcaoco was
converted into a low-cost housing subdivision known as the Olympia Complex Subdivision, she
presented permits from the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission and from
the Municipality of San Pedro. She also adduced in evidence several letters allegedly showing that
PNR occupied the property owned by the Limcaocos. As a result, around eleven hectares of the
sugar cane plantation were destroyed. From 1972 to 1985, she claimed that part of the property taken
by PNR was leased to squatters beside the railroad tracks. She added that Forfom incurred a loss
totaling P2,917,200.00. She claimed that the current price of land contiguous to the parcels taken by
PNR was P1,000.00 per square meter.

3. Ms. Marilene L. De Guzman, Executive Vice-President of Forfom and daughter of the Late Dr. Felix
Limcaoco, corroborated the testimonies of Mr. Capati and Ms. Dimaculangan. She disclosed that his
father died on 25 March 1973. She learned from her father and from Mr. Leon Capati that when the
armed men took a portion of their property, the armed men did not show any court order or authority
from any agency of the government. The armed men used bulldozers destroying 11 hectares of
sugarcane and some mango trees. She said those taken over were used as railroad tracks and a
portion beside the tracks were being leased to squatters. She revealed that the present fair market
value of land at Olympia Complex is P1,400.00 per square meter. If the land is not developed, same
can be sold for P800.00 per square meter. She said from the time their property was taken over by
PNR, her family has been writing to PNR regarding compensation for their land. Ms. De Guzman said

9
the property was still in the name of Dr. Felix Limcaoco, Sr. and Mrs. Olympia Limcaoco when the
PNR took over a portion of their properties. She said she was not informed by Mr. Capati that the
PNR took the said property over pursuant to a Presidential Mandate in order to provide transportation
for relocated squatters.She explained that her father and Mr. Capati were not advised to harvest their
crops and were surprised by the taking over of the land.

For the defendant, Mrs. Edna Ramos, Department Manager of the Real Estate Department of the
PNR, took the stand. She testified that she was familiar with the acquisition by the PNR of the right of
way for the San Pedro-Carmona Commuter Line. It was acquired and established by Presidential
Mandate and pursuant to the authority of the PNR to expropriate under its charter (Presidential
Decree No. 741). She explained that President Ferdinand E. Marcos authorized the PNR to acquire
said right of way in a Cabinet Meeting on 1 November 1972 as evidenced by an excerpt of the
minutes of the meeting of the PNR Board of Directors on Resolution No. 751. The right of way was
acquired to provide a cheap, efficient and safe means of transportation to the squatters who were
relocated in Cavite. The commuter line, she said, was primarily for service rather than profit.

Mrs. Ramos disclosed that the total area acquired by the PNR for the San Pedro-Carmona Commuter
Line was 15.7446 hectares or sixteen (16) lots in all owned by seven (7) private landowners and three
(3) corporations. Among the private landowners were Isabel Oliver, Leoncia Blanco, Catalina
Sanchez, Tomas Oliver, Alejandro Oliver and Antonio Sibulo. Per record of PNR, they were
paid P1.25 per square meter for their lands. They executed Absolute Deeds of Sale in favor of the
PNR, as a result of which, titles to the lands were transferred to PNR. The remaining 9 lots belonging
to the three private corporations Forfom Development Corporation, Alviar Development
Manufacturing & Trading Supply Corp. and Life Realty Development Corporation were not paid for
because these corporations were not able to present their respective titles, which had been used as
loan collaterals in the Philippine National Bank and the Government Service Insurance System. The
unit price per square meter, which the negotiating panel of the PNR and the representatives of the
three corporations was considering then, was P1.25. In a letter dated 3 October 1975, Mr. Felix
Limcaoco, Jr. of Forfom was asking for P12.00 per square meter for their land and P150,000.00 for
damaged sugar crops and mango trees. She likewise said she had the minutes of the conference
between Mr. Limcaoco and the PNR Chief Construction Engineer held at the PNR General Managers
Office on 24 July 1979.

Mrs. Ramos clarified that as a matter of policy, PNR employees and other persons were not allowed
to settle on the PNRs right of way. Squatting along the right of way had never been encouraged. To
prevent its proliferation, special contracts were entered into with selected parties under strict
conditions to vacate the property leased upon notice. She explained that the leasing of PNRs right of
way was an incidental power and was in response to the governments social housing project.

The trial court found that the properties of Forfom were taken by PNR without due process of law and
without just compensation. Although the power of eminent domain was not exercised in accordance
with law, and PNR occupied petitioners properties without previous condemnation proceedings and
payment of just compensation, the RTC ruled that, by its acquiescence, Forfom was estopped from
recovering the properties subject of this case. As to its right to compensation and damages, it said
that the same could not be denied. The trial court declared that P10.00 per square meter was the fair
and equitable market value of the real properties at the time of the taking thereof.

ot contented with the decision, both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals by filing their respective
Notices of Appeal. PNR questioned the trial courts ruling fixing the just compensation at P10.00 per
square meter and not the declared value of P0.60 per square meter or the fair market value of P1.25
paid to an adjacent owner. It likewise questioned the award of actual damages and unearned income
to Forfom.

10
Issue: W or Not Forfom can recover possession because PNR failed to file any expropriation case
and pay just compensation

Held: The power of eminent domain is an inherent and indispensable power of the State. Being
inherent, the power need not be specifically conferred on the government by the Constitution. Section
9, Article III states that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. The constitutional restraints are public use and just compensation. The fundamental
power of eminent domain is exercised by the Legislature. It may be delegated by Congress to the
local governments, other public entities and public utilities. In the case at bar, PNR, under its charter,
has the power of expropriation.

A number of circumstances must be present in the taking of property for purposes of eminent domain:
(1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entrance into private property must be for
more than a momentary period; (3) the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of
legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to a public purpose or otherwise informally,
appropriately or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in
such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

In the case at bar, the expropriator (PNR) entered the property of Forfom, a private land. The
entrance into Forfoms property was permanent, not for a fleeting or brief period. PNR has been in
control, possession and enjoyment of the subject land since December 1972 or January 1973. PNRs
entry into the property of Forfom was with the approval of then President Marcos and with the
authorization of the PNRs Board of Directors. The property of Forfom measuring around eleven
hectares was devoted to public use railroad tracks, facilities and appurtenances for use of the
Carmona Commuter Service. With the entrance of PNR into the property, Forfom was deprived of
material and beneficial use and enjoyment of the property. It is clear from the foregoing that there was
a taking of property within the constitutional sense.

Forfom argues that the property taken from it should be returned because there was neither
expropriation case filed by PNR nor just compensation paid for the same.

It can be gathered from the records that Forfom accepted the fact of the taking of its land when it
negotiated with PNR for just compensation, knowing fully well that there was no expropriation case
filed at all. Forfoms inaction for almost eighteen (18) years to question the absence of expropriation
proceedings and its discussions with PNR as to how much petitioner shall be paid for its land
preclude it from questioning the PNRs power to expropriate or the public purpose for which the power
was exercised. In other words, it has waived its right and is estopped from assailing the takeover of
its land on the ground that there was no case for expropriation that was commenced by PNR.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY DENIED insofar as it denies Forfom Development
Corporations prayer for recovery of possession (in whole or in part) of the subject land, unearned
income, and rentals. The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED in that attorneys fees and litigation
expenses in the amounts of P100,000.00 and P50,000.00, respectively, are awarded. The Philippine
National Railways is DIRECTED to forthwith institute the appropriate expropriation action over the
land in question, so that just compensation due to its owner may be determined in accordance with
the Rules of Court, with interest at the legal rate of six (6%) percent per annum from the time of taking
until full payment is made. As to the claim for the alleged damaged crops, evidence of the same, if
any, may be presented before the expropriation court. No costs.

11
 7.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES CANCIO

G.R. No. 170147 January 30, 2009

FACTS:
On January 15, 1979, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 18115 which reserved
certain parcels of land of the public domain in Lapu Lapu City in favor of petitioner (then Export
Processing Zone Authority or EPZA) for the establishment of the Mactan Export Processing Zone.
However, some of the parcels covered by the proclamation, including that of respondent spouses
Agustin and Imelda Cancio, were private land. Petitioner offered to purchase respondents’ lot
P52,294,000 which respondents rejected.
Petitioner commenced expropriation proceedings for respondents’ property. It sought a writ of
possession for the property for which it was willing to deposit 10% of the offered amount with LBP in
accordance with A.O. No. 50.7. Respondents, however, filed a motion to require petitioner to comply
with RA 8974, specifically Sec 4(a) thereof, which requires that, upon the filing of the complaint for
expropriation, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property an amount
equivalent to 100% of the current zonal valuation thereof for purposes of the issuance of a writ of
possession.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 8974 is applicable to this case for purposes of the issuance of the writ of
possession.

RULING:
RA 8974 governs this case, not A.O. No. 50 as petitioner insists. RA 8974 applies to instances
when the national government expropriates property for national government infrastructure projects.
The economic zone is a national government project. Also, the complaint for expropriation was filed
only on August 27, 2001 or almost 1 year after the law was approved on November 7, 2000. Thus,
there is no doubt about its applicability to this case.
It is only after the trial court ascertains the provisional amount to be paid that just
compensation will be determined. In establishing the amount of just compensation, the parties may
present evidence relative to the property’s fair market value, as provided under Section 5 of RA 8974.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE

AUTHORITY (PEZA) vs SPOUSES AGUSTIN and IMELDA CANCIO

G.R. No. 170147. January 30, 2009.

Facts: On May 19, 2001, petitioner offered to purchase respondents’ lot at P52,294,000 for the whole
property. The letter containing the offer further instructed respondents to consider and accept
however, instead of accepting, respondents filed an unlawful detainer case against Maitland in the
Municipal Trial Court of Lapu Lapu City.

Thereafter, petitioner commenced expropriation proceedings for respondents’ property with the
Regional Trial Court. Accordingly, it sought a writ of possession for the property for which it was
willing to deposit 10% of the offered amount.

Respondents, however, filed a motion to require petitioner to comply with RA 8974 which requires
that, upon the filing of the complaint for expropriation, the implementing agency shall immediately pay
the owner of the property an amount equivalent to 100% of the current zonal valuation thereof for
purposes of the issuance of a writ of possession. Petitioner should make the required payment under
the law because RA 8974, which took effect before the commencement of the expropriation case,
applied to all actions of such nature regardless of whether the government agency was already in
possession or not.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8974 is applicable in this case or not.

12
Held: RA 8974 governs this case. RA 8974 readily reveals that it applies to instances when the
national government expropriates property for national government infrastructure projects.
Undeniably, the economic zone is a national government project – a matter undisputed by both
parties. Also, the complaint for expropriation was filed only on August 27, 2001 or almost one year
after the law was approved on November 7, 2000. Thus, there is no doubt about its applicability to
this case.

There was also confusion regarding the nature of the amount to be paid for the issuance of a writ of
possession. In Capitol Steel Corporation v. PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority, we clarified that the
payment of the provisional value as a condition for the issuance of a writ of possession is different
from the payment of just compensation for the expropriated property. While the provisional value is
based on the current relevant zonal valuation, just compensation is based on the prevailing fair
market value of the property.

There is no need yet to determine with reasonable certainty the final amount of just compensation in
resolving the issue of a writ of possession. In fact, it is the ministerial duty of the trial court to issue the
writ. No hearing is required and the court cannot exercise its discretion in order to arrive at the
amount of the provisional value of the property to be expropriated as the legislature has already fixed
the amount under the aforementioned provision of the law. It is only after the trial court ascertains the
provisional amount to be paid that just compensation will be determined.

8. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Raymunda Martinez

G.R. No. 169008 (August 14, 2007)

Facts:

After compulsory acquisition by the Department of Agrarian Reform, on November 16, 1993, of
respondent Martinez's 62.5369-hectare land in Barangay Agpudlos, San Andres, Romblon, pursuant
to Republic Act No. 6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL), petitioner
Land Bank of the Philippines offered P1,955,485.60 as just compensation, for which respondent
rejected. Thus, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, through its Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator conducted summary administrative proceedings for the preliminary
determination of just compensation in accordance with Section 16 (d) of the CARL. On September 4,
2002, PARAD Virgilio M. Sorita, rendered judgment ordering the LBP to pay landowner-protestant
RAYMUNDA MARTINEZ for her property covered with the total amount of TWELVE MILLION ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY NINE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED NINETY TWO and 50/100 Pesos
(Php12,179,492.50). A petition for the fixing of just compensation was then filed by LBP's counsel
before the Special Agrarian Court (SAC) of the Regional Trial Court of Odiongan, Romblon.
Meanwhile, respondent, still asserting the finality of PARAD Sorita's decision, filed before the Office of
the PARAD a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution, which was eventually granted on
November 11, 2003. The PARAD denied LBP's motion for reconsideration and ordered the issuance
of a writ of execution on February 23, 2004. LBP, on March 12, 2004, moved to quash the said
February 23, 2004 PARAD resolution. On April 6, 2004, even as the motion to quash was yet
unresolved, LBP instituted a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA, on September 28, 2004
dismissed the petition.

Issue: Whether or not the PARAD, gravely abused its discretion when it issued a writ of execution
despite the pendency of LBP's petition for fixing of just compensation with the SAC?

Held: In this case, petitioner moved to quash the PARAD resolutions and at the same time petitioned
for their annulment via certiorari under Rule 65. In both proceedings, the parties are identical and the
reliefs prayed for are the same. In the two actions, petitioner also has a singular stance: the PARAD
resolutions should not be executed in view of the pendency of the petition for fixing of just
compensation with the SAC. Thus a situation is created where the two fora could come up with
conflicting decisions. This is precisely the evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum-
shopping. We find petitioner not entitled to the grant of a writ of certiorari by the appellate court
because the Office of the PARAD did not gravely abuse its discretion when it undertook to execute
the September 4, 2002 decision. Rule XIII, Section 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure. · In
Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals and in Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
13
Board v. Lubrica, we explained the consequence of the said rule to the effect that the adjudicator's
decision on land valuation attains finality after the lapse of the 15-day period. Considering therefore
that, in this case, LBP's petition with the SAC for the fixing of just compensation was filed 26 days
after its receipt of the PARAD's decision, or eleven days beyond the reglementary period, the latter
had already attained finality. The PARAD could very well issue the writ of execution.

“An appeal may be taken from the decision of the Special Agrarian Courts by filing a petition for
review with the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of the decision;
otherwise, the decision shall become final.

9.

HON. VICENTE P. EUSEBIO, LORNA A. BERNARDO, VICTOR ENDRIGA, and the CITY OF
PASIG, Petitioners, v. JOVITO M. LUIS, LIDINILA LUIS SANTOS, ANGELITA CAGALINGAN,
ROMEO M. LUIS, and VIRGINIA LUIS-BELLESTEROS, Respondents.

G.R. NO. 162474 October 13, 2009

Facts:

Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of land taken by Pasig City to be used as a
municipal road in 1980. On 1993, a resolution authorizing payments for said land was passed.
However, respondents were not agreeable with the assessed value and went on to negotiate the
same. On 1994, a letter was addressed to the mayor calling his attention as a property in the same
area had been paid for by petitioners at the price of P2,000.00 per square meter when said property
was expropriated in the year 1994 also for conversion into a public road.

Counsel for respondents sent a demand letter on 1996 to Mayor Eusebio, demanding the amount of
P5,000.00 per square meter, or a total of P7,930,000.00, as just compensation for respondents
property.

Respondents filed a Complaint for Reconveyance and/or Damages praying that the property be
returned to them with payment of reasonable rental for sixteen years of use at P500.00 per square
meter, or P793,000.00, with legal interest of 12% per annum from date of filing of the complaint until
full payment, or in the event that said property can no longer be returned, that petitioners be ordered
to pay just compensation in the amount of P7,930,000.00 and rental for sixteen years of use at
P500.00 per square meter, or P793,000.00, both with legal interest of 12% per annum from the date
of filing of the complaint until full payment.

The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the respondents which was affirmed by the CA upon appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not respondents are entitled to regain possession of their property taken by the city
government in the 1980s and, in the event that said property can no longer be returned, how should
just compensation to respondents be determined.

Ruling:

The Court ruled that failure to question the taking of the property for a long period of time,
respondents are also estopped from recovering possession of their land, but are entitled to just
compensation as addressed in Forfom Development Corporation v. Philippine National Railways.

With regard to the time as to when just compensation should be fixed, it is settled jurisprudence that
where property was taken without the benefit of expropriation proceedings, and its owner files an
action for recovery of possession thereof before the commencement of expropriation proceedings, it
is the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling.

14
10. NPC vs. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay

G.R. No. 165828. August 24, 2011

FACTS:

On November 21, 1997, the respondents as the owners of land with an area of 221,573 square
meters situated in Ditucalan, Iligan City, sued NPC and alleged that they had belatedly discovered
that one of the underground tunnels of NPC that diverted the water flow of the Agus River for the
operation of the Hydroelectric Project in Agus V, Agus VI and Agus VII traversed their land; that their
discovery had occurred in 1995 after Atty. Saidali C. Gandamra, President of the Federation of Arabic
Madaris School, had rejected their offer to sell the land because of the danger the underground
tunnel might pose to the proposed Arabic Language Training Center and Muslims Skills Development
Center; that such rejection had been followed by the withdrawal by Global Asia Management and
Resource Corporation from developing the land into a housing project for the same reason; that Al-
Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines had also refused to accept their land as collateral
because of the presence of the underground tunnel; that the underground tunnel had been
constructed without their knowledge and consent; that the presence of the tunnel deprived them of
the agricultural, commercial, industrial and residential value of their land; and that their land had also
become an unsafe place for habitation because of the loud sound of the water rushing through the
tunnel and the constant shaking of the ground, forcing them and their workers to relocate to safer
grounds. After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs (Heirs of Macabangkit), which CA affirmed
the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether the Heirs of Macabangkits right to claim just compensation had prescribed under section 3
of Republic Act No. 6395 or under Article 620 and Article 646 of the Civil Code.

HELD:

The court upheld the liability of NPC for payment of just compensation. The action to recover just
compensation from the State or its expropriating agency differs from the action for damages. The
former, also known as inverse condemnation, has the objective to recover the value of property taken
in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent
domain has been attempted by the taking agency. Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of
the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain, but the
owner's loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation in order to
convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real,
substantial, full, and ample. On the other hand, the latter action seeks to vindicate a legal wrong
through damages, which may be actual, moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated, or exemplary. When a
right is exercised in a manner not conformable with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and like
provisions on human relations in the Civil Code, and the exercise results to the damage of another, a
legal wrong is committed and the wrongdoer is held responsible.

10 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs SANTA LORO VDA. DE CAPIN and SPS. JULITO
QUIMCO and GLORIA CAPIN

G.R. No. 175176 October 17, 2008

FACTS

Pursuant to NAPOCOR’s KV Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project, they expropriated several

parcels of land which will be traversed by their transmission towers and lines in the
Municipality of Carmen and City of Danao in the Province of Cebu.

Among these lots were those owned by the respondent Santa Loro Vda. De Capin and respondent-
Spouses Quimco. To be able to enter the said properties, NAPOCOR obtained from them a
“Permission to Enter for Construction of Transmission Line Project” in exchange for their promise to
pay just compensation.
15
Petitioner began the construction in 1996. Upon its completion, NAPOCOR imposed several
restrictions on the use of respondents’ land such as prohibition against planting or building anything
higher than three meters below the area traversed by its transmission lines. They were also
prohibited from continuing their quarry business near petitioner’s transmission towers. Respondents
lost substantial amount of income due to the restriction imposed on their properties by the
petitioner. The respondents later learned that they were paid measly sums by NAPOCOR compared
to the other land owners who resisted the expropriation.

NAPOCOR claims that they are not required to pay for the full value of the property traversed as its
Charter provides that they are only obligated only to pay the easement fee equivalent to 10% of the
market value of the land as just compensation, plus the cost of damaged improvements.

The RTC ruled in favour of the respondents and ordered petitioner to pay 448.33 per sqm for
the entire lot taken by the petitioner NAPOCOR. On its motion for reconsideration and appeal, the
RTC ruling was affirmed except for the interest rates imposed.

ISSUE

Whether or not NAPOCOR should pay for the full value of the land or the simple easement fees
as provided in its charter

RULING

Petitioners contention that respondents’ complaint is actually for “reversed eminent domain”
which requires the appointment of commissioners for the determination of just compensation has no
merit.The case filed by the respondents was an ordinary civil action for failure of petitioner to comply
with its obligation to pay just compensation for the respondents’ properties. Petitioner cannot insist
that it only acquired an easement of right of way on the properties of the respondents. Expropriation
is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of title or
possession. The right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over
the land traversed by transmission lines also falls within the ambit of the term “expropriation.”

NAPOCOR’s prohibition regarding the use of respondents’ land amounted to an expropriation

of the portions of the latter’s properties and perpetually deprived the respondents of their proprietary
rights thereon and for which they are entitled to a reasonable and just compensation. Having
established that petitioner’s acquisition of right-of-way easement over the portions of respondents’
lots was definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain, petitioner then is liable to pay
respondents just compensation and not merely an easement fee.

LESSON LEARNED

Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of
title or possession. The right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights
over the land traversed by transmission lines also falls within the ambit of the term “expropriation.”

The acquisition of the right-of-way easement falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain
when it perpetually deprives owners of their proprietary rights. Such cases of easement of right-of-
way has been held by the Supreme Court to merit awards of just compensation for private property
condemned for public use

16
11. ANUNCIACION VDA. DE OUANO, MARIO P. OUANO, LETICIA OUANO ARNAIZ, and CIELO
OUANO MARTINEZ- versus -THE REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES, THE MACTAN-CEBU
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF
CEBU

G.R. No. 168770

Facts:

in 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), MCIAA's predecessor agency pursued a program to
expand the Lahug Airport in Cebu City. Through its team of negotiators. NAC met and negotiated with
the owner of the properties situated around the airport, which included Lot Nos. 744-A, 745-A, 746,
747, 761-A, 762-A, 763-A, 942, and 947 of the Banilad Estate. As the landowners would later claim,
the government negotiating team, assured them that they could re-purchase their respective lands
should the Lahug Airport expansion project do not push through or once the Lahug Airport closes or
its operations transferred to Mactan-Cebu Airport.

Some of the landowners accepted the assurance and executed deeds of sale with a right to re-
purchase. Others, however, refused to sell because the purchase price offered was viewed as way
below market, forcing the hand of the Republic, represented by the then CAA, as successor agency
of the NAC, to file a complaint for the expropriation of Lot Nos. 744-A, 745-A, 746, 747, 761-A, 762-A,
763-A, 942, and 947. On December 29, 1961, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu rendered
judgment for the Republic: a. Declaring the expropriation justified in and in lawful exercise of the right
to eminent domain. When Lahug Airport completely ceased operations prompted the former lot
owners to formally demand from the government that they be allowed to exercise their promised right
to re-purchase.

Issue:

Wether or not the former owners of lots acquired for the expansion of the Lahug Airport in Cebu City
has the right to re-purchase or secure reconveyance of their respective properties.

Held:

The Ouano petition is deemed meritorious. The MCIAA and/or its predecessor agency had not
actually used the lots subject of the final decree of expropriation in Civil Case No. r-1881 for the
purpose they were originally taken by the government. The Lahug Airport had been closed and
abandoned. A significant portion of it had, in fact, been purchased by a private corporation for
development as a commercial complex. it has been preponderantly established by evidence that the
NAC, through its team of negotiators, had given assurance to the affected landowners that they would
be entitled to re-purchase their respective lots in the event they are no longer used for airport
purposes.

11. (a)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION,

vs.
HEIRS OF SATURNINO Q. BORBON, AND COURT OF APPEALS

[G.R. No. 165354; January 12, 2015] Constitutional Law| Eminent Domain|

FACTS:

The National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) entered into a private property owned by respondents
Borbon in order to construct and maintain transmission lines for its Power Transmission Project.
NAPOCOR then filed for expropriation of an easement of right of way over a portion of the
said property. However, during the pendency of the appeal, NAPOCOR filed a motion to discontinue
the expropriation proceedings, that the property sought to be expropriated was no longer necessary
for public purpose, that because the public purpose ceased to exist, the proceedings for expropriation
should no longer continue, and the State was now duty-bound to return the property to its owners;
17
and that the dismissal or discontinuance of the expropriation proceedings was in accordance of the
Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether the expropriation proceedings should be discontinued or dismissed pending appeal.

HELD:

The dismissal of the proceedings for expropriation at the instance of NAPOCOR is proper, but, the
dismissal or discontinuance of the proceedings must be upon such terms as the court deems just and
equitable. Here, NAPOCOR seeks to discontinue the expropriation proceedings on the ground that
the transmission lines constructed on the respondents’ property had already been retired. The
retirement of the transmission lines necessarily stripped the expropriation proceedings of the element
of public use. Accordingly, the Court grants the motion to discontinue the proceedings and requires
the return of the property to the respondents.

In view of the discontinuance of the proceedings and the eventual return of the property to the
respondents, NAPOCOR should compensate the respondents for the disturbance of their property
rights from the time of entry in March 1993 until the time of restoration of the possession by paying
actual or other compensatory damages. The compensation must be based on what they actually lost
as a result and by reason of their dispossession of the property and of its use, including the value of
the fruit trees, plants and crops destroyed by NAPOCOR’s construction of the transmission
lines. Considering that the dismissal of the expropriation proceedings is a development occurring
during the appeal, the Court treats the dismissal of the expropriation proceedings as producing the
effect of converting the case into an action for damages.

11 (new)MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY v. BERNARDO L. LOZADA,

GR No. 176625, 2010-02-25
Facts:
Subject of this case is Lot No. 88-SWO-25042 (Lot No. 88), with an area of 1,017 square meters,
more or less, located in Lahug, Cebu City.
Its original owner was Anastacio Deiparine when the same was subject to expropriation proceedings,
initiated by the Republic of the
Philippines (Republic), represented by the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), for the
expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport. The case was filed with the then Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Third Branch, and docketed as Civil Case No. R-1881.
During the pendency of the expropriation proceedings, respondent Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr. acquired
Lot No. 88 from Deiparine.
On December 29, 1961, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the Republic and ordered the
latter to pay Lozada the fair market value of Lot No. 88, adjudged at P3.00 per square meter, with
consequential damages by way of legal interest computed from November 16, 1947--the... time when
the lot was first occupied by the airport.
Lozada, with the other landowners, contacted then CAA Director Vicente Rivera, Jr., requesting to
repurchase the lots, as per previous agreement.
On November 29, 1989, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued a Memorandum to the Department
of Transportation, directing the transfer of general aviation operations of the Lahug Airport to the
Mactan International Airport before the end of 1990 and, upon such transfer, the... closure of the
Lahug Airport.
From the date of the institution of the expropriation proceedings up to the present, the public purpose
of the said expropriation (expansion of the airport) was never actually initiated, realized, or
implemented.

18
Thus, on June 4, 1996, petitioners initiated a complaint for the recovery of possession and
reconveyance of ownership of Lot No. 88.
On October 22, 1999, the RTC rendered its Decision, disposing as follows... he Court hereby renders
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr.,... Aggrieved, petitioners interposed an
appeal to the CA.
fter the filing of the necessary appellate briefs, the CA rendered its assailed Decision dated February
28, 2006, denying petitioners' appeal and affirming in toto the Decision of the RTC, Branch 57, Cebu
City.
Issues:
(1) the respondents utterly failed to prove that there was a repurchase agreement or compromise
settlement between them and the Government; (2) the judgment in Civil Case No. R-1881 was
absolute and unconditional, giving title in fee simple to... the Republic;
Ruling:
The petition should be denied.
Indeed, the Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 should be read in its entirety, wherein it is apparent
that the acquisition by the Republic of the expropriated lots was subject to the condition that the
Lahug Airport would continue its operation. The condition not having... materialized because the
airport had been abandoned, the former owner should then be allowed to reacquire the expropriated
property.
More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use the
property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should
file another petition for the new purpose.
In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the taking of private property, consequent to
the Government's exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to the condition that the
property be devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was taken.
Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily
abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the property, subject
to the return of the amount of just compensation received. In such... a case, the exercise of the power
of eminent domain has become improper for lack of the required factual justification.
It bears stressing that both the RTC, Branch 57, Cebu and the CA have passed upon this factual
issue and have declared, in no uncertain terms, that a compromise agreement was, in fact, entered
into between the Government and respondents, with the former undertaking to resell Lot
No. 88 to the latter if the improvement and expansion of the Lahug Airport would not be pursued.
the testimony of Lozada was based on... personal knowledge as the assurance from the government
was personally made to him.
As regards the position of petitioners that respondents' testimonial evidence violates the Statute of
Frauds, suffice it to state that the Statute of Frauds operates only with respect to executory contracts,
and does not apply to contracts which have been completely or partially... performed,... The right of
respondents to repurchase Lot No. 88 may be enforced based on a constructive trust constituted on
the property held by the government in favor of the former.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Principles:
If x x x land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that purpose is
ended or abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then, of course, when the purpose
is terminated or abandoned the former owner reacquires the... property so expropriated. If x x x land
is expropriated for a public street and the expropriation is granted upon condition that the city can
only use it for a public street, then, of course, when the city abandons its use as a public street, it
returns to the former... owner, unless there is some statutory provision to the contrary. x x x. If, upon
the contrary, however, the decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title, then, of
course, the land becomes the absolute property of the expropriator, whether it be the State, a...

19
province, or municipality, and in that case the non-user does not have the effect of defeating the title
acquired by the expropriation proceedings. x x x.
When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the exercise of
eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no right in the land, and the public use may
be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without... any impairment of the estate
or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner. x x x.

DUE PROCESS
12. EFREN T. UY v. JUDGE ALAN L. FLORES
AM RTJ-12-2332, July 25, 2014

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is an administrative complaint[1] for gross ignorance of the law, manifest partiality, denial of
due process and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service against respondent Judge Alan
L. Flores.

The facts are not disputed.

In a Revenue Travel Assignment Order,[2] Commissioner of Internal Revenue Lilian B. Hefti relieved
Mustapha M. Gandarosa as Regional Director of Revenue Region No. 16, Bureau of Internal
Revenue, Cagayan de Oro City. Hefti reassigned Gandarosa as Chief of Staff of the Special
Concerns Group at the Bureau's Head Office in Quezon City. Secretary of Finance Margarito B.
Teves approved Hefti's order.

Gandarosa filed a Rule 65 petition[3] for certiorari and/or prohibition with prayer for a temporary
restraining order before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tubod, Lanao del Norte, presided by
Judge Flores. Gandarosa prayed that Hefti's order be declared void and that a writ of injunction be
issued prohibiting the Secretary of Finance and the new Commissioner of Internal Revenue from
enforcing Hefti's order and from replacing or reassigning him. Judge Flores granted a temporary
restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction in favor of Gandarosa.

Meanwhile, the new Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Sixto S. Esquivias IV, issued a new Revenue
Travel Assignment Order[4]reiterating Hefti's order. Secretary Teves also approved Esquivias's
order. Gandarosa thus filed a petition[5] for indirect contempt against Secretary Teves and
Commissioner Esquivias.

Judge Flores issued the following orders: (1) Order[6] dated November 3, 2008 granting a 72-hour
temporary restraining order; (2) Order[7] dated November 7, 2008 extending the temporary
restraining order; (3) Order[8] dated November 21, 2008 admitting Gandarosa's documentary exhibits;
(4) Order[9] dated November 21, 2008 granting a writ of preliminary injunction; (5) Omnibus
Order[10] dated November 25, 2008 treating the comment to the Rule 65 petition, filed through LBC,
as a mere scrap of paper; (6) Order[11] dated December 15, 2008 requiring Secretary Teves and
Commissioner Esquivias to file their comment to the contempt petition; and (7) Omnibus and Interim
Order[12] dated December 22, 2008, which, among others, (a) impleaded Deputy Commissioner
Nelson Aspe and Alberto Olasiman, Officer-in-Charge, Revenue Region No. 16, as respondents in
the contempt petition, and (b) ordered Secretary Teves, Commissioner Esquivias and their
subordinate officials to maintain the status quo and retain Gandarosa as Regional Director of
Revenue Region No. 16.

The Court of Appeals (CA) in its Decision[13] dated August 3, 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 02753-MIN
annulled all seven orders and ordered Judge Flores to dismiss Gandarosa's Rule 65 and contempt

20
petitions. The CA ruled that the trial court lacks jurisdiction over the Rule 65petition. Said CA
Decision attained finality and entry of judgment was made.

Complainants Efren T. Uy, Nelia B. Lee, Rodolfo L. Menes and Quinciano H. Lui now allege that
Judge Flores exhibited gross ignorance of the law when he assumed jurisdiction over the Rule
65 petition as it is the Civil Service Commission which has jurisdiction over the issue of Gandarosa's
reassignment. They add that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tubod, Lanao del Norte, which is
within the 12th Judicial Region, also lacks jurisdiction to issue a temporary restraining order and writ
of preliminary injunction effective in Metro Manila, National Capital Judicial Region, where the
Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue hold office, and in Cagayan de Oro
City, 10th Judicial Region, where the Regional Office of Revenue Region No. 16 is based. Moreover,
Judge Flores treated the comment to the Rule 65 petition as a mere scrap of paper contrary to the
basic rule that if a private carrier, LBC in this case, is used by a party, the date of actual receipt by the
court of such pleading is deemed to be the date of filing of that pleading.

Complainants also allege that Judge Flores violated the right to due process of the Secretary of
Finance and Commissioner of Internal Revenue when he treated their comment to the Rule
65 petition as a mere scrap of paper. And in impleading Aspe and Olasiman as respondents to the
contempt petition, Judge Flores sentenced them even if they had no opportunity to speak a single
word in their defense.

Moreover, complainants assail Judge Flores's alleged bias when he enjoined the implementation of
Hefti and Esquivias's orders.

In his comment,[14] Judge Flores cites an earlier complaint filed against him by the Coalition of
Chambers of Commerce and Industry Associations, Northern Mindanao which was docketed as A.M.
No. 09-1-46-RTC. He cites that upon recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator in its
Report dated January 28, 2009, we dismissed said complaint in a minute Resolution[15] dated March
11, 2009 on the ground that (1) there was no sufficient evidence to show any anomaly or irregularity
in the trial court's proceedings and (2) the propriety of the temporary restraining order, writ of
preliminary injunction and Omnibus and Interim Order dated December 22, 2008 was a judicial matter
which should be properly resolved in a judicial proceeding. Judge Flores also claims that while he
may have erred in taking cognizance of Gandarosa's cases, he did so in good faith and without
malice.

Upon evaluation of the present complaint and Judge Flores's comment, the Office of the Court
Administrator issued a Report[16] dated January 19, 2012 finding Judge Flores guilty of gross
ignorance of the law. The Office of the Court Administrator adopted the ruling of the CA in CA-G.R.
SP No. 02753-MIN that Judge Flores's seven orders were void since the trial court lacked jurisdiction
over Gandarosa's case which was a personnel action within the jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission; that Judge Flores's orders could only be enforced within the 12th Judicial Region; that
Judge Flores gravely erred in restraining the implementation of Hefti's order; and that Judge Flores
failed to show cold neutrality in granting the writ of preliminary injunction based on documents
identified by Gandarosa's counsel.

The recommendations of the Office of the Court Administrator are well taken.

But first, we address Judge Flores's statement that he had been exonerated in an earlier complaint
filed by the Coalition of Chambers of Commerce and Industry Associations, Northern Mindanao. We
examined the record of the earlier complaint against Judge Flores and we find that it is not identical to
the present complaint. The Coalition of Chambers of Commerce and Industry Associations, Northern
Mindanao, had asked the Office of the Court Administrator to review the temporary restraining order

21
issued by Judge Flores. The Coalition said that the venue of the Rule 65 petition gives the
impression that Gandarosa hand-picked the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tubod, Lanao del
Norte. The Coalition also said that the Rule 65 petition is a wrong remedy as Gandarosa could have
availed of administrative remedies within the Bureau of Internal Revenue all the way up to the Office
of the President. The Coalition also claimed that Judge Flores prejudged the case and showed his
bias and overreaching accommodation of Gandarosa by issuing the Omnibus and Interim Order
dated December 22, 2008.

On the other hand, in the present case, we are called upon to determine whether Judge Flores
committed gross ignorance of the law, manifest partiality, violation of due process, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Contrary to Judge Flores's contention, there is no
reason to treat the former complaint as having a substantial bearing on the present charges.

Now on the merits of the complaint.

We agree with the Office of the Court Administrator that Judge Flores committed gross ignorance of
the law but we dismiss the other charges.

When a law or a rule is basic, judges owe it to their office to simply apply the law. Anything less is
gross ignorance of the law. There is gross ignorance of the law when an error committed by the
judge was gross or patent, deliberate or malicious. It may also be committed when a judge ignores,
contradicts or fails to apply settled law and jurisprudence because of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or
corruption. Gross ignorance of the law or incompetence cannot be excused by a claim of good
faith.[17] When an error is so gross and patent, such error produces an inference of bad faith,
making the judge liable for gross ignorance of the law.[18]

In Republic v. Judge Caguioa,[19] we said that the rules on jurisdiction are basic and judges should
know them by heart.

Here, Judge Flores assumed jurisdiction over the Rule 65 petition assailing Hefti's order when he
should have dismissed the petition for Gandarosa's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. An
employee who questions the validity of his transfer should appeal to the Civil Service Commission per
Section 26(3), Chapter 5, Subtitle A, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987, which reads:

SEC. 26. Personnel Actions. x x x

xxxx

(3) Transfer. x x x

x x x. If the employee believes that there is no justification for the transfer, he may
appeal his case to the [Civil Service] Commission.

Citing said provision of the Administrative Code of 1987, we ruled in Hon. Vinzons-Chato v. Hon.
Natividad[20] that:

Moreover, under the law, any employee who questions the validity of his transfer should
appeal to the Civil Service Commission. Respondent judge should have dismissed the
action below for failure of private respondent to exhaust administrative remedies.

We reiterated the above rule in Rualo v. Pitargue,[21] to wit:

22
 Being [Bureau of Internal Revenue] employees, Perez and Vasquez focused their
objections on security of tenure. In the case of Perez, respondents object to the specter
of a transfer. In the case of Vasquez, respondents object to the place of
transfer. Under the law, any employee who questions the validity of his transfer should
appeal to the Civil Service Commission. The trial court should have dismissed the case
as to Perez and Vasquez, who both failed to exhaust administrative remedies x x x.

The law is basic and jurisprudence is clear but Judge Flores failed to apply them. Judge Flores
committed a gross and patent error which makes him liable for gross ignorance of the law
notwithstanding his claim of good faith. Judge Flores even mentioned in the Order dated November
21, 2008 the contention of the Office of the Solicitor General that the trial court lacks jurisdiction over
the case. Judge Flores's gross and patent error produces an inference of bad faith on his part,
considering that the issue of jurisdiction was raised.

And even if we assume that the trial court has jurisdiction over Gandarosa's Rule 65 petition, Section
4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Courtrequires that the petition must be filed in the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. But the trial court
presided by Judge Flores is within the 12th Judicial Region while the Head Office and Regional Office,
Revenue Region No. 16, of the Bureau of Internal Revenue are respectively located in Metro Manila,
National Capital Judicial Region, and Cagayan de Oro City, 10th Judicial Region. Judge Flores
issued a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction against the Secretary of
Finance and Commissioner of Internal Revenue who both hold office in Metro Manila, outside the
territorial area where his court can exercise its jurisdiction. And while Revenue Region No. 16 has a
district office in Tubod, Lanao del Norte, where the trial court is situated, the CA found that no court
process was served on the said district office or in Gandarosa's residence in Tubod, Lanao del
Norte. All court processes were served in the Regional Office of Revenue Region No. 16 based in
Cagayan de Oro City, 10th Judicial Region.

In Republic v. Judge Caguioa,[22] we found Judge Caguioa guilty of gross ignorance of the
law. Among others, we said that the writ of preliminary injunction was issued to enjoin acts performed
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City. It was directed against
government officials whose offices are located in Manila.

Another gross and patent error of Judge Flores is treating the comment of the Secretary of Finance
and Commissioner of Internal Revenue as a mere scrap of paper because the comment was filed
through LBC, not by personal filing or registered mail. But the established rule is that the date of
delivery of pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency is not to be considered as the date of filing
thereof in court, and that in such cases, the date of actual receipt by the court, and not the date of
delivery to the private carrier, is deemed the date of filing of that pleading.[23] Thus, even if the
comment was filed through LBC, it cannot be considered as a mere scrap of paper. The comment
was duly filed on the date it was received by the trial court.

Under Section 8(9) and Section 11(A) of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross ignorance of the law is
a serious charge, punishable by a fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000, or by
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three months but not
exceeding six months, or by dismissal from the service. Considering the circumstances of this case,
we agree with the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator that Judge Flores be
suspended from office without salary and, other benefits for three months and one day.

We note, however, that the Office of the Court Administrator did not discuss the charges of manifest
partiality, denial of due process and conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service. This implies that

23
Judge Flores is not guilty of these charges. In any event, we dismiss the charge of manifest partiality
against Judge Flores for complainants' failure to prove by extrinsic evidence this serious
allegation. We cannot presume that Judge Flores was biased and partial simply because he enjoined
the implementation of Hefti and Esquivias's orders. We have held that there should be clear and
convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality. Extrinsic evidence is required to
establish bias. Absent extrinsic evidence, the decision itself would be insufficient to establish a case
against the judge.[24]

We also dismiss the charge of denial of due process. In the application of the principle of due
process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not the lack of previous notice but the denial of the
opportunity to be heard.[25] We note that the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, even if their comment was erroneously treated as a mere scrap of paper, were duly
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General during the hearing on November 21, 2008 and were
not denied the opportunity to be heard. They were likewise required to file their comment to the
contempt petition in the Order dated December 15, 2008. When Aspe and Olasiman were impleaded
as respondents in the contempt petition, there was a motion to implead them as additional
respondents and Judge Flores stated in the Omnibus and Interim Order dated December 22, 2008
that Aspe and Olasiman were notified of the hearing for said motion. Complainants claimed that
Aspe and Olasiman were already sentenced by Judge Flores in the Omnibus and Interim Order dated
December 22, 2008 despite the fact that the hearing for the contempt petition was only scheduled on
January 26, 2009.

We likewise dismiss the charge of conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service. In Consolacion v.
Gambito,[26] we said that the rules do not provide a definition of, or enumeration of the acts
constituting, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. It refers to acts or omissions that
violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or tend to diminish the people's faith in the
Judiciary. If an employee's questioned conduct tarnished the image and integrity of his public office,
he is liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. We noted in Consolacion v.
Gambito that Gambito's misrepresentation regarding the ownership and actual status of the tricycle
which she sold to Consolacion unquestionably undermined the people's faith in the Judiciary. We
also noted Gambito's transaction with Billamanca where Gambito facilitated two cases for the amount
of P15,000, which was supposed to be used for publication, filing fee and sheriff's fee. Gambito also
received P9,000, which was supposed to be for the bail of Erum's husband, but Gambito used the
money to buy her medicines and books of her daughter. We said that Gambito's unauthorized
transactions constitute conduct grossly prejudicial to the interest of the service. In this case,
complainants failed to allege any similar conduct on the part of Judge Flores.

WHEREFORE, we FIND respondent Judge Alan L. Flores of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7,
Tubod, Lanao del Norte, LIABLE for gross ignorance of the law, and SUSPEND him from office
without salary and other benefits for three months and one day, with WARNING that similar acts in
the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

13. Secretary of Justice vs. Hon. Ralph Lantion, October 17, 2000

Lessons: Extradition Process

Laws: Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the United States, PD 1069, Bill of Rights

24
FACTS:

In accordance to "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
and the Government of the United States of America" (RP-US Extradition Treaty), the Department of
Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a
request for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States attached with the Grand Jury
Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and
other supporting documents on June 18, 1999. Mr. Jimenez was charged with the following:

i. 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States; 2 counts; Maximum
Penalty: 5 years/count)
ii. 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax;4 counts; Maximum Penalty:5 years/count)
iii. 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; 2 counts; Maximum Penalty: 5 years/count)
iv. 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; 6 counts; Maximum Penalty: 5 years/count)
v. 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; 33 counts; Maximum Penalty: less than 1
year)

The Department of Justice denied Mr. Jimenez request for extradition documents based
on the following:

i. Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the United States enumerates the
documentary requirements and establishes the procedures under which the documents submitted
shall be received and admitted as evidence. Evidentiary requirements are under Section 4 of P.D.
No. 1069. Evaluation by the Department of the documents is not a preliminary investigation nor akin
to preliminary investigation of criminal cases. Thus, the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the
accused in all criminal prosecutions are not available. It merely determines the compliance of the
Requesting Government with the procedures and requirements under the relevant law and
treaty. After the filing of the petition for extradition, the person sought to be extradited will be
furnished by the court with copies of the petition.
ii. The Department of Justice under P.D. No. 1069 is the counsel of the foreign governments in all
extradition requests. Furthermore, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides that the
Philippine Government must represent the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising
out of a request for extradition. Thus, it must comply with the request of the United States
Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the subject information.
iii. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that "Every treaty in force is
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith". Extradition is a tool of
criminal law enforcement and to be effective, requests for extradition or surrender of accused or
convicted persons must be processed expeditiously.

Mr. Jimenez filed with filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region a
petition presided over by the Honorable Ralph C. Lantion against the Secretary of Justice, the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation:

i. mandamus to compel the Department to furnish the extradition documents

ii. certiorari to set aside Department’s letter dated July 13, 1999 denying his request
iii. prohibition to restrain the Department from considering the extradition request and from filing an
extradition petition in court
iv. enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any act
directed to the extradition
v. application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction

Honorable Ralph C. Lantion ordered the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation to maintain the status quo by refraining
from committing the acts complained of, from conducting further proceedings in connection with the
request of the United States Government, from filing the corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial
court and from performing any act directed to the extradition for a period of 20 days from service of
the order.

Hon. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines ordered Hon.
Lantion to cease and desist from enforcing the order. Due to transcendental importance, the Court
25
brushed aside peripheral procedural matters which concern the proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-
94684 and the TRO and proceded on the issues.

ISSUE:
i. Whether or NOT the evaluation procedure is not a preliminary investigation nor akin to preliminary
investigation of criminal cases
ii. Whether or NOT the twin basic due process rights granted by Sec. 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court on the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting
documents and the right to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents within 10 days
from receipt is dispensable
iii. Whether or NOT the right of the people to information on matters of public concern granted
under Sec. 7 of Art. III of the 1987 Constitution is violated

HELD: DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the
extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file
his comment with supporting evidence.

i. NO.

Extradition Request

The Extradition Request (Sec. 4. PD 1069) is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the
Requesting State, addressed to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs
has the executive authority to conduct the evaluation process which, just like the extradition
proceedings proper, belongs to a class by itself or is sui generis. It is not a criminal investigation but it
is also erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage, the
executive authority has the power:

1) to make a technical assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the extradition papers in
form and substance
2) to outrightly deny the request if on its face and on the face of the supporting documents the
crimes indicated are not extraditable
3) to make a determination whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is
a military one which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation.

The process may be characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process (NOT an exercise of an

administrative body's quasi-judicial power) (Sec. 5. PD 1069 and Pars. 2 and 3, Art. 7 of the RP-US
Extradition Treaty) that is indispensable to prosecution. The power of investigation consists in
gathering, organizing and analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an administrative
agency's performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial functions.

In Ruperto v. Torres, the Court laid down the test of determining whether an administrative body is
exercising judicial functions or merely investigatory functions applies to an administrative body
authorized to evaluate extradition documents. If the only purpose for investigation is to evaluate
evidence submitted before it based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency
is not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of
judicial discretion and judgment. Thus, the role of the administrative body is limited to an initial
finding of whether or not the extradition petition can be filed in court. The court has the power to
determine whether or not the extradition should be effected. The evaluation procedure (in contrast to
ordinary investigations) may result in the deprivation of liberty of the prospective extraditee or
accused (Sec. 2[c] of PD 1069) at 2 stages:

1) provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the submission of the request
This is because the Treaty provides that in case of urgency, a contracting party may request the
provisional arrest of the person sought pending presentation of the request (Par. 1, Art. 9 of the RP-
US Extradition Treaty) to prevent flight but he shall be automatically discharged after 60 days (Par. 4
of the RP-US Extradition Treaty) or 20 days (Sec. 20[d] PD 1069) if no request is
submitted. Otherwise, he can be continuously detained, or if not, subsequently rearrested (Par. 5, Art
9, RP-US Extradition Treaty)

26
2) temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee during the pendency of the extradition petition in
court (Sec. 6, PD 1069).

The peculiarity and deviant characteristic of the evaluation procedure is that:

1) there is yet no extradite; BUT
2) it results in an administrative if adverse to the person involved, may cause his immediate
incarceration

The evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. Similar to the evaluation
stage of extradition proceedings, a preliminary investigation, which may result in the filing of an
information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and to the deprivation of his
liberty. The characterization of a treaty in Wright was in reference to the applicability of the
prohibition against an ex post facto law. It had nothing to do with the denial of the right to notice,
information, and hearing.

In this case, the extradition request was delivered to the Department of Foreign Affairs on June 17,
1999 (the following day the Department of Justice received the request). Thus, the Department of
Foreign Affairs failed to discharge its duty of evaluating the same and its accompanying documents.

Extradition Petition

After delivery of the Extradition Request by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of
Justice, the latter shall designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case
(Par. 1, Sec. 5, PD 1069). The attorney shall file a written Extradition Petition with the proper regional
trial court, with a prayer that the court take the extradition request under consideration (Par. 2, Sec. 5,
PD 1069). The presiding judge shall issue an order summoning the prospective extraditee to appear
and to answer the petition. The judge may issue a warrant of arrest if it appears that the immediate
arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice or to prevent
flight (Par. 1, Sec. 6, PD 1069).

Extradition Hearing

The provisions of the Rules of Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with the summary
nature of the proceedings, shall apply during the Extradition Hearing (Par. 1, Sec. 9, PD 1069) The
attorney may represent the Requesting state. (Sec. 8, PD 1069). The Court’s decision on whether
the petition is extraditable based on the application of the dual criminality rule and other conditions
mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty or whether or not the offense for which
extradition is requested is a political one (Par. 3, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty) shall be
final and immediately executory (Sec. 12, PD 1069) and appealable with the Court of Appeals where
the provisions of the Rules of Court governing appeal in criminal cases in the Court of Appeals shall
apply except for the required 15-day period to file brief (Sec. 13, PD 1069).

ii. YES.

Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes the twin rights of notice and hearing from a
prospective extradite. In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair
play. Petitioner contends that United States requested the Philippine Government to prevent
unauthorized disclosure of confidential information. Such argument, however has been overturned by
petitioner's revelation that everything it refuses to make available at this stage would be obtainable
during trial. If the information is truly confidential, the veil of secrecy cannot be lifted at any stage of
the extradition proceedings. The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice
outside legality," since private respondent's due process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or
by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees.

However in this case, with the meticulous nature of the evaluation, which cannot just be completed in
an abbreviated period of time due to its intricacies and certain problems in the extradition papers
(such as those that are in Spanish and without the official English translation, and those that are not
properly authenticated) it cannot to be said to be urgent. Therefore, notice and hearing requirements
of administrative due process cannot be dispensed with and shelved aside.

27
iii. NO.
During the evaluation procedure, no official governmental action of our own government has as yet
been done; hence the invocation of the right is premature. Later, and in contrast, records of the
extradition hearing would already fall under matters of public concern, because our government by
then shall have already made an official decision to grant the extradition request.

14. GOVERNMENT of the USA vs. HON. PURGANAN

GR. NO. 148571 Sept. 24 2002

FACTS: Secretary Lantion was to give Mr. Jimenez copies of the request for extradition, its
supporting papers, and to grant the latter a reasonable period to file a comment and supporting
evidence. But on motion for reconsideration by the Secretary of Justice, the decision was reversed. It
did however, hold that the Mr. Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and hearing. On May 18,
2001, the Government of the USA filed the Petition for Extradition with the RTC, praying that an order
for his “immediate arrest” be issued right away in order to prevent Jimenez’s flight. Before the RTC
could act on the petition, Mr. Jimenez filed before the same an “Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte
Motion,” praying that his application be set for hearing. After the hearing, Mr. Jimenez submitted his
Memorandum therein stating that he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000 should a
warrant be issued. The court ordered the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his
temporary liberty at P1M in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash
bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty. The US Government filed a petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to set aside the order for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest
and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash which the court deems best to take cognizance
as there is still no local jurisprudence to guide lower court.

ISSUE: Whether or NOT there is a violation of due process.

RULING: No. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental
fairness. A subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. Thus, there can be no violation of due
process. Mr. Jimenez would have the full opportunity to be heard when the extradition court hears the
Petition for Extradition. He would also enjoy, during the hearings, the full chance to be heard and
fundamental fairness. Also worth of note is that, before the US government requested the extradition
of Mr. Jimenez, proceedings had already been conducted. Having had the opportunity in the
requesting state, instead of taking it, he ran away.

15. G.R No. 190529 April 29, 2010

PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INCvsCOMELEC

FACTS:

The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) files a petition for review and a motion for
reconsideration to nullify Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 8679 dated October
13, 2009 insofar as it relates to PGBI and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009. These resolutions
delisted PGBI from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or
coalitions under the party-list system.

According to Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941, known as Party-List System Act, COMELEC,
upon verified complaint of any interested party, may remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing,
the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if: (1) it fails to
participate in the last two preceding elections or (2)fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the
votes cast under the party-list system in the two preceding elections for the constituency in which it
has registered. For May 2010 Elections, the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 8679 deleting
several party-list groups or organizations from the list of registered national, regional or sectoral
parties, organizations or coalitions.

Among the party-list organizations affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of
the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections. PGBI filed its opposition to
Resolution No. 8679 and likewise, sought for accreditation as a party-list organization. One of the
28
arguments cited is that the Supreme Court's ruling in G.R. No. 177548 – MINERO(Philippine Mines
Safety Environment Association) vs COMELEC cannot apply in the instant controversy. One of the
reasons is because the factual milieu of the cited case is removed from PGBI's. Additionally, the
requirement of Section 6(8) has been relaxed by the Court's ruling in G.R. No. 179271 – BANAT
(Barangay Association for Advancement and National Transparency) vs COMELEC.COMELEC
denied the motion and in response, pointed out that the MINERO ruling is squarely in point, as
MINERO failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did not participate at all in the 2004 elections.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PGBI’s right to due process was violated.

HELD:
No. PGBIs right to due process was not violated for PGBI was given an opportunity to seek, as it did
seek, a reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679. The essence of due process is simply the opportunity
to be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain ones
side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or
trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where
the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at
hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x. The court finds it obvious
under the attendant circumstances that PGBI was not denied due process. In any case, given the
result of this Resolution, PGBI has no longer any cause for complaint on due process grounds.

15.A. Suyan vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 189644, July 2, 2014

SUYAN VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 189644 | July 2, 2014

Section 11 of the Probation Law provides that the commission of another offense shall render the
probation order ineffective. As probation is a mere discretionary grant, petitioner was bound to
observe full obedience to the terms and conditions pertaining to the probation order or run the risk of
revocation of this privilege.

SERENO, J.
FACTS:SUYAN was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425. He
pleaded guilty to the charge. The trial court sentenced him to suffer the penalty of six years of prision
correctional. He filed his application for probation on the same day. RTC issued a Probation Order
covering a period of six years.

While on probation, he was arrested again on two separate occasions, both for violations of Section
16 of RA 6425. Two separate Informations were filed against him. Because of this, the Chief of the
Parole and Probation Office (ATTY. NAVARRO) recommended the revocation of his probation, citing
recidivism. NAVARRO also pointed out that SUYAN was no longer in a position to comply with the
conditions of his probation, in view of his incarceration.

The RTC ordered the revocation of SUYAN’s probation and directed him to serve his sentence.
SUYAN then interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. He argued that he was not accorded
due process. Finding merit in his petition, the CA ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for
further proceedings. Thus, the RTC conducted a hearing on the Motion to Revoke.

The Parole and Probation Office filed a Violation Report where it stated that probationer SUYAN
showed negative attitude towards rehabilitation and instead continued with his illegal drug activities
despite counseling and warning from the Office. The prosecution likewise filed its Formal Offer of
Evidence where it attached a certification from another court that SUYAN has already served his
sentence on the other drug charges against him. SUYAN filed his Comment but did not dispute the
certification.

After hearing, the RTC issued an Order revoking the probation. SUYAN appealed with the CA, but the
same was denied.
29
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the probation was validly revoked.

HELD:

Yes, the probation of SUYAN was validly revoked.

Petitioner does not deny the fact that he has been convicted, and that he has served out his sentence
for another offense while on probation. Consequently, his commission of another offense is a direct
violation of the condition in his Probation Order,and the effects are clearly outlined in Section 11 of
the Probation Law. Section 11 of the Probation Law provides that the commission of another offense
shall render the probation order ineffective.

The Court’s discretion to grant probation is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized
society and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused.Having the power to grant probation, it
follows that the trial courtalso has the power to order its revocation in a proper case and under
appropriate circumstances.
SUMMARY FORMAT

Q: SUYAN was charged and found guilty of violating Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425
or the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972”. SUYAN was sentenced to suffer a prison term of six years. He
immediately filed his application for probation. The RTC issued a Probation Order covering the period
of six years. While SUYAN was on probation, he was arrested on two occasions for drug possession.
The Chief Probation and Parole Officer (ATTY. NAVARRO) filed a Motion to Revoke Probation
considering that SUYAN was a recidivist. Prosecution also submitted a Violation report manifesting
the unreformed attitude of SUYAN and his continued illegal drug activities while on probation. The
RTC then revoked the probation and ordered SUYAN to serve the sentence imposed upon him. Was
the revocation of probation proper?

A: Yes, the probation of SUYAN was validly revoked by the lower court. Petitioner does not deny the
fact that he has been convicted and that he has served out his sentence for another offense while on
probation. Consequently, his commission of another offense is a direct violation of a condition of his
Probation Order. Section 11 of the Probation Law provides that the commission of another offense
shall render the probation order ineffective.

Sec. 11. Effectivity of Probation Order.—A probation order shall take effect upon its issuance, at
which time the court shall inform the offender of the consequences thereof and explain that upon his
failure to comply with any of the conditions prescribed in the said order or his commission of
another offense, he shall serve the penalty imposed for the offense under which he was
placed on probation.

As probation is a mere discretionary grant, petitioner was bound to observe full obedience to the
terms and conditions pertaining to the probation order or run the risk of revocation of this privilege.
Regrettably, petitioner wasted the opportunity granted him by the RTC to remain outside prison bars,
and must now suffer the consequences of his violation.(Suyan v. People, G.R. No. 189644, July 2,
2012)

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

16. TELEBAP VS COMELECG.R. No. 132922 April 21, 1998

FACTS

Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization

of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. They are suing as citizens, taxpayers, and
registered voters. The other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., operates radio and television broadcasting
stations throughout the Philippines under a franchise granted by Congress. They challenge the
validity of Section 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 requiring radio and television broadcast companies to provide
30
free air time to the COMELEC for the use of candidates for campaign and other political purposes.
Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time
and they raised the following issues (1) that it takes property with-out due process of law and without
just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broad-cast companies the equal protection of
the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the
operation of media of communication or information during the period of election. Petitioners complain
that the provision singles out radio and televi-sion stations to provide free air time. They contend that
there was a different treatment with news-papers and magazines for they are not similarly required for
the print space.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a violation of equal protection clause in this case.

HELD:

The argument will not bear analysis. It rests on the fallacy that broadcast media are entitled to the
same treatment under the free speech guarantee of the Constitution as the print media. There are
important differences in the characteristics of the two media, however, which justify their dif-ferential
treatment for free speech purposes. Because of the physical limitations of the broadcast spectrum,
the government must, of necessity, allocate broadcast frequencies to those wishing to use them.
There is no similar justification for government allocation and regulation of the print media. The
reason for this is that, as already noted, the government spends public funds for the allocation and
regulation of the broadcast industry, which it does not do in the case of the print media. To require the
radio and television broadcast industry to provide free air time for the COMELEC Time is a fair
exchange for what the industry gets. The broadcast media have also established a uniquely
pervasive presence in the lives of all Filipinos. On the other hand, the transistor radio is found
everywhere. The television set is also becoming universal. Their message may be simultaneously
received by a national or regional audience of listeners including the indif-ferent or unwilling who
happen to be within reach of a blaring radio or television set. The impact of the vibrant speech is
forceful and immediate. Unlike readers of the printed work, the radio audience has lesser opportunity
to cogitate, analyze, and reject the utterance.

Petitioners' assertion therefore that assailed provision denies them the equal protection of the law has
no basis.

17. G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000

The People of the Philippines, plaintiffvs.Romeo Jalosjos, accused-appellant

Facts:

The victim of rape in this case was a minor below twelve (12) years of age, who herself narrated
the shameful details of the dastardly act against her virtue. The victim was peddled for commercial
sex by her own guardian whom she treated as a foster father. Because the complainantwas a willing
victim, the acts of rape were preceded by several acts of lasciviousness on distinctlyseparate
occasions..The accused was then CongressmanRomeo Jalosjoswho, inspite of his having been
charged and convicted by the trial court for statutory rape, was stillre-elected to his congressional
office. On December 16, 1996, two (2) informations for the crime ofstatutory rape and twelve (12) for
acts of lasciviousness, were filed against accused-appellant

The victim, Maria Rosilyn, grew up in a two-storey apartment in Pasay City under the care of
SimplicioDelantar, whom she treated as her own father. Simplicio was a fifty-six year old homosexual
whose ostensible source of income was selling longganiza and tocino and accepting boarders at his
house.He, however, was also engaged in the skin trade as a pimp.

Rosilyn ran away from home with the help of one of their boarders. They went tothe Pasay City
Police where she executed a sworn statement against SimplicioDelantar. Rosilynwas thereafter taken
to the custody of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD).The National Bureau

31
of Investigation (NBI) conducted an investigation, which eventually led to thefiling of criminal charges
against accused-appellant He was also convicted on six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness.

Issue/s:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING

THEACCUSED-APPELLANT BASED ON TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT,CONSIDERING THE ATTENDANT INDICIA OF INCONSISTENCIES AND
UNTRUTHS.

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE

SIGNIFICANCEOF THE CONFLICTING STATEMENTS GIVEN BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE

SIGNIFICANCEOF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S FAILURE TO IDENTIFY THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT.

4. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
PRIVATECOMPLAINANT WAS A MINOR LESS THAN TWELVE YEARS OF AGE WHEN
THECLAIMED INCIDENTS ALLEGEDLY TOOK PLACE.

5. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT RAPE
WASCOMMITTED AGAINST THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the RTC Makati with modification of penalty.

1. TESTIMONY OF VICTIM; DOCTRINE OFFALSUS IN UNO FALSUS IN OMNIBUS;

APPLICATION THEREOF NOT AN ABSOLUTERULE OF LAW; CASE AT BAR. The contention is
without merit. Falsus in unofalsus inomnibus is not an absolute rule of law and is in fact rarely applied
in modernjurisprudence.Trier of facts are notbound to believe all that any witness has said; they may
accept some portions of his testimony and reject other portions, according to what seems to them,
upon other facts and circumstances to be thetruth . . . Even when witnesses are found to have
deliberately falsified in some material particulars,the jury are not required to reject the whole of their
uncorroborated testimony, but may credit suchportions as they deem worthy of belief.

2. CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; NOT AFFECTED BY SOMEAMBIGUOUS ANSWERS ON

WITNESS STAND, WHICH REFERS TO MINOR ANDPERIPHERAL DETAILS; CASE AT BARA
reading of the pertinent transcript ofstenographic notes reveals that Rosilyn was in fact firm and
consistent on the fact of rape andlascivious conduct committed on her by accused-appellant. She
answered in clear, simple andnatural words customary of children of her age.

3. IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED; DEFECT IN OUT-OF-COURT

IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED CAN BE CURED BY AN IDENTIFICATIONSUBSEQUENTLY

MADE IN COURT; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR.Contrary to thecontentions of accused-
appellant, the records reveal that Rosilyn positively and unhesitatingly identified accused-appellant at
the courtroom. Such identification during the trial cannot be

diminished by the fact that in her sworn statement, Rosilyn referred to accused-appellant as her
abuser based on the name she heard from the person to whom she was introduced and on the name
she saw and read in accused-appellant's office.

4. AGE OF THE VICTIM IN RAPE CASES MAY BE ESTABLISHED BY

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE OTHER THAN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE; PRESENT INCASE AT

BAR. — It is settled that in cases of statutory rape, the age of the victim may be provedby the
presentation of her birth certificate. In the case at bar, accused-appellant contends that the birth
certificate of Rosilyn should not have been considered by the trial court because said birthcertificate
32
has already been ordered cancelled and expunged from the records by the Regional TrialCourt of
Manila, Branch 38, in Special Proceedings No. 97-81893, dated April 11, 1997. Even assuming the
absence of a valid birth certificate, there is sufficient and ample proof of the complainant's age in the
records. Rosilyn's Baptismal Certificate can likewise serve as proofof her age. In People v. Liban, we
ruled that the birth certificate, or in lieu thereof.

5. WHEN CONSUMMATED; SUFFICIENTLYESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. — True, in

People v. Campuhan, we explained that thephrase, "the mere touching of the external genitalia by the
penis capable of consummating thesexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal
knowledge.Theinevitable contact between accused-appellant's penis, and at the very least, the labia
of the pudendum of Rosilyn, was confirmed when she felt pain inside her vagina when the "idiniin"
part ofaccused-appellant's sex ritual was performed.

6. STATUTORY RAPE; ELEMENTS; ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. — At the time of

commission of the crimes complained of herein in 1996, statutory rape was penalizedunder Section
11 of R.A. 7659, which amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:When and how rape is
committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a womanunder any of the following
circumstances: 1. By using force or intimidation; 2. When the woman isdeprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; and 3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

18. Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission ; G.R. No. 192935. December 7, 2010

FACTS: On July 30, 2010, President Aquino signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing Philippine
Truth Commission of 2010. It was established is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the
President. The primary task of the Philippine Truth Commission was to investigate reports of graft and
corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices
and accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to
the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.

PTC has all the powers of an investigative body but it is not a quasi-judicial body. Although it is a fact-
finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of
information in our courts of law. Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin
the PTC from performing its functions. They argued that: (a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers;
(b) That provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot
legitimize E.O. No. 1; (c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested
the “Truth Commission” with quasi-judicial powers and (d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection
clause.

Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, questioned the legal standing of petitioners
and argued that: 1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s
executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct
investigations; 2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because
there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds; 3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate
or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not
a quasi-judicial body; 4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because
it was validly created for laudable purposes.

ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that Executive Order No. 1 violated the equal protection
clause. The Supreme Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1
in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III
(Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires
public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of
the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional
and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper
execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities.
33
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It
applies equally to all members of the same class. The classification will be regarded as invalid if all
the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations
imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as it violated of the equal protection clause. The clear
mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of
graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest.

Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not
a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which
the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to
label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences
do not make for a valid classification. The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The
PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations. Executive Order No. 1 is
hereby declared unconstitutional insofar as it violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

19. COMELEC vs. Conrado Cruz, et.al., November 20, 2009

Facts:

On October 29, 2007 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Elections, some of
the then incumbent officials of several barangays of Caloocan City filed with the RTC a petition for
declaratory relief to challenge the constitutionality of Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9164 (entitled
An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, amending RA
No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991):

Sec. 2. Term of Office. The term of office of all barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials after the
effectivity of this Act shall be three (3) years.

No barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position: Provided, however, That the term of office shall be reckoned from the 1994 barangay
elections. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.

This are there arguments:

1. The term limit of Barangay officials should be applied prospectively and not retroactively.

2. Implementation of paragraph 2 Section 2 of RA No. 9164 would be a violation of the equal

protection of the law.

3. Barangay officials have always been apolitical.

Issue:

Whether or not Section 2 of R.A No. 9164 is constitutional.

Ruling:

The assailed law is valid and constitutional. RA No. 9164 is an amendatory law to RA No. 7160 (the
Local Government Code of 1991 or LGC) and is not a penal law; hence, it cannot be considered an
ex post facto law. The three-term limit, according to the COMELEC, has been specifically provided in
RA No. 7160, and RA No. 9164 merely restated the three-term limitation. It further asserts that laws
34
which are not penal in character may be applied retroactively when expressly so provided and when it
does not impair vested rights. As there is no vested right to public office, much less to an elective
post, there can be no valid objection to the alleged retroactive application of RA No. 9164.

20-A. JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO v. DOJ ; G.R. No. 199082 ; September 18, 2012

FACTS: The Comelec and the DOJ issued a Joint Order creating and constituting a Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and
manipulation cases composed of officials from the DOJ and the Comelec. In its initial report, the Fact-
Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in
the provinces of North and South Cotabato and Maguindanao were indeed perpetrated. The Fact-
Finding Team recommended that herein petitioners Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA), et al. to be
subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage.

After the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC en banc adopted a resolution

ordering that information/s for the crime of electoral sabotage be filed against GMA, et al. while that
the charges against Jose Miguel Arroyo, among others, should be dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence.

Consequently, GMA, et al. assail the validity of the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint
Panel and of Joint Order No. 001-2011 before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 violates the equal protection clause?
Ruling: Petitioners claim that the creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team is in
violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution because its sole purpose is the
investigation and prosecution of certain persons and incidents. They insist that the Joint Panel was
created to target only the Arroyo Administration as well as public officials linked to the Arroyo
Administration.
While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those subjected to preliminary investigation,
not all respondents therein were linked to GMA as there were public officers who were investigated
upon in connection with their acts in the performance of their official duties. Private individuals were
also subjected to the investigation by the Joint Committee.

The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended
to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real
differences among men, it does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons
under like circumstances and conditions shall be treated alike both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

20. Lim vs. Felix, 194 scra 292

Facts:

At the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of
Masbate province of Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely
Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a
lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the
assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound. For the crime of multiple murder
and frustrated murder, the accused were Vicente Lim, Sr., Mayor Susana Lim of Masbate, Jolly T.
Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor C. Lim and Mayor
35
Antonio Kho. The RTC of Masbate concluded that a probable cause has been established for the
issuance of warrants of arrest. In the same Order, the court ordered the arrest of the petitioners plus
bail for provisional liberty.

The entire records of the case were transmitted to the Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate. Respondent
Acting Fiscal Antonio C. Alfane was designated to review the case. A petition to transfer the venue of
the Regional Trial Court of Masbate to the Regional Trial Court of Makati was filed by petitioners and
granted by the SC.

On July 5, 1990, the respondent court issued warrants of arrest against the accused including the
petitioners herein.

Issue:

Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the
prosecution’s certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists

Held:

No. The Judge cannot ignore the clear words of the 1987 Constitution which requires “x x x probable
cause to be personally determined by the Judge x x x”, not by any other officer or person. If a Judge
relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the
investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause. The
determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been
satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion. The records of the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed by the respondent Fiscal were still in
Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. There was
no basis for the respondent Judge to make his own personal determination regarding the existence of
a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution. He could
not possibly have known what transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification.
Significantly, the respondent Judge denied the petitioners’ motion for the transmittal of the records on
the ground that the mere certification and recommendation of the respondent Fiscal that a probable
cause exists is sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest.

21. ALAIN MANALILI vs. COURT OF APPEALS; G.R. No. 113447 October 9, 1997

Facts: At about 2:10 o’clock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, policemen from the Anti-Narcotics Unit
of the Kalookan City Police Station were conducting a surveillance along A. Mabini street, Kalookan
City. They then chanced upon a male person in front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs.
The male person was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. When
this male person tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and introduced themselves
as police officers. The policemen then asked the male person what he was holding in his hands. The
male person tried to resist. Pat. Romeo Espiritu asked the male person if he could see what said
male person had in his hands. The latter showed the wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo Espiritu to
examine the same. Pat. Espiritu took the wallet and examined it. He found suspected crushed
marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents. Then the accused was
arrested.

Issue: Whether a search and seizure could be effected without necessarily being preceded by an
arrest.

Held: Yes. In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search and seizure must be validated
by a previously secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is unconstitutional and
subject to challenge. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, gives this guarantee. This right,
however, is not absolute. The recent case of People vs. Lacerna enumerated five recognized
36
exceptions to the rule against warrantless search and seizure, viz.: "(1) search incidental to a lawful
arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by
the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure." In People vs.
Encinada, the Court further explained that in these cases, the search and seizure may be made only
with probable cause as the essential requirement. Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as
another exception to the general rule against a search without a warrant. In Posadas vs. Court of
Appeals, the Court held that there were many instances where a search and seizure could be
effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, one of which was stop-and-frisk. To require
the police officers to search the bag only after they had obtained a search warrant might prove to be
useless, futile and much too late under the circumstances. In such a situation, it was reasonable for a
police officer to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his identity or to maintain the
status quo while obtaining more information, rather than to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a
crime to occur. Herein, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their surveillance that
Manalili had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which
according to police information was a popular hangout of drug addicts.

22. PEOPLE v. EDISON SUCRO ; G.R. No. 93239 March 18, 1991

FACTS

On March 21, 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was instructed by P/Lt.
Vicente Seraspi, Jr to monitor the activities of appellant Edison Sucro, because of information
gathered by Seraspi that Sucro was selling marijuana.

As planned, at about 5:00 P.M. on said date, Pat. Fulgencio Positioned himself under the house of a
certain Arlie Regalado at C. Quimpo Street. Adjacent to the house of Regalado, about 2 meters away,
was a chapel. Thereafter, Pat. Fulgencio saw appellant enter the chapel, taking something which
turned out later to be marijuana from the compartment of a cart found inside the chapel, and then
return to the street where he handed the same to a buyer, Aldie Borromeo. Pat. Fulgencio radioed
P/Lt. Seraspi and reported the activity going on. P/Lt. Seraspi instructed Pat. Fulgencio to continue
monitoring developments. At about 6:30 P.M., Pat. Fulgencio again called up Seraspi to report that a
third buyer later Identified as Ronnie Macabante, was transacting with appellant.

At that point, the team of P/Lt. Seraspi proceeded to the area and while the police officers were at the
Youth Hostel at Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept Macabante and appellant.
P/Lt. Seraspi and his team caught up with Macabante at the crossing of Mabini and Maagma Sts. in
front of the Aklan Medical Center. Upon seeing the police, Macabante threw something to the ground
which turned out to be a tea bag of marijuana. When confronted, Macabante readily admitted that he
bought the same from appellant (Edison Sucro) in front of the chapel. The police team then was able
to overtake and arrest appellant at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans Sts. The police recovered
19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart inside the chapel and another teabag from
Macabante,

ISSUE

Whether or not the arrest of the accused without warrant is lawful and whether or not the evidence of
such arrest is admissible.

HELD

As the Solicitor General has pointed out:

There are several instances when a warrantless search and seizure can be effected without
necessarily being preceded by an arrest provided the same is effected on the basis of probable cause
(e.g. stop and search without warrant at checkpoints). Between warrantless searches and seizures at
checkpoints and in the case at bar the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in the former,
it was effected on the basis of probable cause. Under the circumstances (monitoring of transactions)
there existed probable cause for the arresting officers, to arrest appellant who was in fact selling
marijuana and to seize the contraband.

37
That searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule (Manipon,
Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267 [1986]). Among the exceptions granted by law is a search
incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which
provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. (People v. Castiller,
G.R. No. 87783, August 6, 1990).

23. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ABE VALDEZ y DELA

CRUZ, accused-appellant. ; G.R. No. 129296. September 25, 2000

Facts: This is an automatic review for the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya, Branch 27 sentencing Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz to death penalty for violating Section 9 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended by R.A. No. 7659.

SPO3 Marcelo Tipay testified that at around 10:15 a.m. of September 24, 1996, he received a tip
from an unnamed informer about the presence of a marijuana plantation, allegedly owned by
appellant. The prohibited plants were allegedly planted close to appellant's hut. Police Inspector
Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief of Police of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya then formed a reaction team
from his operatives to verify the report. Inspector Parungao gave them specific instructions to "uproot
said marijuana plants and arrest the cultivator of same."

At approximately 5:00 o'clock A.M. the following day, said police team, accompanied by their
informer, left for the site where the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. After a three-hour,
uphill trek from the nearest barangay road, the police operatives arrived at the place pinpointed by
their informant. The police found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look
around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot high, flowering
marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters from appellant's hut.PO2 Balut asked
appellant who owned the prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the latter admitted that they were
his. The police uprooted the seven marijuana plants, which weighed 2.194 kilograms. The police took
photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis plants. Appellant was then arrested. One of the
plants, weighing 1.090 kilograms, was sent to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for analysis. Inspector Prevy Fabros Luwis, the Crime Laboratory
forensic analyst, testified that upon microscopic examination of said plant, she found cystolitic hairs
containing calcium carbonate, a positive indication for marijuana.

Issue: Was the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case lawful?

Ruling: The Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be carried on the
strength of a judicial warrant. Otherwise, the search and seizure is deemed "unreasonable." Evidence
procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted for being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be excluded. Such evidence shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In the instant case, recall that PO2 Balut testified that
they first located the marijuana plants before appellant was arrested without a warrant. Hence, there
was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded the search of appellant's premises. Note further that
the police team was dispatched to appellant's kaingin precisely to search for and uproot the prohibited
flora. The seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police officer is not searching for
evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Clearly, their
discovery of the cannabis plants was not inadvertent. We also note the testimony of SPO2 Tipay that
upon arriving at the area, they first had to "look around the area" before they could spot the illegal
plants.Patently, the seized marijuana plants were not "immediately apparent" and a "further search"
was needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in question were not in "plain view" or "open to eye and
hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made to apply.

For the doctrine to apply, the following elements must be present: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on
the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties;(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where
they are; and (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) plain view justified mere
seizure of evidence without further search. Valdez is ACQUITTED.
38
24. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY HO SAN; G.R. No. 128222. June
17, 1999

FACTS: In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband, Chief of
Police Jim Lagasca Cid of Bacnotan Police Station, La Union began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline
with his officers. While monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala, he intercepted a radio call at
around 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite of Barangay Tammocalao requesting for
police assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted. According to Almoite, the
vessel looked different from the boats ordinarily used by fisher folk of the area and was poised to
dock at Tammocalao shores. Cid and six of his men led by SPO1 Reynoso Badua, proceeded
immediately to Tammocalao beach and there conferred with Almoite. Cid then observed that the
speedboat ferried a lone male passenger, who was later identified as Chua Ho San. When the
speedboat landed, the male passenger alighted, carrying a multicolored strawbag, and walked
towards the road. Upon seeing the police officers, the man changed direction and broke into a run.
Badua held Chua’s right arm to prevent him from fleeing. They then introduced themselves as police
officers; however, Chua did not understand what they’re saying. CID then resorted to "sign language;"
he motioned with his hands for Chua to open the bag. Chua apparently understood and acceded to
the request. The said bag was found to contain several transparent plastics containing yellowish
crystalline substances, which was later identified to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Chua was then brought to Bacnotan Police Station, where he was provided with an interpreter to
inform him of his constitutional rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure conducted by the Police Officers
constitute a valid exemption from the warrant requirement.

HELD: The Court held in the negative. The Court explains that the Constitution bars State intrusions
to a person's body, personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid search
warrant issued in accordance with the Rules. However, warrantless searches may be permitted in the
following cases, to wit:(1)search of moving vehicles, (2)seizure in plain view, (3)customs searches,
(4)waiver or consent searches, (5)stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and (6)search incidental to
a lawful arrest. It is required in cases of in flagrante delicto that the arresting officer must have
personal knowledge of such facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable
cause. Probable cause means a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of
the offense with which he is charged. In the case at bar, there are no facts on record reasonably
suggestive or demonstrative of CHUA's participation in ongoing criminal enterprise that could have
spurred police officers from conducting the obtrusive search. CHUA was not identified as a drug
courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no
resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the process of
perpetrating an offense. With these, the Court held that there was no probable cause to justify a
search incidental to a lawful arrest. The Court likewise did not appreciate the contention of the
Prosecution that there was a waiver or consented search. If CHUA could not understand what was
orally articulated to him, how could he understand the police's "sign language?" More importantly, it
cannot logically be inferred from his alleged cognizance of the "sign language" that he deliberately,
intelligently, and consciously waived his right against such an intrusive search. Finally, being a
forbidden fruit, the subject regulated substance was held to be inadmissible in evidence. Hence, the
accused was acquitted as the evidence was not sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

25. PEOPLE vs TANGLIBEN; G.R. No. L-63630, April 6, 1990

Facts: Patrolmen Silverio and Romeo Punzalan were conducting surveillance at the San Fernando
Victory Liner Terminal. At around 9:30pm they noticed a person, Medel Tangliben, carrying a
traveling bag who acted suspiciously. They confronted him, inspected his bag, and there they found
marijuana leaves. The accused was then taken to the Police Headquarters for further investigations.
The Trial Court found Tangliben guilty of violating sec.4 art. 2 of the RA 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972. Issue: Whether or not the search is unlawful

Ruling: The court ruled that the search was lawful.

39
One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a search incident to a lawful
arrest. Thus, Section 12 of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Section 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant.

Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. This case
therefore falls squarely within the exception. The warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest
and is consequently valid.

In the case of People v. Claudia, 160 SCRA 646, Appellant Claudio was caught transporting
prohibited drugs. Pat. Daniel did not need a warrant to arrest Claudio as the latter was caught in
flagrante delicto. The warrantless search being an incident to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful.
(Nolasco V. Paño, 147 SCRA 509). Therefore, there was no infirmity in the seizure of the 1.1 kilos of
marijuana.

In People v. Amininudin, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from an informer that accused-
appellant. was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. Acting on this tip,
they waited for him one evening, approached him as he descended from the gangplank, detained him
and inspected the bag he was carrying. Said bag contained marijuana leaves. The Court held that the
marijuana could not be admitted in evidence since it was seized illegally. The records show, however,
that there were certain facts, not sing in the case before us, which led the Court to declare the seizure
as invalid. As stated therein:

The present case presented no such urgency From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it
is clear that they had at react two days within which they could have obtained a warrant of arrest and
search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle
was identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they
could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a
warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was
ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had
determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."

In contrast, the instant case presented urgency. Although the trial court's decision did not mention it,
the transcript of stenographic notes reveals that there was an informer who pointed to the accused-
appellant as carrying marijuana. (TSN, pp. 52-53) Faced with such on-the-spot information, the police
officers had to act quickly. There was not enough time to secure a search warrant. We cannot
therefore apply the ruling in Aminnudin to the case at bar. To require search warrants during on-the-
spot apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal possessors of firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of
contraband goods, robbers, etc. would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible to contain the
crimes with which these persons are associated.

26. People of the Philippines vs. Leila Johnson Y. Reyes: G.R. No. 138881 December 18, 2000
Second Division

I. Facts:

Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker of the NAIA departure area. When Ramirez frisked Leila
Johnson, a departing passenger bound for the United States, she felt something hard on the latter’s
abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty girdles as she
had just undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy. Not satisfied with the
explanation, Ramirez reported the matter to her superior, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile who directed her to
take accused-appellant to the nearest women’s room for inspection accompanied by SPO1 Rizalina
Bernal. Inside the womens room, Johnson brought out three plastic packs, later identified as
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu with a total weight of 580.2 grams. Johnson claimed that
the shabu confiscated from her is inadmissible as evidence because she was forced to affix her
signature on the plastic bags while she was detained at the 1st RASO office, without the assistance
of counsel and without having been informed of her constitutional rights.

40
II. Issue:

Whether or not the shabu confiscated is inadmissible as evidence.

III. Ruling:

No, the shabu is not inadmissible as evidence. What is involved in this case is an arrest in flagrante
delicto pursuant to a valid search made on her person. The constitutional right of the accused was not
violated as she was never placed under custodial investigation but was validly arrested without
warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Travellers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline
tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such
would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary
constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport
procedures. The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a valid
warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence against Johnson. Johnson’s subsequent arrest,
although likewise without warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery
of shabu in her person in flagrante delicto.

Anent Johnson’s allegation that her signature on the shabu packs had been obtained while she was
in the custody of the airport authorities without the assistance of counsel, the Solicitor General
correctly points out that nowhere in the records is it indicated that Johnson was required to affix her
signature to the packs.

27. G.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.
MIKAEL MALMSTEDT, *defendant-appellant.

Facts:

Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in December 1988 as
a tourist. At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989, Captain Alen Vasco ordered his men
to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose
of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the
said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting
marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by the Commanding
Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his
possession prohibited drugs. At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was
riding was stopped. During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist.
Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and
other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out
whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and
when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking
objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects.
The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.

Issue:

Whether or not the search and arrest of the accused was illegal for it is made without a valid search
warrant.

Held:

A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person when in his
presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense. The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had
prohibited drugs in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport,
taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused was
trying to hide something illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable
cause which justified the warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of the accused.
41
28. G.R. No. 83988 | September 29, 1989: RICARDO C. VALMONTE vs. GEN. RENATO DE
VILLA

FACTS:

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated
pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission
of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose
of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an
atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital
Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various
parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the Union of
Lawyers and Advocates For People’s Rights (ULAP) aver that: (1) because of the installation of said
checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being
placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints,
considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups,
especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order; (2) the said
checkpoints give the respondents a blanket authority to make searches and/or seizures without
search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution; and, (3) instances have occurred where
a citizen, while not killed, had been harassed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the conduct of military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against
unreasonable search and seizures

RULING:

No. Military and police checkpoints do not violate the right of the people against unreasonable search
and seizures. The Court held that not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are
reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is
to be resolved according to the facts of each case. Where, for example, the officer merely draws
aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a
vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search.

Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an
individual's right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former
should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the
same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional
inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal
times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society
and a peaceful community.

29. People of the Philippines vs De Gracia; G.R. Nos. 102009-10, July 06, 1994

Facts:

The incidents took place at the height of the coup d'etat staged in December, 1989 by ultra-rightist
elements headed by the Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-
SFP) against the Government. At that time, various government establishments and military camps in
Metro Manila were being bombarded by the rightist group with their "tora-tora" planes.

In the early morning of December 1, 1989, Maj. Efren Soria of the Intelligence Division, National
Capital Region Defense Command was conducting a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office,
42
together with his team, pursuant to an intelligence report received by the division that said
establishment was being occupied by the elements of the RAM-SFP as a communication command
post. The surveillance team was later attacked by a group of five men.

As a consequence , at around 6:30 in the morning of December 5,1989, a searching team raided the
Eurocar Sales Office. The team was able to find and confiscate six cartons of M-16 ammunition, five
bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and "molotov" bombs inside one of the
rooms. De Gracia was the only person then present in the room; as a result of the raid, he was
arrested along with two others. . No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because,
according to them, at that time there was so much disorder considering that the nearby Camp
Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces and there was simultaneous firing within the
vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts were consequently closed.

Issue:

Whether or not the military operatives made a valid search and seizure during the height of the
December 1989 coup d’etat.

Held:

It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office were not armed with a
search warrant at that time. The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office
was being used as headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted on
the premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming from the Eurocar
building. There was general chaos and disorder at that time because of simultaneous and intense
firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by
rebel forces. The courts in the surrounding areas were obviously closed and, for that matter, the
building and houses therein were deserted.

Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered opinion that the instant case falls under one
of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military
operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that
a crime was being committed. There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to
warrant their action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no
opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself
manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. Under
such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.

30. Social Justice Society vs Dangerous Drugs Board, et al; November 3, 2008

Facts:

In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered
political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c),(d) and (f) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 which
provides that random drug testing will be conducted on Students of secondary and tertiary schools
and also to officers and employees of public and private offices persons, while mandatory drug
testing to All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an
imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day on the ground that
they are constitutionally infirm, for the persons constitutional right against unreasonable searches is
breached by said provisions.

Issue:

Whether or not paragraph (c) and (d) and (f) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 violates the persons constitutional
right against unreasonable searches.

Held:
43
Sec. 36 (c) and (d) of RA 9165 is Constitutional but Sec. 36(f) is unconstitutional. Using US
Jurisprudence, the Court ruled in favor of the constitutionality of Sec 36(c) applying the following
reasonable deduction: (1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their
students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the
custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis,
have a duty to safeguard the health and well-being of their students and may adopt such measures
as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose
conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory. It is within the
prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with
reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary
level students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 (d) of RA 9165 for officers
and employees of public and private offices is justifiable. The Court notes in this regard that petitioner
Social Justice Society, other than saying that subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without
probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy. The
essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. In context, the right to privacy means the right to be
free from unwarranted exploitation of ones person or from intrusion into ones private activities in such
a way as to cause humiliation to a persons ordinary sensibilities. Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its
implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically directed
towards preventing a situation that would unduly embarrass the employees or place them under a
humiliating experience. While every officer and employee in a private establishment is under the law
deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled
out in advance for drug testing. The intrusion into the employees privacy is accompanied by proper
safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal. Like
their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under
reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public
officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. And if RA 9165 passes
the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for
civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to the
people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency. In the case of persons charged
with a crime before the prosecutors office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or
suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made
defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion.
The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutors office and
peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the
procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy.

31. POLLO VS CONSTANTINO-DAVID

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a letter-complaint addressed to respondent CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino-

David marked "Confidential" was sent through a courier service. Acting upon the letter-complaint,
Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four personnel with background in information
technology (IT), and issued a memo directing them to conduct an investigation and specifically "to
back up all the files in the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.
The backing-up of all files in the hard disk of computers at the PALD and Legal Services Division was
witnessed by several employees, together with Directors Castillo and Unite who closely monitored
said activity. The contents of the diskettes were examined by the CSCs Office for Legal Affairs. It was
found that most of the files in the On the basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the Show-
Cause Order requiring the petitioner, who had gone on extended leave, to submit his explanation or
counter-affidavit within five days from notice.

Petitioner then denied that he is the person referred to in the anonymous letter-complaint which had
no attachments to it, because he is not a lawyer. He accused CSC officials of conducting a fishing
expedition when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer, and subsequently
asking him to submit his comment which violated his right against self-incrimination. He averted that
he had protested the unlawful taking of his computer done while he was on leave, that the files in his
computer were his personal files and those of his sister, relatives, friends and some associates and
44
that he is not authorizing their sealing, copying, duplicating and printing as these would violate his
constitutional right to privacy and protection against self-incrimination and warrantless search and
seizure.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner’s claim to avail the right to privacy over his computer and electronic files as
a government employee is valid.

HELD:

No. The Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual expectation of privacy either in his office or
government-issued computer which contained his personal files. On the contrary, he submits that
being in the public assistance office of the CSC; he normally would have visitors in his office like
friends, associates and even unknown people, whom he even allowed to use his computer which to
him seemed a trivial request. The search of petitioner’s computer files was conducted in connection
with investigation of work-related misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint addressed
to Chairperson David regarding anomalies in the CSC-ROIV. A search by a government employer of
an employee’s office is justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it
will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct. Therefore petitioner’s
right to privacy is not violated in the case at bar and his claim to avail such right is not supported by
sufficient grounds.

WRIT OF AMPARO/HABEAS DATA

32. THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF
THEPHILIPPINES vs. RAYMOND MANALO; October 7, 2008; G.R. No. 180906

Facts: On February 14, 2006 past afternoon, Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted
by military men belonging to the CAFGU on the suspicion that they were members and supporters of
the NPA. After 18 months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on August 13, 2007. Ten
days after their escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining
Order to stop the military officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other
basic rights. While the said case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October
24, 2007. The Manalos subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing
petition as amparo petition. On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the
writ of amparo. The CA ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP
to furnish the Manalos and the court with all official and unofficial investigation reports as to the
Manalos’ custody, confirm the present places of official assignment of two military officials involved,
and produce all medical reports and records of the Manalo brothers while under military custody. The
Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP appealed to the SC seeking to
reverse and set aside the decision promulgated by the CA.

Issue: Whether or not actual deprivation of liberty is necessary for the right to security of a person
may be invoked.

Held: In upholding the CA decision, the Supreme Court ruled that there is a continuing violation of the
Manalos right to security. The Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful
act or omission by public officials or employees and by private individuals or entities. Understandably,
since their escape, the Manalos have been under concealment and protection by private citizens
because of the threat to their life, liberty, and security. The circumstances of respondents’ abduction,
detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that
they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their
liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo,” the Court explained. The
right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security. Article III,
Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, one’s body cannot be searched
or invaded without a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute
45
dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury
increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a
crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person.

33. Robert Reyes vs. Sec. Raul Gonzales, December 3, 2009

FACTS: Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on November 30,
2007. On December 1, 2007, upon the request of the DILG, respondent DOJ Secretary Raul
Gonzales issued Hold Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering to include in the Hold Departure List of
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) the name of petitioner and 49 others in the interest
of national security and public safety. RTC issued an Order dismissing the charge for Rebellion
against petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause. Petitioner argues that the DOJ Secretary
has no power to issue a Hold Departure Order and has no legal basis since Rebellion case has
already been dismissed but the HDO has not been lifted.

Petitioner’s counsel Atty. Francisco Chavez manifested that every time petitioner would leave and
return to the country, the immigration officers at the NAIA detain and interrogate him for several
minutes because of the existing HDO. The petition for a writ of amparo is anchored on the ground
that respondents violated petitioner’s constitutional right to travel. The CA dismissed the petition and
denied the privilege of the writ of amparo. The motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s right to liberty has been violated or threatened with violation by the
issuance of the subject HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege of the writ of amparo.

HELD: Petition is denied. The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under
Section 1 of the Rules thereon are the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to
security. In Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al., the court made a categorical
pronouncement that the Amparo Rule in its present form is confined to these two instances of
“extralegal killings” and “enforced disappearances,” or to threats thereof.

The restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case
filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to travel was
impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to life,
liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy. The direct
recourse to this Court is inappropriate, considering the provision of Section 22 of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo which provides, that when a criminal action has commenced no separate petition for the
writ shall be filed. The reliefs under the writ shall be available by motion in the criminal case.

33-A. In the matter of the petition for the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data in favor of NORIEL
H.RODRIGUEZ, vs.GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, et al

Facts:

Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a
peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). He claims that the
military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members
targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.

Rodriguez was abducted by military men and was tortured repeatedly when he refused to confess to
his membership in the NPA. When released, he filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and and
Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and
Production of Documents and Personal Properties. The petition was filed against former Pres. Arroyo,
et al. The writs were granted but the CA dropped Pres Arroyo as party-respondent, as she may not
be sued in any case during her tenure of office or actual incumbency.

Issue:
46
Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas data
cases.

Held:

The doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether respondents are
accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts
to devise remedial measures to protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this Court from applying
the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain responsibility and
accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.

In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify
those accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an
amparo court would issue. In such application, the amparo court does not impute criminal
responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best position to protect the
rights of the aggrieved party. Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may
well be a preliminary determination of criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to further
investigation by the appropriate government agency.

33. B. DR. JOY MARGATE LEEv.P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN

G.R. No. 203254, October 08, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

In order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, the petition must adequately show that
there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on
the other.

Facts:

Neri Ilagan and Joy Margate Lee are common law partners. When Ilagan visited Lee at her
condominium unit, he accidentally left his digital camera therein. As Lee found the said camera, she
discovered that a sex video of Ilagan with another woman was recorded therein, hence she confronted
Ilagan about it which the latter denied. Lee further alleged that during the their confrontation, Ilagan
slammed her head against a wall inside his office and walked away. Thereafter, Lee utilized the said video
as evidence in filing criminal and administrative complaints against Ilagan. Thereafter, Ilagan filed a
petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data on the ground that Lee’s acts of reproducing the subject
video and threatening to distribute the same to the upper echelons of the NAPOLCOM and uploading it to
the internet violated not only his right to life, liberty, security, and privacy but also that of the other
woman. The RTC issued the writ of habeas data.
Issue:

Whether or not the RTC correctly extended the privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of
Ilagan.

Ruling:

No. In order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, the petition must adequately show
that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or
security on the other.Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial
evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the
victim. In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect purely
property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are
vague and doubtful.

In this case, that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life, liberty or
security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of
the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video – which he
fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public consumption – he
failed to explain the connection between such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or
security. In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the petition would equally be

47
dismissible due to the inadequacy of the evidence presented. As the records show, all that Ilagan
submitted in support of his petition was his self-serving testimony which hardly meets the substantial
evidence requirement as prescribed by the Habeas Data Rule.

RIGHT TO PRIVACY

34. Marynette Gamboa vs. Marlou C. Chan et. al., July 24, 2012

Facts: On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative Order
No. 275 (A.O. 275), "Creating an Independent Commission to Address the Alleged Existence of
Private Armies in the Country”, forming the Zeñarosa Commission to investigate the existence of
private army groups (PAGs) with a view to eliminating them before the 10 May 2010 elections and
permanently in the future.

Gamboa alleged that without the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the
information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the
Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs.

On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news program the portion of the Report
naming Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG.21 Gamboa averred that
her association with a PAG also appeared on print media.

Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed,
Gamboa filed a Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against
respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.25 In her Petition, she prayed for
the following reliefs: (a) destruction of the unverified reports from the PNP-Ilocos Norte database; (b)
withdrawal of all information forwarded to higher PNP officials; (c) rectification of the damage done to
her honor; (d) ordering respondents to refrain from forwarding unverified reports against her; and (e)
restraining respondents from making baseless reports.

Issues:

Whether or Not her right to privacy was violated and,

Whether or not the writ of habeas data is the proper remedy for the violation of her rights.

Ruling: The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed
groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority. It also provides for the establishment of one
police force that is national in scope and civilian in character.

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the
alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the
PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ
of habeas data must be denied.

However, to accord the right to privacy with the kind of protection established in existing law and
jurisprudence, this Court nonetheless deems it necessary to caution these investigating entities that
information-sharing must observe strict confidentiality. That it was leaked to third parties and the
media was regrettable, even warranting reproach. But it must be stressed that Gamboa failed to
establish that respondents were responsible for this unintended disclosure.

In any event, there are other reliefs available to her to address the purported damage to her
reputation, making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data unnecessary and
improper.

Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that her
inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to
harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently explained

48
that the investigations conducted against her were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was
implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome.

PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION

35. Felipe Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, August 26, 1999

Facts: The evidence shows that, at around 8:40 in the evening of February 4, 1990, Stanley
Jalbuena and Enrique Ike Lingan, who were reporters of the radio station DWTI in Lucena City,
together with one Mario Ilagan, went to the Entertainment City following reports that it was showing
nude dancers. After the three had seated themselves at a table and ordered beer, a scantily clad
dancer appeared on stage and began to perform a strip act. As she removed her brassieres,
Jalbuena brought out his camera and took a picture. At that point, the floor manager, Dante Liquin,
with a security guard, Alex Sioco, approached Jalbuena and demanded to know why he took a
picture. Jalbuena replied: Wala kang pakialam, because this is my job. Sioco pushed Jalbuena
towards the table as he warned the latter that he would kill him.

This angered Lingan. The two then had a heated exchange. Finally, Lingan said: Masyado kang
abusado, alisin mo yang baril mo at magsuntukan na lang tayo. petitioner Navarro hit him with the
handle of his pistol above the left eyebrow. Lingan fell on the floor, blood flowing down his face. He
tried to get up, but petitioner Navarro gave him a fist blow on the forehead which floored him.
Petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and said: Kita mo yan ha, buhay kang testigo, si Ike Lingan ang
naghamon. He said to Sgt. Aonuevo: Ilagay mo diyan sa blotter, sa harap ni Alex Sioco at Dante
Liquin, na si Ike Lingan ang naghamon. He then poked his gun at the right temple of Jalbuena and
made him sign his name on the blotter. Jalbuena could not affix his signature. His right hand was
trembling and he simply wrote his name in print. Capt. Coronado, the station commander, called
petitioner Navarro to his office, while a policeman took Lingan to the Quezon Memorial Hospital. The
station manager of DWTI, Boy Casaada, arrived and, learning that Lingan had been taken to the
hospital, proceeded there. But Lingan died from his injuries.Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena
was able to record on tape the exchange between petitioner and the deceased.

Issue: Whether the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits wire tapping

Held: SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using
a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-
recorder, or however otherwise described: It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant
or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape
record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or
spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by
this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents
thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to
any other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any
civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by
this prohibition.

SEC. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by
any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any
judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.

Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications. Since
the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not
prohibited.

Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is authenticated by the
testimony of a witness (1) that he personally recorded the conversation; (2) that the tape played in
court was the one he recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of the persons such are
49
claimed to belong. In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice
recording;that the tape played in court was the one he recorded;]and that the speakers on the tape
were petitioner Navarro and Lingan.A sufficient foundation was thus laid for the authentication of the
tape presented by the prosecution.

Second. The voice recording made by Jalbuena established: (1) that there was a heated exchange
between petitioner Navarro and Lingan on the placing in the police blotter of an entry against him and
Jalbuena; and (2) that some form of violence occurred involving petitioner Navarro and Lingan, with
the latter getting the worst of it.

36. Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:
In August, 1929, the Supreme Court rendered a decision in Government of the Phil. Islands vs.
Colegio de San Jose, declaring that two parcels of land bordering on Laguna de Bay and identified as
Lots 1 and 2 form an integral part of the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan belonging to the Colegio
de San Jose. Ten years later, the Colegio de San Jose sold the said two lots, together with an
adjoining unregistered land, to the Government. The three parcels of land acquired by the
Government became known as the Tunasan Homesite. The Rural Progress Administration (RPA),
which was charged with the administration and disposition of the homesite, caused the subdivision
thereof into small lots for the purpose of selling them to bona fide occupants. In December, 1940, Lot
17, Block 78 of the Tunasan Homesite, which was part of Lot 2, and containing an area of 5,158
square meters, was sold by the RPA to Apolonio Diaz. In May, 1948, Lot 19 of the same homesite,
which was also a part of Lot 2, with an area of 1,170 square meters, was acquired by Apolonio Diaz,
although his son Pastor Diaz was made to appear as the vendee. In January, 1955, the heirs of
Apolonio Diaz transferred their rights to both Lots 17 and 19 to Marta Ygonia, wife of Arcadio Ramirez
(said spouses being the parents of herein petitioner), who paid the balance of the purchase price for
the lots. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources approved the deeds of transfer of rights
executed by the heirs of Apolonio Diaz, and in July, 1958, the Land Tenure Administration executed a
deed of sale in favor of Marta Ygonia over Lots 17 and 19. An original application for registration was
filed by spouses Marta Ygonia and Arcadio Ramirez (docketed as LRC Case No. B-46) with the then
Court of First Instance of Laguna in May, 1957. It had for its subject matter a parcel of land on the
eastern side of Lot 17, with an area of 11,055 square meters (later increased to 11,311 sq. meters),
which was claimed by the applicants as an accretion to their land gradually formed by alluvial
deposits. The Director of Lands opposed the application on the grounds that the applicants did not
possess sufficient title to the land sought to be registered, and that the land in question is a part of the
public domain.
Issue:
Whether or not Respondent Hon. Court of Appeals committed grave error in the interpretation and
application of the doctrine of res judicata, more particularly on the issue of public domain.
Ruling:
After careful deliberation and consultation, we find ourselves in agreement with petitioners contention.
Seen from the perspective offered by the aforequoted ruling, it is evident that one of the elements of
res judicata is lacking in the case at bar. Respondent Court declared that identity of causes of action
between Case No. B-46 and Case No. B-526 exist since they both sought registration of the land
formed by alluvial deposits, but failed to recognize that the basis for claiming such registration was
different in each case. In Case No. B-46, applicants-spouses Arcadio Ramirez and Marta Ygonia
(herein petitioners parents) claimed that their possession of the land, tacked to that of their
predecessors Apolonio Diaz, et al. (allegedly from 1943 onwards), was sufficient to vest title in them
by acquisitive prescription. On the other hand, in LRC Case No. B-526, petitioner claimed that the
duration of possession by his parents (commencing allegedly in 1958), combined with his own
possession (counted from 1988 when he purchased the accretion from his parents) gave him
sufficient title thereto by acquisitive prescription.
As to the parties pleas before the respondent Court for the issuance of an order to cause the taking of
a verification survey to determine whether they are referring to the same parcel of land or to two
different properties, suffice it to say that the disposition of this case is not a bar to such a survey.
50
37. G.R. No. 107383 February 20, 1996; CECILIA ZULUETA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
ALFREDO MARTIN

Facts: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982,
petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother,
a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's
clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his
alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and
photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her
husband.

Issue: Whether or not the evidence obtained can be held inadmissible as it violated his right of
privacy of communication.

Held: The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity.
A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged.
Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to
any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for
each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity
that each owes to the other.

38. Waterous Drug CorporationvsNLRC; G.R. No. 113271. October 16, 1997

Facts:

Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp.

YSP Inc., a supplier of medicine, sold to Waterous, thru Catolico, 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at P384
per unit. However, previews P.O.s issued to YSP, Inc. showed that the price per bottle is P320.00.
Verification was made to YSP, Inc. to determine the discrepancy and it was found that the cost per
bottle was indeed overpriced.

YSP, Inc. Accounting Department (Ms. Estelita Reyes) confirmed that the difference represents
refund of jack-up price of ten bottles of Voren tablets per sales invoice, which was paid to Ms.
Catolico. Said check was sent in an envelope addressed to Catolico.

Catolico denied receiving the same. However, Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp. confirmed
that she saw an open envelope with a check amounting P640 payable to Catolico.

Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty.

NLRC: Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from YSP) being rendered
inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by complainants. In the light of the decision
in the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
refers to the immunity of one’s person from interference by government and cannot be extended to
acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by
the government.

Issue: Whether or not the check is admissible as evidence

Held: Yes. The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures
perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have
no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion
51
gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. Despite this, the SC ruled that there was insufficient
evidence of cause for the dismissal of Catolico from employment Suspicion is not among the valid
causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of Employment.

39. Marquez v Desierto; G.R. No. 135882. June 27, 2001

FACTS:

Sometime in May 1998, petitioner Marquez received an Order from the Ombudsman Aniano A.
Desierto dated April 29, 1998, to produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in
camera relative to various accounts maintained at Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas
Branch, where petitioner is the branch manager. The accounts to be inspected are Account Nos. 011-
37270, 240-020718, 245-30317-3 and 245-30318-1, involved in a case pending with the Ombudsman
entitled, Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) v. Amado Lagdameo, et. al.

The lower court rendered a decision in favor for the Ombudsman.

Marquez prayed that the previous decisions be set aside and the issuance of TRO and/or preliminary
injunction to the order of the Ombudsman and court decisions.

ISSUE: Whether the order of the Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the questioned
account is allowed as an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits (R.A. No.1405).

HELD: No. SC ruled that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending
case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the
inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction.
The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and
such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case.

In the case at bar, there is yet no pending case before any court of competent authority. What is
existing is an investigation by the office of the Ombudsman. In short, what the Office of the
Ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence to formally charge Amado Lagdameo,
et. al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending case in court which would warrant the
opening of the bank account for inspection.

40. BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner, vs. RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR
VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR
SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER
CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.

G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998

Facts:

President Fidel V. Ramos issued AO No. 308 entitled “ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL

COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM”. Petitioner assailed its constitutionality
on the grounds that the administrative order issued by the executive is deemed to be a law and not a
mere administrative order thus it is a usurpation of legislative power of the congress to make laws,
and it impermissibly intrudes the citizen’s constitutional right of privacy.

Issue:

Whether or not AO No. 308 violates a person’s right to privacy.

Ruling:

The essence of privacy is the right to be let alone. Administrative Order No. 308 violates the
constitutional right to privacy because its scope is too broad and vague that will put people’s right to
privacy in clear and present danger if implemented. The A.O. 308 also lacks of proper safeguards for
protecting the information that will be gathered from people through biometrics and other means.
52
Thus, A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual’s liberty of abode and travel by enabling
authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access
confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for
“fishing expeditions” by government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

41. Telebap vs Comelec

42. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp vs. COMELEC January 28, 2000

FACTS:

COMELEC issued a Resolution approving the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS CBN or
any other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting exit surveys. The Resolution was
issued by the Comelec allegedly upon "information from a reliable source that ABS-CBN has
prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections and to make an
exit survey of the vote during the elections for national officials particularly for President and Vice
President, results of which shall be broadcasted immediately.” The electoral body believed that such
project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the
National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not authorized or deputized
ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey. Two days before the elections on May 11, 1998, the Court
issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner ABS-CBN. The Comelec was
directed to cease and desist, until further orders, from implementing the assailed Resolution or the
restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit polls were actually conducted and
reported by media without any difficulty or problem.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not ABS-CBN, in holding of exit polls and the nationwide reporting of their results validly
exercises freedoms of speech and of the press.

HELD:

The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. It, cited the following: First, by the very nature of a survey,
the interviewees or participants are selected at random, so that the results will as much as possible
be representative or reflective of the general sentiment or view of the community or group polled.
Second, the survey result is not meant to replace or be at par with the official Comelec count. It
consists merely of the opinion of the polling group as to who the electorate in general has probably
voted for, based on the limited data gathered from polled individuals. Finally, not at stake here are the
credibility and the integrity of the elections, which are exercises that are separate and independent
from the exit polls. The holding and the reporting of the results of exit polls cannot undermine those of
the elections, since the former is only part of the latter. If at all, the outcome of one can only be
indicative of the other.

Indeed, narrowly tailored countermeasures may be prescribed by the Comelec, so as to minimize or

suppress incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls, without transgressing the fundamental rights
of our people.

43. Social Weather Station vs. COMELEC, may 5, 2001

Facts:

Social Weather Stations (SWS) is an institution conducting surveys in various fields. Kamahalan
Publishing Corporation., on the other hand, publishes the Manila Standard which is a newspaper of
general circulation and features items of information including election surveys. Both SWS and
Kamahalan are contesting the validity and enforcement of R.A. 9006 (Fair Election Act), especially
section 5.4 which provides the surveys affecting national candidated shall not be published 15 days
before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be publishes 7 dyas before the
53
election. SWS wanted to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections both at the
national and local levels and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them
directly. Kamahalan, for its part, intends to publish election survey results up to the last day of the
elections on May 14, 2001.

Issue:

Whether or not the restriction on the publication of election survey constitutes a prior restraint on the
exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint.

Held:

Yes, Section 5.4 of R.A. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of speech,
expression, and the press. The power of the COMELEC over media franchises is limited to ensuring
equal opportunity, time, space, and the right to reply, as well as to fix reasonable rates of charge for
the use of media facilities for public information and forms among candidates. here, the prohibition of
speech is direct, absolute, and substantial. Nor does this section pass the O'brient test for content
related regulation because (1) it supresses one type of expression while allowing other types such as
editorials, etc.: (2) the restriction is greater than what is needed to protect government interest
because the interest can be protected by narrower restrictions such as subsequent punishment
punishment. Justice Kapunan's dissenting opinion basically says that the test of clear and present
danger is inappropriate to use in order to test the validity of this section. Instead, he purports to
engage in a form of balancing by weighing the circumstances to determine whether public interest is
served by the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights. However, he failed to show why, on the
balance, the other considerations should outweigh the value of freedom of expression.

44. Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial of in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder cases
against the former President Joseph E. Estrada.

A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC, June 29, 2001

Facts: The Kapisanan ng mga Broadkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), sent a letter requesting the court to
allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against
former President Joseph Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order to assure the public of full
transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history. The petitioners invoked that
in involves a matter of public concern and interest, or a matter over which the entire citizenry has the
right to know, be informed and made aware of. Moreover, the live radio and television coverage of the
proceedings will also serve the dual purpose of ensuring the desired transparency in the
administration of justice in order to disabuse the minds of the supporters of the past regime of any
and all unfounded notions, or ill-received attempts on the part of the present dispensation, to railroad
the instant criminal cases against the former President Estrada. However, in the Resolution of the
Court on October 23, 1991, in a case for libel filed by then President Corazon C. Aquino read that the
Court resolved to prohibit live radio and television coverage of court proceedings in view of protecting
the parties’ right to due process, to prevent distraction of the participants in the proceedings and to
avoid miscarriage of justice.

Issue: Whether the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and right to information of
public concern be given more weight than the fundamental rights of the accused.

Held: An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone
else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is
fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in
secrete conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that
the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct
themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom
should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not
too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants
from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they have observed during
the proceedings. The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the
right to public information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and
54
comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public and in acquainting the public with
the judicial process in action; nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still
the paramount right of the accused to due process which must never be allowed to suffer diminution
in its constitutional proportions. Television can work profound changes in the behavior of the people it
focuses on. There will be conscious and unconscious effect that such coverage may have on the
testimony of witnesses and the decision of judges cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise be said, it
is not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it. Due process guarantees the accused
a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial that is not lifted above its individual
settings nor made an object of public's attention and where the conclusions reached are induced not
by any outside force or influence but only by evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting
dignity and calm ambiance is demanded. It may be difficult to quantify the influence, or pressure that
media can bring to bear on them directly and through the shaping of public opinion, it does so in so
many ways and in varying degrees. With the possibility of losing not only the precious liberty but also
the very life of an accused, a verdict that would come only after the presentation of credible evidence
testified to by unbiased witnesses unswayed by any kind of pressure, whether open or subtle, in
proceedings that are devoid of histrionics that might detract from its basic aim to ferret veritable facts
free from improper influence,8 and decreed by a judge with an unprejudiced mind, unbridled by
running emotions or passions.

45. NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING NETWORK INC. v HON. CEASAR G. DY; G.R. Nos. 170270
& 179411, April 2, 2009.

FACTS:

Petitioners Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc. (Newsounds) and Consolidated Broadcasting

System, Inc. (CBS) operate and run Bombo Radyo DZNC Cauayan (DZNC) and Star FM DWIT
Cauayan in Cauayan Citry, Isabela. Back in 1996, Newsounds commenced relocation in Minante 2,
Cauayan City, Isabela. The HLURB and OMPDC affirmed and certified that the commercial structure
to be constructed conformed to local zoning regulations, noting as well that the location is classified
as a “commercial area”.

The radio station was able to fully operate smoothly thereafter. However in 2002, petitioners’ renewal
of mayor’s permit was denied on the ground that they have not submitted conversion papers showing
that the agricultural land was converted to commercial land. Petitioners asked the court to compel the
issuance of mayor’s permit but the same was denied. In the meantime, DAR Region II office issued to
petitioners a formal recognition of conversion of the property from agricultural to commercial.

In 2003, petitioners again filed their application for renewal of mayor’s permit, attaching the DAR
Order. Respondent Felicisimo Meer, denied the same, claiming that it was void on the grounds that
they did not have record of the DAR Order. The deadline lapsed on Febuary 15, 2004, and
respondents Meer and Racma Fernandez-Garcia closed the radio station. Due to the provision of
Omnibus Election Code which prohibits the closure of radio station during the pendency of election
period, COMELEC issued an order allowing the petitioners to operate before Febuary 17, 2004, but
was barred again by respondent Mayor Cesar Dy on the grounds that the radio station had no permit.
Nonetheless, COMELEC allowed them to run again until June 10, 2004 after elections. Petitioners
filed the case to the RTC and CA for the issuance of mayor’s permit but both courts denied the
petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners’ constitutional right of freedom of expression was violated

RULING:

In the case at bar, the absence of any evidence other than bare assertions that the 1996 to 2001
certifications were incorrect lead to the ineluctable conclusion that respondents are estopped from
asserting that the previous recognition of the property as commercial was wrong.

It is thus evident that respondents had no valid cause at all to even require petitioners to secure
“approved land conversion papers from the DAR showing that the property was converted from prime
55
agricultural land to commercial land.” Respondents closure of petitioner’s radio stations is clearly
tainted with ill motives. Petitioners have been aggressive in exposing the widespread election
irregularities in Isabela that appear to have favored respondent Dy and his political dynasty. Such
statement manifests and confirms that respondent’s denial of the renewal applications on the ground
that property is commercial and merely a pretext, and their real agenda is to remove petitioners from
Cauayan City and suppress the latter’s voice. This is a blatant violation of constitutional right to press
freedom.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED.

46. HECTOR C. VILLANUEVA vs. PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, INC., et. al.; G.R. No. 164437

FACTS: Petitioner was a mayoralty candidates in Bais, Negros Oriental during the 1992 elections.
Two months prior the elections, Ricardo Nolan, petitioned for the disqualification of petitioner before
the COMELEC. Nolan’s petition however, was denied. Two days prior the elections, respondent
Manila Daily Bulletin Publishing Corporation published a story that COMELEC had disqualified
petitioner. A day prior the elections, respondent Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc. also came out with a
similar story. Subsequent the articles, when the results of the elections came out, petitioner lost.
Under the belief that said articles led to his defeat, petitioner sued respondents PDI and Manila
Bulletin, alleging that the articles were maliciously timed to defeat him. He sued for actual damages
worth P270,000, moral damages worth P10,000,000, an unspecified amount of exemplary damages,
and attorney’s fees of P300,000. Respondents disclaimed liability, asserting that they acted without
malice, stressing that the stories were privileged in nature.

ISSUES: Whether or not respondents, being members of the press, abused the freedom of the press.

RULING: The Court did not consider that the respondents had abused the freedom of the press.
Newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and
effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters
and editors usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable
care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or
imperfection in the choice of words. For liability to arise without offending the freedom of the press,
the test to meet is whether or not the constitutional guarantees require a federal rule that prohibits a
public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct,
unless it be proven that the statement was made with ‘actual malice,’ or with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. Absent proof that they were obtained
from a press conference or release, respondents were not impelled by malice. Still, the news items
were derogatory and injurious to petitioner’s reputation and candidacy. The Court simply faulted
respondents for failing to verify the truth of the news tips they published and held them respondents
liable for negligence. Petitioner was awarded damages, as amended.

47. G.R. No. 180291 July 27, 2010

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his

capacity as PRESIDENT and GENERAL MANAGER of the GSIS, Petitioners,vs. DINNAH
VILLAVIZA, ELIZABETH DUQUE, ADRONICO A. ECHAVEZ, RODEL RUBIO, ROWENA
THERESE B. GRACIA, PILAR LAYCO, and ANTONIO JOSE LEGARDA, Respondents.

Facts:

PGM Garcia, as President and General Manager of the GSIS, filed separate formal charges against
respondents and eventually found them guilty for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service and meting out the penalty of one (1) year suspension plus the accessory
penalties appurtenant thereto. The charges contained that respondent, wearing red shirt together with
some employees, marched to or appeared simultaneously at or just outside the office of the
Investigation Unit in a mass demonstration/rally of protest and support for Messrs. Mario Molina and
Albert Velasco, the latter having surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises.

56
On appeal, CSC found that the acts of respondents in going to the GSIS-IU office wearing red shirts
to witness a public hearing do not amount to a concerted activity or mass action prescribed above.
CSC added that their actuations can be deemed an exercise of their constitutional right to freedom of
expression. The CA found no cogent reason to deviate therefrom.

Issue:

Whether or not an unruly mass gathering of employees to protest the prohibition against the
appearance of their leader as counsel in the administrative case, falls within the constitutional purview
of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression.

Held:

Yes. As defined in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 which serves to regulate the political
rights of those in the government service, the concerted activity or mass action prescribed must be
coupled with the intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their
demands of force concession. Wearing similarly colored shirts, attending a public hearing at the
GSIS-IU office, bringing with them recording gadgets, clenching their fists, some even badmouthing
the guards and PGM Garcia, are acts not constitutive of an (i) intent to effect work stoppage or
service disruption and (ii) for the purpose of realizing their demands of force concession.

Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any person in the land to voice out
their protests against what they believe to be a violation of their rights and interests. Not all collective
activity or mass undertaking of government employees is prohibited. Otherwise, we would be totally
depriving our brothers and sisters in the government service of their constitutional right to freedom of
expression. Civil Service does not deprive them of their freedom of expression. It would be unfair to
hold that by joining the government service, the members thereof have renounced or waived this
basic liberty. This freedom can be reasonably regulated only but can never be taken away.

Thus, respondents freedom of speech and of expression remains intact, and CSCs Resolution No.
02-1316 defining what a prohibited concerted activity or mass action has only tempered or regulated
these rights. Measured against that definition, respondents actuations did not amount to a prohibited
concerted activity or mass action.

48. SORIANO VS MTRCB; G.R. No. 164785 March 15, 2010

FACTS:

Eliseo F. Soriano, a television evangelist, hosted the Ang Dating Daan aired nationwide daily from
10:00 p.m. to midnight over public television. The program carried a general patronage rating from
the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB). Soriano regu-larly engaged in
verbal sparring on air with the host of Iglesia ni Cristo’s Ang Tamang Daan, hurling accusations and
counter-accusations with respect to their opposing religious beliefs and practices. It appears that in
his program Ang Tamang Daan’s Michael M. Sandoval attacked So-riano for alleged inconsistencies
in his Bible teachings. Michael compared spliced recordings of Soriano’s statements, matched with
subtitles of his utterances, to demonstrate those inconsisten-cies. On August 10, 2004, in an
apparent reaction to what he perceived as a malicious attack against him by the rival television
program, Soriano accused Michael of prostituting himself with his fab-ricated presentations. Michael
and seven other ministers of the Iglesia ni Cristo lodged a complaint against Soriano before the
MTRCB. Acting swiftly, the latter preventively suspended the airing of Soriano’s Ang Dating Daan
television program for 20 days, pursuant to its powers under Section 3(d) of Presidential Decree 1986
and its related rules. Soriano challenged the validity of that pre-ventive suspension before this Court
in G.R. 164785. After hearing the main case or on September 27, 2004, the MTRCB found Soriano
guilty as charged and imposed on him a penalty of three months suspension from appearing on the
Ang Dating Daan program. Soriano thus filed a second petition in G.R. 165636 to question that
decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a violation of freedom of speech in this case.

57
HELD:

Soriano’s Bible ministry has been on television continuously for 27 years since 1983 with no prior
record of use of foul language. For a 15-second outburst of its head at his bitterest critics, it seems
not fair for the Court to close down this Bible ministry to its large followers altogether for a full quarter
of a year. It is obscenity on television that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech does not
protect. As the Courts decision points out, the test of obscenity is whether the average person,
applying contemporary standards, would find the speech, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest. A quarter-of-a-year suspension would probably be justified when a general patronage
program intentionally sneaks in snippets of lewd, prurient materials to attract an audi-ence to the
program. This has not been the case here.

The Court concedes that Soriano’s short outburst was not in the category of the obscene. Soriano
actually exercised some restraints in the sense that he did not use the vernacular word for the female
sexual organ when referring to it, which word even the published opinions of the Court avoided
despite its adult readers. The word puta or prostitute describes a bad trade but it is not a bad word.
The world needs a word to describe it. The Court claims that, since Ang Dating Daan carried a
general patronage rating, Sorianos speech no doubt caused harm to the children who watched the
show. This statement is much too sweeping. There is no question that Soriano attacked Michael,
using figure of speech, at past 10:00 in the evening, not at 2:00 in the afternoon. The average Filipino
child would have been long in bed by the time Ang Dating Daan appeared on the television screen.

It is a direct, unconditional, and total abridgment of the freedom of speech, to which a re-ligious
organization is entitled, for a whole quarter of a year. Since this case is about protecting children, the
more appropriate penalty, if Soriano’s speech during the program mentioned was indecent and had
offended them, is to raise his programs restriction classification. The MTRCB classify programs to
protect vulnerable audiences.

49. Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., petitioners VS.Anti-Terrorism Council, et

al, respondent; G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010

Facts:

Six petitions were filed challenging the constitutionality of the Republic Act No. 9372 otherwise known
as Human Security Act of 2007. The petitioners raise that the law suffers vagueness and
overbreadth. There is vagueness when the law lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to
the Constitution in two aspects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the
parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcements unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
There is overbreadth when the law is too sweeping that it restricts even those rights that are
protected. The petitioners assail that the definition of the crime of terrorism under the said law was
vague and broad.

Issues:

Whether or not the RA 9372 suffers vagueness or overbreadth that should be grounds for a facial
invalidation or challenge.

Held:

No penal laws should be subject to a facial challenge. A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only
in free speech cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional litigation are rightly accepted. The
petitioners invoked that the law penalizes speech, contending the element of “unlawful demand” in
the definition of terrorism must be necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression
protected by free speech clause. The court held that the notion of the petitioners is entirely
inaccurate, as it

focused on just one element of the crime. Almost every commission of a crime entails consideration
of every word in the elements and mincing of the words of the offender.
58
50. THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, represented by the Most Rev. Bishop Vicente Navarra
vs. COMELEC

FACTS:

On February 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within the compound of San Sebastian
Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately 6×10 in size. They were posted on the front
walls of the cathedral within public view.
The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health
Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This
tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH)/ Team
Buhay” or “(Pro-RH)/Team Patay”.
The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of the RH Law. Those
who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while
those who voted against it form “Team Buhay”:

TEAM BUHAY TEAM PATAY

Estrada, JV Angara, Juan Edgardo
Honasan, Gregorio Casiño, Teddy
Magsaysay, Mitos Cayetano, Alan Peter
Pimentel, Koko Enrile, Jackie
Trillanes, Antonio Escudero, Francis
Villar, Cynthia Hontiveros, Risa
*Party List Legarda, Loren
Party List Buhay Gabriela, Akbayan, Bayan Muna, Anak Pawis Party List Ang Pamilya

Respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, as Election Officer of Bacolod City, issued a Notice to Remove
Campaign Materials addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra, otherwise,
COMELEC will be constrained to file an election offense against the petitioners.

ISSUE:
Whether the act of the COMELEC infringes the Freedom of Religion and Freedom of Speech.

HELD:
On Freedom of Religion. As aptly argued by COMELEC, the tarpaulin, on its face, “does not convey
any religious doctrine of the Catholic church.” That the position of the Catholic church appears to
coincide with the message of the tarpaulin regarding the RH Law does not, by itself, bring the
expression within the ambit of religious speech. On the contrary, the tarpaulin clearly refers to
candidates classified under “Team Patay” and “Team Buhay” according to their respective votes on
the RH Law.

On Freedom of Speech. Embedded in the tarpaulin, are opinions expressed by petitioners. It is a

specie of expression protected by our fundamental law. There are several theories and schools of
thought that strengthen the need to protect the basic right to freedom of expression.

First, this relates to the right of the people to participate in public affairs, including the right to criticize
government actions. Speech that promotes dialogue on public affairs, or airs out grievances and
political discontent, should thus be protected and encouraged.

Second, free speech should be encouraged under the concept of a market place of ideas.

Third, free speech involves self-expression that enhances human dignity.

Fourth, expression is a marker for group identity.

Fifth, the Bill of Rights, free speech included, is supposed to “protect individuals and minorities
against majoritarian abuses perpetrated through [the] framework [of democratic governance]. ”
Lastly, free speech must be protected under the safety valve theory. In order to avoid this situation
and prevent people from resorting to violence, there is a need for peaceful methods in making
passionate dissent. Free speech must, thus, be protected as a peaceful means of achieving one’s
59
goal, considering the possibility that repression of nonviolent dissent may spill over to violent means
just to drive a point.

In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred
position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and
such priority “gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions.”

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

FACTS: On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound
housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′) by
ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first
tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012
or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin
contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a
check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates were classified
according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law.
Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team
Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by
any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the 2013
elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for
that election.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a political question,
hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s power of review.
2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies
as the case was not brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions.
3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.
4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated
petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of expression.
5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-neutral regulation.
6. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.
7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence or
modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the expanded
jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution..

The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act of a
constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming
arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the
tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to expression.

Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue involves a
truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are,
then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government
properly acted within such limits.

A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no constitutionally imposed
limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally

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imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this
court.

In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech. Any
instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any
doubt that a political question brings.

SECOND ISSUE: No.

The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper in
this case.

Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the

controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite that something had by then
been accomplished or performed by either branch or in this case, organ of government before a court
may come into the picture.”

Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium, had
understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of
the election offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right. The
impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.

In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC

suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech.

THIRD ISSUE: No.

Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position that
they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these provisions
pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to
any political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred
right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case.

FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high
degree of protection.

Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being
petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who
voted for it, holds no water.

The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named
candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The
tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or
party-list group.

By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while sponsored
messages are covered.

The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech

Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation
about some issue,” “fostering informed and civic minded deliberation.” On the other hand, commercial
speech has been defined as speech that does “no more than propose a commercial transaction.” The
expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.

FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.

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 Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the subject matter of
the utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the
incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.

The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content is
not easily divorced from the size of its medium.

Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has used
the clear and present danger rule as measure.

Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged act has
overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government
having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.”

Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation.
There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to
justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize
the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the
tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.

SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin
remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise protected by the
Constitution.

Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property or

constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is
repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws.

The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and stickers
should be posted is “so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property.” Consequently,
it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that no person shall be deprived of
his property without due process of law.

SEVENTH ISSUE: No.

The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this
court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice
to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis.
The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as
speech with political consequences and not religious speech.

Doctrine of benevolent neutrality

With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows
accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government policies
that take religion specifically into account not to promote the government’s favored form of religion,
but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect
therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion.
As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion into account . . . to
exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious
beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement an
atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.”

LEMON TEST:

A regulation is constitutional when:

1. It has a secular legislative purpose;
2. It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
3. It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.

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 FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY

51. Bayan, Karapatan, et.al. vs. Ermita, et.al.,; G.R. No. 169838.April 25, 2006

FACTS:
The Petitioners alleged the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880. They alleged that
their rights as organizations and individuals were violated when the rallies, marches and protests that
they have participated were violently dispersed, by policemen implementing BP No. 880.
The Petitioners come in three groups: First is Bayan, et al in GR No. 169838, second is Jess del
Prado, et al in GR No. 169849 and third is Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al in GR No. 169881. The
Petitioners seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy. They
contended that: 1) BP No. 880 is a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which Philippines is a signatory; 2) That
the provisions of BP No. 880 are not mere regulations but prohibitions as it is allegedly a curtailment
of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances; 3)That BP No. 880 requires
permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and
present danger and that it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the
government; 4) That two standards stated in the law, the clear and present danger and imminent and
grave danger were inconsistent.

ISSUE: Whether or not BP No. 880 is constitutional.

RULING: No. The Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of BP. 880. The Supreme Court
ruled that the right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances are fundamental rights of the people guaranteed by the constitution but it is a
settled principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those
rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not injurious to the equal enjoyment of
others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society.

The Court further reiterated that the power to regulate is vested to the government through police
power. The permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order,
public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health and that is the recognized exception
to the exercise of right even under the Universal Declaration on Civil and Political Rights.

The SC ruled that BP No. 880 is only a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of
the assemblies. The law provides a precise and sufficient standard - the clear and present danger
test and that the reference to "imminent and grave danger of substantive evil substantially means the
same thing and is not inconsistent standard. A fair and impartial reading of BP No. 880 readily shows
that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places that the reference to "lawful
cause" does not make it content-based because assemblies have to be for lawful causes otherwise
they would not be peaceable and entitled to protection.

52. IBP vs. Hon. Lito Atienza; February 24, 2010

Facts:

In June 2006, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) filed an application for a rally permit with the
office of Manila Mayor Jose “Lito” Atienza. The IBP sought their rally to be staged at the Mendiola
Bridge. Atienza granted the permit but indicated thereon that IBP is only allowed to stage their rally at
the Plaza Miranda, a freedom park.

IBP President Jose Anselmo Cadiz received the rally permit on the day before the scheduled rally.
Cadiz immediately went to the Court of Appeals to assail the permit because what Atienza did was

63
only a partial grant which was alleged to be a violation of the constitutional right to freedom of
expression and a grave abuse of discretion on the part of Atienza.

Meanwhile, IBP pushed through with the rally not at Plaza Miranda but at the Mendiola Bridge.
Subsequently, the Manila Police District (MPD) filed a criminal case against Cadiz for allegedly
violating the Public Assembly Act or specifically, for staging a rally in a place different from what was
indicated in the rally permit.

The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Atienza. The CA ruled that what Atienza did was within his
power; that freedom of expression is not absolute.

Cadiz appealed before the Supreme Court. Cadiz also prayed for the suspension of the criminal case
against him on the ground that the certiorari case he filed against Atienza is a prejudicial question to
the criminal case.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the certiorari case Cadiz filed against Atienza is a prejudicial question to the
criminal case filed against him (Cadiz).

2. Whether or not it is within Mayor Jose Atienza’s power to modify the rally permit without consulting
with the IBP.

HELD:

1. No. It is improper for Cadiz to raise the issue of prejudicial question at this stage and in this
certiorari case. Under the Rules of Court, a prejudicial question is a ground to suspend the criminal
proceeding. However, Cadiz must first file a petition to suspend the criminal proceeding in the said
criminal case. The determination of the pendency of a prejudicial question should be made at the first
instance in the criminal action, and not before the Supreme Court in an appeal from the civil action.

2. No. In modifying a rally permit or in granting a rally permit which contains a time and place different
from that applied for, the mayor must first consult with the applicant at the earliest opportunity. This is
in order to give the applicant some time to determine if such change is favorable to him or adverse
(and if adverse, he can seek judicial remedies) – Section 6 of the Public Assembly Act.

It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test
be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave
danger of a substantive evil, the applicant must be heard on the matter. In this case, Atienza did not
consult with the IBP. Atienza capriciously and whimsically changed the venue without any reason
therefore. Such is a grave abuse of discretion and a violation of the freedom of expression.

53. BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 880

AN ACT ENSURING THE FREE EXERCISE BY THE PEOPLE OF THEIR RIGHT

PEACEABLY TO ASSEMBLE AND PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR OTHER
PURPOSES

Section 1. Title - This Act shall be known as "The Public Assembly Act of 1985."

Section 2. Declaration of policy - The constitutional right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances is essential and vital to the strength and stability of the State. To this end, the State
shall ensure the free exercise of such right without prejudice to the rights of others to life, liberty and equal protection of
the law.

Section 3. Definition of terms - For purposes of this Act:

(a) "Public assembly" means any rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other form of mass or
concerted action held in a public place for the purpose of presenting a lawful cause; or expressing an opinion to
the general public on any particular issue; or protesting or influencing any state of affairs whether political,
economic or social; or petitioning the government for redress of grievances.

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 The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public meetings and assemblages for religious purposes shall
be governed by local ordinances: Provided, however, That the declaration of policy as provided in Section 2 of
this Act shall be faithfully observed.

The definition herein contained shall not include picketing and other concerted action in strike areas by workers
and employees resulting from a labor dispute as defined by the Labor Code, its implementing rules and
regulations, and by the Batas Pambansa Bilang 227.

(b) "Public place" shall include any highway, boulevard, avenue, road, street, bridge or other thoroughfare, park,
plaza, square, and/or any open space of public ownership where the people are allowed access.

(c) "Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other peace keeping
authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same.

(d) "Modification of permit" shall include the change of the place and time of the public assembly, rerouting of the
parade or street march, the volume of loud-speakers or sound system and similar changes.

Section 4. Permit when required and when not required - A written permit shall be required for any person or persons to
organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. However, no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall
be done or made in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private property, in which case only the
consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required, or in the campus of a government-owned and
operated educational institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational institution. Political
meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period as provided for by law are not covered by this Act.

Section 5. Application requirements - All applications for a permit shall comply with the following guidelines:

(a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or organizers; the purpose of
such public assembly; the date, time and duration thereof, and place or streets to be used for the intended
activity; and the probable number of persons participating, the transport and the public address systems to be
used.

(b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of applicant under Section 8 hereof.

(c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality in whose jurisdiction the
intended activity is to be held, at least five (5) working days before the scheduled public assembly.

(d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in writing, the office of the city or municipal
mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a conspicuous place in the city or municipal building.

Section 6. Action to be taken on the application -

(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is
clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order,
public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health.

(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2) working days from the
date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor
or any official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by
the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed.

(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial
or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter.

(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the application within twenty-four hours.

(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in his
permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law.

(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate Court, its decisions may be appealed to the
appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal
shall be required. A decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall, be
immediately executory.

(g) All cases filed in court under this Section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing.
Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or, in his absence, to
the next in rank.

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 (h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.

(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed.

Section 7. Use of public thoroughfare - Should the proposed public assembly involve the use, for an appreciable length of
time, of any public highway, boulevard, avenue, road or street, the mayor or any official acting in his behalf may, to
prevent grave public inconvenience, designate the route thereof which is convenient to the participants or reroute the
vehicular traffic to another direction so that there will be no serious or undue interference with the free flow of commerce
and trade.

Section 8. Responsibility of applicant - It shall be the duty and responsibility of the leaders and organizers of a public
assembly to take all reasonable measures and steps to the end that the intended public assembly shall be conducted
peacefully in accordance with the terms of the permit. These shall include but not be limited to the following:

(a) To inform the participants of their responsibility under the permit;

(b) To police the ranks of the demonstrators in order to prevent non-demonstrators from disrupting the lawful
activities of the public assembly;

(c) To confer with local government officials concerned and law enforcers to the end that the public assembly may
be held peacefully;

(d) To see to it that the public assembly undertaken shall not go beyond the time stated in the permit; and

(e) To take positive steps that demonstrators do not molest any person or do any act unduly interfering with the
rights of other persons not participating in the public assembly.

Section 9. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities - Law enforcement agencies shall not interfere with the
holding of a public assembly. However, to adequately ensure public safety, a law enforcement contingent under the
command of a responsible police officer may be detailed and stationed in a place at least one hundred (100) meter away
from the area of activity ready to maintain peace and order at all times.

Section 10. Police assistance when requested - It shall be imperative for law enforcement agencies, when their
assistance is requested by the leaders or organizers, to perform their duties always mindful that their responsibility to
provide proper protection to those exercising their right peaceably to assemble and the freedom of expression is
primordial. Towards this end, law enforcement agencies shall observe the following guidelines:

(a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with the demonstrators shall be in complete uniform
with their nameplates and units to which they belong displayed prominently on the front and dorsal parts of their
uniform and must observe the policy of "maximum tolerance" as herein defined;

(b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not carry any kind of firearms but may be equipped with
baton or riot sticks, shields, crash helmets with visor, gas masks, boots or ankle high shoes with shin guards;

(c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar anti-riot device shall not be used unless the public
assembly is attended by actual violence or serious threats of violence, or deliberate destruction of property.

Section 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit - No public assembly with a permit shall be dispersed. However,
when an assembly becomes violent, the police may disperse such public assembly as follows:

(a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall call the
attention of the leaders of the public assembly and ask the latter to prevent any possible disturbance;

(b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objects from the participants are thrown at the
police or at the non-participants, or at any property causing damage to such property, the ranking officer of the
law enforcement contingent shall audibly warn the participants that if the disturbance persists, the public
assembly will be dispersed;

(c) If the violence or disturbances prevailing as stated in the preceding subparagraph should not stop or abate,
the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly issue a warning to the participants of the public
assembly, and after allowing a reasonable period of time to lapse, shall immediately order it to forthwith disperse;

(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also be made during the public assembly unless he
violates during the assembly a law, statute, ordinance or any provision of this Act. Such arrest shall be governed
by Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended:

(e) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or branch of the peace during the public assembly shall not constitute a
group for dispersal.

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Section 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit - When the public assembly is held without a permit where a
permit is required, the said public assembly may be peacefully dispersed.

Section 13. Prohibited acts - The following shall constitute violations of this Act:

(a) The holding of any public assembly as defined in this Act by any leader or organizer without having first
secured that written permit where a permit is required from the office concerned, or the use of such permit for
such purposes in any place other than those set out in said permit: Provided, however, That no person can be
punished or held criminally liable for participating in or attending an otherwise peaceful assembly;

(b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification of a permit in violation of the provisions of this Act by the mayor
or any other official acting in his behalf.

(c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or acknowledge receipt of the application for a permit by the
mayor or any official acting in his behalf;

(d) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly;

(e) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement agency or any person to disperse the
public assembly;

(f) Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof;

(g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100) meters from the area of activity of the public
assembly or on the occasion thereof;

1. the carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such as firearm, pillbox, bomb, and the like;

2. the carrying of a bladed weapon and the like;

3 the malicious burning of any object in the streets or thoroughfares;

4. the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit;

5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public assembly by the use of a motor
vehicle, its horns and loud sound systems.

Section 14. Penalties - Any person found guilty and convicted of any of the prohibited acts defined in the immediately
preceding Section shall be punished as follows:

(a) violation of subparagraph (a) shall be punished by imprisonment of one month and one day to six months;

(b) violations of subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and item 4, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by
imprisonment of six months and one day to six years;

(c) violation of item 1, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to six
years without prejudice to prosecution under Presidential Decree No. 1866;

(d) violations of item 2, item 3, or item 5 of subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of one day to
thirty days.

Section 15. Freedom parks - Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months after the effectivity of this
Act establish or designate at least one suitable "freedom park" or mall in their respective jurisdictions which, as far as
practicable, shall be centrally located within the poblacion where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time
without the need of any prior permit.

In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors shall establish the freedom parks within the
period of six months from the effectivity of this Act.

Section 16. Constitutionality - Should any provision of this Act be declared invalid or unconstitutional, the validity or
constitutionality of the other provisions shall not be affected thereby.

Section 17. Repealing clause - All laws, decrees, letters of instructions, resolutions, orders, ordinances or parts thereof
which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, amended, or modified accordingly.

Section 18. Effectivity - This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, October 22, 1985.

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 FREEDOM OF RELIGION

54. Estrada v. Escritor; 492 SCRA 1; June 22, 2006

Facts: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living
with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him
as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still
legally married to another woman.

Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to
complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the
court allows such act.

Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s
Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when
legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

RULING: The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of
religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our
Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s
interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently
compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any
concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner.
Thus the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition.

Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be
kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.

The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that
gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This
benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does
not offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling
state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible
so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the
state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the law
based on her right to freedom of religion.

55. Soriano vs. Laguardia; April 29, 2009

Facts:

On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating
Daan, which then aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against Iglesia ni Cristo(INC). Two days
after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L.
Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo, against petitioner
in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to
in petitioners remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang
Daan.

Issue: Whether or not Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan” program a
part of the religious discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III of the 1987 Constitution?

Held: No. The SC ruled that “Soriano’s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with
respect to the average child,” and thus his utterances cannot be considered as protected speech.

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Citing decisions from the US Supreme Court, the High Court said that the analysis should be “context
based” and found the utterances to be obscene after considering the use of television broadcasting
as a medium, the time of the show, and the “G” rating of the show, which are all factors that made the
utterances susceptible to children viewers. The Court emphasized on how the uttered words could be
easily understood by a child literally rather than in the context that they were used.” The SC also said
“that the suspension is not a prior restraint, but rather a “form of permissible administrative sanction
or subsequent punishment.” In affirming the power of the MTRCB to issue an order of suspension,
the majority said that “it is a sanction that the MTRCB may validly impose under its charter without
running afoul of the free speech clause.” visit fellester.blogspot.com. The Court said that the
suspension “is not a prior restraint on the right of petitioner to continue with the broadcast of Ang
Dating Daan as a permit was already issued to him by MTRCB,” rather, it was a sanction for “the
indecent contents of his utterances in a “G” rated TV program.”

Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse effect
of petitioner’s utterances on the viewers’ fundamental rights as well as petitioner’s clear violation of
his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan
for three months. Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioner’s suspension was an
undue curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent
punishment. Aside from the reasons given above, a requirement that indecent language be avoided
has its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if
any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language.

56. Pastor Austria vs. NLRC; G.R. No. 124382; August 16, 1999

Facts: The Seventh Day Adventists (SDA) is a religious corporation under Philippine law. The
petitioner was a pastor of the SDA for 28 years from 1963 until 1991, when his services were
terminated. On various occasions from August up to October, 1991, petitioner received several
communication from Mr. Eufronio Ibesate, the treasurer of the Negros Mission asking him to admit
accountability and responsibility for the church tithes and offerings collected by his wife, Mrs. Thelma
Austria, in his district which amounted to P15,078.10, and to remit the same to the Negros Mission.
The petitioner answered saying that he should not be made accountable since it was Pastor Buhat
and Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings since he was very ill to be able
to do the collecting.

A fact-finding committee was created to investigate. The petitioner received a letter of dismissal
citing:

Misappropriation of denominational funds;Willful breach of trust; Serious misconduct; Gross and

habitual neglect of duties; Commission of an offense against the person of employer's duly authorized
representative as grounds for the termination of his services.

Petitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, and sued the SDA for
reinstatement and back wages plus damages. Decision was rendered in favor of petitioner. SDA
appealed to the NLRC. Decision was rendered in favor of respondent.

Issue: 1. Whether or not the termination of the services of the petitioner is an ecclesiastical affair,
and, as such, involves the separation of church and state.

2. Whether or not the Labor Arbiter/NLRC has jurisdiction to try and decide the complaint filed by
petitioner against the SDA.

Held: 1. No. The matter at hand relates to the church and its religious ministers but what is involved
here is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee, which is
purely secular because it has no relationship with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines. The
grounds invoked for petitioner’s dismissal are all based on Art. 282 of Labor Code.

2. Yes. SDA was exercising its management prerogative (not religious prerogative) to fire an
employee which it believes is unfit for the job. It would have been a different case if Austria was
expelled or excommunicated from the SDA.

69
57. Islamic Da’wah Council of the Phils. vs. Exec. Sec., 405 scra 497

ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC vs. OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY; G.R. No. 153888 July 9, 2003

FACTS:

On October 26, 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 creating the
Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent OMA to oversee its
implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates
and perform other related regulatory activities.

On May 8, 2002, a news article entitled "OMA Warns NGOs Issuing Illegal 'Halal' Certification" was
published in the Manila Bulletin, a newspaper of general circulation. In said article, OMA warned
Muslim consumers to buy only products with its official halal certification since those without said
certification had not been subjected to careful analysis and therefore could contain pork or its
derivatives. Respondent OMA also sent letters to food manufacturers asking them to secure the halal
certification only from OMA lest they violate EO 46 and RA 4109.As a result, petitioner lost revenues
after food manufacturers stopped securing certifications from it.

Hence, this petition for prohibition.

Petitioner contends that the subject EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of
Church and State. It is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and guidelines on the
halal certification scheme because said scheme is a function only religious organizations, entity or
scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims. According to petitioner, a food product
becomes halal only after the performance of Islamic religious ritual and prayer. Thus, only practicing
Muslims are qualified to slaughter animals for food. A government agency like herein respondent
OMA cannot therefore perform a religious function like certifying qualified food products as halal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a violation in Section 10, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides
that no law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

HELD:

We grant the petition.

OMA was created in 1981 through Executive Order No. 697 (EO 697) "to ensure the integration of
Muslim Filipinos into the mainstream of Filipino society with due regard to their beliefs, customs,
traditions, and institutions." OMA deals with the societal, legal, political and economic concerns of the
Muslim community as a"national cultural community" and not as a religious group. Thus, bearing in
mind the constitutional barrier between the Church and State, the latter must make sure that OMA
does not intrude into purely religious matters lest it violate the non-establishment clause and the "free
exercise of religion" provision found in Article III, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution.

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this
Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the
broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to
profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and
with the common good."

70
58. Brother MARIANO MIKE Z. VELARDE, petitioner, vs. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY, respondent.; G.R.
No. 159357. April 28, 2004

Facts: This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the June 12, 2003
Decision and July 29, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 49).
The challenged Decision was the offshoot of a Petition for Declaratory Relief filed before the RTC-
Manila by herein Respondent Social Justice Society (SJS) against herein Petitioner Mariano Mike Z.
Velarde, together with His Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Erao Manalo, Brother
Eddie Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano as co-respondents. The Petition prayed for the
resolution of the question whether or not the act of a religious leader like any of herein respondents,
in endorsing the candidacy of a candidate for elective office or in urging or requiring the members of
his flock to vote for a specified candidate, is violative of the letter or spirit of the constitutional provisions.
Issue: May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. Mike Velarde, be prohibited from endorsing
candidates for public office?
Ruling: The basic question posed in the SJS Petition -- WHETHER ENDORSEMENTS OF
CANDIDACIES BY RELIGIOUS LEADERS IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL -- undoubtedly deserves
serious consideration. As stated earlier, the Court deems this constitutional issue to be of paramount
interest to the Filipino citizenry, for it concerns the governance of our country and its people. Thus,
despite the obvious procedural transgressions by both SJS and the trial court, this Court still called for
Oral Argument, so as not to leave any doubt that there might be room to entertain and dispose of the
SJS Petition on the merits.
Counsel for SJS has utterly failed, however, to convince the Court that there are enough factual and
legal bases to resolve the paramount issue. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General has
sided with petitioner insofar as there are no facts supporting the SJS Petition and the assailed
Decision.
We reiterate that the said Petition failed to state directly the ultimate facts that it relied upon for its
claim. During the Oral Argument, counsel for SJS candidly admitted that there were no factual
allegations in its Petition for Declaratory Relief. Neither were there factual findings in the assailed
Decision. At best, SJS merely asked the trial court to answer a hypothetical question. In effect, it
merely sought an advisory opinion, the rendition of which was beyond the courts constitutional
mandate and jurisdiction.
Indeed, the assailed Decision was rendered in clear violation of the Constitution, because it made no
findings of facts and final disposition. Hence, it is void and deemed legally inexistent. Consequently,
there is nothing for this Court to review, affirm, reverse or even just modify.
Regrettably, it is not legally possible for the Court to take up, on the merits, the paramount question
involving a constitutional principle. It is a time-honored rule that the constitutionality of a statute [or
act] will be passed upon only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a
justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned.

59. DOMINADOR L. TARUC vs. BISHOP PORFIRIO B. DE LA CRUZ; G.R. No. 144801. March 10,
2005

FACTS: The petitioners are lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC) in Socorro,
Surigao City. Petitioners led by Taruc clamored for the transfer of parish priest Rustom Florano for
the reason that the family of Fr. Floranos wife belonged to a political party opposed to petitioner
Tarucs. However, Bishop De la Cruz found this reason too flimsy so he denied their request. Things
worsened when Taruc conducted an open mass for the town Fiesta celebrated by Fr. Ambong who
was not a member of the clergy of the diocese of Surigao. Petitioners were then
expelled/excommunicated from the PIC for the reason of (1) disobedience to duly constituted
authority, (2) inciting dissension resulting in division of the Parish of Our Mother of Perpetual Help
and (3) threatening to forcible occupy the Parish Church causing anxiety among the General
Membership.

Petitioners filed a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop De la Cruz and
impleaded Fr. Florano and a certain Delfin Bordas for conspiring with the Bishop. They said that their
rights to due process were violated because they were not heard before the order of expulsion was
made
71
ISSUE: Whether or not the courts have jurisdiction to hear a case involving the
expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution.

HELD: Section 5, Article III or the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution specifically provides
that:

No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights.

The case at bar is purely ecclesiastical matters which is considered to be outside the providence of
the court due to the form of government where the complete separation of civil and ecclesiastical
authority is insisted upon. Hence, the civil courts must not allow themselves to intrude unduly in
matters of an ecclesiastical nature. Civil Courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of a religious
organization except for the protection of civil or property rights. Those rights may be the subject of
litigation in a civil court, and the courts have jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to the title,
use, or possession of church property. Those who unite to an ecclesiastical body do so with implied
consent to submit to the Church government and they are bound to submit to it.

The power to exclude membership from the church of those considered unworthy lies solely to the
Church thus it is outside the province of the civil court. The expulsion of membership of the petitioners
was legally made. They have not violated the due process of law because they were given
opportunity to be heard when they were also warned of the consequences of their actions.

LIBERTY OF ABODE

60. Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap vs. Robredo, G.R. 200903, July 22, 2014

see attached page....

72
 RIGHT TO INFORMATION

61. CHAVEZ, vs. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG); G.R. No.
130716. December 9, 1998

FACTS: Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as taxpayer, citizen and former government official who
initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the
public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the countrys economy, alleges that what impelled
him to bring this action were several news reports bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in
September 1997. These news items referred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of
Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of
a compromise, between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or
share these assets.

Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the state to
disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, demands that respondents make
public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGGs task of recovering the Marcoses
ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an
issue of paramount public interest, since it has a debilitating effect on the countrys economy that
would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. Respondents, on the other
hand, do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs. They claim, though, that
petitioners action is premature, because there is no showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose
the negotiations and the Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make
any disclosure, since the proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not become
effective and binding.

Issue: Whether or not recovery of the Marcoses alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public concern
and imbued with public interest.

Ruling: The Court ruled in affirmative.

Executive Order No. 1, , created the PCGG which was primarily tasked to assist the President in the
recovery of vast government resources allegedly amassed by former President Marcos. Under
Executive Order No. 2, all persons and entities who had knowledge or possession of ill-gotten assets
and properties were warned.On May 7, 1986, another directive (EO No. 14) was issued giving
additional powers to the PCGG which, taking into account the overriding considerations of national
interest and national survival. With such pronouncements of our government, whose authority
emanates from the people, there is no doubt that the recovery of the Marcoses alleged ill-gotten
wealth is a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest. We may also add that ill-gotten
wealth, by its very nature, assumes a public character. Based on the aforementioned Executive
Orders, ill-gotten wealth refers to assets and properties purportedly acquired, directly or indirectly, by
former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and close associates through or as a result
of their improper or illegal use of government funds or properties; or their having taken undue
advantage of their public office; or their use of powers, influences or relationships, resulting in their
unjust enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the Republic of
the Philippines. Clearly, the assets and properties referred to supposedly originated from the
government itself. To all intents and purposes, therefore, they belong to the people. As such, upon
reconveyance they will be returned to the public treasury, subject only to the satisfaction of positive
claims of certain persons as may be adjudged by competent courts. Another declared overriding
consideration for the expeditious recovery of ill-gotten wealth is that it may be used for national
economic recovery.

Also, it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to
disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with
the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to
definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency
recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the
process of being formulated or are in the exploratory stage. There is a need, of course, to observe the
same restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as discussed earlier -- such as on matters
involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information.
73
62. Francisco I. Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development
Corporation; G.R. No. 133250 July 9, 2002 En Banc

I. Facts:

President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084
tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve,
acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands.” PD No. 1085 transferred to PEA the "lands
reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and
Reclamation Project (MCCRRP for brevity). On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture
Agreement ("JVA" for brevity) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands.
PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding. On November 29,
1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege speech in the Senate and
denounced the JVA as the "grandmother of all scams." As a result, the Senate Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. On April 27, 1998, Frank I. Chavez, as a
taxpayer, filed a petition and prayed that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the
JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of
the people to information on matters of public concern. AMARI argues there must first be a
consummated contract before petitioner can invoke the right.

II. Issue:

Whether or not the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going
negotiations before a final agreement.

III. Ruling:

Yes, the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before
a final agreement. Contrary to AMARI's contention, a consummated contract is not a requirement for
the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no
contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its
defects. The right to information covers three categories of information which are "matters of public
concern," namely: (1) official records; (2) documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions and decisions; and (3) government research data used in formulating policies. The
constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final
contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and
should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets
and similar matters affecting national security and public order. Congress has also prescribed other
limitations on the right to information in several legislations.

63. G.R. No. 180643 September 4, 2008

ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner, vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC

OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND
SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, respondents.

Facts:

On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before respondent Committees and testified on matters
concerning the National Broadband Project (the "NBN Project"), a project awarded by the Department
of Transportation and Communications ("DOTC") to Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment
("ZTE"). Petitioner disclosed that then Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") Chairman Benjamin
Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated
that he informed President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo ("President Arroyo") of the bribery attempt and
that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on President Arroyo
and petitioner’s discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking
"executive privilege." To be specific, petitioner refused to answer questions on: (a) whether or not
President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve it. On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear
74
before respondent Committees upon orders of the President invoking executive privilege.
Respondent Committees found petitioner’s explanations unsatisfactory.

Issue: Whether or not the questions sought by the SBRC to be answered falls under executive
privilege.

Held: The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential
communications privilege.

The Court articulated in these cases that "there are certain types of information which the government
may withhold from the public," that there is a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with
respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters"; and that
"the right to information does not extend to matters recognized as ‘privileged information’ under the
separation of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and
discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings."

In the case at bar, this Court, in upholding executive privilege with respect to three (3) specific
questions, did not in any way curb the public’s right to information or diminish the importance of public
accountability and transparency. First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-
delegable power” of the President. Second, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of
the President. Under the “operational proximity” test. Third, there is no adequate showing of a
compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

64. G.R. No. 189546 | September 21, 2010; CENTER FOR PEOPLE EMPOWERMENT IN
GOVERNANCE vs COMELEC

FACTS: On May 26, 2009 petitioner Center for People Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG),
a non-government organization, wrote respondent COMELEC, requesting a copy of the source code
of the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) programs, the Board of Canvassers
Consolidation/Canvassing System (BOC CCS) programs for the municipal, provincial, national, and
congressional canvass, the COMELEC server programs, and the source code of the in-house
COMELEC programs called the Data Capturing System (DCS) utilities.

On June 24, 2009 the COMELEC granted the request for the source code of the PCOS and the CCS,
but denied that for the DCS, since the DCS was a system used in processing the Lists of Voters
which is not part of the voting, counting and canvassing systems contemplated by R.A. 9369.
According to COMELEC, if the source code for the DCS were to be divulged, unscrupulous
individuals might change the program and pass off an illicit one that could benefit certain candidates
or parties.

Rejecting COMELEC’s excuse, on October 5, 2009 CenPEG filed the present petition for mandamus,
seeking to compel COMELEC to immediately make its source codes available to CenPEG and other
interested parties.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC violated the constitutional right to information

HELD: Yes. The pertinent portion of Section 12 of R.A. 9369 is clear in that once an AES
technology is selected for implementation, the Commission shall promptly make the source code of
that technology available and open to any interested political party or groups which may conduct their
own review thereof. The COMELEC has offered no reason not to comply with this requirement of the
law. Indeed, its only excuse for not disclosing the source code was that it was not yet available when
CenPEG asked for it and, subsequently, that the review had to be done, apparently for security
reason, under a controlled environment. The elections had passed and that reason is already stale.

The Court GRANTS the petition for mandamus and directs the COMELEC to make the source codes
for the AES technologies it selected for implementation pursuant to R.A. 9369 immediately available
to CenPEG and all other interested political parties or groups for independent review.

75