PEOPLE v.

PANFILO LACSON, GR 149453

Facts:
the respondent and his co-accused were charged with multiple murder for the shooting and killing of eleven
male person... bandied as members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang.
The Court also held therein that although Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
could be given retroactive effect, there is still a need to determine whether the requirements for its...
application are attendant.
It emphasized that the new rule fixes a time-bar to penalize the State for... its inexcusable delay in
prosecuting cases already filed in court
In support of their Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioners contend that (a) Section 8, Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689;
and (b) the time-bar in said rule should not be applied... retroactively.
The petitioners aver that Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable
to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 because the essential requirements for its application
were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr., issued his resolution of
March 29, 1999.
The petitioners contend that even on the assumption that the respondent expressly consented to a
provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 and all the heirs of the victims
were notified of the respondent's motion before the hearing thereon and were... served with copies of the
resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the eleven cases, the two-year bar in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be applied prospectively and not retroactively against the
State. To apply the time limit... retroactively to the criminal cases against the respondent and his co-accused
would violate the right of the People to due process, and unduly impair, reduce, and diminish the State's
substantive right to prosecute the accused for multiple murder.
They submit that in case of conflict between the Revised Penal Code and the new rule, the former should
prevail. They also insist that the State had consistently relied on the prescriptive... periods under Article 90
of the Revised Penal Code. It was not accorded a fair warning that it would forever be barred beyond the
two-year period by a retroactive application of the new rule.[
For his part, the respondent asserts that the new rule under Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure may be applied retroactively since there is no substantive right of the State that may
be impaired by its application to the criminal cases in question... since '[t]he State's witnesses were ready,
willing and able to provide their testimony but the prosecution failed to act on these cases until it became
politically expedient in April 2001 for them to do so.'[29] According to the respondent, penal laws,... either
procedural or substantive, may be retroactively applied so long as they favor the accused.[30] He asserts
that the two-year period commenced to run on March 29, 1999 and lapsed two years thereafter was more
than reasonable opportunity for the State... to fairly indict him.[31] In any event, the State is given the right
under the Court's assailed Resolution to justify the filing of the Information in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-
101102 to 01-101112 beyond the time-bar under the new rule.
The Court agrees with the respondent that procedural laws may be applied retroactively. As applied to
criminal law, procedural law provides or regulates the steps by which one who has committed a crime is to
be punished.
further
It further ruled therein that a procedural law may not be applied retroactively if to do so would work injustice
or would involve intricate problems of due process or impair the independence of the Court.
Remedial legislation, or procedural rule, or doctrine of the Court designed to enhance and implement the
constitutional rights of parties in criminal proceedings may be applied retroactively or prospectively
depending upon several factors, such as the history of the new rule,... its purpose and effect, and whether
the retrospective application will further its operation, the particular conduct sought to be remedied and the
effect thereon in the administration of justice and of criminal laws in particular
Issues:
whether the 2-year period to revive it has already lapse... whether there is any... justification for the filing of
the cases beyond the 2-year period
Ruling:
In this case, the Court agrees with the petitioners that the time-bar of two years under the new rule should
not be applied retroactively against the State.
The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that the two-year period
commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of the resolution of
Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the... intendment of the new rule. Instead
of giving the State two years to revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than
two years to do so.
If the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the State would have only one year and three months
or until March 31, 2001 within which to revive these criminal cases.
The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the accused. It should not
be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar therein provided merely
to benefit the accused. For to do so would cause an
"injustice of hardship" to the State and adversely affect the administration of justice in general and of
criminal laws in particular.
the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED.
Principles:
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent
of the accused and with notice to the offended party.
In a per curiam... decision in Stefano v. Woods,[49] the United States Supreme Court catalogued the factors
in determining whether a new rule or doctrine enunciated by the High Court should be given retrospective
or prospective effect:
"(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement
authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application
of the new standards."

ANTIPORDA v. GARCHITORENA
Nature: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order to restrain the 1st Division Sandiganbayan from further proceeding with Crim. Case No. 24339 and
from enforcing the warrants of arrest or to maintain the status quo until further orders from this Court.

Facts:
· Municipal Mayor Antiporda and others were charged with the crime of kidnapping one Elmer
Ramos. It was filed with the First Division of the Sandiganbayan. The Information reads as follows:
“That on September 1, 1995, in Sanchez Mira, Cagayan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused Eliterio Rubiaco, Caesar Talla, Vicente Gascon and Licerio Antiporda, Jr…did
then and there… kidnap Elmer Ramos from his residence in Marzan, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan against his
will with the use of a Maroon Tamaraw FX motor vehicle…“
· Sandiganbaya ordered the prosecution to submit an amendment to the Information:
[Sandiganbayan] expressed anxiety as to the Court's jurisdiction over the case considering that it
was not clear whether or not the subject matter of the accusation was office related.
For this purpose, Prosecutor Agcaoili is given 30 days to submit the amendment embodying whatever
changes necessary in order for the Information to effectively describe the offense herein charged...
· The prosecution filed an Amended Information:
“That on September 10, 1997, at Sanchez Mira, Cagayan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the accused Licerio Antiporda, Jr., being the Municipal Mayor of Buguey, Cagayan in the exercise of
his official duties as such and taking advantage of his position, ordered, confederated and conspired
with Juan Gallardo, Barangay Captain of San Lorenzo, Buguey, Cagayan (now deceased) and
accused Eliterio Rubiaco, barangay councilman of San Lorenzo, Buguey, Cagayan, Vicente Gascon
and Caesar Talla… kidnap and abduct the victim Elmer Ramos… and detain him illegally at the residence
of Antiporda for more than five (5) days.”
· Accused then filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that a reinvestigation of the case be
conducted and the issuance of warrants of arrest be deferred.
· Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto denied the Omnibus Motion.
· The accused filed a Motion for New Preliminary Investigation and to Hold in Abeyance and/or
Recall Warrant of Arrest Issued which was also denied "on the ground that there was nothing in the
Amended Information that was added… so that the accused could not claim a right to be heard
separately in an investigation in the Amended Information.
· Also, the Court ruled that "since none of the accused have submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the Court, the accused are not in a position to be heard on this matter at this time"
· The accused filed a Motion to Quash the Amended Information for lack of jurisdiction over the
offense charged.
· Sandiganbayan ignored the Motion to Quash since the accused have continually refused to
submit themselves to the jurisdiction of this Court.
· A MR was filed wherein it was alleged that the filing of the Motion to Quash and the appearance
of their counsel during the scheduled hearing amounted to their voluntary appearance and invested
the court with jurisdiction over their persons.
· Sandiganbayan denied the MR.
Issues:
a) Can the Sandiganbayan, which has no jurisdiction as charged in the original complaint, acquire
jurisdiction through the amendment of Information? NO, petitioners barred by estoppel.
Sandiganbayan Jurisdiction
· Sec. 4, par (a) of P.D. 1606, as amended by P.D. 1861:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office…
· Criminal Jurisdiction Requisites:
(1) the offense is one which the court is by law authorized to take cognizance of (SUBJECT MATTER)
(2) the offense must have been committed within its territorial jurisdiction (VENUE OR TERRITORY)
(3) the person charged with the offense must have been brought in to its forum for trial (PERSON OF
THE ACCUSED)
a) forcibly by warrant of arrest
b) or upon his voluntary submission to the court.
PERSON OF THE ACCUSED
· Petitioners:
o Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction since the original information did not allege that one of the
petitioners, took advantage of his position as mayor.
o Court lacking jurisdiction cannot order the amendment of the information.
· Court:
o They cannot question the assumption of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan because they insist that
said court acquired jurisdiction over their motion to quash.
SUBJECT MATTER
WON the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the offense charged?
· NO. The original Information did not mention that the offense committed by the accused is
office-related.
· BUT, the petitioners are estopped for in the MR filed with the Sandiganbayan, it was they
who "challenged the jurisdiction of the RTC over the case and clearly stated in their MR that the
said crime is work connected.
· A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent,
and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
· Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case because of estoppel and it was thus vested with
the authority to order the amendment of the Information.

b) Can the amended information be allowed without conducting anew a preliminary investigation for the
graver offense charged therein?
· Reinvestigation is not necessary anymore. It is proper only if the accused's substantial
rights would be impaired. The amendments merely describe the public positions and where the
victim was brought when he was kidnapped.
· A preliminary investigation is essentially inquisitorial. It is not a trial of the case on the
merits and but determines only whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty.

· The purpose of a preliminary investigation has been achieved already and we see no cogent nor
compelling reason why a reinvestigation should still be conducted.

Facts:
Accused Mayor Licerio Antiporda and others were charged for the crime of kidnapping, the case was filed
in the first division of Sandiganbayan. Subsequently, the Court ordered the prosecution to submit amended
information, which was complied evenly and the new information contained the place where the victim was
brought.
The accused filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that a reinvestigation be conducted and the issuance
of warrants of arrest be deferred but it was denied by the Ombudsman. The accused thereafter filed a
Motion for New Preliminary investigation and to hold in abeyance and/or recall warrant of arrest issued but
the same was also denied. Subsequently, the accused filed a Motion to Quash Amended Information for
lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, which was ignored for their continuous refusal to submit their
selves to the Court and after their voluntary appearance which invested the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction
over their persons, their motion for reconsideration was again denied.
Issue
(1): WON the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the offense charged.
Held: No. The original Information filed with the Sandiganbayan did not mention that the offense committed
by the accused is office-related. It was only after the same was filed that the prosecution belatedly
remembered that a jurisdictional fact was omitted therein.
However, we hold that the petitioners are estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for
in the supplemental arguments to motion for reconsideration and/or reinvestigation filed with the same
court, it was they who “challenged the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the case and clearly
stated in their Motion for Reconsideration that the said crime is work connected.
It is a well-settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against
his opponent, and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
We therefore hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case because of estoppel and it was
thus vested with the authority to order the amendment of the Information.
(2): WON reinvestigation must be made anew.
Held: No. A reinvestigation is proper only if the accused’s substantial rights would be impaired. In the
case at bar, we do not find that their rights would be unduly prejudiced if the Amended Information is filed
without a reinvestigation taking place. The amendments made to the Information merely describe the
public positions held by the accused/petitioners and stated where the victim was brought when he was
kidnapped.
It must here be stressed that a preliminary investigation is essentially inquisitorial, and it is often the only
means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the prosecutor
to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except
that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe
that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the persons accused in jeopardy. It is not the
occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of such
evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation has been achieved already and we see no cogent nor compelling
reason why a reinvestigation should still be conducted.

Union Bank of the Philippines and Desi Tomas. v. People, G.R. No. 192565, Feb. 28, 2012
Crim Pro - Jurisdiction

Facts:
Union bank filed two complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against spouses Eddie
and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The first complaint was filed before the RTC, Branch 109, Pasay
City on April 13, 1998. The second complaint was filed on March 15, 2000 and was raffled in the MeTC,
Branch 47, Pasay City.

In both cases, Desi Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping. Then, she
was charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC (perjury) "by falsely declaring under oath in the
Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did not commence any other action
or proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency". The Certification was notarized in
Makati City but was submitted and used in Pasay City, while the Information against Union Bank and Tomas
was filed in Makati.

Tomas filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds that the venue was improperly laid and that the facts
do not constitute an offense. On the first ground, Tomas argued that since it is the Pasay City Court where
the Certificate was submitted and used, it should have the jurisdiction over the case against her. The MeTC-
Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over the case since the Certificate
was notarized there and the allegations in the Information sufficiently charged Tomas with perjury. Her
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

When the case was elevated to the RTC-Makati City, the petitioners prayed that the ruling of the MeTC-
Makati City be annulled and set aside on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. They also cited the
rulings in US vs. Canet and Ilusorio v. Bildner which state that "venue and jurisdiction should be in the
place where the false document was presented".

The petition, however, was found to have no merit as a recent jurisprudence, Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy.
In the Sy Tiong Shiou case, the high court ruled that the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the
court of the municipality where the perjury was committed, or where any of its essential ingredients
occured. The petitioners then filed this petition to the Supreme Court to address the seeming conflict
between the rulings in Illusorio v. Bildner and Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy.

Issue: Where is the proper venue of perjury under Art. 183 of the RPC - the place, where the Certificate
against Forum Shopping was notarized or where the Certification was presented to the trial court?
Held: The place where the Certificate was notarized, the MeTC-Makati City, is the proper venue for the
criminal action.

The criminal act charged was for the execution of an affidavit that contained a falsity. Art. 183 of the
RPC is the applicable provision for this case; and following so, the jurisdiction and venue should be
determined on the basis of this article which penalizes one who makes an affidavit upon any material matter
before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires. The
constitutive act of the offense is the making of an affidavit, so, the criminal act is consummated when the
statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly authorized person.'

The SC finds the ruling in Sy Tiong as more in accord with Art. 183 of the RPC. The Court ruled that
the crime of perjury committed through the making of a false affidavit under Art. 183 of the RPC is committed
at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements
of the crime of perjury are executed. When the crime is committed through false testimony under oath in a
proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is given.

If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor
civil, a written sown statement is submitted, venue may either be at the place where the sworn statement
is submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath and the submission are both material
ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases, the determination of venue shall be based on the acts
alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime committed.

ALL CRIMINAL ACTIONS COMMENCED BY COMPLAINT OR BY INFORMATION SHALL BE

PROSECUTED UNDER THE DIRECTION AND CONTROL OF A PUBLIC PROSECUTOR.
” In appeals of criminal cases before the CA and before this Court, the OSG is the appellate counsel of
the People, pursuant to Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code. The
People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can represent the People in criminal
proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court.(DANTE LA. JIMENEZ VS. HON. EDWIN SORONGON,
G.R. NO. 178607, DECEMBER 5, 2012, BRION, J.

Gimenez vs. Nazareno

Facts:

On 3 August 1973, Samson Suan, Alex Potot, Rogelio Mula, Fernando Cargando, Rogelio Baguio and
Teodoro de la Vega, Jr., were charged with the crime of murder. The accused were arraigned and each of
them pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Following the arraignment, the judge, Hon. Ramon E.
Nazareno, set the hearing of the case for 18 September 1973 at 1:00 p.m. All the accused were duly
informed of this. Before the scheduled date of the first hearing the de la Vega escaped from his detention
center and on the said date, failed to appear in court. This prompted the fiscals handling the case (Fiscal
Celso M. Gimenez and Federico B. Mercado) to file a motion with the lower court to proceed with the
hearing of the case against all the accused praying that de la Vega, Jr. be tried in absentia invoking the
application of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. Pursuant to the above-written provision, the
lower court proceeded with the trial of the case but nevertheless gave de ala Vega the opportunity to take
the witness stand the moment he shows up in court. After due trial, or on 6 November 1973, the lower
court rendered a decision dismissing the case against the other five accused (Suan, et. al.) while holding
in abeyance the proceedings against de la Vega. On 16 November 1973, Gimenez and Mercado filed a
Motion for Reconsideration questioning the dispositive portion of the court's decision on the ground that
it will render

nugatory the constitutional provision on "trial in absentia" cited earlier. However, this was denied by the
lower court in an Order dated 22 November 1973. Gimenez and Mercado filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether judgment upon an accused tried should be in abeyance pending the appearance of the
accused before the court.

Held: The second part of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides that a "trial in absentia"
may be had when the following requisites are present:

(1) that there has been an arraignment

(2) that the accused has been notified;

(3) that he fails to appear and his failure to do so is unjustified.

Herein, all the above conditions were attendant calling for a trial in absentia. De la Vega was arraigned on
22 August 1973 and in the said arraignment he pleaded not guilty. He was also informed of the scheduled
hearings set on September 18 and 19, 1973 and this is evidenced by his signature on the notice issued by
the lower court. It was also proved by a certified copy of the Police Blotter that de la Vega escaped from
his detention center. No explanation for his failure to appear in court in any of the scheduled hearings
was given. Even the trial court considered his absence unjustified.

The lower court correctly proceeded with the reception of the evidence of the prosecution and the other
accused in the absence of de la Vega, but it erred when it suspended the proceedings as to de la Vega and
rendered a decision as to the other accused only. Upon the termination of a trial in absentia, the court
has the duty to rule upon the evidence presented in court. The court need not wait for the time until the
accused who escape from custody finally decides to appear in court to present his evidence and cross-
examine the witnesses against him. To allow the delay of proceedings for this purpose is to render
ineffective the constitutional provision on trial in absentia. Still, the accused remain to be presumed
innocent, a judgment of conviction must still be based upon the evidence presented in court, and such
evidence must prove him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. There can be no violation of due process since
the accused was given the opportunity to be heard. By his failure to appear during the trial of which he
had notice, he virtually waived the rights to cross-examine and to present evidence on his behalf. Thus,
an escapee who has been duly tried in absentia waives his right to present evidence on his own behalf
and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testified against him.

Doctrine: The trial against the fugitives, just like those of the others, should have been brought to its
ultimate conclusion. Thereafter, the trial court had the duty to rule on the evidence presented by the
prosecution against all the accused and to render its judgment accordingly. It should not wait for the
fugitives’ re-appearance or re-arrest. They were deemed to have waived their right to present evidence
on their own behalf and to confront and cross-examine the witnesses who testified against them
Fukuzume vs People (2005) G.R. 143647

Facts:
Sometime in July 1991, Yu, a businessman engaged in buying and selling aluminum scrap wires,
accompanied by Jovate, went to the house of Fukuzume in Parañaque. Jovate introduced Fukuzume to Yu
telling the latter that Fukuzume is from Furukawa Electric Corporation and that he has at his disposal
aluminum scrap wires. Fukuzume confirmed this information and told Yu that the scrap wires belong to
Furukawa but they are under the care of NAPOCOR. Believing Fukuzume’s representation to be true, Yu
agreed to buy the aluminum scrap wires from Fukuzume. This transaction later turned uneventful as
Fukuzume failed to comply his undertaking to return Yu’s money when Yu was refused by NAPOCOR,
thus, prompting Yu to file an estafa case.
Upon arraignment, Fukuzume pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued, finding the accused guilty as charged.
Aggrieved by the trial court’s decision, he appealed to CA but CA affirmed the trial courts’ decision modifying
only the penalty, hence, the petition before the SC.

Issue: WON the trial court of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged.

Held: SC answered on the negative. We agree with Fukuzume’s contention that the CA erred in ruling
that the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged.
The CA ruled on the basis of the sworn statement of Yu filed with the NBI and the affidavit subscribed by
Fukuzume. With respect to the sworn statement of Yu, which was presented in evidence by the prosecution,
it is clear that he alleged that he gave Fukuzume the amount of P50,000.00 at the Intercontinental Hotel in
Makati. However, we agree with Fukuzume’s contention that Yu testified during his direct examination that
he gave the amount of P50,000.00 to Fukuzume in the latter’s house. It is not disputed that Fukuzume’s
house is located in Parañaque.
Settled is the rule that whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness
in court, the testimony commands greater weight considering that affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to
testimony given in court, the former being almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate.
More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to establish that he gave any
money to Fukuzume or transacted business with him with respect to the subject aluminum scrap wires
inside or within the premises of the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or anywhere in Makati for that matter.
Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. Citing Uy vs. Court of Appeals: However,
if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the
court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.
The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati. However, aside from the
sworn statement executed by Yu, the prosecution presented no other evidence, testimonial or documentary,
to corroborate Yu’s sworn statement or to prove that any of the above-enumerated elements of the offense
charged was committed in Makati. From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that
Fukuzume committed the crime of estafa in Makati or that any of the essential ingredients of the offense
took place in the said city. Hence, the judgment of the trial court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa
should be set aside for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to the filing of appropriate charges
with the court of competent jurisdiction.