TAÑADA VS.

TUVERA

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as
the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official
Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and
administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the
case, contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute
becomes valid and enforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of
this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are
to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication,
there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem
excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for
the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the
Official Gazette…. The word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an
imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be
informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a

requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by
law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court
declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not been
published have no force and effect.
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985.
Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it
was “otherwise” as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws
which are not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does
not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or
in any other date, without its previous publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply
to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion
of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid,
the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only
to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the
public of the content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official
Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is
not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it
impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the
shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules
cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a
valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people.
The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the
naked blade is drawn.

Commissioner of Customs vs. Hypermix Feeds Corporation, G.R. No. 179579,

February 1, 2012.
Tariff and Customs Code; Revised Administrative Code Customs Memorandum Order
No. 27-2003. Customs Memorandum Order No. 27-2003 (CMO 23-2007) is invalid. The
Commissioner of Customs (1) violated the right to due process in the issuance of CMO
27-2003 when he failed to observe the requirements under the Revised Administrative
Code, (2) violated the right to equal protection of laws when he provided for an
unreasonable classification in the application of the regulation, and (3) went beyond his
powers of delegated authority when the regulation limited the powers of the customs
officer to examine and assess imported articles. CMO 27-2003 was issued without
following the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code on public participation, prior
notice, and publication or registration with the University of the Philippines Law Center.
For tariff purposes, CMO 27-2003 classified wheat according to the following: (1)
importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge. This is a violation
of the equal protection clause under the Constitution. The Court does not see how the
quality of wheat is affected by who imports it, where it is discharged, or which country it
came from. Thus, on the one hand, even if other millers excluded from CMO 27-2003
have imported food grade wheat, the product would still be declared as feed grade
wheat, a classification subjecting them to 7% tariff. On the other hand, even if the
importers listed under CMO 27-2003 have imported feed grade wheat, they would only
be made to pay 3% tariff, thus depriving the state of the taxes due. The regulation,
therefore, does not become disadvantageous to respondent only, but even to the state.
Section 1403 of the Tariff and Customs Law, as amended mandates that the customs
officer must first assess and determine the classification of the imported article before
tariff may be imposed. Unfortunately, CMO 23-2007 has already classified the article
even before the customs officer had the chance to examine it. Finally, Commissioner of
Customs diminished the powers granted by the Tariff and Customs Code with regard to
wheat importation when it no longer required the customs officer’s prior examination
and assessment of the proper classification of the wheat.

NMSMI vs. DND, G.R. NO. 187587, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 359

Petitioner: Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc.

Respondents: Department of National Defense (DND)
Military Shrine Services - Philippine Veterans Affairs Office,

Facts:
Former President Marcos issued a proclamation which excludes a certain area in
a parcel of land previously reserved for military purposes and declared it open for
disposition. The proclamation includes three barangays (Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan
and Signal Village) in its body and another barangay (Western Bicutan) contained at the
bottom through a handwritten addendum by the President. Said proclamation was
published in the Official Gazette without the hand written addendum.
Issue:
Whether or not the handwritten addendum is an integral part of the proclamation.
Held:
No, the handwritten addendum has no legal force and effect due to lack of the
required publication in the Official Gazette. Publication must be in full or it is no publication
at all for the purpose that it should inform the public of the contents of the law. Pursuant
to Article 2 of the Civil Code, the requirement of publication is indispensable in the
effectivity of a law unless otherwise provided by the law itself.

214 Phil. 385

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is an appeal by defendants from a Decision rendered by the then Court of First
Instance of Bulacan. The appeal was originally taken to the then Court of Appeals,
which endorsed it to this instance stating that the issue involved was one of law.
It appears that on or about September 7, 1957, plaintiff loaned P10,000.00, without
interest, to defendant partnership and defendant Elino Lee Chi, as the managing
partner. The loan became ultimately due on January 31, 1960, but was not paid on that
date, with the debtors asking for an extension of three months, or up to April 30, 1960.
On March 17, 1960, the parties executed another loan document. Payment of the
P10,000.00 was extended to April 30, 1960, but the obligation was increased by
P6,000.00 as follows:
"That the sum of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00), Philippine currency shall form
part of the principal obligation to answer for attorney's fees, legal interest, and other cost
incident thereto to be paid unto the creditor and his successors in interest upon the
termination of this agreement."
Defendants again failed to pay their obligation by April 30, 1960 and, on September 23,
1960, plaintiff instituted this collection case. Defendants admitted the P10,000.00
principal obligation, but claimed that the additional P6,000.00 constituted usurious
interest.
Upon application of plaintiff, the Trial Court issued, on the same date of September 23,
1960, a Writ of Attachment on real and personal properties of defendants located at
Karanglan, Nueva Ecija. After the Writ of Attachment was implemented, proceedings
before the Trial Court versed principally in regards to the attachment.
On January 18, 1961, an Order was issued by the Trial Court stating that "after
considering the manifestations of both counsel in Chambers, the Court hereby allows
both parties to simultaneously submit a Motion for Summary Judgment.[1] The plaintiff
filed his Motion for Summary Judgment on January 31, 1961, while defendants filed
theirs on February 2, 1961.[2]
On June 26, 1961, the Trial Court rendered decision ordering defendants to pay plaintiff
"the amount of P10,000.00 plus the further sum of P6,000.00 by way of liquidated
damages .... with legal rate of interest on both amounts from April 30, 1960." It is from
this judgment that defendants have appealed.
We have decided to affirm.
Under Article 1354 of the Civil Code, in regards to the agreement of the parties relative
to the P6,000.00 obligation, "it is presumed that it exists and is lawful, unless the debtor
proves the contrary". No evidentiary hearing having been held, it has to be concluded
that defendants had not proven that the P6,000.00 obligation was illegal. Confirming the
Trial Court's finding, we view the P6,000.00 obligation as liquidated damages suffered
by plaintiff, as of March 17, 1960, representing loss of interest income, attorney's fees
and incidentals.
The main thrust of defendants' appeal is the allegation in their Answer that the
P6,000.00 constituted usurious interest. They insist the claim of usury should have been
deemed admitted by plaintiff as it was "not denied specifically and under oath".[3]
Section 9 of the Usury Law (Act 2655) provided:
"SEC. 9. The person or corporation sued shall file its answer in writing under oath to any
complaint brought or filed against said person or corporation before a competent court
to recover the money or other personal or real property, seeds or agricultural products,
charged or received in violation of the provisions of this Act. The lack of taking an oath
to an answer to a complaint will mean the admission of the facts contained in the latter."
The foregoing provision envisages a complaint filed against an entity which has
committed usury, for the recovery of the usurious interest paid. In that case, if the entity
sued shall not file its answer under oath denying the allegation of usury, the defendant
shall be deemed to have admitted the usury. The provision does not apply to a case, as
in the present, where it is the defendant, not the plaintiff, who is alleging usury.
Moreover, for sometime now, usury has been legally non-existent. Interest can now be
charged as lender and borrower may agree upon.[4]The Rule of Court in regards to
allegations of usury, procedural in nature, should be considered repealed with
retroactive effect.
"Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retrospective in that sense and to that extent."[5]
"x x x. Section 24(d), Republic Act No. 876, known as the Arbitration Law, which took
effect on 19 December 1953, and may be retroactively applied to the case at bar
because it is procedural in nature x x x ."[6]
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to
costs. SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., and De La Fuente, JJ., concur.

Spouses Augusto G. Dacudao and Ofelia R. Dacudao, Petitioners, vs. Secretary of

Justice Raul M. Gonzales of the Department of Justice, Respondent
G.R. No. 188056; January 8, 2013

Facts: The petitioners filed a case of syndicated estafa against Celso Delos Angeles
and his associates after the petitioners were defrauded in a business venture.
Thereafter, the DOJ Secretary issued Department Order 182 which directs all
prosecutors in the country to forward all cases already filed against Celso Delos
Angeles, Jr. and his associates to the secretariat of DOJ in Manila for appropriate
action. However, in a separate order which is Memorandum dated March 2009, it was
said that cases already filed against Celso Delos Angeles et. al of the Legacy Group of
Companies in Cagayan De Oro City need not be sent anymore to the Secretariat of
DOJ in Manila. Because of such DOJ orders, the complaint of petitioners was forwarded
to the secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ in Manila. Aggrieved, Spouses
Dacudao filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing to the
respondent Secretary of justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing the department
Order and the Memorandum, which according to the violated their right to due process,
right to equal protection of the law and right to speedy disposition of the cases. The
petitioners opined that orders were unconstitutional or exempting from coverage cases
already filed and pending at the Prosecutor’s Office of Cagayan De Oro City. They
contended that the assailed issuances should cover only future cases against Delos
Angeles, Jr., et al, not those already being investigated. They maintained that DO 182
was issued in violation of the prohibition against passing laws with retroactive effect.

Issue: Whether or not the assailed issuances can be given retroactive effect.

Ruling: Yes. As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However,
exceptions exist, and one such exception concerns a law that is procedural in nature.
The reason is that a remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of
procedure does not create new rights or take away vested rights but operates only in
furtherance of the remedy or the confirmation already existing rights. The retroactive
application is not violative of any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, for,
no vested right generally attaches to or arises from procedural law.

People of the Philippines vs Judge Donato & Rodolfo Salas

Salas aka NPA’s “Ka Bilog” was arrested and was charged for rebellion. He was charged
together with the spouses Concepcion. Salas, together with his co-accused later filed a
petition for the WoHC. A conference was held thereafter to hear each party’s side. It was
later agreed upon by both parties that Salas will withdraw his petition for the WoHC and
that he will remain in custody for the continued investigation of the case and that he will
face trial. The SC then, basing on the stipulations of the parties, held to dismiss the
habeas corpus case filed by Salas. But later on, Salas filed to be admitted for bail and
Judge Donato approved his application for bail. Judge Donato did not bother hearing the
side of the prosecution. The prosecution argued that Salas is estopped from filing bail
because he has waived his right to bail when he withdrew his petition or habeas corpus
as a sign of agreement that he will be held in custody.
ISSUE: Whether or not Salas can still validly file for bail.
HELD: The SC ruled that Salas did waive his right to bail when he withdrew his petition
for the issuance of the WoHC. The contention of the defense that Salas merely agreed to
be in custody and that the same does not constitute a waiver of his right to bail is not
tenable. His waiver to such right is justified by his act of withdrawing his petition for WoHC.

Felisa De Roy vs Court of Appeals

The firewall of a burned out building owned by Felisa De Roy collapsed and destroyed
the tailoring shop occupied by the family of Luis Bernal resulting in injuries and even to
the death of Bernal’s daughter. De Roy claimed that Bernal had been warned prior hand
but that she was ignored.
In the RTC, De Roy was found guilty of gross negligence. She appealed but the Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTC. On the last day of filing a motion for reconsideration, De Roy’s
counsel filed a motion for extension. It was denied by the CA. The CA ruled that pursuant
to the case of Habaluyas Enterprises vs Japzon (August 1985), the fifteen-day period for
appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.
De Roy’s counsel however argued that the Habaluyas case should not be applicable
because said ruling was never published in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE: Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be published in the Official
Gazette before they can be binding.
HELD: No. There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decision in the
Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective.
It is bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions
of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated
and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such
publications as the SCRA and law journals.

BENJAMIN G. TING,
Petitioner,
- versus -
CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING,
Respondent.

G.R. No. 166562

March 31, 2009

Facts:
Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez-Ting first met in 1972 while they were classmates in
medical school. They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when
respondent was already pregnant with their first child. On October 21, 1993, after being
married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their youngest child was only two
years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed
that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration
of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter.
Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted of the following
manifestations:
1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his
profession;
2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to sell
the family car twice and the property he inherited from his father in order to pay off his
debts, because he no longer had money to pay the same; and
4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give
regular financial support to his family.

In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that

he is a respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He also pointed out that it was he
who often comforted and took care of their children, while Carmen played mahjong with
her friends twice a week. Both presented expert witnesses (psychiatrist) to refute each
others claim. RTC ruled in favor of the respondent declaring the marriage null and void.

Petitioner appealed to the CA. CA reversed RTC’s decision. Respondent filed a motion
for reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this case

Issues:
1. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the
guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina cases,

2. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological
incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the
Family Code has been liberalized,

3. Whether the CAs decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent
null and void is in accordance with law and jurisprudence.

Held:
1. No. respondent’s argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and
Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare
decisis is no longer new.

2. The Case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged
not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to
its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

3. There is no evidence that adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is

psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and more
particularly, that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the
marriage eighteen (18) years ago.
G.R. No. L-51841 June 30, 1987 REMIGIO QUIQUI, EMILIANO Q. ARELLANO,
TURCUATA Q. DIPUTADO, APOLONIA Q. SALCEDOR, LORETO QUIQUI, SUPLICIA
Q. CHAN, ELDEGUNDA Q. MONASTERIO, ELSA Q. ARBON, and ANTIPAS Q.
YANG, Petitioners, -versusThe Honorable Judge ALEJANDRO R. BONCAROS of
Branch V, Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, ESTEFANIA G. AMOLO, LOPE
AMOLO, SOFIA G. ALBON, PASTOR GADINGAN, ANGEL GADINGAN, ANTERO
GADINGAN, TEOFILO GADINGAN, and FELICITAS GADINGAN, Respondents. X-------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
FACTS:
1. The petition is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, which concerns a
parcel of land situated in Barangay Cabangan, Siaton, Negors Oriental with an area of
450 square meters.
2. Said parcel of land is a portion of Lot No. 3217, Pls-659-D covered by Free Patent
Title No. FV-1703.
3. On May 22, 1973, herein respondents were able to secure Free Patent Title No. FV-
1703 in their names, and the 450 sq.m. parcel of land was included in the survey of the
entire parcel of land covered by said Title.
4. Herein petitioners contend that the parcel of land in question belongs to them as the
same was purchased by their father sometime in 1920 and they have been in actual
possession thereof, peacefully, openly continuously and adversely for a period of 56
years already.
5. On November 9, 1976, petitioners filed a Complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Negros Oriental for reconveyance and/or annulment of Title with damages against the
private respondents.
6. In the course of proceedings of the complaint, an Order dated July 16, 1979 was
issued by the trial court, with respondent Judge Alejandro R. Boncaros, presiding,
dismissing the Complaint on the ground that it had no jurisdiction over the case, and the
counsel for the petitioners received a copy of the said Order on July 17, 1979.
7. On August 17, 1979 (31 days after receipt by the counsel of the petitioners of the
Order), the petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the trial court
dismissing the complaint.
8. Private respondents opposed petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration, stating that the
same had been filed beyond the 30-day reglementary period under the Rules, and
asserting that since the Motion was filed beyond the 30-day period, the Order of
dismissal has become final and executory, and could no longer be the subject of a
Motion for Reconsideration.
9. The trial court denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration on the grounds asserted
by respondents.
10. On August 23, 1979, the petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal seeking relief from the
Court of Appeals but the same was denied by the trial court.
11. Finding the action of the trial court unsatisfactory, the petitioners brought their case
directly to the Supreme Court by way of this petition.
ISSUES: 1. WHETHER OR NOT, the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the
trial court filed by the petitioners on August 17, 1979 was properly dismissed by the trial
court on the grounds that the same had been filed beyond the 30-day reglementary
period.
RULING:
1. According to Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken by
serving upon the adverse party and filing with the trial court within thirty (30) days from
notice of order or judgment. Petitioners, admitting that they received their copy of the
Order of dismissal of their Complaint on July 17, 1979, had 30 days within which to
appeal their case, the 30th day falling on August 16, 1979;
2. Since petitioners filed their appeal or Motion for Reconsideration on August 17, 2015,
one day late from the last day of filing, the order of the trial court has become final and
executory and is beyond the reach of such Motion for Reconsideration;
3. The Notice of Appeal was properly denied as the perfection of an appeal in the
manner and within the period laid down by law is mandatory.
4. Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Van Dorn vs Romillo (G.R. No. L-68470)

Posted: August 8, 2011 in Civil Law
Tags: Divorce, Marriage, Nationality Principle 0
Nationality Principle – Divorce

FACTS:
Petitioner Alice Reyes is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen
of the United States; they were married in Hongkong. Thereafter, they established their
residence in the Philippines and begot two children. Subsequently, they were divorced
in Nevada, United States, and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to
Theodore Van Dorn.

Private respondent filed suit against petitioner, stating that petitioner’s business in
Manila is their conjugal property; that petitioner he ordered to render accounting of the
business and that private respondent be declared to manage the conjugal property.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case contending that the cause of action is barred by
the judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court. The denial now is the
subject of the certiorari proceeding.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the divorce obtained by the parties is binding only to the alien spouse.

HELD:

Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American Law, under which
divorce dissolves the marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the decision of his
own country’s court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision
he does not repudiate, he is stopped by his own representation before said court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

Issue:
Whether there is an effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged
conjugal property in the Philippines.

Held:

It is not necessary to determine the property relations between petitioner and

private respondent after their marriage, whether absolute or relative community
property, complete separation of property or any other regime. The pivotal fact in this
case is that the Nevada divorce of the parties that the Nevada Court obtained
jurisdiction over the petitioner and private respondent.

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO v. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, GR No.

193707, 2014-12-10
Facts:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem
contracted marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990.[2] On January 19, 1994, they
were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the
filing of the... instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.[3]
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce
Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland.[4] At that time, their son was only
eighteen (18) months old.[5] Thereafter, petitioner and her son... came home to the
Philippines.[6]
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their
son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene
However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in... the Philippines, respondent
never gave support to the son, Roderigo.[8]
Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in
Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been residing thereat.
To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu
City.[11]
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for
support from respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter.[12]
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit with the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City
Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure
Order against respondent.[16] Consequently, respondent was arrested and,
subsequently, posted bail.
Petitioner also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order
Subsequently,... respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,[21] dismissing
the instant criminal case against respondent
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order[25] denying petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration
Issues:
Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law
Ruling:
We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully agree with petitioner's
contentions.
we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195[34] of the New Civil
Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and
duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with
the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to
whether... he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his
failure to do so.[37]
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner's
son under Article 195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant
obtained in Holland.
This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support... petitioner's
son altogether.
In view of respondent's failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor,
the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign
law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign
law is... the same as our local or domestic or internal law.[44] Thus, since the law of the
Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and
proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which...
enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-
compliance therewith.
the
Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely show that he is not
liable to give support to his son after the divorce decree was issued.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of
respondent states that parents have no obligation to support their children or that such
obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still not find applicability,...
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those
which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a... foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in
our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.
Principles:
the doctrine of processual presumption

Maria Cristina Bellis vs Edward Bellis

Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United States. By his first wife
whom he divorced he had five legitimate children (Edward Bellis et al), by his second wife,
who survived him, he had three legitimate children. He, however, also had three
illegitimate children in the Philippines (Maria Cristina Bellis et al). Before he died, he made
two wills, one disposing of his Texas properties and the other disposing his Philippine
properties. In both wills, his illegitimate children were not given anything. The illegitimate
children opposed the will on the ground that they have been deprived of their legitimes to
which they should be entitled, if Philippine law were to be applied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the
successional rights of the illegitimate children.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that the said children, maria Kristina et al, are not
entitled to their legitimes under the Texas Law, being the national law of the deceased,
there are no legitimes.

S O L E D AD L . L AV AD I A v s . H E I R S O F J U AN L U C E S L U N A,
r e p r e s e n t e d b yGREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA ZABALLERO-LUNA, G.R. No.
171914, July 23, 2014, J. Lucas P. Bersamin
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule
adopted byPhilippine law. Hence, any settlement of property between the parties
of the first marriageinvolving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce
obtained in a foreign country lackscompetent judicial approval, and cannot be
enforceable against the assets of the husband whocontracts a subsequent
marriage.Atty. Luna’s subsequent marriage to Soledad was void for being bigamous,
on the ground thatthe marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not been
dissolved by the Divorce Decreerendered by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the
Dominican Republic but had subsisted until thedeath of Atty. Luna.Given the
subsistence of the first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the
presumptionthat Atty. Luna acquired the properties out of his own personal funds
and effort remained. Itshould then be justly concluded that the properties in litis
legally pertained to their conjugalpartnership of gains as of the time of his death.
Consequently, the sole ownership of the 25/100pro indiviso share of Atty. Luna in the
condominium unit, and of the law books pertained to therespondents as the lawful heirs
of Atty. Luna.

WASSMER VS. VELEZ

G.R. No. L-20089

December 26, 1964

By: Karen P. Lustica

Facts: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love
decided to get married on September 4, 1954. On the day of the supposed marriage,
Velez left a note for his bride-to-be that day to postpone their wedding because his
mother opposes it. Therefore, Velez did not appear and was not heard from again.

Beatriz sued Velez for damages and Velez failed to answer and was declared in default.
Judgement was rendered ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff P2.000 as actual
damages P25,000 as moral and exemplary damages, P2,500 as attorney’s fees.

Later, an attempt by the Court for amicable settlement was given chance but failed,
thereby rendered judgment hence this appeal.
In support of his “motion for new trial and reconsideration,” defendant asserts that the
judgment is contrary to law. The reason given is that “there is no provision of the Civil
Code authorizing” an action for breach of promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling in
Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs.
Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that “mere breach of a promise to marry” is not an
actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of
the new Civil Code the provisions that would have it so.

Issue: Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong in this case.

Held: YES.

Ratio: The Court admitted that under Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, ordinarily, a
mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. However, it said that “the
extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, was not
limitless” because of Article 21 of the NCC.

“any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”

The Court found that on August 23, 1954, Wassmer and Velez applied for a license to
conrtract marriage, the wedding was set for September 4, 1954 and invitations were
printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances.

In addition, the bride-to-be’s trousseau, party drsrses and other apparel for the
important occasion were purchased. Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl
were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were
given and gifts received. And then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant,
who was then 28 years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating: “Will have to postpone
wedding — My mother opposes it … ” He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and
the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: “Nothing changed rest
assured returning soon.” But he never returned and was never heard from again.

The Court ruled that this was not a case of mere breach to marry.

As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally
set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to
walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is
palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held
answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.

Hence, although Velez did not violate any law in abandoning his fiancée, he was
ordered to pay damages because he exhibited behavior that was contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy. It may also argued that the Court awarded damages
because of the public humiliation suffered by Wassmer and her family.

Joyce Ardiente v. Spouses Javier and Ma. Theresa Pastorfide, Cagayan De Oro Water
District and Gaspar Gonzales, Jr. GR. NO. 161921, July 17, 2013
"Principle of Abuse of Rights" - Article 19 of the Civil Code

FACTS:

Ma. Theresa Pastorfide entered a MOA with Joyce Ardiente where the latter sold,
conveyed, and transferred all their rights and interests in the Emily Homes Housing unit
to the former. It has been agreed by the parties that the water bill will remain in the
account of Ardiente. On March 12, 1999, Ma. Theresa's water supply was disconnected
without notice. She complained to the Cagayan De Oro Water District (COWD) and she
found out that the account has become delinquent. She paid the three months due and
wrote a letter through her counsel to the COWD to explain why her water supply was
cut without notice.
The general manager of the COWD, Gaspar Gonzalez, replied that it was Joyce
Ardiente who requested the disconnection of the water supply. A complaint for damages
was filed against Ardiente, COWD and Gonzalez by Ma. Theresa. The RTC ruled in
favor of Ma. Theresa on the ground that the defendants committed abuse of their rights.
The ruling was upheld by the CA on appeal with modification on the award of the
amount for damages.Hence this petition before the SC.

ISSUE:

Are the defendants liable for damages?

RULING:

Yes. The court ruled that the principle of abuse of rights under Section 19 of the Civil
Code was violated. It provides that "every person must, in the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith."

A right, although it is legal for being recognized by law as such, may nevertheless
become the source of illegality (Globe Mackay and Radio Corporation v CA), when it is
exercised in a manner that does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and
the same causes damage to another. The person exercising an abuse of right is thus
liable for damages caused to another. The herein petitioner is liable for damages by
ordering the cutting of the water supply of the respondent without giving notice about
such intention. The COWD and Gonzalez are likewise liable for damages by
disconnecting the water supply without prior notice and for their subsequent neglect of
reconnecting the water supply even when the respondent already paid the delinquent
account.

Gashem Shookat Baksh vs Court of Appeals

In August 1986, while working as a waitress in Dagupan City, Pangasinan, Marilou

Gonzales, then 21 years old, met Gashem Shookat Baksh, a 29 year old exchange
student from Iran who was studying medicine in Dagupan. The two got really close and
intimate. On Marilou’s account, she said that Gashem later offered to marry her at the
end of the semester. Marilou then introduced Gashem to her parents where they
expressed their intention to get married. Marilou’s parents then started inviting sponsors
and relatives to the wedding. They even started looking for animals to slaughter for the
occasion.
Meanwhile, Marilou started living with Gashem in his apartment where they had sexual
intercourse. But in no time, their relationship went sour as Gashem began maltreating
Marilou. Gashem eventually revoked his promise of marrying Marilou and he told her that
he is already married to someone in Bacolod City. So Marilou went home and later sued
Gashem for damages.
The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou and awarded her P20k in moral damages. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
On appeal, Gashem averred that he never proposed marriage to Marilou and that he
cannot be adjudged to have violated Filipino customs and traditions since he, being an
Iranian, was not familiar with Filipino customs and traditions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.
HELD: Yes. Gashem is liable to pay for damages in favor of Marilou not really because
of his breach of promise to marry her but based on Article 21 of the Civil Code which
provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. In this case, it is the deceit
and fraud employed by Gashem that constitutes a violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code.
His promise of marrying Marilou was a deceitful scheme to lure her into sexual congress.
As found by the trial court, Marilou was not a woman of loose morals. She was a virgin
before she met Gashem. She would not have surrendered herself to Gashem had
Gashem not promised to marry her. Gashem’s blatant disregard of Filipino traditions on
marriage and on the reputation of Filipinas is contrary to morals, good customs, and public
policy. As a foreigner who is enjoying the hospitality of our country and even taking
advantage of the opportunity to study here he is expected to respect our traditions. Any
act contrary will render him liable under Article 21 of the Civil Code.
The Supreme Court also elucidated that Article 21 was meant to expand the concepts of
torts and quasi delict. It is meant to cover situations such as this case where the breach
complained of is not strictly covered by existing laws. It was meant as a legal remedy for
the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically
enumerate and punish in the statute books – such as the absence of a law penalizing a
the breach of promise to marry.
The Supreme Court however agreed with legal luminaries that if the promise to marry
was made and there was carnal knowledge because of it, then moral damages may be
recovered (presence of moral or criminal seduction), Except if there was mutual lust; or if
expenses were made because of the promise (expenses for the wedding), then actual
damages may be recovered.
UYPITCHING V. QUIAMCO 510 SCRA 172 (2007)
Honeste vivere, non alterum laedere et jus suum cuique tribuere.
To live virtuously, not to injure others and to give everyone his due. These supreme
norms of justice are the underlying principles of law and order in society.
FACTS:
· In 1982, respondent Quiamco was approached by Davalan, Gabutero and
Generoso to settle the civil aspect of a criminal case for robbery filed by Quiamco
against them.
· They surrendered to him a red Honda motorcycle and a photocopy of its
certificate of registration. Respondent asked for the original certificate of registration but
the three accused never came to see him again.
· Meanwhile, the motorcycle was parked in an open space inside respondent‘s
business establishment, where it was visible and accessible to the public.
· It turned out that, in October 1981, the motorcycle had been sold on installment
basis to Gabutero by Uypitching Sons, Inc. And to secure its payment, the motorcycle
was mortgaged to petitioner corporation.
· When Gabutero could no longer pay the installments, Davalan assumed the
obligation and continued the payments.
· In September 1982, however, Davalan stopped paying the remaining
installments.
· Nine years later, petitioner Uypitching, accompanied by policemen, went to
Avesco-AVNE Enterprises to recover the motorcycle.
· The leader of the police team talked to the clerk in charge and asked for
respondent. While P/Lt. Vendiola and the clerk were talking, petitioner Uypitching paced
back and forth inside the establishment uttering "Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle."
· Unable to find respondent, the policemen on petitioner Uypitching‘s
instructionand over the clerk‘s objection, took the motorcycle.
· Petitioner Uypitching filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or violation
of the Anti-Fencing Law against respondent but was dismissed.
· Respondent filed an action for damages against petitioners in the RTC
· The trial court rendered a decision finding that petitioner Uypitching was
motivated with malice and ill will when he called respondent a thief, took the motorcycle
in an abusive manner and filed a baseless complaint for qualified theft and/or violation
of the Anti-Fencing Law
· Petitioners appealed the RTC decision but the CA affirmed the trial court‘s
decision.

ISSUE:
WON the filing of a complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law
warranted the award of moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney‘s fees and costs
in favor of respondent.

HELD: YES.
They were held liable for damages not only for instituting a groundless complaint
against respondent but also for making a slanderous remark and for taking the
motorcycle from respondent’s establishment in an abusive manner .Petitioners Abused
Their Right of Recovery as Mortgagee(s)
A mortgagee may take steps to recover the mortgaged property to enable it to enforce
or protect its foreclosure right there on. There is, however, a well-defined procedure for
the recovery of possession of mortgaged property: if a mortgagee is unable to obtain
possession of a mortgaged property for its sale on foreclosure, he must bring a civil
action either to recover such possession as a preliminary step to the sale, or to obtain
judicial foreclosure .Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil action
necessary to acquire legal possession of the motorcycle. Instead, petitioner Uypitching
descended on respondent‘s establishment with his policemen and ordered the seizure
of the motorcycle without a search warrant or court order. Worse, in the course of the
illegal seizure of the motorcycle, petitioner Uypitching even mouthed a slanderous
statement.
Petitioners‘ acts violated the law as well as public morals, and transgressed the proper
norms of human relations.
The basic principle of human relations, embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code .Article
19, also known as the "principle of abuse of right," prescribes that a person should not
use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith ,otherwise he opens himself
to liability. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure
another.
The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was
established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh;
there must be nointention to harm another.
In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at petitioners‘ instance was
not only attended by bad faith but also contrary to the procedure laid down by law.
Considered in conjunction with the defamatory statement, petitioners’ exercise of the
right to recover the mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious to
respondent.

Petitioners acted in an excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice of respondent.

Palma Development Corporation vs Municipality of Malangas

413 SCRA 572 [GR No. 152492 October 16, 2003]

Facts: Petitioner Palma Development Corporation is engaged in milling and selling rice
and corn to wholesalers in Zamboanga City. It uses the municipal port of Malangas,
Zamboanga del Sur as transshipment port for its goods. The port, as well as the
surrounding roads leading to it, belong to and are maintained by the Municipality of
Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur. On January 16, 1994, the municipality passed municipal
revenue code no. 09 series of 1993, which was subsequently approved by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur in resolution no. 1330 dated August
4, 1994. Section 56.01 of the ordinance reads as follows:

Sec 56.01 Imposition of Fees. There shall be collected service fee for its use of the
municipal roads or streets leading to the wharf and to any point along the shorelines within
the jurisdiction of the municipality and for police surveillance on all goods and all
equipment harboured or sheltered in the premises of the wharf and other within the
jurisdiction of the municipality [xxx]

Accordingly, the service fees imposed by section 56.01 of the ordinance was paid by
petitioner under protest. It contended that under Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known
as the local government code of 1991, municipal governments did not have authority to
tax goods and vehicles that passed through their jurisdictions. Thereafter, before the
Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City, petitioner filed against the Municipality of Malangas
on November 29, 1995, an action for declaratory relief assailing the validity of section
56.01 of the municipal ordinance.

Issue: Whether or not the imposition of service fee is proper and valid.

Held: No. By the express language of section 153 and 155 RA 7160, local government
units, through their sanggunian, may prescribe the terms and conditions for the imposition
of toll fees or charges for the use of any public road, pier or wharf funded and constructed
by them. A service fee imposed on vehicles using municipal roads leading to the wharf is
thus valid, however, section 133 (e) of RA 7160 prohibits the imposition, in the guise of
wharfage fees — as well as other taxes or charges in any form whatsoever on goods or
merchandise. It is therefore irrelevant if the fee imposed are actually for police
surveillance on the goods, because any other form of imposition on goods passing
through the territorial jurisdiction of the municipality is clearly prohibited by section 133
(e).
G.R. No. 113216 September 5, 1997 RHODORA M. LEDESMA, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of RTC, Quezon City, respondents

Facts : Sometime in April 1992, a complaint for libel was filed by Dr. Juan F. Torres, Jr.
against Dr. Rhodora M. Ledesma, petitioner herein, before the Quezon City
Prosecutor's Office, docketed as I.S. No. 92-5433A. Petitioner filed her counter-affidavit
to the complaint. Finding "sufficient legal and factual basis," the Quezon City
Prosecutor's Office filed on July 6, 1992 an Information for libel against petitioner with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104. A petition for review of the
resolution of Assistant City Prosecutor Vestil was filed by petitioner before the
Department of Justice pursuant to P.D. No. 77 as amended by P.D. No. 911. The
Department of Justice gave due course to the petition and directed the Quezon City
prosecutor to move for deferment of further proceedings and to elevate the entire
records of the case. 5 Accordingly, a "Motion to Defer, Arraignment" dated September
7, 1992 was filed by Prosecutor Tirso M. Gavero before the court a quo. 6 On
September 9, 1992, the trial court granted the motion and deferred petitioner's
arraignment until the final termination of the petition for review. 7 Without the consent or
approval of the trial prosecutor, private complainant, through counsel, filed a Motion to
Lift the Order dated September 9, 1992 and to Set the Case for Arraignment/Trial

Issue : WON the letter is libelous

Held : In every case for libel, the following requisites must concur: (a) it must be
defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim
must be identifiable Petitioner's letter was written to seek redress of proper grievance
against the inaccurate distribution and payment of professional fees and against unfair
treatment in the Nuclear Medicine Department of the Philippine Heart Center
Petitioner's letter was written to seek redress of proper grievance against the inaccurate
distribution and payment of professional fees and against unfair treatment in the
Nuclear Medicine Department of the Philippine Heart Center. It is a qualified privileged
communication under Article 354(1) of the Revised Penal Code Petitioner's letter was a
private communication made in the performance of a moral duty on her part. Her
intention was not to inflict an unjustifiable harm on the private complainant, but to
present her grievance to her superior. The privileged nature of her letter overcomes the
presumption of malice. There is no malice when justifiable motive exists; and in the
absence of malice, there is no libel. We note that the information itself failed to allege
the existence of malice Further, we note that the information against petitioner was filed
only on July 27, 1992 or one year after June 27, 1991, the date the letter was sent. It is
obviously nothing more than a countercharge to give Complainant Torres a leverage
against petitioner's administrative action against him