G.R. No.

L-26270 October 30, 1969

BONIFACIA MATEO, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
GERVASIO LAGUA, ET AL., respondents.

Pedro P. Tuason for petitioners.

Isaiah Asuncion for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals (In CA-G.R. Nos. 30064-R and 30065-
R), raising as only issue the correctness of the appellate court's reduction of a donation propter nuptias,
for being inofficious.

The established facts of this case are as follows:

Cipriano Lagua was the original registered owner of 3 parcels of land situated in Asingan, Pangasinan,
referred to as Lot No. 998, with an area of 11,080 sq.m., more or less and covered by O.C.T. No. 362; Lot
No. 6541, with an area of 808 sq.m., more or less, covered by O.C.T. No. 6618; and Lot No. 5106, with
an area of 3,303 sq.m., covered by O.C.T. No. 8137. Sometime in 1917, Lagua and his wife Alejandra
Dumlao, in a public instrument, donated Lots 998 and 6541 to their son Alejandro Lagua, in consideration
of the latter's marriage to Bonifacia Mateo. The marriage was celebrated on 15 May 1917, and thereafter,
the couple took possession of the properties, but the Certificates of Title remained in the donor's name.

In 1923, the son, Alejandro, died. His widow, Bonifacia Mateo, and her infant daughter lived with her
father-in-law, Cipriano Lagua, who then undertook the farming of the donated lots. It seems that at the
start, Cipriano Lagua was giving to Bonifacia the owner's share of the harvest from the land. In 1926,
however, Cipriano refused to deliver the said share, thus prompting Bonifacia to resort to the Justice of
the Peace Court of Asingan, Pangasinan, from where she obtained a judgment awarding to her
possession of the two lots plus damages.

On 31 July 1941, Cipriano Lagua, executed a deed of sale of the same two parcels of land in favor of his
younger son, Gervasio. This sale notwithstanding, Bonifacia Mateo was continuously given the owner's
share of the harvest until 1956, when it was altogether stopped. It was only then that Bonifacia Mateo
learned of the sale of the lots to her brother-in-law, who had the sale in his favor registered only on 22
September 1955. As a consequence, TCT Nos. 19152 and 19153 of the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan were issued to Gervasio.

Bonifacia Mateo and her daughter, Anatalia, assisted by her husband, Luis Alcantara, went to the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan (Civil Case No. T-339), seeking annulment of the deed of sale in favor of
Gervasio Lagua and for recovery of possession of the properties. On 3 January 1957, judgment was
rendered in the case —

... declaring the sale executed by Cipriano Lagua in favor of the other defendants, Gervasio
Lagua and Sotera Casimero, as null and void and non-existent; ordering the Register of Deeds
for the Province of Pangasinan, to cancel Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 19152 and 19153;
condemning the defendants to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs the sum of P200.00;
ordering the defendants Gervasio Lagua and Sotera Lagua to vacate and deliver the possession
over the two parcels of land to the plaintiffs, and to pay the costs of this suit.

The decision became final, and Bonifacia Mateo, and her daughter, Anatalia Lagua, were installed in
possession of the land.
On 18 August 1957, the spouses Gervasio Lagua and Sotera Casimero commenced in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Asingan, Pangasinan, an action against Bonifacia Mateo and her daughter for
reimbursement of the improvements allegedly made by them on Lots 998 and 6541, plus damages.
Dismissed by the Justice of the Peace Court for being barred by the judgment in Civil Case No. T-339,
therein plaintiffs appealed to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan where the case was docketed as
Civil Case No. T-433. At about the same time, another case was filed, this time by Gervasio Lagua and
Cipriano Lagua, for annulment of the donation of the two lots, insofar as one-half portion thereof was
concerned (civil Case No. T-442). It was their claim that in donating the two lots, which allegedly were all
that plaintiff Cipriano Lagua owned, said plaintiff not only neglected leaving something for his own support
but also prejudiced the legitime of his forced heir, plaintiff Gervasio Lagua.

Being intimately related, the two cases were heard jointly. On November 12, 1958, while the cases were
pending final resolution, plaintiff Cipriano Lagua died. On 23 December 1960, the court rendered a single
decision dismissing Civil Case No. T-433 for lack of cause of action, plaintiffs spouses Gervasio Lagua
and Sotera Casimero having been declared possessors in bad faith in Civil Case No. T-339 and,
therefore, not entitled to any reimbursement of the expenses and improvements put up by them on the
land. The other suit, Civil Case No. T-442, was, likewise, dismissed on the ground of prescription, the
action to annul the donation having been brought only in 1958, or after the lapse of 41 years. Defendants'
counterclaims were similarly dismissed although they were awarded attorneys' fees in the sum of
P150.00.

Plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. Nos. 30064 and 30065-R). Said
tribunal, on 18 March 1966, affirmed the ruling of the trial court in Civil Case No. T-433 denying plaintiffs'
claim for reimbursement of the improvements said to have been made on the land. In regard to the
annulment case (C.F.I. No. T-442), however, the Court of Appeals held that the donation to Alejandro
Lagua of the 2 lots with a combined area of 11,888 square meters execeeded by 494.75 square meters
his (Alejandro's) legitime and the disposable portion that Cipriano Lagua could have freely given by will,
and, to the same extent prejudiced the legitime of Cipriano's other heir, Gervasio Lagua. The donation
was thus declared inofficious, and defendants-appellees were ordered to reconvey to plaintiff Gervasio
Lagua a portion of 494.15 square meters to be taken from any convenient part of the lots. The award of
attorneys' fees to the defendants was also eliminated for lack of proper basis.

Bonifacia Mateo, et al., then resorted to this Court, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar
as it ordered them to reconvey a portion of the lots to herein respondent Gervasio Lagua. It is petitioners'
contention that (1) the validity of the donation proper nuptias having been finally determined in Civil Case
No. T-339, any question in derogation of said validity is already barred; (2) that the action to annul the
donation, filed in 1958, or 41 years after its execution, is abated by prescription; (3) that a donation proper
nuptias is revocable only for any of the grounds enumerated in Article 132 of the new Civil Code, and
inofficiousness is not one of thorn; and (4) that in determining the legitime of the Lagua brothers in the
hereditary estate of Cipriano Lagua, the Court of Appeals should have applied the provisions of the Civil
Code of 1889, and not Article 888 of the new Civil Code.

Petitioners' first two assigned errors, it may be stated, are non-contentious issues that have no bearing in
the actual controversy in this case. All of them refer to the validity of the donation — a matter which was
definitively settled in Civil Case No. T-339 and which, precisely, was declared by the Court of Appeals to
be "beyond the realm of judicial inquiry." In reality, the only question this case presents is whether or not
the Court of Appeals acted correctly in ordering the reduction of the donation for being inofficious and in
ordering herein petitioners to reconvey to respondent Gervasio Lagua an unidentified 494.75 square-
meter portion of the donated lots.

We are in accord with the Court of Appeals that Civil Case No. 442 is not one exclusively for annulment
or revocation of the entire donation, but of merely that portion thereof allegedly trenching on the legitime
of respondent Gervasio Lagua;1 that the cause of action to enforce Gervasio's legitime, having accrued
only upon the death of his father on 12 November 1958, the dispute has to be governed by the pertinent
provisions of the new Civil Code; and that a donation proper nuptias property may be reduced for being
inofficious. Contrary to the views of appellants (petitioners), donations proper nuptias (by reason of
marriage) are without onerous consideration, the marriage being merely the occasion or motive for the
donation, not its causa. Being liberalities, they remain subject to reduction for inofficiousness upon the
donor's death, if they should infringe the legitime of a forced heir. 2

It is to be noted, however, that in rendering the judgment under review, the Court of Appeals acted on
several unsupported assumptions: that the three (3) lots mentioned in the decision (Nos. 998, 5106 and
6541) were the only properties composing the net hereditary estate of the deceased Cipriano Lagua; that
Alejandro Lagua and Gervasio Lagua were his only legal heirs; that the deceased left no unpaid debts,
charges, taxes, etc., for which the estate would be answerable.3 In the computation of the heirs' legitime,
the Court of Appeals also considered only the area, not the value, of the properties.

The infirmity in the above course of action lies in the fact that in its Article 908 the new Civil Code
specifically provides as follows:

ART. 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the testator
shall be considered, deducting all debts, and charges, which shall not include those imposed in
the will.

To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by the testator
that are subject to collation, at the time he made them.

In other words, before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it
is necessary that certain steps be taken first. The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by
deducting an payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at
the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate
thus determined, the legitimes of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only thereafter can
it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes. Certainly, in order that a
donation may be reduced for being inofficious, there must be proof that the value of the donated property
exceeds that of the disposable free portion plus the donee's share as legitime in the properties of the
donor.4 In the present case, it can hardly be said that, with the evidence then before the court, it was in
any position to rule on the inofficiousness of the donation involved here, and to order its reduction and
reconveyance of the deducted portion to the respondents.

FOR THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the decision of the Court of Appeals, insofar as Civil Case
No. 442 of the court a quo is concerned, is hereby set aside and the trial court's order of dismissal
sustained, without prejudice to the parties' litigating the issue of inofficiousness in a proper proceeding,
giving due notice to all persons interested in the estate of the late Cipriano Lagua. Without costs.

BONIFACIA MATEO vs. GERVACIO LAGUA

29 SCRA 864

October 30, 1969

FACTS:

Sometime in 1917, the parents of Alejandro Lagua donated two lots to him in
consideration of his marriage to petitioner Bonifacia Mateo. The marriage was celebrated on
May 15, 1917 and thereafter the couple took possession of the lots, but the certificates of title
remained in the donor’s name.

In 1923, Alejandro died, leaving behind his widow Bonifacia with their infant
daughter, who lived with the father-in-law Cipriano Lagua who in turn undertook to farm on
the donated lots. At first, Cipriano gave to Bonifacia the share from the lots’ harvests, but in
1926 he refused to deliver to petitioner the said share, which reason prompted her to initiate
an action and won for her possession of the lots plus damages.

On July 31, 1941, Cipriano executed a deed of sale of the said lots in favor of his
younger son, herein respondent Gervacio. Petitioner learned of this only in 1956 when
Cipriano stopped giving to petitioner her share to the harvest. A Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) was issued under respondent’s name by the Registry of Deeds (ROD) of Pangasinan.

The CFI of Pangasinan declared the TCT issued to respondent null and void and
ordered cancelled by the ROD, and for respondent to vacate and deliver the lots to
petitioner. In 1957, Gervacio and Cipriano filed with the CFI for the annulment of the donation
of the two lots. While the case was pending, Cipriano died in 1958. It was dismissed for
prescription, having been filed after the lapse of 41 years. When appealed, the CA in 1966
held that the donation to Alejandro of the two lots with the combined area of 11,888 sq. m.
exceeded by 494.75 sq. m. his legitime and the disposable portion that Cipriano could have
freely given by will, and to the same extent prejudiced the legitime of Cipriano’s other heir,
Gervacio. The donation was thus declared inofficious and herein petitioners were ordered to
reconvey to Gervacio a portion of 494.75 sq. m. from any convenient part of the lots.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly reduced the donation propter nuptias
for being inofficious.

HELD:

Decision of CA based on unsupported assumptions set aside; trial court’s order of

dismissal sustained.

Before the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, the net estate of
the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the
value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations
subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the
legitimes of the compulsory heirs can be established, and only thereafter can it be ascertained
whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes. Certainly, in order that a donation
may be reduced for being inofficious, there must be proof that the value of the donated
property exceeds that of the disposable free portion plus the donee’s share as legitime in the
properties of the donor. In the present case, it can hardly be seen that, with the evidence
then before the court, it was in any position to rule on the inofficiousness of the donation
involved here, and to order its reduction and reconveyance of the deducted portion to the
respondents.

Article 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death
of the testator shall be considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include
those imposed in the will.
To the value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by
the testator that are subject to collation, at the time he made them.

G.R. No. 143382 November 29, 2006

SECURITY BANK and TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner,

vs.
MAR TIERRA CORPORATION, WILFRIDO C. MARTINEZ, MIGUEL J. LACSON and RICARDO A.
LOPA, Respondents.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

May the conjugal partnership be held liable for an indemnity agreement entered into by the husband to
accommodate a third party?

This issue confronts us in this petition for review on certiorari assailing the November 9, 1999 decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 48107.

On May 7, 1980, respondent Mar Tierra Corporation, through its president, Wilfrido C. Martinez, applied
for a ₱12,000,000 credit accommodation with petitioner Security Bank and Trust Company. Petitioner
approved the application and entered into a credit line agreement with respondent corporation. It was
secured by an indemnity agreement executed by individual respondents Wilfrido C. Martinez, Miguel J.
Lacson and Ricardo A. Lopa who bound themselves jointly and severally with respondent corporation for
the payment of the loan.

On July 2, 1980, the credit line agreement was amended and increased to ₱14,000,000. Individual
respondents correspondingly executed a new indemnity agreement in favor of the bank to secure the
increased credit line.

On September 25, 1981, respondent corporation availed of its credit line and received the sum of
₱9,952,000 which it undertook to pay on or before November 30, 1981. It was able to pay ₱4,648,000 for
the principal loan and ₱2,729,195.56 for the interest and other charges. However, respondent corporation
was not able to pay the balance as it suffered business reversals, eventually ceasing operations in 1984.
Unable to collect the balance of the loan, petitioner filed a complaint for a sum of money with a prayer for
preliminary attachment against respondent corporation and individual respondents in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 66. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 3947.

Subsequently, however, petitioner had the case dismissed with respect to individual respondents Lacson
and Lopa,2leaving Martinez as the remaining individual respondent.

On August 10, 1982, the RTC issued a writ of attachment on all real and personal properties of
respondent corporation and individual respondent Martinez. As a consequence, the conjugal house and
lot of the spouses Wilfrido and Josefina Martinez in Barrio Calaanan, Caloocan City covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 49158 was levied on.

The RTC rendered its decision3 on June 20, 1994. It held respondent corporation and individual
respondent Martinez jointly and severally liable to petitioner for ₱5,304,000 plus 12% interest per annum
and 5% penalty commencing on June 21, 1982 until fully paid, plus ₱10,000 as attorney’s fees. It,
however, found that the obligation contracted by individual respondent Martinez did not redound to the
benefit of his family, hence, it ordered the lifting of the attachment on the conjugal house and lot of the
spouses Martinez.

Dissatisfied with the RTC decision, petitioner appealed to the CA but the appellate court affirmed the trial
court’s decision in toto. Petitioner sought reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner makes two basic assertions: (1) the RTC and CA erred in finding that respondent corporation
availed of ₱9,952,000 only from its credit line and not the entire ₱14,000,000 and (2) the RTC and CA
were wrong in ruling that the conjugal partnership of the Martinez spouses could not be held liable for the
obligation incurred by individual respondent Martinez.

We uphold the CA.

Factual findings of the CA, affirming those of the trial court, will not be disturbed on appeal but must be
accorded great weight.4 These findings are conclusive not only on the parties but on this Court as well.5

The CA affirmed the finding of the RTC that the amount availed of by respondent corporation from its
credit line with petitioner was only ₱9,952,000. Both courts correctly pointed out that petitioner itself
admitted this amount when it alleged in paragraph seven of its complaint that respondent corporation
"borrowed and received the principal sum of ₱9,952,000."6 Petitioner was therefore bound by the factual
finding of the appellate and trial courts, as well as by its own judicial admission, on this particular point.

At any rate, the issue of the amount actually availed of by respondent corporation is factual. It is not within
the ambit of this Court’s discretionary power of judicial review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which
is concerned solely with questions of law.7

We now move on to the principal issue in this case.

Under Article 161(1) of the Civil Code,8 the conjugal partnership is liable for "all debts and obligations
contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." But when are debts and obligations
contracted by the husband alone considered for the benefit of and therefore chargeable against the
conjugal partnership? Is a surety agreement or an accommodation contract entered into by the husband
in favor of his employer within the contemplation of the said provision?

We ruled as early as 1969 in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. de Garcia9 that, in acting as a guarantor or surety
for another, the husband does not act for the benefit of the conjugal partnership as the benefit is clearly
intended for a third party.
In Ayala Investment and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,10 we ruled that, if the husband
himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., the direct recipient of the money and services to be
used in or for his own business or profession, the transaction falls within the term "obligations for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership." In other words, where the husband contracts an obligation on behalf
of the family business, there is a legal presumption that such obligation redounds to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.11

On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity and the husband acted
only as a surety or guarantor, the transaction cannot by itself be deemed an obligation for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership.12 It is for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family.
No presumption is raised that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation
agreement, it is for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Proof must be presented to establish the
benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.13 In the absence of any showing of benefit received by it,
the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the husband to
accommodate a third party.14

In this case, the principal contract, the credit line agreement between petitioner and respondent
corporation, was solely for the benefit of the latter. The accessory contract (the indemnity agreement)
under which individual respondent Martinez assumed the obligation of a surety for respondent corporation
was similarly for the latter’s benefit. Petitioner had the burden of proving that the conjugal partnership of
the spouses Martinez benefited from the transaction. It failed to discharge that burden.

To hold the conjugal partnership liable for an obligation pertaining to the husband alone defeats the
objective of the Civil Code to protect the solidarity and well being of the family as a unit. 15 The underlying
concern of the law is the conservation of the conjugal partnership.16 Hence, it limits the liability of the
conjugal partnership only to debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. MAR TIERRA CORP, WILFRIDO MARTINEZ, MIGUEL
LACSON, and RICARDO LOPA
November 29, 2006 (508 SCRA 419)

FACTS:
Respondent Mar Tierra Corporation, through its president, Wilfrido C. Martinez, applied for a
P12,000,000 credit accommodation with petitioner Security Bank and Trust Company. Petitioner
approved the application and entered into a credit line agreement with respondent corporation.
It was secured by an indemnity agreement executed by individual respondents Wilfrido C.
Martinez, Miguel J. Lacson and Ricardo A. Lopa who bound themselves jointly and severally with
respondent corporation for the payment of the loan.

Respondent corporation was not able to pay all its debt balance as it suffered business
reversals, eventually ceasing operations. Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent corp
and individual respondents.
RTC issued a writ of attachment on all real and personal properties of respondent corporation
and individual respondent Martinez including the conjugal house and lot of the spouses but it
found that it did not redound to the benefit of his family, hence, it ordered the lifting of the
attachment on the conjugal house and lot of the spouses Martinez.

Petitioner appealed to CA. It affirmed RTC decision. Petitioned to SC.

ISSUE: WON the conjugal partnership may be held liable for an indemnity agreement entered
into by the husband to accommodate a third party

HELD:
No. SC upheld the CA. Under Article 161(1) of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable
for “all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.”

The court ruled in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. de Garcia that, in acting as a guarantor or surety for
another, the husband does not act for the benefit of the conjugal partnership as the benefit is
clearly intended for a third party.

In Ayala Investment and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that, if the
husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., the direct recipient of the money
and services to be used in or for his own business or profession, the transaction falls within the
term “obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” In other words, where the
husband contracts an obligation on behalf of the family business, there is a legal presumption
that such obligation redounds to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity and the
husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, the transaction cannot by itself be deemed an
obligation for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. It is for the benefit of the principal debtor
and not for the surety or his family.

In the case at bar, the principal contract, the credit line agreement between petitioner and
respondent corporation, was solely for the benefit of the latter. The accessory contract (the
indemnity agreement) under which individual respondent Martinez assumed the obligation of a
surety for respondent corporation was similarly for the latter’s benefit. Petitioner had the
burden of proving that the conjugal partnership of the spouses Martinez benefited from the
transaction. It failed to discharge that burden.
G.R. No. 178288 August 15, 2012

SPOUSES CHARLIE FORTALEZA and OFELIA FORTALEZA, Petitioners,

vs.
SPOUSES RAUL LAPITAN and RONA LAPITAN, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Unless a case falls under recognized exceptions provided by law and jurisprudence, courts should
maintain the ex parte, non-adversarial, summary and ministerial nature of the issuance of a writ of
possession.

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) dated January 10, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86287 which affirmed the Order3 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba City Branch 35, dated September 16, 2005 in SLRC Case No.
2528-2004-C granting an ex parte petition for the issuance of writ of possession. Likewise assailed is the
CA Resolution4 dated June 6, 2007 which denied the Motion for Reconsideration5 of the said assailed
Decision.

Factual Antecedents

Spouses Charlie and Ofelia Fortaleza (spouses Fortaleza) obtained a loan from spouses Rolando and
Amparo Lapitan (creditors) in the amount of P1.2 million subject to 34% interest per annum. As security,
spouses Fortaleza executed on January 28, 1998 a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage 6 over their residential
house and lot situated in Barrio Anos, Municipality of Los Baños, Laguna (subject property) registered
under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-412512.7

When spouses Fortaleza failed to pay the indebtedness including the interests and penalties, the
creditors applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage before the Office of the Clerk of
Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Calamba City. The public auction sale was set on May 9, 2001.

At the sale, the creditors’ son Dr. Raul Lapitan and his wife Rona (spouses Lapitan) emerged as the
highest bidders with the bid amount of P2.5 million. Then, they were issued a Certificate of Sale 8 which
was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Calamba City and annotated at the back of TCT No. T-
412512 under Entry No. 615683 on November 15, 2002.9

The one-year redemption period expired without the spouses Fortaleza redeeming the mortgage. Thus,
spouses Lapitan executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership on November 20, 2003 and caused
the cancellation of TCT No. T-412512 and the registration of the subject property in their names under
TCT No. T-53594510 on February 4, 2004. Despite the foregoing, the spouses Fortaleza refused spouses
Lapitan’s formal demand11 to vacate and surrender possession of the subject property.

Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court

On August 27, 2004, spouses Lapitan filed an ex parte petition for the issuance of writ of possession with
Branch 35 of the RTC of Calamba City docketed as SLRC Case No. 2528-2004-C.12 As new registered
owners of the subject property, spouses Lapitan claimed that they were entitled to its possession
pursuant to Section 7 of Act No. 3135,13as amended by Act No. 4118.
In their opposition,14 spouses Fortaleza questioned the validity of the real estate mortgage and the
foreclosure sale. They argued that the mortgage was void because the creditors bloated the principal
amount by the imposition of exorbitant interest. Spouses Fortaleza added that the foreclosure proceeding
was invalid for non-compliance with the posting requirement.

Later, for repeated failure of spouses Fortaleza to appear at the scheduled hearings, the RTC allowed
spouses Lapitan to present evidence ex parte.

Eventually, on September 16, 2005, the RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of possession explaining that
it is a ministerial duty of the court especially since the redemption period had expired and a new title had
already been issued in the name of the spouses Lapitan, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Opposition with counterclaim filed by the respondents is denied
while this instant petition is hereby granted.

Accordingly, the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to issue a Writ of Possession directing the
provincial sheriff of Laguna to place the petitioner in possession of the above described property free from
any adverse occupants thereof.

SO ORDERED.15

Spouses Fortaleza moved for reconsideration,16 claiming that the subject property is their family home
and is exempt from foreclosure sale. On October 11, 2005, however, the RTC issued an Order 17 denying
their motion. Accordingly, the branch clerk of court issued the Writ of Possession 18 and the sheriff served
the corresponding Notice to Vacate19against spouses Fortaleza.

Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

Dissatisfied, spouses Fortaleza elevated the case to the CA via Rule 41 of the Rules of Court docketed
as CA-G.R. CV No. 86287. With the perfection of an appeal, the RTC held in abeyance the
implementation of the writ.20 After the parties submitted their respective briefs, the CA rendered the
assailed Decision21 dated January 10, 2007 dismissing the appeal:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The Order dated September 16, 2005 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 35, Calamba City in SLRC Case No. 2528-2004-SC, is AFFIRMED. The court a quo is
DIRECTED to enforce the Writ of Possession it issued on October 24, 2005.

SO ORDERED.22

In affirming the ruling of the RTC, the CA stressed that any question regarding the regularity and validity
of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be raised as a justification for opposing the issuance of the writ
of possession since the proceedings is ex parte and non-litigious. Moreover, until the foreclosure sale is
annulled, the issuance of the writ of possession is ministerial.

Issues

Unsuccesful with their quest to have the CA reconsider its Decision, 23 spouses Fortaleza filed this petition
for review on certiorari24 raising the following errors:

WHETHER X X X THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE TWO (2)-RAFFLE RULE
PRESCRIBED BY AND LONG ESTABLISHED UNDER THE REVISED INTERNAL RULES OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS WHEN IT IMMEDIATELY RENDERED THE ASSAILED DECISION BARELY
AFTER THE SUBMISSION OF THE PARTIES’ BRIEFS. IN SO DOING, THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ENGAGED IN PROCEDURAL SHORTCUTS AND ACTED WITH UNDUE HASTE AND
INDECENT SPEED, THUS RENDERING ITS DECISION AS NULL AND VOID AND CHARACTERIZED
BY MANIFEST BIAS AND PARTIALITY TO THE RESPONDENTS.

II

WHETHER X X X THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS REVERSIBLE

ERROR IN UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURT’S ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF POSSESSION DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THEIR ENTITLEMENT TO THE
ISSUANCE OF SAID WRIT, THE NON-COMPLIANCE BY THE ORIGINAL MORTGAGORS AND THE
RESPONDENTS OF THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS OF EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE OF
MORTGAGE UNDER ACT NO. 3135, AND THE FATAL DEFECTS OF THE FORECLOSURE
PROCEEDINGS.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
PETITIONERS WERE PREVENTED BY THE RESPONDENTS FROM EXERCISING THEIR RIGHT OF
REDEMPTION OVER THE FORECLOSED PROPERTY BY DEMANDING A REDEMPTION PRICE OF
A HIGHLY INEQUITABLE AND MORE THAN DOUBLE THE AMOUNT OF THE FORECLOSED
PROPERTY, ESPECIALLY THAT THE FORECLOSED MORTGAGED PROPERTY IS THE FAMILY
HOME OF PETITIONERS AND THEIR CHILDREN.25

First, spouses Fortaleza point out that the CA violated its own 2002 Internal Rules of Procedure when it
decided the case without passing the two-raffle system. They claim that the justice assigned in the
completion stage also decided the case on the merits. This procedural shortcut, according to spouses
Fortaleza, evinces the appellate court’s bias and prejudgment in favor of the spouses Lapitan.

Second, citing Barican v. Intermediate Appellate Court26 and Cometa v. Intermediate Appellate
Court,27 and reiterating the irregularities that allegedly attended the foreclosure sale, the spouses
Fortaleza insist that the issuance of writ of possession is not always ministerial and the trial court should
have accorded them opportunity to present contrary evidence.

Last, spouses Fortaleza maintain that the subject property is a family home exempt from forced sale.
Hence, in the spirit of equity and following the rulings in Tolentino v. Court of Appeals,28 and De los Reyes
v. Intermediate Appellate Court,29 the Court should allow them to exercise the right of redemption even
after the expiration of the one-year period.

Our Ruling

On Matters of Procedure

True, under the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (IRCA), appealed civil cases undergo two-
raffle system. First, a preliminary raffle is held to determine the Justice to whom the case will be assigned
for completion of records. After completion, a second raffle is conducted to determine the Justice to whom
the case will be assigned for study and report. "Each stage is distinct and it may happen that the Justice
to whom the case was initially raffled for completion may not be the same Justice who will write the
decision thereon."30

Thus:
Section 2. Raffle of Cases. –

(a) Assignment of cases to a Justice, whether for completion of records or for study and report, shall be
by raffle, subject to the following rules:

(1) Appealed cases for completion of records shall be raffled to individual Justices; (Sec. 5(a),
Rule 3, RIRCA [a])

(1.1) Records are deemed completed upon filing of the required briefs or memoranda or
the expiration of the period for the filing thereof and resolution of all pending incidents.
Thereupon, the Division Clerk of Court shall report the case to the Justice concerned for
the issuance of a resolution declaring the case submitted for decision and referring the
same to the Raffle Committee for raffle to a Justice for study and report; (Sec. 5(b), Rule
3, RIRCA [a]).31 (Emphasis supplied.)

However, the two-raffle system is already abandoned under the 2009 IRCA. As the rule now stands, the
Justice to whom a case is raffled shall act on it both at the completion stage and for the decision on the
merits, thus:

SEC. 2. Raffle of Cases. –

(a) Cases shall be assigned to a Justice by raffle for completion of records, study and report, subject to
the following rules:

(1) Cases, whether original or appealed, shall be raffled to individual justices;

(1.1) Records are deemed completed upon filing of the required pleadings, briefs or
memoranda or the expiration of the period for the filing thereof and resolution of all
pending incidents. Upon such completion, the Division Clerk of Court shall report the
case to the Justice concerned for the issuance of a resolution declaring the case
submitted for decision.32 (Emphasis supplied.)

Corollarily, the alleged defect in the processing of this case before the CA has been effectively cured. We
stress that rules of procedure may be modified at any time and become effective at once, so long as the
change does not affect vested rights.33 Moreover, it is equally axiomatic that there are no vested rights to
rules of procedure.34 Thus, unless spouses Fortaleza can establish a right by virtue of some statute or
law, the alleged violation is not an actionable wrong.35 At any rate, the 2002 IRCA does not provide for the
effect of non-compliance with the two-raffle system on the validity of the decision. Notably too, it does not
prohibit the assignment by raffle of a case for study and report to a Justice who handled the same during
its completion stage.

We also find that personal bias and prejudgment cannot be inferred from the alleged breach of internal
rules. It is settled that clear and convincing evidence is required to prove bias and prejudice. 36 Bare
allegations and mere suspicions of partiality are not enough in the absence of evidence to overcome the
presumption that a member of the court will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law
and evidence and without fear or favor.37Moreover, no acts or conduct of the division or the ponente was
shown to indicate any arbitrariness against the spouses Fortaleza. What is extant is that the opinions
formed in the course of judicial proceedings are all based on the evidence presented.

On the Issuance of Writ of Possession

Spouses Fortaleza claim that the RTC grievously erred in ignoring the apparent nullity of the mortgage
and the subsequent foreclosure sale. For them, the RTC should have heard and considered these
matters in deciding the case on its merits. They relied on the cases of Barican38 and Cometa39 in taking
exception to the ministerial duty of the trial court to grant a writ of possession.

But the cited authorities are not on all fours with this case. In Barican, we held that the obligation of a
court to issue a writ of possession ceases to be ministerial if there is a third party holding the property
adversely to the judgment debtor. Where such third party exists, the trial court should conduct a hearing
to determine the nature of his adverse possession. And in Cometa, there was a pending action where the
validity of the levy and sale of the properties in question were directly put in issue which this Court found
pre-emptive of resolution. For if the applicant for a writ of possession acquired no interest in the property
by virtue of the levy and sale, then, he is not entitled to its possession. Moreover, it is undisputed that the
properties subject of said case were sold at an unusually lower price than their true value. Thus, equitable
considerations motivated this Court to withhold the issuance of the writ of possession to prevent injustice
on the other party.

Here, there are no third parties holding the subject property adversely to the judgment debtor. It was
spouses Fortaleza themselves as debtors-mortgagors who are occupying the subject property. They are
not even strangers to the foreclosure proceedings in which the ex parte writ of possession was applied
for. Significantly, spouses Fortaleza did not file any direct action for annulment of the foreclosure sale of
the subject property. Also, the peculiar circumstance of gross inadequacy of the purchase price is absent.

Accordingly, unless a case falls under recognized exceptions provided by law 40 and jurisprudence,41 we
maintain the ex parte, non-adversarial, summary and ministerial nature of the issuance of a writ of
possession as outlined in Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, which provides:

SECTION 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of
First Instance of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him
possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of
the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was
made without violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act. Such petition
shall be made under oath and filed in form of an ex parte motion x x x and the court shall, upon approval
of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the
property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately. (Emphasis supplied.)

Under the provision cited above, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale may apply for a writ of possession
during the redemption period. Notably, in this case, the one-year period for the spouses Fortaleza to
redeem the mortgaged property had already lapsed. Furthermore, ownership of the subject property had
already been consolidated and a new certificate of title had been issued under the name of the spouses
Lapitan. Hence, as the new registered owners of the subject property, they are even more entitled to its
possession and have the unmistakable right to file an ex parte motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession. As aptly explained in Edralin v. Philippine Veterans Bank,42 the duty of the trial court to grant
a writ of possession in such instances is ministerial, and the court may not exercise discretion or
judgment, thus:

Consequently, the purchaser, who has a right to possession after the expiration of the redemption period,
becomes the absolute owner of the property when no redemption is made. x x x The purchaser can
demand possession at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to
him of a new TCT. After consolidation of title in the purchaser’s name for failure of the mortgagor to
redeem the property, the purchaser’s right to possession ripens into the absolute right of a confirmed
owner. At that point, the issuance of a writ of possession, upon proper application and proof of title
becomes merely a ministerial function. Effectively, the court cannot exercise its discretion. (Emphasis in
the original.)

In this case, spouses Lapitan sufficiently established their right to the writ of possession. More
specifically, they presented the following documentary exhibits: (1) the Certificate of Sale and its
annotation at the back of spouses Fortaleza’s TCT No. T-412512; (2) the Affidavit of Consolidation
proving that spouses Fortaleza failed to redeem the property within the one-year redemption period; (3)
TCT No. T-535945 issued in their names; and, (4) the formal demand on spouses Fortaleza to vacate the
subject property.

Lastly, we agree with the CA that any question regarding the regularity and validity of the mortgage or its
foreclosure cannot be raised as a justification for opposing the petition for the issuance of the writ of
possession.43 The said issues may be raised and determined only after the issuance of the writ of
possession.44 Indeed, "[t]he judge with whom an application for writ of possession is filed need not look
into the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure."45 The writ issues as a matter of course.
"The rationale for the rule is to allow the purchaser to have possession of the foreclosed property without
delay, such possession being founded on the right of ownership."46 To underscore this mandate, Section
847 of Act No. 3135 gives the debtor-mortgagor the right to file a petition for the setting aside of the
foreclosure sale and for the cancellation of a writ of possession in the same proceedings where the writ
was issued within 30 days after the purchaser-mortgagee was given possession. The court’s decision
thereon may be appealed by either party, but the order of possession shall continue in effect during the
pendency of the appeal.

"Clearly then, until the foreclosure sale of the property in question is annulled by a court of competent
jurisdiction, the issuance of a writ of possession remains the ministerial duty of the trial court. The same is
true with its implementation; otherwise, the writ will be a useless paper judgment – a result inimical to the
mandate of Act No. 3135 to vest possession in the purchaser immediately."48

On exemption of the subject property

and the exercise of right of redemption

Spouses Fortaleza’s argument that the subject property is exempt from forced sale because it is a family
home deserves scant consideration. As a rule, the family home is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment.49However, Article 155(3) of the Family Code explicitly allows the forced sale of a family home
"for debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution." In this case, there is
no doubt that spouses Fortaleza voluntarily executed on January 28, 1998 a deed of Real Estate
Mortgage over the subject property which was even notarized by their original counsel of record. And
assuming that the property is exempt from forced sale, spouses Fortaleza did not set up and prove to the
Sheriff such exemption from forced sale before it was sold at the public auction. As elucidated in Honrado
v. Court of Appeals:50

While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a
family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code, such
claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public
auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption. As this Court ruled
in Gomez v. Gealone:

Although the Rules of Court does not prescribe the period within which to claim the exemption, the rule is,
nevertheless, well-settled that the right of exemption is a personal privilege granted to the judgment
debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself at the time of the levy
or within a reasonable period thereafter.51(Emphasis supplied.)

Certainly, reasonable time for purposes of the law on exemption does not mean a time after the expiration
of the one-year period for a judgment debtor to redeem the property. 52

Equally without merit is spouses Fortaleza’s reliance on the cases of Tolentino53 and De Los Reyes54 in
praying for the exercise of the right of redemption even after the expiration of the one-year period.
In Tolentino, we held that an action to redeem filed within the period of redemption, with a simultaneous
deposit of the redemption money tendered to the sheriff, is equivalent to an offer to redeem and has the
effect of preserving the right to redemption for future enforcement even beyond the one-year
period.55 And in De Los Reyes, we allowed the mortgagor to redeem the disputed property after finding
that the tender of the redemption price to the sheriff was made within the one-year period and for a
sufficient amount.

The circumstances in the present case are far different. The spouses Fortaleza neither filed an action nor
made a formal offer to redeem the subject property accompanied by an actual and simultaneous tender of
payment. It is also undisputed that they allowed the one-year period to lapse from the registration of the
certificate of sale without redeeming the mortgage. For all intents and purposes, spouses Fortaleza have
waived or abandoned their right of redemption.1âwphi1

Although the rule on redemption is liberally interpreted in favor of the original owner of the property, we
cannot apply the privilege of liberality to accommodate the spouses Forteza due to their negligence or
omission to exercise the right of redemption within the prescribed period without justifiable cause.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 10, 2007 and
Resolution dated June 6, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86287 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS: Spouses Charlie and Ofelia Fortaleza (spouses

Fortaleza) obtained a loan from spouses Rolando and Amparo Lapitan
(creditors) in the amount of P1.2 million subject to 34% interest per annum. As
security, spouses Fortaleza executed on January 28, 1998 a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage over their residential house and lot and registered under TCT No. T-
412512. ςrνll
When spouses Fortaleza failed to pay the indebtedness including the interests
and penalties, the creditors applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of the Real
Estate Mortgage . The public auction sale was set on May 9, 2001. At the sale,
the creditors son Dr. Raul Lapitan and his wife Rona (spouses Lapitan) emerged
as the highest bidders with the bid amount of P2.5 million. Then, they were
issued a Certificate of Sale which was registered and annotated at the back of
TCT No. T-412512. The one-year redemption period expired without the
spouses Fortaleza redeeming the mortgage. Thus, spouses Lapitan executed an
affidavit of consolidation of ownership on November 20, 2003 and caused the
cancellation of TCT No. T-412512 and the registration of the subject property in
their names under TCT No. T-535945 on February 4, 2004. Despite the
foregoing, the spouses Fortaleza refused spouses Lapitan s formal demand to
vacate and surrender possession of the subject property.
On August 27, 2004, spouses Lapitan filed an ex parte petition for the issuance of
writ of possession as new registered owners of the subject property. In their
opposition, spouses Fortaleza questioned the validity of the real estate mortgage
and the foreclosure sale. They argued that the mortgage was void because the
creditors bloated the principal amount by the imposition of exorbitant interest.
Spouses Fortaleza added that the foreclosure proceeding was invalid for non-
compliance with the posting requirement. The RTC ordered the issuance of a
writ of possession explaining that it is a ministerial duty of the court especially
 since the redemption period had expired and a new title had already been issued
in the name of the spouses Lapitan, Spouses Fortaleza moved for
reconsideration, claiming that the subject property is their family home and is
exempt from foreclosure sale.
II. ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property is exempt from forced sale
because it is a family home
III. RULING: No, spouses Fortaleza’s argument that the subject property is
exempt from forced sale because it is a family home deserves scant
consideration. As a rule, the family home is exempt from execution, forced sale
or attachment. However, Article 155(3) of the Family Code explicitly allows the
forced sale of a family home "for debts secured by mortgages on the premises
before or after such constitution." In this case, there is no doubt that spouses
Fortaleza voluntarily executed on January 28, 1998 a deed of Real Estate
Mortgage over the subject property which was even notarized by their original
counsel of record. And assuming that the property is exempt from forced sale,
spouses Fortaleza did not set up and prove to the Sheriff such exemption from
forced sale before it was sold at the public auction.

G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003

ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner,

vs.
JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as "DR. MELVIN S. LAHOM"), respondent.

VITUG, J.:

The bliss of marriage and family would be to most less than complete without children. The realization
could have likely prodded the spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom to take into their care
Isabelita's nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo and to bring him up as their own. At the tender age of two, Jose
Melvin enjoyed the warmth, love and support of the couple who treated the child like their own. Indeed,
for years, Dr. and Mrs. Lahom fancied on legally adopting Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple
decided to file a petition for adoption. On 05 May 1972, an order granting the petition was issued that
made all the more intense than before the feeling of affection of the spouses for Melvin. In keeping with
the court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed the name "Jose Melvin Sibulo" to "Jose Melvin
Lahom."

A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a
petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City.
In her petition, she averred —

"7. That x x x despite the proddings and pleadings of said spouses, respondent refused to
change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom, to the frustrations of petitioner particularly her
husband until the latter died, and even before his death he had made known his desire to revoke
 respondent's adoption, but was prevented by petitioner's supplication, however with his further
request upon petitioner to give to charity whatever properties or interest may pertain to
respondent in the future.

xxx xxx xxx

"10. That respondent continued using his surname Sibulo to the utter disregard of the feelings of
herein petitioner, and his records with the Professional Regulation Commission showed his name
as Jose Melvin M. Sibulo originally issued in 1978 until the present, and in all his dealings and
activities in connection with his practice of his profession, he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo.

xxx xxx xxx

"13. That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in this city with only her household
helps to attend to her, has yearned for the care and show of concern from a son, but respondent
remained indifferent and would only come to Naga to see her once a year.

"14. That for the last three or four years, the medical check-up of petitioner in Manila became
more frequent in view of a leg ailment, and those were the times when petitioner would need
most the care and support from a love one, but respondent all the more remained callous and
utterly indifferent towards petitioner which is not expected of a son.

"15. That herein respondent has recently been jealous of petitioner's nephews and nieces
whenever they would find time to visit her, respondent alleging that they were only motivated by
their desire for some material benefits from petitioner.

"16. That in view of respondent's insensible attitude resulting in a strained and uncomfortable
relationship between him and petitioner, the latter has suffered wounded feelings, knowing that
after all respondent's only motive to his adoption is his expectancy of his alleged rights over the
properties of herein petitioner and her late husband, clearly shown by his recent filing of Civil
Case No. 99-4463 for partition against petitioner, thereby totally eroding her love and affection
towards respondent, rendering the decree of adoption, considering respondent to be the child of
petitioner, for all legal purposes, has been negated for which reason there is no more basis for its
existence, hence this petition for revocation,"1

Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also
known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of
adopters to rescind a decree of adoption.

Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 now reads:

"SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. — Upon petition of the adoptee, with the
assistance of the Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated,
as guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the following grounds committed
by the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having
undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d)
abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations.

"Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the
adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919
of the Civil Code." (emphasis supplied)
Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending principally (a) that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the case and (b) that the petitioner had no cause of action in view of the aforequoted
provisions of R.A. No. 8552. Petitioner asseverated, by way of opposition, that the proscription in R.A. No.
8552 should not retroactively apply, i.e., to cases where the ground for rescission of the adoption vested
under the regime of then Article 3482 of the Civil Code and Article 1923 of the Family Code.

In an order, dated 28 April 2000, the trial court held thusly:

"On the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit, Section 5(c) of R.A. No. 8369
confers jurisdiction to this Court, having been designated Family Court in A.M. No. 99-11-07 SC.

"On the matter of no cause of action, the test on the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the
complaint, is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the Court could render a valid judgment
in accordance with the prayer of said complaint (De Jesus, et al. vs. Belarmino, et al., 95 Phil.
365).

"Admittedly, Section 19, Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 deleted the right of an adopter to rescind an
adoption earlier granted under the Family Code. Conformably, on the face of the petition, indeed
there is lack of cause of action.

"Petitioner however, insists that her right to rescind long acquired under the provisions of the
Family Code should be respected. Assuming for the sake of argument, that petitioner is entitled to
rescind the adoption of respondent granted on May 5, 1972, said right should have been
exercised within the period allowed by the Rules. From the averments in the petition, it appears
clear that the legal grounds for the petition have been discovered and known to petitioner for
more than five (5) years, prior to the filing of the instant petition on December 1, 1999, hence, the
action if any, had already prescribed. (Sec. 5, Rule 100 Revised Rules of Court)

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the petition is ordered dismissed."4

Via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, petitioner raises the
following questions; viz:

1. May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be revoked or rescinded by an
adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552?

2. In the affirmative, has the adopter's action prescribed?

A brief background on the law and its origins could provide some insights on the subject. In ancient times,
the Romans undertook adoption to assure male heirs in the family.5 The continuity of the adopter's family
was the primary purpose of adoption and all matters relating to it basically focused on the rights of the
adopter. There was hardly any mention about the rights of the adopted. 6 Countries, like Greece, France,
Spain and England, in an effort to preserve inheritance within the family, neither allowed nor recognized
adoption.7 It was only much later when adoption was given an impetus in law and still later when the
welfare of the child became a paramount concern.8Spain itself which previously disfavored adoption
ultimately relented and accepted the Roman law concept of adoption which, subsequently, was to find its
way to the archipelago. The Americans came and introduced their own ideas on adoption which, unlike
most countries in Europe, made the interests of the child an overriding consideration. 9 In the early part of
the century just passed, the rights of children invited universal attention; the Geneva Declaration of Rights
of the Child of 1924 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, 10followed by the United
Nations Declarations of the Rights of the Child,11 were written instruments that would also protect and
safeguard the rights of adopted children. The Civil Code of the Philippines12 of 1950 on adoption, later
modified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code13 and then by the Family Code of the Philippines,14 gave
immediate statutory acknowledgment to the rights of the adopted. In 1989, the United Nations initiated the
Convention of the Rights of the Child. The Philippines, a State Party to the Convention, accepted the
principle that adoption was impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent
was geared to favor the adopted child. R.A. No. 8552 secured these rights and privileges for the adopted.
Most importantly, it affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted child, not only in his new family but also
in the society as well. The new law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and
gave to the adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties created by adoption.

Petitioner, however, would insist that R.A. No. 8552 should not adversely affect her right to annul the
adoption decree, nor deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction to hear the case, both being vested under the
Civil Code and the Family Code, the laws then in force.

The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due process 15 that
expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary
state action;16 it includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also
exemptions from new obligations created after the right has become vested. 17 Rights are considered
vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest,18 absolute, unconditional, and perfect19 or fixed
and irrefutable.

In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,20 a petition to adopt Jason Condat was filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles on
02 February 1988 when the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603) allowed an
adoption to be sought by either spouse or both of them. After the trial court had rendered its decision and
while the case was still pending on appeal, the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No.
209), mandating joint adoption by the husband and wife, took effect. Petitioner Republic argued that the
case should be dismissed for having been filed by Mrs. Bobiles alone and without being joined by the
husband. The Court concluded that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the
time of the commencement of the action. The petition to adopt Jason, having been filed with the court
at the time when P.D. No. 603 was still in effect, the right of Mrs. Bobiles to file the petition, without being
joined by her husband, according to the Court had become vested. In Republic vs. Miller,21spouses
Claude and Jumrus Miller, both aliens, sought to adopt Michael Madayag. On 29 July 1988, the couple
filed a petition to formalize Michael's adoption having theretofore been taken into their care. At the time
the action was commenced, P.D. No. 603 allowed aliens to adopt. After the decree of adoption and while
on appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Family Code was enacted into law on 08 August 1988
disqualifying aliens from adopting Filipino children. The Republic then prayed for the withdrawal of the
adoption decree. In discarding the argument posed by the Republic, the Supreme Court ruled that the
controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the petition was filed.

It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to revoke the
decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law,22 had already abrogated and repealed the right
of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently
with its earlier pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption
decree, having been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be
pursued.

Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the
five-year bar rule under Rule 10023 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to
revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive
period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. It must
also be acknowledged that a person has no vested right in statutory privileges. 24 While adoption has often
been referred to in the context of a "right," the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or
fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute.25 It is a privilege that is governed by the state's
determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child. 26 Matters relating to
adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to
regulation by the State.27 Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be taken away at anytime
before it has been exercised.28
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to rescind the
adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remains,
nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be the hackneyed
truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while
barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain
benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law,
an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude
him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003

FACTS:
A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him up as their own. In 1972, the trial court granted the
petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil Registrar to change the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom.
Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption, in which she averred, that, despite the her pleas
and that of her husband, their adopted son refused to use their surname Lahom and continue to use Sibulo in all his
dealing and activities. Prior to the institution of the case, in 1998, RA No. 8552 went into effect. The new statute
deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption (Section 19 of Article VI).
These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference, ingratitude and lack of care and concern prompted Lahom
to file a petition in Court in December 1999 to rescind the decree of adoption previously issued way back on May 5,
1972. When Lahom filed said petition there was already a new law on adoption, specifically R.A. 8552 also known
as the Domestic Adoption Act passed on March 22,1998, wherein it was provided that: "Adoption, being in the
interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However the adopter(s) may disinherit the
adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Section 19).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No.
8552, and if in the affirmative, whether or not the adopter’s action prescribed.

RULING:
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. The
controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the petition was filed. In this case, it was
months after the effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1972.
By then the new law had already abrogated and repealed the right of the adopter under the Civil Code and the family
Code to rescind a decree of adoption. So the rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by Lahom after
RA 8552 had come into force, could no longer be pursued.

Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the five year bar rule
under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after
the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the
requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. Rights are considered vested when the right to the enjoyment is
a present interest, absolute, unconditional and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a "vested right" is a
consequence of the constitutional guarantee of due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right
reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action. While adoption has often been referred to in the
context of a "right", it is not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is more of
a privilege that is governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare
of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of the adopter to nullify the adoption
decree, are subject to State regulation. Concomitantly, a right of action given by a statute may be taken away at any
time before it has been exercised.
But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the
forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child, like denying him his legitime, and by will
and testament, may expressly exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.
Categories: Adoption, G.R. No. 143989, Persons and Family Relations, Philippine Civil Code