ARTICLE 838 The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed

the Petition for Certiorari filed by

Additional Cases petitioners which alleged grave abuse
of discretion in the Resolutions dated
14 December 2007 and 29 January
2008 issued by Judge Maria Susana T.
SECOND DIVISION Baua in her capacity as presiding
judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
LEO C. ROMERO G.R. No. of Lingayen, Pangasinan. The said
and DAVID 188921 Resolutions dismissed petitioners
AMANDO C. complaint against private respondents
ROMERO, Aurora C. Romero and Vittorio C.
Romero.
Petitioners, Present:
Petitioners allege that upon their fathers
death on 18 October 1974, their mother,
respondent Aurora Romero, was
CARPIO, J., appointed as legal guardian who held
Chairperson several real and personal properties in
- versus - trust for her children.[3] Since that year
BRION,
until the present, she continues to be
the administrator of the properties,
PEREZ,
businesses, and investments comprising
SERENO, and the estate of her late husband.

REYES, JJ. Sometime in 2006, petitioners Leo and

HON. COURT OF Amando discovered that several Deeds
APPEALS, of Sale were registered over parcels of
AURORA C. land that are purportedly conjugal
ROMERO and Promulgated: properties of their parents. These
VITTORIO C. included the following real and personal
ROMERO, properties:

Respondents. April 18, 2012 1. A parcel of land identified as Lot

3-G of Subdivision Plan Psd-
67995 situated in Barrio Pogon-
lomboy, Mangatarem,
x---------------------------- Pangasinan, containing an area of
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x one thousand square meters
under Declaration of Real
Property No. 16142 and Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
DECISION 290013 in the name of Vittorio C.
Romero. A warehouse stands on
SERENO, J.: the lot, covered by Declaration of
Real Property No. 16142.

2. A parcel of land identified as Lot

This is a Petition filed under Rule 45 of 3-D of Subdivision Plan Psd-
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, 67995 situated in Barrio Pogon-
praying for the reversal of the lomboy, Mangatarem,
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals Pangasinan, containing an area of
dated 14 April 2009 and the one thousand square meters
subsequent Resolution [2] dated 21 July under Declaration of Real
2009. Property No. 405, and TCT No.
1

77223 in the name of Spouses

Page
 Dante Y. Romero and Aurora
Cruz-Romero.
3. A parcel of land identified as Lot
3-E of Subdivision Plan Psd-
67995 situated in Barrio Pogon-
lomboy, Mangatarem,
Pangasinan, containing an area of
one thousand square meters
under Declaration of
Real Property No. 407 and TCT
No. 77224 in the names of
Spouses Dante Y. Romero and
Aurora Cruz-Romero.
4. A parcel of land identified as Lot
3-H of Subdivision Plan Psd-
67995 situated in Barrio Pogon-
lomboy, Mangatarem,
Pangasinan, containing an area of
one thousand square meters
under Declaration of Real
Property No. 406, and TCT No.
77225 in the name of Spouses
Dante Y. Romero and Aurora
Cruz-Romero.
5. A parcel of land identified as Lot
3815-A of Subdivision Plan Psd-
227224 situated in Barrio Pogon-
lomboy, Mangatarem,
Pangasinan, containing an area of
four hundred ninety-four square
meters under TCT No. 113514 in
the name of Aurora Cruz vda.
de Romero.
6. A parcel of land located in
Barangay Burgos, Mangatarem,
Pangasinan, containing an area of
more or less three hundred
seventy-nine square meters under
Declaration of Real Property No.
16136. It is not yet registered
under Act 496 or the Old Spanish
Mortgage Law, but registrable
under Act 3344 as amended. The
improvement thereon, a building
classified as a warehouse, is
covered by Declaration of Real
Property No. 16136 A.
7. A parcel of land located in Brgy.
Burgos, Mangatarem,
Pangasinan, containing an area of
more or less two hundred four
square meters under Declaration
of Real Property No. 16139. It is
not yet registered under Act 496
or Act 3344 as amended. The
improvement thereon is covered
by Declaration of Real Property
No. 16140.
8. A parcel of land located in Brgy.
Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem,
Pangasinan, containing an area of
more or less eleven thousand six
hundred forty-six square meters
under Declaration of Real
Property No. 724 and TCT No.
284241 in the name of Aurora P.
Cruz vda. de Romero.
9. A parcel of land located in Brgy.
Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem,
Pangasinan, containing an area of
more or less one thousand two
hundred fifty-six square meters
under Declaration of Real
Property No. 725 and TCT No.
284242 in the name of Aurora P.
Cruz vda. de Romero.[4]
Petitioners claim that sometime in
August of 2005, their brother Vittorio
through fraud, misrepresentation and
duress succeeded in registering the
above-mentioned properties in his name
through of Deeds of Sale executed by
their mother, Aurora.[5] Vittorio allegedly
employed force and threat upon her,
and even administered drugs that
rendered her weak and vulnerable.
Thus, Aurora signed the Deeds of Sale
without reading or knowing their
contents.
On 18 December 2006,
petitioners filed a Complaint for
Annulment of Sale, Nullification of Title,
and Conveyance of Title
[6]
(Amended) against private
respondents Aurora C. Romero and
Vittorio C. Romero. Respondents filed
2
their Answer, arguing that the properties
Page
in question were acquired long after the
death of their father, Judge Dante
Romero; hence, the properties cannot
be considered conjugal. They allege that
the lots covered by TCT Nos. 290010,
290011, 113514, and Tax Declaration
Nos. 16136 and 11639 were
paraphernal properties of Aurora which
she had mortgaged. Vittorio purportedly
had to shell out substantial amounts in
order to redeem them. The lots covered
by TCT Nos. 77223, 77224, and 77225
were sold by Aurora herself as attorney-
in-fact of her children on 23 November
2006, since her authority to do so had
never been revoked or modified.
On 14 December 2007, the RTC
rendered its Resolution dismissing
petitioners complaint, stating thus:
xxx(T)he case under
Special Proceedings No.
5185 remains pending in
that no distribution of the
assets of the estate of the
late Dante Y. Romero, nor a
partition, has been effected
among his compulsory
heirs. Thus, the
contending claims of
plaintiffs and defendants
in this case could not be
adjudicated nor passed
upon by this Court
without first getting a
definitive pronouncement
from the intestate court
as to the share of each of
the heirs of the late Dante
Y. Romero in his estate.
Even the claim of
defendant Aurora C.
Romero that some of the
properties being claimed by
plaintiffs in this case are her
own, the same being
paraphernal, is an issue
which must be taken up and
established in the intestate
proceedings.[7] (Emphasis
supplied.)
The RTC denied their Motion for
Reconsideration, citing Section 3, Rule
87 of the Rules of Court which bars an
heir or a devisee from maintaining an
action to recover the title or possession
of lands until such lands have actually
been assigned. The court ruled that
plaintiffs must first cause the termination
of Special Proceedings No. 5185 to its
logical conclusion before this case could
be entertained by the Court.[8]
Alleging grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial court in rendering
the said Resolutions, petitioners filed for
certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. On
14 April 2009, the CA rendered the
assailed judgment dismissing the
Petition, ruling that the properties
involved in this case are part of the
estate left to the heirs of Judge Romero,
the partition of which is already subject
of an intestate proceeding filed on 6
January 1976 in the then Court of First
Instance (CFI).[9] The CA based its
judgment on the findings of the RTC that
the inventory of the estate of Judge
Romero submitted to the CFI included
the same parties, properties, rights and
interests as in the case before it.
Petitioners now come to us on a
Rule 45 Petition, arguing that the
probate court may rule on issues
pertaining to title over property only in a
provisional capacity. They assert that
the CA erred in dismissing their appeal,
just because the intestate proceeding
has not yet terminated. Petitioners, as
heirs, are purportedly allowed to
exercise their option of filing a separate
civil action in order to protect their
interests.
Thus, the singular issue in the
case at bar is whether or not petitioners
in this case may file a separate civil
action for annulment of sale and
reconveyance of title, despite the
pendency of the settlement proceedings
for the estate of the late Judge Dante Y.
Romero.
Ruling of the Court
The probate court has jurisdiction
to determine the issues in the
present case
3
Petitioners assert that the jurisdiction of
Page
the RTC sitting as a probate or intestate
court relates only to matters having to provisionally pass upon the issue of title,
do with the settlement of the estate of precisely because the only interested
deceased persons or the appointment of parties are all heirs to the estate, subject
executors, but does not extend to the of the proceeding, viz:
determination of questions of ownership
that arise during the It should be clarified
[10]
proceedings. They cite Ongsingco v. that whether a particular
Tan,[11] Baybayan v. Aquino[12] and matter should be resolved
several cases which state that when by the Court of First
questions arise as to ownership of Instance in the exercise of
property alleged to be part of the estate its general jurisdiction or of
of a deceased person, but claimed by its limited probate
some other person to be his property, jurisdiction is in reality not a
not by virtue of any right of inheritance jurisdictional question. In
from the deceased but by title adverse essence, it is a procedural
to that of the deceased and his estate, question involving a mode
the intestate court has no jurisdiction to of practice "which may be
adjudicate these questions. Petitioners waived."
conclude that the issue of ownership of
the properties enumerated in their
Petition and included in the inventory
submitted by respondent Aurora As a general rule, the
Romero to the intestate court, must be question as to title to
determined in a separate civil action to property should not be
resolve title.[13] passed upon in the testate
or intestate proceeding.
The rulings That question should be
in Ongsingco and Baybayan are wholly ventilated in a separate
inapplicable, as they both arose out of action. That general rule
facts different from those in the case at has qualifications or
bar. Baybayan involved a summary exceptions justified by
settlement for the estate of the expediency and
decedent, in which a parcel of land convenience.
representing the share of decedents
nephews and nieces was already
covered by a TCT under the name of a
third party. To defeat the writ of partition Thus, the probate
issued by the probate court, the third court may provisionally
party, petitioners Baybayan et al., had to pass upon in an intestate or
file a separate civil action for quieting of testate proceeding the
their title and for damages. The issue question of inclusion in, or
before the Court then devolved upon the exclusion from, the
propriety of the probate courts order to inventory of a piece of
amend the Complaint for quieting of title property without prejudice
before the regular court. More to its final determination in a
importantly,Baybayan pertained to a civil separate action.
action involving third parties who were
not heirs, and not privy to the intestate
proceedings in the probate court. The
present action was instituted precisely Although generally, a
by heirs of Judge Romero, against their probate court may not
brother, who is also an heir, and their decide a question of title or
mother, who is the administrator of the ownership, yet if the
estate. interested parties are all
heirs, or the question is one
of collation or
4

In Coca v. Borromeo,[14] this

Page

Court allowed the probate court to advancement, or the parties

 consent to the assumption al., 67 Phil., 353, this court
of jurisdiction by the held:
probate court and the rights
of third parties are not
impaired, then the probate
court is competent to A court
decide the question of which takes
ownership. cognizance of
testate or
We hold that the intestate
instant case may be treated proceedings
as an exception to the has power and
general rule that questions jurisdiction to
of title should be ventilated determine
in a separate action. whether or not
the properties
Here, the probate included
court had already received therein or
evidence on the ownership excluded
of the twelve-hectare therefrom
portion during the hearing belong prima
of the motion facie to the
for its exclusion from (the) deceased,
inventory. The only although such
interested parties are the a determination
heirs who have all is not final or
appeared in the intestate ultimate in
proceeding.[15] (Citations nature, and
omitted.) without
prejudice to the
While it is true that a probate courts right of
determination of ownership over interested
properties which may form part of the parties, in a
estate is not final or ultimate in nature, proper action,
this rule is applicable only as between to raise the
the representatives of the estate and question on the
strangers thereto. Indeed, as early ownership or
as Bacquial v. Amihan,[16] the court existence of
stated thus: the right or
credit.
xxx The rulings of this
court have always been to
the effect that in the special
proceeding for the To this same effect
settlement of the estate of a are rulings in various states
deceased person, persons of the United States.
not heirs, intervening
therein to protect their
interests are allowed to do
so protect the same, but not * * * That
for a decision on their the probate
action. In the case of In court is without
re Estate of the deceased jurisdiction to
Paulina Vasquez Vda. de try the title to
Garcia, Teresa property as
5

Garcia vs. Luisa Garcia, et between the

Page

representative
 s of an estate
and
strangers ther
eto is too well
established by
the authorities
to require
argument.
There is also
authority abroad that where
the court is without
jurisdiction to determine
questions of title, as for
example, as between the
estate and persons
claiming adversely, its
orders and judgments
relating to the sale do not
render the issue of title res
judicata.[17] (Citations
omitted, emphasis
supplied.)
In any case, there is no merit to
petitioners claim that the issues raised
in the case at bar pertain to title and
ownership and therefore need to be
ventilated in a separate civil action. The
issue before the court is not really one
of title or ownership, but the
determination of which particular
properties should be included in the
inventory of the estate. In Civil Case No.
18757, the RTC has listed the properties
alleged by petitioners to have been
conjugal properties of their parents and,
therefore, part of the estate that was
illegally sold to the respondent. Some of
these real properties identified seem to
be the same real properties that form
part of the inventory of the estate in the
intestate proceedings.[18]
Not only do petitioners assert their legal
interest as compulsory heirs, they also
seek to be the owners, pro indiviso, of
the said properties. To anchor their
claim, they argue that the properties are
conjugal in nature and hence form part
of their inheritance. For his defense,
Vittorio contends that the lots are the
paraphernal properties of Aurora that
she had mortgaged, and that Vittorio
subsequently redeemed.
In Bernardo v. Court of Appeals,[19] the
Supreme Court declared that the
determination of whether a property is
conjugal or paraphernal for purposes
of inclusion in the inventory of the
estate rests with the probate court:
xxx (T)he jurisdiction
to try controversies
between heirs of a
deceased person regarding
the ownership of properties
alleged to belong to his
estate, has been
recognized to be vested in
probate courts. This is so
because the purpose of an
administration proceeding is
the liquidation of the estate
and distribution of the
residue among the heirs
and legatees. Liquidation
means determination of all
the assets of the estate and
payment of all the debts
and expenses. Thereafter,
distribution is made of the
decedent's liquidated estate
among the persons entitled
to succeed him. The
proceeding is in the nature
of an action of partition, in
which each party is required
to bring into the mass
whatever community
property he has in his
possession. To this end,
and as a necessary
corollary, the interested
parties may introduce
proofs relative to the
ownership of the properties
in dispute. All the heirs who
take part in the distribution
of the decedent's estate are
before the court, and
subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, in all matters and
incidents necessary to the
complete settlement of such
estate, so long as no
interests of third parties are
affected.
6
Page
 In the case now
before us, the matter in
controversy is the
question of ownership of
certain of the properties
involved whether they
belong to the conjugal
partnership or to the
husband exclusively. This
is a matter properly within
the jurisdiction of the
probate court which
necessarily has to
liquidate the conjugal
partnership in order to
determine the estate of
the decedent which is to
be distributed among his
heirs who are all parties
to the
[20]
proceedings. xxx (Emp
hasis supplied.)
In the present case, petitioners
assume that the properties subject of
the allegedly illegal sale are conjugal
and constitute part of their share in the
estate. To date, there has been no final
inventory of the estate or final order
adjudicating the shares of the heirs.
Thus, only the probate court can
competently rule on whether the
properties are conjugal and form part of
the estate. It is only the probate court
that can liquidate the conjugal
partnership and distribute the same to
the heirs, after the debts of the estate
have been paid.
Section 3, Rule 87 bars petitioners
from filing the present action
Petitioners next contend that even
if the probate court has the power to rule
on their Complaint, the submission of
the issues in this case to the probate
court is merely optional, and not
mandatory upon them. Hence, they
argue, they still have the right to bring
these issues in a separate civil action, if
they so choose. They argue further that
Section 3, Rule 87 of the Revised Rules
of Court is not applicable to the present
case.
The said provision states that:
Sec. 3. Heir may not
sue until share
assigned. When an
executor or administrator is
appointed and assumes the
trust, no action to recover
the title or possession of
lands or for damages done
to such lands shall be
maintained against him by
an heir or devisee until
there is an order of the
court assigning such lands
to such heir or devisee or
until the time allowed for
paying debts has expired.
Petitioners believe that the above
rule is subject to certain exceptions.
They invoke the doctrine that while heirs
have no standing in court to sue for the
recovery of property of the estate
represented by an administrator, these
heirs may maintain such action if the
administrator is unwilling to bring the
suit, or has allegedly participated in the
act complained of.
On this contention, petitioners
theory must again fail. There is nothing
on the record that would prove that
Aurora defied the orders of the probate
court or entered into sale agreements in
violation of her trust. In fact, petitioners
are really accusing a co-heir, their
brother Vittorio, of having acquired
certain properties which they allege to
be properties of their parents.
Even if we assume the property to
be conjugal and thus, part of the estate,
Aurora Romeros acts as the
administrator of the estate are subject to
the sole jurisdiction of the probate court.
In Acebedo v. Abesamis,[21] the Court
stated:
In the case of Dillena
vs. Court of Appeals, this
Court made a
pronouncement that it is
within the jurisdiction of the
probate court to approve
the sale of properties of a
deceased person by his
7
prospective heirs before
Page
final adjudication. Hence, it
 is error to say that this
matter should be threshed
out in a separate action.
The Court further
elaborated that although the
Rules of Court do not
specifically state that the
sale of an immovable
property belonging to an
estate of a decedent, in a
special proceeding, should
be made with the approval
of the court, this authority is
necessarily included in its
capacity as a probate
court.[22]
Again, petitioners do not pose
issues pertaining to title or ownership.
They are, in effect, questioning the
validity of the sales made by the
administrator, an issue that can only be
properly threshed out by the probate
court. Paragraph 13 of petitioners
Complaint alleges as follows:
13. The purported
transfers and sales
executed by Defendant
Aurora C. Romero to and in
favor of Defendant Vittorio
C. Romero are nullities
since all were simulated,
entered into without the
intent and volition of
Defendant Aurora C.
Romero, attended by force,
intimidation, duress and
fraud and not supported
with any valid or sufficient
consideration and with the
sole depraved intentions of
depriving the other
compulsory heirs of the late
Judge Dante Y. Romero of
their rightful share in the
estate.[23] (Emphasis
omitted.)
Indeed, implicit in the requirement
for judicial approval of sales of property
under administration is the recognition
that the probate court has the power to
rescind or nullify the disposition of a
property under administration that was
effected without its authority.[24] That
petitioners have the prerogative of
choosing where to file their action for
nullification whether with the probate
court or the regular court is erroneous.
As held in Marcos, II v. Court of
Appeals:
xxx (T)he authority of
the Regional Trial Court,
sitting, albeit with limited
jurisdiction, as a probate
court over the estate of
deceased individual, is not
a trifling thing. The court's
jurisdiction, once invoked,
and made effective, cannot
be treated with indifference
nor should it be ignored
with impunity by the very
parties invoking its
authority.
In testament to this, it
has been held that it is
within the jurisdiction of the
probate court to approve
the sale of properties of a
deceased person by his
prospective heirs before
final adjudication; to
determine who are the heirs
of the decedent; the
recognition of a natural
child; the status of a woman
claiming to be the legal wife
of the decedent; the legality
of disinheritance of an heir
by the testator; and to pass
upon the validity of a waiver
of hereditary
rights.[25] (Citations
omitted.)
Thus, the validity of the sales
made by Aurora, allegedly orchestrated
by petitioners co-heir, Vittorio, can only
be determined by the probate court,
because it is the probate court which is
empowered to identify the nature of the
property, and that has jurisdiction over
Auroras actions and dispositions as
administrator. In Peaverde v.
[26]
Peaverde, the Court even adjudged
the petitioners guilty of forum-shopping
for filing a separate civil action despite
8
the pendency of the said petitioners own
Page
case seeking that letters of
administration be granted to them.
Similar to the case at bar, the petitioners
in Peaverde also sought the annulment
of titles in the name of their co-heir:
The two cases filed
by petitioners are: (1) Sp.
Proc. No. Q-94-19471,
which seeks letters of
administration for the estate
of Mariano Peaverde;
and (2) Civil Case No. Q-95-
24711, which seeks the
annulment of the Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication executed
by Mariano Peaverde and
the annulment of titles in his
name as well as the
reopening of the distribution
of his estate.
Evidently, in filing Sp.
Proc. No. Q-94-19471,
petitioners sought to share
in the estate of Mariano,
specifically the subject land
previously owned in
common by Mariano and his
wife, Victorina.This is also
what they hoped to obtain in
filing Civil Case No. Q-95-
24711.
In the case at bar, it
cannot be denied that the
parties to Sp. Proc. No. Q-
94-19471 and Civil Case
No. Q-95-24711 are
identical. There is also no
question that the rights
asserted by petitioners in
both cases are identical, i.e.,
the right of succession to
the estate of their aunt,
Victorina, wife of
Mariano. Likewise, the
reliefs prayed for --- to
obtain their share in the
estate of Mariano --- are the
same, such relief being
founded on the same facts -
--their relationship to
Mariano's deceased wife,
Victorina.[27]
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition
is DENIED. As the properties herein are
already subject of an intestate proceeding
filed on 6 January 1976, the 14 April 2009
judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 104025 finding no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Indeed, a petition for

letters of administration has
for its object the ultimate
distribution and partition of a
decedent's estate. This is
also manifestly sought in
Civil Case No. Q-95-24711,
which precisely calls for the
"Reopening of Distribution
of Estate" of Mariano
Peaverde. In both cases,
petitioners would have to
prove their right to inherit
from the estate of Mariano
Peaverde, albeit indirectly,
as heirs of Mariano's wife,
Victorina.

Under the
circumstances, petitioners
are indeed guilty of forum-
shopping.
9
Page

xxx xxx xxx

G.R. No. L-29300 June 21, 1978 HITOSIS-GABITO
GAMBA, respondents.
PEDRO D. H. GALLANOSA,
CORAZON GRECIA-GALLONOSA and Haile Frivaldo for petitioners.
ADOLFO FORTAJADA, the deceased
Pedro Gallanosa being substituted by Joaquin R Mitosis for private
his legal heirs, namely his above- respondents.
named widow and his children,
ISIDRO GALLANOSA and LEDY
GALLANOSA, and grandchildren
named IMELDA TECLA GALLANOSA AQUINO, J.:
and ROSARIO BRIGIDA
GALLANOSA, children of the late In this special civil action of certiorari,
SIKATUNA GALLANOSA, son of filed on July 29, 1968, the petitioners
Pedro D.H. GALLONOSA, petitioners, seek to annul the orders of respondent
vs. Judge dated May 3 trial June 17, 1968,
HON. UBALDO Y. ARCANGEL, Judge wherein he reconsidered his order of
of Branch I of the Court of First January 10, 1968, dismissing, on the
Instance of Sorsogon and ground of prescription, the complaint in
FLORENTINO G. HITOSIS, CASIANO Civil Case No. 2233 of the Court of First
G. HITOSIS, TEOTIMO G. HITOSIS, Instance of Sorsogon.
VICTORIO G. HITOSIS, EMILIA G.
HITOSIS VDA. DE CRUZ, JOAQUIN R. The case involves the sixty-one parcels
HITOSIS VDA. DE CRUZ, JOAQUIN R. of land in Sorsogon left by Florentino
HITOSIS, FLORENTINO R. HITOSIS, Hitosis, with an estimated value of
VIRGINIA R. MITOSIS, DEBORAH R. P50,000, trial claims for damages
HITOSIS, EDILBERTO R. HITOSIS, exceeding one million pesos. The
LEONOR R. HITOSIS, NORMA R. undisputed facts are as follows:
HITOSIS-VILLANUEVA, LEONCIO R.
HITOSIS, minors ANGEL R. HITOSIS 1. Florentino Hitosis executed a will in
and RODOLFO R. HITOSIS, the Bicol dialect on June 19, 1938 when
represented by their legal guardian he was eighty years old. He died on
and mother LOURDES RELUCIO May 26, 1939 at Irosin, Sorsogon. A
VDA. DE HITOSIS, PETRONA childless widower, he as survived by his
HITOSIS-BALBIDO, MODESTO brother, Leon Hitosis. His other
HITOSIS-GACILO, CLETO HITOSIS, brothers, named Juan, Tito (Juancito),
AGUSTIN HITOSIS-FORTES, Leoncio (Aloncio) trial Apolonio and only
TOMASA HITOSIS-BANARES VDA. sister, Teodora, were all dead.
DE BORRAS, CONRADA HITOSIS-
BANARES FRANCHE, RESTITUTO 2. On June 24, 1939 a petition for the
HITOSIS-BANARES, DAMIAN probate of his will was filed in the Court
HITOSIS-BANARES, FIDEL HITOSIS- of First Instance of Sorsogon (Special
BANARES, SUSANA HITOSIS- Proceeding No. 3171). The notice of
BANARES RODRIGUEZ, JOSE hearing was duly published. In that will,
HITOSIS, LOLITA HITOSIS-BANEGA, Florentino bequeathed his one-half
minors MILAGROS HITOSIS- share in the conjugal estate to his
BANEGA, ALICIA HITOSIS-BANEGA second wife, Tecla Dollentas, and,
AND ELISA HITOSIS-BANEGA, should Tecla predecease him, as was
represented by their legal guardian the case, his one-half share would be
and father ERNESTO BANEGA, assigned to the spouses Pedro
FELICITAS HITOSIS-PENAFLOR, Gallanosa and Corazon Grecia, the
GENOVEVA HITOSIS-ADRIATICO, reason being that Pedro, Tecla's son by
MANUEL HITOSIS, PEDRO HITOSIS, her first marriage, grew up under the
LIBRATA HITOSIS-BALMES, care of Florentino; he had treated Pedro
as his foster child, and Pedro has
10

JUANITA HITOSIS-GABITO VDA. DE

GABAS, MAURA HITOSIS-GABITO rendered services to Florentino and
Page

VDA. DE GANOLA and LEONA Tecla. Florentino likewise bequeathed

his separate properties consisting of restored to the possession thereof. They
three parcels of abaca land and parcel also claimed damages (Civil Case No.
of riceland to his protege (sasacuyang 696).
ataman), Adolfo Fortajada, a minor.
6. Gallanosa moved to dismiss the
3. Opposition to the probate of the will above complaint for lack of cause of
was registered by the testator's legal action trial on the ground of bar by the
heirs, namely, his surviving brother, prior judgment in the probate
Leon, trial his nephews trial nieces. After proceeding. Judge Anatolio C. Mañalac
a hearing, wherein the oppositors did dismiss the complaint on the ground
not present any evidence in support of of res judicatain his order of August 14,
their opposition, Judge Pablo S. Rivera, 1952 wherein he said:
in his decision of October 27, 1939,
admitted the will to probate and It also appears that the
appointed Gallanosa as executor. Judge plaintiffs and/or their
Rivera specifically found that the predecessors-in-interest
testator executed his last will "gozando had intervened in the
de buena salud y facultades mentales y testate proceedings in Civil
no obrando en virtud de amenaza, Case No. 3171 of this Court
fraude o influencia indebida." for- the purpose of
contesting the probate of
4. On October 24, 1941, the the will of (the) late
testamentary heirs, the Gallanosa Florentino Hitosis; trial had
spouses trial Adolfo Fortajada, their opposition prospered
submitted a project of partition covering trial the will denied of
sixty-one parcels of land located in probate, the proceedings
various parts of Sorsogon, large cattle would have been converted
trial several pieces of personal property into one of intestacy (Art.
which were distributed in accordance 960 Civil Code) and the
with Florentino's will. The heirs assumed settlement of the estate of
the obligations of the estate amounting the said deceased would
to P7,129.27 in the portion of P2,376.42 have been made in
for Adolfo Fortajada and P4,752.85 for accordance with the
the Gallanosa spouses. The project of provisions of law governing
partition was approved by Judge legal or intestate
Doroteo Amador in his order of March succession ... , in which
13, 1943, thus confirming the heirs' case the said plaintiffs, as
possession of their respective shares. the nearest of kin or legal
The testator's legal heirs did not appeal heirs of said Florentino
from the decree of probate trial from the Mitosis, would have
order of partition trial distribution. succeeded to the ownership
and possession of the 61
5. On February 20, 1952, Leon Hitosis parcels of land in question
trial the heirs of Florentino's deceased forming part of his estate
brothers trial sisters instituted an action (art. 1003, Civil Code).
in the Court of First Instance of
Sorsogon against Pedro Gallanosa for However, the derision of the
the recovery of the said sixty-one Court was adverse to them,
parcels of land. They alleged that they, when it their opposition trial
by themselves or through their ordered the probate of his
predecessors-in-interest, had been in will. From this decision
continuous possession of those (Annex K) legalizing the
lands en concepto de dueño trial that said will, the oppositors did
Gallanosa entered those lands in 1951 not file any appeal within
trial asserted ownership over the lands. the period fixed by law,
11

They prayed that they be declared the despite the fact that they
Page

owners of the lands trial that they be were duly notified thereof,
 so that the said decision
had become final trial it now
constitutes a bar to any
action that the plaintiffs may
institute for the purpose of a
redetermination of their
rights to inherit the
properties of the late
Florentino Hitosis.
In other words, the said
decision of this Court in
Civil Case special ) No.
3171, in which the herein
plaintiffs or their
predecessors-in-interest
had intervened as parties
oppositors, constitutes a
final judicial determination
of the issue that the said
plaintiffs, as ordinary heirs,
have no legal rights to
succeed to any of the
properties of the late
Florentino Hitosis;
consequently, their present
claim to the ownership trial
possession of the 61
parcels of land in question
is without any legal merit or
basis.
7. The plaintiffs did not appeal from that
order of dismissal which should have set
the matter at rest. But the same plaintiffs
or oppositors to the probate of the will,
trial their heirs, with a persistence
befitting a more meritorious case, filed
on September 21, 1967, or fifteen years
after the dismissal of Civil Case No. 696
trial twenty-eight years after the probate
of the will another action in the same
court against the Gallanosa spouses
trial Adolfo Fortajada for the "annulment"
of the will of Florentino Hitosis trial and
for the recovery of the same sixty-one
parcels of land. They prayed for the
appointment of a receiver.
8. As basis of their complaint, they
alleged that the Gallanosa spouses,
through fraud trial deceit, caused the
execution trial simulation of the
document purporting to be the last will
trial testament of Florentino Hitosis.
While in their 1952 complaint the game
plaintiffs alleged that they were in
possession of the lands in question, in
their 1967 complaint they admitted that
since 1939, or from the death of
Florentino Hitosis, the defendants (now
the petitioners) have been in possession
of the disputed lands (Par. XIV of the
complaint, p. 70, Rollo in Civil Case No.
555, Gubat Branch, which was
transferred to Branch I in Sorsogon town
where Special Proceeding No. 3171 trial
Civil Case No. 696 were decided trial
which was re-docketed as Civil Case
No. 2233).
9. As already stated, that 1967
complaint, upon motion of the
defendants, now the petitioners, was
dismissed by respondent Judge. The
plaintiffs filed a motion for
reconsideration Respondent Judge.
granted it trial set aside the order of
dismissal. He denied defendants' motion
for the reconsideration of his order
setting aside that dismissal order.
The petitioners or the defendants below
contend in this certiorari case that the
lower court has no jurisdiction to set
aside the 1939 decree of probate trial
the 1952 order of dismissal in Civil Case
No. 696 trial that it acted with grave
abuse of discretion in not dismissing
private respondents' 1967 complaint.
The issue is whether, under the facts set
forth above, the private respondents
have a cause of action the "annulment"
of the will of Florentino Hitosis trial for
the recovery of the sixty-one parcels of
land adjudicated under that will to the
petitioners.
We hold that the lower court committed
a grave abuse of discretion in
reconsideration its order of dismissal
trial in ignoring the 1939 testamentary
case trial the 1952 Civil Case No. 696
which is the same as the instant 1967
case.
A rudimentary knowledge of substantive
law trial procedure is sufficient for an
ordinary lawyer to conclude upon a
causal perusal of the 1967 complaint
that it is baseless trial unwarranted.
12
Page
What the plaintiffs seek is the
"annulment" of a last will trial testament
duly probated in 1939 by the lower court
itself. The proceeding is coupled with an
action to recover the lands adjudicated
to the defendants by the same court in
1943 by virtue of the probated will,
which action is a resuscitation of The
complaint of the same parties that the
same court dismissed in 1952.
It is evident from the allegations of the
complaint trial from defendants' motion
to dismiss that plaintiffs' 1967 action is
barred by res judicata, a double-
barrelled defense, trial by prescription,
acquisitive trial extinctive, or by what are
known in the jus civile trial the jus
gentium as usucapio, longi temporis
possesio and praescriptio (See Ramos
vs. Ramos, L-19872, December 3,
1974, 61 SCRA 284).
Our procedural law does not sanction an
action for the "annulment" of a will. In
order that a will may take effect, it has to
be probated, legalized or allowed in the
proper testamentary proceeding. The
probate of the will is mandatory (Art.
838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75,
formerly sec. 1, Rule 76, Rules of Court;
Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479;
Guevara vs. Guevara, 98 Phil. 249).
The testamentary proceeding is a
special proceeding for the settlement of
the testator's estate. A special
proceeding is distinct trial different from
an ordinary action (Secs. 1 trial 2, Rule
2 trial sec. 1, Rule 72, Rules of Court).
We say that the defense of res judicata,
as a ground for the dismissal of
plaintiffs' 1967 complaint, is a two-
pronged defense because (1) the 1939
trial 1943 decrees of probate trial
distribution in Special Proceeding No.
3171 trial (2) the 1952 order of dismissal
in Civil Case No. 696 of the lower court
constitute bars by former judgment,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 49. Effect of
judgments. — The effect of
a judgment or final order
rendered by a court or
judge of the Philippines,
having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment or
order, may be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or
order against a specific
thing, or in respect to the
probate of a will or the
administration of the estate
of a deceased person, or in
respect to the personal,
political, or legal condition
or status of a particular
person or his relationship to
another, the judgment or
order is conclusive upon the
title to the thing the will or
administration, or the
condition, status or
relationship of the person;
however, the probate of a
will or granting of letters of
administration shall only be
prima facie evidence of the
death of the testator or
intestate;
(b) In other cases the
judgment or order is, with
respect to the matter
directly adjudged or as to
any other matter that could
have been raised in relation
thereto, conclusive between
the parties trial their
successors in interest by
title subsequent to the
commencement of the
action or special
proceeding, litigating of the
same thing trial under the
same title trial in the same
capacity;
(c) In any other litigation
between the same parties
or their successors in
interest, that only is
deemed to have been
adjudged in a former
judgment which appears
upon its face to have been
so adjudged, or which was
actually trial necessarily
included therein or
13
necessary thereto.
Page
The 1939 decree of probate is
conclusive as to the due execution or
formal validity of the will (Sec. 625, Act
190, sec. 1, Rule 76, now sec. 1, Rule
75, Rules of Court; Last par. of art. 838,
Civil Code).
That means that the testator was of
sound trial disposing mind at the time
when he executed the will and was not
acting under duress, menace, fraud, or
undue influence; that the will was signed
by him in the presence of the required
number of witnesses, and that the will is
genuine trial is not a forgery.
Accordingly, these facts cannot again be
questioned in a subsequent proceeding,
not even in a criminal action for the
forgery of the will. (3 Moran's Comments
on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, p.
395; Manahan vs. Manahan, 58 Phil.
448).
After the finality of the allowance of a
will, the issue as to the voluntariness of
its execution cannot be raised anymore
(Santos vs. De Buenaventura, L-22797,
September 22, 1966, 18 SCRA 47).
In Austria vs. Ventenilla, 21 Phil. 180, a
"petition for annulment of a will" was not
entertained after the decree of probate
had become final. That case is
summarized as follows:
Wills; Probate; Alledged
Fraudulent Will; Appeal.—
V. died. His will was
admitted to probate without
objection. No appeal was
taken from said order. It
was admitted that due trial
legal notice had been given
to all parties. Fifteen
months after the date of
said order, a motion was
presented in the lower court
to have said will declared
null and void, for the reason
that fraud had been
practised upon the
deceased in the making of
his will.
Held: That under section
625 of Act No. 190, the only
time given parties who are
displeased with the order
admitting to probate a will,
for an appeal is the time
given for appeals in
ordinary actions; but without
deciding whether or not an
order admitting a will to
probate will be opened for
fraud, after the time allowed
for an appeal has expired,
when no appeal is taken
from an order probating a
will, the heirs can not, in
subsequent litigation in the
same proceedings, raise
questions relating to its due
execution. The probate of a
will is conclusive as to its
due execution trial as to the
testamentary capacity of
The testator. (See Austria
vs. Heirs of Ventenilla. 99
Phil. 1069).
On the other hand, the 1943 decree of
adjudication rendered by the trial court
in the testate proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of Florentino
Hitosis, having been rendered in a
proceeding in rem, is under the
abovequoted section 49(a), binding
upon the whole world (Manalo vs.
Paredes, 47 Phil. 938; In re Estate of
Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; De la Cerna vs.
Potot, 120 Phil. 1361, 1364; McMaster
vs. Hentry Reissmann & Co., 68 Phil.
142).
It is not only the 1939 probate
proceeding that can be interposed
as res judicata with respect to private
respondents' complaint, The 1952 order
of dismissal rendered by Judge Mañalac
in Civil Case No. 696, a judgment in
personam was an adjudication on the
merits (Sec. 4, Rule 30, old Rules of
Court). It constitutes a bar by former
judgment under the aforequoted section
49(b) (Anticamara vs. Ong, L-29689.
April 14, 1978).
The plaintiffs or private respondents did
not even bother to ask for the annulment
of the testamentary proceeding trial the
proceeding in Civil Case No. 696.
14
Obviously, they realized that the final
Page
adjudications in those cases have the
binding force of res judicata and that
there is no ground, nor is it timely, to ask
for the nullification of the final orders trial
judgments in those two cases.
It is a fundamental concept in the
organization of every jural system, a
principle of public policy, that, at the risk
of occasional errors, judgments of
courts should become final at some
definite date fixed by law. Interest rei
publicae ut finis sit litum. "The very
object for which the courts were
constituted was to put an end to
controversies." (Dy Cay vs. Crossfield
and O'Brien, 38 Phil. 521: Peñalosa vs.
Tuason, 22 Phil, 303; De la Cerna vs.
Potot, supra).
Court of Appeals. Even the trial court did
not take pains to verify the
misrepresentation of plaintiffs' counsel
that the Dinglecase was decided by this
Court. An elementary knowledge of civil
law could have alerted the trial court to
the egregious error of plaintiffs' counsel
in arguing that article 1410 applies to
wills.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders
of May 3 trial June 17, 1968 are
reversed trial set aside trial its order of
dismissal dated January 10, 1968 is
affirmed. Costs against the private
respondents.
SO ORDERED.

After the period for seeking relief from a

final order or judgment under Rule 38 of
the Rules of Court has expired, a final
judgment or order can be set aside only
on the grounds of (a) lack of jurisdiction
or lack of due process of law or (b) that
the judgment was obtained by means of
extrinsic or collateral fraud. In the latter
case, the period for annulling the
judgment is four years from the
discovery of the fraud (2 Moran's
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970
Edition, pp. 245-246; Mauricio vs.
Villanueva, 106 Phil. 1159).

To hurdle over the obstacle of

prescription, the trial court, naively
adopting the theory of plaintiffs' counsel,
held that the action for the recovery of
the lands had not prescribed because
the rule in article 1410 of the Civil Code,
that "the action or defense for the
declaration of the inexistence of
a contract does not prescribe", applies
to wills.

That ruling is a glaring error. Article

1410 cannot possibly apply to last wills
trial testaments. The trial court trial
plaintiffs' counsel relied upon the case of
Dingle vs. Guillermo, 48 0. G. 4410,
allegedly decided by this Court, which
cited the ruling in Tipton vs. Velasco, 6
Phil. 67, that mere lapse of time cannot
give efficacy to void contracts, a ruling
elevated to the category of a codal
15

provision in article 1410.

Page

The Dingle case was decided by the

G.R. No. L-13938 July 31, 1968
IN THE MATTER OF THE PROBATE
OF THE WILL OF CHRISTIAN
HARRIS, Deceased. PEDRO
BUTIONG,petitioner-appellee,
vs.
THE SURIGAO CONSOLIDATED
MINING CO., INC., oppositor-appellant.
Montilla, Ravelo and Valente and Alviso
and Beberino for petitioner-appellee.
Gamboa and Gamboa for oppositor-
appellant.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Direct appeal from an order of the Court
of First Instance of Surigao allowing a
given instrument to probate as the last
will and testament of Christian Harris.
On September 7, 1954, Pedro Butiong
commenced Special Proceedings No.
737 of said Court for the probate of a
document — attached to his petition,
and later marked as Exhibit G —
purporting to have been executed by
Christian Harris as his last will and
testament. Paragraph IV of said Exhibit
G reads:
I hereby make, appoint and
constitute Pedro Butiong, who is
my adopted son and whom I have
reared and brought up since he
was still about two (2) years old,
as my sole and universal heir of
all my properties located in the
Philippines, consisting of shares
of stock and interest in the
Mindanao Mother Lode Mining
Co., Inc., located at Mabuhay,
Surigao, Surigao, and of shares of
stock, interest and one (1%) per
cent royalty in the Surigao
Consolidated Mining Co., Inc.,
located at Siano, Surigao.
The Surigao Consolidated Mining Co.,
Inc. opposed the probate of said Exhibit
G upon the ground of forgery. After
appropriate proceedings, the lower court
issued an order, dated June 15, 1957,
admitting the disputed document to
probate. Hence, this appeal by said
Company — hereinafter referred to as
appellant — upon the ground that the
lower court erred:
1) In not holding that the
"Semana," in which notice of the
hearing of said petition had been
published, is not a newspaper of
general circulation in the Province
of Surigao;
2) In finding that Pedro Butiong
and Clementino Sykimte are the
next of kin of Harris;
3) In holding that appellant had
not proven that Harris did not own
the property and interest disposed
of in his last will; 1äwphï1.ñët
4) In giving credence to the
testimony of the attesting
witnesses;
5) In giving credence to Butiong's
explanation regarding the
temporary disappearance of
Exhibit G; and
6) In allowing Exhibit G to
probate, instead of declaring that
the alleged signatures of Harris
thereon are a "forgery."
Upon the other hand, Butiong maintains
that the lower court erred in entertaining
appellant's opposition and in not
dismissing its appeal.
It is obvious that Butiong's contention is
well taken. Indeed, it is well-settled that
one who has or can have no interest in
succeeding a decedent cannot oppose
the probate of his alleged will.1 Appellant
herein does not claim to have such
interest in the succession to Christian
Harris. Accordingly, the lower court
should not have considered its
opposition to the probate of Exhibit G,
much less given due course to the
present appeal.
Independently of the foregoing,
appellant's assignment of errors are
devoid of merit. Indeed, the notice of
hearing issued by the Justice of the
16
Peace of the provincial capital, "for and
Page
in the absence of the District judge,"
states that the "Semana," in which said
notice was ordered and was in fact
published, is of general circulation in the
Province of Surigao, and there is no
evidence to the contrary.
Again, the question whether or not
Butiong and Sykimte are related to the
deceased, and whether the latter really
owns the property and interests sought
to be disposed of in Exhibit G, are
immaterial to the probate thereof. At any
rate, the testimony of Clemente
Sykimte, who used to act as the
secretary of Harris, during his lifetime
and that of appellant's general
superintendent of operations, J.B.
Harrison, have established the fact that
Harris had in his name four (4) mining
claims, two (2) of which were operated
by the appellant. In fact, appellant's
Articles of Incorporation show, also, that
Harris was one of its incorporators, with
a subscription of 900,000 shares of
stock. In addition thereof, he had 75,000
shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother
Lode Mining Co., Inc.
It is true that, testifying as appellant's
witness, Martin S. Ramos, as alleged
handwriting expert, expressed the
opinion that the supposed signature of
Harris on Exhibit G is forged. This
negative evidence was more than offset,
however, by the testimony of Vicente C.
Fernandez, Bernardino O. Almeda and
Mateo Penafiel to the effect that, after
reading Exhibit G aloud and announcing
that it was the true expression of his will,
Harris — who was of sound mind and
spoke, as well as understood, both
English and Spanish — signed thereon
in their presence, and they, in turn,
signed on said instrument, in the
presence of each other and that of
Harris, in accordance with law. Besides,
their testimony on the genuineness of
the signature of Harris on Exhibit G was
corroborated by the testimony of
Butiong and Sykimte, as well as by
handwriting expert, Dr. Paul R. Verzosa,
aside from having been confirmed by
His Honor, the trial Judge, who
compared said signature with the
admittedly genuine signatures of Harris,
used as standards in the lower court. It
is thus apparent that Butiong's evidence
is much weightier than that of appellant
herein.
As regards the delay in the filing of
Exhibit G for probate, Butiong explained
it as follows: Harris died in Surigao,
Surigao, on December 7, 1941, or on
the eve of the outbreak of war in the
Pacific. Inasmuch as, soon thereafter,
the Japanese forces occupied the
province of Surigao, Butiong evacuated
from Surigao, Surigao, and transferred
Exhibit G, from a wooden trunk he has
in his house, to a valise belonging to his
uncle, Bernardino Butiong, with whom
he lived, in the barrio of Alegria,
Municipality of Mainit. After liberation,
neither he (Pedro Butiong) nor
Bernardino could, however, find Exhibit
G until August 20, 1954, when
Bernardino located it accidentally while
looking for other papers. There upon
Exhibit G was filed in court for probate.
The records before us do not furnish
sufficient data to warrant denying
credence to the testimony of Pedro
Butiong and Bernardino Butiong, to this
effect. At any rate, since the authenticity
of the signature of Harris on Exhibit G
and the due execution thereof, as his
last will and testament, have been
satisfactorily established, the
explanation for the delay in its
presentation for probate has become of
minimal importance.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from
is hereby affirmed, with costs against
appellant, Surigao Consolidated Mining
Co., Inc. It is so ordered. 1äwphï1.ñët
17
Page
 ARTICLE 839 and testament of Placido
Valmonte and ordering the
issuance of letters
testamentary to the
LETICIA VALMONTE ORTEGA, G.R. No. petitioner Josefina
157451 Valmonte. Let this case be
remanded to the court a
Petitioner, quo for further and
concomitant proceedings.[4]
- versus -
The assailed
JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE, Resolution denied
Respondent. petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
Promulgated:

December 16, 2005

The Facts
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x The facts were summarized in
the assailed Decision of the CA, as
follows:
DECISION x x x: Like so many
others before him, Placido
toiled and lived for a long
time in the United States
PANGANIBAN, J.:
until he finally reached
retirement. In 1980, Placido
T he law favors the probate of a will.
finally came home to stay in
Upon those who oppose it rests the
the Philippines, and he lived
burden of showing why it should not be
in the house and lot located
allowed. In the present case, petitioner
at #9200 Catmon St., San
has failed to discharge this burden
Antonio Village, Makati,
satisfactorily. For this reason, the Court
which he owned in common
cannot attribute any reversible error on
with his sister Ciriaca
the part of the appellate tribunal that
Valmonte and titled in their
allowed the probate of the will.
names in TCT 123468. Two
The Case years after his arrival from
the United States and at the
Before the Court is a Petition for age of 80 he wed Josefina
Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of who was then 28 years old,
Court, seeking to reverse and set aside in a ceremony solemnized
the December 12, 2002 Decision[2] and by Judge Perfecto Laguio,
the March 7, 2003 Resolution[3] of the Jr. on February 5, 1982. But
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. in a little more than two
44296. The assailed Decision disposed years of wedded bliss,
as follows: Placido died on October 8,
1984 of a cause written
WHEREFORE, the down as COR
appeal is GRANTED, and PULMONALE.
the Decision appealed from
is REVERSED and SET Placido executed a
ASIDE. In its place notarial last will and
testament written in English
18

judgment is rendered
approving and allowing and consisting of two (2)
Page

probate to the said last will pages, and dated June 15,
1983 but acknowledged 1. It is
only on August 9, 1983. my will that I be
The first page contains the buried in the
entire testamentary Catholic
dispositions and a part of Cemetery,
the attestation clause, and under the
was signed at the end or auspices of the
bottom of that page by the Catholic
testator and on the left hand Church in
margin by the three accordance
instrumental witnesses. The with the rites
second page contains the and said
continuation of the Church and
attestation clause and the that a suitable
acknowledgment, and was monument to
signed by the witnesses at be erected and
the end of the attestation provided my by
clause and again on the left executrix (wife)
hand margin. It provides in to perpetuate
the body that: my memory in
the minds of
my family and
friends;
LAST
WILL AND
TESTAMENT
OF PLACIDO 2. I
VALMONTE IN give, devise
THE NAME OF and bequeath
THE LORD unto my loving
AMEN: wife,
JOSEFINA C.
VALMONTE,
one half (1/2)
I, portion of the
PLACIDO follow-
VALMONTE, of described
legal age, properties,
married to which belongs
Josefina to me as [co-
Cabansag owner]:
Valmonte, and
a resident of
9200 Catmon
Street, Makati, a. Lot 4-A, Block
Metro Manila, 13 described on
83 years of age plan Psd-28575,
and being of LRC, (GLRO),
sound and situated in
disposing mind Makati, Metro
and memory, Manila, described
do hereby and covered by
declare this to TCT No. 123468
be my last will of the Register of
and testament: Deeds of Pasig,
19

Metro-Manila
Page

registered jointly
 as co-owners devise and
with my bequeath to my
deceased sister said wife,
(Ciriaca Josefina C.
Valmonte), Valmonte;
having share and
share alike;

4. I
hereby appoint
b. 2-storey my wife,
building standing Josefina C.
on the above- Valmonte as
described sole executrix
property, made of of my last will
strong and mixed and testament,
materials used as and it is my will
my residence and that said
my wife and executrix be
located at No. exempt from
9200 Catmon filing a bond;
Street, Makati,
Metro Manila also
covered by Tax
Declaration No. IN
A-025-00482, WITNESS
Makati, Metro- WHEREOF, I
Manila, jointly in have hereunto
the name of my set my hand
deceased sister, this 15th day of
Ciriaca Valmonte June 1983 in
and myself as co- Quezon City,
owners, share Philippines.
and share alike or
equal co-owners
thereof;

The allowance to
3. All probate of this will was
the rest, opposed by Leticia on the
residue and grounds that:
remainder of
my real and 1. Petitio
personal ner failed to allege all
properties, assets of the testator,
including my especially those found
savings in the USA;
account bank
book in USA
which is in the
possession of 2. Petitio
my nephew, ner failed to state the
and all others names, ages, and
whatsoever residences of the heirs
20

and wherever of the testator; or to

Page

found, I give,
 give them proper notice of understanding and
pursuant to law; integrity.

3. Will was not At the hearing, the

executed and attested petitioner Josefina testified
as required by law and and called as witnesses the
legal solemnities and notary public Atty. Floro
formalities were not Sarmiento who prepared
complied with; and notarized the will, and
the instrumental witnesses
spouses Eugenio Gomez,
Jr. and Feliza Gomez and
4. Testator was Josie Collado. For the
mentally incapable to opposition, the oppositor
make a will at the time Leticia and her daughter
of the alleged execution Mary Jane Ortega testified.
he being in an advance
sate of senility;

According to Josefina
after her marriage with the
5. Will was executed testator they lived in her
under duress, or the parents house at Salingcob,
influence of fear or Bacnotan, La Union but
threats; they came to Manila every
month to get his $366.00
monthly pension and stayed
at the said Makati
6. Will was procured by residence. There were
undue and improper times though when to shave
influence and pressure off on expenses, the
on the part of the testator would travel alone.
petitioner and/or her And it was in one of his
agents and/or travels by his lonesome self
assistants; and/or when the notarial will was
made. The will was
witnessed by the spouses
Eugenio and Feliza Gomez,
7. Signature of testator who were their wedding
was procured by fraud, sponsors, and by Josie
or trick, and he did not Collado. Josefina said she
intend that the had no knowledge of the
instrument should be existence of the last will and
his will at the time of testament of her husband,
affixing his signature but just serendipitously
thereto; found it in his attache case
after his death. It was only
then that she learned that
the testator bequeathed to
her his properties and she
and she also opposed the was named the executrix in
appointment as Executrix of the said will. To her
estimate, the value of
21

Josefina alleging her want

property both real and
Page

personal left by the testator

is worth more or less
P100,000.00. Josefina
declared too that the
testator never suffered
mental infirmity because
despite his old age he went
alone to the market which is
two to three kilometers from
their home cooked and
cleaned the kitchen and
sometimes if she could not
accompany him, even
traveled to Manila alone to
claim his monthly pension.
Josefina also asserts that
her husband was in good
health and that he was
hospitalized only because
of a cold but which
eventually resulted in his
death.
Notary Public Floro
Sarmiento, the notary public
who notarized the testators
will, testified that it was in
the first week of June 1983
when the testator together
with the three witnesses of
the will went to his house
cum law office and
requested him to prepare
his last will and testament.
After the testator instructed
him on the terms and
dispositions he wanted on
the will, the notary public
told them to come back on
June 15, 1983 to give him
time to prepare it. After he
had prepared the will the
notary public kept it safely
hidden and locked in his
drawer. The testator and his
witnesses returned on the
appointed date but the
notary public was out of
town so they were
instructed by his wife to
come back on August 9,
1983, and which they did.
Before the testator and his
witnesses signed the
prepared will, the notary
public explained to them
each and every term
thereof in Ilocano, a dialect
which the testator spoke
and understood. He
likewise explained that
though it appears that the
will was signed by the
testator and his witnesses
on June 15, 1983, the day
when it should have been
executed had he not gone
out of town, the formal
execution was actually on
August 9, 1983. He
reasoned that he no longer
changed the typewritten
date of June 15, 1983
because he did not like the
document to appear dirty.
The notary public also
testified that to his
observation the testator
was physically and mentally
capable at the time he
affixed his signature on the
will.
The attesting
witnesses to the will
corroborated the testimony
of the notary public, and
testified that the testator
went alone to the house of
spouses Eugenio and
Feliza Gomez at GSIS
Village, Quezon City and
requested them to
accompany him to the
house of Atty. Floro
Sarmiento purposely for his
intended will; that after
giving his instructions to
Atty. Floro Sarmiento, they
were told to return on June
15, 1983; that they returned
on June 15, 1983 for the
execution of the will but
were asked to come back
instead on August 9, 1983
because of the absence of
the notary public; that the
testator executed the will in
22
question in their presence
while he was of sound and
Page
disposing mind and that he
was strong and in good 1. Non-compliance
health; that the contents of with the legal
the will was explained by solemnities and
the notary public in the formalities in the
Ilocano and Tagalog dialect execution and
and that all of them as attestation of the
witnesses attested and will; and
signed the will in the
presence of the testator and
of each other. And that
during the execution, the 2. Mental
testators wife, Josefina was incapacity of the
not with them. testator at the time
of the execution of
the will as he was
then in an
The oppositor Leticia advanced state of
declared that Josefina senility
should not inherit alone
because aside from her
there are other children
from the siblings of Placido It then found these grounds
who are just as entitled to extant and proven, and
inherit from him. She accordingly disallowed
[5]
attacked the mental probate.
capacity of the testator,
declaring that at the time of
the execution of the notarial
will the testator was already Ruling of the Court of Appeals
83 years old and was no
longer of sound mind. She
knew whereof she spoke
because in 1983 Placido Reversing the trial court, the appellate
lived in the Makati court admitted the will of Placido
residence and asked Valmonte to probate. The CA upheld the
Leticias family to live with credibility of the notary public and the
him and they took care of subscribing witnesses who had
him. During that time, the acknowledged the due execution of the
testators physical and will. Moreover, it held that the testator
mental condition showed had testamentary capacity at the time of
deterioration, aberrations the execution of the will. It added that
and senility. This was his sexual exhibitionism and unhygienic,
corroborated by her crude and impolite ways[6] did not make
daughter Mary Jane Ortega him a person of unsound mind.
for whom Placido took a
fancy and wanted to marry.
Hence, this Petition.[7]

Issues
Sifting through the
evidence, the court a
Petitioner raises the following
quo held that [t]he evidence
issues for our consideration:
adduced, reduces the
opposition to two grounds,
namely:
23

I.
Page
 instant case, the findings of fact of the
appellate court differ from those of the
Whether or not the findings trial court.[9]
of the probate court are
entitled to great respect. The fact that public policy favors
the probate of a will does not
necessarily mean that every will
presented for probate should be
II. allowed. The law lays down the
procedures and requisites that must be
Whether or not the satisfied for the probate of a
signature of Placido will.[10] Verily, Article 839 of the Civil
Valmonte in the subject will Code states the instances when a will
was procured by fraud or may be disallowed, as follows:
trickery, and that Placido
Valmonte never intended Article 839. The will
that the instrument should shall be disallowed in any of
be his last will and the following cases:
testament.

(1) If the
III. formalities required by law
have not been complied
Whether or not Placido with;
Valmonte has testamentary
capacity at the time he
allegedly executed the
subject will.[8] (2) If the testator
was insane, or otherwise
mentally incapable of
making a will, at the time of
In short, petitioner assails the CAs its execution;
allowance of the probate of the will of
Placido Valmonte.

(3) If it was
executed through force or
This Courts Ruling under duress, or the
influence of fear, or threats;

The Petition has no merit.

(4) If it was
procured by undue and
improper pressure and
Main Issue: influence, on the part of the
beneficiary or of some other
Probate of a Will person;
At the outset, we stress that only
questions of law may be raised in a
Petition for Review under Section 1 of (5) If the
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As an signature of the testator
exception, however, the evidence was procured by fraud;
24

presented during the trial may be

examined and the factual matters
Page

resolved by this Court when, as in the

 (6) If the testator
acted by mistake or did not
intend that the instrument
he signed should be his will
at the time of affixing his
signature thereto.
In the present case, petitioner assails
the validity of Placido Valmontes will by
imputing fraud in its execution and
challenging the testators state of mind at
the time.
Existence of Fraud in the
Execution of a Will
Petitioner does not dispute the due
observance of the formalities in the
execution of the will, but maintains that
the circumstances surrounding it are
indicative of the existence of fraud.
Particularly, she alleges that
respondent, who is the testators wife
and sole beneficiary, conspired with the
notary public and the three attesting
witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it.
Deception is allegedly reflected in the
varying dates of the execution and the
attestation of the will.
Petitioner contends that it was
highly dubious for a woman at the prime
of her young life [to] almost immediately
plunge into marriage with a man who
[was] thrice her age x x x and who
happened to be [a] Fil-American
pensionado,[11] thus casting doubt on the
intention of respondent in seeking the
probate of the will. Moreover, it
supposedly defies human reason, logic
and common experience[12] for an old
man with a severe psychological
condition to have willingly signed a last
will and testament.
We are not convinced. Fraud is a trick,
secret device, false statement, or
pretense, by which the subject of it is
cheated. It may be of such character
that the testator is misled or deceived as
to the nature or contents of the
document which he executes, or it may
relate to some extrinsic fact, in
consequence of the deception regarding
which the testator is led to make a
certain will which, but for the fraud, he
would not have made.[13]
We stress that the party
challenging the will bears the burden of
proving the existence of fraud at the
time of its execution.[14] The burden to
show otherwise shifts to the proponent
of the will only upon a showing of
credible evidence of
[15]
fraud. Unfortunately in this case, other
than the self-serving allegations of
petitioner, no evidence of fraud was
ever presented.
It is a settled doctrine that the
omission of some relatives does not
affect the due execution of a will.[16] That
the testator was tricked into signing it
was not sufficiently established by the
fact that he had instituted his wife, who
was more than fifty years his junior, as
the sole beneficiary; and disregarded
petitioner and her family, who were the
ones who had taken the cudgels of
taking care of [the testator] in his twilight
years.[17]
Moreover, as correctly ruled by
the appellate court, the conflict between
the dates appearing on the will does not
invalidate the document, because the
law does not even require that a
[notarial] will x x x be executed and
acknowledged on the same
[18]
occasion. More important, the will
must be subscribed by the testator, as
well as by three or more credible
witnesses who must also attest to it in
25
the presence of the testator and of one
Page
another.[19] Furthermore, the testator
and the witnesses must acknowledge Was this the actual
the will before a notary public.[20] In any date when the
event, we agree with the CA that the document was
variance in the dates of the will as to its acknowledged?
supposed execution and attestation was
satisfactorily and persuasively explained A Yes sir.
by the notary public and the
instrumental witnesses.[21]

Q What about the date

when the testator and
The pertinent transcript of the three witnesses
stenographic notes taken on June 11, affixed their
1985, November 25, 1985, October 13, respective signature
1986, and October 21, 1987 -- as on the first and
quoted by the CA -- are reproduced second pages of
respectively as follows: exhibit C?

A On that particular date

when it was
Atty. Floro Sarmiento: acknowledged,
August 9, 1983.

Q You typed this document

exhibit C, specifying Q Why did you not make
the date June 15 the necessary
when the testator and correction on the date
his witnesses were appearing on the
supposed to be in body of the document
your office? as well as the
attestation clause?
A Yes sir.
A Because I do not like
anymore to make
some alterations so I
Q On June 15, 1983, did put it in my own
the testator and his handwriting August 9,
witnesses come to 1983 on the
your house? acknowledgement.
(tsn, June 11, 1985,
A They did as of agreement pp. 8-10)
but unfortunately, I
was out of town.

Eugenio Gomez:

xxxxxxxxx

Q It appears on the first

page Mr. Witness
Q The document has been that it is dated June
acknowledged on 15, 1983, whereas in
August 9, 1983 as the
per acknowledgement it
26

acknowledgement is dated August 9,

appearing therein. 1983, will you look at
Page
 this document and xxxxxxxxx
tell us this
discrepancy in the
date?
A The reason why we went
A We went to Atty. there three times is
Sarmiento together that, the first week of
with Placido June was out first
Valmonte and the two time. We went there
witnesses; that was to talk to Atty.
first week of June Sarmiento and
and Atty. Sarmiento Placido Valmonte
told us to return on about the last will and
the 15thof June but testament. After that
when we returned, what they have talked
Atty. Sarmiento was what will be placed in
not there. the testament, what
Atty. Sarmiento said
was that he will go
back on the 15th of
Q When you did not find June. When we
Atty. Sarmiento on returned on June 15,
June 15, 1983, did Atty. Sarmiento was
you again go back? not there so we were
not able to sign it, the
A We returned on the 9th of will. That is why, for
August and there we the third time we
signed. went there on August
9 and that was the
time we affixed our
signature. (tsn,
Q This August 9, 1983 October 13, 1986, pp.
where you said it is 4-6)
there where you
signed, who were
your companions?
Josie Collado:
A The two witnesses, me
and Placido
Valmonte. (tsn,
November 25, 1985, Q When you did not find
pp. 7-8) Atty. Sarmiento in his
house on June 15,
1983, what
transpired?
Felisa Gomez on cross-
examination: A The wife of Atty.
Sarmiento told us
that we will be back
on August 9, 1983.
Q Why did you have to go
to the office of Atty.
Floro Sarmiento,
three times? Q And on August 9, 1983
did you go back to
27

the house of Atty.

Page

Sarmiento?
 A Yes, Sir.
Q For what purpose?
A Our purpose is just to
sign the will.
Q Were you able to sign the
will you mentioned?
A Yes sir. (tsn, October 21,
1987, pp. 4-5)[22]
Notably, petitioner failed to
substantiate her claim of a grand
conspiracy in the commission of a fraud.
There was no showing that the
witnesses of the proponent stood to
receive any benefit from the allowance
of the will. The testimonies of the three
subscribing witnesses and the notary
are credible evidence of its due
execution.[23] Their testimony favoring it
and the finding that it was executed in
accordance with the formalities required
by law should be affirmed,absent any
showing of ill motives.[24]
Capacity to Make a Will
In determining the capacity of the
testator to make a will, the Civil Code
gives the following guidelines:
Article 798. In order
to make a will it is essential
that the testator be of sound
mind at the time of its
execution.
Article 799. To be of
sound mind, it is not
necessary that the testator
be in full possession of all
his reasoning faculties, or
that his mind be wholly
unbroken, unimpaired, or
shattered by disease, injury
or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if
the testator was able at the
time of making the will to
know the nature of the
estate to be disposed of,
the proper objects of his
bounty, and the character of
the testamentary act.
Article 800. The law
presumes that every person
is of sound mind, in the
absence of proof to the
contrary.
The burden of proof
that the testator was not of
sound mind at the time of
making his dispositions is
on the person who opposes
the probate of the will; but if
the testator, one month, or
less, before making his will
was publicly known to be
insane, the person who
maintains the validity of the
will must prove that the
testator made it during a
lucid interval.
According to Article 799, the three
things that the testator must have the
ability to know to be considered of
sound mind are as follows: (1) the
nature of the estate to be disposed of,
(2) the proper objects of the testators
bounty, and (3) the character of the
testamentary act. Applying this test to
the present case, we find that the
28
appellate court was correct in holding
Page
that Placido had testamentary capacity testamentary incapacity
at the time of the execution of his will. does not necessarily
require that a person shall
actually be insane or of
unsound mind."[26]
It must be noted that despite his
advanced age, he was still able to
identify accurately the kinds of property
he owned, the extent of his shares in
them and even their locations. As
regards the proper objects of his bounty, WHEREFORE, the Petition
it was sufficient that he identified his is DENIED, and the assailed Decision
wife as sole beneficiary. As we have and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
stated earlier, the omission of some are AFFIRMED. Costs against
relatives from the will did not affect its petitioner.
formal validity. There being no showing
of fraud in its execution, intent in its
disposition becomes irrelevant.
SO ORDERED.
Worth reiterating in determining
soundness of mind is Alsua-Betts v.
CA,[25] which held thus:

"Between the highest

degree of soundness of
mind and memory which
unquestionably carries with
it full testamentary capacity,
and that degrees of mental
aberration generally known
as insanity or idiocy, there
are numberless degrees of
mental capacity or
incapacity and while on one
hand it has been held that
mere weakness of mind, or
partial imbecility from
disease of body, or from
age, will not render a
person incapable of making
a will; a weak or
feebleminded person may
make a valid will, provided
he has understanding and
memory sufficient to enable
him to know what he is
about to do and how or to
whom he is disposing of his
property. To constitute a
sound and disposing mind,
it is not necessary that the
mind be unbroken or
unimpaired or unshattered
29

by disease or otherwise. It
Page

has been held that

 ARTICLE 847
G.R. No. L-8927 March 10, 1914
ASUNCION NABLE JOSE, ET
AL., plaintiff-appellants,
vs.
MARIA IGNACIA USON, ET
AL., defendants-appellees.
Ramon Salinas for appellants.
Pedro M.a Sison for appellees.
MORELAND, J.:
The question involved in this appeal
arises from the interpretation of the first
and second clauses of a codicil to the
will of Filomena Uson. They read as
follows:
First. I declare that all the property
which belongs to me as conjugal
property, referred to in my said
testament, shall be the property of
my aforesaid husband, Don
Rafael Sison; in case all or part of
said property exists at my
husband's death, it is my will that
at his death my sisters and nieces
hereinafter named succeed him
as heirs.
Second. I declare to be my sisters
in lawful wedlock the persons
named Doña Antonia Uson, now
deceased, who has left tow
daughters called Maria Rosario,
widow, and Maria Paz, unmarried;
Maria Romualda Uson, widow of
Estanislao Lengson; Ignacia
Uson, married to Don Vicente
Puson; Eufemia Uson, now
deceased, who is survived by
three daughters called Maria
Salud, Maria Amparo, and Maria
Asuncion; and Maria Pilar Uson;
Maria Manaoag Uson, unmarried,
issued had by our deceased after
Don Daniel Uson with one
Leonarda Fernandez, alias Andao
de Lingayen, so that they may
have and enjoy it in equal parts as
good sisters and relatives.
The court below found that the children
of the deceased sisters should take only
that portion which their respective
mothers would have taken if they been
alive at the time the will was made; that
the property should be divided into six
equal parts corresponding to the
number of sisters; that each living sister
should take one-sixth, and the children
of each deceased sister should also
take one-sixth, each one- sixth to be
divided among said children equally.
This appeal is taken from the judgment
entered upon that finding, appellants
asserting that under a proper
construction of the paragraphs of the
codicil above-quoted the property
should be divided equally between the
living sisters and the children of the
deceased sisters, share and share alike,
a niece taking the same share that a
sister receives.
We are of the opinion that the
appellants' contention is well founded.
We see no words appellants in the
clauses quoted which lead necessarily
to the construction placed upon those
paragraphs by the learned court below.
On the other hand, we find expressions
which seem to indicate with fair
clearness that it was the intention of the
testatrix to divide her property equally
between her sisters and nieces. The
court below based its construction upon
the theory that the other construction
would be "an admission that the testatrix
desired to favor her deceased sister
Eufemia Uson, who left three children,
more than her other deceased sister
Antonia Uson, who left two children, and
moreover both would be more favored
than any of the other four surviving
sisters, one of whom was married at the
time of the execution of the said codicil
and without doubt had children."
As we look at the codicil we observe,
first, that the testatrix, in the first
paragraph thereof, declares that after
her husband's death she desires that
"my sisters and nieces, as hereinafter
named, shall succeed him as heirs."
We note, in the second place, that the
testatrix, in the second paragraph of the
30
codicil, names and identifies each one
Page
of her heirs then living, in each one of
the persons whom she desires shall
succeed her husband in the property.
Among those mentioned specially are
the nieces as well as the sisters. The
nieces are referred to in no way different
from the sisters. Each one stands out in
the second paragraph of the codicil as
clearly as the other and under exactly
the same conditions.

In the third place, we note, with interest,

the last clause of the second paragraph
of the codicil which, it seems to us,
taken together with the last clause of the
first paragraph of the codicil, is decisive
of the intention of the testatrix. In the
last clause she says that she names all
of the persons whom she desires to take
under her will be name "so that they
must take and enjoy the property in
equal parts as good sisters and
relatives."

We have then in the first paragraph a

declaration as to who the testatrix
desires shall become the owners of her
property on the death of her husband.
Among them we find the names of the
nieces as well as of the sisters. We
have also the final declaration of the
testatrix that she desires that the sisters
and the nieces shall take and enjoy the
property in equal parts. That being so, it
appears to us that the testatrix's
intention is fairly clear, so clear in fact
that it is unnecessary to bring in
extraneous arguments to reach a
conclusion as to what she intended.

The judgment appealed from is hereby

modified by declaring that, of the
property passing under the codicil
herein above referred to, the living
sisters and the children of the deceased
sisters shall take per capita and in equal
parts, and as so modified the judgment
is affirmed. No costs in this instance.
31
Page
 ARTICLE 850
G.R. No. L-23079 February 27, 1970
RUBEN AUSTRIA, CONSUELO
AUSTRIA-BENTA and LAURO
AUSTRIA MOZO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANDRES REYES, Judge, Court
of First Instance of Rizal, PERFECTO
CRUZ, BENITA CRUZ-MENEZ
ISAGANI CRUZ, ALBERTO CRUZ and
LUZ CRUZ-SALONGA respondents.
Salonga, Ordoñez, Yap, Sicat and
Associates for petitioners.
Ruben Austria for himself and co-
petitioners.
De los Santos, De los Santos and De
los Santos for respondent Perfecto
Cruz.
Villareal, Almacen, Navarra and Amores
for other respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
On July 7, 1956 Basilia Austria vda. de
Cruz filed with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Special Proceedings
2457) a petition for probate, ante
mortem, of her last will and testament.
The probate was opposed by the
present petitioners Ruben Austria,
Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro
Austria Mozo, and still others who, like
the petitioner, are nephews and nieces
of Basilia. This opposition was,
however, dismissed and the probate of
the will allowed after due hearing.
The bulk of the estate of Basilia,
admittedly, was destined under the will
to pass on to the respondents Perfecto
Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meñez, Isagani Cruz,
Alberto Cruz, and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all
of whom had been assumed and
declared by Basilia as her own legally
adopted children.
On April 23, 1959, more than two years
after her will was allowed to probate,
Basilia died. The respondent Perfecto
Cruz was appointed executor without
bond by the same court in accordance
with the provisions of the decedent's
will, notwithstanding the blocking
attempt pursued by the petitioner Ruben
Austria.
Finally, on November 5, 1959, the
present petitioners filed in the same
proceedings a petition in intervention for
partition alleging in substance that they
are the nearest of kin of Basilia, and that
the five respondents Perfecto Cruz, et
al., had not in fact been adopted by the
decedent in accordance with law, in
effect rendering these respondents
mere strangers to the decedent and
without any right to succeed as heirs.
Notwithstanding opposition by the
respondent Perfecto Cruz, as executor
of the estate, the court a quo allowed
the petitioners' intervention by its order
of December 22, 1959, couched in
broad terms, as follows: "The Petition in
Intervention for Partition filed by the
above-named oppositors [Ruben
Austria, et al.,] dated November 5, 1959
is hereby granted."
In the meantime, the contending sides
debated the matter of authenticity or
lack of it of the several adoption papers
produced and presented by the
respondents. On motion of the
petitioners Ruben Austria, et al., these
documents were referred to the National
Bureau of Investigation for examination
and advice. N.B.I. report seems to bear
out the genuineness of the documents,
but the petitioners, evidently dissatisfied
with the results, managed to obtain a
preliminary opinion from a Constabulary
questioned-document examiner whose
views undermine the authenticity of the
said documents. The petitioners Ruben
Austria, et al., thus moved the lower
court to refer the adoption papers to the
Philippine Constabulary for further
study. The petitioners likewise located
former personnel of the court which
appeared to have granted the
32
questioned adoption, and obtained
Page
written depositions from two of them
denying any knowledge of the pertinent
adoption proceedings.
On February 6, 1963, more than three
years after they were allowed to
intervene, the petitioners Ruben Austria,
let al., moved the lower court to set for
hearing the matter of the genuineness of
the adoption of the respondents
Perfecto Cruz, et al., by the late Basilia.
Before the date set by the court for
hearing arrived, however, the
respondent Benita Cruz-Meñez who
entered an appearance separately from
that of her brother Perfecto Cruz, filed
on February 28, 1963 a motion asking
the lower court, by way of alternative
relief, to confine the petitioners'
intervention, should it be permitted, to
properties not disposed of in the will of
the decedent.
On March 4, 1963, the lower court heard
the respondent Benita's motion. Both
sides subsequently submitted their
respective memoranda, and finally, the
lower court issued an order on June 4,
1963, delimiting the petitioners'
intervention to the properties of the
deceased which were not disposed of in
the will.
The petitioners moved the lower court to
reconsider this latest order, eliciting
thereby an opposition, from the
respondents. On October 25, 1963 the
same court denied the petitioners'
motion for reconsideration.
A second motion for reconsideration
which set off a long exchange of
memoranda from both sides, was
summarily denied on April 21, 1964.
Hence this petition for certiorari, praying
this Court to annul the orders of June 4
and October 25, 1963 and the order of
April 21, 1964, all restricting petitioners'
intervention to properties that were not
included in the decedent's testamentary
dispositions.
The uncontested premises are clear.
Two interests are locked in dispute over
the bulk of the estate of the deceased.
Arrayed on one side are the petitioners
Ruben Austria, Consuelo Austria-Benta
and Lauro Austria Mozo, three of a
number of nephews and nieces who are
concededly the nearest surviving blood
relatives of the decedent. On the other
side are the respondents brothers and
sisters, Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-
Meñez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz and
Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom heirs in
the will of the deceased Basilia, and all
of whom claim kinship with the decedent
by virtue of legal adoption. At the heart
of the controversy is Basilia's last will —
immaculate in its extrinsic validity since
it bears the imprimatur of duly
conducted probate proceedings.
The complaint in intervention filed in the
lower court assails the legality of the tie
which the respondent Perfecto Cruz and
his brothers and sisters claim to have
with the decedent. The lower court had,
however, assumed, by its orders in
question, that the validity or invalidity of
the adoption is not material nor decisive
on the efficacy of the institution of heirs;
for, even if the adoption in question
were spurious, the respondents Perfecto
Cruz, et al., will nevertheless succeed
not as compulsory heirs but as
testamentary heirs instituted in Basilia's
will. This ruling apparently finds support
in article, 842 of the Civil Code which
reads:
One who has no
compulsory heirs may
dispose of by will all his
estate or any part of it in
favor of any person having
capacity to succeed.
One who has compulsory
heirs may dispose of his
estate provided he does not
contravene the provisions
of this Code with regard to
the legitime of said heirs.
The lower court must have assumed
that since the petitioners nephews and
niece are not compulsory heirs, they do
not possess that interest which can be
prejudiced by a free-wheeling
testamentary disposition. The
petitioners' interest is confined to
33
properties, if any, that have not been
Page
disposed of in the will, for to that extent
intestate succession can take place and
the question of the veracity of the
adoption acquires relevance.
The petitioners nephews and niece,
upon the other hand, insist that the
entire estate should descend to them by
intestacy by reason of the intrinsic nullity
of the institution of heirs embodied in the
decedent's will. They have thus raised
squarely the issue of whether or not
such institution of heirs would retain
efficacy in the event there exists proof
that the adoption of the same heirs by
the decedent is false.
The petitioners cite, as the controlling
rule, article 850 of the Civil Code which
reads:
The statement of a false
cause for the institution of
an heir shall be considered
as not written, unless it
appears from the will that
the testator would not have
made such institution if he
had known the falsity of
such cause.
Coming closer to the center of the
controversy, the petitioners have called
the attention of the lower court and this
Court to the following pertinent portions
of the will of the deceased which recite:
III
Ang aking mga sapilitang
tagapagmana (herederos
forzosos) ay ang aking
itinuturing na mga anak na
tunay (Hijos legalmente
adoptados) na sina
Perfecto, Alberto, Luz,
Benita at Isagani, na
pawang may apelyidong
Cruz.
xxx xxx xxx
Kung ako ay bawian ng
Dios ng buhay, ay aking
ipinamamana ang aking
mga ari-ariang maiiwan, sa
kaparaanang sumusunod:
A.—Aking ipinamamana sa
aking nabanggit na limang
anak na sina Perfecto,
Alberto, Luz, Benita at
Isagani, na pawang may
apelyidong Cruz, na
parepareho ang kaparti ng
bawa't isa at walang
lamangan (en partes
iguales), bilang kanilang
sapilitang mana (legiti[ma]),
ang kalahati (½) ng aking
kaparti sa lahat ng aming
ari-ariang gananciales ng
aking yumaong asawang
Pedro Cruz na napapaloob
sa Actuacion Especial No.
640 ng Hukumang Unang
Dulugan ng Rizal at
itinutukoy sa No. 1 ng
parafo IV ng testamentong
ito, ang kalahati (½) ng mga
lagay na lupa at palaisdaan
na nasa Obando at Polo,
Bulacan, na namana ko sa
aking yumaong ama na si
Calixto Austria, at ang
kalahati (½) ng ilang lagay
na lupa na nasa Tinejeros,
Malabon, Rizal, na aking
namana sa yumao kong
kapatid na si Fausto
Austria.
The tenor of the language used, the
petitioners argue, gives rise to the
inference that the late Basilia was
deceived into believing that she was
legally bound to bequeath one-half of
her entire estate to the respondents
Perfecto Cruz, et al. as the latter's
legitime. The petitioners further contend
that had the deceased known the
adoption to be spurious, she would not
have instituted the respondents at all —
the basis of the institution being solely
her belief that they were compulsory
heirs. Proof therefore of the falsity of the
adoption would cause a nullity of the
institution of heirs and the opening of
the estate wide to intestacy. Did the
lower court then abuse its discretion or
act in violation of the rights of the parties
in barring the petitioners nephews and
34
niece from registering their claim even
to properties adjudicated by the
Page
decedent in her will?
Before the institution of heirs may be
annulled under article 850 of the Civil
Code, the following requisites must
concur: First, the cause for the
institution of heirs must be stated in the
will; second, the cause must be shown
to be false; and third, it must appear
from the face of the will that the testator
would not have made such institution if
he had known the falsity of the cause.
The petitioners would have us imply,
from the use of the terms, "sapilitang
tagapagmana" (compulsory heirs) and
"sapilitang mana" (legitime), that the
impelling reason or cause for the
institution of the respondents was the
testatrix's belief that under the law she
could not do otherwise. If this were
indeed what prompted the testatrix in
instituting the respondents, she did not
make it known in her will. Surely if she
was aware that succession to the
legitime takes place by operation of law,
independent of her own wishes, she
would not have found it convenient to
name her supposed compulsory heirs to
their legitimes. Her express adoption of
the rules on legitimes should very well
indicate her complete agreement with
that statutory scheme. But even this, like
the petitioners' own proposition, is highly
speculative of what was in the mind of
the testatrix when she executed her will.
One fact prevails, however, and it is that
the decedent's will does not state in a
specific or unequivocal manner the
cause for such institution of heirs. We
cannot annul the same on the basis of
guesswork or uncertain implications.
And even if we should accept the
petitioners' theory that the decedent
instituted the respondents Perfecto
Cruz, et al. solely because she believed
that the law commanded her to do so,
on the false assumption that her
adoption of these respondents was
valid, still such institution must stand.
Article 850 of the Civil Code, quoted
above, is a positive injunction to ignore
whatever false cause the testator may
have written in his will for the institution
of heirs. Such institution may be
annulled only when one is satisfied,
after an examination of the will, that the
testator clearly would not have made the
institution if he had known the cause for
it to be false. Now, would the late Basilia
have caused the revocation of the
institution of heirs if she had known that
she was mistaken in treating these heirs
as her legally adopted children? Or
would she have instituted them
nonetheless?
The decedent's will, which alone should
provide the answer, is mute on this point
or at best is vague and uncertain. The
phrases, "mga sapilitang
tagapagmana" and "sapilitang
mana," were borrowed from the
language of the law on succession and
were used, respectively, to describe the
class of heirs instituted and the abstract
object of the inheritance. They offer no
absolute indication that the decedent
would have willed her estate other than
the way she did if she had known that
she was not bound by law to make
allowance for legitimes. Her disposition
of the free portion of her estate (libre
disposicion) which largely favored the
respondent Perfecto Cruz, the latter's
children, and the children of the
respondent Benita Cruz, shows a
perceptible inclination on her part to give
to the respondents more than what she
thought the law enjoined her to give to
them. Compare this with the relatively
small devise of land which the decedent
had left for her blood relatives, including
the petitioners Consuelo Austria-Benta
and Lauro Mozo and the children of the
petitioner Ruben Austria. Were we to
exclude the respondents Perfecto Cruz,
et al. from the inheritance, then the
petitioners and the other nephews and
nieces would succeed to the bulk of the
testate by intestacy — a result which
would subvert the clear wishes of the
decedent.
Whatever doubts one entertains in his
mind should be swept away by these
explicit injunctions in the Civil Code:
"The words of a will are to receive an
interpretation which will give to every
expression some effect, rather than one
which will render any of the expressions
35
inoperative; and of two modes of
interpreting a will, that is to be preferred
Page
which will prevent intestacy." 1
Testacy is favored and doubts are
resolved on its side, especially where
the will evinces an intention on the part
of the testator to dispose of practically
his whole estate,2 as was done in this
case. Moreover, so compelling is the
principle that intestacy should be
avoided and the wishes of the testator
allowed to prevail, that we could even
vary the language of the will for the
purpose of giving it effect.3 A probate
court has found, by final judgment, that
the late Basilia Austria Vda. de Cruz
was possessed of testamentary capacity
and her last will executed free from
falsification, fraud, trickery or undue
influence. In this situation, it becomes
our duty to give full expression to her
will.4

At all events, the legality of the adoption

of the respondents by the testatrix can
be assailed only in a separate action
brought for that purpose, and cannot be
the subject of a collateral attack.5

To the petitioners' charge that the lower

court had no power to reverse its order
of December 22, 1959, suffice it to state
that, as borne by the records, the
subsequent orders complained of
served merely to clarify the first — an
act which the court could legally do.
Every court has the inherent power to
amend and control its processes and
orders so as to make them conformable
to law and justices.6 That the court a
quo has limited the extent of the
petitioners' intervention is also within its
powers as articulated by the Rules of
Court.7

ACCORDINGLY, the present petition is

denied, at petitioners cost.
36
Page