1
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
[MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President,
HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the
President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director,
Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as
Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right
recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as
the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official
Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to
compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the
Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200,
234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404,
1
406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574,
594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961,
1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278,
1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840,
1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150,
153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213,
215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273,
275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346,
349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473,
486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612,
615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940,
964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526,
1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600,
1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734,
1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800,
1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836,
1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870,
1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984,
1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492,
494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560,
563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703,
705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76,
80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.

g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed
outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring
the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that
petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged
non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are
without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are
not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the
use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant,
immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to
Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition
concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty,
they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino
vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of
mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has
some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be
protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for
the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be
subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question
2
is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of
a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at
whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal
or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as
such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd
ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private
individual, as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the
Governor General to call a special election for the position of municipal president in
the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T.
Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition
that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is
sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it
would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous
to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the
rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not
exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by
counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different
from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to
these proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty
of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the people in cases of
this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in
the aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right
sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less
than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this
proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the
same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally
empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in
this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua
non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their
own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in
question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication
in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is
anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of
said article. In a long line of decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the
Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not
provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for
determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its
publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the
effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes
applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2
does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the
law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act
638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important
legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines;
[2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have
no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance
to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required
so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the
3
President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general
applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate
notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the
publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have
bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature.
While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and
deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to
the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of
the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what
presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of
informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the
Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se
comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y
Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de
su potestad.5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be
published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon
respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the
Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be
given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in
the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion
whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for
fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the
people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other
presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons
such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the
assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature"
or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that
before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically
informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs.
COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part
of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand
that the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish
the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know
where to obtain their official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application,
which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the
Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might
have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were
published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to
whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced
or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar
situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth
in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having
been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring
no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged
decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v.
Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as
to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications.
The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact
and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always
4
be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular
conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of
status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of
public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous
application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of
those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest
from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the
right of a party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor
before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their
publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have
consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by
a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the
presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive,
have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these
PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their
subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever
been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the
Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise
the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding
on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently
recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment
that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of
criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in
some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take
effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official
Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and
unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

SO ORDERED.

Relova, J., concurs.

Aquino, J., took no part.

Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

5
G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986
LORENZO M. TAÑ;ADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
(MABINI), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President,
HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the
President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION
CRUZ, J.:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number
of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by
law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was
not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared
that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision
of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of
some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official
Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and
unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for
reconsideration/clarification of that decision. 1 Specifically, they ask the following
questions:
6
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which
are not?
3. What is meant by "publication"?
4. Where is the publication to be made?
5. When is the publication to be made?
Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no
distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that
publication means complete publication; and that the publication must be made
forthwith in the Official Gazette. 2
In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the
motion was a request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and,
on the merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil
Code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative; that
publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and
that in any case the subject decision was concurred in only by three justices and
consequently not binding. This elicited a Reply 4 refuting these arguments. Came
next the February Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file
a Rejoinder in view of the supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules
of Court. Responding, he submitted that issuances intended only for the internal
administration of a government agency or for particular persons did not have to be
'Published; that publication when necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette;
and that, however, the decision under reconsideration was not binding because it
was not supported by eight members of this Court. 5

The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall
take effect one year after such publication.
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the
original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion and so
hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity
and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted.
This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example,
as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original
decision, 6 is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its
publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general
rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided. "
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed
with altogether. The reason. is that such omission would offend due process insofar
as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the
legislature could validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon its approval
notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after
publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a
result and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply
because they did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal
laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a
law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may
affect before they can begin to operate.
7
We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law,
which of course presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to
have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of
the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially,
the legislative enactments of the government.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application,
for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that
do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular
individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization.
It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it
unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a
matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the
political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law
without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as
class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must
invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and t to the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private
laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen
days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by
the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution.
administrative rules and regulations must a also be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only
the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published.
Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it
applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the
inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even,
say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from
certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board
must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of
the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of
Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules
laid down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his
personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are
not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.
We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose
is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the
petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of
such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of
effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the
publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was the
manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a
presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published"
by the Marcos administration. 7 The evident purpose was to withhold rather than
disclose information on this vital law.
Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically
for publication in the Official Gazette 8 and that six others felt that publication could
be made elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently informed. 9 One reserved
his vote 10 and another merely acknowledged the need for due publication without
indicating where it should be made. 11 It is therefore necessary for the present
membership of this Court to arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to lay
down a binding decision supported by the necessary vote.
8
There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the
Official Gazette, considering its erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly,
newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating,
the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider
readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of
publication is not the one required or authorized by existing law. As far as we know,
no amendment has been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General
has not pointed to such a law, and we have no information that it exists. If it does, it
obviously has not yet been published.
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal
or modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to
the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and
approved by the political departments of the government in accordance with the
prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under
Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazett
and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such
publication or after a different period provided by the legislature.
We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as
possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that
possibility, of course, although not suggested by the parties that a law could be
rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to
cause its publication as required. This is a matter, however, that we do not need to
examine at this time.
Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request
for an advisory opinion is untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further
comment.
The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once
again an open society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny
and available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to
remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government
authority emanating from them.
Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to
review the work of their delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their lights,
through their freedom of expression and their right of suffrage. This they cannot do if
the acts of the legislature are concealed.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the
shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored
rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are
confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper
notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint parry
or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately
upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the
Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or
on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil
Code.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr.,

and Paras, JJ., concur.

9
G.R. No. 103144 April 4, 2001 While in Saudi Arabia, private respondents were allegedly made to sign a second
contract on February 4, 1985 which changed some of the provisions of their original
contract resulting in the reduction of some of their benefits and privileges.2 On April 1,
PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT and SERVICES CORPORATION, 1985, their foreign employer allegedly forced them to sign a third contract which
petitioner, increased their work hours from 48 hours to 60 hours a week without any
corresponding increase in their basic monthly salary. When they refused to sign this
vs. third contract, the services of private respondents were terminated by Al-Hejailan and
they were repatriated to the Philippines.3
THE HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, VIVENCIO DE MESA,
RODRIGO MIKIN and CEDRIC LEYSON, respondents.

Upon their arrival in the Philippines, private respondents demanded from petitioner
Philsa the return of their placement fees and for the payment of their salaries for the
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
unexpired portion of their contract. When petitioner refused, they filed a case before
the POEA against petitioner Philsa and its foreign principal, Al-Hejailan., with the
following causes of action:
This is a petition for certiorari from the Order dated November 25, 1991 issued by
public respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment. The November 25, 1991
Order affirmed in toto the August 29, 1988 Order of the Philippine Overseas
1. Illegal dismissal;
Employment Administration (hereinafter the "POEA") which found petitioner liable for
three (3) counts of illegal exaction, two (2) counts of contract substitution and one
count of withholding or unlawful deduction from salaries of workers in POEA Case No.
(L) 85-05-0370. 2. Payment of salary differentials;

Petitioner Philsa International Placement and Services Corporation (hereinafter 3. Illegal deduction/withholding of salaries;
referred to as "Philsa") is a domestic corporation engaged in the recruitment of
workers for overseas employment. Sometime in January 1985, private respondents,
who were recruited by petitioner for employment in Saudi Arabia, were required to 4. Illegal exactions/refund of placement fees; and
pay placement fees in the amount of P5,000.00 for private respondent Rodrigo L.
Mikin and P6,500.00 each for private respondents Vivencio A. de Mesa and Cedric P.
Leyson.1 5. Contract substitution. 4

After the execution of their respective work contracts, private respondents left for The case was docketed as POEA Case No. (L) 85-05 0370.
Saudi Arabia on January 29, 1985. They then began work for Al-Hejailan Consultants
A/E, the foreign principal of petitioner.
Under the rules of the POEA dated May 21, 1985, complaints involving
employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract
involving Filipino workers for overseas employment, including money claims, are
10
adjudicated by the Workers' Assistance and Adjudication Office (hereinafter the 1. TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE SAUDI RIYALS
"WAAO") thru the POEA Hearing Officers.5 On the other hand, complaints involving (SR2,225.00) to each complainant, representing the refund of their unpaid separation
recruitment violations warranting suspension or cancellation of the license of pay;
recruiting agencies are cognizable by the POEA thru its Licensing and Recruitment
Office (hereinafter the "LRO"). 6 In cases where a complaint partakes of the nature of
both an employer-employee relationship case and a recruitment regulation case, the 2. ONE THOUSAND SAUDI RIYALS (SR1,000.00) for V.A. de Mesa alone,
POEA Hearing Officer shall act as representative of both the WAAO and the LRO representing the salary deduction from his March salary;
and both cases shall be heard simultaneously. In such cases, the Hearing Officer
shall submit two separate recommendations for the two aspects of the case. 7
3. TWO THOUSAND SAUDI RIYALS (SR2,000.00) each for R.I. Mikin and C.A.P.
Leyson only, representing their differential pay for the months of February and March,
In the case at bench, the first two causes of action were in the nature of money 1985; and
claims arising from the employer-employee relations and were properly cognizable
by the WAAO. The last two causes of action were in the nature of recruitment
violations and may be investigated by the LRO. The third cause of action, illegal
4. Five percent (5%) of the total awards as and by way of attorney's fees.
deduction/withholding of salary, is both a money claim and a violation of recruitment
regulations and is thus under the investigatory jurisdiction of both the WAAO and the
LRO.
All payments of the abovestated awards shall be made in Philippine Currency
equivalent to the prevailing exchange rate according to the Central Bank at the time
of payment.
Several hearings were conducted before the POEA Hearing Officer on the two
aspects of private respondents' complaint. During these hearings, private
respondents supported their complaint with the presentation of both documentary
and testimonial evidence. When it was its turn to present its evidence, petitioner All other claims of complainants as well as the counterclaims of respondent are
failed to do so and consequently, private respondents filed a motion to decide the dismissed for lack of merit.
case on the basis of the evidence on record. 8

SO ORDERED." 10
On the aspects of the case involving money claims arising from the
employer-employee relations and illegal dismissal, the POEA rendered a decision
dated August 31, 1988 9 , the dispositive portion of which reads: Under the Rules and Regulations of the POEA, the decision of the
POEA-Adjudication Office on matters involving money claims arising from the
employer-employee relationship of overseas Filipino workers may be appealed to the
"CONFORMABLY TO THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered ordering National Labor Relations Commission (hereinafter the "NLRC)11 . Thus, as both felt
respondent PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT AND SERVICE aggrieved by the said POEA Decision, petitioner and private respondents filed
CORPORATION to pay complainants, jointly and severally with its principal separate appeals from the August 31, 1988 POEA Decision to the NLRC.
Al-Hejailan, the following amounts, to wit:

11
In a decision dated July 26, 1989 12 , the NLRC modified the appealed decision of
the POEA Adjudication Office by deleting the award of salary deductions and
differentials. These awards to private respondents were deleted by the NLRC
considering that these were not raised in the complaint filed by private respondents.
The NLRC likewise stated that there was nothing in the text of the decision which
would justify the award.
Private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by
the NLRC in a Resolution dated October 25; 1989.
Private respondents then elevated the July 26, 1989 decision of the NLRC to the
Supreme Court in a petition for review for certiorari where it was docketed as G.R. No.
89089. However, in a Resolution dated October 25, 1989, the petition was dismissed
outright for "insufficiency in form and substance, having failed to comply with the
Rules of Court and Circular No. 1-88 requiring submission of a certified true copy of
the questioned resolution dated August 23, 1989." 13
Almost simultaneous with the promulgation of the August 31, 1988 decision of the
POEA on private respondents' money claims, the POEA issued a separate Order
dated August 29, 1988 14 resolving the recruitment violations aspect of private
respondents' complaint. In this Order, the POEA found petitioner guilty of illegal
exaction, contract substitution, and unlawful deduction. The dispositive portion of this
August 29, 1988 POEA Order reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office finds herein respondent PHILSA
International Placement and Services Corporation liable for three (3) counts of illegal
exaction, two (2) counts of contract substitution and one count of withholding or
unlawful deduction from salaries of workers.
Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered to refund the placement fees in the
amount of P2,500.00 to Rodrigo L. Mikin, P4,000.00, each, to Vivencio A. de Mesa
and Cedric A.P. Leyson plus restitution of the salaries withheld in the amount of
SR1,000.00 to Vivencio A. de Mesa.
12
Moreover, respondent's license is hereby suspended for eight (8) months to take
effect immediately and to remain as such until full refund and restitution of the
above-stated amounts have been effected or in lieu thereof, it is fined the amount of
SIXTY THOUSAND (P60,000.00) PESOS plus restitution.
SO ORDERED."
In line with this August 29, 1988 Order, petitioner deposited the check equivalent to
the claims of private respondents and paid the corresponding fine under protest.
From the said Order, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
subsequently denied in an Order dated October 10, 1989.
Under the POEA Rules and Regulations, the decision of the POEA thru the LRO
suspending or canceling a license or authority to act as a recruitment agency may be
appealed to the Ministry (now Department) of Labor and Employment. 15
Accordingly, after the denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed the
August 21, 1988 Order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment. However, in an
Order dated September 13, 1991,16 public respondent Secretary of Labor and
Employment affirmed in toto the assailed Order. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but this was likewise denied in an Order dated November 25, 1991.
Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari where petitioner raises the following grounds
for the reversal of the questioned Orders:
I
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING
PETITIONER GUILTY OF ILLEGAL EXACTIONS. THE FINDING IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE AND IN ANY EVENT, THE LAW ON WHICH THE
CONVICTION IS BASED IS VOID.

II
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN PENALIZING
PETITIONER WITH CONTRACT SUBSTITUTION. IN THE PREMISES, THE
CONTRACT SUBSTITUTION IS VALID AS IT IMPROVED THE TERMS AND
CONDITIONS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' EMPLOYMENT.
III.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION, OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING
PETITIONER LIABLE FOR ILLEGAL DEDUCTIONS/WITHHOLDING OF SALARIES
FOR THE SUPREME COURT ITSELF HAS ALREADY ABSOLVED PETITIONER
FROM THIS CHARGE.
With respect to the first ground, petitioner would want us to overturn the findings of
the POEA, subsequently affirmed by the Secretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment, that it is guilty of illegal exaction committed by collecting placement
fees in excess of the amounts allowed by law. This issue, however, is a question of
fact which cannot be raised in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. 17 As we have
previously held:
"It should be noted, in the first place, that the instant petition is a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. An extraordinary remedy,
its use is available only and restrictively in truly exceptional cases wherein the action
of an inferior court, board or officer performing judicial or quasi-judicial acts is
challenged for being wholly void on grounds of jurisdiction. The sole office of the writ
of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the commission of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It does not
include correction of public respondent NLRC's evaluation of the evidence and
13
factual findings based thereon, which are generally accorded not only great respect
but even finality." 18
The question of whether or not petitioner charged private respondents placement
fees in excess of that allowed by law is clearly a question of fact which is for public
respondent POEA, as a trier of facts, to determine. As stated above, the settled rule
is that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the POEA, which have
acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are
generally accorded not only respect, but at times even finality if such findings are
supported by substantial evidence. 19
On this point, we have carefully examined the records of the case and it is clear that
the ruling of public respondent POEA that petitioner is guilty of illegal exaction is
supported by substantial evidence. Aside from the testimonial evidence offered by
private respondents, they also presented documentary evidence consisting of
receipts issued by a duly authorized representative of petitioner which show the
payment of amounts in excess of those allowed by the POEA. In contrast, petitioner
did not present any evidence whatsoever to rebut the claims of private respondents
despite the many opportunities for them to do so.
Petitioner insists, however, that it cannot be held liable for illegal exaction as POEA
Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1983, which enumerated the allowable fees
which may be collected from applicants, is void for lack of publication.
There is merit in the argument.
In Tañada vs. Tuvera 20 , the Court held, as follows:
"We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private
laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen
days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by
the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution:
Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only
the personnel of the administrative agency and the public, need not be published.
Neither is publication required of the so-called letter of instructions issued by the
administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties."
Applying this doctrine, we have previously declared as having no force and effect the
following administrative issuances: a) Rules and Regulations issued by the Joint
Ministry of Health-Ministry of Labor and Employment Accreditation Committee
regarding the accreditation of hospitals, medical clinics and laboratories; 21 b) Letter
of Instruction No. 416 ordering the suspension of payments due and payable by
distressed copper mining companies to the national government; 22 c) Memorandum
Circulars issued by the POEA regulating the recruitment of domestic helpers to Hong
Kong; 23 d) Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 issued by the Philippine
International Trading Corporation regulating applications for importation from the
People's Republic of China;24 and e) Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10
issued by the Department of Budget and Management discontinuing the payment of
other allowances and fringe benefits to government officials and employees. 25 In all
these cited cases, the administrative issuances questioned therein were uniformly
struck down as they were not published or filed with the National Administrative
Register as required by the Administrative Code of 1987. 26
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 must likewise be declared
ineffective as the same was never published or filed with the National Administrative
Register.
POEA Memorandum Order No. 2, Series of 1983 provides for the applicable
schedule of placement and documentation fees for private employment agencies or
authority holders. Under the said Order, the maximum amount which may be
14
collected from prospective Filipino overseas workers is P2,500.00. The said circular
was apparently issued in compliance with the provisions of Article 32 of the Labor
Code which provides, as follows:
"ARTICLE 32. Fees to be paid by workers. — Any person applying with a private
fee-charging employment agency for employment assistance shall not be charged
any fee until he has obtained employment through its efforts or has actually
commenced employment. Such fee shall be always covered with the approved
receipt clearly showing the amount paid. The Secretary of Labor shall promulgate a
schedule of allowable fees." (italic supplied)
It is thus clear that the administrative circular under consideration is one of those
issuances which should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce
and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. 27 Considering that
POEA Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not as yet been published or
filed with the National Administrative Register, the same is ineffective and may not be
enforced.
The Office of the Solicitor General argues however that the imposition of
administrative sanctions on petitioner was based not on the questioned
administrative circular but on Article 32 and Article 34 (a) 28 of the Labor Code.
The argument is not meritorious. The said articles of the Labor Code were never
cited, much less discussed, in the body of the questioned Orders of the POEA and
Secretary of Labor and Employment. In fact, the said Orders were consistent in
mentioning that petitioner's violation of Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983
was the basis for the imposition of administrative sanctions against petitioner.
Furthermore, even assuming that petitioner was held liable under the said provisions
of the Labor Code, Articles 32 and 34 (a) of the Labor Code presupposes the
promulgation of a valid schedule of fees by the Department of Labor and
Employment. Considering that, as, previously discussed, Administrative Circular No.
2, Series of 1983 embodying such a schedule of fees never took effect, there is thus
no basis for the imposition of the administrative sanctions against petitioner.
Moreover, under Book VI, Chapter II, Section 3 of the Administrative Code of 1987,
"(r)ules in force on the date of the effectivity of this Code which are not filed within
three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction
against any party or persons." Considering that POEA Administrative Circular No. 2
was never filed with the National Administrative Register, the same cannot be used
as basis for the imposition of administrative sanctions against petitioner.
The Office of the Solicitor General likewise argues that the questioned administrative
circular is not among those requiring publication contemplated by Tañada vs. Tuvera
as it is addressed only to a specific group of persons and not to the general public.
Again, there is no merit in this argument.
The fact that the said circular is addressed only to a specified group, namely private
employment agencies or authority holders, does not take it away from the ambit of
our ruling in Tañada vs. Tuvera. In the case of Phil. Association of Service Exporters
vs. Torres,29 the administrative circulars questioned therein were addressed to an
even smaller group, namely Philippine and Hong Kong agencies engaged in the
recruitment of workers for Hong Kong, and still the Court ruled therein that, for lack of
proper publication, the said circulars may not be enforced or implemented.
Our pronouncement in Tañada vs. Tuvera is clear and categorical. Administrative
rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant to a valid delegation., The only exceptions are interpretative
regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those so-called letters of instructions
issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed
by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. Administrative Circular No. 2,
Series of 1983 has not been shown to fall under any of these exceptions.
In this regard, the Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Yaokasin vs.
Commissioner of Customs 30 is misplaced. In the said case, the validity of certain
Customs Memorandum Orders were upheld despite their lack of publication as they
were addressed to a particular class of persons, the customs collectors, who were
also the subordinates of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. As such, the
said Memorandum Orders clearly fall under one of the exceptions to the publication
requirement, namely those dealing with instructions from an administrative superior
15
to a subordinate regarding the performance of their duties, a circumstance which
does not obtain in the case at bench.
With respect to the second ground, petitioner would want us to review the findings of
fact of the POEA regarding the two counts of alleged contract substitution. Again, this
is a question of fact which may not be disturbed if the same is supported by
substantial evidence. A reading of the August 29, 1988 Order of the POEA shows
that, indeed, the ruling that petitioner is guilty of two (2) counts of prohibited contract
substitution is supported by substantial evidence. Thus:
"2. As admitted by respondent, there was definitely a contract of substitution in the
first count. The first contract was duly approved by the Administration and, therefore,
the parties are bound by the terms and condition thereof until its expiration. The mere
intention of respondents to increase the number of hours of work, even if there was a
corresponding increase in wage is clear violation of the contract as approved by the
Administration, and notwithstanding the same, the amendment is evidently contrary
to law, morals, good customs and public policy and hence, must be shunned (Art.
1306, Civil Code of the Philippines, Book III, Title I, Chapter 1, Article 83, Labor Code
of the Philippines, as amended). Moreover, it would appear that the proposed salary
increase corresponding to the increase in number of work bonus may just have been
a ploy as complainant were (sic) thereafter not paid at the increased rate.
As to contract substitution in the second part, a third contract was emphatically
intended by respondent to be signed by complainants which, however, was not
consummated due to the adamant refusal of complainants to sign thereon. Mere
intention of the respondent to commit contract substitution for a second time should
not be left unpunished. It is the duty of this Office to repress such acts by teaching
agencies a lesson to avoid repetition of the same violation." 31
With respect to the third ground, petitioner argues that the public respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioner liable for illegal
deductions/withholding of salaries considering that the Supreme Court itself has
already absolved petitioner from this charge. Petitioner premises its argument on the
fact that the July 26, 1989 Decision of the NLRC absolving it from private respondent
de Mesa's claim for salary deduction has already attained finality by reason of the
dismissal of private respondents' petition for certiorari of the said NLRC decision by
the Supreme Court.
Petitioner is correct in stating that the July 26, 1989 Decision of the NLRC has
attained finality by reason of the dismissal of the petition for certiorari assailing the
same. However, the said NLRC Decision dealt only with the money claims of private
respondents arising from employer-employee relations and illegal dismissal and as
such, it is only for the payment of the said money claims that petitioner is absolved.
The administrative sanctions, which are distinct and separate from the money claims
of private respondents, may still be properly imposed by the POEA. In fact, in the
August 31, 1988 Decision of the POEA dealing with the money claims of private
respondents, the POEA Adjudication Office precisely declared that "respondent's
liability for said money claims is without prejudice to and independent of its liabilities
for the recruitment violations aspect of the case which is the subject of a separate
Order." 32
The NLRC Decision absolving petitioner from paying private respondent de Mesa's
claim for salary deduction based its ruling on a finding that the said money claim was
not raised in the complaint. 33 While there may be questions regarding such finding
of the NLRC, the finality of the said NLRC Decision prevents us from modifying or
reviewing the same. But the fact that the claim for salary deduction was not raised by
private respondents in their complaint will not bar the POEA from holding petitioner
liable for illegal deduction or withholding of salaries as a ground for the suspension or
cancellation of petitioner's license.
Under the POEA Rules and Regulations, the POEA, on its own initiative, may
conduct the necessary proceeding for the suspension or cancellation of the license of
any private placement agency on any of the grounds mentioned therein. 34 As such,
even without a written complaint from an aggrieved party, the POEA can initiate
proceedings against an erring private placement agency and, if the result of its
investigation so warrants, impose the corresponding administrative sanction thereof.
Moreover, the POEA, in an investigation of an employer-employee relationship case,
may still hold a respondent liable for administrative sanctions if, in the course of its
investigation, violations of recruitment regulations are uncovered. 35 It is thus clear
that even if recruitment violations were not included in a complaint for money claims
initiated by a private complainant, the POEA, under its rules, may still take
16
cognizance of the same and impose administrative sanctions if the evidence so
warrants.
As such, the fact that petitioner has been absolved by final judgment for the payment
of the money claim to private respondent de Mesa does not mean that it is likewise
absolved from the administrative sanctions which may be imposed as a result of the
unlawful deduction or withholding of private respondents' salary. The POEA thus
committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding petitioner administratively liable of
one count of unlawful deduction/withholding of salary.
To summarize, petitioner should be absolved from the three (3) counts of illegal
exaction as POEA Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 could not be the
basis of administrative sanctions against petitioner for lack of publication. However,
we affirm the ruling of the POEA and the Secretary of Labor and Employment that
petitioner should be held administratively liable for two (2) counts of contract
substitution and one (1) count of withholding or unlawful deduction of salary.
Under the applicable schedule of penalties imposed by the POEA, the penalty for
each count of contract substitution is suspension of license for two (2) months or a
fine of P10,000.00 while the penalty for withholding or unlawful deduction of salaries
is suspension of license for two (2) months or fine equal to the salary withheld but not
less than P10,000.00 plus restitution of the amount in both instances.36 Applying the
said schedule on the instant case, the license of petitioner should be suspended for
six (6) months or, in lieu thereof, it should be ordered to pay fine in the amount of
P30,000.00. Petitioner should likewise pay the amount of SR1,000.00 to private
respondent Vivencio A. de Mesa as restitution for the amount withheld from his
salary.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the September 13, 1991 and November 25,
1991 Orders of public respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment are hereby
MODIFIED. As modified, the license of private respondent Philsa International
Placement and Services Corporation is hereby suspended for six (6) months or, in
lieu thereof, it is hereby ordered to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as fine. Petitioner
is likewise ordered to pay the amount of SR1,000.00 to private respondent Vivencio
A. de Mesa. All other monetary awards are deleted.
SO ORDERED.

Melo, Vitug, Panganiban and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ ., concur

17
G.R. No. 100335. April 7, 1993.
UNCIANO PARAMEDICAL COLLEGE, INC. (now UNCIANO COLLEGES &
GENERAL HOSPITAL, INC.); MIRANDO C. UNCIANO, SR., DOMINADOR
SANTOS AND EDITHA MORA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, Honorable LOURDES K. TAYAO-JAGUROS, in her
capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Manila; ELENA
VILLEGAS thru VICTORIA VILLEGAS; and TED MAGALLANES thru JACINTA
MAGALLANES, respondents.
Bernardo P. Fernandez for petitioners.
Free Legal Assistance Group for private respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; RULE WHEN A DOCTRINE OF THE
SUPREME COURT IS OVERRULED AND A DIFFERENT VIEW IS ADOPTED. — In
the case of People v. Jabinal, (G.R. No. 82499, 178 SCRA 493 [1989]), it is a settled
rule that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the
new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who
had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION;
PURPOSE. — As to the question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, the case of Capitol Medical Center, Inc., et al. v.
Court of Appeals, et al. discussed exhaustively the purpose in issuing said writ: "The
sole object of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to
preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. The status quo is
the last actual peaceable uncontested status which preceded the controversy
18
(Rodulfa vs. Alfonso, 76 Phil. 225). It may only be resorted to by a litigant for the
preservation or protection of his rights or interests and for no other purpose during
the pendency of the principal action (Calo vs. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445). It should only be
granted if the party asking for it is clearly entitled thereto (Climaco vs. Macaraeg, 4
SCRA 930; Subido vs. Gopengco, 27 SCRA 455; Police Commission vs. Bello, 37
SCRA 230). Inasmuch as a mandatory injunction tends to do more than to maintain
the status quo, it is generally improper to issue such an injunction prior to the final
hearing (Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. vs. Del Rosario, 22 Phil. 433). It may,
however, issue 'in cases of extreme urgency; where the right is very clear; where
considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in complainant's favor; where
there is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff's right against his protest and
remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one; and where the effect of the
mandatory injunction is rather to reestablish and maintain a preexisting continuing
relation between the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant,
than to establish a new relation. Indeed, the writ should not be denied the
complainant when he makes out a clear case, free from doubt and dispute.'
(Commissioner of Customs vs. Cloribel, et al., 19 SCRA 235)."
DECISION
NOCON, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking reversal of the decision 1 of public
respondent Court of Appeals dated February 7, 1991, in CA-G.R. SP No. 21020; and
its resolution dated June 3, 1991.
The antecedent facts are, as follows:
On April 16, 1990, private respondents Elena Villegas and Ted Magallanes, thru their
mothers, Victoria Villegas and Jacinta Magallanes, respectively, filed before the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, a petition for
injunction and damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
against petitioners Unciano Paramedical College, Inc. (now Unciano Colleges and
General Hospital, Inc.), Mirando C. Unciano, Sr., Dominador Santos, Editha Mora, Dr.
Evelyn Moral and Laureana Vitug, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-52745. Among
other things, they alleged therein that:
"6.01. Around the latter part of July 1989, the above-named students initiated a
petition proposing to the school authorities the organization of a student council in the
school. They solicited support of their petition from the studentry by asking the
students to endorse the same with their signatures. They were able to get at least
180 signatures.
"6.02. On August 18, 1989, Elena Villegas and a certain student named Solomon
Barroa were summoned to the Office of Dr. Moral and were admonished not to
proceed with the proposal because, according to her, the school does not allow and
had never allowed such an organization.
"6.03. On September 12, 1989, when news leaked out that the above-named
students would be barred from enrollment, they sought confirmation with respondent
Dr. Moral, Dean of Discipline, who told them 'it's not true unless you violate the rules
and regulations of the school and if you still insist with your student council.'
"6.04. On October 28, 1989, in compliance with an announcement to see the
Dean of Nursing, the above-named students met with Dean Vitug and Dr. Moral who
informed them that they would be barred from enrollment for the second semester
because they supposedly harassed a female student, invited an outsider to the
school to speak before the students, and also because the school has an
arrangement with the Department of Education, Culture and Sports not to allow their
students to put up a student council. Dr. Moral advised them to get their Honorable
Dismissal, and warned them that if she herself were to give it, it would be marked
`expelled.'
"6.05. On November 6, 1989, the students again approached Dr. Moral who
informed them that they were no longer allowed to enroll because they are allegedly
members of the National Union of Students of the Philippines (NUSP) and the
League of Filipino Students (LFS), officers of the student organization they organized,
and, moreover 'drug addicts.' The students asked for proof of these accusations but
19
were not given any, and were told by Dr. Moral that the school has people
investigating for (sic) them but she did not disclose their identities nor provide any
proof to support her allegations.
"6.06. On November 13, 1989, a few days after petitioners retained the services of
counsel FREE LEGAL ASSISTANCE GROUP (FLAG), counsel sent a letter to Mr.
Mirando Unciano, President of the College, demanding that the constitutional
requirements of due process be complied with prior to unilaterally dismissing the
students, and requesting that a conference be held prior to 17 November 1989, as
the enrollment deadline was fast approaching . . .:
"6.07. On 17 November 1989, acceding to the demand, a meeting was held,
attended by Dr. Moral, Dean Vitug, Mr. Rustico Lopez, the students, and their
counsel. Due, however, to the inability of Dr. Moral to resolve the problem in the
absence of the College President and their legal counsel, the meeting was reset to
November 22, 1989 upon Dr. Moral's request. However, notice was sent to the
students' counsel from Unciano Paramedical College resetting the meeting to
November 27, 1989 stating that the President will attend personally therein . . .
"6.08. On 27 November 1989, due to the absence of the school's legal counsel
and the President who allegedly just arrived from the United States, Dr. Moral again
requested that the meeting be reset. A verbal altercation occurred between the
parties due to the delaying tactics of the school officials and the failure to resolve the
problem by their continuous refusal to discuss the merits of the accusations against
the students. The meeting, attended by Dr. Moral, Dean Vitug and Dean Dominador
Santos, ended with the school officials' request that it be reset for 29 November 19B9
and that the students bring their parents or guardian with them at said meeting. The
students agreed to this request and their counsel prepared a written summary of the
matters discussed and agreed during the meeting. The school officials refused to
sign it, however . . .
"6.09. On 29 November 1989, the students were informed that the President had
unilaterally refused to allow them to enroll and it was up to their parents to request or
appeal to the school officials to change their decision. Mrs. Victoria Villegas and Mrs.
Jacinta Magallanes wrote to the school officials to request that their children be
allowed to enroll . . . Dr. Moral informed them that the Board of Trustees will have to
decide on these requests.
"6.10. On 11 December 1989, the students were informed that the Board of
Trustees had refused to grant the parents' request." 2
On May 16, 1990, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order effective May
17, 1990, enjoining petitioner school from not enrolling private respondents in its
College of Nursing and setting the hearing for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction on June 4, 1990. 3
Petitioners filed an opposition to the prayer for a preliminary mandatory injunction on
the ground that private respondents are not entitled thereto and have no clear legal
right to the relief demanded. On the same date, the trial court issued an order, the
pertinent parts of which, read:
"xxx xxx xxx
"It is the opinion of the Court that there will be irreparable injury to the petitioners if
they are not allowed to enroll. At least they will miss another semester.
"On the other hand, the injuries mentioned by Dr. Unciano, in particular the
withdrawal of the other students and the school will lose money if the petitioners are
allowed to enroll is still a speculation, and may not take place.
"In view thereof, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition for issuance of a preliminary
mandatory injunction, ordering the respondents to allow petitioners to enroll for the
first semester of school year 1990-1991, upon filing by petitioners of a bond in the
amount of P2,000.00 each.
20
"xxx xxx xxx
"SO ORDERED." 4
On June 11. 1990, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued. 5
On June 13, 1990, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the Order of June 4,
1990 was denied. 6
Elevating the matter to the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction, the same was dismissed on February 7, 1991 for lack of
merit. 7 Said the court:
"The arguments advanced in support of the petition are mainly anchored on the
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of ALCUAZ, et al. vs. Philippine School of
Business Administration, Quezon City Branch (PSBA), et al., L-76353, May 2, 1988;
161 SCRA 7 where it was held that —
'It is beyond dispute that a student once admitted by the school is considered
enrolled for one semester. It is provided in Paragraph 137 (of the) Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools, that when a college student registers in a school, it
is understood that he is enrolling for the entire semester. Likewise, it is provided in
the Manual, that the 'written contracts' required for college teachers are for 'one
semester.' It is thus evident that after the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no
longer has any existing contract either with the students or with the intervening
teachers . . .
"However, in the more recent case of Ariel Non, et al. vs. Hon. Sancho Dames II, et
al., G.R. No. 89317, May 20, 1990 (185 SCRA 523), the Supreme Court, abandoned
and overruled its decision in Alcuaz and declared thus:

The Court, in Alcuaz, anchored its decision on the 'termination of contract' theory. But
it must be repeatedly emphasized that the contract between the school and the
student is not an ordinary contract. It is imbued with public interest, considering the
high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State of
supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational institutions [See Art. XIV,
Secs. 1-2, 4(1).]
reason, the student shall be charged the pertinent fees only up to and including the
last month of attendance.'
'Clearly, in no way may Paragraph 137 be construed to mean that the student shall
be enrolled for only one semester, and that after the semester is over his
re-enrollment is dependent solely on the sound discretion of the school. On the
contrary, the Manual recognizes the right of the student to be enrolled in his course
for the entire period he is expected to complete it. Thus, Paragraph 107 states:

'Respondent school cannot justify its actions by relying on Paragraph 137 of the
Manual of Regulations for Private School which provides that '(w)hen a student
registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire semester for
collegiate courses,' which the Court in Alcuaz construed as authority for schools to
refuse enrollment to a student on the ground that his contract, which has a term of
one semester, has already expired.
'Every student has the right to enroll in any school, college or university upon meeting
its specific requirement and reasonable regulation: Provided, that except in the case
of academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulation, the student is
presumed to be qualified for enrollment for the entire period he is expected to his (sic)
complete his course without prejudice to his right to transfer.'

'The 'termination of contract' theory does not even find support in the Manual.
Paragraph 137 merely clarifies that a college student enrolls for the entire semester. 'This 'presumption' has been translated into a right in Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, the
It serves to protect schools wherein tuition fees are collected and paid on an 'Education Act of 1982.' Section 9 of this act provides:
installment basis, i.e. collection and payment of the downpayment upon enrollment
and the balance before examinations. Thus, even if a student does not complete the
semester for which he was enrolled, but has stayed on for more than two weeks, he 'SEC. 9. Rights of Students in School. — In addition to other rights, and subject to
may be required to pay his tuition fees for the whole semester before he is given his the limitations prescribed by law and regulations, students and pupils in all schools
credentials for transfer. This is the import of Paragraph 137, subsumed under Section shall enjoy the following rights:
VII on Tuition and Other Fees, which in its totality provides:

xxx xxx xxx

'137. When a student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for
the entire school year for elementary and secondary courses, and for the entire
semester for collegiate courses. A student who transfers or otherwise withdraws, in 12. The right to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to
writing, within two weeks after the beginning of classes and who has already paid the continue their course therein up to graduation, except in cases of academic
pertinent tuition and other school fees in full or for any length of time longer than one deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations.' " 8
month may be charged ten per cent of the total amount due for the term if he
withdraws within the first week of classes, or twenty per cent if within the second
week of classes, regardless of whether or not he has actually attended classes. The
On June 3, 1991, the motion for reconsideration was denied, again, for lack of merit.
student may be charged all the school fees in full if he withdraws anytime after the
9 Hence, the present petition.
second week of classes. However, if the transfer or withdrawal is due to a justifiable

21

Petitioners raise this lone issue:
"WHETHER OR NOT THE NON DOCTRINE SHOULD BE APPLIED
RETROACTIVELY TO GOVERN AND INVALIDATE THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF
INCIDENTS THAT TOOK PLACE PRIOR TO ITS ADOPTION AND WHICH
INCIDENTS WERE PROPER AND VALID UNDER THE ALCUAZ DOCTRINE
PREVAILING AT THE TIME SAID INCIDENTS TOOK PLACE." 10
Petitioners argue that under the then prevailing Alcuaz doctrine which was
promulgated on May 2, 1988, the contract between them and private respondents
was validly terminated upon the end of the first semester of school year 1989-1990.
Although said doctrine was later abandoned in Non, et al. v. Dames II, et al., supra,
this case was promulgated much later, or on May 20, 1990, when the termination of
the contract between them had long become fait accompli. Settled is the rule that
when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new
doctrine is applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who relied on the
old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof, conformably with the case of People v.
Jabinal, G.R. No. L-30061, 55 SCRA 607 (1974). Thus, the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction was issued by the trial court with grave abuse of discretion.
We agree with the arguments of petitioners.
The ruling in the Non case should not be given a retroactive effect to cases that arose
before its promulgation on May 20, 1990, as in this case, which was filed on April 16,
1990. If it were otherwise, it would result in oppression to petitioners and other
schools similarly situated who relied on the ruling in the Alcuaz case, promulgated on
May 2, 1988, which recognized the termination of contract theory. We had an
opportunity to resolve a similar issue in National Service Corporation, et al. v. NLRC.
11 In this case, petitioner claimed that as a government corporation (by virtue of its
being a subsidiary of the National Investment and Development Corporation, a
subsidiary wholly owned by the Philippine National Bank, which in turn is a
government owned corporation), the terms and conditions of employment of its
employees are governed by the civil service law, rules and regulations. In support
22
thereof, petitioner cited the ruling in National Housing Corporation v. Juco, 12 that
employees of government owned or controlled corporations are governed by the civil
service law, rules and regulations, we rejected this claim of petitioner and held that:
"It would appear that, in the interest of justice, the holding in said case should not be
given retroactive effect, that is, to cases that arose before its promulgation on 17
January 1985. To do otherwise would be oppressive to Credo and other employees
similarly situated, because under the same 1973 Constitution but prior to the ruling in
National Housing Corporation vs. Juco, this Court had recognized the applicability of
the Labor Code to, and the authority of the NLRC to exercise jurisdiction over,
disputes involving terms and conditions of employment in government-owned or
controlled corporations, among them, the National Service Corporation (NASECO)."
13
In addition, We reiterate Our earlier pronouncement in the case of People v. Jabinal,
supra, that it is a settled rule that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a
different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and
should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith
thereof.
Coming now to the question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction, the case of Capitol Medical Center, Inc., et al. v. Court of
Appeals, et al. 14 discussed exhaustively the purpose in issuing said writ:
"The sole object of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to
preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. The status quo is
the last actual peaceable uncontested status which preceded the controversy
(Rodulfa vs. Alfonso, 76 Phil. 225). It may only be resorted to by a litigant for the
preservation or protection of his rights or interests and for no other purpose during
the pendency of the principal action (Calo vs. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445). It should only be
granted if the party asking for it is clearly entitled thereto (Climaco vs. Macaraeg, 4
SCRA 930; Subido vs. Gopengco, 27 SCRA 455; Police Commission vs. Bello, 37
SCRA 230).
Inasmuch as a mandatory injunction tends to do more than to maintain the status quo, EMETERIO CUI, plaintiff-appellant,
it is generally improper to issue such an injunction prior to the final hearing (Manila
Electric Railroad and Light Co. vs. Del Rosario, 22 Phil. 433). It may, however, issue vs.
'in cases of extreme urgency; where the right is very clear; where considerations of ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, defendant-appellee.
relative inconvenience bear strongly in complainant's favor where there is a willful
and unlawful invasion of plaintiff's right against his protest and remonstrance, the
injury being a continuing one and where the effect of the mandatory injunction is
G.A.S. Sipin, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.
rather to re-establish and maintain a pre-existing continuing relation between the
parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, than to establish a new E. Voltaire Garcia for defendant-appellee.
relation. Indeed, the writ should not be denied the complainant when he makes out a
clear case, free from doubt and dispute.' (Commissioner of Customs vs. Cloribel, et
al., 19 SCRA 235.)." 15
CONCEPCION, J.:

In the present case, the contract between the parties was validly terminated upon the
Appeal by plaintiff Emeterio Cui from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
end of the first semester of school year 1989-1990, or in October, 1989. This is the
Manila, absolving defendant Arellano University from plaintiff's complaint, with costs
status quo. The trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of
against the plaintiff, and dismissing defendant's counter claim, for insufficiency of
preliminary mandatory injunction which ordered petitioners to allow private
proof thereon.
respondents "to enroll for the first semester of school year 1990-1190." 16 Guided by
the Capitol case, certainly, this writ will not restore the status quo but will go a step
backward, then restore the condition preceding the status quo. Private respondents
do not possess any clear legal right to re-enroll, corollarily, petitioners are not obliged In the language of the decision appealed from:
legally to re-admit them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals dated February 7, 1991 and its resolution dated June 3, 1991 are SET
ASIDE. The orders of the trial court dated June 4, 1990 and June 13, 1990 and the
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction are likewise SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Padilla, Regalado and Campos, Jr., JJ ., concur.
G.R. No. L-15127 May 30, 1961
23
The essential facts of this case are short and undisputed. As established by the
agreement of facts Exhibits X and by the respective oral and documentary evidence
introduced by the parties, it appears conclusive that plaintiff, before the school year
1948-1949 took up preparatory law course in the defendant University. After finishing
his preparatory law course plaintiff enrolled in the College of Law of the defendant
from the school year 1948-1949. Plaintiff finished his law studies in the defendant
university up to and including the first semester of the fourth year. During all the
school years in which plaintiff was studying law in defendant law college, Francisco R.
Capistrano, brother of the mother of plaintiff, was the dean of the College of Law and
legal counsel of the defendant university. Plaintiff enrolled for the last semester of his
law studies in the defendant university but failed to pay his tuition fees because his
uncle Dean Francisco R. Capistrano having severed his connection with defendant
and having accepted the deanship and chancellorship of the College of Law of Abad
Santos University, plaintiff left the defendant's law college and enrolled for the last
semester of his fourth year law in the college of law of the Abad Santos University
graduating from the college of law of the latter university. Plaintiff, during all the time
he was studying law in defendant university was awarded scholarship grants, for
scholastic merit, so that his semestral tuition fees were returned to him after the ends
of semester and when his scholarship grants were awarded to him. The whole
amount of tuition fees paid by plaintiff to defendant and refunded to him by the latter
from the first semester up to and including the first semester of his last year in the
college of law or the fourth year, is in total P1,033.87. After graduating in law from
Abad Santos University he applied to take the bar examination. To secure permission
to take the bar he needed the transcripts of his records in defendant Arellano
University. Plaintiff petitioned the latter to issue to him the needed transcripts. The
defendant refused until after he had paid back the P1,033 87 which defendant
refunded to him as above stated. As he could not take the bar examination without
those transcripts, plaintiff paid to defendant the said sum under protest. This is the
sum which plaintiff seeks to recover from defendant in this case.
Before defendant awarded to plaintiff the scholarship grants as above stated, he was
made to sign the following contract covenant and agreement:
"In consideration of the scholarship granted to me by the University, I hereby waive
my right to transfer to another school without having refunded to the University
(defendant) the equivalent of my scholarship cash.
(Sgd.) Emeterio Cui".
It is admitted that, on August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued
Memorandum No. 38, series of 1949, on the subject of "Scholarship," addressed to
"All heads of private schools, colleges and universities," reading:
1. School catalogs and prospectuses submitted to this, Bureau show that some
schools offer full or partial scholarships to deserving students — for excellence in
scholarship or for leadership in extra-curricular activities. Such inducements to poor
but gifted students should be encouraged. But to stipulate the condition that such
scholarships are good only if the students concerned continue in the same school
nullifies the principle of merit in the award of these scholarships.
24
2. When students are given full or partial scholarships, it is understood that such
scholarships are merited and earned. The amount in tuition and other fees
corresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the
recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution.
Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in a school.
3. Several complaints have actually been received from students who have enjoyed
scholarships, full or partial, to the effect that they could not transfer to other schools
since their credentials would not be released unless they would pay the fees
corresponding to the period of the scholarships. Where the Bureau believes that the
right of the student to transfer is being denied on this ground, it reserves the right to
authorize such transfer.
that defendant herein received a copy of this memorandum; that plaintiff asked the
Bureau of Private Schools to pass upon the issue on his right to secure the transcript
of his record in defendant University, without being required to refund the sum of
P1,033.87; that the Bureau of Private Schools upheld the position taken by the
plaintiff and so advised the defendant; and that, this notwithstanding, the latter
refused to issue said transcript of records, unless said refund were made, and even
recommended to said Bureau that it issue a written order directing the defendant to
release said transcript of record, "so that the case may be presented to the court for
judicial action." As above stated, plaintiff was, accordingly, constrained to pay, and
did pay under protest, said sum of P1,033.87, in order that he could take the bar
examination in 1953. Subsequently, he brought this action for the recovery of said
amount, aside from P2,000 as moral damages, P500 as exemplary damages,
P2,000 as attorney's fees, and P500 as expenses of litigation.
In its answer, defendant reiterated the stand it took, vis-a-vis the Bureau of Private
Schools, namely, that the provisions of its contract with plaintiff are valid and binding
and that the memorandum above-referred to is null and void. It, likewise, set up a
counterclaim for P10,000.00 as damages, and P3,000 as attorney's fees.
The issue in this case is whether the above quoted provision of the contract between
plaintiff and the defendant, whereby the former waived his right to transfer to another
school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his scholarships in cash, is
valid or not. The lower court resolved this question in the affirmative, upon the ground
that the aforementioned memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is not a law;
that the provisions thereof are advisory, not mandatory in nature; and that, although
the contractual provision "may be unethical, yet it was more unethical for plaintiff to
quit studying with the defendant without good reasons and simply because he
wanted to follow the example of his uncle." Moreover, defendant maintains in its brief
that the aforementioned memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is null and
void because said officer had no authority to issue it, and because it had been neither
approved by the corresponding department head nor published in the official gazette.
We do not deem it necessary or advisable to consider as the lower court did, the
question whether plaintiff had sufficient reasons or not to transfer from defendant
University to the Abad Santos University. The nature of the issue before us, and its
far reaching effects, transcend personal equations and demand a determination of
the case from a high impersonal plane. Neither do we deem it essential to pass upon
the validity of said Memorandum No. 38, for, regardless of the same, we are of the
opinion that the stipulation in question is contrary to public policy and, hence, null and
void. The aforesaid memorandum merely incorporates a sound principle of public
policy. As the Director of Private Schools correctly pointed, out in his letter, Exhibit B,
to the defendant,
There is one more point that merits refutation and that is whether or not the contract
entered into between Cui and Arellano University on September 10, 1951 was void
as against public policy. In the case of Zeigel vs. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, 245
Ill. 180, 19 Ann. Case 127, the court said: 'In determining a public policy of the state,
courts are limited to a consideration of the Constitution, the judicial decisions, the
statutes, and the practice of government officers.' It might take more than a
government bureau or office to lay down or establish a public policy, as alleged in
your communication, but courts consider the practices of government officials as one
of the four factors in determining a public policy of the state. It has been consistently
held in America that under the principles relating to the doctrine of public policy, as
applied to the law of contracts, courts of justice will not recognize or uphold a
transaction which its object, operation, or tendency is calculated to be prejudicial to
the public welfare, to sound morality or to civic honesty (Ritter vs. Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
169 U.S. 139; Heding vs. Gallaghere 64 L.R.A. 811; Veazy vs. Allen, 173 N.Y. 359).
25
If Arellano University understood clearly the real essence of scholarships and the
motives which prompted this office to issue Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949, it should
have not entered into a contract of waiver with Cui on September 10, 1951, which is a
direct violation of our Memorandum and an open challenge to the authority of the
Director of Private Schools because the contract was repugnant to sound morality
and civic honesty. And finally, in Gabriel vs. Monte de Piedad, Off. Gazette Supp.
Dec. 6, 1941, p. 67 we read: 'In order to declare a contract void as against public
policy, a court must find that the contract as to consideration or the thing to be done,
contravenes some established interest of society, or is inconsistent with sound policy
and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights. The
policy enunciated in Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949 is sound policy. Scholarship are
awarded in recognition of merit not to keep outstanding students in school to bolster
its prestige. In the understanding of that university scholarships award is a business
scheme designed to increase the business potential of an education institution. Thus
conceived it is not only inconsistent with sound policy but also good morals. But what
is morals? Manresa has this definition. It is good customs; those generally accepted
principles of morality which have received some kind of social and practical
confirmation. The practice of awarding scholarships to attract students and keep
them in school is not good customs nor has it received some kind of social and
practical confirmation except in some private institutions as in Arellano University.
The University of the Philippines which implements Section 5 of Article XIV of the
Constitution with reference to the giving of free scholarships to gifted children, does
not require scholars to reimburse the corresponding value of the scholarships if they
transfer to other schools. So also with the leading colleges and universities of the
United States after which our educational practices or policies are patterned. In these
institutions scholarships are granted not to attract and to keep brilliant students in
school for their propaganda mine but to reward merit or help gifted students in whom
society has an established interest or a first lien. (Emphasis supplied.)
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one shall
be entered sentencing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87, with
interest thereon at the legal rate from September 1, 1954, date of the institution of
this case, as well as the costs, and dismissing defendant's counterclaim. It is so
ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Parades, Dizon, De Leon
and Natividad, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., reserves his vote.

26
G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees,
vs.
JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Antonio M. Martinez for
plaintiff-appellee.
Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino for defendant-appellant.
ANTONIO, J.:p
Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas (provincial capital),
Batangas, in Criminal Case No. 889, finding the accused guilty of the crime of Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Ammunition and sentencing him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years
imprisonment, with the accessories provided by law, which raises in issue the validity
of his conviction based on a retroactive application of Our ruling in People v. Mapa.1
The complaint filed against the accused reads:
That on or about 9:00 o'clock, p.m., the 5th day of September, 1964, in the poblacion,
Municipality of Batangas, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a person not
authorized by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep in his
possession, custody and direct control a revolver Cal. .22, RG8 German Made with
27
one (1) live ammunition and four (4) empty shells without first securing the necessary
permit or license to possess the same.
At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused entered a plea of not guilty,
after which trial was accordingly held.
The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the
revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license
or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he
had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial
Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC
Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the
authority to possess and carry the firearm in question.
Indeed, the accused had appointments from the above-mentioned officials as
claimed by him. His appointment from Governor Feliciano Leviste, dated December
10, 1962, reads:
Reposing special trust and confidence in your civic spirit, and trusting that you will be
an effective agent in the detection of crimes and in the preservation of peace and
order in the province of Batangas, especially with respect to the suppression of
trafficking in explosives, jueteng, illegal cockfighting, cattle rustling, robbery and the
detection of unlicensed firearms, you are hereby appointed a SECRET AGENT of the
undersigned, the appointment to take effect immediately, or as soon as you have
qualified for the position. As such Secret Agent, your duties shall be those generally
of a peace officer and particularly to help in the preservation of peace and order in
this province and to make reports thereon to me once or twice a month. It should be
clearly understood that any abuse of authority on your part shall be considered
sufficient ground for the automatic cancellation of your appointment and immediate
separation from the service. In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in
G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23, 1959, you will have the right to bear a firearm,
particularly described below, for use in connection with the performance of your
duties.
By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of your duties by
taking your oath of office and filing the original thereof with us.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO LEVISTE
Provincial Governor
FIREARM AUTHORIZED TO CARRY:
Kind: — ROHM-Revolver
Make: — German
SN: — 64
Cal:— .22
On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC Provincial
Commander of Batangas as Confidential Agent with duties to furnish information
regarding smuggling activities, wanted persons, loose firearms, subversives and
other similar subjects that might affect the peace and order condition in Batangas
province, and in connection with these duties he was temporarily authorized to
possess a ROHM revolver, Cal. .22 RG-8 SN-64, for his personal protection while in
the performance of his duties.
The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned
appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the
28
firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of
the Supreme Court's decision in People vs. Macarandang2 and People vs. Lucero.3
The trial court, while conceding on the basis of the evidence of record the accused
had really been appointed Secret Agent and Confidential Agent by the Provincial
Governor and the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas, respectively, with
authority to possess and carry the firearm described in the complaint, nevertheless
held the accused in its decision dated December 27, 1968, criminally liable for illegal
possession of a firearm and ammunition on the ground that the rulings of the
Supreme Court in the cases of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and
abandoned in People vs. Mapa, supra. The court considered as mitigating
circumstances the appointments of the accused as Secret Agent and Confidential
Agent.
Let us advert to Our decisions in People v. Macarandang, supra, People v. Lucero,
supra, and People v. Mapa, supra. In Macarandang, We reversed the trial court's
judgment of conviction against the accused because it was shown that at the time he
was found to possess a certain firearm and ammunition without license or permit, he
had an appointment from the Provincial Governor as Secret Agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order and in the detection of crimes, with authority to hold
and carry the said firearm and ammunition. We therefore held that while it is true that
the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit, nevertheless,
section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "peace officers" are
exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess
firearms; and Macarandang's appointment as Secret Agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order and detection of crimes, sufficiently placed him in
the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police
who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code are exempted from the
requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. In Lucero, We
held that under the circumstances of the case, the granting of the temporary use of
the firearm to the accused was a necessary means to carry out the lawful purpose of
the batallion commander to effect the capture of a Huk leader. In Mapa, expressly
abandoning the doctrine in Macarandang, and by implication, that in Lucero, We
sustained the judgment of conviction on the following ground:
The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful
for any person to ... possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition
therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." (Sec. 878, as amended
by Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative Code.) The next section provides that
"firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or
marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards
in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors,
lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors,
and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms
are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of
their official duties." (Sec. 879, Revised Administrative Code.)
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is
not exempt. ... .
It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial
Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Commander in 1964,
the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid down by Us in People v.
Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). Our decision in People v. Mapa
reversing the aforesaid doctrine came only in 1967. The sole question in this appeal
is: Should appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and
Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of the
Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? The Solicitor General is of the first view,
and he accordingly recommends reversal of the appealed judgment.
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence
of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil
Code "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system ... ." The interpretation upon a law by this Court
constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law originally passed, since
this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent
that law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by
numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim
obtinet" — the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has
the force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the
jurisprudence, hence of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in
possession of the firearm in question and when he arraigned by the trial court. It is
true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of
this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be
29
applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old
doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and
application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishability of an act be
reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.
It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his appointments as
Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to
the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero, under which no
criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence
of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant
may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be
punishable.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and appellant is
acquitted, with costs de oficio.
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional
Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON
respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to
set aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case
No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said
case, and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.

The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while
private respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in
Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their residence in the
Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18,
1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982;
and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No.
1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that
petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal
property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting
of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the
conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause
of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the
Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no
community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to
Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in
the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is
now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not
subject to appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the
propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of
discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and
whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its
supervisory authority and to correct the error committed which, in such a case, is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it would be useless
and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed
in this case within the exception, and we have given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged
conjugal property in the Philippines.
30
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged
conjugal property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings
before the American Court that they had no community of property; that the Galleon
Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is
barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court
cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national
policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same
is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters
within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property
relations between petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon
absolute or relative community property, upon complete separation of property, or
upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the
parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over
petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also
obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381
Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case,
Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the
understanding that there were neither community property nor community obligations.
3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of
KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce
proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear
on my behalf and do an things necessary and proper to represent me, without further
contesting, subject to the following:
 penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is
still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court. petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court. whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation
before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

xxx xxx xxx 4

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the
States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the
divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local
law and public policy.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations
under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.
5 only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the
same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Without costs.
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards
of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the SO ORDERED.
Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,
799:

Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Patajo, JJ.,
concur.
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court
of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of
husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus
severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a

31
G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998
FE D. QUITA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, * respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on
18 May 1941. They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the
way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19
July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately from each other and a
settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final
judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in
the same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she
married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong
filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of
administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust
Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan),
claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo,
Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the children of
Arturo Padlan opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty.
Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the
oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30
April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and Padlan children) submitted certified
photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final judgment of divorce
between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole
surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened.
32
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the
decedent and the distribution of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October
1987, private respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to
appear despite due notice. On the same day, the trial court required the submission
of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof,
after which, with or without the documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs
would be considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period lapsed without
the required documents being submitted.
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escaño 1 which held that "a foreign divorce
between Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil
Code (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction," 2
disregarded the divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Consecuently, it expressed
the view that their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972. Neither did it
consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of conjugal properties due to lack of
judicial approval. 3 On the other hand, it opined that there was no showing that
marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo, much less was it shown
that the alleged Padlan children had been acknowledged by the deceased as his
children with her. As regards Ruperto, it found that he was a brother of Arturo. On 27
November 1987 4 only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of
Arturo. Accordingly, equal adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in
favor of the two intestate heirs. 5
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to
present proofs that the recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate
children, except Alexis who was recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made
in their respective records of birth. Thus on 15 February 1988 6 partial
reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of
Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and
petitioner to the other half. 7 Private respondent was not declared an heir. Although it
was stated in the aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturo were married
on 22 April 1947, their marriage was clearly void since it was celebrated during the
existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of
the errors allegedly committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case was
decided without a hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which
provides that if there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs
of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is
entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary
cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal;
hence, on 11 September 1995 it declared null and void the 27 November 1987
decision and 15 February 1988 order of the trial court, and directed the remand of the
case to the trial court for further proceedings. 8 On 18 April 1996 it denied
reconsideration. 9
Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings? Petitioner
insists that there is no need because, first, no legal or factual issue obtains for
resolution either as to the heirship of the Padlan children or as to the decedent; and,
second, the issue as to who between petitioner and private respondent is the proper
hier of the decedent is one of law which can be resolved in the present petition based
on establish facts and admissions of the parties.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear:
If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled
under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6)
Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they have
been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs
of Arturo Padlan; 10 nor as to their respective hereditary shares. But controversy
remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. The trial court, after
the parties other than petitioner failed to appear during the scheduled hearing on 23
October 1987 of the motion for immediate declaration of heirs and distribution of
estate, simply issued an order requiring the submission of the records of birth of the
Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without
the documents, the issue on declaration of heirs would be deemed submitted for
resolution.
33
We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised, among
others, the issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent
considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice
remarried. She also invoked the above quoted procedural rule. 11 To this, petitioner
replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite
of the divorce they obtained. 12 Reading between the lines, the implication is that
petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This
should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship.
The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid
of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the parties
either supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily
settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escaño.
Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's
decision she stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the
ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. 13 that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. She prayed therefore that the case be set for hearing. 14 Petitioner
opposed the motion but failed to squarely address the issue on her citizenship. 15
The trial court did not grant private respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded
to resolve her motion with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino
citizens and were married in the Philippines." 16 It maintained that their divorce
obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine
jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on their citizenship pertained solely to the
time of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a basis to determine
petitioner's citizenship at the time of their divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether
she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial court must
have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a
Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and
petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.
Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship; 17 it did
not merit enlightenment however from petitioner. 18 In the present proceeding,
petitioner's citizenship is brought anew to the fore by private respondent. She even
furnishes the Court with the transcript of stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995
during the hearing for the reconstitution of the original of a certain transfer certificate
title as well as the issuance of new owner's duplicate copy thereof before another trial
court. When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner answered that
she was since 1954. 19 Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo
was obtained in the same year. Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply
memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their
divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be conducted by the trial court.
Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err in ordering the case returned to
the trial court for further proceedings.
The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss
the present petition for forum shopping is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 167109 February 6, 2007

We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should
be limited only to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse.
Private respondent's claim to heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN, Petitioner,
and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and
vs.
Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from
the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, ORLANDO B. CATALAN and MEROPE E.
surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate BRAGANZA, Respondents.
relationship. 20

DECISION
As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and a her counsel to be
declared in contempt of court and that the present petition be dismissed for forum
shopping, 21 the same lacks merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions must
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
involve the same transactions and same essential facts and circumstances. There
must also be identical causes of action, subject matter and issue. 22 The present
petition deals with declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions filed before
the three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of This petition for review assails the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
titles of certain properties belonging to the estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no No. 69875 dated August 6, 2004, which reversed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial
reason to declare the existence of forum shopping. Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 44, in Civil Case No. D-10636, declaring the
marriage between respondents Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza void on
the ground of bigamy, as well as the Resolution3 dated January 27, 2005, which
denied the motion for reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals
ordering the remand of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and
declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T.
Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court modifying its Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in
previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan Mabini, Pangasinan.4 Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and
children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas
exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, and Orlando divorced in April 1988.5
is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that the reception of
evidence by the trial court should he limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as
the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan. Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent
Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan.6 Contending that said marriage was bigamous
34
since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol, petitioner filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan
City7 against Orlando and Merope. Respondents appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the
decision of the RTC, thus:

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss8 on the ground of lack of cause of action as

petitioner was allegedly not a real party-in-interest, but it was denied.9 Trial on the WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the appeal and
merits ensued. consequently REVERSE and SET ASIDE the appealed decision. We likewise
DISMISS Civil Case No. D-10636, RTC, Branch 44, Dagupan City. No costs.

On October 10, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, the
dispositive portion of which reads: SO ORDERED.11

WHEREFORE, judgment is declared in favor of plaintiff Felicitas Amor Catalan and After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner filed the instant petition for
against defendants Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza, as follows: review raising the following issues:

1) The subsequent marriage of Merope Braganza with Orlando B. Catalan is I.

declared null and void ab initio;

WHETHER PETITIONER HAS THE REQUIRED STANDING IN COURT TO

2) The defendants are ordered jointly and severally to pay plaintiff by way of moral QUESTION THE NULLITY OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN RESPONDENTS;
damages the amount of P300,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of
P200,000.00 and attorney’s fees in the amount of P50,000.00, including costs of this
suit; and II.

3) The donation in consideration of marriage is ordered revoked and the property WHETHER THE FAILURE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DECLARE THE
donated is ordered awarded to the heirs of Juliana Braganza. QUESTIONED MARRIAGE VOID CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR.12

Furnish copies of this Decision to Atty. Napoleon B. Arenas, Jr. and Atty. Nolan Petitioner contends that the bigamous marriage of the respondents, which brought
Evangelista. embarrassment to her and her children, confers upon her an interest to seek judicial
remedy to address her grievances and to protect her family from further
embarrassment and humiliation. She claims that the Court of Appeals committed
SO ORDERED.10 reversible error in not declaring the marriage void despite overwhelming evidence
and the state policy discouraging illegal and immoral marriages.13
35

The main issue to be resolved is whether petitioner has the personality to file a
petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage of the respondents on the ground of
bigamy. However, this issue may not be resolved without first determining the
corollary factual issues of whether the petitioner and respondent Orlando had indeed
become naturalized American citizens and whether they had actually been judicially
granted a divorce decree.
While it is a settled rule that the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally
undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties
during the trial of the case,14 there are, however, exceptions to this rule, like when
the findings of facts of the RTC and the Court of Appeals are conflicting, or when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based.15
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that petitioner and respondent Orlando
were naturalized American citizens and that they obtained a divorce decree in April
1988. However, after a careful review of the records, we note that other than the
allegations in the complaint and the testimony during the trial, the records are bereft
of competent evidence to prove their naturalization and divorce.
The Court of Appeals therefore had no basis when it held:
In light of the allegations of Felicitas’ complaint and the documentary and testimonial
evidence she presented, we deem it undisputed that Orlando and Felicitas are
American citizens and had this citizenship status when they secured their divorce
decree in April 1988. We are not therefore dealing in this case with Filipino citizens
whose marital status is governed by the Family Code and our Civil Code, but with
American citizens who secured their divorce in the U.S. and who are considered by
their national law to be free to contract another marriage. x x x16
Further, the Court of Appeals mistakenly considered the failure of the petitioner to
refute or contest the allegation in respondents’ brief, that she and respondent
36
Orlando were American citizens at the time they secured their divorce in April 1988,
as sufficient to establish the fact of naturalization and divorce.17 We note that it was
the petitioner who alleged in her complaint that they acquired American citizenship
and that respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce decree.18 It is settled rule
that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence.19
Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after
marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute
divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first
kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in
full force.20 A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner.21 However, before it can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it, which must be proved considering that our courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws.22
Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, we cannot rule on
the issue of whether petitioner has the personality to file the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. After all, she may have the personality to file the petition if the
divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law
may restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree becomes absolute.23 In such
case, the RTC would be correct to declare the marriage of the respondents void for
being bigamous, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates,
which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Mabini, Pangasinan dated
December 21, 1959 between Eusebio Bristol and respondent Merope,24 and the
other, in Calasiao, Pangasinan dated June 16, 1988 between the respondents.25
However, if there was indeed a divorce decree obtained and which, following the
national law of Orlando, does not restrict remarriage, the Court of Appeals would be
correct in ruling that petitioner has no legal personality to file a petition to declare the
nullity of marriage, thus:
Freed from their existing marital bond, each of the former spouses no longer has any
interest nor should each have the personality to inquire into the marriage that the
other might subsequently contract. x x x Viewed from another perspective, Felicitas
has no existing interest in Orlando’s subsequent marriage since the validity, as well
as any defect or infirmity, of this subsequent marriage will not affect the divorced
status of Orlando and Felicitas. x x x26
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents
were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who
can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can
demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of
marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest27 and must be based on a cause of action.28 Thus, in Niñal v.
Bayadog,29 the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to
declare the nullity of the marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it
affects their successional rights.1awphi1.net
granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows
or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the
same did not allow respondent Orlando’s remarriage, then the trial court should
declare respondents’ marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduce the amount
of moral damages from ₱300,000.00 to ₱50,000.00 and exemplary damages from
₱200,000.00 to ₱25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree
was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the
instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas
Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the same.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, let this case be REMANDED to the trial court
for its proper disposition. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Significantly, Section 2(a) of The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which took effect on March 15, Associate Justice
2003, now specifically provides:

SECTION 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. —

(a) Who may file. — A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or the wife.

xxxx

In fine, petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage
cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign
law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of
additional evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was

37
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007 Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila,
Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased
Felicisimo.
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs. Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent. had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen,
filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute
Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. 6
x ---------------------------------------------------- x

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007
Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at
Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with
respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner, death on December 18, 1992.
vs.

FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent. Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets
and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition
for letters of administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed
DECISION as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set
aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3 Resolutions of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998
Resolution 4 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death,
the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang,
Metro Manila; that the decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his
six children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent
left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at ₱30,304,178.00 more or
less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the
conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued
to her.

On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis
his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and
(Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his
failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of
lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia
administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was
38
Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent
has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of
Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry
Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother
Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal 10 of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial
court issued an Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994
her opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while
Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went
home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they
bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce
issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the
marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed
that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article
26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed
motions for reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They
asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive
effect to validate respondent’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would
impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a
motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the
case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for
reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the
legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the
motion for disqualification was deemed moot and academic 18 because then Acting
39
Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the
resolution of said motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994.
On even date, Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order
denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and
law on which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for
inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T.
Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective
position papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file
the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments
and evidence set forth in his previous motion for reconsideration as his position
paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14, 24 and June
20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of
administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected
governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have
been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent
was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her
marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree
of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the
Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it
would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of Judge
Arcangel but said motions were denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the
orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24,
1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court
for further proceedings. 29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the
term "place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or
domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in
Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of
administration was properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry
respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the marriage
between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of
absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a
result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a
subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus –
With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family
Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and
philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, — there is no justiciable reason to
sustain the individual view — sweeping statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel, that
"Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state
against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law
grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to the express mandate
of the law. The foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on December
14, 1992, 32 the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under
40
Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between the deceased and petitioner
should not be denominated as "a bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving
spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased. x x x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34 which were
denied by the Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on
certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition
which was granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the
subject petition for letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of
his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that
pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban
City, 38 "residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person can
only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his
domicile, the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void and
bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage to
Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied
because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such,
respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no
legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether
respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of
the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule
v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence
– as contradistinguished from domicile – of the decedent for purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from
"legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and
"residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of
the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and
rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence
rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical
sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile"
but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should
be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term
means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s
domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the
residence must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue
of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The
rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they
involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for
41
purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions.
In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that
is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the
"residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or
domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is
possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang,
Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence
the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased
purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing statements 45 from the
Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August to
December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala
Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of the
deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc.,
47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased’s children to him at
his Alabang address, and the deceased’s calling cards 49 stating that his home/city
address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his
office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the
subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial
Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject
petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a
municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in
Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject
petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition for
letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is
divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code,
considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974,
or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we
need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26,
par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in
the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and
his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce
obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under
Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their
conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the
validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties
acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage
from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As
stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton,
45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of
husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus
severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a
penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is
still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation
before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. 53
42
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no
longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be
required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations
under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served. 54 (Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court
recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that
the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife.
The Court stated that "the severance of the marital bond had the effect of
dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would
not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58
Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained
in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of
divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as
severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the
Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a
divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino
cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio,
60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and
legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed,
to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No.
209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988.
Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive
Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the
Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now
provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5)
and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and
a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
43
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the
Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn
v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien
spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce
is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family
Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already
established through judicial precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance
intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community,
relief in some way should be obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared
commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the
society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other
remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid
divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is
void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this
Court’s rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be
discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In
Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we
may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law,
the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the
lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to
cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of
that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render
justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with
justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure,
there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a
particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not
bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in
slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between
the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law
as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause
and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law,"
so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that
goes beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and
perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this
Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision.
Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts
warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was
the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly
obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have
vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s
44
surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to
prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the
Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and
divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient
and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is
not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by
the seal of his office. 71
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California,
U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text
72 of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was
done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot
take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of
evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974,
nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject
petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of
Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts
during their cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may
be granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79
thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the
administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be
to the petitioner: x x x. equal.

An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the
estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor.
The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a
direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence
of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and
Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was
validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a
co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property
relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property
acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and
salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not
necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry.
Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners
shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the
issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage
and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution
in the acquisition of the property is essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined
by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions
must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of
the party’s own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x
x 81
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject
petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of
Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the
Family Code.

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the
marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property
reinstating and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court
relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to
which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which
marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that even if the cohabitation or
dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be
the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
governs. 80 The Court described the property regime under this provision as follows:

SO ORDERED.
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who
are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as
husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in
proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
45
Associate Justice

46
G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008 In the first, a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 and docketed as G.R. No. 155635,
Rebecca assails and seeks to nullify the April 30, 2002 Resolution2 of the CA, as
reiterated in another Resolution of September 2, 2002,3 granting a writ of preliminary
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner, injunction in favor of private respondent Vicente Madrigal Bayot staving off the trial
court's grant of support pendente lite to Rebecca.
vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT,

respondents. The second, a petition for review under Rule 45,4 docketed G.R. No. 163979, assails
the March 25, 2004 Decision5 of the CA, (1) dismissing Civil Case No. 01-094, a suit
for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage with application for support commenced
by Rebecca against Vicente before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City;
x-------------------------------------------x
and (2) setting aside certain orders and a resolution issued by the RTC in the said
case.

G.R. No. 163979 November 7, 2008

Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of both
cases.
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,

vs.
The Facts
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondent.

Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose,
DECISION Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage Certificate6 identified
Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American citizen7 born in Agaña, Guam, USA
to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay, American, and Helen Corn Makapugay, American.
VELASCO, JR., J.:

On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to Marie
The Case Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital
relationship seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce
proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Before the Court of the First Instance of the
Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente was
Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner Maria Rebecca Makapugay
duly represented by counsel. On February 22, 1996, the Dominican court issued Civil
Bayot impugning certain issuances handed out by the Court of Appeals (CA) in
Decree No. 362/96,8 ordering the dissolution of the couple's marriage and "leaving
CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.
them to remarry after completing the legal requirements," but giving them joint
custody and guardianship over Alix. Over a year later, the same court would issue
Civil Decree No. 406/97,9 settling the couple's property relations pursuant to an
Agreement10 they executed on December 14, 1996. Said agreement specifically
47
stated that the "conjugal property which they acquired during their marriage consist[s]
only of the real property and all the improvements and personal properties therein
contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang, Muntinlupa."11
Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance of Civil
Decree No. 362/96, Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a petition12 dated
January 26, 1996, with attachments, for declaration of nullity of marriage, docketed
as Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca, however, later moved13 and secured
approval14 of the motion to withdraw the petition.
On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment15 stating
under oath that she is an American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have
been living separately; and that she is carrying a child not of Vicente.
On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa
City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage16 on the ground of Vicente's
alleged psychological incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094 and entitled as
Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot v. Vicente Madrigal Bayot, the petition was
eventually raffled to Branch 256 of the court. In it, Rebecca also sought the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for support pendente
lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent
monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.
On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss17 on, inter alia, the grounds of
lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce.
Earlier, on June 5, 2001, Rebecca filed and moved for the allowance of her
application for support pendente lite.
To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino
citizenship, as affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there
is no valid divorce to speak of.
48
Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, and
Rebecca commenced several criminal complaints against each other. Specifically,
Vicente filed adultery and perjury complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca, on the
other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and concubinage.
Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss
and Motion for Support Pendente Lite
On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order18 denying Vicente's motion to dismiss
Civil Case No. 01-094 and granting Rebecca's application for support pendente lite,
disposing as follows:
Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed by the respondent is
DENIED. Petitioner's Application in Support of the Motion for Support Pendente Lite
is hereby GRANTED. Respondent is hereby ordered to remit the amount of TWO
HUNDRED AND TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a month to
Petitioner as support for the duration of the proceedings relative to the instant
Petition.
SO ORDERED.19
The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce judgment invoked by Vicente
as bar to the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of
defense best taken up during actual trial. As to the grant of support pendente lite, the
trial court held that a mere allegation of adultery against Rebecca does not operate to
preclude her from receiving legal support.
Following the denial20 of his motion for reconsideration of the above August 8, 2001
RTC order, Vicente went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
injunction.21 His petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.

Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA
On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO.22 On April 30, 2002, the
appellate court granted, via a Resolution, the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, the decretal portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of the petition at bar, let
the Writ of Preliminary Injunction be ISSUED in this case, enjoining the respondent
court from implementing the assailed Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the
Order dated November 20, 2001, and from conducting further proceedings in Civil
Case No. 01-094, upon the posting of an injunction bond in the amount of
P250,000.00.
SO ORDERED.23
Rebecca moved24 but was denied reconsideration of the aforementioned April 30,
2002 resolution. In the meantime, on May 20, 2002, the preliminary injunctive writ25
was issued. Rebecca also moved for reconsideration of this issuance, but the CA, by
Resolution dated September 2, 2002, denied her motion.
The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and September 2, 2002 are presently
being assailed in Rebecca's petition for certiorari, docketed under G.R. No. 155635.
Ruling of the CA
Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision dated March 25, 2004,
effectively dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094, and set aside incidental orders the RTC
issued in relation to the case. The fallo of the presently assailed CA Decision reads:
49
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Omnibus Order
dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and a new one entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 01-094, for failure to
state a cause of action. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.26
To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss on the basis
of the following premises:
(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the
hypothetical-admission rule applies in determining whether a complaint or petition
states a cause of action.27 Applying said rule in the light of the essential elements of
a cause of action,28 Rebecca had no cause of action against Vicente for declaration
of nullity of marriage.
(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her marriage with
Vicente declared void, the union having previously been dissolved on February 22,
1996 by the foreign divorce decree she personally secured as an American citizen.
Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, such divorce
restored Vicente's capacity to contract another marriage.
(3) Rebecca's contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being a Filipino citizen at
the time the foreign divorce decree was rendered, was dubious. Her allegation as to
her alleged Filipino citizenship was also doubtful as it was not shown that her father,
at the time of her birth, was still a Filipino citizen. The Certification of Birth of Rebecca
issued by the Government of Guam also did not indicate the nationality of her father.
(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American citizenship, having professed
to have that nationality status and having made representations to that effect during
momentous events of her life, such as: (a) during her marriage; (b) when she applied
for divorce; and (c) when she applied for and eventually secured an American
passport on January 18, 1995, or a little over a year before she initiated the first but
later withdrawn petition for nullity of her marriage (Civil Case No. 96-378) on March
14, 1996.
(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a purportedly Filipino father
in Guam, USA which follows the jus soli principle, Rebecca's representation and
assertion about being an American citizen when she secured her foreign divorce
precluded her from denying her citizenship and impugning the validity of the divorce.
Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Decision, but this
recourse was denied in the equally assailed June 4, 2004 Resolution.29 Hence,
Rebecca's Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed under G.R. No.
163979.
The Issues
In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of errors as grounds for the
allowance of her petition, all of which converged on the proposition that the CA erred
in enjoining the implementation of the RTC's orders which would have entitled her to
support pending final resolution of Civil Case No. 01-094.
In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the assailed CA decision
submitting as follows:
I Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce obtained
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MENTIONING AND NOT
TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS THE
FACT OF PETITIONER'S FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY STATED
AND ALLEGED IN HER PETITION BEFORE THE COURT A QUO.
50
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ONLY ON ANNEXES
TO THE PETITION IN RESOLVING THE MATTERS BROUGHT BEFORE IT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT HIS MARRIAGE TO
PETITIONER HAD ALREADY BEEN DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS
SUBSEQUENT AND CONCURRENT ACTS.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS
ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT, MUCH LESS A
GRAVE ABUSE.30
We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its outcome being
determinative of the success or failure of the petition in G.R. No. 155635.
abroad by an alien married to a Philippine national may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided the decree of divorce is valid according to the national law of
the foreigner.31 Second, the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the divorcing
parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad. And third, an absolute divorce secured by a Filipino
married to another Filipino is contrary to our concept of public policy and morality and
shall not be recognized in this jurisdiction.32
 given only on June 8, 2000 upon the affirmation by the Secretary of Justice of
Rebecca's recognition pursuant to the Order of Recognition issued by Bureau
Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue tendered in G.R. No. Associate Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.
155635, i.e., the propriety of the granting of the motion to dismiss by the appellate
court, resolves itself into the questions of: first, whether petitioner Rebecca was a
Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment was rendered in the Dominican
Republic on February 22, 1996; and second, whether the judgment of divorce is valid For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate No. RC 9778:
and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects?

To Whom It May Concern:

The Court's Ruling

This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT* whose photograph

The petition is bereft of merit. and thumbprints are affixed hereto and partially covered by the seal of this Office,
and whose other particulars are as follows:

Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case

Place of Birth: Guam, USA Date of Birth: March 5, 1953

There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and
obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one, Sex: female Civil Status: married
absent proof of an effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following are Color of Hair: brown
compelling circumstances indicative of her American citizenship: (1) she was born in
Agaña, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed in this American territory
granting American citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she was, and may Color of Eyes: brown Distinguishing marks on face: none
still be, a holder of an American passport.33

was - r e c o g n i z e d - as a citizen of the Philippines as per pursuant to Article IV,

And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted, and
represented herself as an American citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as
shown in the marriage certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3) when she
secured the divorce from the Dominican Republic. Mention may be made of the
Affidavit of Acknowledgment34 in which she stated being an American citizen.
Section 1, Paragraph 3 of the 1935 Constitution per order of Recognition JBL 95-213
signed by Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez dated October 6, 1995, and duly
affirmed by Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1st Indorsement dated
June 8, 2000.

Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for travel purposes.
It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau) of
Identification (ID) Certificate No. RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport. On its face, ID
Certificate No. RC 9778 would tend to show that she has indeed been recognized as Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of October, 1995
a Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-emphasized, however, that such recognition was
51
 by the DOJ of any Order of Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued by the Bureau
is required.
(SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA

ASSO. COMMISSIONER
Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-00235 on Recognition as a Filipino
Citizen clearly provides:
Official Receipt No. 5939988

issued at Manila The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section shall automatically furnish
dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000 the Department of Justice an official copy of its Order of Recognition within 72 days
from its date of approval by the way of indorsement for confirmation of the Order by
the Secretary of Justice pursuant to Executive Order No. 292. No Identification
Certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice
From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following material facts and dates
and any Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau pursuant to an Order of
may be deduced: (1) Bureau Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez issued the
Recognition shall prominently indicate thereon the date of confirmation by the
Order of Recognition on October 6, 1995; (2) the 1st Indorsement of Secretary of
Secretary of Justice. (Emphasis ours.)
Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen was
issued on June 8, 2000 or almost five years from the date of the order of recognition;
and (3) ID Certificate No. RC 9778 was purportedly issued on October 11, 1995 after
the payment of the PhP 2,000 fee on October 10, 1995 per OR No. 5939988. Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine passport only on
June 13, 2000, or five days after then Secretary of Justice Tuquero issued the 1st
Indorsement confirming the order of recognition. It may be too much to attribute to
coincidence this unusual sequence of close events which, to us, clearly suggests that
What begs the question is, however, how the above certificate could have been
prior to said affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca was not yet recognized as a Filipino
issued by the Bureau on October 11, 1995 when the Secretary of Justice issued the
citizen. The same sequence would also imply that ID Certificate No. RC 9778 could
required affirmation only on June 8, 2000. No explanation was given for this patent
not have been issued in 1995, as Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002 mandates
aberration. There seems to be no error with the date of the issuance of the 1st
that no identification certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the
Indorsement by Secretary of Justice Tuquero as this Court takes judicial notice that
Secretary of Justice. Logically, therefore, the affirmation or confirmation of Rebecca's
he was the Secretary of Justice from February 16, 2000 to January 22, 2001. There
recognition as a Filipino citizen through the 1st Indorsement issued only on June 8,
is, thus, a strong valid reason to conclude that the certificate in question must be
2000 by Secretary of Justice Tuquero corresponds to the eventual issuance of
spurious.
Rebecca's passport a few days later, or on June 13, 2000 to be exact.

Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino citizenship

When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a
require the affirmation by the DOJ of the Order of Recognition issued by the Bureau.
Under Executive Order No. 292, also known as the 1987 Administrative Code, Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One
specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6), it is the DOJ which is tasked to
"provide immigration and naturalization regulatory services and implement the laws
governing citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens." Thus, the confirmation The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen. But from
the foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or
52
at least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she secured the February
22, 1996 judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic.
The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that Rebecca voluntarily
withdrew her original petition for declaration of nullity (Civil Case No. 96-378 of the
Makati City RTC) obviously because she could not show proof of her alleged Filipino
citizenship then. In fact, a perusal of that petition shows that, while bearing the date
January 26, 1996, it was only filed with the RTC on March 14, 1996 or less than a
month after Rebecca secured, on February 22, 1996, the foreign divorce decree in
question. Consequently, there was no mention about said divorce in the petition.
Significantly, the only documents appended as annexes to said original petition were:
the Vicente-Rebecca Marriage Contract (Annex "A") and Birth Certificate of Alix
(Annex "B"). If indeed ID Certificate No. RC 9778 from the Bureau was truly issued
on October 11, 1995, is it not but logical to expect that this piece of document be
appended to form part of the petition, the question of her citizenship being crucial to
her case?
As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under
Civil Case No. 01-094, like the withdrawn first petition, also did not have the ID
Certificate from the Bureau as attachment. What were attached consisted of the
following material documents: Marriage Contract (Annex "A") and Divorce Decree. It
was only through her Opposition (To Respondent's Motion to Dismiss dated 31 May
2001)36 did Rebecca attach as Annex "C" ID Certificate No. RC 9778.
At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had sufficient basis to dismiss
the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage as said petition, taken
together with Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition to motion, with
their respective attachments, clearly made out a case of lack of cause of action,
which we will expound later.
Validity of Divorce Decree
Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97 valid.
53
First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be
recognized, assuming for argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a
Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public documents as an American citizen.
At the very least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her
American citizenship to govern her marital relationship. Second, she secured
personally said divorce as an American citizen, as is evident in the text of the Civil
Decrees, which pertinently declared:
IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties expressly submit to the
jurisdiction of this court, by reason of the existing incompatibility of temperaments x x
x. The parties MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT, of United States nationality, 42 years of
age, married, domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin
Lupa, Philippines, x x x, who personally appeared before this court, accompanied by
DR. JUAN ESTEBAN OLIVERO, attorney, x x x and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT,
of Philippine nationality, of 43 years of age, married and domiciled and residing at
502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Filipino, appeared before this court
represented by DR. ALEJANDRO TORRENS, attorney, x x x, revalidated by special
power of attorney given the 19th of February of 1996, signed before the Notary Public
Enrico L. Espanol of the City of Manila, duly legalized and authorizing him to
subscribe all the acts concerning this case.37 (Emphasis ours.)
Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the
United States of America, a country which allows divorce. Fourth, the property
relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their
Agreement38 executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was
rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued
on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid.
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign
divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and
as valid under the national law of the alien spouse.39 Be this as it may, the fact that
Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that
divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union,40 the
presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign
court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.

It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied, but in
fact admitted by both parties. And neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the
divorce court nor challenge the validity of its proceedings on the ground of collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit both appeared to have the opportunity to
do so. The same holds true with respect to the decree of partition of their conjugal
property. As this Court explained in Roehr v. Rodriguez:
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment [of divorce]
x x x, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given
ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the
Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.--The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a
foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the
title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of
a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title;
but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice
to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment,
in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this
jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in
personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment |merely
constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such,
is subject to proof to the contrary.41
54
As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the foreign
divorce while Vicente was duly represented by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro
Torrens, in said proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce decrees rendered
and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid and, consequently, bind both
Rebecca and Vicente.
Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by
force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October
6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify or
invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen on
February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in determining whether or not a
divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's policy against
absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a
valid divorce is obtained.42
Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce
Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be
given a res judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce
decree obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is considered
severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente
and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each other. As the divorce court
formally pronounced: "[T]hat the marriage between MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT
and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x x leaving them free to
remarry after completing the legal requirements."43
Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to
a husband's obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to
live with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca.44
The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of Art. 26
of the Family Code, providing as follows:
Art. 26. x x x x
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and
a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (As amended by E.O. 227)
In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicability of
the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:
x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as
follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.45
Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor further the fact of
marriage of Vicente and Rebecca, their citizenship when they wed, and their
professed citizenship during the valid divorce proceedings.
Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No. 406/97 and the
Agreement executed on December 14, 1996 bind both Rebecca and Vicente as
55
regards their property relations. The Agreement provided that the ex-couple's
conjugal property consisted only their family home, thus:
9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property which they acquired during
their marriage consists only of the real property and all the improvements and
personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa, covered by TCT No. 168301 dated Feb. 7, 1990 issued by the Register
of Deeds of Makati, Metro Manila registered in the name of Vicente M. Bayot, married
to Rebecca M. Bayot, x x x.46 (Emphasis ours.)
This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was affirmed by the divorce
court which, per its second divorce decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97 dated March 4,
1997, ordered that, "THIRD: That the agreement entered into between the parties
dated 14th day of December 1996 in Makati City, Philippines shall survive in this
Judgment of divorce by reference but not merged and that the parties are hereby
ordered and directed to comply with each and every provision of said agreement."47
Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the Agreement.
She is thus estopped by her representation before the divorce court from asserting
that her and Vicente's conjugal property was not limited to their family home in Ayala
Alabang.48
No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage
Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that Rebecca
lacks, under the premises, cause of action. Philippine Bank of Communications v.
Trazo explains the concept and elements of a cause of action, thus:
A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the
other. A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action hypothetically admits the
truth of the allegations in the complaint. The allegations in a complaint are sufficient
to constitute a cause of action against the defendants if, hypothetically admitting the
facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance
with the prayer therein. A cause of action exists if the following elements are present,
namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law
it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect
or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant
violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the
defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of
damages.49
One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying petition before the RTC,
Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition thereof, with the documentary
evidence attached therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of action for declaration of
nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes the existence of a marriage.
were, her entitlement to that kind of support hinges on the tenability of her petition
under Civil Case No. 01-094 for declaration of nullity of marriage. The dismissal of
Civil Case No. 01-094 by the CA veritably removed any legal anchorage for, and
effectively mooted, the claim for support pendente lite.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is hereby DISMISSED
on the ground of mootness, while the petition for review in G.R. No. 163979 is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the March 25, 2004 Decision and June 4,
2004 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant must show that PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated
or is ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain.50 With the valid foreign divorce secured by Associate Justice
Rebecca, there is no more marital tie binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no more
marriage to be dissolved or nullified.

The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente and
Rebecca to support the needs of their daughter, Alix. The records do not clearly show
how he had discharged his duty, albeit Rebecca alleged that the support given had
been insufficient. At any rate, we do note that Alix, having been born on November
27, 1982, reached the majority age on November 27, 2000, or four months before her
mother initiated her petition for declaration of nullity. She would now be 26 years old.
Hence, the issue of back support, which allegedly had been partly shouldered by
Rebecca, is best litigated in a separate civil action for reimbursement. In this way, the
actual figure for the support of Alix can be proved as well as the earning capacity of
both Vicente and Rebecca. The trial court can thus determine what Vicente owes, if
any, considering that support includes provisions until the child concerned shall have
finished her education.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to delve into the issue
tendered in G.R. No. 155635, that is, Rebecca's right to support pendente lite. As it
56
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963 4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except
my above named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN,

DECEASED. xxx xxx xxx

ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased,

Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to
Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that
she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she been at
any time adopted by me, and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit,
Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS
(P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria
Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid
to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per month
until the principal thereof as well as any interest which may have accrued thereon, is
exhausted..

LABRADOR, J.:
xxx xxx xxx

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon.
Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said
September 14, 1949, approving among things the final accounts of the executor,
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as
directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600
aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the
paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy
income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real,
Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime,
personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated,
and in case of death without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs.
of which I may be possessed at my death and which may have come to me from any
Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the
source whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951
and contains the following provisions:

It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final
account and project of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN
Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his
(now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years
daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
ago, and who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A.

57
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen
Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural
child, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged II
natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of
opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the
Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO
denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND
the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
the law that should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the
internal law of California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign
elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were III
decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that the
domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged that
Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural child of the
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER
decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.
INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE
INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE
DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
States and of the State of California at the time of his death, the successional rights
and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of
California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his property
IV
in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his property is
sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952,
and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal).
Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF
reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal. DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE
PHILIPPINE LAWS.

The most important assignments of error are as follows:

V

I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE
PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF
(1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED
NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN
DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE. There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States
and of the State of California at the time of his death. But there is also no question
58
that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the
following facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee's brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that
the deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York
City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher,
was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of
Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He
stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there
for the following nine years until 1913, during which time he resided in, and was
teaching school in Sacramento, California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913.
However, in 1928, he again departed the Philippines for the United States and came
back here the following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he again returned
to his own country, and came back to the Philippines the following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.
1äwphï1.ñët
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military
Forces in the Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left
for the United States but returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees
Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and
"CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after
the making of his last will and testament (now in question herein) which he executed
59
at his lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital
in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we
are persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California and
resided there for nine years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he
returned to California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and
considering that he appears never to have owned or acquired a home or properties in
that state, which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and
make home in the State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere
temporary presence to the most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to
denote something more than mere physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws,
p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in
California when he resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never
lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States
(not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a
citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he declared
that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to
abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in
accordance with the following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of
Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a
place of permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a
technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place where he has never been.
And he may reside in a place where he has no domicile. The man with two homes,
between which he divides his time, certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But
if he went on business which would require his presence for several weeks or months,
he might properly be said to have sufficient connection with the place to be called a
resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his settlement as continuing only for
the particular business in hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not be a
domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the exercise of
intention as well as physical presence. "Residence simply requires bodily presence
of an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place
and also an intention to make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term used
with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the most
permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the only proper one.
(Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article
16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the
meaning of the term "national law" is used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in
the United States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its
citizens only and in force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article
16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any
general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of
California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of
personal property? The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the
60
executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of
his property by will in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of
McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions
of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is
deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied.
We have checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other
hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the
case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as the
deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof,
which is that given in the abovecited case, should govern the determination of the
validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in force in
the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other
hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and
following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary
provision in question should be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile,
which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the
forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely
internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus
its Conflict of Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the
renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter
back to Michigan law. But once having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle
is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference back should not have been
to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the "endless chain of
references" which has so often been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the
renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the
renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no compelling logical reason why the
original reference should be the internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It
is true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those who have
accepted the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the
second reference and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of
the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule of
reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that
greater uniformity will result from adoption of their respective views. And still more
strange is the fact that the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law
problem is if in the dispute the two states whose laws form the legal basis of the
litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both
accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In
the case stated above, had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would
have been against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois courts, and
they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman. The same result
would happen, though the courts would switch with respect to which would hold
liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land is
in question, and where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these
cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in
the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only to the
internal law. Thus, a person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized
by every court; and every divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid
everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable
property in Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises as to how this
property is to be distributed among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the
conflict of laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for an application of the
61
law of the deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France,
the natural thing for the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute
of distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a
distribution accordingly. An examination of French law, however, would show that if a
French court were called upon to determine how this property should be distributed, it
would refer the distribution to the national law of the deceased, thus applying the
Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the surface of things the
Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: (a) either to apply the
French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French court and
apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is what a
French court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoi doctrine, it will follow the
latter course, thus applying its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of
the forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the
matter back again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The
German term for this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review,
Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as
governing a particular case, the further question may arise: Are the rules as to the
conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a
question which, while it has been considered by the courts in but a few instances,
has been the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the
doctrine involved has been descriptively designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to
send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", since an
affirmative answer to the question postulated and the operation of the adoption of the
foreign law in toto would in many cases result in returning the main controversy to be
decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of
the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the question before
it, must take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as
to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the
other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the
renvoi has generally been repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)

The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its
application in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law
Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are
quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to
be understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign
state or country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory
'the law of a country' means the whole of its law.
xxx xxx xxx
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at
Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of
foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals
abroad as regards their personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shall
be determined by the law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where the
act in question occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one
of them is necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a
question to the same system of law.
62
xxx xxx xxx
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an
Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his
domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal
property upon death in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the
Belgian law would make the distribution in accordance with the law of nationality —
that is the English law — he must accept this reference back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while
the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and
the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own
intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to
citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are
not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to
the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved
is in accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should
govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will
directing the manner of distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was
domiciled at the time of his death will be looked to in deciding legal questions about
the will, almost as completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions about the
devise of land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the
personal estate in case of intestate succession, the same rules should determine the
validity of an attempted testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not
that the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. The rules
of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs
property, and the reason for the recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is
the general convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has said on the point:
'The general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the domicile
of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had its origin in
that international comity which was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age,
when business intercourse and the process of accumulating property take but little
notice of boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent
than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out
as the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws
of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein
and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We
should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein,
and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must
enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in
Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in accordance
with the express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law
for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States
but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there
exists in the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art.
946 of the California Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of
California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his
acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law,
the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal
law of California..

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned
to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.
the place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code
refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary
in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and
deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in the Makalintal, JJ., concur.
various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil
Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which Bengzon, C.J., took no part.
authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile.
The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the
case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the
Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer
the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of
determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth
between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and
the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in
the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided,
especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for
children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines,
makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing
them.

The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40
Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52
Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the
decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the
63
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the
Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of
partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United
States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate
children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A.
Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy,
who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis
64
and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr.,
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he
directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for,
his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner:
(a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three
illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or
P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the
remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives,
namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman,
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio,
Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila
on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests
therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E.
Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis
and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of
their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to
time according as the lower court approved and allowed the various motions or
petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their
respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted
and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of
Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E.
Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the
legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the
amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the
executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament
— divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the
testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.

On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their
respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were
deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of
the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of
which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the
executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the
lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and
approving the executor's final account, report and administration and project of
partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the
decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court
on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of
which law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of
renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31,
1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one
country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the
decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his
death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the
domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae)
calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated,
renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In
the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be
presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the
doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their
65
arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil
Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law
of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items:
(a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic
validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that
—
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code,
stating that —
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for
their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not
correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of
this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and
Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change Castro, JJ., concur.
the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must
have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision
in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further
indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039,
which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the
decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in
our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the
amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions
must prevail over general ones.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern
his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he
intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the
decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law,
for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a
foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with
Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law
cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of
the Civil Code states said national law should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of
Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or
legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the
amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine
law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs
against appellants. So ordered.

66
G.R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000 On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to
as "Paula") were married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua,
Camarines Sur.4
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner,

vs. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and
COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents. Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.5

DECISION On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and
Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States
District Court, Southern District of New York.6
PARDO, J.:

Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was
granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the
The Case
Philippines.7 He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was "living in" and
having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.8

The case raises a conflict of laws issue.

What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals1 modifying
that of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City2 declaring
respondent Alicia F. Llorente (herinafter referred to as "Alicia"), as co-owners of
whatever property she and the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to
as "Lorenzo") may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years that they lived
together as husband and wife.
The Facts
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States
Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957.3
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the
Registrar of Nabua as "Crisologo Llorente," with the certificate stating that the child
was not legitimate and the line for the father’s name was left blank.9
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the
couple drew a written agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances
allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzo’s salary and all other
obligations for Paula’s daily maintenance and support would be suspended; (2) they
would dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they
would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during
their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act
since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo
peacefully. The agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was
witnessed by Paula’s father and stepmother. The agreement was notarized by
Notary Public Pedro Osabel.10

67
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce
with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego.
Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the
proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California,
for the County of San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an
interlocutory judgment of divorce.11
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.12
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.13 Apparently,
Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as
Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation.14
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife.15 Their
twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all
surnamed Llorente.16
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was
notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with
attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will,
Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children, to wit:
"(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential
house and lot, located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines,
including ALL the personal properties and other movables or belongings that may be
found or existing therein;
"(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children,
Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, all my real
68
properties whatsoever and wheresoever located, specifically my real properties
located at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua,
Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay
Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines Sur;
"(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto
my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal
shares, my real properties located in Quezon City Philippines, and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the Registry
of Deeds of the province of Rizal, Philippines;
"(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or
personal properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other
persons, but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and among
themselves;
"(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my Last
Will and Testament, and in her default or incapacity of the latter to act, any of my
children in the order of age, if of age;
"(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should
served (sic) without bond;
"(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions
heretofore executed, signed, or published, by me;
"(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in the
Llorente’s Side should ever bother and disturb in any manner whatsoever my wife
Alicia R. Fortunato and my children with respect to any real or personal properties I
gave and bequeathed respectively to each one of them by virtue of this Last Will and
Testament."17
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines
Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein
Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate.18
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator
Lorenzo was still alive.19
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted
the will to probate.20
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died.21
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition22 for letters of
administration over Lorenzo’s estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was
Lorenzo’s surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were acquired during their
marriage, (3) that Lorenzo’s will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her
children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property.23
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755),
a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary.24
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave
due course to Paula’s petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.25
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper "Bicol
Star".26
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:
69
"Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted
to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the
marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is
likewise void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters
testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share from the
estate even if the will especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained
the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
"On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious,
and so declares the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March
13, 1981 as void and declares her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half
of their conjugal properties, and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also
entitled to one-third of the estate and then one-third should go to the illegitimate
children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in
equal shares and also entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares.
"Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the
deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the corresponding letters of administration
issue in her favor upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00
conditioned for her to make a return to the court within three (3) months a true and
complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and credits, and estate which shall at
any time come to her possession or to the possession of any other person for her,
and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies and charges on the
same, or such dividends thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to
render a true and just account of her administration to the court within one (1) year,
and at any other time when required by the court and to perform all orders of this
court by her to be performed.
"On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could not
be granted.
"SO ORDERED."27
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted
decision.28
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments
raised,36 the issue is simple. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N.
Llorente?
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicia’s motion for reconsideration but
modified its earlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children
"legitimate or otherwise" of Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by him.29
Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly Llorente as We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to
the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and the trial court for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.
one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate.30

The Applicable Law

On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.31

The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of
modification the decision of the trial court in this wise: his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed.

"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by
MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as co-owner of whatever properties she and foreign law.
the deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation.

The Civil Code clearly provides:

"SO ORDERED."32

"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
reconsideration of the decision.33 abroad.

On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,34 denied the motion for lack of merit. "Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.

Hence, this petition.35

"However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
The Issue
70
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found." (emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged
and proved.37
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not
admit the foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore the
renvoi doctrine, where the case was "referred back" to the law of the decedent’s
domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently
proven, in the same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement
that "American law follows the ‘domiciliary theory’ hence, Philippine law applies when
determining the validity of Lorenzo’s will.38
First, there is no such thing as one American law.1ªwph!1 The "national law"
indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American
law. There is no such law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the
United States. Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in
force only within the State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State
of which the decedent was a resident.39 Second, there is no showing that the
application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions
in favor of Alice, who in the trial court’s opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court
threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half
(1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation,
applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
71
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already
probated as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal,
especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.40 we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied
in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of
public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,41 that once
proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce
from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could
"very well lose her right to inherit" from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,42 we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in
his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its
legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned
in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be
reversed.43 We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first
wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now,
the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are
matters best left to the determination of the trial court.
Validity of the Will
The Civil Code provides:

In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and
RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased
"Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the
shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed. County of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.

"When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of
the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by
Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution." (underscoring ours)
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children
by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his
wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on "family rights and duties,
status, condition and legal capacity."44
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the
intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’
successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court
shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within
the framework of the Rules of Court.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues
best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was
executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to
Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated. Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good
customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to
extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the
amount of successional rights to the decedent's national law.45

Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.

The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G. R. SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.
72