G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985 e] Executive Orders Nos.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507,
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN
VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA
CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his
capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6,
Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners
seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication
in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200,
234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404,
406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574,
594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961,
1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278,
1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153,
155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224,
226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289,
291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362,
367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501,
399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665,
702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-
1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529,
1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-
1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-
1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800,
1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836,
1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-
1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028,
2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-
568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-
786, 788-852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81,
92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground
that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted
that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by
the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the
requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties"
within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the
use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant,
immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to
Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner
by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right
and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for
their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor
General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a
private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved,
or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and
"it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved
[Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the
object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the
real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show
that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and
as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper
party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election
for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court,
Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
 We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition
that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is
sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it
would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous
to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the
rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not
exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by
counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different
from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to
these proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of
the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the people in cases of this
character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned
case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein
is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not
allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate
the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to
represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement
for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus
submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they
are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point
stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long
line of decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those
cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication
is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not
when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws
with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the
conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative
acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all
executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no
general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be
so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to
be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the
President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general
applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It
would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken
so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power
heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the
debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the
legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus,
without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been
promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of
such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se
comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines
dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the
Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative
duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be
published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion
whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated
by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or
otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category.
Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by
law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee
said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part
of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand
that the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish
the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know
where to obtain their official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been
published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the
possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those
presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the
question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or
implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this
Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs.
Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having
been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no
rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged
decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v.
Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as
to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications.
The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact
and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always
be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular
conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of
status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of
public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous
application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of
those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest
from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party
under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared
unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official
Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees
sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to
1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject
matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But
whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever
been implemented or enforced by the government. InPesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice
Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal]
regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this
holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment
that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the
same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some
criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-28896 February 17, 1988
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,
vs.
ALGUE, INC., and THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should be collected without unnecessary hindrance
On the other hand, such collection should be made in accordance with law as any arbitrariness will
negate the very reason for government itself. It is therefore necessary to reconcile the apparently
conflicting interests of the authorities and the taxpayers so that the real purpose of taxation, which is the
promotion of the common good, may be achieved.
The main issue in this case is whether or not the Collector of Internal Revenue correctly disallowed the
P75,000.00 deduction claimed by private respondent Algue as legitimate business expenses in its
income tax returns. The corollary issue is whether or not the appeal of the private respondent from the
decision of the Collector of Internal Revenue was made on time and in accordance with law.
We deal first with the procedural question.
The record shows that on January 14, 1965, the private respondent, a domestic corporation engaged in
engineering, construction and other allied activities, received a letter from the petitioner assessing it in
the total amount of P83,183.85 as delinquency income taxes for the years 1958 and 1959.1 On January
18, 1965, Algue flied a letter of protest or request for reconsideration, which letter was stamp received
on the same day in the office of the petitioner. 2 On March 12, 1965, a warrant of distraint and levy was
presented to the private respondent, through its counsel, Atty. Alberto Guevara, Jr., who refused to
receive it on the ground of the pending protest. 3 A search of the protest in the dockets of the case
proved fruitless. Atty. Guevara produced his file copy and gave a photostat to BIR agent Ramon Reyes,
who deferred service of the warrant. 4 On April 7, 1965, Atty. Guevara was finally informed that the BIR
was not taking any action on the protest and it was only then that he accepted the warrant of distraint
and levy earlier sought to be served.5 Sixteen days later, on April 23, 1965, Algue filed a petition for
review of the decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue with the Court of Tax Appeals. 6
The above chronology shows that the petition was filed seasonably. According to Rep. Act No. 1125,
the appeal may be made within thirty days after receipt of the decision or ruling challenged. 7 It is true
that as a rule the warrant of distraint and levy is "proof of the finality of the assessment" 8 and renders
hopeless a request for reconsideration," 9 being "tantamount to an outright denial thereof and makes the
said request deemed rejected."10 But there is a special circumstance in the case at bar that prevents
application of this accepted doctrine.
The proven fact is that four days after the private respondent received the petitioner's notice of
assessment, it filed its letter of protest. This was apparently not taken into account before the warrant of
distraint and levy was issued; indeed, such protest could not be located in the office of the petitioner. It
was only after Atty. Guevara gave the BIR a copy of the protest that it was, if at all, considered by the
tax authorities. During the intervening period, the warrant was premature and could therefore not be
served.
As the Court of Tax Appeals correctly noted," 11 the protest filed by private respondent was not pro
forma and was based on strong legal considerations. It thus had the effect of suspending on January
18, 1965, when it was filed, the reglementary period which started on the date the assessment was
received, viz., January 14, 1965. The period started running again only on April 7, 1965, when the
private respondent was definitely informed of the implied rejection of the said protest and the warrant
was finally served on it. Hence, when the appeal was filed on April 23, 1965, only 20 days of the
reglementary period had been consumed.
Now for the substantive question.
The petitioner contends that the claimed deduction of P75,000.00 was properly disallowed because it
was not an ordinary reasonable or necessary business expense. The Court of Tax Appeals had seen it
differently. Agreeing with Algue, it held that the said amount had been legitimately paid by the private
respondent for actual services rendered. The payment was in the form of promotional fees. These were
collected by the Payees for their work in the creation of the Vegetable Oil Investment Corporation of the
Philippines and its subsequent purchase of the properties of the Philippine Sugar Estate Development
Company.
Parenthetically, it may be observed that the petitioner had Originally claimed these promotional fees to
be personal holding company income 12 but later conformed to the decision of the respondent court
rejecting this assertion.13 In fact, as the said court found, the amount was earned through the joint
efforts of the persons among whom it was distributed It has been established that the Philippine Sugar
Estate Development Company had earlier appointed Algue as its agent, authorizing it to sell its land,
factories and oil manufacturing process. Pursuant to such authority, Alberto Guevara, Jr., Eduardo
Guevara, Isabel Guevara, Edith, O'Farell, and Pablo Sanchez, worked for the formation of the
Vegetable Oil Investment Corporation, inducing other persons to invest in it.14 Ultimately, after its
incorporation largely through the promotion of the said persons, this new corporation purchased the
PSEDC properties.15 For this sale, Algue received as agent a commission of P126,000.00, and it was
from this commission that the P75,000.00 promotional fees were paid to the aforenamed individuals.16
There is no dispute that the payees duly reported their respective shares of the fees in their income tax
returns and paid the corresponding taxes thereon.17 The Court of Tax Appeals also found, after
examining the evidence, that no distribution of dividends was involved. 18
The petitioner claims that these payments are fictitious because most of the payees are members of the
same family in control of Algue. It is argued that no indication was made as to how such payments were
made, whether by check or in cash, and there is not enough substantiation of such payments. In short,
the petitioner suggests a tax dodge, an attempt to evade a legitimate assessment by involving an
imaginary deduction.
We find that these suspicions were adequately met by the private respondent when its President,
Alberto Guevara, and the accountant, Cecilia V. de Jesus, testified that the payments were not made in
one lump sum but periodically and in different amounts as each payee's need arose. 19 It should be
remembered that this was a family corporation where strict business procedures were not applied and
immediate issuance of receipts was not required. Even so, at the end of the year, when the books were
to be closed, each payee made an accounting of all of the fees received by him or her, to make up the
total of P75,000.00. 20 Admittedly, everything seemed to be informal. This arrangement was
understandable, however, in view of the close relationship among the persons in the family corporation.
We agree with the respondent court that the amount of the promotional fees was not excessive. The
total commission paid by the Philippine Sugar Estate Development Co. to the private respondent was
P125,000.00. 21After deducting the said fees, Algue still had a balance of P50,000.00 as clear profit
from the transaction. The amount of P75,000.00 was 60% of the total commission. This was a
reasonable proportion, considering that it was the payees who did practically everything, from the
formation of the Vegetable Oil Investment Corporation to the actual purchase by it of the Sugar Estate
properties. This finding of the respondent court is in accord with the following provision of the Tax Code:
SEC. 30. Deductions from gross income.--In computing net income there shall be
allowed as deductions —
(a) Expenses:
(1) In general.--All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including a reasonable allowance
for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered; ... 22
and Revenue Regulations No. 2, Section 70 (1), reading as follows:
SEC. 70. Compensation for personal services.--Among the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred in carrying on any trade or business may be included a
reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services
actually rendered. The test of deductibility in the case of compensation payments is
whether they are reasonable and are, in fact, payments purely for service. This test
and deductibility in the case of compensation payments is whether they are
reasonable and are, in fact, payments purely for service. This test and its practical
application may be further stated and illustrated as follows:
Any amount paid in the form of compensation, but not in fact as the purchase price of
services, is not deductible. (a) An ostensible salary paid by a corporation may be a
distribution of a dividend on stock. This is likely to occur in the case of a corporation
having few stockholders, Practically all of whom draw salaries. If in such a case the
salaries are in excess of those ordinarily paid for similar services, and the excessive
payment correspond or bear a close relationship to the stockholdings of the officers of
employees, it would seem likely that the salaries are not paid wholly for services
rendered, but the excessive payments are a distribution of earnings upon the stock. . .
. (Promulgated Feb. 11, 1931, 30 O.G. No. 18, 325.)
It is worth noting at this point that most of the payees were not in the regular employ of Algue nor were
they its controlling stockholders. 23
The Solicitor General is correct when he says that the burden is on the taxpayer to prove the validity of
the claimed deduction. In the present case, however, we find that the onus has been discharged
satisfactorily. The private respondent has proved that the payment of the fees was necessary and
reasonable in the light of the efforts exerted by the payees in inducing investors and prominent
businessmen to venture in an experimental enterprise and involve themselves in a new business
requiring millions of pesos. This was no mean feat and should be, as it was, sufficiently recompensed.
It is said that taxes are what we pay for civilization society. Without taxes, the government would be
paralyzed for lack of the motive power to activate and operate it. Hence, despite the natural reluctance
to surrender part of one's hard earned income to the taxing authorities, every person who is able to
must contribute his share in the running of the government. The government for its part, is expected to
respond in the form of tangible and intangible benefits intended to improve the lives of the people and
enhance their moral and material values. This symbiotic relationship is the rationale of taxation and
should dispel the erroneous notion that it is an arbitrary method of exaction by those in the seat of
power.
But even as we concede the inevitability and indispensability of taxation, it is a requirement in all
democratic regimes that it be exercised reasonably and in accordance with the prescribed procedure. If
it is not, then the taxpayer has a right to complain and the courts will then come to his succor. For all the
awesome power of the tax collector, he may still be stopped in his tracks if the taxpayer can
demonstrate, as it has here, that the law has not been observed.
We hold that the appeal of the private respondent from the decision of the petitioner was filed on time
with the respondent court in accordance with Rep. Act No. 1125. And we also find that the claimed
deduction by the private respondent was permitted under the Internal Revenue Code and should
therefore not have been disallowed by the petitioner.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto, without
costs.
SO ORDERED.
70 Phil. 726
[ G.R. No. 47800, December 02, 1940 ]
MAXIMO CALALANG, PETITIONER, VS. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
LAUREL, J.:
Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before this
court this petition for a writ of prohibition, against the respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the
National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting
Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and
Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.
It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940,
resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending
from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarinas Street, from 7:30 a. m. to 12:30 p. m. and from 1:30 p.
m. to 5:30 p. m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to'
Echague Street, from 7 a. m. to 11 p.m., for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the
Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on July 18, 1940,
recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resokjfeion
aforementioned, in pursuance of the provisions orCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said
Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to
promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads^fiiat on
August 2, 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission as aforesaid, with the modification that the closing of Rizal
Avenue to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad
crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street; that on August 10, 1940, the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved
the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-
drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as above indicated, for a period of one year
from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Mayor of Manila and the Acting
Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus
adopted; that as a consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are not now allowed to
pass and pick up passengers in the places above-mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners
but of the riding public as well.
It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the Director of Public Works,
with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is authorized to promulgate
rules and regulations for the regulation and control of the use of and traffic on national roads and streets
is unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. This contention is
untenable. As was observed by this court in Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil, 660, 700),
"The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and
since followed in a multitude of cases, namely: 'The true distinction therefore is between the delegation
of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring
an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.' (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs.
Comm'rs. Clinton County, 1 Ohio St., 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman vs.
Southard (10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department or official.
The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments or subordinate officials thereof, to whom
it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U. S. vs. Kinkead, 248 Fed.,
141.) The growing tendency in the decisions is to give prominence to the 'necessity' of the case."
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as follows:
"Section 1. To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as
national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the
Philippines, the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to regulate and control the use
of and traffic on such roads and streets. Such rules and regulations, with the approval of the President,
may contain provisions controlling or regulating the construction of buildings or other structures within a
reasonable distance from along the national roads. Such roads may be temporarily closed to any or all
classes of traffic by the Director of Public Works and his duly authorized representatives whenever the
condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the public
convenience and interest, or for a specified period, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications."
The above provisions of law do not confer legislative pOwer upon the Director of Public Works and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and under
which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public
policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said
Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as
national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the
Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the
road or the trafh'c makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest."-/
The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the
ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated.
To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long
a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and
the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be
directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other
government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for
executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law. As
was said in Locke's Appeal (72 Pa. 491) : "To assert that a law is less than a law, because it is made to
depend on a future event or act, is to rob the Legislature of the power to act wisely for the public welfare
whenever a law is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet developed, or to things future and
impossible to fully know." The proper distinction the court said was this: "The Legislature cannot
delegate its power to make the law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact
or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this
would be to stop the wheels of government. There are many things upon which wise and useful
legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law-making power, and, must, therefore, be a
subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of legislation." (Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649,
694; 36 L. Ed. 294.)
In the case of People vs. Rosenthal and Osmeiia, G. it. Nos. 46076 and 46077, promulgated June 12,
1939, and in Pangasinan Transportation vs. The Public Service Commission, G. R. No. 47065,
promulgated June 26, 1940, this Court had occasion to observe that the principle of separation of
powers has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the
adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in the United States
and England but in practically all modern governments. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of
modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of governmental powers has, to a large
extent, been relaxed by permitting the delegation of greater powers by the legislative and vesting a
larger amount of discretion in administrative and executive officials, not only in the execution of the
laws, but also in the promulgation of certain rules and regulations calculated to promote public interest.
The petitioner further contends that the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant
to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an unlawful interference with legitimate
business or trade and abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion. Commonwealth
Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power of the
state.
Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations icomplained of were promulgated, aims to promote
safe 'transit upon_and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the
public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public
convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic. which is, to say the
least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at_ the bottom of the enactment of said law,
and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property,
and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints
and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity.,piJlje_state (U. S. vs.
Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to
prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to
prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the
required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that
there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all.
The moment greater authority is conferred upon the government, logically so much is withdrawn from
the residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent
curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preservation.
precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-bring and economic security of all the
people. The promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy
towards any given group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor
anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State
so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social
justice means the promotion of the welfare of ill the people, the adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the
maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the
community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of rowers underlying the existence of all governments on th$ time-
honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence
among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all
persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."
In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby denied, with costs against the
petitioner. So ordered.

The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances. As was said in the case of
Dobbins vs. Los Angeles (195 U. S. 223, 238; 49 L. ed. 169), "the right to exercise the police power is a
continuing one, and a business lawful today may in the future, because of the changed situation, the
growth of population or other causes, become a menace to the public health and welfare, and be
required to yield to the public good." And in People vs. Pomar (46 Phil., 440), it was observed that
"advancing civilization is bringing within the police power of the state today things which were not
thought of as being within such power yesterday. The development of civilization, the rapidly increasing
population, the growth of public opinion, with an increasing desire on the part of the masses and of the
government to look after and care for the interests of the individuals of the state, have brought within the
police power many questions for regulation which formerly were not so considered."

G.R. No. L-14078 March 7, 1919

The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional
 RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs,
vs.
THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, defendant.
D. R. Williams & Filemon Sotto for plaintiff.
Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for defendant.
MALCOLM, J.:
In one of the cases which denote a landmark in American Constitutional History (Worcester vs. Georgia
[1832], 6 Pet., 515), Chief Justice Marshall, the first luminary of American jurisprudence, began his
opinion (relating to the status of an Indian) with words which, with a slight change in phraseology, can
be made to introduce the present opinion — This cause, in every point of view in which it can be placed,
is of the deepest interest. The legislative power of state, the controlling power of the constitution and
laws, the rights if they have any, the political existence of a people, the personal liberty of a citizen, are
all involved in the subject now to be considered.
To imitate still further the opinion of the Chief Justice, we adopt his outline and proceed first, to
introduce the facts and the issues, next to give a history of the so called "non-Christians," next to
compare the status of the "non-Christians" with that of the American Indians, and, lastly, to resolve the
constitutional questions presented.
I. INTRODUCTION.
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of
Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial
officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at
Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the
provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.
The return of the Solicitor-General alleges:
1. That on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which
is as follows:
The provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, Jr., presented the following resolution:
"Whereas several attempts and schemes have been made for the advancement of the non-Christian
people of Mindoro, which were all a failure,
"Whereas it has been found out and proved that unless some other measure is taken for the Mangyan work
of this province, no successful result will be obtained toward educating these people.
"Whereas it is deemed necessary to obliged them to live in one place in order to make a permanent
settlement,
"Whereas the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is
authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such
inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and
approved by the provincial board.
"Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan is a place most
convenient for the Mangyanes to live on, Now, therefore be it
"Resolved, that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of
Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro
subject to the approval of the Honorable Secretary of the Interior, and
"Resolved further, That Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said
homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor."
2. That said resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of the provincial board of Mindoro was approved by the
Secretary of the Interior of February 21, 1917.
3. That on December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order No. 2 which
says:
"Whereas the provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, current series, has selected a site in the sitio
of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro.
"Whereas said resolution has been duly approve by the Honorable, the Secretary of the Interior, on
February 21, 1917.
"Now, therefore, I, Juan Morente, jr., provincial governor of Mindoro, pursuant to the provisions of
section 2145 of the revised Administrative Code, do hereby direct that all the Mangyans in the
townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the
districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao,
Naujan Lake, not later than December 31, 1917.
"Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not
exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code."
4. That the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and the executive order of
the governor of the same province copied in paragraph 3, were necessary measures for the protection of
the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce
civilized customs among them.
5. That Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao
and are liable to be punished in accordance with section 2759 of Act No. 2711.
6. That the undersigned has not information that Doroteo Dabalos is being detained by the sheriff of
Mindoro but if he is so detained it must be by virtue of the provisions of articles Nos. 2145 and 2759 of Act
No. 2711.
It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the
Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan,
selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in
accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the
Secretary of the Interior as required by said action. Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this
section of the Administrative Code. This, therefore, becomes the paramount question which the court is
called upon the decide.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christina upon sites selected by provincial governor. — With
the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which
non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in
the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on
unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincial board.
In connection with the above-quoted provisions, there should be noted section 2759 of the same Code,
which read as follows:
SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Christian to take up appointed habitation. — Any non-Christian
who shall refuse to comply with the directions lawfully given by a provincial governor, pursuant
to section two thousand one hundred and forty-five of this Code, to take up habitation upon a
site designated by said governor shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a period not
exceeding sixty days.
The substance of what is now found in said section 2145 is not new to Philippine law. The genealogical
tree of this section, if we may be permitted to use such terminology, would read: Section 2077,
Administrative Code of 1916; section 62, Act No. 1397; section 2 of various special provincial laws,
notably of Act No. 547, specifically relating to the Manguianes; section 69, Act No. 387.
Section 2145 and its antecedent laws make use of the term "non-Christians." This word, as will later be
disclosed, is also found in varying forms in other laws of the Philippine Islands. In order to put the
phrase in its proper category, and in order to understand the policy of the Government of the Philippine
Islands with reference to the uncivilized elements of the Islands, it is well first of all to set down a
skeleton history of the attitude assumed by the authorities towards these "non-Christians," with
particular regard for the legislation on the subject.
II. HISTORY.
A. BEFORE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINE BY THE UNITED STATES.
The most important of the laws of the Indies having reference to the subject at hand are compiled in
Book VI, Title III, in the following language.
LAW I.
The Emperor Charles and the Prince, the governor, at Cigales, on March 21, 1551. Philip II at
Toledo, on February 19, 1560. In the forest of Segovia on September 13, 1565. In the Escorial
on November 10, 1568. Ordinance 149 of the poblaciones of 1573. In San Lorenzo, on May
20, 1578,
THAT THE "INDIOS" BE REDUCED INTO "POBLACIONES" COMMUNITIES).
In order that the indios may be instructed in the Sacred Catholic Faith and the evangelical law,
and in order that they may forget the blunders of their ancient rites and ceremonies to the end
that they may live in harmony and in a civilized manner, it has always been endeavored, with
great care and special attention, to use all the means most convenient to the attainment of
these purposes. To carry out this work with success, our Council of the Indies and other
religious persons met at various times; the prelates of new Spain assembled by order of
Emperor Charles V of glorious memory in the year one thousand five hundred and forty-six —
all of which meetings were actuated with a desire to serve God an our Kingdom. At these
meetings it was resolved that indios be made to live in communities, and not to live in places
divided and separated from one another by sierras and mountains, wherein they are deprived
of all spiritual and temporal benefits and wherein they cannot profit from the aid of our
ministers and from that which gives rise to those human necessities which men are obliged to
give one another. Having realized that convenience of this resolution, our kings, our
predecessors, by different orders, have entrusted and ordered the viceroys, presidents, and
governors to execute with great care and moderation the concentration of
the indios intoreducciones; and to deal with their doctrine with such forbearance and
gentleness, without causing inconveniences, so that those who would not presently settle and
who would see the good treatment and the protection of those already in settlements would, of
their own accord, present themselves, and it is ordained that they be not required to pay taxes
more than what is ordered. Because the above has been executed in the greater part of our
Indies, we hereby order and decree that the same be complied with in all the remaining parts
of the Indies, and the encomederos shall entreat compliance thereof in the manner and form
prescribed by the laws of this title.
LAW VIII.
Philip II at the Pardo, on December 1, 1573. Philip III at Madrid, October 10, 1618.
THE "REDUCCTIONES" BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THIS LAW.
The places wherein the pueblos and reducciones shall be formed should have the facilities of
waters. lands, and mountains, ingress and egress, husbandry and passageway of one league
long, wherein the indios can have their live stock that they may not be mixed with those of the
Spaniards.
LAW IX.
Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1956.
THAT THE "INDIOS" IN "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT DEPRIVED OF THE LANDS PREVIOUSLY HELD
BY THEM.
With more good-will and promptness, the indios shall be concentrated in reducciones.
Provided they shall not be deprived of the lands and granaries which they may have in the
places left by them. We hereby order that no change shall be made in this respect, and that
they be allowed to retain the lands held by them previously so that they may cultivate them and
profit therefrom.
LAW XIII.
THE SAME AS ABOVE.
THAT THE "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT REMOVED WITHOUT ORDER OF THE KING, VICEROY, OR
COURT.
No governor, or magistrate, or alcalde mayor, or any other court, has the right to alter or to
remove thepueblos or the reducciones once constituted and founded, without our express
order or that of the viceroy, president, or the royal district court, provided, however, that
the encomenderos, priests, or indios request such a change or consent to it by offering or
giving information to that en. And, because these claims are often made for private interests
and not for those of the indios, we hereby order that this law be always complied with,
otherwise the change will be considered fraudulently obtained. The penalty of one thousand
pesos shall be imposed upon the judge or encomendero who should violate this law.
 LAW XV.
Philip III at Madrid, on October 10, 1618.
THAT THERE BE MAYORS AND ALDERMEN IN THE "REDUCTIONES," WHO SHALL BE "INDIOS."
We order that in each town and reduccion there be a mayor, who should be an indio of the
same reduccion; if there be more than eighty houses, there should be two mayors and two
aldermen, also indios; and, even if the town be a big one, there should, nevertheless, be more
than two mayors and four aldermen, If there be less than eighty indios but not less than forty,
there should be not more than one mayor and one alderman, who should annually elect nine
others, in the presence of the priests , as is the practice in town inhabited by Spaniards
and indios.
LAW XXI.
Philip II, in Madrid, On May 2, 1563, and on November 25, 1578. At Tomar, on May 8, 1581. At
Madrid, on January 10, 1589. Philip III, at Todesillas, on July 12, 1600. Philip IV, at Madrid, on
October 1 and December 17, 1646. For this law and the one following, see Law I, Tit. 4, Book
7.
THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE "INDIOS," THERE SHALL LIVE NO SPANIARDS, NEGROES,
"MESTIZOS," AND MULATTOES.
We hereby prohibit and forbid Spaniards, negroes, mulattores, or mestizos to live to live in
the reduccionesand towns and towns of the indios, because it has been found that some
Spaniards who deal, trade, live, and associate with the indios are men of troublesome nature,
of dirty ways of living; robbers, gamblers, and vicious and useless men; and, to avoid the
wrongs done them, the indios would leave their towns and provinces; and the
negroes, mestizos, and mulattoes, besides maltreating them and utilizing their services,
contaminate them with their bad customs, idleness, and also some of their blunders and vices
which may corrupt and pervert the goal which we desire to reach with regard to their salvation,
increase, and tranquillity. We hereby order the imposition of grave penalties upon the
commission of the acts above-mentioned which should not be tolerated in the towns, and that
the viceroys, presidents, governors, and courts take great care in executing the law within their
powers and avail themselves of the cooperation of the ministers who are truly honest. As
regards the mestizos and Indian and Chinese half-breeds (zambaigos), who are children
of indias and born among them, and who are to inherit their houses andhaciendas, they all not
be affected by this law, it appearing to be a harsh thing to separate them from their parents.
(Law of the Indies, vol. 2, pp. 228, 229, 230, 231.)
A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish government, in its efforts to improve the condition of
the less advanced inhabitants of the Islands by concentrating them in "reducciones," is found in the
Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands of January 14, 1881, reading as follows:
It is a legal principle as well as a national right that every inhabitant of a territory recognized as
an integral part of a nation should respect and obey the laws in force therein; while, on other
hand, it is the duty to conscience and to humanity for all governments to civilize those
backward races that might exist in the nation, and which living in the obscurity of ignorance,
lack of all the nations which enable them to grasp the moral and material advantages that may
be acquired in those towns under the protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws.
It is equally highly depressive to our national honor to tolerate any longer the separation and
isolation of the non-Christian races from the social life of the civilized and Christian towns; to
allow any longer the commission of depredations, precisely in the Island of Luzon wherein is
located the seat of the representative of the Government of the, metropolis.
It is but just to admit the fact that all the governments have occupied themselves with this most
important question, and that much has been heretofore accomplished with the help and self-
denial of the missionary fathers who have even sacrificed their lives to the end that those
degenerate races might be brought to the principles of Christianity, but the means and the
preaching employed to allure them have been insufficient to complete the work undertaken.
Neither have the punishments imposed been sufficient in certain cases and in those which
have not been guarded against, thus giving and customs of isolation.
As it is impossible to consent to the continuation of such a lamentable state of things, taking
into account the prestige which the country demands and the inevitable duty which every
government has in enforcing respect and obedience to the national laws on the part of all who
reside within the territory under its control, I have proceeded in the premises by giving the most
careful study of this serious question which involves important interests for civilization, from the
moral and material as well as the political standpoints. After hearing the illustrious opinions of
all the local authorities, ecclesiastics, and missionaries of the provinces of Northern Luzon, and
also after finding the unanimous conformity of the meeting held with the Archbishop of Manila,
the Bishops of Jaro and Cebu, and the provincial prelates of the orders of the Dominicans,
Agustinians, Recoletos, Franciscans, and Jesuits as also of the meeting of the Council of
Authorities, held for the object so indicated, I have arrived at an intimate conviction of the
inevitable necessity of proceeding in a practical manner for the submission of the said pagan
and isolated races, as well as of the manner and the only form of accomplishing such a task.
For the reasons above stated and for the purpose of carrying out these objects, I hereby
promulgate the following:
DECREE.
1. All the indian inhabitants (indios) of the Islands of Luzon are, from this date, to be governed
by the common law, save those exceptions prescribed in this decree which are bases upon the
differences of instructions, of the customs, and of the necessities of the different pagan races
which occupy a part of its territory.
2. The diverse rules which should be promulgated for each of these races — which may be
divided into three classes; one, which comprises those which live isolated and roaming about
without forming a town nor a home; another, made up of those subdued pagans who have not
as yet entered completely the social life; and the third, of those mountain and rebellious
pagans — shall be published in their respective dialects, and the officials, priests, and
missionaries of the provinces wherein they are found are hereby entrusted in the work of
having these races learn these rules. These rules shall have executive character, beginning
with the first day of next April, and, as to their compliance, they must be observed in the
manner prescribed below.
3. The provincial authorities in conjunction with the priests shall proceed, from now on, with all
the means which their zeal may suggest to them, to the taking of the census of the inhabitants
of the towns or settlement already subdued, and shall adopt the necessary regulations for the
appointment of local authorities, if there be none as yet; for the construction of courts and
schools, and for the opening or fixing up of means of communication, endeavoring, as regards
the administrative organization of the said towns or settlements, that this be finished before the
first day of next July, so that at the beginning of the fiscal year they shall have the same rights
and obligations which affect the remaining towns of the archipelago, with the only exception
that in the first two years they shall not be obliged to render personal services other than those
previously indicated.
4. So long as these subdued towns or settlements are located infertile lands appropriate for
cultivation, the inhabitants thereof shall not be obliged to move their dwelling-houses; and only
in case of absolute necessity shall a new residence be fixed for them, choosing for this
purpose the place most convenient for them and which prejudices the least their interest; and,
in either of these cases, an effort must be made to establish their homes with the reach of the
sound of the bell.
5. For the protection and defense of these new towns, there shall be established an armed
force composed precisely of native Christian, the organization and service of which shall be
determined in a regulations based upon that of the abolished Tercios de Policia (division of
the Guardia Civil).
6. The authorities shall see to it that the inhabitants of the new towns understand all the rights
and duties affecting them and the liberty which they have as to where and now they shall till
their lands and sell the products thereof, with the only exception of the tobacco which shall be
bought by the Hacienda at the same price and conditions allowed other producers, and with
the prohibition against these new towns as well as the others from engaging in commerce of
any other transaction with the rebellious indios, the violation of which shall be punished with
deportation.
7. In order to properly carry out this express prohibition, the limits of the territory of the
rebellious indiosshall be fixed; and whoever should go beyond the said limits shall be detained
and assigned governmentally wherever convenient.
8. For the purpose of assisting in the conversion of the pagans into the fraternity of the
Catholic Church, all by this fact along be exempt for eight years from rendering personal labor.
9. The authorities shall offer in the name of the State to the races not subdued (aetas and
mountains igorrots the following advantages in returns for their voluntary submission: to live in
towns; unity among their families; concession of good lands and the right to cultivate them in
the manner they wish and in the way them deem most productive; support during a year, and
clothes upon effecting submission; respect for their habits and customs in so far as the same
are not opposed to natural law; freedom to decide of their own accord as to whether they want
to be Christians or not; the establishment of missions and families of recognized honesty who
shall teach, direct, protect, and give them security and trust them; the purchase or facility of the
sale of their harvests; the exemption from contributions and tributes for ten years and from
thequintas (a kind of tax) for twenty years; and lastly, that those who are governed by the local
authorities as the ones who elect such officials under the direct charge of the authorities of the
province or district.
10. The races indicated in the preceding article, who voluntarily admit the advantages offered,
shall, in return, have the obligation of constituting their new towns, of constructing their town
hall, schools, and country roads which place them in communication with one another and with
the Christians; provided, the location of these towns be distant from their actual residences,
when the latter do not have the good conditions of location and cultivations, and provided
further the putting of families in a place so selected by them be authorized in the towns already
constituted.
11. The armed force shall proceed to the prosecution and punishment of the tribes, that,
disregarding the peace, protection, and advantages offered them, continue in their rebellious
attitude on the first of next April, committing from now on the crimes and vexations against the
Christian towns; and for the this purposes, the Captain General's Office shall proceed with the
organization of the divisions of the Army which, in conjunction with the rural guards
(cuadrilleros), shall have to enter the territory of such tribes. On the expiration of the term, they
shall destroy their dwelling-houses, labors, and implements, and confiscate their products and
cattle. Such a punishment shall necessarily be repeated twice a year, and for this purpose the
military headquarters shall immediately order a detachment of the military staff to study the
zones where such operations shall take place and everything conducive to the successful
accomplishment of the same.
12. The chiefs of provinces, priests, and missioners, local authorities, and other subordinates
to my authorities, local authorities, and other subordinates to may authority, civil as well as
military authorities, shall give the most effective aid and cooperation to the said forces in all
that is within the attributes and the scope of the authority of each.
13. With respect to the reduccion of the pagan races found in some of the provinces in the
southern part of the Archipelago, which I intend to visit, the preceding provisions shall
conveniently be applied to them.
14. There shall be created, under my presidency as Governor-General, Vice-Royal Patron, a
council or permanent commission which shall attend to and decide all the questions relative to
the application of the foregoing regulations that may be brought to it for consultations by the
chiefs of provinces and priests and missionaries.
15. The secondary provisions which may be necessary, as a complement to the foregoing, in
brining about due compliance with this decree, shall be promulgated by the respective official
centers within their respective jurisdictions. (Gaceta de Manila, No. 15) (Diccionario de la
Administracion, vol. 7, pp. 128-134.)
B. AFTER ACQUISITON OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES.
Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States, the question as to the best
method for dealing with the primitive inhabitants has been a perplexing one.
1. Organic law.
The first order of an organic character after the inauguration of the American Government in the
Philippines was President McKinley's Instructions to the Commission of April 7, 1900, later expressly
approved and ratified by section 1 of the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. Portions of
these instructions have remained undisturbed by subsequent congressional legislation. One paragraph
of particular interest should here be quoted, namely:
In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same
course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain
their tribal organization and government and under which many of these tribes are now living in
peace and contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to
conform. Such tribal governments should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation;
and, without undue or petty interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to
prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs.
Next comes the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in the nature of an Organic Act for
the Philippines. The purpose of section 7 of the Philippine Bill was to provide for a legislative body and,
with this end in view, to name the prerequisites for the organization of the Philippine Assembly. The
Philippine Legislature, composed of the Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly, was to
have jurisdiction over the Christian portion of the Islands. The Philippine Commission was to retain
exclusive jurisdiction of that part of said Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
The latest Act of Congress, nearest to a Constitution for the Philippines, is the Act of Congress of
August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law. This transferred the exclusive legislative
jurisdiction and authority theretofore exercised by the Philippine Commission, to the Philippine
Legislature (sec. 12). It divided the Philippine Islands into twelve senatorial districts, the twelfth district
to be composed of the Mountain Province, Baguio, Nueva Vizcaya, and the Department of Mindanao
and Sulu. The Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was authorized to appoint senators and
representatives for the territory which, at the time of the passage of the Jones Law, was not represented
in the Philippine Assembly, that is, for the twelfth district (sec. 16). The law establish a bureau to be
known as the "Bureau of non-Christian Tribes" which shall have general supervision over the public
affairs of the inhabitants which are represented in the Legislature by appointed senators and
representatives( sec. 22).
Philippine organic law may, therefore, be said to recognized a dividing line between the territory not
inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory which Moros or other non-Christian
tribes, and the territory which is inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
2. Statute law.
Local governments in the Philippines have been provided for by various acts of the Philippine
Commission and Legislature. The most notable are Acts Nos. 48 and 49 concerning the Province of
Benguet and the Igorots; Act NO. 82, the Municipal Code; ;Act no. 83, the Provincial Government Act;
Act No. 183, the Character of the city of Manila; Act No. 7887, providing for the organization and
government of the Moro Province; Act No. 1396, the Special Provincial Government Act; Act No. 1397,
the Township Government Act; Act No. 1667, relating to the organization of settlements; Act No. 1963,
the Baguio charger; and Act No. 2408, the Organic Act of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The
major portion of these laws have been carried forward into the Administrative Codes of 1916 an d1917.
Of more particular interest are certain special laws concerning the government of the primitive peoples.
Beginning with Act No. 387, sections 68-71, enacted on April 9, 1902, by the United States Philippine
Commission, having reference to the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos. 4111, 422, 445, 500, 547,
548, 549, 550, 579, 753, 855, 1113, 1145, 4568, 1306 were enacted for the provinces of Abra, Antique,
Bataan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela. Lepanto-Bontoc, Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva Vizcaya,
Pangasinan, Paragua (Palawan), Tarlac, Tayabas, and Zambales. As an example of these laws,
because referring to the Manguianes, we insert Act No. 547:
No. 547. — AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL CIVIL
GOVERNMENTS FOR THE MANGUIANES IN THE PROVINCE OF MINDORO.
By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Commission, that:
SECTION 1. Whereas the Manguianes of the Provinces of Mindoro have not progressed
sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal
government, the provincial governor is authorized, subject to the approval of the Secretary of
the Interior, in dealing with these Manguianes to appoint officers from among them, to fix their
designations and badges of office, and to prescribe their powers and duties: Provided, That the
powers and duties thus prescribed shall not be in excess of those conferred upon township
officers by Act Numbered Three hundred and eighty-seven entitled "An Act providing for the
establishment of local civil Governments in the townships and settlements of Nueva Vizcaya."
SEC. 2. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, the provincial governor is
further authorized, when he deems such a course necessary in the interest of law and order, to
direct such Manguianes to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be
selected by him and approved by the provincial board. Manguianes who refuse to comply with
such directions shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a period not exceeding sixty days.
SEC. 3. The constant aim of the governor shall be to aid the Manguianes of his province to
acquire the knowledge and experience necessary for successful local popular government,
and his supervision and control over them shall be exercised to this end, an to the end that law
and order and individual freedom shall be maintained.
SEC. 4. When in the opinion of the provincial board of Mindoro any settlement of Manguianes
has advanced sufficiently to make such a course practicable, it may be organized under the
provisions of sections one to sixty-seven, inclusive, of Act Numbered three hundred and
eighty-seven, as a township, and the geographical limits of such township shall be fixed by the
provincial board.
SEC. 5. The public good requiring the speedy enactment of this bill, the passage of the same
is hereby expedited in accordance with section two of 'An Act prescribing the order of
procedure by the Commission in the enactment of laws,' passed September twenty-sixth,
nineteen hundred.
SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
Enacted, December 4, 1902.
All of these special laws, with the exception of Act No. 1306, were repealed by Act No. 1396 and 1397.
The last named Act incorporated and embodied the provisions in general language. In turn, Act No.
1397 was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1916. The two Administrative Codes retained the
provisions in questions.
These different laws, if they of the non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and a settled and
consistent practice with reference to the methods to be followed for their advancement.
 C. TERMINOLOGY.
The terms made use of by these laws, organic and statutory, are found in varying forms.
"Uncivilized tribes" is the denomination in President McKinley's instruction to the Commission.
The most commonly accepted usage has sanctioned the term "non-Christian tribes." These words are
to be found in section 7 of the Philippine Bill and in section 22 of the Jones Law. They are also to be
found in Act No. 253 of the Philippines Commission, establishing a Bureau of non-Christian Tribes and
in Act No. 2674 of the Philippine Legislature, carried forward into sections 701-705 of the Administrative
Code of 1917, reestablishing this Bureau. Among other laws which contain the phrase, there can be
mentioned Acts Nos. 127, 128, 387, 547, 548, 549, 550, 1397, 1639, and 2551.
"Non-Christian people," "non-Christian inhabitants," and "non-Christian Filipinos" have been the favorite
nomenclature, in lieu of the unpopular word "tribes," since the coming into being of a Filipinized
legislature. These terms can be found in sections 2076, 2077, 2390, 2394, Administrative Code of 1916;
sections 701-705, 2145, 2422, 2426, Administrative Code of 1917; and in Acts Nos. 2404, 2435, 2444,
2674 of the Philippine Legislatures, as well as in Act No. 1667 of the Philippine Commission.
The Administrative Code specifically provides that the term "non-Christian" shall include Mohammedans
and pagans. (Sec. 2576, Administrative Code of 1917; sec. 2561, Administrative Code of 1916, taken
from Act No. 2408, sec. 3.)
D. MEANING OF TERM "NON-CHRISTIAN."
If we were to follow the literal meaning of the word "non-Christian," it would of course result in giving to
it a religious signification. Obviously, Christian would be those who profess the Christian religion, and
non-Christians, would be those who do not profess the Christian religion. In partial corroboration of this
view, there could also be cited section 2576 of the last Administrative Code and certain well-known
authorities, as Zuñiga, "Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas," Professor Ferdinand Blumentritt, "Philippine
Tribes and Languages," and Dr. N. M. Saleeby, "The Origin of Malayan Filipinos." (See Blair &
Robertson, "The Philippine Islands," 1493-1898, vol. III, p. 300, note; Craig-Benitez, "Philippine
Progress prior to 1898," vol. I. p. 107.)
Not content with the apparent definition of the word, we shall investigate further to ascertain what is its
true meaning.
In one sense, the word can have a geographical signification. This is plainly to be seen by the
provisions of many laws. Thus, according to the Philippine Bill, the authority of the Philippine Assembly
was recognized in the "territory" of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
Again, the Jones Law confers similar recognition in the authorization of the twelfth senatorial district for
the "territory not now represented in the Philippine Assembly." The Philippines Legislature has, time and
again, adopted acts making certain other acts applicable to that "part" of the Philippine Islands inhabited
by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
Section 2145, is found in article XII of the Provincial Law of the Administrative Code. The first section of
this article, preceding section 2145, makes the provisions of the article applicable only in specially
organized provinces. The specially organized provinces are the Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya,
Mindoro, Batanes, and Palawan. These are the provinces to which the Philippine Legislature has never
seen fit to give all the powers of local self-government. They do not, however, exactly coincide with the
portion of the Philippines which is not granted popular representation. Nevertheless, it is still a
geographical description.
It is well-known that within the specially organized provinces, there live persons some of who are
Christians and some of whom are not Christians. In fact, the law specifically recognizes this. ( Sec.
2422, Administrative Code of 1917, etc.)
If the religious conception is not satisfactory, so against the geographical conception is likewise
inadquate. The reason it that the motive of the law relates not to a particular people, because of their
religion, or to a particular province because of its location, but the whole intent of the law is predicated n
the civilization or lack of civilization of the inhabitants.
At most, "non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatisfactory word. Apologetic words usually introduce the
term. "The so-called non-Christian" is a favorite expression. The Secretary of the Interior who for so
many years had these people under his jurisdiction, recognizing the difficulty of selecting an exact
designation, speaks of the "backward Philippine peoples, commonly known as the 'non-Christian
tribes."' (See Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines, United States Senate, Sixty-third
Congress, third session on H.R. 18459, An Act to declare the purpose of the People of the United
States as to the future political status of the Philippine Islands and to provide a more autonomous
government for the Islands, pp. 346, 351; letter of the Secretary of the Interior of June 30, 1906,
circulated by the Executive Secretary.)
The idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to relate to degree of civilization, is substantiated by
reference to legislative, judicial, and executive authority.
The legislative intent is borne out by Acts Nos. 48, 253, 387, 1667, and 2674, and sections 701 et seq,
and sections 2422 et seq, of the Administrative Code of 1917. For instance, Act No. 253 charged the
Bureau of non-Christian tribes to conduct "systematic investigations with reference to non-Christian
tribes . . . with special view to determining the most practicable means for bringing about their
advancement in civilization and material property prosperity."
As authority of a judicial nature is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of United
States vs. Tubban [Kalinga] ([1915], 29, Phil., 434). The question here arose as to the effect of a tribal
marriage in connection with article 423 of the Penal code concerning the husband who surprises his
wife in the act of adultery. In discussing the point, the court makes use of the following language:
. . . we are not advised of any provision of law which recognizes as legal a tribal marriage
of so-called non-Christians or members of uncivilized tribes, celebrated within that province
without compliance with the requisites prescribed by General Orders no. 68. . . . We hold also
that the fact that the accused is shown to be a member of an uncivilized tribe, of a low order of
intelligence, uncultured and uneducated, should be taken into consideration as a second
marked extenuating circumstance.
Of much more moment is the uniform construction of execution officials who have been called upon to
interpret and enforce the law. The official who, as a member of the Philippine Commission, drafted
much of the legislation relating to the so-called Christians and who had these people under his
authority, was the former Secretary of the Interior. Under date of June 30, 1906, this official addressed a
letter to all governor of provinces, organized under the Special Provincial Government Act, a letter
which later received recognition by the Governor-General and was circulated by the Executive
Secretary, reading as follows:
 Sir: Within the past few months, the question has arisen as to whether people who were
originally non-Christian but have recently been baptized or who are children of persons who
have been recently baptized are, for the purposes of Act 1396 and 1397, to be considered
Christian or non-Christians.
It has been extremely difficult, in framing legislation for the tribes in these islands which are not
advanced far in civilization, to hit upon any suitable designation which will fit all cases. The
number of individual tribes is so great that it is almost out of the question to enumerate all of
them in an Act. It was finally decided to adopt the designation 'non-Christians' as the one most
satisfactory, but the real purpose of the Commission was not so much to legislate for people
having any particular religious belief as for those lacking sufficient advancement so that they
could, to their own advantage, be brought under the Provincial Government Act and the
Municipal Code.
The mere act of baptism does not, of course, in itself change the degree of civilization to which
the person baptized has attained at the time the act of baptism is performed. For practical
purposes, therefore, you will give the member of so-called "wild tribes" of your province the
benefit of the doubt even though they may recently have embraced Christianity.
The determining factor in deciding whether they are to be allowed to remain under the
jurisdiction of regularly organized municipalities or what form of government shall be afforded
to them should be the degree of civilization to which they have attained and you are requested
to govern yourself accordingly.
I have discussed this matter with the Honorable, the Governor-General, who concurs in the
opinion above expressed and who will have the necessary instructions given to the governors
of the provinces organized under the Provincial Government Act. (Internal Revenue Manual, p.
214.)
The present Secretary of the Interior, in a memorandum furnished a member of this court, has the
following to say on the subject:
As far as names are concerned the classification is indeed unfortunate, but while no other
better classification has as yet been made the present classification should be allowed to stand
. . . I believe the term carries the same meaning as the expressed in the letter of the Secretary
of the Interior (of June 30, 1906, herein quoted). It is indicative of the degree of civilization
rather than of religious denomination, for the hold that it is indicative of religious denomination
will make the law invalid as against that Constitutional guaranty of religious freedom.
Another official who was concerned with the status of the non-Christians, was the Collector of Internal
Revenue. The question arose for ruling relatives to the cedula taxation of the Manobos and the Aetas.
Thereupon, the view of the Secretary of the Interior was requested on the point, who, by return
indorsement, agreed with the interpretation of the Collector of Internal Revenue. This Construction of
the Collector of Internal Revenue can be found in circular letter No. 188 of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, dated June 11, 1907, reading as follows (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214):
The internal revenue law exempts "members of non-Christian tribes" from the payment of
cedula taxes. The Collector of Internal Revenue has interpreted this provision of law to mean
not that persons who profess some form of Christian worship are alone subject to the cedula
tax, and that all other person are exempt; he has interpreted it to mean that all persons
preserving tribal relations with the so-called non-Christian tribes are exempt from the cedula
tax, and that all others, including Jews, Mohammedans, Confucians, Buddists, etc., are subject
to said tax so long as they live in cities or towns, or in the country in a civilized condition. In
other words, it is not so much a matter of a man's form of religious worship or profession that
decides whether or not he is subject to the cedula tax; it is more dependent on whether he is
living in a civilized manner or is associated with the mountain tribes, either as a member
thereof or as a recruit. So far, this question has not come up as to whether a Christian,
maintaining his religious belief, but throwing his lot and living with a non-Christian tribe, would
or would not be subject to the cedula tax. On one occasion a prominent Hebrew of Manila
claimed to this office that he was exempt from the cedula tax, inasmuch as he was not a
Christian. This Office, however, continued to collect cedula taxes from all the Jews, East
Indians, Arabs, Chinamen, etc., residing in Manila. Quite a large proportion of the cedula taxes
paid in this city are paid by men belonging to the nationalities mentioned. Chinamen, Arabs
and other s are quite widely scattered throughout the Islands, and a condition similar to that
which exist in Manila also exists in most of the large provincial towns. Cedula taxes are
therefore being collected by this Office in all parts of these Islands on the broad ground that
civilized people are subject to such taxes, and non-civilized people preserving their tribal
relations are not subject thereto.
(Sgd.) JNO. S. HORD,
Collector of Internal Revenue.
On September 17, 1910, the Collector of Internal Revenue addressed circular letter No. 327, approved
by the Secretary of Finance and Justice, to all provincial treasurers. This letter in part reads:
In view of the many questions that have been raised by provincial treasurers regarding cedula
taxes due from members of non-Christian tribes when they come in from the hills for the
purposes of settling down and becoming members of the body politic of the Philippine Islands,
the following clarification of the laws governing such questions and digest of rulings thereunder
is hereby published for the information of all concerned:
Non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands are so classed, not by reason of the fact
that they do not profess Christianity, but because of their uncivilized mode of life and low state
of development. All inhabitants of the Philippine Islands classed as members of non-Christian
tribes may be divided into three classes in so far as the cedula tax law is concerned . . .
Whenever any member of an non-Christian tribe leaves his wild and uncivilized mode of life,
severs whatever tribal relations he may have had and attaches himself civilized community,
belonging a member of the body politic, he thereby makes himself subject to precisely the
same law that governs the other members of that community and from and after the date when
he so attaches himself to the community the same cedula and other taxes are due from him as
from other members thereof. If he comes in after the expiration of the delinquency period the
same rule should apply to him as to persons arriving from foreign countries or reaching the age
of eighteen subsequent to the expiration of such period, and a regular class A, D, F, or H
cedula, as the case may be, should be furnished him without penalty and without requiring him
to pay the tax for former years.
In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the prime factors in determining whether or not a
man is subject to the regular cedula tax is not the circumstance that he does or does not
profess Christianity, nor even his maintenance of or failure to maintain tribal relations with
some of the well known wild tribes, but his mode of life, degree of advancement in civilization
 and connection or lack of connection with some civilized community. For this reason so called
"Remontados" and "Montescos" will be classed by this office as members of non-Christian
tribes in so far as the application of the Internal Revenue Law is concerned, since, even
though they belong to no well recognized tribe, their mode of life, degree of advancement and
so forth are practically the same as those of the Igorrots and members of other recognized
non-Christina tribes.
Very respectfully,
(Sgd.) ELLIS CROMWELL,
Collector of Internal Revenue,
Approved:
(Sgd.) GREGORIO ARANETA,
Secretary of Finance and Justice.
The two circular above quoted have since been repealed by Bureau of Internal Revenue Regulations
No. 1, promulgated by Venancio Concepcion, Acting Collector of Internal Revenue, and approved on
April 16, 1915, by Honorable Victorino Mapa, Secretary of Finance and Justice. Section 30 of the
regulations is practically a transcript of Circular Letter No. 327.
The subject has come before the Attorney-General for consideration. The Chief of Constabulary request
the opinion of the Attorney-General as to the status of a non-Christian who has been baptized by a
minister of the Gospel. The precise questions were these: "Does he remain non-Christian or is he
entitled to the privileges of a Christian? By purchasing intoxicating liquors, does he commit an infraction
of the law and does the person selling same lay himself liable under the provision of Act No. 1639?" The
opinion of Attorney-General Avanceña, after quoting the same authorities hereinbefore set out,
concludes:
In conformity with the above quoted constructions, it is probable that is probable that the
person in question remains a non-Christian, so that, in purchasing intoxicating liquors both he
and the person selling the same make themselves liable to prosecution under the provisions of
Act No. 1639. At least, I advise you that these should be the constructions place upon the law
until a court shall hold otherwise.
Solicitor-General Paredes in his brief in this case says:
With respect to the meaning which the phrase non-Christian inhabitants has in the provisions
of the Administrative code which we are studying, we submit that said phrase does not have its
natural meaning which would include all non-Christian inhabitants of the Islands, whether
Filipino or strangers, civilized or uncivilized, but simply refers to those uncivilized members of
the non-Christian tribes of the Philippines who, living without home or fixed residence, roam in
the mountains, beyond the reach of law and order . . .
The Philippine Commission in denominating in its laws that portion of the inhabitants of the
Philippines which live in tribes as non-Christian tribes, as distinguished from the common
Filipinos which carry on a social and civilized life, did not intended to establish a distinction
based on the religious beliefs of the individual, but, without dwelling on the difficulties which
later would be occasioned by the phrase, adopted the expression which the Spanish legislation
employed to designate the uncivilized portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines.
The phrase 'non-Christian inhabitants' used in the provisions of articles 2077 and 2741 of Act
No. 2657 (articles 2145 and 2759) should be understood as equivalent to members of
uncivilized tribes of the Philippines, not only because this is the evident intention of the law, but
because to give it its lateral meaning would make the law null and unconstitutional as making
distinctions base the religion of the individual.
The Official Census of 1903, in the portion written by no less an authority than De. David P. Barrows,
then "Chief of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes," divides the population in the Christian or Civilized
Tribes, and non-Christian or Wild Tribes. (Census of the Philippine Islands [1903], vol. 1, pp. 411 et
seq). The present Director of the Census, Hon. Ignacio Villamor, writes that the classification likely to be
used in the Census now being taken is: "Filipinos and Primitive Filipinos." In a Pronouncing Gazetteer
and Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands, prepared in the Bureau of Insular Affairs, War
Department, a sub-division under the title non-Christian tribes is, "Physical and Political Characteristics
of the non-Christian Tribes," which sufficiently shows that the terms refers to culture and not to religion.
In resume, therefore, the Legislature and the Judiciary, inferentially, and different executive officials,
specifically, join in the proposition that the term "non-Christian" refers, not to religious belief, but, in a
way , to geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a law grade of
civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities.
E. THE MANGUIANES.
The so-called non-Christians are in various state approaching civilization. The Philippine Census of
1903 divided them into four classes. Of the third class, are the Manguianes (or Mangyans) of Mindoro.
Of the derivation of the name "Manguian" Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera in his Etimilogia de los nombres de
Rozas de Filipinas, says:
In Tagalog, Bicol, and Visaya, Manguian signifies "savage," "mountainer," "pagan," "negro." It
may be that the use of this word is applicable to a great number of Filipinos, but nevertheless it
has been applied only to certain inhabitants of Mindoro. Even in primitive times without doubt
this name was given to those of that island who bear it to-day, but its employed in three Filipino
languages shows that the radical ngian had in all these languages a sense to-day forgotten. In
Pampango this ending still exists and signifies "ancient," from which we can deduce that the
name was applied to men considered to be the ancient inhabitants, and that these men were
pushed back into the interior by the modern invaders, in whose language they were called the
"ancients."
The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood and have not advanced
beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are a peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people. They
number approximately 15,000. The manguianes have shown no desire for community life, and, as
indicated in the preamble to Act No. 547, have not progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it
practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government. (See Census of the Philippine
(Islands [1903], vol. I, pp. 22, 23, 460.)
III. COMPARATIVE — THE AMERICAN INDIANS.
Reference was made in the Presidents' instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted by the
United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the Government of the Philippines Islands
in its dealings with the so-called non-Christian people is said, on argument, to be practically identical
with that followed by the United States Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes. Valuable
lessons, it is insisted, can be derived by an investigation of the American-Indian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as "in a state
of pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government of the United States and the Indians
may be described as that of guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when and how the
guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary authority of the United
States.
Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, hereinbefore mentioned, tells how the
Congress passed an Act in 1819 "for promoting those humane designs of civilizing the neighboring
Indians." After quoting the Act, the opinion goes on — "This act avowedly contemplates the
preservation of the Indian nations as an object sought by the United States, and proposes to effect this
object by civilizing and converting them from hunters into agriculturists."
A leading case which discusses the status of the Indians is that of the United States vs. Kagama
([1886], 118 U.S., 375). Reference is herein made to the clause of the United States Constitution which
gives Congress "power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian tribes." The court then proceeds to indicate a brief history of the position of the Indians in
the United States (a more extended account of which can be found in Marshall's opinion in
Worcester vs. Georgia, supra), as follows:
The relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United States, both before and
since the Revolution, to the people of the United States, has always been an anomalous one
and of a complex character.
Following the policy of the European Governments in the discovery of American towards the
Indians who were found here, the colonies before the Revolution and the States and the
United States since, have recognized in the Indians a possessory right to the soil over which
they roamed and hunted and established occasional villages. But they asserted an ultimate
title in the land itself, by which the Indian tribes were forbidden to sell or transfer it to other
nations or peoples without the consent of this paramount authority. When a tribe wished to
dispose of its lands, or any part of it, or the State or the United States wished to purchase it, a
treaty with the tribe was the only mode in which this could be done. The United States
recognized no right in private persons, or in other nations, to make such a purchase by treaty
or otherwise. With the Indians themselves these relation are equally difficult to define. They
were, and always have been, regarded as having a semi-independent position when they
preserved their tribal relations; not as States, not as nation not a possessed of the fall
attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of regulating their internal
and social relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the Union or of the State within
whose limits they resided.
The opinion then continues:
It seems to us that this (effect of the law) is within the competency of Congress. These Indian
tribes are the wards of the nation. The are communities dependent on the United States.
dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent for their political rights. They owe no
allegiance to the States, and receive from the no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the
people of the States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very
weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal
Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arise the duty of
protection, and with it the power. This has always been recognized by the Executive and by
Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has arisen . . . The power of the General
Government over these remnants of race once powerful, now weak and diminished in
numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they
dwell. it must exist in that government, because it never has existed anywhere else, because
the theater of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States, because it has
never been denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.
In the later case of United States vs. Sandoval ([1913], 231 U.S., 28) the question to be considered was
whether the status of the Pueblo Indians and their lands was such that Congress could prohibit the
introduction of intoxicating liquor into those lands notwithstanding the admission of New Mexico to
statehood. The court looked to the reports of the different superintendent charged with guarding their
interests and founds that these Indians are dependent upon the fostering care and protection of the
government "like reservation Indians in general." Continuing, the court said "that during the Spanish
dominion, the Indians of the pueblos were treated as wards requiring special protection, where
subjected to restraints and official supervisions in the alienation of their property." And finally, we not the
following: "Not only does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress to regulate commerce with the
Indians tribes, but long-continued legislative and executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial
decisions have attributed to the United States as a superior and civilized nation the power and the duty
of exercising a fostering care and protection over all dependent Indian communities within its borders,
whether within its original territory or territory subsequently acquired, and whether within or without the
limits of a state."
With reference to laws affecting the Indians, it has been held that it is not within the power of the courts
to overrule the judgment of Congress. For very good reason, the subject has always been deemed
political in nature, not subject to the jurisdiction of the judicial department of the government. (Matter of
Heff [1905], 197 U.S., 488; U.S.vs. Celestine [1909], 215 U.S., 278; U.S. vs. Sandoval, supra;
Worcester vs. Georgia, supra; U.S. vs. Rogers [1846], 4 How., 567; the Cherokee Tobacco [1871], 11
Wall, 616; Roff vs. Burney [1897], 168 U.S., 218; Thomasvs. Gay [1898], 169 U.S.., 264; Lone
Wolf vs. Hitchcock[1903], 187 U.S., 553; Wallace vs. Adams [1907], 204 U.S., 415; Conley vs. Bollinger
[1910], 216 U.S., 84; Tiger vs. Western Invest. Co. [1911], 221 U.S., 286; U.S. vs. Lane [1913], 232
U.S.., 598; Cyr vs. Walker (1911], 29 Okla, 281; 35 L.R.A. [N. S.], 795.) Whenever, therefore, the United
States sets apart any public land as an Indian reservation, it has full authority to pass such laws and
authorize such measures as may be necessary to give to the Indians thereon full protection in their
persons and property. (U.S. vs. Thomas [1894], 151 U.S., 577.)
All this borne out by long-continued legislative and executive usage, and an unbroken line of judicial
decisions.
The only case which is even remotely in point and which, if followed literally, might result in the issuance
of habeas corpus, is that of United States vs. Crook ([1879], Fed. Cas. No. 14891). This was a hearing
upon return to a writ of habeas corpus issued against Brigadier General George Crook at the relation of
Standing Bear and other Indians, formerly belonging to the Ponca Tribe of Indians. The petition alleged
in substance that the relators are Indians who have formerly belonged to the Ponca tribe of Indians,
now located in the Indian Territory; that they had some time previously withdrawn from the tribe, and
completely severed their tribal relations therewith, and had adopted the general habits of the whites,
and were then endeavoring to maintain themselves by their own exertions, and without aid or
assistance from the general government; that whilst they were thus engaged, and without being guilty of
violating any of the laws of the United States, they were arrested and restrained of their liberty by order
of the respondent, George Crook. The substance of the return to the writ was that the relators are
individual members of, and connected with, the Ponca tribe of Indians; that they had fled or escaped
form a reservation situated some place within the limits of the Indian Territory — had departed
therefrom without permission from the Government; and, at the request of the Secretary of the Interior,
the General of the Army had issued an order which required the respondent to arrest and return the
relators to their tribe in the Indian Territory, and that, pursuant to the said order, he had caused the
relators to be arrested on the Omaha Indian Territory.
The first question was whether an Indian can test the validity of an illegal imprisonment by habeas
corpus. The second question, of much greater importance, related to the right of the Government to
arrest and hold the relators for a time, for the purpose of being returned to the Indian Territory from
which it was alleged the Indian escaped. In discussing this question, the court reviewed the policy the
Government had adopted in its dealing with the friendly tribe of Poncase. Then, continuing, the court
said: "Laws passed for the government of the Indian country, and for the purpose of regulating trade
and intercourse with the Indian tribes, confer upon certain officers of the Government almost unlimited
power over the persons who go upon the reservations without lawful authority . . . Whether such an
extensive discretionary power is wisely vested in the commissioner of Indian affairs or not , need not be
questioned. It is enough to know that the power rightfully exists, and, where existing, the exercise of the
power must be upheld." The decision concluded as follows:
The reasoning advanced in support of my views, leads me to conclude:
1. that an Indian is a 'person' within the meaning of the laws of the United States, and has,
therefore, the right to sue out a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court, or before a federal
judge, in all cases where he may be confined or in custody under color of authority of the
United States or where he is restrained of liberty in violation of the constitution or laws of the
United States.
2. That General George Crook, the respondent, being commander of the military department of
the Platte, has the custody of the relators, under color of authority of the United States, and in
violation of the laws therefore.
3. That n rightful authority exists for removing by force any of the relators to the Indian
Territory, as the respondent has been directed to do.
4. that the Indians possess the inherent right of expatriation, as well as the more fortunate
white race, and have the inalienable right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," so long
as they obey the laws and do not trespass on forbidden ground. And,
5. Being restrained of liberty under color of authority of the United States, and in violation of
the laws thereof, the relators must be discharged from custody, and it is so ordered.
As far as the first point is concerned, the decision just quoted could be used as authority to determine
that Rubi, the Manguian petitioner, a Filipino, and a citizen of the Philippine Islands, is a "person" within
the meaning of theHabeas Corpus Act, and as such, entitled to sue out a writ in the Philippine courts.
(See also In re Race Horse [1895], 70 Fed., 598.) We so decide.
As to the second point the facts in the Standing Bear case an the Rubi case are not exactly identical.
But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations do exist in the United
States, that Indians have been taken from different parts of the country and placed on these
reservation, without any previous consultation as to their own wishes, and that, when once so located,
they have been made to remain on the reservation for their own good and for the general good of the
country. If any lesson can be drawn form the Indian policy of the United States, it is that the
determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive branches of the government and that
when once so decided upon, the courts should not interfere to upset a carefully planned governmental
system. Perhaps, just as may forceful reasons exists for the segregation as existed for the segregation
of the different Indian tribes in the United States.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.
A. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
The first constitutional objection which confronts us is that the Legislature could not delegate this power
to provincial authorities. In so attempting, it is contended, the Philippine Legislature has abdicated its
authority and avoided its full responsibility.
That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be zealously
protected, we agree. An understanding of the rule will, however, disclose that it has not bee violated in
his instance.
The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and
since followed in a multitude of case, namely: "The true distinction therefore is between the delegation
of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring
an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R.
Co. vs. Comm'rs. Clinton County [1852], 1 Ohio S.t, 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in
Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature to an executive
department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate
official thereof, to whom t has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.
(U.S. vs. Kinkead [1918], 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decision is to give prominence to
the "necessity" of the case.
Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has attempted to accomplish by the enactment of section
21454 of the Administrative Code? Has not the Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial
governor, with the approval of the provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as
to the execution of the law? Is not this "necessary"?
The case of West vs. Hitchock, ([1906], 205 U.S., 80) was a petition for mandamus to require the
Secretary of the Interior to approve the selection and taking of one hundred and sixty acres by the
relator out of the lands ceded to the United States by the Wichita and affiliated bands of Indians.
Section 463 of the United States Revised Statutes provided: "The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall,
under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and agreeably to such regulations as the President
may prescribe, have the management of all Indian affairs, and of all matters arising out to the Indian
relations." Justice Holmes said: "We should hesitate a good deal, especially in view of the long
established practice of the Department, before saying that this language was not broad enough to
warrant a regulation obviously made for the welfare of the rather helpless people concerned. The power
of Congress is not doubted. The Indians have been treated as wards of the nation. Some such
supervision was necessary, and has been exercised. In the absence of special provisions naturally it
would be exercised by the Indian Department." (See also as corroborative authority, it any is needed,
Union Bridge Co. vs. U.S. [1907], 204 U.S.., 364, reviewing the previous decisions of the United States
Supreme Court: U.S. vs. Lane [1914], 232 U.S., 598.)
There is another aspect of the question, which once accepted, is decisive. An exception to the general
rule. sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative
powers to local authorities. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of
Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board.
Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province,
are better qualified to judge "when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and
order?" As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants,
who but they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the
people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state?
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by
the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head.
B. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
The attorney de officio, for petitioners, in a truly remarkable brief, submitted on behalf of his unknown
clients, says that — "The statute is perfectly clear and unambiguous. In limpid English, and in words as
plain and unequivocal as language can express, it provides for the segregation of 'non-Christians' and
none other." The inevitable result, them, is that the law "constitutes an attempt by the Legislature to
discriminate between individuals because of their religious beliefs, and is, consequently,
unconstitutional."
Counsel's premise once being conceded, his arguments is answerable — the Legislature must be
understood to mean what it has plainly expressed; judicial construction is then excluded; religious
equality is demanded by the Organic Law; the statute has violated this constitutional guaranty, and Q.
E. D. is invalid. But, as hereinbefore stated, we do not feel free to discard the long continued meaning
given to a common expression, especially as classification of inhabitants according to religious belief
leads the court to what it should avoid, the nullification of legislative action. We hold that the term "non-
Christian" refers to natives of the Philippines Islands of a low grade of civilization, and that section 2145
of the Administrative Code of 1917, does not discriminate between individuals an account of religious
differences.
C. LIBERTY; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.
The third constitutional argument is grounded on those portions of the President's instructions of to the
Commission, the Philippine Bill, and the Jones Law, providing "That no law shall be enacted in said
Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to
any person therein the equal protection of the laws." This constitutional limitation is derived from the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution — and these provisions, it has been said "are
universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any
differences of race, of color, or of nationality." (Yick Wo vs.Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356.) The
protection afforded the individual is then as much for the non-Christian as for the Christian.
The conception of civil liberty has been variously expressed thus:
Every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties, compatible with the
possession of like liberty by every other. (Spencer, Social Statistics, p. 94.)
Liberty is the creature of law, essentially different from that authorized licentiousness that
trespasses on right. That authorized licentiousness that trespasses on right. It is a legal and a
refined idea, the offspring of high civilization, which the savage never understood, and never
can understand. Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome restraint; the more restraint on
others to keep off from us, the more liberty we have . . . that man is free who is protected from
injury. (II Webster's Works, p. 393.)
Liberty consists in the ability to do what one caught to desire and in not being forced to do
what one ought not do desire. (Montesque, spirit of the Laws.)
Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is no unrestricted license to ac according to one's
own will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of
the same right by others. (Field, J., in Crowley vs. Christensen [1890], 137 U.S., 86.)
Liberty does not import "an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all
circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person
is necessarily subject for the common good. On any other basis, organized society could not
exist with safety to its members. Society based on the rule that each one is a law unto himself
would soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all could not exist under
the operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own,
whether in respect of his person or his property, regardless of the injury that may be done to
others . . . There is, of course, a sphere with which the individual may asserts the supremacy
of his own will, and rightfully dispute the authority of any human government — especially of
any free government existing under a written Constitution — to interfere with the exercise of
that will. But it is equally true that in very well-ordered society charged with the duty of
conserving the safety of its members, the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at
times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint to be enforced by
reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may demand." (Harlan, J., In
Jacobson vs. Massachusetts [1905] 197 U.S., 11.)
Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and the upright and
honorable conscience of the individual. (Apolinario Mabini.)
Civil Liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized
community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. The right to Liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal
restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the
person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties with which he has
been endowed by this Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the common welfare.
As enunciated in a long array of authorities including epoch-making decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, Liberty includes the right of the citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways;
to live an work where he will; to earn his livelihood by an lawful calling; to pursue any avocations, an for
that purpose. to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying
out these purposes to a successful conclusion. The chief elements of the guaranty are the right to
contract, the right to choose one's employment, the right to labor, and the right of locomotion.
In general, it may be said that Liberty means the opportunity to do those things which are ordinarily
done by free men. (There can be noted Cummings vs. Missouri [1866], 4 Wall, 277;
Wilkinson vs. Leland [1829], 2 Pet., 627; Williams vs. Fears [1900], 179 U.S., 274;
Allgeyer vs. Louisiana [1896], 165, U.S., 578; State vs. Kreutzberg [1902], 114 Wis., 530. See 6 R.C.L.,
258, 261.)
One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of Liberty is plainly apparent. It is this:
"Liberty" as understood in democracies, is not license; it is "Liberty regulated by law." Implied in the
term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of
society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce
unbridled license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law
for the common good. Whenever and wherever the natural rights of citizen would, if exercises without
restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which are also and equally natural, such assumed rights must
yield to the regulation of law. The Liberty of the citizens may be restrained in the interest of the public
health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power. (See
Hall vs. Geiger-Jones [1916], 242 U.S., 539; Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. vs.Cruz [1914], 189 Al.,
66.)
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. Daniel Webster, in the
course of the argument in the Dartmouth College Case before the United States Supreme Court, since
a classic in forensic literature, said that the meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every citizen shall
hold his life, liberty, property, an immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern
society." To constitute "due process of law," as has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always
necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite a rule which is especially true
where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to particular
cases. (See McGehee, Due Process of Law, p. 371.) Neither is due process a stationary and blind
sentinel of liberty. "Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age and
customs, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the public good,
which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of
law." (Hurtado vs. California [1883], 110, U.S., 516.) "Due process of law" means simply . . . "first, that
there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the
Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be enforced
according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to
all the citizens of the state or to all of a class." (U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on
appeal to the United States Supreme Court. 1) "What is due process of law depends on circumstances.
It varies with the subject-matter and necessities of the situation." (Moyer vs. Peablody [1909], 212 U. S.,
82.)
The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a statute
which is applicable to all of a class. The classification must have a reasonable basis and cannot be
purely arbitrary in nature.
We break off with the foregoing statement, leaving the logical deductions to be made later on.
D. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.
The fourth constitutional contention of petitioner relates to the Thirteen Amendment to the United States
Constitution particularly as found in those portions of Philippine Organic Law providing "That slavery
shall not exist in said Islands; nor shall involuntary servitude exist except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." It is quite possible that the Thirteenth Amendment,
since reaching to "any place subject to" the "jurisdiction" of the United States, has force in the
Philippine. However this may be, the Philippine Legislature has, by adoption, with necessary
modifications, of sections 268 to 271 inclusive of the United States Criminal Code, prescribed the
punishment for these crimes. Slavery and involuntary servitude, together wit their corollary, peonage, all
denote "a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another." (Hodges vs. U.S. [1906], 203
U.S., 1.) The term of broadest scope is possibly involuntary servitude. It has been applied to any
servitude in fact involuntary, no matter under what form such servitude may have been disguised.
(Bailey vs. Alabama [1910], 219 U.S., 219.)
So much for an analysis of those constitutional provisions on which petitioners rely for their freedom.
Next must come a description of the police power under which the State must act if section 2145 is to
be held valid.
E. THE POLICE POWER.
Not attempting to phrase a definition of police power, all that it is necessary to note at this moment is
the farreaching scope of the power, that it has become almost possible to limit its weep, and that among
its purposes is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and
good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its
resources and add to is wealth and prosperity. (See Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113 U.S., 27.) What
we are not interested in is the right of the government to restrain liberty by the exercise of the police
power.
"The police power of the State," one court has said, . . . "is a power coextensive with self-protection, and
is not inaptly termed the 'law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary
power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of
society." (Lake View vs. Rose Hill Cemetery Co. [1873], 70 Ill., 191.) Carried onward by the current of
legislation, the judiciary rarely attempt to dam the on rushing power of legislative discretion, provided
the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security for the public welfare
or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual.
The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority the right to exercise the
sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. "There can be
not doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature
and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamental principles which lie at
the foundation of all republican forms of government." (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil.,
580; U.S. vs. Pompeya [1915], 31 Phil., 245.)
With the foregoing approximation of the applicable basic principles before us, before finally deciding
whether any constitutional provision has indeed been violated by section 2145 of the Administrative
Code, we should endeavor to ascertain the intention of the Legislature in enacting this section. If legally
possible, such legislative intention should be effectuated.
F. LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao
reservation, it will be remembered, assigned as reasons fort the action, the following: (1) The failure of
former attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only
successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent
settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the
protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs
among the Manguianes.
The present Secretary of the Interior says of the Tigbao reservation and of the motives for its selection,
the following:
 To inform himself of the conditions of those Manguianes who were taken together to Tigbao,
the Secretary of the Interior on June 10 to 13, 1918, made a trip to the place. There he found
that the site selected is a good one; that creditable progress has been made in the clearing of
forests, construction of buildings, etc., that there appears to be encouraging reaction by the
boys to the work of the school the requirements of which they appear to meet with enthusiastic
interest after the first weeks which are necessarily a somewhat trying period for children wholly
unaccustomed to orderly behaviour and habit of life. He also gathered the impression that the
results obtained during the period of less than one year since the beginning of the institution
definitely justify its continuance and development.
Of course, there were many who were protesting against that segregation. Such was naturally
to be expected. But the Secretary of the Interior, upon his return to Manila, made the following
statement to the press:
"It is not deemed wise to abandon the present policy over those who prefer to live a
nomadic life and evade the influence of civilization. The Government will follow its
policy to organize them into political communities and to educate their children with
the object of making them useful citizens of this country. To permit them to live a
wayfaring life will ultimately result in a burden to the state and on account of their
ignorance, they will commit crimes and make depredation, or if not they will be
subject to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them."
The Secretary of the Interior, who is the official charged with the supervision of all the non-Christian
people, has adopted as the polaris of his administration — "the advancement of the non-Christian
elements of our population to equality and unification with the highly civilized Christian inhabitants." This
is carried on by the adoption of the following measures:
(a) Pursuance of the closer settlement policy whereby people of seminomadic race are
induced to leave their wild habitat and settle in organized communities.
(b) The extension of the public school system and the system of public health throughout the
regions inhabited by the non-Christian people.
(c) The extention of public works throughout the Mohammedan regions to facilitate their
development and the extention of government control.
(d) Construction of roads and trials between one place and another among non-Christians, to
promote social and commercial intercourse and maintain amicable relations among them and
with the Christian people.
(e) Pursuance of the development of natural economic resources, especially agriculture.
( f ) The encouragement of immigration into, and of the investment of private capital in, the
fertile regions of Mindanao and Sulu.
The Secretary adds:
To attain the end desired, work of a civilizing influence have been continued among the non-
Christian people. These people are being taught and guided to improve their living conditions
in order that they may fully appreciate the benefits of civilization. Those of them who are still
given to nomadic habits are being persuaded to abandon their wild habitat and settle in
organized settlements. They are being made to understand that it is the purpose of the
Government to organize them politically into fixed and per manent communities, thus bringing
them under the control of the Government, to aid them to live and work, protect them from
involuntary servitude and abuse, educate their children, and show them the advantages of
leading a civilized life with their civilized brothers. In short, they are being impressed with the
purposes and objectives of the Government of leading them to economic, social, and political
equality, and unification with the more highly civilized inhabitants of the country. (See Report of
the Department for 1917.)
The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly relations with the so-called
non-Christians, and to promote their educational, agricultural, industrial, and economic development
and advancement in civilization. (Note Acts Nos. 2208, 2404, 2444.) Act No. 2674 in reestablishing the
Bureau of non-Christian Tribes, defines the aim of the Government towards the non-Christian people in
the following unequivocal terms:
It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes to continue the work for advancement
and liberty in favor of the region inhabited by non-Christian Filipinos and foster by all adequate
means and in a systematical, rapid, and complete manner the moral, material, economic,
social, and political development of those regions, always having in view the aim of rendering
permanent the mutual intelligence between, and complete fusion of, all the Christian and non-
Christian elements populating the provinces of the Archipelago. (Sec. 3.)
May the Manguianes not be considered, as are the Indians in the United States, proper wards of the
Filipino people? By the fostering care of a wise Government, may not these unfortunates advance in the
"habits and arts of civilization?" Would it be advisable for the courts to intrude upon a plan, carefully
formulated, and apparently working out for the ultimate good of these people?
In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purpose of the Government is evident.
Here, we have on the Island of Mindoro, the Manguianes, leading a nomadic life, making depredations
on their more fortunate neighbors, uneducated in the ways of civilization, and doing nothing for the
advancement of the Philippine Islands. What the Government wished to do by bringing than into a
reservation was to gather together the children for educational purposes, and to improve the health and
morals — was in fine, to begin the process of civilization. this method was termed in Spanish times,
"bringing under the bells." The same idea adapted to the existing situation, has been followed with
reference to the Manguianes and other peoples of the same class, because it required, if they are to be
improved, that they be gathered together. On these few reservations there live under restraint in some
cases, and in other instances voluntarily, a few thousands of the uncivilized people. Segregation really
constitutes protection for the manguianes.
Theoretically, one may assert that all men are created free and equal. Practically, we know that the
axiom is not precisely accurate. The Manguianes, for instance, are not free, as civilized men are free,
and they are not the equals of their more fortunate brothers. True, indeed, they are citizens, with many
but not all the rights which citizenship implies. And true, indeed, they are Filipinos. But just as surely,
the Manguianes are citizens of a low degree of intelligence, and Filipinos who are a drag upon the
progress of the State.
In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the purposes of the Legislature in
enacting the law, and of the executive branch in enforcing it, are again plain. Settlers in Mindoro must
have their crops and persons protected from predatory men, or they will leave the country. It is no
argument to say that such crimes are punished by the Penal Code, because these penalties are
imposed after commission of the offense and not before. If immigrants are to be encouraged to develop
the resources of the great Islands of Mindoro, and its, as yet, unproductive regions, the Government
must be in a position to guarantee peace and order.
Waste lands do not produce wealth. Waste people do not advance the interest of the State. Illiteracy
and thriftlessness are not conducive to homogeneity. The State to protect itself from destruction must
prod on the laggard and the sluggard. The great law of overwhelming necessity is all convincing.
To quote again from the instructive memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior:
Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading the influence of civilization, they (the
manguianes) are engaged in the works of destruction — burning and destroying the forests
and making illegal caiñgins thereon. Not bringing any benefit to the State but instead injuring
and damaging its interests, what will ultimately become of these people with the sort of liberty
they wish to preserve and for which they are now fighting in court? They will ultimately become
a heavy burden to the State and on account of their ignorance they will commit crimes and
make depredations, or if not they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who may
want to abuse them.
There is no doubt in my mind that this people a right conception of liberty and does not
practice liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty as the right to do anything they will —
going from one place to another in the mountains, burning and destroying forests and making
illegal caiñgins thereon.
Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how can they allege that
they are being deprived thereof without due process of law?
But does the Constitutional guaranty that 'no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due
process of law' apply to a class of persons who do not have a correct idea of what liberty is
and do not practise liberty in a rightful way?
To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class of
persons as to what liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar, that the Government should not
adopt any measures looking to the welfare and advancement of the class of persons in
question. It will mean that this people should be let along in the mountains and in a permanent
state of savagery without even the remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in its true
and noble sense.
In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the Government has been
placed in the alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization.
The latter measure was adopted as the one more in accord with humanity and with national
conscience.
The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended more and more
towards the education and civilization of such people and fitting them to be citizens. The
progress of those people under the tutelage of the Government is indeed encouraging and the
signs of the times point to a day which is not far distant when they will become useful citizens.
In the light of what has already been accomplished which has been winning the gratitude of
most of the backward people, shall we give up the noble work simply because a certain
element, believing that their personal interests would be injured by such a measure has come
forward and challenged the authority of the Government to lead this people in the pat of
civilization? Shall we, after expending sweat, treasure, and even blood only to redeem this
people from the claws of ignorance and superstition, now willingly retire because there has
been erroneously invoked in their favor that Constitutional guaranty that no person shall be
deprived of his liberty without due process of law? To allow them to successfully invoke that
Constitutional guaranty at this time will leave the Government without recourse to pursue the
works of civilizing them and making them useful citizens. They will thus left in a permanent
state of savagery and become a vulnerable point to attack by those who doubt, nay challenge,
the ability of the nation to deal with our backward brothers.
The manguianes in question have been directed to live together at Tigbao. There they are
being taught and guided to improve their living conditions. They are being made to understand
that they object of the government is to organize them politically into fixed and permanent
communities. They are being aided to live and work. Their children are being educated in a
school especially established for them. In short, everything is being done from them in order
that their advancement in civilization and material prosperity may be assured. Certainly their
living together in Tigbao does not make them slaves or put them in a condition compelled to do
services for another. They do not work for anybody but for themselves. There is, therefore, no
involuntary servitude.
But they are compelled to live there and prohibited from emigrating to some other places under
penalty of imprisonment. Attention in this connection is invited to the fact that this people, living
a nomadic and wayfaring life, do not have permanent individual property. They move from one
place to another as the conditions of living warrants, and the entire space where they are
roving about is the property of the nation, the greater part being lands of public domain.
Wandering from one place to another on the public lands, why can not the government adopt a
measure to concentrate them in a certain fixed place on the public lands, instead of permitting
them to roam all over the entire territory? This measure is necessary both in the interest of the
public as owner of the lands about which they are roving and for the proper accomplishment of
the purposes and objectives of the government. For as people accustomed to nomadic habit,
they will always long to return to the mountains and follow a wayfaring life, and unless a
penalty is provinced for, you can not make them live together and the noble intention of the
Government of organizing them politically will come to naught.
G. APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION.
Our exhaustive study should have left us in a position to answer specific objections and to reach a
general conclusion.
In the first place, it is argued that the citizen has the right, generally speaking, to go where he pleases.
Could be not, however, be kept away from certain localities ? To furnish an example from the Indian
legislation. The early Act of Congress of 1802 (2 U.S. Stat. at L., p. 141) Indian reservation. Those
citizens certainly did not possess absolute freedom of locomotion. Again the same law provided for the
apprehension of marauding Indians. Without any doubt, this law and other similar were accepted and
followed time and again without question.
It is said that, if we hold this section to be constitutional, we leave this weak and defenseless people
confined as in a prison at the mercy of unscrupulous official. What, it is asked, would be the remedy of
any oppressed Manguian? The answer would naturally be that the official into whose hands are given
the enforcement of the law would have little or not motive to oppress these people; on the contrary, the
presumption would all be that they would endeavor to carry out the purposes of the law intelligently and
patriotically. If, indeed, they did ill-treat any person thus confined, there always exists the power of
removal in the hands of superior officers, and the courts are always open for a redress of grievances.
When, however, only the validity of the law is generally challenged and no particular case of oppression
is called to the attention of the courts, it would seems that the Judiciary should not unnecessarily
hamper the Government in the accomplishment of its laudable purpose.
The question is above all one of sociology. How far, consistently with freedom, may the right and
liberties of the individual members of society be subordinated to the will of the Government? It is a
question which has assailed the very existence of government from the beginning of time. Now purely
an ethical or philosophical subject, nor now to be decided by force, it has been transferred to the
peaceful forum of the Judiciary. In resolving such an issue, the Judiciary must realize that the very
existence of government renders imperatives a power to restrain the individual to some extent,
dependent, of course, on the necessities of the class attempted to be benefited. As to the particular
degree to which the Legislature and the Executive can go in interfering with the rights of the citizen, this
is, and for a along time to come will be, impossible for the courts to determine.
The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of economics and
political theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown as widespread belief in the amplest
possible demonstration of governmental activity. The courts unfortunately have sometimes seemed to
trial after the other two branches of the government in this progressive march.
Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the
Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. it is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a
great malady requires an equally drastic remedy.
Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of
civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general
good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to
our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the law, there exists a law ; the law seems to
be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies
alike to all of a class.
As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which, in case of doubt, would lead to the
determination that section 2145 is valid. it the attitude which the courts should assume towards the
settled policy of the Government. In a late decision with which we are in full accord,
Gambles vs. Vanderbilt University (200 Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of Tennessee writes:
We can seen objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. Every really new question
that comes before the courts is, in the last analysis, determined on that theory, when not determined by
differentiation of the principle of a prior case or line of cases, or by the aid of analogies furnished by
such prior case. In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to tip the scales which the court
believes will best promote the public welfare in its probable operation as a general rule or principle. But
public policy is not a thing inflexible. No court is wise enough to forecast its influence in all possible
contingencies. Distinctions must be made from time to time as sound reason and a true sense of justice
may dictate."
Our attempt at giving a brief history of the Philippines with reference to the so-called non-Christians has
been in vain, if we fail to realize that a consistent governmental policy has been effective in the
Philippines from early days to the present. The idea to unify the people of the Philippines so that they
may approach the highest conception of nationality. If all are to be equal before the law, all must be
approximately equal in intelligence. If the Philippines is to be a rich and powerful country, Mindoro must
be populated, and its fertile regions must be developed. The public policy of the Government of the
Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in
order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as we have said, for their own good
and the good of the country.
Most cautiously should the power of this court to overrule the judgment of the Philippine Legislature, a
coordinate branch, be exercised. The whole tendency of the best considered case is toward non-
interference on the part of the courts whenever political ideas are the moving consideration. Justice
Holmes, in one of the aphorisms for which he is justly famous, said that "constitutional law, like other
mortal contrivances, has to take some chances." (Blinn vs. Nelson [1911], 222 U.S., 1.) If in the final
decision of the many grave questions which this case presents, the courts must take "a chance," it
should be with a view to upholding the law, with a view to the effectuation of the general governmental
policy, and with a view to the court's performing its duty in no narrow and bigoted sense, but with that
broad conception which will make the courts as progressive and effective a force as are the other
departments of the Government.
We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive
a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the
laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery
and involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is
a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not
issue. This is the true ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxes against petitioners. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967
HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his
capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO
D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G.
REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal
Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City
Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro,
Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for
respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin 1 — hereinafter referred to as
Respondents-Prosecutors — several judges2 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges —
issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the
corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons
above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take
possession of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or
intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications
adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution
and the Rules of Court — because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents,
books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3)
the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases
filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the
documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to
be disposed of in accordance with law — on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme
Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending
final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondents-
Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or
any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter,
decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void,
and commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in
accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash
moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and
have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by
petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against
herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition.
However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the
papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are
concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and
seized in the residences of petitioners herein.7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question
may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the
aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality
of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that
said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of
herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said
corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. 8 Indeed, it is well settled that the
legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,9 and
that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of
the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to
above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongsexclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to
the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers were
unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they were
the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants. Next, it is clear that a
question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have been
invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of
defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been
disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when its
violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United
States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of the
evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure does not extend to the personal
defendants but embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A
Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the
aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by
this Court,12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence
against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be settled,
namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the
authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative,
whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners
herein.1äwphï1.ñët
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and
that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this connection,
the Constitution13 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were
issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a
"violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code." In other words, nospecific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof
with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the
judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same
presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal
laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed
by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation
of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," —
as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said
laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the
privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace
officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted —
to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of
keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by
legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants,
that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court 14 by providing
in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court
added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was
compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and
loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations,
whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the
things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the
elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if
the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and
things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation,
however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be
abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule, that the criminal should not
be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has blundered," 16 upon the theory that the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than
the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages against
the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and against
those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without
liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted
the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has
been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may
have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which
itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be
repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a
citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be
secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed
are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and
their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by
the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which
have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same Federal
Court. 20After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of
privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are led
by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official
lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific
guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in
a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by
the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise,
then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and
seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving of mention in a perpetual
charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from state
invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus
with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high
regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that the Court held
in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the
 cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth
Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even
Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when conceded operatively enforceable
against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which
its protection and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and
Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all
constitutionally unreasonable searches — state or federal — it was logically and
constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine — an essential part of the right to
privacy — be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the
Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate
denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence
which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold
otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last
year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to deter — to
compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way — by
removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of
constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that
the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and
that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore
constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise.
Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured
by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any
police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment.
Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the
Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which honest law
enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true
administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a
search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime
by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not
comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such
competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and,
hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification)
for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing
expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or
make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under
consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By agents of the party
in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not
have. Regardless of the handicap under which the minority usually — but, understandably — finds itself
in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and
moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of
the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29,
1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey
Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be
included among the premises considered in said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry
S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the
records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of the corporations above referred to include
personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their exclusive possession and control,
for the exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal
courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over the
aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been
Advanced, notin their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and
Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be
readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the Resolution sought to
be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached
to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either inconsistent
allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for
reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in
support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the cases
relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed, should we agree
thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave
the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned;
that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the
Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal;
that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and
other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the
writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the
aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and
Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs
prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29)
places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement
as to costs.It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 76532 January 26, 1987
DR. FLOR J. LACANILAO, petitioner,
vs.
CAPT. JUAN DE LEON (P.N.), respondent.
FELICIANO, J.:
In this special civil action of quo warranto, petitioner Dr. Flor J. Lacanilao asserts that he is the lawful
holder of the position of Chief of the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center — Aquaculture
Department, and seeks to prevent Juan de Leon, a retired navy captain, from usurping and taking over
or occupying the said office and from exercising the functions and responsibilities of such office.
The Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC) was established by an Agreement that
was signed in Bangkok on 28 December 1967 by the Governments of the following countries: Burma,
Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. 1 The
general purpose of the SEAFDEC is "to contribute to the promotion of the fisheries development in
Southeast Asia," 2 which purpose is to be realized by carrying out the following functions:
(i) to train fisheries technicians of the Southeast Asian countries;
(ii) to study such fisheries techniques as are suited to the fisheries in Southeast Asia;
(iii) to develop fishing grounds and to conduct investigation of fisheries resources and
research in fisheries oceanography in Southeast Asia;
(iv) to collect and analyze information related to the fisheries in Southeast Asia;
(v) to provide the Members with the results of studies and researches by the Center
and other information; and
(vi) to handle other matters related to the functions referred to in (i) to (v) of this
Article. 3
The SEAFDEC has the following principal organs: the Council, where each member government is
represented by one Director and an Alternate Director; the Secretariat, which consists of a Secretary-
General a Deputy Secretary-General and the Secretariat staff; and such Departments as may be
created by the Council. 4 Each Department consists of a Department-Chief, a Deputy Department-Chief
and Department staff. In July 3-7, 1973, the SEAFDEC Council at its sixth meeting held in Kuala
Lumpur, approved the establishment of an Aquaculture Department in the province of Iloilo, Philippines.
The Government of the Philippines has granted certain tax exemption privileges to the Aquaculture
Department of SEAFDEC as well as to foreign (non Philippine) citizens serving on the technical and
scientific staff of the Aquaculture Department. 5
Under Article 6 (2) (vi) of the Agreement Establishing the SEAFDEC, the power to appoint Department-
Chiefs rests in the Council of the SEAFDEC. Article 10 of the Agreement further provides:
xxx xxx xxx
2. The Department-Chief shall be appointed by the Council upon the recommendation
of the government of the member country in whose territory the Department is
located and the Deputy Department-Chief shall be appointed by the Council upon the
recommendation of the government of Japan.
3. The term of office of the Department-Chief and the Deputy Department-Chief shall
be two yearsand they may be re-appointed.
4. The Department staff shall be appointed by the Department-Chief.
... (Emphasis supplied)
Just before and immediately after the February 1986 revolution in the country, the position of
Department-Chief of the Aquaculture Department, SEAFDEC, was held by Dr. Alfredo C. Santiago, Jr.
Dr. Santiago was prevailed upon to withdraw as Chief of the Aquaculture Department and to surrender
his office to the petitioner. By a letter dated 8 April 1986, the Minister of Agriculture and Food, acting "by
authority of the President," nominated the petitioner as Chief of the Aquaculture Department of
SEAFDEC. 6 This recommendation was immediately transmitted to the Secretary-General of
SEAFDEC, who holds office in Bangkok, Thailand.
By an urgent telex dated 8 April 1986 addressed to the petitioner, the Secretary-General of SEAFDEC
acknowledged receipt of the petitioner's "nomination by the President of the Philippines as new Chief for
the SEAFDEC AQD." 7 The Secretary General advised the petitioner, in the same telex that pending
Council approval of his nomination, the petitioner was requested "to serve as [Officer-in-charge] for
AQD effective today" and was authorized "to take necessary actions to ensure orderly transfer of power
in both administration and finance."
By another telex dated 11 April 1986, the Secretary General advised the petitioner that the Secretariat
had received the favorable vote of a majority of the members of the Council, and that, consequently,
under Article 7 (2) of the Agreement Establishing the SEAFDEC, "the appointment of Dr. Flor J.
Lacanilao as AQD Chief [had been] approved by SEAFDEC Council." 8 It appears that the Council was
not then in session and we assume that the members were canvassed by telephone, telex or other
comparable means and their votes obtained or transmitted by the same means. 9
By a letter dated 13 June 1986, the Secretary General formally advised the SEAFDEC Council Director
for Japan (and presumably the Council Directors for the other member countries) that "the Secretariat
has received a unanimous vote for the appointment of Dr. Flor J. Lacanilao as Chief of the SEAFDEC
Aquaculture Department effective 8 April 1986, for a period of two years, as recommended by the
government of the Republic of the Philippines. 10
Accordingly, the petitioner entered upon the discharge of the functions and duties of Chief of the
Aquaculture Department, SEAFDEC and continued to do so from early April 1986. until about 21
November 1986.
On or about 21 November 1986, while Dr. Lacanilao was in Tokyo, Japan attending the annual
SEAFDEC Council meeting, the respondent, attended by groups of retainers and assistants, entered
and took physical possession of the different offices of the Aquaculture Department, SEAFDEC, i.e., its
Manila Liaison Office, its Research Stations in Binangonan, Naujan Tigbauan and Leganes, as well as
its Iloilo Liaison Office. Having physically. occupied the office of the Aquaculture Department, the
respondent instantly undertook to exercise the functions of the Department-Chief, and in the process
took immediate control of all purchases and payments, stopped the issuance of checks, recalled all
motor vehicles assigned to various officers and agencies of the Department, immediately terminated the
services of all consultants of the Department and put his own followers in charge of the various sections
and agencies of the Department.
The petitioners and other previously appointed or designated Aquaculture Department Officers and
employees protested and have opposed and resisted the respondent's assertion of power and physical
occupation of the Aquaculture Department by the respondent and his followers who have refused to
vacate the offices and stations they have physically occupied.
On 25 November 1986, immediately upon his return from Tokyo, Dr. Lacanilao filed in this Court a
sworn Petition for Quo Warranto with prayer for preliminary injunction dated 24 November 1986. In the
afternoon of 26 November 1986, the petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion for a temporary
restraining order, stating that morning, he had been served with summons issued by Judge Eutropio
Migrinio of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 151, in Civil Case No. 54091 entitled "Southeast
Asian Fisheries Development Center — Aquaculture Department, et al. vs. Flor J. Lacanilao," together
with are strainin order issued by the same judge purporting to restrain the petitioner from discharging
the functions and exercising the privileges pertaining to the office of the Chief of the Aquaculture
Department, SEAFDEC, disbursing funds of the Aquaculture Department, using any of its facilities and
vehicles and otherwise acting in his capacity of Chief of the Aquaculture Department.
On 27 November 1986, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Migrinio from
proceeding with Civil Case No. 54091 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 151, and from
implementing and enforcing his restraining order issued in the said civil case, and further restraining the
respondent Capt. Juan de Leon from assuming and/or continuing to exercise the functions of the office
of the Chief of the Aquaculture Department, SEAFDEC, from intimidating the officers and personnel of
the SEAFDEC, in particular the use of armed men in such intimidation, and from occupying and
otherwise intervening in the functions and activities of the Aquaculture Department.
In his Comment filed on 18 December 1986 on the Petition for Quo Warranto in accordance with the
resolution of this Court, the respondent claims that he is entitled to the office of Chief of the Aquaculture
Department, SEAFDEC, by reason of a recommendation in his favor embodied in a letter dated 12
November 1986 signed by the Vice President and Minister for Foreign Affairs and addressed to the
Secretary-General of SEAFDEC. This letter reads as follows:
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines is pleased to submit the
nomination of Juan A. de Leon as Chief of the Aquaculture Department of SEAFDEC
for a two-year term vice Dr. Flor J. Lacanilao. This nomination is being submitted for
consideration in the annual meeting of the SEAFDEC Council of Directors scheduled
in Tokyo next week in accordance with Article 10 of the SEAFDEC Agreement.
The term of Mr. de Leon shall take effect on November 21, 1986. ...
Copies of this letter were apparently sent to the SEAFDEC Council Directors for Japan, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.
In another letter also dated 12 November 1986, addressed to the respondent, the Vice President and
Minister for Foreign Affairs advised him that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
has approved your nomination as Chief of the Aquaculture Department of the
Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC) for a term of two years
starting November 21, 1986.
In accordance with established procedure of the SEAFDEC nomination, this Ministry
has advised the Secretary-General of SEAFDEC regarding your nomination.
You are, therefore, directed to assume the foregoing position effective November 21,
1986, and to request, for this purpose, the assistance of government offices and
agencies concerned.
It was under cover of this letter that the respondent, about nine days later, launched his physical
occupation of the office of the Chief of the Aquaculture Department, with all the planning and dispatch of
a military campaign.
The receipt of the 12 November 1986 nomination of the respondent as Chief of the Aquaculture
Department, SEAFDEC, caused consternation in the SEAFDEC Council meeting in Tokyo, where Dr.
lacanilao was present. Objections were raised and the Courcil refrained from acting on the respondent's
nomination The formal response of the SEAFDEC Council is embodied in a letter dated 21 November
1986 addressed by Mr. K. Kimura, Chairman of the SEAFDEC Council of Directors, to Mr. Juanito B.
Malig, Council Director for the Philippines:
I have the honour to refer to the Secretary-General's letter of 18 November 1986
informing the Council Directors that the Vice President and Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Government of the Philippines has officially submitted, by his letter of 12
November 1986, the nomination of Mr. Juan A. De Leon as Chief of the 9 Aquaculture
Department, effective 21 November 1986.
In this connection, you have mentioned to the Council Members that neither the
President of the Philippines nor the Minister of Agriculture and Food have withdrawn
support for Dr. F.J. Lacanilao, appointed by the Council for a two-year term effective 8
April 1986, as Chief of AQD.
I therefore would like to convey to you the unanimous agreement of the Council
Members asking you to seek further clarification on this matter and inform SEAFDEC
Council accordingly. 11
We note from this letter that the SEAFDEC Council of Directors has not approved the nomination of
respondent as chief of the Aquaculture Department. So far as the records of this case in this Court
show, the SEAFDEC Council has not taken any further action on such nomination.
The recommendation in favor of the respondent must be regarded as legally ineffective for the
fundamental reason that there existed no vacancy to which the respondent could be nominated by the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines and to which the respondent could be appointed by the
SEAFDEC Council. Notwithstanding the insinuations of the respondent, we have no doubt that Dr.
Lacanilao was lawfully entitled to hold the position of the Chief of the Aquaculture Department,
SEAFDEC, as of 21 November 1986 when the respondent and his assistants and retainers introjected
themselves in the offices of the Aquaculture Department. Until the tenure of the petitioner is lawfully
terminated in accordance with the laws and regulations governing such tenure, no nomination for the
same position can be approved and given effect It is clear that the nomination of the respondent for a
position then lawfully filled in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the
SEAFDEC, did not have the effect of removing or otherwise terminating the two-year term of the
petitioner. Thepower to appoint having been vested by Article 6 of the SEAFDEC Agreement in the
Council, the, power to removemust likewise be deemed lodged in the Council, and not in the nominating
member-government. It is worth noting that under Article 6 (2) of the Agreement, the power to
appoint the Department-Chiefs and the Deputy Department-Chiefs cannot be delegated by the Council
to the Secretary-General. It follows, under the present terms of the SEAFDEC Agreement, that
the power to remove cannot similarly be delegated to the Secretary-General.
It has been suggested by the respondent that a nomination by the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines to the office of the Chief of the Aquaculture Department should be regarded as equivalent to
an appointment to such position, upon the ground that "by established diplomatic procedure (sic), the
appointment to be made by the SFAFDEC Council based on such nomination or
recommendation would be merely ministerial as the Council, again by force of international procedure
(sic) could not override or reject such nomination." 12 This suggestion of the respondent is bereft of any
basis in the Agreement Establishing the SEAFDEC and indeed flies in the face of Article 10 (2) of that
Agreement. Under Article 10 (2) of the Agreement, two distinct acts are essential for a Department-
Chief to be lawfully entitled to his position as such: the recommendation of the government of the
member country in whose territory the department is located; and the appointment to such position be
the SEAFDEC Council. The recommendation by the government of the member country must be
accepted by the Council; a Department-Chief must be acceptable to both the host government and the
Council of the SEAFDEC. If it be assumed that the SEAFDEC Council has in the past uniformly
accepted the recommendations of the government of the host member country, that circumstance
assuredly does not mean that the SEAFDEC Council cannot, under its constitutional document, reject
such a recommendation. Neither can it be supposed that the recommendation by the government of the
host member country, by itself and without more, would be sufficient to vest lawful title to the office
concerned. It follows that the recommendation dated 12 November 1986 in favor of the respondent
cannot, in and of itself, be regarded as lawfully authorizing him to assume the office of the Chief of the
Aquaculture Department, SEAFDEC, and to exclude the petitioner from that same office.
WHEREFORE, the respondent is hereby enjoined from assuming the position and from discharging, or
continuing to discharge, directly or indirectly, the powers and functions of the Chief of the Aquaculture
Department, SEAFDEC. All acts, contracts and directives done or issued by the respondent, or by
persons appointed or designated by him, are invalid and ineffective unless adopted or ratified by the
petitioner or other competent authority of the Aquaculture Department, SEAFDEC. The Temporary
Restraining Order we issued on 27 November 1986 is hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.

We hold, accordingly, that the petitioner is entitled to the position of Chief of the Aquaculture
Department, SEAFDEC, for the duration of his term or until that term is otherwise ended conformably
with applicable law, including applicable regulations of the SEAFDEC.

The respondent also argues that the position of Chief of the Aquaculture Department, SEAFDEC, is not
a "public office" and therefore not a proper subject of inquiry in a quo warranto proceeding. The
respondent further asserts that the Aquaculture Department, SEAFDEC, is not a corporation and that
the office of the Chief of the Aquaculture Department is not therefore a corporate position. These
arguments need not detain us for long. It is not necessary for us here to determine the precise nature of
the position of Chief of the Aquaculture Department, SEAFDEC. The SEAFDEC exhibits some of the
features of an intergovernmental organization, albeit of a fairly rudimentary type. Thus, the position of
the Chief of the Aquaculture Department may be assimilated to a position within an intergovernmental
organization. There appears nothing to prevent the petitioner, as the lawful holder of an office within an
international organization having offices within the territory of the Philippines, from seeking the
assistance of the courts of the Philippines in protecting his right to such office against the pretensions of
the respondent. The respondent himself sought the assistance of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig,
Branch 151, by filing a complaint for injunction and damages, in attempting to prevent the petitioner
from continuing to exercise the rights and responsibilities attaching to the position of Chief of the
Aquaculture Department. In his complaint for injunction, the respondent made allegations entirely
analogous to those made in petitioner's Quo Warrantopetition: his own right to the office, and the
defendant's (petitioner herein) lack of right to the same office.

We would note, finally, that the present petition relates to a controversy between two claimants to the
same position; this is not a controversy between the SEAFDEC on the one hand, and an officer or
employee, or a person claiming to be an officer or employee, of the SEAFDEC, on the other hand. G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989
There is before us no question involving immunity from the jurisdiction of the Court, there being no plea
for such immunity whether by or on behalf of SEAFDEC, or by an official of SEAFDEC with the consent DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) and DIRECTOR OF CENTER
of SEAFDEC. FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT, petitioners,
vs.
The present controversy has created considerable confusion and anxiety among the officers and ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as
employees of the Aquaculture Department and threatens the paralization of the important activities, and Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch
dissipation of funds and assets, of that Department. This controversy should be resolved forthwith. In 172, respondents.
the exercise of the broad jurisdiction of this Court and in the interest of prompt and substantial justice,
we treat the petition in this case as a petition for injunction, the respondent's comment as his answer Ramon M. Guevara for private respondent.
thereto and dispose of the case accordingly.
CRUZ, J.:
The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a person who has thrice failed the National
Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again.
The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule that-
h) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3)
successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth
time.
The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds.
But first the facts.
The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science
in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many
times.1 When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the
aforesaid rule. He then went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his
admission to the test.
In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to academic freedom and
quality education. By agreement of the parties, the private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT
scheduled on April 16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his petition. 2 In an amended petition filed with
leave of court, he squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972,
containing the above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection.
After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the challenged order
invalid and granting the petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that the petitioner had been
deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power. 3
We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her decision must be reversed.
In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 4 this Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to
limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and
preparation for a medical education. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano declared for a unanimous Court:
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some
reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for
admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and
safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most
usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the pratice of medicine in all its
branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health
and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of
medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to
practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative
regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass
medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of
governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational
requirements-i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical
school-for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a
legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. What we have before us in
the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to medical schools. MECS
Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation of this
type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of
medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the
medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission,
selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in
the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical
practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in
our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current
state of our social and economic development, are widely known.
We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the
NMAT as a means of achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of
applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical
education in the country." Given the widespread use today of such admission tests in,
for instance, medical schools in the United States of America (the Medical College
Admission Test [MCAT] and quite probably, in other countries with far more
developed educational resources than our own, and taking into account the failure or
inability of the petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold
that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation
and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the
public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who
would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.
However, the respondent judge agreed with the petitioner that the said case was not applicable. Her
reason was that it upheld only the requirement for the admission test and said nothing about the so-
called "three-flunk rule."
We see no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case cannot apply to the case at bar. The issue
raised in both cases is the academic preparation of the applicant. This may be gauged at least initially
by the admission test and, indeed with more reliability, by the three-flunk rule. The latter cannot be
regarded any less valid than the former in the regulation of the medical profession.
There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that the power is
validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to
the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.5
In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and
a lawful method.
The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right
and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by
incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it
arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately
the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a
doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the closer the link,
the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources
and to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be
applied in a manner that will best promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of
satisfaction.
A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. If one who wants to
be a lawyer may prove better as a plumber, he should be so advised and adviced. Of course, he may
not be forced to be a plumber, but on the other hand he may not force his entry into the bar. By the
same token, a student who has demonstrated promise as a pianist cannot be shunted aside to take a
course in nursing, however appropriate this career may be for others.
We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists who should never have left the
farm and engineers who should have studied banking and teachers who could be better as merchants.
It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of education by
directing the student to the course for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and
evaluations. Otherwise, we may be "swamped with mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not
because we are lacking in intelligence but because we are a nation of misfits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated January 13, 1989,
is REVERSED, with costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered.

The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The Constitution also
provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair,
reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements.6

The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those better prepared. Where
even those who have qualified may still not be accommodated in our already crowded medical schools,
there is all the more reason to bar those who, like him, have been tested and found wanting.

The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is not well-taken. A law
does not have to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III,
Section 1 of the Constitution.

There can be no question that a substantial distinction exists between medical students and other
students who are not subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The medical profession directly
affects the very lives of the people, unlike other careers which, for this reason, do not require more
vigilant regulation. The accountant, for example, while belonging to an equally respectable profession,
does not hold the same delicate responsibility as that of the physician and so need not be similarly
treated.

There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and
others who have also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what the equal protection requires
is equality among equals.

The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the G.R. No. L-38969-70 February 9, 1989
Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. The private
respondent has failed the NMAT five times. 7 While his persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love. vs.
FELICIANO MUÑOZ, alias "Tony", et al., accused, MARVIN MILLORA, TOMAS TAYABA, alias
No depreciation is intended or made against the private respondent. It is stressed that a person who "Tamy Tayaba" and JOSE MISLANG, defendants-appellants.
does not qualify in the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for any work or occupation. The only
inference is that he is a probably better, not for the medical profession, but for another calling that has The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
not excited his interest.
Manuel B. Millora for appellant Marvin Millora.
In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the latter, he is more likely to succeed and
may even be outstanding. It is for the appropriate calling that he is entitled to quality education for the
full harnessing of his potentials and the sharpening of his latent talents toward what may even be a Abelardo P. Fermin for appellant Jose Mislang.
brilliant future.
Aquilino D. Baniqued for appellant Tomas Tayaba.
CRUZ, J.:
Of the four persons convicted in this case, one has not appealed and thus impliedly accepted his
sentence. The others have questioned their conviction and insist that they are innocent. The
prosecution did not think so, and neither does the Solicitor General now. The brief for the appellee
would affirm the finding of guilt and in fact even increase the penalty.
The prosecution presented a bizarre case of arbitrary condemnation and instant punishment meted out
by what appear to be the members of a private army. Eleven persons, most of them bodyguards of the
town mayor, went out in a jeep at the behest of one of them who had complained of having been
victimized by cattle rustlers. Having found their supposed quarry, they proceeded to execute each one
of them in cold blood without further ado and without mercy. One was shot in the mouth and died
instantly as his son and daughter looked on in horror. The second was forced to lie down on the ground
and then shot twice, also in the head, before his terrified wife and son. The third, who was only sixteen
years old, was kicked in the head until he bled before he too had his brains blown out. To all
appearances, the unfortunate victims were only innocent farmers and not the dangerous criminals they
were pronounced to be.
Bizarre but true, as the trial court agreed.
Of the eleven persons who were charged with murder in three separate informations, the four who
stood trial were found guilty. 1 The other seven have yet to be identified and tried. The sentence of
Feliciano Muñoz, who did not appeal, has long become final and executory and is now being
served. 2 We deal here only with the appeals of the other convicts, namely, Marvin Millora, Tomas
Tayaba, and Jose Mislang, who all ask for a reversal.
3 correctly pointed out by the trial judge, however, these witnesses were naturally deterred from doing so
The killings occurred in the morning of June 30, 1972, in Balite Sur, San Carlos City, Pangasinan.
As established by the prosecution, Feliciano Muñoz, Marvin Millora, Tomas Tayaba, Jose Mislang, and
the other seven unidentified men went to the house of Mauro Bulatao and asked for the address of his
son Arsenic. All four of them went inside while the rest surrounded the house. All eleven men were
armed. Mauro, who was then bathing his horse, was called by the accused. As he approached and
while under his house, he was met by Millora who simply shot him at arm's length with a "long firearm,"
hitting him in the mouth and killing him as he fell. At that precise time, Muñoz, Tayaba and Mislang were
standing by Millora, evidently giving him armed support. None of them made any move to restrain or
dissuade him. 4
After killing Mauro, the four accused dragged out of the house his sixteen year old son, Aquilino, and
knocked him down. Muñoz kicked him several times in the head as he lay on the ground while the
others looked on in silent approval or at least without objection. They then took the bleeding man with
them to look for their third target, Alejandro Bulatao. 5
In Alejandro's house, the group forced his wife, Juana to go with them and direct them to her husband.
They found him tending to their cows with his son Pedro. Muñoz ordered Alejandro and his wife to lie
down and then, even as Pedro pleaded for his father's life, shot Alejandro twice in the head, killing him
instantly. Millora, Tayaba and Mislang, along with their companions, merely stood by as the brutal act
was committed. Juana watched her husband's death in terror and the 12-year old boy made a
desperate run for his life as one of the accused fired at him and missed. 6
The second victim having been murdered as the first, the accused then vented their violence on
Aquilino, whom Muñoz again brutally kicked as the others looked on. Aquilino was entirely defenseless.
Finally, Muñoz ended the boy's agony and shot him to death, hitting him in the head and body. Muñoz
and Minora then picked up all the empty shells and fled with the rest of their companions, leaving the
terrified Juana with the two grisly corpses. 7
The above events were narrated at the trial by Melecia Bulatao, 8 Mauro's daughter and Aquilino's
sister; Jose Bulatao, 9 Mauro's son and Aquilino's brother; Juana Bulatao, 10 Alejandro's wife; and Pedro
Bulatao, 11 their son. Their testimony was corroborated by Dr. Juanita de Vera, 12 who performed the
autopsy on the three victims.
Melecia and Jose testified on the killing of their father by Marvin Minora as the other accused stood by
and the mauling of their brother Aquilino before he was dragged away by the group. The trial court
especially noted the straightforward account given by Jose, who positively identified Minora as the killer
and described the participation of the others, including the savage kicking of his brother by
Muñoz. 13 Melecia earlier pointed to Mislang as the one who had shot her father but changed her mind
later on cross-examination and named Millora as the actual killer. She explained her turn-about by
confessing that she had earlier agreed to exonerate Minora in exchange for the sum of P3,000.00
promised by his father although she actually did not receive the money. 14 For her part, Juana related
how she was threatened with death unless she accompanied the accused to where her husband was.
She narrated in detail how Alejandro was killed before her very eyes and how Aquilino was later kicked
and then also shot to death, also by Muñoz, while the other accused stood by. 15 Her testimony was
corroborated by Pedro, her son, whom the accused had also thought of killing because he was
"talkative" and indeed was shot at when he successfully escaped after his father's murder. 16
The defense makes much of the fact that it was only months after the killings that it occurred to these
witnesses to denounce the accused and suggests that this delay should impugn their credibility. As
for fear that they would meet the same fate that befell their relatives. These were humble barrio folk
whose timidity did not allow them to report their grievances beyond the barrio officials they knew, more
so since the higher authorities appeared to be indifferent and gave no attention, much less
encouragement, to their complaints.
It is true that there were several inconsistencies in the testimony of these witnesses as painstakingly
pointed out by the appellants, 17 but these are minor flaws that do not detract from the essential
truthfulness of their accounts of the ruthless killings. 18
The brutality of the murders and the veracity of the testimony of the said witnesses are emphasized by
the medical reports 19 of the injuries sustained by the victims, as follows:
Mauro Bulatao:
1. Thru and thru gunshot wound with point of entrance at the upper lip left side around
1 cm. in diameter and with the exit at the middle of the back of the head around 1-1/2
cm. in diameter.
2. Gunshot wound at the lower lip left side of the mouth.
 Alejandro Bulatao:
1. Lacerated gunshot wound at the left eye with the whole eye practically lacerated.
2. Lacerated gunshot wound of the right eye and the forehead practically opened with
the brain tissue outside.
Aquiline Bulatao:
1. Thru and thru gunshot wound with point of entrance at the upper right jaw bone
around 1- 1/2 cm. in diameter and with the exit at the middle of the back of the head
around 2 cm. in diameter.
2. Gunshot wound at the upper left shoulder out the middle of the left clavicle around
1- 1/2 inches in diameter.
The three appellants invoked individual defenses which the trial court correctly rejected as false and
unbelievable. All claimed the Bulataos were killed as a result of an exchange of gunfire with a rather
hazy group and each claimed he was not involved in the shoot-out.
Testifying for Millora on the alleged encounter between the Bulataos and their adversaries, Victoriano
Bacani said that the latter included Tayaba, Mislang and five others who fled from the scene in a
jeep. 20 Graciano Muñoz, corroborating Bacani, said he himself saw seven men in a jeep coming from
the sound of the gunfire after he had paid Mauro P400.00 to redeem his stolen carabao. 21 Another
witness for Millora, Orlando de los Santos, testified to having seen the encounter between the Bulataos
and the other group and declared that the former were armed with carbines and Garand rifles. 22
The trial court rejected Bacani's testimony because he appeared hesitant and suspicious on the stand
and did not give the impression that he was telling the truth. 23 Moreover, it took him all of one year to
report the alleged shooting encounter, which he also did not mention that same afternoon when he
visited Mauro's family to condole with them. 24 It is also not believable that the group would flee because
they had no more bullets when their supposed three adversaries were already dead in the field. The
alleged redemption made by Muñoz was described by the trial court as preposterous, especially since
no shred of evidence had been presented to show that Mauro was a cattle rustler, let alone his 16 year
old son. 25 As for De los Santos, no firearms were discovered beside the dead bodies of the Bulataos,
including Mauro, who was found not in the supposed battleground but under his house, as testified to by
Dr. De Vera. 26
Millora's own defense was that he was in Dagupan City at the time of the killings, having gone there in
the evening of June 29, 1972. He claimed he had stayed there overnight with a female companion after
drinking beer with Atty. Antonio Resngit returning to San Carlos City only between 8 and 9 o'clock the
following morning or June 30, 1972.27 The lawyer corroborated him, 28 but he cannot be more credible
than Mauro's own children, Jose and Melecia, who positively identified Millora as the person who
actually shot their father in the face and killed him instantly. Such a traumatic experience could not have
been forgotten by these witnesses who saw their father murdered without warning or mercy nor could
their memory of the heartless killer have been easily wiped out from their minds.
It is stressed that Juana Bulatao and her son Pedro also categorically declared that Millora was with the
group that she took to the field where her husband and Aquilino were killed by Muñoz. 29
Tayaba and Mislang offered a common defense, also of alibi. Both claimed that Mislang having
complained of cattle rustlers, a group of policemen, including Tayaba, stayed in the former's house the
whole night of June 29, 1972, leaving only at 8 o'clock the following morning of June 30, 1972, after
Mislang had served them breakfast. 30Significantly, however, barrio Bacnar where Mislang's house was
located, is only two kilometers from Balite Sur. 31Moreover, the trial court doubted the testimony given
by Sgt. Lomibao, who corroborated them and spoke of having heard the gunfire narrated by Millora's
witnesses. The decision noted that Lomibao was mysteriously absent when the police chief and Dr. de
Vera went to the scene of the crime at 9 o'clock that morning to investigate the killings. In fact, it
expressed the suspicion that Lomibao and Patrolman Liwanag, who also testified for the accused, might
have been among the seven unidentified persons who were with Muñoz and the three appellants herein
when the Bulataos were murdered. 32
All told, we affirm the findings of the trial judge, who had the opportunity to observe the witnesses at the
trial and assess their credibility. As we said in a previous case:
We see no reason to reverse the factual findings of the trial judge, who had the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and to assess their credibility.
The written record will not show that nuance of tone or voice, the meaningful contrast
between the hesitant pause and the prompt reply, and the expression or color or tilt of
face that will affirm the truth or expose the fabrication. All these subtle factors could
be considered by the trial judge in weighing the conflicting declarations before him,
and we do not find that he has erred. 33
We agree that the three appellants, together with Muñoz and their seven other companions, participated
in the killings of the three Bulataos in the manner described by the witnesses for the prosecution. The
defenses of the herein appellants should be, as they properly were, rejected as undeserving of belief in
the light of the more convincing and telling evidence submitted by the government.
However, we do not accept the different degrees of participation assigned by the court a quo to each of
the appellants in each of the three offenses imputed to them. In Criminal Case No. 0176, Millora was
found guilty as principal and Muñoz and the other two herein appellants only as accomplices, and in
Criminal Case Nos. 0177 and 0178, Muñoz was found guilty as principal and the herein appellants only
as accomplices. 34 In support of this finding, the trial court said that there was no evidence of conspiracy
to justify holding each of the accused equally liable for the three murders.
We hold that there was. Indeed, it is clear that from the very start, when the eleven men went out to look
for the suspected cattle rustlers, there was already an agreement among them to ferret out and punish
the Bulataos whom they had condemned beforehand. They knew whom they were looking for. They
knew where to look for them. They sought each of them with drawn and ready weapons. When they
reached Mauro Bulatao's house, four of them went inside while the rest deployed themselves in
strategic positions. When Millora shot Mauro, the appellants and the others stood by with guns at the
ready. Nobody moved to dissuade or stop him. Together they dragged Aquilino from the house and the
rest watched while Muñoz kicked him in the head while helpless on the ground. Together, they took him
with them and then forced Juana Bulatao to lead them to her husband. The rest stood by with their
weapons as Muñoz shot Alejandro in the head. No one interceded to stop him from also killing Aquilino.
There is no question that the group moved in concert, pursuing a common design previously agreed
upon, that made each of them part of a conspiracy. 35 As such, each of them is liable in equal degree
with the others for each of the three killings. Each member of the conspiracy to commit the crime of
murder is guilty as a co-principal, regardless of who actually pulled the trigger that killed the three
victims. It is settled that in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. 36
Each of the three killings constituted the crime of murder, qualified by alevosia. There was treachery
because every one of the three victims was completely helpless and defenseless when shot and killed
by the accused with no risk to themselves. Mauro was completely taken by surprise when he was shot
in the face. Alejandro was lying down when he was shot in the head. Aquilino was seated when he was
shot in the head and shoulders. None of the three victims had a chance to resist.
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death, but this was modified by Article III, Section 19(l) of the 1987 Constitution
providing as follows:
Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
inflicted Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty
already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
Conformably, the Court has since February 2, 1987 not imposed the death penalty whenever it was
called for under the said article but instead reduced the same to reclusion perpetua as mandated by the
above provision. The maximum period of the penalty was thus in effect lowered to the medium, the
same period applied, as before, where the offense was not attended by any modifying circumstance,
with the minimum period, i. e., reclusion temporal maximum, being still applicable in all other cases. The
three-grade scheme of the original penalty, including death, was thus maintained except that the
maximum period was not imposed because of the constitutional prohibition.
In People v. Gavarra 37 Justice Pedro L. Yap declared for the Court that "in view of the abolition of the
death penalty under Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the penalty that may be imposed for
murder isreclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua" thereby eliminating death as
the original maximum period. Later, without categorically saying so, the Court, through Justice
Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera in People v. Masangkay 38 and through Justice Andres R. Narvasa
in People v. Atencio 39 divided the modified penalty into three new periods, the limits of which were
specified by Justice Edgardo L. Paras in People v. Intino, 40 as follows: the lower half of reclusion
temporal maximum as the minimum; the upper half of reclusion temporal maximum as the medium;
and reclusion perpetua as the maximum.
The Court has reconsidered the above cases and, after extended discussion, come to the conclusion
that the doctrine announced therein does not reflect the intention of the framers as embodied in Article
III, Section 19(l) of the Constitution. This conclusion is not unanimous, to be sure. Indeed, there is much
to be said of the opposite view, which was in fact shared by many of those now voting for its reversal.
The majority of the Court, however, is of the belief that the original interpretation should be restored as
the more acceptable reading of the constitutional provision in question.
The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution abolished the death penalty and
thereby limited the penalty for murder to the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium.
These should now be divided into three new periods in keeping with the three-grade scheme intended
by the legislature. Those who disagree feel that Article III, Section 19(l) merely prohibits the imposition
of the death penalty and has not, by reducing it to reclusion perpetua, also correspondingly reduced the
remaining penalties. These should be maintained intact.
A reading of Section 19(l) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein which
expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty
shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter
provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language, while
rather awkward, is still plain enough. And it is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language
under consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the
records of the constitutional convention, for its interpretation. 41
At that, the Court finds that such resort, even if made, would not be of much assistance either in the
case at bar. Accepting arguendo that it was the intention of the framers to abolish the death penalty, we
are still not convinced from the debates in the Constitutional Commission that there was also a
requirement to adjust the two remaining periods by dividing them into three shorter periods. This is not a
necessary consequence of the provision as worded. The following exchange cited by those in favor
of Masangkay is at best thought-provoking but not decisive of the question:
FR. BERNAS: The effect is the abolition of the death penalty from those statutes-only the death
penalty. The statute is not abolished, but the penalty is abolished.
MR. MAAMBONG: That is what I am worried about, because the statutes, especially in the
General Criminal Law, which is the Revised Penal Code, do not necessarily punish directly with
death. Sometimes it has a range of reclusion temporal to death or reclusion perpetua to death.
And what would be the effect on the judges, for example, if the range is reclusion temporal to
death and he can no longer impose the death penalty? He will have difficulty in computing the
degrees.
Could the committee enlighten us on how the judge will look at the specific situation.
FR. BERNAS: I grant that the judges will have difficulty, but I suppose that the judges will be
equal to their tasks. The only thing is, if there is a range, the range cannot go as far as death
(Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. I, 749).
FR. BERNAS: Certainly, the penalties lower than death remain.
MR. REGALADO: That would be reclusion perpetua. But the range of the penalty for murder
consists of three periods. The maximum period of reclusion temporal under the present status is
the minimum period for the penalty for murder. The medium period isreclusion perpetua. The
maximum period is death. If we now remove the death penalty, we will, therefore, have a range
of penalty of 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion temporal up to reclusion
perpetua. You cannot divide reclusion perpetua into two. While it has a duration of 30 years, it is
an indivisible penalty. Where do we get the medium period now until such time that Congress
gets around to accommodate this amendment?
FR. BERNAS: As I said, this is a matter which lawyers can argue with judges about. All we are
saying is, the judges cannot impose the death penalty (Record, CONCOM July 18, 1986, Vol. I,
p. 750).
So there we have it — "this is a matter which lawyers can argue with judges about." Assuming that
Commissioner Bernas's answer reflected the consensus of the body, we are still not persuaded that it
was the intention of the framers to lower not only the maximum period but also the other periods of the
original penalty. That is not necessarily inferable from his statement that "the judges will be equal to
their task," especially so since he also said and we think with more definiteness-that "all we are
saying is that the judges cannot impose the death penalty" (Emphasis supplied). We understand this to
mean that they were not saying more.
The question as we see it is not whether the framers intended to abolish the death penalty or merely to
prevent its imposition. Whatever the intention was, what we should determine is whether or not they
also meant to require a corresponding modification in the other periods as a result of the prohibition
against the death penalty.
It is definite that such a requirement, if there really was one, is not at all expressed in Article III, Section
19(l) of the Constitution or indicated therein by at least clear and unmistakable implication. It would have
been so easy, assuming such intention, to state it categorically and plainly, leaving no doubt as to its
meaning. One searches in vain for such a statement, express or even implied. The writer of this opinion
makes the personal observation that this might be still another instance where the framers meant one
thing and said another-or strangely, considering their loquacity elsewhere — did not say enough.
The original ruling as applied in the Gavarra, Masangkay, Atencio and Intino cases represented the
unanimous thinking of the Court as it was then constituted. All but two members 42 at that time still sit on
the Court today. If we have seen fit to take a second look at the doctrine on which we were all agreed
before, it is not because of a change in the composition of this body. It is virtually the same Court that is
changing its mind after reflecting on the question again in the light of new perspectives. And well it
might, and can, for the tenets it lays down are not immutable. The decisions of this Court are not
petrified rules grown rigid once pronounced but vital, growing things subject to change as all life is.
While we are told that the trodden path is best, this should not prevent us from opening a fresh trial or
exploring the other side or testing a new idea in a spirit of continuing inquiry.
others. The award of civil indemnity for the heirs of each of the victims is affirmed but the amount
thereof is hereby increased to P30,000.00 in line with the present policy.
It remains to observe that the crimes inflicted upon the humble farmers would have remained
unpunished were it not for the vigilance of certain responsible officials, especially the police and the
prosecuting officer, who took up the cudgels for the victims' families. The courage and
conscientiousness they displayed are still the most potent weapons against those who, in their
arrogance, believe that they can flout the law and frustrate justice because they have the protection of
powerful patrons.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is MODIFIED and all the accused-appellants are hereby declared
guilty as principals in Criminal Case Nos. 0176, 0177 and 0178. Each of them is sentenced to suffer
three (3) penalties ofreclusion perpetua, and to pay solidarily to the heirs of their victims civil indemnity
in the sum of P30,000.00 for each of the deceased, or a total indemnity of P90,000.00, with costs.
SO ORDERED.

Accordingly, with the hope that "as judges, (we) will be equal to (our) tasks," whatever that means, we
hereby reverse the current doctrine providing for three new periods for the penalty for murder as
reduced by the Constitution. Instead, we return to our original interpretation and hold that Article III,
Section 19(l) does not change the periods of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code except only insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion
perpetua. The range of the medium and minimum penalties remains unchanged.

The Court relies that this interpretation may lead to certain inequities that would not have arisen under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code before its modification. Thus, a person originally subject to the
death penalty and another who committed the murder without the attendance of any modifying
circumstance will now be both punishable with the same medium period although the former is
concededly more guilty than the latter. True enough. But that is the will not of this Court but of the
Constitution. That is a question of wisdom, not construction. Of some relevance perhaps is the parable
in the Bible of the workman who was paid the stipulated daily wage of one penny although he had
worked longer than others hired later in the day also paid the same amount. When he complained
because he felt unjustly treated by the householder, the latter replied: "Friend, I do you no wrong. Did G.R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987
you not agree with me for a penny?'
ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA, petitioners,
The problem in any event is addressed not to this Court but to the Congress. Penalties are prescribed
vs.
by statute and are essentially and exclusively legislative. As judges, we can only interpret and apply
SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, AND
them and have no authority to modify them or revise their range as determined exclusively by the
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET,
legislature. We should not encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking body.
respondents, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, intervenor.
Coming back to the case at bar, we find that there being no generic aggravating or mitigating
circumstance attending the commission of the offenses, the applicable sentence is the medium period
of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code which, conformably to the new
doctrine here adopted and announced, is still reclusion perpetua. This is the penalty we impose on all PADILLA, J.:
the accused-appellants for each of the three murders they have committed in conspiracy with the
Once more the Court is called upon to delineate constitutional boundaries. In this petition for prohibition,
the petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison from performing the
functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the respondent Guillermo
Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of
Mison's salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of respondent
Mison's appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
Because of the demands of public interest, including the need for stability in the public service, the
Court resolved to give due course to the petition and decide, setting aside the finer procedural
questions of whether prohibition is the proper remedy to test respondent Mison's right to the Office of
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and of whether the petitioners have a standing to bring this
suit.
By the same token, and for the same purpose, the Court allowed the Commission on Appointments to
intervene and file a petition in intervention. Comment was required of respondents on said petition. The
comment was filed, followed by intervenor's reply thereto. The parties were also heard in oral argument
on 8 December 1987.
This case assumes added significance because, at bottom line, it involves a conflict between two (2)
great departments of government, the Executive and Legislative Departments. It also occurs early in the
life of the 1987 Constitution.
The task of the Court is rendered lighter by the existence of relatively clear provisions in the
Constitution. In cases like this, we follow what the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice (later, Chief
Justice) Jose Abad Santos stated inGold Creek Mining Corp. vs. Rodriguez, 1 that:
The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of
the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which
force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional
provisions themselves.
The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions, not in accordance with how the
executive or the legislative department may want them construed, but in accordance with what they say
and provide.
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution says:
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of
other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the
departments, agencies, commissions or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective
only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.
It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just quoted, there are four (4)
groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter
refer from time to time, are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; 2
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law; 3
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in
the President alone.
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. 5
The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of contention. Should they be
appointed by the President with or without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments? By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an
express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those
appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments. But we need not rely solely on this basic rule of constitutional
construction. We can refer to historical background as well as to the records of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission to determine, with more accuracy, if not precision, the intention of the framers of the 1987
Constitution and the people adopting it, on whether the appointments by the President, under the
second, third and fourth groups, require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
Again, in this task, the following advice of Mr. Chief Justice J. Abad Santos in Gold Creek is apropos:
In deciding this point, it should be borne in mind that a constitutional provision must
be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and understanding of prior
and existing laws and with reference to them. "Courts are bound to presume that the
people adopting a constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon
the subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon which they express their
judgment and opinion in its adoption." (Barry vs. Truax 13 N.D., 131; 99 N.W., 769,65
L. R. A., 762.) 6
It will be recalled that, under Sec. 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, it is provided that —
xxx xxx xxx
 (3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus,
officers of the army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank
of captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of
inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments.
(4) The President shall havethe power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
xxx xxx xxx
(7) ..., and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls ...
Upon the other hand, the 1973 Constitution provides that-
Section 10. The President shall appoint the heads of bureaus and offices, the officers
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from the rank of Brigadier General or
Commodore, and all other officers of The government whose appointments are not
herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. However, the Batasang Pambansa may by law vest in the Prime Minister,
members of the Cabinet, the Executive Committee, Courts, Heads of Agencies,
Commissions, and Boards the power to appoint inferior officers in their respective
offices.
Thus, in the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments required the consent (confirmation)
of the Commission on Appointments. It is now a sad part of our political history that the power of
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, under the 1935 Constitution, transformed that
commission, many times, into a venue of "horse-trading" and similar malpractices.
On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in which it was
molded and remolded by successive amendments, placed the absolute power of appointment in the
President with hardly any check on the part of the legislature.
Given the above two (2) extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and the other, in the 1973 Constitution,
it is not difficult for the Court to state that the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting
it, struck a "middle ground" by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments
for the first group of appointments and leaving to the President, without such confirmation, the
appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the second and third groups as well as those in the fourth
group, i.e., officers of lower rank.
The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission support this conclusion. The original text of
Section 16, Article VII, as proposed by the Committee on the Executive of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, read as follows:
Section 16. The president shall nominate and, with the consent of a Commission on
Appointment, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from
the rank of colonel or naval captain and all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may by law vest the appointment of
inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments 7 [Emphasis supplied].
The above text is almost a verbatim copy of its counterpart provision in the 1935 Constitution. When the
frames discussed on the floor of the Commission the proposed text of Section 16, Article VII, a feeling
was manifestly expressed to make the power of the Commission on Appointments over presidential
appointments more limited than that held by the Commission in the 1935 Constitution. Thus-
Mr. Rama: ... May I ask that Commissioner Monsod be recognized
The President: We will call Commissioner Davide later.
Mr. Monsod: With the Chair's indulgence, I just want to take a few
minutes of our time to lay the basis for some of the amendments
that I would like to propose to the Committee this morning.
xxx xxx xxx
On Section 16, I would like to suggest that the power of the Commission on
Appointments be limited to the department heads, ambassadors, generals and so on
but not to the levels of bureau heads and colonels.
xxx xxx xxx 8 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the course of the debates on the text of Section 16, there were two (2) major changes proposed and
approved by the Commission. These were (1) the exclusion of the appointments of heads of
bureaus from the requirement of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and (2) the
exclusion of appointments made under the second sentence 9 of the section from the same
requirement. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission show the following:
MR. ROMULO: I ask that Commissioner Foz be recognized
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Foz is recognized
MR. FOZ: Madam President, my proposed amendment is on page
7, Section 16, line 26 which is to delete the words "and bureaus,"
and on line 28 of the same page, to change the phrase 'colonel or
naval captain to MAJOR GENERAL OR REAR ADMIRAL. This last
amendment which is co-authored by Commissioner de Castro is to
put a period (.) after the word ADMIRAL, and on line 29 of the same
page, start a new sentence with: HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT, et
cetera.
 MR. REGALADO: May we have the amendments one by one. The
first proposed amendment is to delete the words "and bureaus" on
line 26.
MR. FOZ: That is correct.
MR. REGALADO: For the benefit of the other Commissioners, what
would be the justification of the proponent for such a deletion?
MR. FOZ: The position of bureau director is actually quite low in the
executive department, and to require further confirmation of
presidential appointment of heads of bureaus would subject them to
political influence.
MR. REGALADO: The Commissioner's proposed amendment by
deletion also includes regional directors as distinguished from
merely staff directors, because the regional directors have quite a
plenitude of powers within the regions as distinguished from staff
directors who only stay in the office.
MR. FOZ: Yes, but the regional directors are under the
supervisiopn of the staff bureau directors.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MAAMBONG: May I direct a question to Commissioner Foz?
The Commissioner proposed an amendment to delete 'and bureaus
on Section 16. Who will then appoint the bureau directors if it is not
the President?
MR. FOZ: It is still the President who will appoint them but their
appointment shall no longer be subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
MR. MAAMBONG: In other words, it is in line with the same answer
of Commissioner de Castro?
MR. FOZ: Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Is this clear now? What is the reaction of the
Committee?
xxx xxx xxx
MR. REGALADO: Madam President, the Committee feels that this
matter should be submitted to the body for a vote.
MR. DE CASTRO: Thank you.
MR. REGALADO: We will take the amendments one by one. We
will first vote on the deletion of the phrase 'and bureaus on line 26,
such that appointments of bureau directors no longer need
confirmation by the Commission on Appointment.
Section 16, therefore, would read: 'The President shall nominate, and with the
consent of a Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to delete the phrase 'and
bureaus' on page 7, line 26? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the
amendments is approved.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. ROMULO: Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT: The Acting Floor Leader is recognized.
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Foz is recognized
MR. FOZ: Madam President, this is the third proposed amendment
on page 7, line 28. 1 propose to put a period (.) after 'captain' and
on line 29, delete 'and all' and substitute it with HE SHALL ALSO
APPOINT ANY.
MR. REGALADO: Madam President, the Committee accepts the
proposed amendment because it makes it clear that those other
officers mentioned therein do not have to be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments.
MR. DAVIDE: Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Davide is recognized.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. DAVIDE: So would the proponent accept an amendment to his
amendment, so that after "captain" we insert the following words:
AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE
VESTED IN HIM IN THIS CONSTITUTION?
 FR. BERNAS: It is a little vague.
MR. DAVIDE: In other words, there are positions provided for in the
Constitution whose appointments are vested in the President, as a
matter of fact like those of the different constitutional commissions.
FR. BERNAS: That is correct. This list of officials found in Section
16 is not an exclusive list of those appointments which
constitutionally require confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments,
MR. DAVIDE: That is the reason I seek the incorporation of the
words I proposed.
FR. BERNAS: Will Commissioner Davide restate his proposed
amendment?
MR. DAVIDE: After 'captain,' add the following: AND OTHER
OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN HIM IN
THIS CONSTITUTION.
FR. BERNAS: How about:"AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE
APPOINTMENTS REQUIRE CONFIRMATION UNDER THIS
CONSTITUTION"?
MR. DAVIDE: Yes, Madam President, that is modified by the
Committee.
FR. BERNAS: That will clarify things.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Committee accept?
MR. REGALADO: Just for the record, of course, that excludes
those officers which the Constitution does not require confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments, like the members of the
judiciary and the Ombudsman.
MR. DAVIDE: That is correct. That is very clear from the
modification made by Commissioner Bernas.
THE PRESIDENT: So we have now this proposed amendment of
Commissioners Foz and Davide.
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to this proposed
amendment of Commissioners Foz and Davide as accepted by the
Committee? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendment, as
amended, is approved 10 (Emphasis supplied).
It is, therefore, clear that appointments to the second and third groups of officers can
be made by the President without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments.
It is contended by amicus curiae, Senator Neptali Gonzales, that the second sentence
of Sec. 16, Article VII reading-
He (the President) shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
with particular reference to the word "also," implies that the President shall "in like manner" appoint the
officers mentioned in said second sentence. In other words, the President shall appoint the officers
mentioned in said second sentence in the same manner as he appoints officers mentioned in the first
sentence, that is, by nomination and with the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments.
Amicus curiae's reliance on the word "also" in said second sentence is not necessarily supportive of the
conclusion he arrives at. For, as the Solicitor General argues, the word "also" could mean "in addition;
as well; besides, too" (Webster's International Dictionary, p. 62, 1981 edition) which meanings could, on
the contrary, stress that the word "also" in said second sentence means that the President, in
addition to nominating and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appointing the
officers enumerated in the first sentence, can appoint (without such consent (confirmation) the officers
mentioned in the second sentence-
Rather than limit the area of consideration to the possible meanings of the word "also" as used in the
context of said second sentence, the Court has chosen to derive significance from the fact that the first
sentence speaks of nomination by the President and appointment by the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments, whereas, the second sentence speaks only of appointment by the
President. And, this use of different language in two (2) sentences proximate to each other underscores
a difference in message conveyed and perceptions established, in line with Judge Learned Hand's
observation that "words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition" but, more so, because the recorded
proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission clearly and expressly justify such differences.
As a result of the innovations introduced in Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are
officers whose appointments require no confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, even if such
officers may be higher in rank, compared to some officers whose appointments have to be confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments under the first sentence of the same Sec. 16, Art. VII. Thus, to
illustrate, the appointment of the Central Bank Governor requires no confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, even if he is higher in rank than a colonel in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or a
consul in the Consular Service.
But these contrasts, while initially impressive, merely underscore the purposive intention and deliberate
judgment of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that, except as to those officers whose appointments
require the consent of the Commission on Appointments by express mandate of the first sentence in
Sec. 16, Art. VII, appointments of other officers are left to the President without need of confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments. This conclusion is inevitable, if we are to presume, as we must, that
the framers of the 1987 Constitution were knowledgeable of what they were doing and of the foreseable
effects thereof.
Besides, the power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Limitations on or
qualifications of such power should be strictly construed against them. Such limitations or qualifications
must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. But, it is only in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII
where it is clearly stated that appointments by the President to the positions therein enumerated require
the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
As to the fourth group of officers whom the President can appoint, the intervenor Commission on
Appointments underscores the third sentence in Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which
reads:
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. [Emphasis supplied].
and argues that, since a law is needed to vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the
President alone, this implies that, in the absence of such a law, lower-ranked officers have to be
appointed by the President subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and, if this is
so, as to lower-ranked officers, it follows that higher-ranked officers should be appointed by the
President, subject also to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
The respondents, on the other hand, submit that the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, abovequoted,
merely declares that, as to lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment in the
President, in the courts, or in the heads of the various departments, agencies, commissions, or boards
in the government. No reason however is submitted for the use of the word "alone" in said third
sentence.
The Court is not impressed by both arguments. It is of the considered opinion, after a careful study of
the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the use of the word alone" after the word
"President" in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is, more than anything else, a slip or lapsus in
draftmanship. It will be recalled that, in the 1935 Constitution, the following provision appears at the end
of par. 3, section 1 0, Article VII thereof —
...; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments. [Emphasis supplied].
The above provision in the 1935 Constitution appears immediately after the provision which makes
practically all presidential appointments subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments,
thus-
3. The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus,
officers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank
of captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not herein provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by
law to appoint; ...
In other words, since the 1935 Constitution subjects, as a general rule, presidential appointments to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, the same 1935 Constitution saw fit, by way of an
exception to such rule, to provide that Congress may, however, by law vest the appointment of inferior
officers (equivalent to 11 officers lower in rank" referred to in the 1987 Constitution) in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed out, the clear and expressed intent of its framers
was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments,
except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII.
Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the word "alone"
after the word "President" in providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked
officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments, because the power to
appoint officers whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in the
President, without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in the second sentence of
the same Sec. 16, Article VII.
Therefore, the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII could have stated merely that, in the case of lower-
ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the
heads of various departments of the government. In short, the word "alone" in the third sentence of Sec.
16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, as a literal import from the last part of par. 3, section 10, Article
VII of the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of the second sentence of Sec. 16,
Article VII. And, this redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive intent of the framers of the
1987 Constitution that presidential appointments, except those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec.
16, Article VII, are not subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Coming now to the immediate question before the Court, it is evident that the position of Commissioner
of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments
where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as already
pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution includes "heads of bureaus" among those officers whose
appointments need the consent of the Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution on the other
hand, deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs. The original text of Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, otherwise known as the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines, which was enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on 22 June
1957, reads as follows:
601. Chief Officials of the Bureau.-The Bureau of Customs shall have one chief and
one assistant chief, to be known respectively as the Commissioner (hereinafter
known as the 'Commissioner') and Assistant Commissioner of Customs, who shall
each receive an annual compensation in accordance with the rates prescribed by
existing laws. The Assistant Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed by the
proper department head.
Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, was amended on 27 October 1972 by Presidential Decree No. 34,
amending the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. Sec. 601, as thus amended, now reads as
follows:
 Sec. 601. Chief Officials of the Bureau of Customs.-The Bureau of Customs shall
have one chief and one assistant chief, to be known respectively as the
Commissioner (hereinafter known as Commissioner) and Deputy Commissioner of
Customs, who shall each receive an annual compensation in accordance with the
rates prescribed by existing law. The Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of
Customs shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines (Emphasis supplied.)

Of course, these laws (Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34) were approved during the effectivity of the
1935 Constitution, under which the President may nominate and, with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus, like the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs.

After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34 have to be
read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the appointment of the Commissioner
of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the President, as an appointment he is authorizedby
law to make, such appointment, however, no longer needs the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments.

Consequently, we rule that the President of the Philippines acted within her constitutional authority and
power in appointing respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, without
submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. He is thus entitled to
exercise the full authority and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments
pertaining thereto.

WHEREFORE, the petition and petition in intervention should be, as they are, hereby DISMISSED.
Without costs.

SO ORDERED.