Midwest Political Science Association 66th Annual Conference

April 3-6, 2008

Chicago, IL

The Role of Informal Institutions in U.S. Immigration Policy Implementation:

The Case of Illegal Labor Migration from Kyrgyzstan

Saltanat Liebert, Ph.D.

Assistant Professor
L. Douglas Wilder School of Government & Public Affairs
Virginia Commonwealth University
Scherer Hall, Office 313
PO Box 842028
923 W. Franklin Street
Richmond, VA 23284-2019
Phone: (804) 828-1874
E-mail: sliebert@vcu.edu

DRAFT

Comments and critique are welcome:

please refer them to the author at sliebert@vcu.edu
The Role of Informal Institutions in U.S. Immigration Policy Implementation:
The Case of Illegal Labor Migration from Kyrgyzstan

Abstract:

Politicians, scholars and citizens alike pronounce the U.S. immigration policy to be

“broken” as the number of illegal immigrants has reached 11 million. Why is the immigration

policy in crisis? This article argues that informal institutions involved in migration processes,

such as migrant trafficking networks, can explain much of the crisis. It examines the influence of

informal institutions on the effectiveness of immigration policy based on a case study of labor

migration from Kyrgyzstan to the United States. This project embraces a case study research

method relying on multiple data sources, including in-depth semi-structured interviews with

labor migrants, migration intermediaries, migration officials and American consular personnel,

and analysis of migration laws of the United States and Kyrgyzstan. This research finds that

while informal institutions undermine the implementation of immigration policies, they also have

a positive effect substituting for ineffective formal institutions such as childcare and elderly care.

2
The Role of Informal Institutions in U.S. Immigration Policy Implementation:
The Case of Illegal Labor Migration from Kyrgyzstan
Immigration is an acute and sensitive topic on the U.S. political, social and economic

agenda. It has been a subject of heated debates, rendering the country drastically divided on this

matter. Proponents of immigration equate it to the civil rights issue (Bernstein 2006), while

opponents cite the alleged burden of illegal immigration on public education, Medicare,

Medicaid and public welfare of the United States. Due to globalization and the end of the Cold

War people are on the move as never before. Millions of individuals from poor countries migrate

to richer ones in an effort to provide for themselves and their families both through legal

channels, and in their absence, illegal ones.

In general, the United States has strict immigration policies; it has been enforcing existing

measures and introducing new ones, including a construction of a fence along Mexico-U.S.

border, to curb illegal migration into the country. However, the number of irregular labor

migrants from various countries has not decreased and seems to be only increasing. Politicians,

scholars and citizens alike pronounce the immigration policy to be “broken” as the number of

illegal immigrants has reached 11 million (Papademetriou 2005). Why is the immigration policy

(and its implementation) in crisis? This article argues that informal institutions involved in

migration processes, such as migrant trafficking networks, can explain much of the crisis.

U S. Immigration Policy

At present, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952 and its numerous

amendments passed since then regulate legal labor migration into the United States.

Opportunities for migration for highly skilled professionals and unskilled workers vary

significantly. Well-educated foreign nationals, who speak fluent English and have skills readily

transferable into the U.S. labor market, can legally migrate to the United States for labor via non-

3
immigrant temporary employment visas. Legal avenues for migration of unskilled laborers or of

workers, whose skills are not readily transferable to the American labor market, are much more

limited. There are presently only two categories of visas available to unskilled workers. The first

visa category, H-2A Agricultural Worker visa, allows foreign agricultural workers to come to the

United States for temporary or seasonal work. There is no annual cap for agricultural seasonal

workers, who are mostly used by American employers for “perishable-crop” jobs such as

harvesting vegetables and picking fruit. To bring in foreign workers to the United States under

this visa, the employers must petition the Department of Labor. Even though almost all H-2A

certifications are approved by the Department of Labor, the process is so cumbersome and the

necessary certifications are often issued late, after the peak harvest season, that many employers

choose not to go through the process (Waller Meyers 2006). In addition, the H-2A worker

program is highly regulated and requires that the employers provide free transportation, housing

and meals, and pay the migrant workers wages prescribed by the authorities. It is likely that some

unscrupulous employers prefer to hire undocumented workers with no authorization for

employment in the United States, who are thus more vulnerable to exploitation.

The second visa category available to labor migrants sponsored by American employers

is H-2B, Skilled or Unskilled Worker visa. It allows skilled and unskilled foreign workers to

work in the United States to meet temporary or seasonal non-agricultural needs of employers.

Both the job and the worker have to be of temporary nature and workers have to return to their

home country after 6 months in the United States. The employers have to show that qualified

U.S. workers are not available for these jobs and have to file a petition with the Department of

Labor. The annual cap for non-agricultural skilled or unskilled workers is 66,000. This number

4
falls significantly short of the estimated 400,000-500,000 unskilled workers that the U.S.

employers need (Smith 2006).

There is practically no way for unskilled workers to migrate to the U.S. for labor through

legal channels unless sponsored by American employers. Many employers find the official

process extremely cumbersome and prefer to hire illegal migrants who are already in the United

States. The process of legally importing temporary unskilled workers is complicated and

involves the following U.S. formal institutions: the Department of Labor, which processes and

approves labor certification of jobs; the State Department, which issues visas; and the

Department of Homeland Security, which adjudicates petitions and determines admissibility of

workers into the United States (Waller Meyers 2006).

Knowing that there is a substantial demand for unskilled laborers in the U.S. and lacking

legal channels for migration, millions of unskilled migrants arrive in the United States, either by

crossing the U.S. border illegally or by overstaying their visas. Immigration policies designed to

control the U.S. borders and to prevent tourists and other temporary guests from staying in the

United States illegally are clearly being undermined, oftentimes by informal institutions.

The Case of Migration from Kyrgyzstan to the United States

The case of migration from Kyrgyzstan to the United States demonstrates the pervasive

role that informal institutions play in enabling and perpetuating irregular migration. This case

study specifically illustrates how informal institutions respond to immigration policies they (and

their “clients”) deem to be undesirable.

Legal temporary migration and permanent immigration from the former Soviet republics,

including Kyrgyzstan, to the U.S. for permanent residency is not a new phenomenon. However,

there is a new trend of temporary (and mostly illegal) labor migration from the Commonwealth

5
of Independent States (CIS) 1 to the United States that has emerged in the last decade. There are

typically two categories of labor migrants from the CIS: highly educated individuals with fluent

English whose skills are in demand in the American labor market (such as scientists, high-tech

professionals, academics, accomplished athletes), and who can thus officially obtain U.S. work

visas; and unskilled (or with skills not in demand in the U.S.) labor migrants who are either

smuggled into the country or work illegally having arrived on tourist or other types of visas.

Such illegal labor migrants are primarily employed in unskilled low-wage jobs such as domestic

service workers, caregivers to children and the elderly, as well as in construction and in

sweatshops.

This research focuses on the latter group of migrants because due to lack or non-

transferability of their skills and education into the American labor market, there are practically

no legal channels for migration available for these groups of prospective migrants. Consequently,

they are more likely to use informal channels for migration.

The United States was chosen as the focus of this case study because immigration policy

is presently one of the most important and divisive issues in the country. Perhaps the most

obvious arena indicative of the status of immigration is politics: immigration has played a key

role in 2006 congressional elections and has been prominent in 2008 presidential debates. The

example of Kyrgyzstan-U.S. labor migration is important because it is a microcosm of the large

phenomenon of migration from developing to advanced countries. Kyrgyzstan was chosen for

this case study as an example of a post-Soviet transitional country that sends a large share of its

population abroad for labor. Kyrgyzstan has few exportable natural resources, which has created

1
Commonwealth of Independent States was created in December 1991 shortly before the official disintegration of
the Soviet Union. It now includes all former Soviet republics with the exception of the three Baltic states.

6
a situation where the country’s largest export is its labor force. It is estimated that over one third

of Kyrgyzstan’s labor force is currently working abroad. 2

Implementation and Institutionalism Literature

Immigration, a phenomenon that involves formal and informal institutions in migrant-

sending and receiving countries, represents an interesting case that readily lends itself to the

study of implementation. Among numerous factors influencing the effectiveness of immigration

and other public policies, the existence and efficacy of informal institutions might have a

significant explanatory power. The outcomes of formal policies can be undermined, or in

contrast, be complemented by informal institutions. This study seeks to shed light on the

behavior of informal institutions in response to immigration control policies they perceive to be

undesirable.

Policy implementation literature largely focuses on the following factors as determinants

of policy success: 1) realizable policy expectations; 2) effective policy tools; 3) implementation

(i.e. policy implementation assigned to an agency that is well-staffed, has resources, and has a

champion, is likely to succeed); and 4) public support for the policy (Ingram and Mann 1980).

In addition, it has been argued that economic and social conditions, clear communication of

policy standards, incentives for compliance with new policy, and biases of implementation

officials are also likely to affect policy success (Sabatier and Mazmanian 1980).

2
There was also a practical consideration in choosing Kyrgyzstan for the case study. Migrant workers, some of
whom might be undocumented and/or out of status in the receiving countries, are traditionally a difficult population
to access. Having been born and raised in Kyrgyzstan, I hoped (as it turned out, rightly so) that Kyrgyzstani
migrants, some of whom might be in the United States illegally, would be more likely to agree for an interview and
share their stories with a compatriot. In addition, securing interviews with migration policy makers and officials in a
post-Soviet setting is a very challenging task. In a system that heavily relies on personal connections, bureaucrats
“cold-called” by researchers would rarely agree to a meeting unless the latter are affiliated with potential donor
organizations. As a Kyrgyz researcher, it was more feasible to secure interviews in a country where I had some
personal contacts.

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 What is underanalyzed in the literature is a consideration of informal institutions that

influence the effectiveness of public policies. The present study addresses this research gap by

examining the effect of informal institutions on the immigration policy based on a case study of

labor migration from Kyrgyzstan to the United States. I start out by a review of literature on

implementation and institutionalism. In the following section, I outline the theoretical framework

guiding this research and my methodology in conducting the case study. I then analyze the main

types of institutional interaction uncovered in this research and examine how informal

institutions influence formal institutional outcomes. Finally, I conclude by discussing policy

implications of this study.

Until 1970s public policy scholars had largely ignored policy implementation as a subject

of a systematic study focusing instead on the process of policy adoption and on administrative

and judicial behavior. However, 1970s and 1980s have witnessed a proliferation in the number of

studies on the implementation of specific policies (Hargrove 1975; Pressman and Wildavsky

1973; Sabatier and Mazmanian 1980).

Much of the implementation literature focuses on what could be classified as internal and

external forces that determine whether policies succeed or fail. Internal organizational factors

usually include: 1) characteristics of the implementing agencies such as competent policy

appliers who have “time, financial resources, expertise, positive incentives, and negative

sanctions in administering the policies” (Ingram and Mann 1980, 8; see also Van Meter and Van

Horn 1975; Hogwood and Gunn 1984); 2) clear communication within and among implementing

agencies (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975; Hogwood and Gunn 1984); 3) clear and consistent

policy objectives that are clearly understood and agreed upon (Hogwood and Gunn 1984;

Sabatier and Mazmanian 1980); and 4) the roles of implementing officials are specified

8
(Hogwood and Gunn 1984). In addition, Sabatier and Mazmanian argue that “probable policy

predispositions of implementation officials” (i.e. their biases) are likely to affect policy success

(1980, 540; see also Maynard-Moody, Musheno, and Palumbo 1990; Van Meter and Van Horn

1975; Lipsky 1980).

External conditions affecting the successful implementation of public policies comprise:

1) public support for policy; 2) policy and the implementing agency has a champion (usually a

highly regarded policy maker) who is able to resolve impediments to implementation as they

arise (Bardach 1977); 3) environmental conditions are “conducive to compliance, including

communications media, education facilities, and business conditions” (Ingram and Mann 1980,

8); 4) policy recipients are favorably disposed toward the proposed policy; 5) social and

economic conditions (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975); 6) incentives for compliance with policy

decisions (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975); 7) effective cooperation between implementing

agencies and departments (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973); 8) proposed policy is based on an

accurate theory of cause and effect (Hogwood and Gunn 1984); and 9) “tractability” or

solvability of issues that policy seeks to address (Sabatier and Mazmanian 1980; Van Meter and

Van Horn 1975; Ingram and Mann 1980).

In addition to the internal and external factors mentioned above, during the last decades

of the 20th century scholars have turned their attention to the impact of institutions on policy

formulation and implementation (Hill and Hupe 2002). While few implementation scholars have

studied the role of institutions in implementation, much can be learned from political science and

sociology with implications pertinent for implementation studies. Institutions are important

because they can “make” or “break” public policy. The study of institutions, institutionalism, has

been present in American political science as early as 1887. In his famous essay Woodrow

9
Wilson (1887) focused on the role of institutions in the United States and in Europe. Many

political scientists have since studied how formal institutional arrangements, such as

constitutional design and electoral systems, influence political and social outcomes (Cain,

Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Carey and Shugart 1995; Laver and Shepsle 1996; Lijphart 1994;

McCubbins and Rosenbluth 1995). However, other researchers began to draw attention to

limitations of studying only the formal institutional design - many political outcomes cannot be

fully explained by it. They argued that more research had to be done on informal institutions that

guide political behavior stating, “if social and political actors respond to a mix of ‘formal and

informal’ constraints, then good institutional analysis requires that scholars examine both sets of

rules” (Helmke and Levitsky 2003, 4).

The study of informal institutions is not a new research avenue. Comparative political

scientists have examined patterns of political behavior that diverge from formal rules (Hyden

1983; Jowitt 1983; Price 1975; Riggs 1964). Nevertheless, the leading institutionalism scholars

point out that “informal institutions have not been rigorously conceptualized or theorized in

comparative politics, and as a result, they remain at the margins of contemporary literature on

political institutions” (Helmke and Levitsky 2003, 4). A notable exception is the institutionalism

work pioneered by sociologists such as Philip Selznick, who in his classic study TVA and the

Grass Roots (1949) argues that local citizens “co-opted” into the administration of agricultural

programs in 1930s through voluntary associations were involved in policy formation and

implementation (at least theoretically). In a different approach, Chester Barnard (1938) has

drawn attention to the role of informal social systems within formal organizations [emphasis

added]. In a similar vein, Dahl has pointed out that it was a mistake to assume that “individuals

… would accept logical organization and would not… rebel against it or silently supersede it

10
with an informal organization better suited to their personality needs” (Dahl 1947, 5). Both

Barnard and Dahl focused on informal institutions within a formal system. The missing link in

the literature is the examination of external informal institutions and their impact on policy

implementation. This study picks up where Dahl and Barnard left off and examines how external

informal institutions, not the social systems created within formal organizations, affect policy

outcomes.

The disintegration of the Iron Curtain and the collapse of the Soviet Union have

presented scholars with an opportunity to study the countries that were previously closed to the

rest of the world and that had institutional arrangements significantly divergent from the western

school of institutional thought. Political institutions in the post-communist states, largely

inherited from the Soviet system, present an interesting challenge to scholars and theorists of

institutional studies. Douglass North, for example, doubted that the “present version of any

existing theories could adequately encompass these extraordinarily complex processes and

explain the very different rates and patterns of transformations across the post-communist world”

(North 1997, 1-2). The rigidity of formal rules in the Soviet Union and a chronic shortage of

basic consumer goods necessitated creation of informal networks by elites. Such informal

networks were designed to lessen the burden of bureaucracy and provide access to consumer

goods. For example, the system of informal connections – blat – has been regularly used by the

Soviet elites for various purposes ranging from advancing one’s career to securing an overseas

trip subsidized by the Soviet government. Similarly, clans – informal identity networks based on

kinship – played a profound role in politics and institutions of Kyrgyzstan, and Central Asia as a

whole, even during the Soviet era. Informal institutions are so prevalent in the former Soviet

states and other developing countries that Collins calls to “look beneath and within formal

11
institutions and systematically integrate informal organizations and informal politics into our

study of political order” (2004, 261).

Interaction between formal and informal institutions

A puzzle for many scholars and practitioners is trying to understand why similar

institutions in various settings produce different outcomes. Douglass North (1990) summarizes

this matter in the following statement:

Many Latin American countries adopted the U.S. Constitution (with some
modifications) in the nineteenth century, and many of the property rights laws of successful
Western countries have been adopted by Third World countries. The results, however, are not
similar to those in either the Untied States or other successful Western countries. Although the
rules are the same, the enforcement mechanism, the way enforcement occurs, the norms of
behaviour, and the subjective models of the actors are not (1990, 101).

In search of answers, several authors looked at the interaction between formal and

informal institutions in various economic, political and social spheres. Interaction between

formal and informal institutions is a recent and understudied area of research. As Pejovich states,

“… the relationship between formal and informal rules … is by no means a new question.

However, what is new is the systematic treatment of the relationship between formal and

informal institutions” (Pejovich 1999, 169). Several scholars have recently attempted to

categorize the types of interaction between formal and informal institutions. Lauth broke the

ground in this undertaking by identifying three ways in which formal and informal institutions

interact: complementary, substitutive, and conflicting (Lauth 2000, 25). Helmke and Levitsky

(2003) expanded on this typology and added the fourth, accommodating, interaction type

between formal and informal institutions. Grzymala-Busse (2004) refers to three types of

interactions – substitution, reinforcement, and undermining – in her review of formal-informal

12
interaction in post-communist state transformation in East Central Europe. Finally, Pejovich

(1999) proposed a thesis of interaction between formal and informal institutions.

Migration presents a particularly interesting case for the analysis of interaction between

formal and informal institutions. The most illustrative example of such interaction is that of

restrictive immigration laws and law enforcement versus migrant smuggling networks. The latter

continuously undermine the former, which prompts even more restrictive policies. Rey

Koslowski argues that "as more restrictive policies increase the obstacles to crossing borders,

migrants increasingly turn to smugglers rather than pay the growing costs of unaided attempts

that prove unsuccessful" (Koslowski 1999, 207-08). In a similar vein, Massey (1990) rightly

maintains that it would be difficult for governments to control migration flows because informal

migrant networks (including smugglers) are outside of governmental control.

However, this newly emerging body of research on the interaction between formal and

informal institutions focuses on such interaction in the context of one country. In contrast, this

article examines the institutional interaction in two countries and investigates transnational 3

interaction between formal and informal institutions. Migration is a phenomenon that involves

actors and institutions in more than one country. Thus, in order to fully understand the impact of

institutional interaction on immigration policy, it is important to analyze the interaction between

formal and informal institutions that takes place across international borders.

3
Much of literature uses the terms “transnational”, “international” and “multinational” referring to the same
type of migration (sometimes interchangeably). Such confusion has (hopefully) been clarified by Portes who
specified that “transnational” refers to activities “initiated and sustained by non-institutional actors, be they
organized groups or networks of individuals across borders” (Portes, 2001). He also states that “international”
pertains to activities and programs of national-states, while “multinational” refers to large-scale institutions such as
corporations or religions whose activities take place in multiple countries.

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 Definitions

The definition of “institutions” has been the subject of contention among scholars and

there are numerous suggested definitions (see, for example, O’Donnell 1994; Carey 2000).

However, Douglass North’s framework dominates the literature in the field. He defines

institutions as “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, … the humanly devised

constraints that shape human interaction” (1990, 3). North differentiates between “formal

constraints – such as rules that human beings devise – and … informal constraints – such as

conventions and codes of behavior” (1990, 4).

Formal institutions are defined as: “rules that are openly codified, in the sense that they

are established and communicated through channels that are widely accepted as official”

(Helmke and Levitsky 2003, 5). In the context of migration formal institutions include

immigration and border control laws and procedures; law enforcement, immigration and consular

authorities; as well as laws regulating employment of aliens. The definition proposed by Helmke

and Levitsky does not seem to clearly include political institutions, such as organizations, or

economic institutions. I will, therefore, modify their definition and define formal institutions as

“rules, procedures and organizations that are created, communicated, and enforced through

channels that are widely accepted as official.”

Helmke and Levitsky define informal institutions as “socially shared rules, usually

unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned

channels” (2003, 6). A good example of informal institutions is migrant networks and migrant

smugglers. I will adopt Helmke-Levitsky definition of informal institutions as it is well suited for

the purposes of this study. Given the economic nature of migration phenomena, this paper will

explore the relationship between political and economic institutions involved in labor migration.

14
 Theoretical Framework and Research Questions

This article examines a set of questions in the context of international labor migration: 1)

how do informal and formal institutions involved in labor migration interact with each other? 2)

how do informal institutions affect formal policy outcomes? These questions are prompted by

the newly emerging theory of interaction between formal and informal institutions articulated by

Helmke and Levitsky (2003). In their framework for studying informal institutions, they

differentiate between effective and ineffective formal institutions, defining effectiveness as the

“extent to which rules and procedures that exist on paper are enforced or complied with in

practice” (Helmke and Levitsky 2006, 13). For operationalization purposes, I consider

institutions ineffective when actors repeatedly violate formal rules and the probability of

enforcement is low.

Another dimension of the Helmke-Levitsky framework is the compatibility of actors’

goals - “what they seek to accomplish through a particular informal institution and their

expectation about the likely outcomes generated by formal institutions”. In some cases the

actors’ goals are compatible with expected formal institutional outcomes, while in others they are

in conflict with those outcomes. Bringing all the above mentioned arguments together, Helmke

and Levitsky propose a four-fold typology of interaction between formal and informal

institutions: complementary, accommodating, competing, and substitutive.

Table 1. A Typology of Interaction between Formal and Informal Institutions

Effective Formal Institutions Ineffective Formal Institutions

Compatible Goals Complementary Substitutive
Conflicting Goals Accommodating Competing

15
 Source: Helmke, Gretchen and Steven Levitsky. “Informal Institutions and Comparative
Politics: A Research Agenda.” Working Paper # 307, September 2003.

The complementary type denotes that type of interaction where informal institutions co-

exist with effective formal institutions enhancing the performance or efficiency of the latter. In

situations where the actors’ goals are at odds with expected formal institutional outcomes, the

type of interaction is accommodating. This type is described as “a ‘second best’ strategy for

actors who dislike outcomes generated by the formal rules but are unable to change or openly

break those rules” (Helmke and Levitsky 2003). Competing type refers to interaction involving

informal institutions and weak or ineffective formal institutions. In this type of interaction actors

choose to use informal institutions even if such action is in violation of formal rules. And finally,

substitutive type of interaction refers to the scenario in which informal institutions substitute the

role of ineffective formal institutions.

This study will test the Helmke-Levitsky typology. The goal of this research is to

improve the newly emerging theory of interaction between formal and informal institutions and

demonstrate how informal institutions impact the effectiveness of immigration policy in the

United States.

Methodology

This project embraces a case study research method relying on multiple data sources,

including in-depth semi-structured interviews with 30 labor migrants from Kyrgyzstan in New

York metropolitan area, migration intermediaries, Kyrgyz migration officials and American

consular personnel, and analysis of migration laws and regulations of the United States and

Kyrgyzstan. This research is based on a single case study of low-wage labor migration from

Kyrgyzstan to the United States. The unit of analysis is the labor migrants and formal and

16
informal institutions they interact with. The project involves multiple units of observation –

formal and informal institutions involved in such migration and the labor migrants themselves.

Review of the U.S. and Kyrgyz migration laws and regulations. The initial phase of data

collection involved archival research. To understand the role of formal institutions involved in

migration processes, I reviewed migration-related laws and procedures of Kyrgyzstan and the

United States. This was important because such laws and regulations are a codification of formal

rules.

Interviews with labor migrants. The main part of the field research involved interviewing

migrants from Kyrgyzstan working in the New York metropolitan area (including New Jersey

counties adjacent to New York City), and Philadelphia. The purpose of migrant interviews was

to map out all institutions involved in irregular labor migration from Kyrgyzstan to the United

States and identify their roles in order to be able to analyze how formal and informal institutions

interact. I chose the New York metropolitan area as a field research site because it has a large

immigrant population of former Soviet citizens 4 , which naturally attracts labor migrants from

Kyrgyzstan due to linguistic and cultural links. In addition, New York City traditionally absorbs

large numbers of illegal migrant workers.

The interviews were conducted between November 2005 and February 2006. I conducted

30 in-depth semi-structured interviews with labor migrants via snowball sampling method

through referrals. Selection of persons to interview was purposive - I only interviewed migrants

who have legally or illegally arrived to the U.S. after 1991 and who are or were employed in

unskilled low-wage positions. I limited the inquiry to migrants who arrived in the U.S. after the

collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Prior to 1989-91 migration out of the Soviet Union was

4
It is estimated that over 1.6 million ethnic Russians live in New York Metropolitan area. Exact statistics on
the number of immigrants from the former Soviet republics are not available but are likely to be well over 2 million.

17
very restricted, and with very few exceptions, emigration of Soviet citizens was not allowed (see,

for example, Shevtsova 1992).

I had prepared a list of questions to guide the interviews, and I documented the responses in

a systematic manner as if it was a survey. Interviews with migrants from Kyrgyzstan were

conducted in Russian or Kyrgyz languages depending on the migrants’ preference. 5 Due to the

possibility that some of the respondents might have been in an irregular immigration status at the

time of the interviews, all interviews were anonymous.

Interviews with migration officials. To complement the review of migration laws and

understand the migration policies that are not apparent from official rules and regulations, I

interviewed policy makers and migration officials in Kyrgyzstan. Interviews took place in

September 2005 and in May 2006. These interviews were important to understand the informal

rules relevant to migration and migration policies that are not apparent from official rules and

regulations.

The US migration policies are more transparent and could be drawn from readily available

laws and immigration procedures. Nevertheless, to complement the review of U.S. migration

policies, I interviewed an employee of the American Consulate in Kyrgyzstan to identify on the

ground policies and procedures of the United States towards labor migrants from Kyrgyzstan. 6

Migration facilitators/intermediaries. I was able to secure an interview with a migrant

who used to facilitate migration from Kyrgyzstan to the United States. She provided invaluable

5
Despite almost all migrants being ethnically Kyrgyz, some were more comfortable conversing in Russian,
while others were more at ease speaking Kyrgyz. Such preference for Russian language among some urban ethnic
Kyrgyz is attributable to the russification policies of the Soviet government, especially in larger cities. Russian was
the lingua franca during the Soviet era required for higher education and professional advancement (see Jones
Luong 2004; Roy 2000 for a discussion of Soviet language policies).
6
Due to the sensitive nature of the information shared by this individual, his name is not disclosed in the text
and is referred to as “Informant”.

18
information as to how some Kyrgyz migrants obtain US visas and other details about the

transnational cooperation of informal institutions involved in migration. As I started interviewing

migrants, I repeatedly heard that many of them use the services of employment agencies in

finding work in the United States. A closer examination of an employment agency of this sort

would add a lot of value to the research project. Therefore, I decided to visit a couple of such

agencies to investigate how they work. These field visits resulted in a valuable insight into the

workings of an important informal institution involved in migration.

Analysis and Findings

Given the challenge of understanding and theorizing about institutions in transitional

societies, the question that arises then is, What happens when institutions in developing and

developed countries interact with each other? How does such interaction influence the

effectiveness of public policies?

There is a variety of informal and formal institutions taking part in the process of labor

migration from Kyrgyzstan to the United States. This study has identified more than 40 formal

and informal institutions. In the interest of conciseness, the discussion below will focus on select

few institutional interactions. An analysis of the interaction between informal and formal

institutions participating in the process of labor migration through the prism of the Helmke-

Levitsky typology (table 1) reveals that the following types of interaction are present in this case

study: competing, substitutive and complementary. It is noteworthy that informal institutions

involved in migration influence not only the immigration-related formal institutions in the United

States, but also child care, elderly care, housing regulations and other formal systems as

discussed in the following section.

19
 Competing Interaction. Migration intermediaries play a critical role in the process of labor

migration by enabling migrants from Kyrgyzstan to obtain tourist and other types of visas.

Migration intermediaries, usually operating as a turisticheskoe agentstvo (travel agency) in

Kyrgyzstan, have established partnerships with intermediary firms in the United States. The

U.S.-based intermediaries supply letters of invitation from U.S. citizens and companies to

prospective migrants in Kyrgyzstan for fees ranging from $150 to $2,000. In almost all cases

such invitations are fraudulent: even if they are signed by individuals and companies that exist,

these actors do not know the prospective migrants and have no intention of hosting them in the

United States. 7 There appear to be hundreds of entities in the New York metropolitan area

supplying invitations to prospective migrants. As a former migration intermediary reports, “Here

[in Brooklyn, New York] you can get those invitations on every corner, even in law firms. If you

pay them, they’ll arrange for an invitation.” 8

Upon receipt of the invitations, visa applicants are coached by the intermediaries in

Kyrgyzstan to memorize an invented story to be recited to the U.S. consul: how they know the

individual or a firm that is inviting them, the purpose of their visit, etc. A former travel agent

who supplied letters of invitation to potential migrants in Kyrgyzstan estimated that thirty

percent of her clients received visas to the United States. Once her clients received visas, the

Kyrgyz intermediary would call her American counterpart who would then meet those clients at

the airport upon their arrival in the United States. 9 As this example demonstrates, migration

intermediaries in Kyrgyzstan and the United States engage in transnational interaction.

Collectively, these intermediaries undermine the U.S. policies intended to prevent illegal

7
The invitations have to come from real individuals and firms because the U.S. Consulate could potentially
telephone these parties before issuing a visa to an applicant.
8
Anonymous migrant worker, interview by author, Brooklyn, NY., 4 December, 2005.
9
Anonymous migrant worker, interview by author, Brooklyn, NY., 4 December, 2005.

20
immigration. Their cooperation ranges from simple operations, such as supplying invitations

from U.S. citizens and firms to Kyrgyz migrants, to more complex ventures that involve bringing

large groups of Kyrgyz migrants to the United States on H-2B visas issued for non-agricultural

unskilled workers. On several occasions an American intermediary firm has submitted the

necessary paperwork to the U.S. Department of Labor and the Department of Homeland Security

to bring unskilled workers from Kyrgyzstan. These formal institutions have approved the firms’

petitions for migrant workers, at which point their Kyrgyz counterpart recruited would-be

workers in Kyrgyzstan. At least one group of thirty migrant workers brought to the United States

through this channel has “mysteriously disappeared” upon arrival at an airport in the United

States. The two partner firms drew the attention of the U.S. Consulate in Kyrgyzstan when the

entire group of migrant workers did not return from the United States upon expiration of their

visas. Subsequently, when these two intermediaries submitted visa applications on behalf of

another group of 30 potential migrant workers, the U.S. Consulate in Kyrgyzstan denied visas to

the entire group (Anonymous 2006).

By facilitating the migration of individuals to the United States under false pretenses,

migration intermediaries engage in a competing type of interaction vis-à-vis formal immigration

policies. The goals of these two institutions in question are clearly divergent: the intermediaries

seek to facilitate the migration of individuals who enlisted their services, while the U.S.

Consulate tries to prevent migration of persons who present an immigration risk and are likely to

overstay their visas. Since formal rules pertaining to the issuance of visas to enter the United

States are often violated by migrants and migration intermediaries who submit visa applications

with false information, the U.S. Consulate, which enforces formal visa procedures, can be

described as an ineffective formal institution.

21
 Corrupt government officials at several ministries of Kyrgyzstan were also found to

facilitate the migration of Kyrgyz nationals to the United States. They “sell” spots in official

delegations going to the United States for exchange visits or for athletic tournaments. Visa

applicants who are part of an official government delegation are more likely to receive a U.S.

visa because their applications are submitted to the U.S. Consulate by Kyrgyz government

agencies and seem legitimate. Once in the United States, such “delegates” go “AWOL”.

Migrants interviewed in this study reported having paid anywhere from $4,000 to $7,000 to be

“included” in such delegations. Such corrupt government officials seek to achieve goals that are

drastically divergent from the formal U.S. immigration policies implemented by the Department

of State through its consulates overseas.

An interesting informal institution actively used by migrants in the United States is a

network of informal hostels. When migrants arrive in the United States, they typically do not

have a lot of financial resources and cannot afford to stay at a hotel. There are numerous

informal hostels, which are typically run by other immigrants, where migrants (or anybody else)

can get a place to sleep for $10-15 a night. These hostels range from neat bedrooms (rented out

by families living in the same apartment) to overcrowded rooms or basements that accommodate

10-15 individuals sleeping on mattresses on the floor. 10 It is noteworthy that migrants stay at

such informal hostels not only upon arrival in the United States but also throughout their stay.

For example, female live-in domestic workers and caregivers usually have one unpaid day off

per week. They are expected to leave their employers’ residences on their days off. However,

they often do not have anywhere else to go and resort to spending a night at one of the informal

hostels. Many of the informal hostels violate the local Housing Maintenance Codes, restrictions

10
Similar types of accommodation options exist in other migrant destination communities such as Houston, TX
(Hegstrom 2006).

22
pertaining to occupancy limits in residential dwellings, and are unlikely to report their income

from running such informal hostels to the Internal Revenue Service. In interacting with formal

rules such as Housing Maintenance Codes, the informal hostels disregard the latter. By evading

taxation of their rental income, these informal institutions undermine the rule of law in the

United States.

Substitutive Interaction. Informal hostels used by migrants also serve another function. As

formal hotels are beyond reach for almost all newly arrived migrants, who sometimes bring less

than $200 with them, informal hostels fill in the gap and address the need for affordable

temporary housing. In doing so, informal hostels substitute for formal institutions that are

ineffective in some way. In the context of the Helmke-Levitsky typology (table 1), a formal

institution would be classified as ineffective if it is substituted for by informal institutions.

However, one would hardly describe formal hotels as being ineffective. Rather, they are

unavailable for many migrants due to their high cost. This new classification of formal

institutions warrants a modification of the Helmke-Levitsky typology, which I suggest below. It

is important to note that the Helmke-Levitsky typology was designed to classify political formal

and informal institutions. In addition to political institutions this study analyzes economic

informal and formal institutions. Therefore, the dimension of price and availability/accessibility

becomes an integral part of the institutional analysis. I suggest a modified typology of informal-

formal institutional interaction that encompasses political and economic institutions (table 2).

Based on the modified typology, I argue that informal hostels housing migrants substitute for

formal hotels that are unaffordable, and thus unavailable, for most migrant workers.

“Unavailable” in this modified typology encompasses formal institutions that are beyond reach

23
for some actors due to the cost, accessibility, and availability (i.e. hotels are sometimes fully

booked).

Table 2. Modified Typology of Interaction between Formal and Informal Institutions

Effective Formal Ineffective or Unavailable

Institutions Formal Institutions
Compatible Goals Complementary Substitutive
Conflicting Goals Accommodating Competing

As many studies report, there is a substantial shortage of good quality, affordable childcare

in the United States (Blau and Robins 1988; Kisker and Ross 1997; Blau 1993; Johansen,

Leibowitz, and Waite 1996; Gordon and Chase-Lansdale 2001). The demand for formal

childcare that provides learning opportunities for children far outstrips the supply. The shortage

of childcare options is an often-cited impediment to women’s participation in the formal labor

force and to a manageable balance between work and family (Gordon and Chase-Lansdale

2001). Formal childcare is often either unaffordable or unavailable, and many parents are not

satisfied with its quality. Hondagneu-Sotelo argues that many middle-class families are deeply

prejudiced against formal childcare centers, “perceiving them as offering cold, institutionalized,

and second-class child care” (2001, 4). Children attending formal childcare centers also tend to

get sick more often, forcing parents to miss work. As a result, many parents turn to informal

childcare 11 , much of which is provided by female migrant workers. Twenty percent of female

interviewees in this study were live-in caregivers for children. Their responsibilities also

included numerous other household chores such as cleaning the house, cooking, doing laundry,

11
Formal childcare includes childcare centers or family childcare homes that are regulated by state authorities.
Informal childcare is performed in unregulated home settings (Kisker and Ross 1997).

24
and ironing. An additional 26.7 percent of women were child caregivers at some point, but later

moved on to jobs that involved only housekeeping duties. Overall, almost half of the women

interviewed were childcare workers at the time of the interviews or at some point during their

employment in the United States. I argue that affordable female migrant labor providing

childcare allows more American women to participate in the formal labor force, and thus

enhances the effectiveness of the formal economy. This relationship represents an example of a

substitutive interaction between informal and formal institutions where migrant labor substitutes

for the unaffordable, unavailable or low-quality formal childcare.

Similarly, the responsibility of caring for the elderly is being increasingly transferred from

the immediate family members to hired workers who are often migrants (Pratt 1999). The

capacity of public assistance programs for the elderly is limited: federally-funded healthcare

covers only acute health conditions requiring skilled medical assistance (Bass and Noelker

1987). Many elderly individuals do not want to live in nursing homes or cannot afford to live in

expensive retirement facilities. They might not require medical assistance on a daily basis, which

makes them unqualified for federally subsidized programs, but they do need help with personal

care. In such cases the only in-home care options for the elderly are limited to daily assistance

from family members (if it is available) and/or to privately purchased care. Traditionally, the

families provided the bulk of care for elderly individuals with disabilities (Bass and Noelker

1987). Purchased care is becoming a more attractive option for primary caregivers given the

significant physical and emotional care-related stress, and the availability of inexpensive migrant

labor. It is estimated that half of the disabled elderly using in-home services rely exclusively on

privately purchased care (Bass and Noelker 1987). A quarter of the female migrants interviewed

in this study reported working as live-in caregivers to the elderly. Migrant workers willing to

25
work as live-in caregivers to the elderly relieve the burden from the immediate family

members/children. Since the responsibility of caring for the elderly is disproportionately borne

by women (Ettner 1996; Bass and Noelker 1987), migrant labor in this sphere allows more

women to fully participate in the labor force. This arrangement of caring for the elderly

represents a substitutive interaction where migrant labor substitutes for the ineffective formal

elderly care system.

Complementary Interaction. Unlicensed employment agencies in Kyrgyzstan routinely

facilitate labor migration out of the country. According to the Kyrgyz legislation, employment

agencies placing Kyrgyz workers in overseas jobs are required to obtain a license from the State

Committee for Migration and Employment (Kyrgyz Republic 2006). Yet, a recent study reports

that almost 80 percent of such agencies operate illegally without a license (The European

Commission and International Organization for Migration 2005). Unlicensed employment

agencies are not sanctioned and/or prosecuted in Kyrgyzstan despite their violation of the Law

on External Labor Migration (Kyrgyz Republic 2006) and the Provision on the Activities of

Employment Agencies Facilitating Employment of Kyrgyz Citizens Abroad (Kyrgyz Republic

2006). It is likely that unlicensed employment agencies are largely ignored because the Kyrgyz

state implicitly encourages out-migration. I argue that since the state cannot provide legal

channels for international migration, it allows employment agencies to do so through illegal

channels. The State Committee for Migration and Employment is particularly interested in

encouraging out-migration as its mandate includes employment issues as well. The more

migrants leave the country, the lower the unemployment rate will seem on paper. Both

institutions have a converging goal – facilitating labor migration out of Kyrgyzstan. Unlicensed

employment agencies seek to achieve this goal to profit from the passage fees paid by migrants.

26
The government of Kyrgyzstan encourages temporary labor out-migration because the latter

results in a significant inflow of hard currency into the economy, strengthens the local financial

system, substitutes for an ineffective social welfare system (through remittances sent to

migrants’ families), and artificially reduces the unemployment rate. This is an example of a

complementary interaction between unlicensed employment agencies and the state, the former

providing an outcome that the Kyrgyz government itself cannot achieve.

Interestingly, I found no incidences of an accommodating relationship between

institutions, in which the informal institution alters formal institutional outcomes without directly

violating formal rules. A possible explanation for the lack of accommodating relationships is that

when it comes to a restrictive immigration regime, actors engaging informal institutions often

seek outcomes (i.e. irregular migration) that are markedly divergent from formal institutional

goals (i.e. restricted immigration). By choosing to follow informal rules, actors inevitably violate

formal rules (Helmke and Levitsky 2006).

Conclusion

This study stands in stark contrast to the existing implementation literature in that it

examined the role that informal institutions play in the effectiveness of public policies. The

critical finding is that informal institutions in the United States have established transnational

partnerships with their counterparts in Kyrgyzstan and cooperate fairly effectively to find

avenues for migration of Kyrgyz nationals. Collectively, these informal institutions routinely

undermine the effectiveness of immigration policies. Informal institutions also influence other

formal institutions such as childcare, elderly care, and housing regulations.

A test of the Helmke-Levitsky typology undertaken in this study demonstrates that the

typology is a good starting point for the analysis of institutional interaction not only in the

27
context of one country but also in a transnational setting. With some modification, namely the

categorization of formal institutions as “ineffective and/or unavailable” as opposed to

exclusively “ineffective”, the typology holds true for examining not only political but economic

formal and informal institutions as well.

This research project discovered a significant number of informal institutions undermining

formal institutions and rules designed to control illegal immigration. It therefore comes as no

surprise that the current immigration situation in the United States is considered to be “broken”,

and the government is unable to manage illegal immigration to the extent that some individuals

have taken matters into their hands, as demonstrated by grass-roots initiatives such as the

“Minuteman project”. 12

The widespread perception in the literature on informal institutions is that informality is a

feature of an under-developed Third World state (Borocz 2000; Portes and Sassen-Koob 1987;

Sztompka 1993). Some scholars argue that informal institutions are prevalent in developing

countries, where formal institutions are more likely to be ineffective as compared to developed

countries (Borocz 2000; Portes and Sassen-Koob 1987; Jones Luong 2004; Collins 2004; Peng

2004; Sztompka 1993). This research project, however, finds that in the context of labor

migration, informal institutions are almost as prevalent in the United States as they are in

Kyrgyzstan. The findings of this study suggest that the emergence and resilience of informal

institutions in developed countries such as the United States is due to local supply and demand.

The demand for inexpensive migrant labor in the United States is so great that migration

intermediaries find ways to bring in migrant workers. Domestic services are increasingly

performed by paid workers in the United States as more American women are entering the

12
The Minuteman Project is a movement that started in 2005 in several border states of the United States. Civilian
activists patrol the borders to intercept and report migrants attempting to illegally cross the Mexico-U.S. border.

28
formal labor force. In essence, as Hondagneu-Sotelo puts it, “the work of cleaning houses and

caring for children gradually left the hands of wives and mothers and entered the global

marketplace” (2001, xii). Few American women want to work in domestic service industry as

wages are low, work is often back-breaking, no benefits are offered and the job itself is perceived

as demeaning. As a result, domestic work in the United States has become “the domain of

disenfranchised immigrant women of color” (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001, xii). Similarly, labor-

intensive low-wage jobs in agriculture, construction, and restaurant industries are largely filled

by migrant workers insofar as native-born or legal immigrant workers are reluctant to do this

type of work despite its abundance.

Much of the literature in the field of institutionalism argues that informal institutions

undermine formal institutional outcomes. Such arguments are largely confirmed by findings of

this research project. Yet, this study shows that not all informal institutions are subversive of

formal rules. In some cases, informal institutions enhance the effectiveness of formal rules or

substitute for ineffective formal institutions, thereby addressing a legitimate need. Most notably,

migrant labor makes up for the ineffective formal childcare and elderly care system in the United

States and allows more American women to participate in the labor force.

Further research focusing on the role of informal institutions in immigration from major

migrant-sending countries would contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics of

informal-formal institutional interaction. It would be especially interesting to compare how

informal institutions emerge and operate in states sharing a border with the United States, such as

Mexico, and in far-off countries such as China.

The policy implications of this study are significant. Informal institutions play an active

and important role in the implementation of immigration and other policies and, thus should be

29
taken into account in the early stages of policy design. Over 60 years ago Dahl argued that the

study of public administration is “a study of human beings as they have behaved, and as they

may be expected or predicted to behave, under certain special circumstances” (Dahl 1947, 4). As

this study has demonstrated, in response to policies designed to control illegal immigration actors

create informal institutions. In line with Dahl’s timeless argument, given the restrictiveness of

the present immigration regime (Dahl’s “special circumstance”), these informal institutions

should be expected to behave in ways that undermine formal immigration policies. Thus, it is

imperative that informal institutions are considered an important variable in the design and

evaluation of immigration and other policies. The emergence of informal institutions in response

to societal demands accentuates the need for dynamic formal institutions that are responsive and

flexible to ensure that their effectiveness is not undermined by informal institutions.

30
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