201
PROTECTION FOR THE TRANSMISSION GRID
W.R. Lachs MIEE, FIEEE & D. Sutanto SMIEEE
The University of New South Wales, SYDNEY, NSW 2052 AUSTRALIA
1. INTRODUCTION
The power blackouts on 2nd July and 10th August, 1996
in Western USA affected Canada and Mexico and 15 and 9
states respectively, interrupted millions of customers and
took 8 hours and almost a day to regain normal operation.
The area affected was comparable to the 1965 North East
American blackout when the grid was completely de-
energised, taking even longer to regain normal operation
[l]. In each incident, the disturbances were more severe
thain any considered by planning or operational criteria, so
leading to system voltage instability. The worst of these
problems, the large amount of load shedding and the delay
in restoring normal operation, could have been avoided if
the integrity of the transmission grid had held.
A worrying aspect of these collapses is that planning and
operational security generally provide for single
contingencies, whereas disturbances that have led to
system voltage instability and collapse have been caused
by multiple contingencies. Although more severe than
any disturbance considered by system planning criteria, the
grid has remained intact for a significant period before
abruptly collapsing. Even though 20 seconds offers ample
time for interposing control responses with available fast
technologies, no satisfactory automatic measures have yet
been introduced. Of added concern is the actions of
protections such as rotor overcurrent and transmission line
overload protection that precipitate the disruptive phase.
The complexity of modelling the entire power system to
simulate post-disturbance events has inhibited the
development of computational methods to guide automatic
conltrol measures. The assumptions which must be made
to allow real-time computation, themselves prevent
replication of the actual post-disturbance phenomena.
Consequently computational approaches as described in
papers tend only to evaluate a margin to the stability limit
and rarely, if ever, propose measures for the control of
system voltage stability [2,3].
An alternative approach is presented, which besides being
much simpler and more reliable, also avoids the practical
shortcomings of using elaborate computational methods.
This proposed approach is capable of adapting to
unexpected events for directing timely measures that can
conltrol system voltage stability and so maintain the
integrity of the EHV transmission grid.
Developments in Power System Protection, 25-27th March 1997,
Conference Publication No. 434, 0 IEE, 1997
2. SYSTEM VOLTAGE INSTABILITY
Reports of the 1978 French and the 1983 Swedish
collapses both describe a first slow phase of a minute or
more, when a multiple contingency reduced voltagcs in a
limited area, followed by a fast disruptive phase, voltages
dropped sharply throughout the grid which was then
disrupted in seconds, when losing angular stability [4,5I.
The most important step in developing useful measures is
to uncover the underlying cause and also to gain an
understanding of the post disturbance events that lead to
the grid's disruption. Although the first slow phase
appears so different from the second disruptive phase,
reported incidents demonstrate that they follow
sequentially. The steps to counteracting system voltage
instability have been devised following a simulation
which faithfully replicates the chain of events that have
been reported in actual incidents.
Another apparently intractable difficulty is the inability to
predict disturbances which have led to system voltage
instability. A numerical example, relating to a small
network provides an effective illustration of this problem.
A 30 element network has Z3O or over a billion
connection modes, with all but one corresponding to an
outage. Planning criteria would examine single (30) and
double (30x29=870) contingencies, leaving over a billion
modes unexamined. The disturbances which have led to
system voltage instability all come from these
unexamined situations. This is the region into which the
proposal makes inroads so as to assure the grid integrity
following unpredictable multiple contingencies.
3. EFFECT OF TAP CHANGING ON LOADS
An adequate understanding of system voltage instability
cannot take anything for granted, so it is necessary to start
with investigations of the slow phase. During this first
slow phase, automatic transformer tap changing functions
by being programmed to correct consumer voltage levels.
In an effort to assess its effect on load magnitudes, a
preliminary study modelled the transformation steps from
a city transmission substation down to the distribution
networks. With the number of transformation steps
between the EHV grid and consumers and bearing in mind
that the transmission voltages would still be depressed,
there is need to know what demand is imposed on the grid
through the transmission substations.
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The study uses a simple model of a metropolitan network (than pre-disturbance) at 33kV, 132kV and 330kV,
with all loads at l l k V and load magnitudes being affected which produced substantially greater reactive power
by variations of voltage level to determine the influence of losses in transformer windings.
transformer tap changing on the power flow into a 330kV With falling 330kV voltage level, the series losses
transmission substation following a disturbance which continued to increase and the compensation charging
lowered 330kV voltages [6]. All transformers have 1% continued to reduce.
taps and they function automatically until the nominal Even though the consumer MVAr demand was at pre-
levels are regained on low voltage windings. Timers delay disturbance magnitude, the other two components
each automatic tap changing operation to 20 secs produced an increasing 330kV grid reactive demand.
(330/132kV transformers), 4 0 secs (132/33kV &
132/11kV transformers) and 6 0 secs (33/11kV 4. THE REACTIVE POWER BALANCE
transformers). With no local generation, 1400MVAr of
reactive compensation is provided (at 132, 33 and 11kV) The cause of system voltage instability is a sudden
for a total l l k V load of 3995MW and 1320MVAr. Each increase of reactive power demand due to a disturbance.
operation in Table1 is at a 20 second interval and shows The best counter strategy would be to deal with the
the 330kV voltage levels and the corresponding flow from underlying cause of this increase, and to be effective the
the grid into the 330/132kV transformers [6]. strategy must respond during the first slow phase
specifically to prevent the onset of the second disruptive
TABLE 1 - phase. It is essential to distinguish the separate
Influence of Tap Changing on 330kV Transformer Load components which together create the reactive power
demand and these have been identified from the transformer
>oad-Voltage Characteristic: lMWaV1 &MVAraV tap changing studies as being composed of
)peration No. 1330kV Levell 330kV Winding Flow i . The reactive power component of consumer loads,
ii. The series reactive power losses of system elements,
% I MW I MVAr I iii. The contribution of shunt elements - line and cable
Prefault 101 4156 55 1 charging, transformer magnetising,
0 95 3876 683 iv. The contribution of fixed compensation elements -
1 95 3927 663 shunt capacitors and reactors,
2 94.5 3994 653 v. The output of controllable devices - generators,
3 94 4052 679 synchronous condensers and SVC's.
4 93 4096 68 1
5 92 4097 68 1 Not only are these components affected by voltage
6 91 4173 719 changes, but sources of charging are interspersed with
7 90 4173 7 19 elements incurring series losses. Consequently it is not
8 88.5 4193 732 possible to gain a realistic reactive power balance with
9 87 4196 78 1 simplified power systems, such as modelling the
85 4181 803 transmission grid without including transformers.

Load flows on a heavily loaded 92 line longitudinal grid,

9lthough the method is very simple it offers insights that that included all generator and transmission substation
lave an important bearing on the study of system voltage transformers, examined first a peak load followed by a
nstability. The 6% reduction on 330kV initially reduces multiple contingency, the simultaneous loss of 5 EHV
'oads at 1lkV, whereas the demand on the grid through the lines. This approach was taken to show the effectiveness
330/132kV transformers is less MW but more MVAr. An of proposed countermeasures against a multiple
analysis provides an explanation for this unexpected load contingency more severe than any described in reported
response, as follows: incidents. For these two load flows the split-up of the five
reactive power components is shown in Table 2 [ 7 ] :
- By step 5 (at 100 seconds), tapping restored l l k V
voltages, regaining pre-disturbance consumer demands TABLE 2
- Automatic tap changing of three series groups of Effect of Losing 5 EHV Lines on 92 Bus Power Grid
transformers can sustain l l k V levels and loads even
with a 16% fall on the 330kV voltage at step 10,
- However the other 3 voltages did not recover, QUANTITY Pre-Disturbance At Disturbance
- 33kV levels almost recovered, 132kV continued to fall, Total Load 14468+j5413 13335+ j4951
and the worst reductions were at 330kV. Total Losses 392+j5254 450+ j6697
- Consequently the reactive power compensation at Total Generation 14760+j3758 13785 +j5440
33kV and 132kV levels was much reduced. Total Line Charge j4834 j4394
- Even though the l l k V demand had recovered, because Total Capacitors j2733 j2478
of their reduced voltages, there were heavier currents Grid Power Angle 43.90 79.1°
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Immediately after the loss of 5 EHV lines, the reduction 5. CONTROL MEASURES
of voltages reduced the consumer reactive demand as well
as the output of capacitors and line charging. However the The understanding gained from this successful replication
higher currents increased the total series losses, and there of post-disturbance events, besides providing intelligence
was an even larger increase in rotating unit reactive power from which pattern recognition could be used as a means
outputs to balance supply and demand. An analysis of the for controlling system voltage stability, has suggested the
load flow showed that the bulk of the 1440MVAr increase following definition for system voltage instability:
of series losses was produced by just 3 EHV lines (in
parallel with the lost lines). The potential threat to system Definition: System reactive p o w e r stabilitj is
voltage stability could be identified by the large voltage threatened when a disturbance increases the reactive power
reductions at substations fed by the three (3) lines, coupled demand beyond the sustainable capacity of the available
with the increase of reactive power outputs of rotating reactive power resources.
units. A small number of rotating units, particularly
synchronous condensers at the worst affected substations, 5.1 Primary Strategy
increased output above their continuous rating.
Simulation of the collapse has shown that the increase of
A further series of load flow studies succeeded in series reactive power losses in just three lines is the
replicating both the first slow phase and the second underlying cause and must be the focus of the primary
disruptive phase, as described in reported incidents [6]. In strategy to control system voltage stability. To better
the simulation of post-disturbance events, the first slow illustrate this strategy, the increase in series losses in a
phase which lasted 110 seconds, considered only the single 200km, 330kV line, with lO0MVAr no load
effects of automatic transformer tap changing, These were charging, is examined. It is considered that planning
found to increase the system's total series reactive power criteria would allow the line to be loaded up to 700MVA
losses by an extra 1100MVAr and lower, by 7.7%, the or twice surge impedance loading (SIL), so that 300MVAr
330kV voltage on the worst affected load substation. of reactive compensation is provided. If an unexpectedly
Again the bulk of the increase of series losses was severe disturbance were to increase loading to 1050MVA
concentrated in just these 3 EHV lines. At 110 seconds, or 3 SIL the lines series reactive power losses, as shown
the action of rotor overcurrent protection on one in Table 3, would greatly exceed the available reactivc
synchronous condenser curtailed its reactive power output power compensation, by as much as 730MVAr, if the
by lowering its excitation to rated current. This sharply voltage falls to 90%.
incre,ased excitation on nearby synchronous condensers,
and in quick succession, each of their rotor overcurrent TABLE 3
protections responded. Within seconds, substation Net Reactive Power Losses in 200 km 330kV Line
voltages dropped a further 7.6%, the angle across the
powe,r system increased from 8 4 O to 112O and series
reactive power losses jumped 1900MVAr, predominently
in the transmission grid, in which half the increase was
concentrated in just three lines [7]. The falling voltages in
the affected area created a quickly increasing voltage
differential to the previously unaffected surrounding
localities, drawing exponentially increasing amounts of
reactive power through the incoming transmission lines.
Not only did this produce a burgeoning increase of current
and :series reactive power losses in these lines, but
voltages falls suddenly mushroomed thoughout ever
The ability of rotating units to produce more than rated
widening areas of the grid. This combination of increasing
excitation for a limited period provides an initial voltage
currents and reducing voltages was the trigger for line
stability. As there is no other ready source of reactive
tripping by zone 3 protection experienced in the 2nd July
compensation, voltage stability can only be safeguarded
US disturbance on 225kV lines supplying the affected
by reducing the excessive reactive power demand. Clearly,
Boise: region. Charts of this incident revealed the sharp
the fastest and simplest method would be by reducing the
rise of line reactive loadings during the final disruptive
line's loading by timely load shedding at its receiving end.
phase. (This led to a suggestion for removing line zone 3
protection, an approach which tackles the symptoms but
Timely shedding is the most effective means of averting
not thie cause of system voltage instability and should not
the disastrous effects that follow the action of rotor
even be considered.) The quickly rising line reactive power
overcurrent protection that lead to the disruption of the
flows, by increasing the angles across lines, diminished
transmission grid. The duration of the first phase allows
inter-unit synchronising forces and was the cause of loss
supplementary measures to be introduced so reducing the
of angular stability that led to out-of-step tripping and the
amount of load shedding.
islanding of the Western US network.

5.2 Sumlementary Measures
Although there would be no alternative to load shedding at
substations with the largest voltage reductions, there could
be a period of a minute or more to interpose other actions
to reduce the amount of shedding. The following
supplementary measures have been suggested [ 6 ] :
a) Fast tap changing on transmission substation
transfonners,
b) Increasing synchronous condenser outputs by raising
terminal voltages,
c) Raising sending end transmission voltages by either
fast tap changing on generator transformers or raising
generator terminal voltages.
5.3 Indicators
The threat to system voltage stability can be identified by
the changes of two parameters:
- Voltage reductions at transmission substations,
- Increases of rotating unit reactive power outputs.
A hierarchical control structure would direct measures,
including load shedding, and would initiate measures (b) &
(e) if the parameter changes continued for a period that
exceeded the response time of the slowest protection.
5.4 Prototype-Protection Arrangement
A prototype protection arrangement was simulated on the
92 line and bus network after the loss of 5 EHV lines.
This simulation incorporated the protection strategy in a
computer programme that directed successive load flows
and was driven by the post-disturbance reductions of
transmission voltages and increases of rotating unit
reactive power outputs [7]. In this programme there is a 5
second delay to identify the threat and initiate measures
and a 30 second delay to strategic load shedding
Even though the five line outage is considerably more
severe than any reported disturbance, the sequential action
of these measures, which involved l0OOMW of load
shedding, achieved the following:
All rotating- units were reduced to below their
continuously rated excitation,
~ ~ substation ~ ~
voltages regained pre-
disturbance levels,
Total series reactive losses were held at S725MVAr,
47 lMVAr above pre-disturbance,
Generator re-mangement reduced the grids power angle
from 7 9 O at disturbance to 5 7 O .
The practical advantage of pattern recognition in this
proposal is in circumventing the complexity of modelling
of the power system and avoiding the assumptions which
undermine the validity of real-time computation. However
this proposal has one weakness, namely that the indicators
cannot initially determine if and when load shedding would
be needed, so an arbitary 30 seconds delay was set to
minimise the amount of load shedding.
204
The 2nd July Western US incident, when out-of-step
relays functioned in 25 seconds, splitting the grid into 5
islands, showed up this deficiency.
6. EVALUATION OF ROTOR HEATING
An additional avenue has been found which can, within
seconds after a disturbance, provide precise answers, so
allowing a more flexible approach. By focussing on the
core problem, rotor temperature increase, all the associated
complexities associated with system voltage instability
can be by-passed and a simpler and more elegant solution
is possible. It is based on a mathematical rotor thermal
model which allows the swift evaluation of temperature
changes for any sudden increase of rotor current. The
simplicity of the algorithm can allow an associated
microprocessor to instantly evaluate the rotating unit's
rate of temperature rise and the period of time to reach its
temperature limit. The only input would be the rotor
current and voltage so that any sudden change of rotor
current and voltage starts the computation of rotor
temperature increase. Evaluations using the algorithm
have shown errors of less than lCo at all point when
assessed against rotor heating tests [8].
Within seconds of a disturbance the rate of temperature
change of all units can be evaluated, providing the
inklligence of whether any unit will surpass its rated rotor
temperature and the shortest time for any unit to exceed
this temperature. Should this danger exist for even one
unit, load shedding would be needed. Load shedding would
take place in a much shorter period than the evaluated time
for the first rotor to reach its temperature limit. The
timing intelligence would be incorporated into an
automatic arrangement for safeguarding the grid against
system voltage instability. After it had functioned, the
automatic protection would pass control to the operators
who would easily comprehend the relation between time
and rotor heating. Suitably organised, the information
would help them in dealing with the post-disturbance
situation.
'- APPLICAT1oN
~ Studies on ~numerous multiple
i contingencies
~ on a number
~ i
of substantial power systems have demonstrated the
effectiveness of the strategy for controlling system voltage
stability. The prototype programme has been able to adapt
to both the severity and the location of each disturbance in
regaining a viable operating state for the power system.
However for the practical application of such the strategy
studies would need to be undertaken by a utility on its
own power system to have an assurance that it would
function correctly. For this purpose a package has been
developed which incorporate the strategy and only requires
an ability to undertake load flow studies for its use. It
offers a practical tool for examining a wide range of
multiple contingencies on the grid. Each study would be
relatively brief as it avoids the time consuming process of
 205
examining the collapse process. It would therefore make it
possible to examine a wide array of multiple
contingencies, scattered throughout the grid, so giving an
assurance that when commisioned, the arrangement would
be able to protect the transmission grid against voltage
instability.
8. CONCLUSION
An approach is described which can allow the development
an arrangement for automatically dealing with the threat to
systern voltage stability. The approach utilises pattern
recognition to provide adaptive and timely responses
throughout the entire grid. Pattern recognition offers an
intrinsically simple (minimal computation) and reliable
methold, an essential for a practical protection which must
function whenever it is needed. To allow an affordable
solution against multiple contingencies to the grid, load
shedding is proposed, as it avoids the inordinante expense
of rediundant equipment for withstanding unpredictable
situations. This offers a modest cost protection at only a
tiny fraction of the tens of millions of dollar costs
incurred by the 2nd July and 10th August US incidents.
In many of the incidents reported throughout the world,
there has been an initial slow phase, lasting minutes.
Supplementary measures are described for introduction
during this initial period as their action would reduce the
amount of load shedding.
The genesis of the approach stems from the simulation of
post-dlisturbance events by a sequence of load flows. The
ability to replicate the events of reported incidents of
system voltage instability has provided the needed
understanding of the post-disturbance phenomena.,
Specifically, voltage reductions and increases of rotating
unit reactive power outputs offer a means of quickly
identifying the danger and avoid the need for cumbersome
and unreliable computer modelling of the power system.
The simulation has also shown that during the first slow
post-clisturbance phase, only a limited region is affected.
By introducing timely measures just in the affected region,
the disruption of the grid, due to the spreading of post-
disturbance effects can be prevented.
Reported incidents of voltage instability collapse have
followed multiple contingencies more severe than any
considered in planning the power system. The proposed
strategy is able to deal with these unpredictable multiple
contingencies by adapting to their severity and responding
in the affected region of the grid. A package incorporating
the control strategy has been tested on a number of
substantial systems for a wide range of multiple
contingencies. An example of its effectiveness is outlined,
when handling the simultaneous loss of five lines on a 92
line, 114,700MW system. This package could be used by
planniing engineers to examine a broad range of multiple
continlgencies and confirm the effectiveness of the strategy
in controlling system voltage stability. Only after
satisfying themselves of its effectiveness would the
decision be made to introduce an arrangement for
automatically protecting the grid against system voltage
instability. To adequately safeguard an interconnected grid,
the constituent utilities should all adopt to the same
strategy, else an uncontrolled disturbance on one portion
could disrupt the entire grid.
The weakness of pattern recognition is its inability to
identify directly the need for load shedding, nor its timing,
should it be needed. This deficiency has been solved a
further development which can determine the impending
rate of rotor temperature rise within seconds of any
disturbance. This only requires monitoring the increases of
rotor current and voltages on all rotating units to
determine if any temperature limit would be exceeded on
any unit and the time it would take. This additional
intelligence, which would not require a great cost, would
allow the development of a comprehensive arrangement
for the control of system voltage stability. The proposal
offers the Electricity Industry a practical and cost effective
approach for dealing with the threat of power system
collapse and maintaining transmission grid integrity..
9. REFERENCES
1. G.D. Friedlander - "The North East Power Failure"
Spectrum Vol. 3 No.2 February 1966 pp. 54-73
2. Y. Tamura, K. Sakamato & Y. Tayama - "Current
Issues in the Analysis of Voltage Instability
Phenomena" EPRI-EL6 183 Proceedings: Bulk Power
System Voltage Phenomena - Voltage Stability and
Security Jan. 1989 pp. 5-39 to 5-54
3. R.J. Thomas & H-D. Chiang - "On Dynamic Voltage
Instabilities in Electric Power Systems" Ibid pp.6- 1to
6-21
4. A. Cheimanoff & C. Corroyer - "The Power Failure of
December 19th 1978 ' RGE Tome 89 Avril 1980
pp.280-96
5. IS.Walve - "Modelling Power System Components at
Severe Disturbances" CIGRE 38- 18, 1986.
6. W.R. Lachs - "System Reactive Power Limitations"
Paper A79 01 5-9 NEW YORK IEEE Winter Power
Meeting. 1979
7. W.R. Lachs & D. Sutanto - "Voltage Instability in
Interconnected Power Systems: A Simulation
Approach." IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.
PWRS Vol. 7 No. 2 May, 1992 pp. 753-761
8. W.R. Lachs & D. Sutanto - "Rotor Heating as an
Indicator of System Voltage Instability" IEEE
Transactions on Power Systems PWRS Vol. 10 No. 1
February 1995 pp. 175-181