Sergiu Celibidache Analytical PDF

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SERGIU CELIBIDACHE -
ANALYTICAL APPROACHES TO HIS TEACHINGS ON
PHENOMENOLOGY AND MUSIC
by
Tom Zelle
A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment

o f the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Musical Arts
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY
May 1996
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
UMI Number: 9625105
Copyright 1996 by
Zelle, Tom
All rights reserved.
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SERGIU CELIBIDACHE -
ANALYTICAL APPROACHES TO HIS TEACHINGS ON
PHENOM ENOLOGY AND MUSIC
by
Tom Zelle
has been approved
April 1996
APPROVED:
, C h a ir
Supervisory Committee
ACCEPTED:
Director o f the School
MMlX' l&UiMjdkm
Dean, Graduate College
ABSTRACT
Published materials on Sergiu Celibidache’s teachings on phenomenology and
music were reviewed to present an analytical overview of his central ideas. The
research project concentrates on the following primary sources: Celibidache’s
interviews, documentation o f his seminars, rehearsals and performances, and his own
texts. The results of this research project are based on the utilization of Celibidache’s
main topics and central themes as categories for applying the constant comparative
analytical method. Each publication was analyzed in reference to each of the
previously determined categories. The first part of the research project presents an
introduction to phenomenology for the reader, with special reference to the topic of
Celibidache and music. The second part presents Celibidache’s essential points of
view and arguments which include the question of phenomenology, Far Eastern
philosophies, time, tempo, reduction, and aesthetic points on recordings. The research
project concludes with a description of the most significant and apparent principles of
Celibidache’s rehearsal techniques and a bibliography of primary sources on the
subject of Celibidache's teachings for future research.
iii
To my father, mother, and brother.
iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This dissertation owes its existence to Sergiu Celibidache, whose impact on my
understanding of life, music, and my role within them has been immeasurable. I want
to thank the students of the Phoenix Symphony Guild Youth Orchestra, whose
example and work have served as a constant source of inspiration.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER Page
I. INTRODUCTION
IN T R O D U C T IO N ...............................................................................................01
Context o f the S tu d y .............................................................................. 04
The Historical Context............................................................... 04
The Philosophical Context ....................................................06
PURPOSE OF THE S T U D Y ...........................................................................09
DEFINITIONS....................................................................................................... 10
D E L IM IT A T IO N S ............................................................................................... 12
METHODS .........................................................................................................13
II. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

IN T R O D U C T IO N ............................................................................................... 15
SERGIU C E L IB ID A C H E ..................................................................................16
PHENOM ENOLOGY........................................................................................... 19
G e n e r a l......................................................................................................19
Phenomenology of T im e ........................................................................24
Phenomenology of M u s i c .................................................................... 27
III. SERGIU CELIBIDACHE - A BIOGRAPHICAL OVERVIEW

IN T R O D U C T IO N ...............................................................................................34
C H R O N O L O G Y ..................................................................................................35
IV. INTRODUCTION TO PHENOMENOLOGY

INTRODUCTION TO E. HUSSERL AND PHENOMENOLOGY . . 44
THE MOST IMPORTANT M ETHODOLOGICAL STEPS
OF PH E N O M E N O L O G Y .................................................................... 54
Intentionality ........................................................................................ 55
E p o c h e ..................................................................................................... 60
Noema and n o e s i s ..................................................................................62
Transcendental reduction .................................................................... 67
Eidetic re d u c tio n .....................................................................................72
PHENOMENOLOGY AND INTERNAL TIME CONSCIOUSNESS . 74
IN T E R SU B JE C T IV IT Y .....................................................................................76
CONCLUSIONS AND S U M M A R Y ..............................................................79
vi
CHAPTER Page
V. SERGIU CELIBIDACHE’S PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH

TO M U S IC ...............................................................................................83
IN T R O D U C T IO N ...............................................................................................83
COSMOS, W ORLD, AND S O U N D ..............................................................86
Introduction ........................................................................................... 86
Death - the natural tendency of e v e ry th in g .......................................88
Tension and d i r e c t i o n ...........................................................................90
The f i f t h .................................................................................................. 93
Extroversion and in tro v e rsio n ..............................................................95
Phrasing .................................................................................................. 96
E p ip h e n o m e n a ........................................................................................ 98
THE MIND ..................................................................................................... 99
Pure consciousness................................................................................. 99
Noema and n o e s i s ................................................................................ 102
T h i n k in g .................................................................................................103
L a n g u a g e .................................................................................................105
Emotion, beauty, and interpretation ............................................... 106
Truth and r e a l it y ................................................................................... 108
Intersubjective o b je c tiv ity ................................................................... 110
Conditions that something may become m u s i c ...............................I l l
REDUCTION........................................................................................................113
TIM E AND TEM PO ...........................................................................................118
CONDUCTING BY M EM ORY....................................................................... 124
P H E N O M E N O L O G Y .......................................................................................125
MUSIC ....................................................................................................... 128
W ILHELM FURTW AENGLER...................................................................... 131
FAR EASTERN INFLUENCES...................................................................... 135
RECORDINGS AND R E P E T IT IO N ............................................................ 140
VI. SERGIU CELIBIDACHE’S REHEARSAL T E C H N IQ U E S ..................144
BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................... 148

Sergiu Celibidache .......................................................................................... 148
Books
Dissertations and Theses ................................................................................ 162
Articles and Interviews....................................................................................... 165
Papers 1
Unpublished S o u rc e s .......................................................................................... 174
Laser Discs, Video Tapes, Audio T a p e s ......................................................175
Archives ....................................................................................................177
vii
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
Ever since Sergiu Celibidache began his career as the conductor of the Berlin
Philharmonic Orchestra in 1945 much attention has been drawn to his work and
achievements because o f his unique artistic ability and personality, as well as his
philosophical impact on musicians and music making.
Celibidache was born in 1912 in Rumania. He studied in Berlin, including
composition with Heinz Tiessen, counterpoint with Hugo Diestler, conducting with
Walter Gmeindl, musicology with Arnold Schering, and philosophy with Eduard
Spranger and Nicolai Hartmann. He conducted his first concert with the Berlin
Philharmonic Orchestra in 1945, later taking the orchestra on tour to Europe and
South America. W hen Herbert von Karajan was appointed as the new music director
of the Berlin Philharmonic in 1954, Celibidache left Berlin to conduct in Italy,
Germany, Denmark, and Sweden. In 1972, Celibidache started teaching conducting
classes, and he was appointed music director1 of the Munich Philharmonic Orchestra
in 1979. His working relationship with this orchestra marks the last major phase in
'D ue to various difficulties with the administration and the orchestra, it took six
years to sign the contract with the city of Munich as permanent music director
(Weiler 1993: 361-371).
his artistic career.
Celibidache’s theoretical influence on the musical world originates from his
utilization of Far Eastern thinking and his specific approach to music, an approach
which is based on phenomenology. During the twentieth century, phenomenology has
affected almost all aspects of the natural sciences, the humanities, and the arts.
Phenomenologically influenced ideas have especially entered discussions concerning
the meanings and ideals of human artistic expression. Various attempts have been
made in recent years to create a well-defined theoretical system for a phenomenology
of music. However, most conductors seem to struggle in an attempt to integrate
philosophy in general or specifically phenomenology into their actual practice
(Reverter n.d.: 1-5). Celibidache can be seen as unique in twentieth-century
approaches to conducting, especially from the standpoint of how conductors integrate,
utilize, and put into practice a personal position of philosophy and spirituality (Weiler
1993: 352 and Umbach 1995a: 7-16).
In 1984, Celibidache conducted a concert with the orchestra of the Curtis
Institute of Music in New Y ork’s Carnegie Hall. This concert is an event which
musicians still speak of today (Umbach 1995a: 318). John Rockwell of the New York
Times called Celibidache a "musical spiritualist" whose performances he would
remember for the rest of his life (Rockwell 1989: 17 and M uenchner Philharmoniker
1989: 85). In addition, the 1989 United States/Canada tour of the Munich
Philharmonic under Celibidache’s baton left a profound impression on the music
world (Zelle 1994). Still, in the United States almost nothing substantial has been
published about Celibidache. This research project has sought to shed some light on
his background, his teachings, and his philosophical positions.
4
Context of the Study
In order to comprehend more adequately Celibidache’s work and
achievements, it is necessary to look at his career from an historical standpoint as
well as a philosophical one.
The Historical Context
Although bom in Rumania, historically Celibidache will always be perceived
within the German tradition of conducting. Celibidache himself consistently referred
to Wilhelm Furtwaengler as the figure in his life who had influenced him the most
(Lang 1988: 208-231). Celibidache not only conducted Furtwaengler’s orchestra, the
Berlin Philharmonic, from 1945 until 1954, but also referred to him several times as
the figure who personifies his musical ideals.
Gar n ic h t. . . Es ist gar nicht wahr, dass ich das wollte. Ich
wollte nicht Nachfolger von Furtwaengler werden. Keiner kann
Nachfolger von Furtwaengler sein ....V on ihm habe ich die
tiefgreifendsten musikalischen Erkenntnisse (Celibidache 1988:
221-229).2
Even though Celibidache had conducted 414 concerts with the Berlin
Philharmonic, and even though he was generally considered to be Furtwaengler’s
successor, he had always hoped Furtwaengler would return as music director.2 Never,
2Not at all...It is not true that I wanted that. 1 did not want to become
Furtwaengler’s successor. No one can be Furtwaengler’s successor....I have received
from him the most profound and influential knowledge o f music, [translation mine T.
Z.]
2Furtwaengler was struggling with a complex de-nazification

("Entnazifizierung") process in Germany, which prevented him from
conducting during that time. Celibidache him self had helped
Furtwaengler personally to succeed with the de-nazification process in
according to himself, during that time had Celibidache perceived himself as a rival
trying to take over Furtw aengler’s position (Mueller et. al. 1992: 26). W hen Herbert
von Karajan was announced as new music director for the Berlin Philharmonic after
Furtwaengler’s death in 1954, Celibidache became institutionally rootless (W eiler
1993: 93) and his career was interrupted. The transition from Celibidache to von
Karajan, as well as Celibidache leaving Berlin caused numerous discussions.3 It is
interesting to examine how Celibidache’s and von Karajan’s careers have developed
differently in the shadow of Furtwaengler’s legacy. Historically, Celibidache’s
context - of what he himself refers to as the 20th century European/German tradition
of orchestral conducting - is composed of four factors: Wilhelm Furtwaengler, the
Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra, von Karajan, and the impact of the Second World
War.
Clearly, Celibidache’s goals and ideals have always been different from those
of von Karajan’s. Whereas von Karajan continuously lead the Berlin Philharmonic in
a direction that would enhance commercial success (numerous recording cycles, first
on LPs and then on CDs and videos), Celibidache withdrew from the commercial
aspects of classical music. For the past three decades he has continuously refused to
the hope that Furtwaengler would some day be able to return to Berlin
to his old position as music director.
3See for a more detailed discussion and documentation Weiler (1993) and Matzner
(1986).
make any recordings which would place him in a commercially-oriented
environment.4 And now, almost at the turn of the century, it is inspiring to look at
von Karajan’s and Celibidache’s overall impact on the German tradition of conducting
and orchestral culture.
Besides this historical context, yet interdependently related to it are the
philosophical, theoretical, and aesthetical contexts in which Celibidache’s career
evolved.
The Philosophic Context
During his early years in Berlin, Celibidache developed a close relationship to
the Buddhist master and teacher M artin Steinke (Mueller et. al. 1992: 19). Steinke’s
profound influence on Celibidache determined the overall direction of his life. In an
interview given on May 5, 1992, in Santiago de Chile, Celibidache said, "Ich bin
Anhaenger des M eister Baba"5 (Celibidache 1992: 28). In his rehearsals and his
teachings, Celibidache often referred to Far Eastern traditions such as Zen, Hinduism,
4According to Celibidache, those CD recordings that are available on the market

were made either illegally or against his will. In the past, Celibidache had conducted
several radio symphony orchestras (Germany, Italy) which had been recorded due to
the nature o f the orchestra (purpose being to make recordings for radio broadcasts).
Celibidache’s work with these radio symphony orchestras had one reason, that is that
these orchestras allowed the highest amount o f rehearsal time. The video tapes and
laser discs that are available were made due to the influence of Celibidache’s son,
Serge (Weiler 1993: 342). Celibidache stated several times that the purpose o f these
videos and laser discs is a purely educational and non-commercial one, not a musical
or artistic one.
tra n s la tio n by author: "I am a devotee o f the master Baba." Celibidache refers to
the Indian Guru Bhagavan Sathya Sai Baba.
7
Chinese philosophies, and as well others. Far Eastern influences represent the first
main aspect of Celibidache’s thinking.
The seminars Celibidache taught in Germany at the University o f Mainz and
the Musikhochschule in Munich were entitled "Die Phaenomenologie der M usik."
Phenomenology represents the second main aspect of Celibidache’s thinking.
Phenomenology is a school o f Western philosophy that was founded by Edmund
Husserl at the very end of the 19th century (Held 1985: 6). Phenomenology’s
essential focus has been defined as the human experience, consciousness, and the laws
and structures of their processes as opposed to the object prior to experience.
Together with the question o f how to distinguish and how to separate the object
outside of an experience from the object within an experience, the question of time
perception, time experience, timelessness, and duration have played a major role in
phenomenological discourse. Phenomenology has been one of the major foundations
for Celibidache’s life work. In many ways, his work appears to be congruent with
Husserl’s philosophy, but at the same time, differs in other essential questions.
Both streams of thought, the Far Eastern philosophies as well as the Western
t
school of phenomenology, determine the philosophical structure within which
Celibidache has developed his own personal philosophical position. It is essential to
understand that he not only utilizes these streams of thought separately, but also
emphasizes many common denominators between the two. This synthesizing of
thought can be considered ground-breaking and unique within conducting and music-
making, for it has lead to concepts within the context of music (such as
8
transcendence, timelessness, and reduction) that might have existed before, but have
not been addressed and incorporated into the actual practice of musicianship.
Celibidache refers to these philosophical backgrounds with such intensity that they
affect both his rehearsal and his conducting technique (Eggebrecht 1992: 62-77).
This study will place emphasis on the philosophical context of Celibidache’s
work. Celibidache’s philosophy will be analyzed in two ways: First, it will be
presented within the context of phenomenology in general (Husserl); and second, it
will be related to Celibidache’s actual rehearsal techniques and conducting.
9
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The design of this study emerges from the two contexts previously discussed:
the historical context and the philosophical context. The purposes of this study are:
1. To present a documentation in English of Sergiu Celibidache’s life,
philosophy, and approach to conducting that is based on published and
available materials which are predominantly written in German. This
documentation is to be perceived as a basis for future research on
the subject.
2. To outline Celibidache’s contribution to a phenomenology of music, which
includes the areas in which his position is in harmony with that of
Husserl and other phenomenologists, as well as areas in which he
differs from them.
3. To present a bibliography of materials which is as complete as possible and
which can be used for future research.
10
DEFINITIONS
The fundamental terms relevant to this study are defined as follows:
Phenom enology: A scientific6 method based on the writings of Husserl that excludes
any object outside of consciousness from analysis, and defines the
domain of experience as the only locus of reality.
Phenomenology o f m usic: A scientific method in which the point of focus is no
longer sound as it is assumed to exist independently from
perception, but only the experience o f sound itself.
Epoche: The world itself, but only as it appears in consciousness. According to
Ferrara (1991) a synonym for transcendental reduction (pp. 60-64).
Transcendental reduction: The bracketing o f all physical/sensational information and
relations, and the exclusive concentration on pure self-reflection,
which is the sole reflection o f conscious onto itself (including its acts).
Eidetic reduction: The filtering of all common features of several transcendental
reductions and the exclusion o f specific individual features within
transcendental reductions in order to come to some sort of
universal conclusion about the condition o f knowledge and truth.
Durational tem porality: The temporal quality of an experience of succession, which
distinguishes between before and after.
6The term scientific is part o f Husserl’s own definition o f the phenomenological

method and it expresses his critique o f the scientific method generally used. The key
notion in Husserl’s argument is that o f consciousness being the focus of analysis. For a
more detailed discussion, see Husserl 1985 (pp. 196-224) and Husserl 1962.
Non-durational tem porality: The temporal quality of an experience of something
within which no before and after exist.
Timelessness: The quality of an experience which does not contain any type of
temporality and in which duration does not exist.
Music education: All forms and institutions concerned with the teaching of music.
12
DELIMITATIONS
The purpose of this study was to examine Celibidache’s teachings on
phenomenology and music. Although a biographical chronology is presented in
chapter III, the study was not intended to be a biography. It was not the purpose of
this study to represent Celibidache personally, biographically, or philosophically. The
research project was exclusively based on previously published materials, and Oil
notes taken by the author and other students of Celibidache as he taught. Sergin
Celibidache has neither read nor approved this text.
Phenomenology, Far Eastern traditions or schools of thought are discussed
only in the context of Sergiu Celibidache, and—by necessity—are represented only
partially.
The philosophical analysis focuses primarily on the most recent period of
Celibidache’s career with the Munich Philharmonic Orchestra. Changes in and
developments of his artistic views and philosophical standpoints were not the focus of
this study.
13
METHODS
The methods for this research project are drawn from the following
publications: Ball and Smith (1992), Colwell (1992), Glaser and Strauss (1967),
Goodenough (1957, 1969, and 1970), Kleinschroth (n.d.), Lincoln (1985), Patton
(1990), Zelle (1992/93).
The methodology is based on the outlines and discussions published in the
Handbook ot Research on Music Teaching and Learning by Richard Colwell (ed.).7 It
will consist of the utilization of qualitative research that includes ethnography,
biography, and descriptive research, including observational research, and spoken
responses to questions. "Responses to questions" and "observational research" mainly
refer to the author’s participation in Celibidache’s master classes and his questions
addressed to Celibidache. All research methods mentioned are discussed in a broader
sense in Colwell (1992). Colwell’s Handbook of Research on Music Teaching and
Learning has become a work of fundamental importance to the community of music
educators in the United States.
In addition, the methodology used in this research project utilizes the
theoretical foundations outlined by Glaser and Strauss (1967), Patton (1980), and
Lincoln and Guba (1985).8
7See Section B, Chapter six, Qualitative Research Methodology in Music

Education (pp. 75 - 90) and Section B, Chapter nine. Descriptive Research: Technique
and Procedures (pp. 115- 123) .
8The methodological references also apply to the analysis o f visual data. Ball and
Smith (1992) have discussed the utilization o f qualitative research methods for visual
data. Similar to the discussions in Lincoln and Guba (1985), and Glaser and Strauss
14
The first and main methodological procedure for this research project is that of
structuring the given material by creating topics (i.e., coding). The author will find
categories with which the data can be organized. The categories are primarily
theoretical and are drawn from Celibidache’s philosophical teachings. The main
categories used in this research project are congruent with the main categories in
Celibidache’s teachings. These are key terms or key topics (for example: time and
reduction). These categories are developed through the methods o f triangulation, cross
checking, and content analysis.
The second methodological step consists o f the integration o f the developed
categories. Here, the findings o f single categories will be related to the findings of
other categories.
The third methodological step consists of the development o f generalizations
which are supported by the data. This includes the presentation o f summaries,
characteristics, and implications for future research.
(1967), Ball and Smith outline the methods o f coding and content analysis for visual
data (See especially Ball and Smith 1992: 20-31).
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
INTRODUCTION
The following areas were considered in this review: 1) published materials on
Sergiu Celibidache, and 2) current research and developments in musical
phenomenology with special emphasis on musical time. No dissertations have yet been
published on Sergiu Celibidache.
16
SERGIU CELIBIDACHE
In the past, Sergiu Celibidache has consistently refused not only to
conduct/work for audio recordings, but also to publish texts on his teachings. Few
people have been permitted to conduct interviews with him. The reader of this
research project must keep in mind that Celibidache has been highly critical of what
other have people said, written, and published about him. For example, several times
during Celibidache’s seminars and master classes he would not tolerate even literal
quotes.1 In general, his position towards publications, the written word, and language
as a means to communicate the essence of his art is thoroughly negative (Zelle 1992:
36-42). The interviews that were published and documented, however, formed the
basis of the second part of this study which specifically analyses Celibidache’s
approach to music and phenomenology.
Those interviews that played a major role in this research project were
conducted by Wolfgang Schreiber (1992), Joachim Matzner (1986), Matthias Fischer
(1986), Harald Eggebrecht (1992), Klaus Lang (1988), Heinz Ludwig (1976), Antonio
Morales (Umbach 1995b), Klaus Umbach (1995a and 1995b),2 and Jan Schmidt-Garre
’In his 1992 seminar at the University of Mainz, for example, Celibidache
strongly censored a student quoting what Celibidache had just said previously.
Celibidache refers to an experience (which includes anything a human says) as
something unique, to be experienced only once, placed in the present moment of its
appearance, and hence unrepeatable. The repetition of words (quotes) implies a
separation of the communicated experience from the linguistic medium (language).
His censorship appeared to be his way of teaching this distinction (Zelle 1992: 36-42).
2Klaus Umbach collected many materials on the subject "Sergiu Celibidache" for
his own research. Most of the material collected in this archive originates directly
from the archive of P e r Sniegel/Germanv. which is not open to the public. Klaus
17
(1992).3 These individuals developed long working relationships with either
Celibidache or the orchestras he conducted. Besides the interviews with Celibidache,
only two major texts exist that were written about Celibidache by friends of his.4
In this research project these materials played a major role for chapter three
(biographic overview).
Newspaper review-articles played a minor role in this research project, since
these articles were written by authors rather unfamiliar with phenomenology and
present subjective impressions and judgments. However, the review-articles that were
collected by the author strongly supported the data given in the interviews and other
primary sources. Some review-articles were used in this research project.
Sony Classics published four video recordings of the Bruckner symphonies
number six, seven, and eight with the Munich Philharmonic and number seven with
the Berlin Philharmonic, and Teldec Video has published a video recording of
Prokofiev’s Symphonie Classique (all conducted by Celibidache). All are available on
Umbach kindly offered the author the use of his archive. The author photocopied 968
pages of documents from Klaus Umbach’s archive. Most documents are newspaper
review articles. 151 pages consist of interviews with Sergiu Celibidache. Most
documents give the source (usually newspapers), and the date. Page numbers and
newspaper sections are not given. Several documents do not give the source. The
pages of this archive are not numbered. Klaus Umbach’s archive consists exclusively
of photo copies. The author of this research project is therefore using photocopies of
the photocopies of Klaus Umbach’s archive. Throughout the research project the
author will refer to documents of this archive with the reference: (Umbach 1995b). If
the used document states its source and date of publication it will appear in the text.
3Some published interviews do not list the name o f the person who conducted the
interview (for example Celibidache 1992a).
4See Sombart 1984 and Weiler 1993.
18
laser disc as well. Celibidache insistently described these recordings as educational
documents and not as authentic substitutes for his conducting and for music (Zelle
1992: 16). Several TV broadcasts were made in Italy, the United States, Great
Britain, and other countries of concerts conducted by Celibidache. These audio-visual
documents were partially used for the discussion of Celibidache’s rehearsal and
conducting techniques.5
SA good documentation of Celibidache’s most recent work with the Munich

Philharmonic is published in the series Philharmonische Blaetter (1986, 1989,
1992/93, 1993, 1994a, and 1994b). See as well Gaag 1992, Lesle 1991, Schreiber
1987, n.d., and 1992, and Umbach 1989.
19
PHENOMENOLOGY
General
Historically, the term phenomenology refers to the works and thinking of
Edmund Husserl, although similar ideas originated from Brentano, Scheler,
Hartmann, M erleau-Ponty, Heidegger, and Jean-Paul Sartre.6 Husserl was born in
1859 in Germany and studied mathematics and philosophy in Leipzig and Berlin.
After completing his dissertation on the philosophy of mathematics, Husserl studied
philosophy in Vienna with Franz Brentano, who profoundly influenced him in the
development o f phenomenology. Following his Habilitation,1 Husserl published his
first major work—Logische Untersuchungen.8 Besides Husserl, M artin Heidegger,
although in general classified as an existentialist, plays an essential role in the
development and illumination of the phenomenological tradition.
Phenomenology, as it is described and introduced by Husserl, represents a
scientific method. The key terms of H usserl’s philosophy are those of reduction and
epoche. Reduction is defined as the elimination of any object outside of consciousness
from scientific analysis. Epoche is defined as the analytical relationship of
consciousness with itself, which is the methodological prerequisite for any analysis
per se based on reduction. Husserl’s philosophy is extremely complex and many other
6See Held in Introduction to Edmund Husserl, Die Phaenomenoloeische Methode

- Ausgewaehlte Texte I (Stuttgart: Phillipp Reclam ju n ., 1985).
7The term Habilitation refers to the thesis that has been a requirement in the
European academic system to be appointed as professor.
8Husserl 1975 and 1984.
20
essential terms must be comprehended to cover the whole spectrum of his work.
Other m ajor concepts that emerge from the understanding of reduction and epoche are
noema, noesis, eidetic and transcendental reduction, among others. This discussion,
however, uses only the key terms (reduction and epoche) as a point of departure for
an understanding of a phenomenology of music.
Epoche and reduction actually represent acts of consciousness, which define
the relationships among experiencing subject, experienced object, and reflecting
consciousness. From these acts of consciousness, which are the fundamental of
phenomenological methodology are derived the understandings that the world only
appears as consciousness and that no assumptions whatsoever can be made about a
world outside o f consciousness. According to Husserl, consciousness constitutes the
world as it appears to us rather than the world constituting consciousness. Bednarz
(1984) expressed this fundamental hypothesis as follows:
Reason means for Husserl to be able to supply not only evidence

needed to support knowledge but also the source o f this
evidence. The source of the kind of evidence that will satisfy the
ultimate justification claims of any knowledge is co-extensive,
therefore, with discovering the foundations of knowledge itself.
This foundation can not limit itself to being a purely logical
foundation of the objective-ideal type because it does not take
into account the acts in which evidence presents itself (DAI-A
42/02, p .733).
Bednarz described the scientific justification and legitimacy that becomes
possible through the concepts of reduction and epoche. He pointed out that the
legitimacy o f this approach emerges not only because the objects of and within
consciousness are being analyzed, but also because of the modes by which these
21
objects are represented by consciousness within consciousness.
Altmann (1981) approached this problem from a slightly different angle. He
pointed to the implications Husserl’s phenomenology has for our understanding of the
human body. Altmann stated in his dissertation on corporeality:
For Husserl there is in every act of consciousness an element

that is irreducible to nature. In his assessment of the naturalistic
tendency he demonstrates that spiritual/psychical phenomena
cannot simply be reduced to mere epiphenomena of physical or
material nature. On the contrary, nature is a correlate of
consciousness and the intentional meaning-product of
transcendental subjectivity....Corporeality, therefore, does not
have its traditional connotation of a material entity existing
within a presupposed spatial-temporal world matrix in
accordance with the law of a natural causality (DAI-A 41/11,
p. 4737).
Altmann hinted at an important implication that is often overlooked in
phenomenological writings: the body can not be perceived as a material object with
the world, but as an "organ of spirit" (1981). Altmann created the point of departure
for understanding that the body is essentially interconnected with its spiritual and
mental processes. With this connection phenomenological discussions have focused on
the temporal qualities of the acts of consciousness.
The understanding of the methodological steps of epoche and reduction play an
indispensable role for the concept of temporality, which is essential in the realm of
music and music making. Reimann (1969) argued not only that the positivistic attitude
of the mind and the body as objects is naive, but also that the traditional concept of
duration and measurable time is no longer applicable. Reimann’s philosophical
22
conclusion was congruent with concepts of quantum physics,9 namely that the
traditional space/time matrix does not exist, and that consciousness is directly related
to this fact. Reimann’s distinction between "inside of" and "outside of" time is
essential. Reimann concluded in his dissertation:
All that is argued is that the epoche requires for its very
possibility that the subject of our awareness is a transcendental
ego, and specifically that temporality can appear for a
transcendental ego not itself in time (Reimann 1969: DAI-A
30/03, p. 1205).
The significance of phenomenology has been pointed out by many authors for
a variety of contexts, such as linguistics (Barfoot), communication (Schrag), aesthetics
(Lipps), anthropology (Scheler), axiology and the philosophy of religion (Hartmann),
sociology (Mannheim), psychology (Benswanger), psychiatry and psychotherapy
(Frankl), and psychology of personality (Rogers) (Sahakian 1968). Millikan (1967),
for example, placed emphasis on "showing positively the self-transcendence which
Heidegger saw in both in-authentic and authentic existence, and in explaining time as
the ontological condition of the possibility of self-transcendent existence" (DAI-A
27/08, p. 2561). Mason (1973) and Malik (1937) discussed the phenomenological
problem of time and self-transcendence in relation to W hitehead’s philosophy of the
metaphysics of time. Alexandersson (1981) applied Husserl’s methodology to a
"phenomenologically grounded empirical psychology" which bears implications for
the field of educational psychology. In all these works there is a strong emphasis on
9See as well Heidegger 1992, Popper and Eccles 1982, Dossey 1982, Fraser
1990, and Wilber 1977.
23
the indispensable use of the phenomenological methodology for understanding the
human mind and its perception o f and position in the world. Chapters four and five
will further discuss how these philosophical concepts relate to Celibidache’s work,
and how he is utilizing them.
Several works that apply principles o f phenomenology within the domain of
education have been completed. Garrison (1988) emphasized the importance of
Dewey’s and Husserl’s epistemologies for the philosophy of education. Stone (1979)
presented "phenomenology as an alternative approach in conducting educational
research." Atkinson (1972: 295) established a "familiarity with the vocabulary and
concepts o f phenomenology as an aid to the general scholar" which serves an
important function. Atkinson’s contribution is particularly important because, in the
past, the specific fields of academia have not incorporated phenomenological methods,
particularly due to the extreme degree of abstraction involved. The vocabulary
developed by Husserl and Heidegger (especially in Sein und Zeit) is so complex that it
prevented the emergence of generally accepted linguistic tools for expression, thought,
discussion, and practice. Atkinson tried to help overcome these problems of
comm unication.10
,0See as well Johnston 1992, Orth n .d., Barfoot 1981, and Schrag 1979.
24
Phenomenology o f Time
A focus o f Husserl’s, which is also a general focus of phenomenological
research, is that of time and time consciousness. It is the dichotomy o f duration and
non-duration, o f time and timelessness, as two different states o f consciousness which
causes the human condition to be torn between two realities: the outside and the
inside, or as Reimann (1969) pointed out, the ego and the transcended ego. Gallagher
(1981) wrote:
The human body, temporal, incomplete, and imperfect, is thought to be

somewhat the initiator of error and the spoiler for freedom. The soul, in
its relation to the body, is conceived to be entrapped in temporality, and
yet in other respects it is understood to be a participant in the non
temporal essence of the eternal. The soul is thought to be somewhat
between time and timeless (DAI-A 42/05, p. 2164).
Gallagher’s conclusion correlates with Altmann’s dissertation on corporeality.
As later chapters on music and time perception will discuss, Gallagher’s concept of
temporality and the body/mind relationship can play a significant role for an aesthetic
o f m usic.11 Tougas (1981) concurred in his dissertation on "Internal Time
Consciousness and Transfinity." Tougas’ terms o f reflection and totality, when
applied to music, refer respectively to analyses o f music and experiencing/being
music. Although his analytical approach originated from a different perspective, he
came to very similar conclusions. Instead of the dichotomy of body and soul, he
analogously distinguished between reflection and totality:
For reflection, totality is essentially an infinite continuity,
"F o r further discussions see Ferrara 1991, Kramer 1988, Smith 1989, Dowling
and Harwood 1986, Stockhausen 1989a and 1989b, and Barry 1990.
25
wherein all parts are connected in foundation. By its logic,

totality is transfmite and underlying but not concrete and finally
lim ited....Reflection and totality are nevertheless both founded
in the continuity of the absolute founding now of the innerly
aware, not in "bigness." Reflection limits; totality transcends.
Their Now is the limit of each past and the openness to each
future (Tougas 1981: DAI-A 42/02, p. 735).
The essential idea of phenomenology is the premise that the quality of human
perception is constituted by what exists within the perceiving apparatus and not by the
object of perception prior to perception. The object is an internal—not an external-
entity. In applying this premise to the understanding of time, Portmess (1978) wrote:
The assumption which underlies much contemporary philosophy

of time is that reality is as our most sophisticated physical
theories tell us it is, and that ultimately we are to understand
reality in light of certain abstract theoretical concepts. In
keeping with the phenomenological tradition, I shall argue that
time ought to be understood as it is revealed in ordinary
experience, and that essentially time is a problem, not of
abstract thought, but of life itself—a problem that arises from the
human need to find reconciliation with the passage of time (pp.
ii-iii).
White (1977) and Pageler (1967) discussed the question of time within the
contexts of Heidegger’s and Kirkegaard’s philosophies. To them a phenomenology of
time was not a problem that can be understood by looking outside, for example with
the concept of "clock time" or the durational continuum of measured time in physics.
Rather, time and timelessness are determinations of the specific states of human
consciousness.12
Schwartz (1977) studied the various experiences of time among graduate
12See for a complex discussion of time and phenomenology Heine 1980, Herman
1974.
26
students. His study on Heidegger’s concept of "being-in-the-world" showed that
different qualities of human responsibility toward one’s own experiences and
differences in personality ("actively internalized" and "passively externalized")
correlate with significant differences about how temporality is experienced.13 Schwartz
demonstrated that an understanding o f temporality needs to be contextualized—in this
case with the factors of personality-in order for one to understand fully the dimension
o f time as it is actually experienced.
13See as well a related study on personality and time perception by Barnes 1977.
27
Phenomenology of Music
Husserl’s philosophy raises significant issues for music. The questions that
emerge are: How do human consciousness and the human mind relate to the
difference between sound and music? W hat is it that lets music emerge out of sound?
How does temporality differ in the realm of music and in the realm o f sound?
These questions yield different responses when they are applied to the
positivistic and Cartesian paradigms versus phenomenologically and spiritually
oriented paradigms. Not only are the answers different, but the laws and structures of
the two paradigms are distinct, too. Consequently, it is crucial for the field of music,
and especially music education, to contextualize clearly assumptions and conclusions
when referring to the realm of sound (positivistic; objectified and measured) or the
realm of music (phenomenological). As Bartholomew (1986) noted in his critique of
Reimann’s aesthetics for music education, we are constantly dealing with a confusion
of the "experienced object and the experiencing of the object" (p. 4).
Historically, Ansermet and Celibidache were probably among the first who
understood the importance of this connection between phenomenology and music.
Thakar (1988) seems to have based his research on Celibidache’s teachings, although
no specific citations to Celibidache are given.14 Celibidache not only taught a
phenomenology of music in his master classes, but also puts the phenomenological
method in practice during rehearsals and performances. As will be outlined later,
,4See as well Thakar’s unpublished materials on phenomenology and Celibidache

(Thakar 1988 and n.d.).
28
Celibidache eliminates any assumption about musical objects outside the mind during
his work as a conductor. For example, a musician will execute a musical indication (a
crescendo for example) not because it appears on the page of the score, but because
of a conscious, internal necessity and the musical context of which it is an integral
part. Because of this, the motivation to execute a crescendo is internal and not
external. Phenomena only exist within consciousness and that is the exclusive realm to
which the musician refers and within which he/she works.
Ansermet (1961, 1991) attempted the same goal in "Les Fondements de la
Musique dans la Conscience Humaine," which is of historical importance. In this
work he emphasized the importance of self-reflection within consciousness. In his
complex argument, Ansermet followed H usserl’s methodology, in which the
noema/noesis difference play an essential p a rt.15 Although several scholarly works
have been published on the phenomenological studies by Ernest Ansermet, they are of
minor importance for this dissertation.16
15The constituting act of consciousness is the main field of H usserl’s studies. He

demonstrates several mechanisms of the presentation of information within the human
mind. Only a few can be mentioned here. First of all, Husserl distinguishes the actual
experience and feeling of an act of consciousness from the act of reflecting on that
activity of consciousness. Both the actual experience (Erlebnis) and the reflection
(Auffassungssinn) are constituting acts. The act of reflection Husserl calls noesis (or
noetische Phase) and the actual experience o f the internal object of experience he calls
noema. Noema refers to the physical dimension of an conscious experience, which is
expressed and manifested through language o f objectify mg terminologies. Beyond
that, a noema always contains two aspects: an aspect of objects (appearing within
experience in their material sense) and an aspect of contents appearing in their non
material sense (for example, values) (Prechtel 1991: 42).
16See Piguet’s discussion of Ansermet’s phenomenological interpretation of

logarithmic structures as the foundation of human consciousness (Piguet 1985).
29
Any attempt to apply systematically the phenomenological method to the field
of music creates tensions with current practices o f musicology, theory, and
performance. Kimmey (1984) discussed the history of musicology from a
phenomenological perspective. He tried to establish "the eidetic structure of
musicology through a phenomenological approach" (p.7). In doing so he concluded
that the dualistic schematization of musicology into speculative and practical aspects is
not appropriate in relation to its goals:
It seems more in keeping with the phenomenon under scrutiny,

i.e., musicology, that the traditional discussion is
unw arranted....M usicology is a unified discipline not a divided
one (pp. 256-258).
This investigation is the application of methods to produce the

science of musical phenomena: musicology. To disengage these
methods and view them as an object for investigation is to move
into the realm of metamusicology. The change in focus from
musicology to metamusicology is a change from an objective
focus...to a subjective one (the tools and methods used by
musicologists to investigate the musical field) (pp. 4-5).
Kimmey insisted that any research result must not be separated from context o f the
researcher (who is he/she, what are his/her intentions, etc). Instead the researcher
him self/herself plays an integral function in understanding the research result itself. It
can no longer be perceived as being separated (what traditionally justifies the quality
of objectivity) from the researching mind. Analogously, current research in education
makes a distinction between positivism and interpretivism.
M ost studies on a phenomenology of music have noted that current musical
and educational institutions seem to ignore the phenomenological approach as a
possible instructional device. Smith (1973) wrote:
30
It is suggested that traditional musicology has over

emphasized the thematical and cognitive aspects of musical
structure and underemphasized the study of sound perception....
It is concluded that the attempts of 20th century musicology to
explain auditory perception can benefit both psychological
empiricism and phenomenology (p.64).17
The attempt to understand music phenomenologically became a serious
scientific encounter only in the most recent decades of this century. Whereas initial
works (for example Arcaya 1975) outlined and defined the problems o f a
phenomenological approach to music, later studies systematized and structured this
new field of study into a phenomenology of music. Bartholomew (1985) specifically
discussed the importance of phenomenology for music education and suggests several
questions for music teachers (especially at conservatory and university levels). He
emphasized the relationship between the whole of a piece of music and the abstracted
parts (such as rhythm, pitch, articulation, dynamics, etc.). Although he fails to
present concrete practical concepts for the actual rehearsal/classroom situation, his
work stands as an initial breakthrough toward a phenomenology of music.
Shaerer (1976) applied similar concepts to the question of aesthetic values in
music, primarily referring to Heidegger’s concepts expressed in Sein und Zeit (1976).
He describes the goal of his phenomenological approach as follows:
The aim of this work, then, is to show, by strict
phenomenological exhibition, that the reduction of interest to

self-contained context, and the concentration on aesthetic
structure as it appears in consciousness within that context, have
17Smith’s critique of musicology encompasses many parallels to H usserl’s critique

of Western science in general and psychology in particular (psychology debate).
31
indeed provided us with the most appropriate ground for

aesthetic valuation (p. 2). [emphasis mine T. Z.]
Delpaz and his co-authors (1978: 252) discussed the "modalities of musical
attention and perception" as a "view of aesthetics and style." Again, the important
quality of this approach is the attempt to explain aesthetic value by focusing on the act
of experiencing as opposed to focusing exclusively on the object of experience. The
fact that the object of experience is inseparably connected with the modes of the act of
experiencing leads to a new understanding of what an aesthetic value can be.
Together with Bartholomew, the works of Pelt (1983) and M agnusdottir (1980)
can be seen as more general approaches toward a phenomenology of music. These
authors tend to work toward a more generic model of a phenomenological
conceptualization of music. Magnusdottir critiqued "the psychological-neurological
model for overlooking the primordial perceptual relation of the perceiver and the
perceived" (pp. 164-166), primarily using M erleau-Ponty’s philosophy as a starting
point. Pelt focused on the ontology of a piece of art, using Heidegger’s philosophy as
a starting point. Although both authors presented important research for the
development of a phenomenology of music, both failed to create a systematic outline
that bears clear practical guidelines that can be used in the actual rehearsal/classroom
situation.
Other studies discuss the philosophical and aesthetic difficulties in greater
detail in the context of specific musical problems. Lochhead (1982) and Bodreau
(1992), who critiqued other phenomenologically-oriented studies, specifically dealt
with a phenomenology of musical time.
32
Streb (1984) applied phenomenological thinking to the elementary and
secondary education in the arts and Panzarella (1977) investigated concrete "peak
experiences in response to music and visual art and some personality correlates" (p.
4). Analogous to Schwartz’ findings of personality differences as an important factor
for the evaluation o f experience-qualities, Panzarella pointed to various individual
factors as being responsible for the aesthetic meaning of peak experiences. Crucial in
this work was the attempt to eliminate the exclusive fixation on an object outside of
human consciousness and to contextualize the peak experience with the consciousness
that is experiencing it.
Lewin (1986) and M oog (1977) discussed phenomenological methodologies
from a psychological perspective. W hereas M oog focused on the "influence on music
theory o f phenomenological investigations of perception and potential or at least
metaphorical links with artificial intelligence" (p. I l l ) , Lewin discussed "musical
experiences phenomenologically as time gestalts existing only in experience. The
division o f time gestalts into noise, speech, and music implies various experiential
functions" (p. 364) [emphasis mine, T. Z.].
M ore specific are the works o f Carpenter (1974), who primarily dealt with the
question of musical form (including some questions o f temporality), Cordes (1971),
who exclusively discussed specific twentieth-century pieces utilizing a
phenomenological methodology, and Clifton (1983), who included the parameters of
33
time, space, feeling, and motion in his extensive discussion.18 Carpenter attempted to
define the concept of a fugue, using a phenomenological approach to interpret the
temporalities and structures implied in a fugue. She used in her research examples of
Pachelbel and Bach. Cordes came to this conclusion:
It seems to be true that composers in the latter decades of the

twentieth century have indeed found a way of symbolically
representing sound per se, that is, not a demonstration of what
man the master of nature can do with the sound phenomenon at
his disposal but rather a truer picture of all the possibilities of
the musical sound-phenomena of nature without the purposive
manipulation of man (p. 186).
18See as well the work of Brodhead (1983) on "Structural Time in Twentieth-

Century Tonal Music."
CHAPTER III
SERGIU CELIBIDACHE - A BIOGRAPHICAL OVERVIEW
INTRODUCTION
In general, relatively little is known about Celibidache’s personal life.
However, available literature does reflect the main stages and points o f Celibidache’s
professional life. The following data are given in the form of a chronology of the
most important (mainly professional) events of Celibidache’s life. It is a summary of
the following three sources, which can be considered fundamental to the biographical
data collection of Celibidache’s life: Klaus Umbach (1995a: 330-331), Klaus Weiler
(1993: 361-371), and Konrad M ueller et. al. (1992: 134-136). Most o f the listed data
are overlapping and published in two or in all three publications. Some data that are
indirectly related to Sergiu Celibidache are included in this chronology for a better
understanding of the circumstances of Celibidache’s career and life.1
•Some o f the texts used for this chronology (especially Weiler 1993) are so short
that the English representation in this research project comes very close to a translation
o f the original German text. This resemblance was not intended but unavoidable.
35
CHRONOLOGY
1912-35 Celibidache born on the 11th of July 1912 in the city of Roman in
Rumania (date according to the Gregorian Calendar). According to the
Julian Calendar, which was valid in 1912, his date of birth is 28th of
June 1912. Lived in Rumania until 1935. At age four started to play
piano. Nine years o f piano lessons. After basic school training, studied
mathematics and philosophy in the city of Jassy. In Jassy, beginning of
regular studies of music. Continuation of studies in Bukarest. Pianist at
a dance school in Bukarest.
1935/36 Studies in Paris. Played in a Jazz Band.
1936-45 Studies in Berlin at the Musikhochschule and the Friedrich-Wilhelms-
Universitaet. Most influential teachers were: Heinz Tiessen
(composition), W alter Gmeindl (conducting), Hugo Distler
(counterpoint), Kurt Thomas and Fritz Stein (theory), Eduard Spranger
and Nicolai Hartmann (philosophy), Arnold Schering and Georg
Schuenemann (musicology). Began dissertation on the subject of form-
creating elements in the composition technique of Josquin des Pres.
Concert tours as piano accompanist. Autodidact and self-teachings in
dancing. Concerts with amateur ensembles and choirs. Performance of
the six Brandenburg Concertos with students of the Musikhochschule at
Berlin (approx. fall 1944). Began to compose and to perform his own
compositions.
36
8. 1945 W inner of the conducting competition of the Russian occupation
army/district with the Berlin Radio Symphony Orchestra.
8. 23. 1945 Leo Borchard, the first post war conductor of the Berlin Philharmonic
Orchestra, died.
8. 29. 1945 First concert under Celibidache’s baton with the Berlin Philharmonic
Orchestra.
12. 1. 1945 Appointment as conductor (Lizenztraeger)-n o t music d ire c to r-o f the
Berlin Philharmonic.
1946 Started to teach at the International Institute of Music in Berlin.
Appointed Music Director of the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra until
the return of Wilhelm Furtwaengler (who at that time was not allowed
to conduct in Germany because of accusations of having collaborated
with the nazi regime). Premier of Shostakovich’s seventh symphony
in Germany with the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra under the
direction of Sergiu Celibidache. First personal meeting with Wilhelm
Furtwaengler.
5. 1. 1947 Denazification of Furtwaengler (which was supported and prepared by
Celibidache, who was trying to help Furtwaengler return to the
Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra).
5. 25. 1947 First concert with the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra under the direction
of Wilhelm Furtwaengler after the war. Celibidache, however,
remained designated Music Director of the Berlin Philharmonic
37
Orchestra.
1948 First concert with the London Philharmonic Orchestra under the
direction of Sergiu Celibdiache. Concert tour with Sergiu Celibidache,
Furtwaengler, and the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra to England
1949 Highly acclaimed conducting successes in England, Vienna, Italy, and
France.
1950 - 51 Highly acclaimed concerts in Central and South America.
5. 1951 Serious throat surgery in Mexico City.
1951 - 52 Concert tours in Italy, Central and South America.
1952 Furtwaengler again Music Director of the Berlin Philharmonic
Orchestra.
5. 1952 Highly acclaimed success in Buenos Aires.
12. 19. 1952 Last meeting with Wilhelm Furtwaengler in Turin/Italy.
1953 Berlin Art Award (Kunstpreis) for music.
10. 1953 First concert with the Orchestra of the M ilan Scala.
11. 28. 1954 Grosses Verdienstkreuz des Verdienstordens der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland (highest award of the Federal Republic of Germany) for
the reconstruction of the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra after the second
world war.
11. 29. 1954 Last concert with the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra until 3. 31. 1992.
30. 11. 1954 W ilhelm Furtwaengler died.
12. 13. 1954 Herbert von Karajan appointed new Music Director of the
Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra. Celibidache left Berlin and the Berlin
Philharmonic Orchestra (which he had conducted, until this date, 414
times in concert performances).
1955 Award of the Association of German Critics (Preis des Verbandes
Deutscher Kritiker) [Translation mine, T. Z.]. Intensive work in Italy.
From 1953 - 1967 Celibidache conducted the season opening concerts
of La Scala in Milan. Intensive work and cooperation with the
Orchestra of the Academia di Santa Cecilia in Rome. Guest conducting
with the Radio Symphony Orchestras of Rome, M ilan, Turin,
Naples, Bologna, and Florence. Guest conducting in Israel and
England.
10 . 7 . 1957 Celibidache conducted for the first time in three years in Berlin
again, namely the Radio-Symphony Orchestra Berlin during a concert
celebrating the seventieth birthday of his composition teacher Heinz
Tiessen.
1957 - 58 Various concerts with the Radio Symphony Orchestra of the West
Deutscher Rundfunk in Cologne. Celibidache took this orchestra on
several tours throughout Germany and Italy.
1958 - 59 First concerts with the Radio Symphony Orchestra Stuttgart/Germany.
1960 - 63 Intensive work and cooperation with the Royal Orchestra Copenhagen.
In 1961 Celibidache took this orchestra on an extensive tour
throughout Germany and West Berlin.
39
10. 1962 First concerts with the Swedish Radio Symphony Orchestra.
1962 Celibidache moved to Italy.
1963 - 71 Principal Guest Conductor and Artistic Director of the Swedish Radio
Symphony Orchestra. 1967 concert tours to Denmark and the Federal
Republic of Germany. Additional tours to Switzerland and Spain in
1968, to Finland and Austria in 1969, and to the Netherlands, Austria
and Rumania in 1970.
1967 Concerts with the Staatskapelle Berlin in East Berlin, Dresden, and
Leipzig (former German Democratic Republic).
1968 His wife Joane gave birth to their son Serge.
1969 - 70 Concerts with the Bamberger Sinfoniker (Symphony Orchestra of
Bamberg/Germany).
1970 Appointment as knight of the Vasa Order {Ritter des Vasa
Orcfewj/Stockholm) in Stockholm and recipient of the award of the
Leonie-Sonning Music Price of Denmark in Copenhagen.
3. 21. 1971 Last concert with the Swedish Radio Symphony Orchestra.
6. 1971 Conducted the 25th anniversary concert of the Radio
Symphony Orchestra Stuttgart/Germany.
1972 Taught conducting masterclasses in Bologna and
Siena/Italy.
1972 - 77 Principal Guest Conductor and Artistic Director of the Radio Symphony
Orchestra Stuttgart. Celibidache took this orchestra on numerous tours
40
abroad: Yugoslavia, Spain, France, and Austria in 1977.
1973 - 75 Principal Guest Conductor of the Orchestre National de l’ORTF in
Paris. Celibidache moved to Paris with his wife Joane and their son
Serge.
1977 - 78 Taught conducting masterclasses in Trier/Germany.
1978 Taught conducting masterclasses in Bukarest with the
Bukarest Philharmonic Orchestra. Begining of his teaching at the
Institute for Musicology at the University of Mainz/Germany in
phenomenology of music. Concerts with the NHK-Symphony Orchestra
Tokyo, the London Symphony Orchestra, and the Rheinland-
pfaelzischem Staatsorchester/Germany.
2. 14. 1979 First concert with the Munich Philharmonic Orchestra.
6. 1979 Appointment as Music Director o f the city o f Munich
('Generalmusikdirektor) and subsequently as Music Director o f the
Munich Philharmonic Orchestra. Appointed member of the Bavarian
Academy o f Fine Arts (Bayrische Akademie der Schoenen Kuenste).
10. 15. 1979 First performance o f Bruckner’s eight symphony with the Munich
Philharmonic Orchestra.
1980 - 82 Taught conducting masterclasses in Munich with the
M unich Philharmonic Orchestra.
10. 1981 First concert tour throughout Germany with the Munich
41
1982 Concert tour with the Munich Philharmonic Orchestra throughout
France, Italy, and Spain.
6. 9. 1982 Last concert with the Radio Symphony Orchestra Stuttgart/Germany.
2. 27. 1984 Concert with the Orchestra o f the Curtis Institute o f M usic/
Philadelphia (with which Celibidache had intensively rehearsed during a
three week period) in New York City’s Carnegie Hall.
1984 - 1985 Serious illness, which lead to severe difficulties in Celibidache’s
relationship with the city of M unich and the M unich Philharmonic
Orchestra. Celibidache almost left all his positions and
responsibilities in Munich. Resigned from his positions in
M unich on the 11. 19. 1984. Because o f the initiative o f various
composers, musicians, professors, journalists, and administrators in
Germany, Celibidache later returned to his position in Munich.
1985 Celibidache worked with the orchestra o f the Musikhochschule Munich.
Since 1985 extensive tours throughout the world with the Munich
11. 1985 For the first time, signed a contract with the city o f Munich.
All previous engagements were carried out without a definite contract.
1987 - 88 Conducted the orchestra of the Schleswig Holstein Musik
Festival.
1987 First appearance at the International Bruckner Festival at Linz.
Performance of Bruckner’s eight symphony at the Stiftskirche o f St.
42
Florian.
1988 Celibidache conducted four concerts in Moscow during the visit of
German Chancellor Kohl.
1989 Concert tour throughout the USA and Canada with the Munich
Philharmonic Orchestra. Celibidache conducted, on invitation of the
German President, the Munich Philharmonic Orchestra at the
celebration
of the 40th anniversary of the Federal Republic o f Germany.
1990 Concert tour to Japan with the M unich Philharmonic Orchestra, where
Bruckner’s fourth, seventh, and eight symphonies were commercially
recorded on video and laser disc.
1991 Celibidache appointed professor honoris causa of the Staatliche
Musikhochschule Muenchen (Academy o f Music at Munich).
1992 Serious illness which lead to the cancellation of various concerts.
For the first time in 37 years, Celibidache conducted the Berlin
Philharmonic Orchestra again on the invitation of the German
President Richard von W eizsaecker. Honorary (Ehrenbeurger) of the
city of Munich. East Asia concert tour. Highly acclaimed concert in
Tokyo with Benedetti-Michelangeli.
1993 Celibidache taught his masterclasses on phenomenology o f music at
the Musikhochschule at M unich for the last time.
1995/96 Concerts in Poland and Spain (1996).
43
This chronology2 gives a basic idea about Celibidache’s professional career. In
general, his private life is not well documented. With great consistency, Celibidache
protected his private life from the outside world. Klaus Umbach’s biographical reports
(1995a) contain some further anecdotal and private information which will be left
aside in this research project.
2The data of this chronology were selected from the given ones in the publications
of Umbach (1995a), Weiler (1993), and M ueller et. al. (1992).
CHAPTER IV
INTRODUCTION TO PHENOMENOLOGY
INTRODUCTION TO EDMUND HUSSERL AND PHENOMENOLOGY
Quentin Lauer (1958b: 1) wrote in The Triumph of Subjectivity that "with the
passage of time it becomes more and more difficult to determine what the words
"phenomenology" and "phenomenological" are supposed to mean in the contexts in
which they are used." The phenomenological literature—especially of The International
Husserl and Phenomenological Research Society and The W orld Institute for
Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning (Tymieniecka 1971, Nitta and
Tatematsu 1979)-has developed to a complexity that makes it impossible to generate
simple and clear explanations and definitions.
First, phenomenology has entered almost all m ajor fields of twentieth century
thought. W ithin these fields (philosophy, aesthetics, sociology, anthropology, theory
of science, religion, and many others) distinct schools have developed independently.
Second, a group of distinct philosophers must be considered when analyzing
the historic origin of phenomenological thought. Jean-Paul Sartre, Martin Heidegger,
Gabriel Marcel, Jean Hering, Franz Brentano, M erlau-Ponty, Max Scheler, Nicolai
Hartmann, and Victor Frankl are only a few numbers o f this group (Husserl 1985: 5,
Sahakian 1968: 327, and Lauer 1958a: 1).
45
Besides the work of Edmund Husserl (see Husserliana - Edmund H usserl’s
gesammelte W erke. Aufgrund des Nachlasses veroeffentlicht mit dem Husserl Archiv
an der Universitaet Koeln, vom Husserl Archiv (Lowen) Den Haag 1950ff and other
writings), the works of the following three authors, who essentially helped build the
foundation for the idea of phenomenology and its development, need to be mentioned
to cover the term phenomenology in a broader historical sense: Der Formalismus in
der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik of Max Scheler (1913/16) (Scheler 1945); Sein
und Zeit of Martin Heidegger (1927) (Heidegger 1976); and Die Phanomenologie der
Wahrnehmung of M erleau-Ponty (1945) (see Klaus Held in Husserl 1985: Einleitung).
Third, Edmund Husserl’s work presents a multitude o f open questions and
inconsistencies. Ricoeur (1967: 3) opened his introduction to H usserl-A nalvsis of His
Phenomenology with the assertion that "all of phenomenology is not Husserl, even
though he is more or less its center." The literature does, however, present Husserl’s
thinking as key to what is considered phenomenology (Ricken 1984: 141-144), stating
that he is "generally regarded as one of the most important philosophers o f the
twentieth century" (de Boer 1978: XIX).
Nevertheless, the focus on Husserl does not make the attempt to define
phenomenology any easier. De Boer (1978: XlXff) points out that no full agreement
on the interpretation has been reached and considerable problems exist in coherently
interpreting and understanding Husserl’s works. H usserl’s own students never reached
agreement, and beyond that, the analysis of Husserl’s work shows that his ideas not
only changed continuously during his lifetime, but that "Husserl utilizes language in a
46
number of different ways. First, he introduces some new terms and [then] uses old
ones in novel ways" (Natanson 1973: 7).
In the context of this research project, this chapter on phenomenology
represents an approximation of the fundamentals of Husserl’s work. The under
standing o f these fundamentals contextualizes the analysis of Celibidache’s teachings.
By no means is the introduction to phenomenology, provided in this research project
complete or absolute. This chapter serves the following main purposes:
1) To attempt to represent the core of phenomenological propositions as well
as the various components which comprise the general ideas and which
qualify as belonging within the phenomenological arena.
2) To focus the discussion/description on those features of phenomenology
which will help clarify and give context to the subsequent discussion of
Celibidache’s work.
Husserl was born on the 8th of April, 1859, in Maehren, where he studied
mathematics and philosophy in Leipzig and Berlin and later became, after completing
his dissertation, a student of Franz Brentano. After his Habilitation (published
1900/01), his first m ajor work, Logische Untersuchuneen. set the starting point for
phenomenology. Subsequently, he continued his work at the Universities of
Goettingen and Freiburg (Natanson 1973: 7).
In 1930, Husserl wrote in the epilogue of Ideen I (Ideas I):
Philosophic gilt m ir, der Idee nach, als die universale und im
radikalen Sinne strenge Wissenschaft. Als das ist sie
W issenschaft aus letzter Begriindung, oder, was gleich gilt, aus
47
letzter Selbstverantwortung, in der also keine pradikative oder

vorpradikative Selbstverstandlichkeit als unbefragter Erkenntnis-
boden fungiert. Es ist, wie ich betone, eine Idee, d ie.... nur in
einem Stil relativer, zeitweiliger Giiltigkeit und in einem
historischen ProzeB zu verwirklichen ist -aber so auch in der Tat
zu verwirklichen ist" (Husserl 1987:X).’ [emphasis mine, T. Z.]
Husserl wanted, and this is the fundamental motivation in all his work, to find
a way in which he could achieve knowledge without any preliminary assumption or
prejudice. The problem inherent in Kant’s and Descarte’s philosophies is that
knowledge always depends on some axiomatic assumption that is so fundamental that
it cannot be proven by any method. Because of that, positivistic science is not able to
limit itself as an isolated subject matter, and, furthermore, science is not able to use
its own knowledge radically to understand itself; self-reflection in its absolute
meaning is not possible with the preliminaries given in science (Elisabeth Stroecker
1887: x-xi).
H usserl’s most consistent claim and most dominant insistence was that of being
scientific, of developing a critique of positive science, and of claiming his
methodology to be objective. The core concepts for this argument were that of being
and reality. "We need a science of Being in the absolute sense" (Husserl quoted from
'"F o r me, philosophy, as an idea, means universal, and in a radical sense,

"rigorous" science. As such, it is science built on an ultimate foundation, or what
comes down to the same thing, a science based on ultimate self-responsibility, in
which, hence, nothing held to be obvious either predicatively or pre-predicatively, can
pass, unquestioned, as a basis for knowledge. It is, I emphasize, an idea, w hich...is
to be realized only by way of relative and temporary validities and in an infinite
historical process-but in a way it is, in fact, reliable. In our positive sciences, in
conformity with their historical origin, this idea lives on, no matter how little they
themselves actually do justice to it on account of the way they are founded" (Husserl
1989b: 406).
48
Kim 1976: 7).
The realization of the claim of a pure science and of an absolute methodology
that lead to objective knowledge, Husserl argued, could only be achieved by the
analysis of human consciousness and its modes of appearances within consciousness.
Phenomenology looks for what is only assumed to be "out there" (German: es sei)
and at the very same time at the mode in which its state of being is presented within
human consciousness. The mode of presentation of the information cannot be
separated from the meaning information contains (Elisabeth Stroecker in Husserl
1987: x-xi).
Husserl’s concern about the notion of pure science and his critique of
conventional positive science is reflected especially in the title of his last major work,
The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (written 1934 -
1937) (Husserl 1982a and 1962), which in many ways contains the last evolutionary
stage of his philosophy. In it he wrote:
The spirit, and indeed only the spirit, exists in itself and for itself, is self
sufficient; and in its self sufficiency, and only in this way, it can be
treated truly rationally, truly and from the ground on scientifically...The
spirit is by its essence capable of practicing self-knowledge....Only when
the spirit returns from its naive external orientation to itself, and remains
with itself and purely itself, can it be sufficient unto itself. The
development of an actual method for grasping the fundamental essence of
the spirit in its intentionalities, and for constructing from there an analysis
of the spirit that is consistent in infinitum, led to transcendental
phenomenology. It overcomes naturalistic objectivism ...through the fact
that he who philosophizes proceeds from his own ego, and this purely as
the performer of all his validities, of which he becomes the purely
theoretical spectator....H ere, the spirit is not in or alongside nature; rather
nature is itself drawn into the spiritual sphere (Husserl 1970: 297-298).
Positivistic science always assumed that the material world exists
49
independently outside of human consciousness, and that this "factuality" can be
perceived, understood, and accepted as such by human consciousness. Husserl goes
exactly in the opposite direction. He assumes that objective knowledge and
understanding can only be achieved if that which appears to "be" is contextualized
through the mode in which the quality "being" presents itself in human consciousness.
If something appears in human consciousness, then it can no longer be separated from
the constituting performance mechanisms of consciousness. The individual
consciousness contains necessary conditions for any constituting action/mental
information. The scheme "Part-Whole" determines the direction of any
phenomenological analysis (Prechtel 1991: 19ff).
M erleau Ponty expressed this in his Phenomenology de la perception, dated
1945, in a very similar manner:
Die Welt ist kein Objekt, deren Konstitutionsgestz ich besitze,

sie ist das natiirliche Milieu und das Feld all meiner Gedanken
und all meiner ausdriicklichen Wahmehmungen. Die Wahrheit
wohnt nicht nur in dem inneren M enschen... oder vielmehr: es
gibt keinen inneren Menschen, der Mensch ist in der W elt, er
kennt sich in der Welt. Wenn ich vom Dogmatismus des
gesunden Menschenverstandes aus oder vom Dogmatismus der
Wissenschaft aus zu mir selbst komme, treffe ich nicht auf ein
Zentrum innerer Wahrheit, sondem auf ein der Welt
hingegebenes Subjekt (Klaus 1974: 929).2
2The world is not an object with laws of constitution I can own or know. The
world is the natural milieu and the field of all my thoughts and all my obvious
perceptions. The truth does not only live inside the human being; the human being is
in the world and he knows himself in the world. If I come from the dogmatism of
natural humanness or from the dogmatism of science to myself, I do not meet an
actual center of inner truth, but only do I meet a subject that is devoted to the world.
[Translation mine, T. Z.]
50
Therefore, a phenomenon, in the sense Husserl meant it, cannot exist independently
of its own presentation within the human mental system; it exists within the specific
vogue o f its presentation (Husserl 1985: 14-15). Basically, it is only the mental
appearance itself that one studies in phenomenology. It is not assumed that this mental
appearance is related to any kind o f external object that the mental appearance tries to
express/represent for human consciousness, nor is what might have caused such an
external object actually to be represented within a conscious act assumed. It is
necessary to use the term might because Husserl assumed that, since all forms of
knowledge, experience, and perception (this includes the objects of knowledge,
experience, and perception) exist exclusively within the human mind, it is not possible
to make a statement about the world outside of the human mind. He excluded the
question about any external reality from his interest and concentrated exclusively on
the subject o f consciousness-acts, which constitute the various forms o f mental facts.
However, in leaving all questions about the external world aside, he broke with the
W estern traditions o f science and philosophy.
Kant as well as Descartes, for example, based their systems of thought on the
assumption that a reality that can be objectified and analyzed exists independently of
human consciousness. Descartes ignored an egological standpoint per se. His Cogito
Ego Sum was based on the dichotomy between the human act o f thinking and the
world that is being thought of. The "I" o f the Cogito was left out o f his analysis of
contents (Natanson 1973: 64). Husserl wrote in his Cartesian M editations:
Unlike Descartes, we shall plunge into the task of laying open
51
the infinite field o f transcendental experience. The Cartesian

evidence—the evidence of the proposition, ego cogito, ego sum-
-remained barren because Descartes neglected, not only to
clarify the pure sense o f the method of transcendental epoche,
but also to direct his attention to the fact that the ego can
explicate him self ad infinitum and systematically, by means of
transcendental experience, and therefore lies ready as a possible
field of work (Natanson 1973: 64-65).
Historically, the insistence on introspection (as opposed to looking outside at
the world) follows Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy (1993), in which
Descartes describes the significance of self-examination, questioning one’s own beliefs
in consequent reflection to create evidence for objective knowledge. But Descartes
does not acknowledge the significance of lived experience, its processes, formal laws,
and structures. The term "phenomenology" originates from the idea of phenomena,
which was described by Kant: phenomena are data that derive from our experience.
Husserl discussed in depth Descartes’ and Kant’s philosophies3 [see especially Husserl
(1987) Cartesian Meditationsl with which he shares some common ground in his
departure. H usserl’s philosophic axiomata, however, stood far apart from them and
created a world of their own w hich-in this form—was new to occidental philosophy
(Reeder 1986: 2-3).
Husserl throws the Cartesian tradition overboard. Ricken commends this by
stating that the fundamental assumptions of daily life are abandoned, which means the
spontaneous assumption of something "out there." The direction of focus is turned
one-hundred-and-eighty degrees around from looking outward to looking exclusively
3For a comparison of Husserl’s philosophy with that of Kant see Broekman (1963:
109ff) and Kockelmans (1977: 269ff).
52
inward (Ricken 1984:142ff)-
Husserl developed a highly complex methodology and formal analysis of this
focal point towards subjectivity, which tries to explain the constitution, condition,
relationship, and processes of the internal acts of consciousness. In addition to the
focus on singular, specific, and individual acts of consciousness, another goal of
phenomenology is the determination of essences that are shared by various acts of
consciousness simultaenously. The revelation of these essences4 give the
phenomenological methodology its transcendental quality; phenomenology becomes
transcendental phenomenology (Schischkoff 1965: 455ff).
In concluding this introduction, Reeder’s working definition will serve as a
useful basis for the discussion. What follows it:
Phenomenology is a self-critical methodology for reflexively examining

and describing the lived evidences (the phenomena) which provides a
crucial link in our philosophical and scientific understanding of the world
(Reeder 1986: 1).
The following statements confirm the aforementioned definition:
1. The term "methodology" designates the theory behind the phenomenological
method. Methodological process and theory-although not identical-are
inseparable.
2. Phenomenology wants to answer the question of how we know, not
what we know, about reality external to us, to analyze the lived
evidence (the conscious experience) of knowing (something).
4German: Wesensschau; Wesen.
53
3. Phenomenology is reflexive because the method focuses on evidence that
belongs to the consciousness and that uses the process of
focusing/analyzing.
4. Phenomenology is a science, because it is "an explicit, self-critical...and
inter-subjective examination of its subject matter, our experience....W hile
the naturalist is taking a meter reading, the phenomenologist is interested
in the structure of the meanings-as-li'-'ed by the scientist....T his experience
is important to science, since human experience is the basic evidence for
our claims about the world" (Reeder 1986: 2-3).
The actual and lived evidence and the conscious self-reflection upon it is important as
a scientific methodological means because human experience is the foundation of any
human claim about the reality, meaning, and contents of the world, and any
comprehension of truth.
54
THE MOST IMPORTANT M ETHODOLOGICAL STEPS OF PHENOM ENOLOGY
Husserl’s main achievement consists of the thesis that consciousness creates
the human world, not that the world creates the human consciousness. The individual
methodological steps of his philosophy can only be mentioned briefly here. If one
only looks at his discussion of Descartes’ statement Cogito Ego Sum (in Husserl
(1987): Cartesian M editations), one realizes how difficult it was for Husserl to make
the step that has been described in the previous sections. This research project only
describes brief summaries, which are oversimplified and designed only to set the stage
for the following chapters. Furthermore, it needs to be clear that the relation to
Celibidache’s philosophy makes things even more difficult. Celibidache’s
interpretation of "phenomenology" goes far beyond that of Husserl. It is surely based
on Husserl’s work, but it extends it. In fact, Husserl’s work was extended by several
people after his death. Today the work of the phenomenological societies in Europe
and the U.S. is an important aspect of contemporary philosophy.
55
Intentionality
Husserl’s criticism was focused primarily on the practice of psychology and all
academic branches that were dealing in any way with mental acts [see as well the
historically important issue of the so-called psychology-critique ("Psychologis-
m uskritik")5 in the history of psychology (de Boer 1978: 52-62)].
Husserl hebt sein V orgehen...scharf von der psychologischen

Betrachtungsweise ab. Er sieht den entscheidenden Unterschied
zwischen phaenomenologischer und psychologischer Analyse
darin, dass die Psychologie es mit dem Subjektiven als Eigenart
eines in der Welt lebenden animalischen Wesens zu tun hat, die
Phaenomenologie dagegen mit dem von jedem Realbezug
losgeloesten Subjektiven, das in keinem kausalen Abhaengig-
keitsverhaeltnis zum Naturhaften, Empirischen steht. (Janssen
1976: 39)6
Husserl developed from this critical attempt the term intentionality (Kohak
1978: 105ff and Mohanty 1971: lOOff), which is one of the very few terms whose
meaning was not altered by Husserl over the years. Its meaning remained consistently
the same and therefore reflects the importance for the overall understanding of
5For the problem of Husserl’s psychology-critique, see especially section B of his

Die Krisis der Europaeischen Wissenschaften und die Transzendentale
Phaenomenologie (Husserl 1962: 194-278).
6Husserl clearly differentiates his own conduct of analysis from that of

psychology. He sees the fundamental difference between psychology and the
phenomenological analysis in the fact that psychology treats subjectivity as something
animalistic, that exists objectively in this world. On the contrary, phenomenology
understands anything subjective as being detached from the world outside, having no
relationship to objectiveness whatsoever. Furthermore, it has no causal dependency to
what is considered to be natural. [Translation mine, T. Z.]
56
Husserl’s philosophy.7 Husserl not only describes intentionality as a way of focusing
on something, but as an achievement of consciousness that constitutes meaning/sense.
Intentionality is the mechanism on which the possibility of meaning/sense for the
human consciousness thoroughly depends (Brauner 1978: 39).
There are...no two things present in immanent experience; the object is

not immanently experienced and then next to it the intentional, immanent
experience itself;...rather, only one thing is present, the intentional,
immanent experience, of which the essential descriptive characteristic is
precisely the relevant intention (Bernet, Kern, and Marbach 1993: 91).
[emphasis mine T. Z.]
It is important to understand that the reason for creating an act of
consciousness is created by consciousness itself and only exists within consciousness;
again, the reason does not exist outside of consciousness, nor is it imposed onto the
subject by something from the outside (problem of self-responsibility as mentioned
before in the quote by Husserl). Husserl defines the state of being focused on
something as intentional. Clearly, together with this state of being focused goes the
desire of fulfillment, which means that the focusing of the mental apparatus becomes
a success. Success means primarily that something appears as a oneness, which means
it has identity with clear limits and borders, which are necessary for any type of
understanding, meaning, identification and self-identification. Without this possibility
of fulfillment (i.e., being perceived as a one/oneness), no consciousness of any entity
would be possible, because without limitations due to definition, nothing could/would
7The notion of intentionality is treated by Husserl consistently. It is one of the few

concepts/terms which Husserl interpreted invariably throughout the period of his
writings. This is significant, since several other key terms were thoroughly re
interpreted by Husserl during his lifetime.
57
be represented within consciousness (Held in Husserl 1986: 10).
Intentionality signifies an a priori structure of any conscious experience, and it
is this structure that the phenomenological method uncovers and analyzes. Any
conscious experience is two-fold, or "bi-polar" as Reeder calls it (Reeder 1986:
6, 45ff). Conscious experiences are founded on the ego-pole and the object-pole. Both
poles form a oneness through the emergence of conscious experience. By experiencing
an object X, the presence of an object is dependent on the subject.8 No object can
appear without a subject. No subject can appear without an object. Reeder
summarizes logically that, according to Husserl, "there can be no evidence for
idealism (which tries to reduce all object-poles to ego-poles) or for realism (which
tries to reduce all ego-poles to object-poles) (Reeder 1986: 6). An analysis of lived
experience therefore must always include the appearance of an object within
consciousness as well as the "mode of attention peculiar to that object" within
consciousness (Reeder 1986: 6ff)-9
Because the object of consciousness is constituted by consciousness itself,
consciousness seems to always be conscious o f something. The notion of oneness
plays an important role in regard to the formal structure of conscious acts.
Additionally, oneness as a quality appears in several of Husserl’s discussions of
internal time consciousness and inter-subjective objectivity. Husserl elaborates at great
8Without an ego (without me) the object within experience could not exist.
Without an object an ego (me) could not be experienced.
9For the discussion of Husserl’s analysis of the various dimensions of

intentionality, see de Muralt 1974: 341-374.
58
length on the phenomenon o f "the present" and the indivisible unity of his
pretention/retention model (Husserl 1964: 96-97, 155-188). This aspect of his
philosophy, although only briefly introduced at this point, plays a significant role in
Celibidache’s musical teachings on the phenomenology of music.
Husserl’s conceptualization of oneness and the unification of consciousness
within which experiences (although divisible in the material/positivistic sense of the
word as matter) are not divisible phenomenologically (Husserl 1964: 96-98) shows
remarkable resemblance to Zen concepts of time. The Zen teaching, "One in all and
all in one" (Suzuki 1973: 34-35), reflects this dialectic relationship between conscious
experiences and positivistic/material interpretations of life. That is why in Zen
teachings, for instance, it is said that the closer the mind wants to get to an object,
the further it will move away, until eventually it will not see anything. On the other
hand, the more the mind distances itself from an object, the more closeness will
emerge; and eventually, once it is eternities away from the object, it will be able to
grasp it. That is a typical Zen paradox. In this school of thought, it is contradictory
thinking and illogical paradoxes that designate truth to the human mind.
The act of experiencing two material objects as oneness at the very same time
requires the indication/definition of clear borders and limits, of clear denotation of
what belongs to something and what does not. M oreover, the meaning of a mental
object always is one single meaning out of innumerable possible meanings/aspects of
that object. Any expression o f human consciousness and all constituting acts of
consciousness depend on the limitation of an object’s aspects: namely, that limitation
59
reduces it to one single aspect that is perceivable, but not identical with the object
itself. The aspect of an object is only one possible aspect. The object itself remains
unperceivable. Perception, therefore, always means reduction, always means a cipher,
something that wants us to become closer to the object, but that actually distances us
from it more and more.
We now see that the mind always needs to make a decision about which
fractional aspect concerning something it wants to use in order to be able to function
at all. Therefore, the subject always defines automatically a clear intention of meaning
once it starts to work. The step that creates a mental object in its specific intentional
context is defined with the German word venneinen, which can doubtlessly translate
that psychological mechanism best (Prechtel 1991: 31). Husserl tried in his analysis as
well to find a general structure of vermeinen, hoping to discover universal principles
o f intentionality. In summary, it is now apparent that the importance of conscious acts
is not the object outside or prior to experience, but the situation from which the
context of experience and object together emerged (Kohak 1978: 121).
Die phanomenologische Frage "Wie bietet sich unserer

Betrachtung unser eigenes Bewusstseinserlebnis dar?" kniipft an
die Behauptung an, daB die Bedeutung nicht einem auBeren
Gegenstand abzulesen sei, sondern eine Leistung unseres
BewuBtseins, unseres Denkens ist....A kte sollen die Erlebnisse
des Bedeutens sein und das Bedeutungsmassige im jeweiligen
Einzelakt soli gerade im Akterlebnis und nicht im Gegenstande
liegen (Prechtel 1991: 3 5 ).10
“’The phenomenological question, "How does our own perception present itself as
an act of consciousness?", is related to the statement that the meaning o f something
can never be designated from an exterior object, but can only be understood through
the act of consciousness itself....In addition, the meaning of an act lies in the
60
Epoche
The pure reference of consciousness towards itself and nothing else but itself is
defined as epoche. Very often, the term "epoche" is translated to mean "bracketing"
or "inhibition." However, such a translation and definition leaves one major
characteristic aside. Bracketing would mean that something would be excluded, since,
if there is something within the brackets, there must be something outside of the
brackets. Husserl assumes in his outline of this subject not that the existence of the
exterior world itself is negated, but only the assumption or the intuition of it. That
allows us to leave the question as to whether our assumptions are true or false aside.
Husserl asserted, as did Plato, that all science, with the exception of
philosophy, always places its own elaboration on at least one single hypothesis that
cannot be certified (see again critique of psychology). One of the most consequential
aims of Husserl was to fulfill the Platonian promise that the phenomenological
approach has to free itself from all sorts of assumptions (Magill, v2, 1961: 795ff).
The term pure phenomenology suggests exactly this. Hence, knowledge and
understanding are not connected whatsoever anymore with anything outside of the
subject, but only with the subject itself. Pure phenomenology concentrates on the
conditions which make knowledge possible, and which logically determine the quality
o f knowledge. Because of the new attitude based on the definition of "epoche," the
world appears in a totally new light (Prechtel 1991: 60). It is very practical in writing
experience of the act itself and not in an object of the experience. [Translation mine,
T. Z.]
61
and thinking to distinguish objects in their material-positivistic context from those in
their purely phenomenological context by using quotation marks. Tree, therefore,
means the material-physical object outside and independent of human existence,
whereas "tree" designates the mental constitution within the human sphere of
consciousness."
"Some authors of the secondary literature use the terms "epoche" and "reduction"
in a broader sense and mention different stages of reduction (for example, Harvey
1989: 89ff and Lauer 1958a: 46ff). This is of importance, since this research project
will show that Celibidache too utilizes the term reduction in a broader sense than does
Husserl. Reduction, therefore, is very often used as a concept for several
methodological steps of phenomenology, not only for one single step (epoche).
62
Noema and noesis12
The constituting act of consciousness is the main field of Husserl’s analysis. In
very broad analyses, Husserl demonstrates several mechanisms associated with the
presentation of information within the human mind. Here only a few can be
mentioned. First of all, Hussserl distinguishes the actual experience and feeling of an
act of consciousness from the act of reflecting on the activity of the conscious. Both
the actual experience (Erlebnis) and the reflection (Auffassungssinn) are constituting
acts. The act of reflection Husserl calls noesis and the actual experience he calls
noema. "Noema" means the physical dimension of a conscious experience, which is
expressed and manifested through language by objectifying terminologies. Beyond
that, a noema always contains two aspects: an aspect of objects (appearing in their
material sense) and an aspect of contents appearing in their non-material sense (for
example, values) (Prechtel 1991: 42ft).
An example should demonstrate that difference between noema and noesis: A
person joyfully sees an apple tree. As it was stated before, the apple tree exists in its
positivistic meaning (that is if we look at it in a non phenomenological manner)
outside o f the perceiver in an eternally independent time-space continuum and also the
joy exists within the parameters of these four dimensions. Phenomenologically,
however, the matter is different. Using the phenomenological method of epoche, the
world is excluded from the investigation (bracketing). Now the tree and the joy
12Probably H usserl’s most profound discussion of the noesis/noema relationships

can be found in his Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a
Phenomenological Philosophy (Husserl 1982b: 211-235).
63
become "tree" and "joy," being independent from any exterior system of reference
(Magill, v2 1961: 795). The term "phenomenon" designates all contents of
consciousness, but nothing else. The step from tree to "tree" and the step from joy to
"joy" do not take away anything from the experience, which is a significant
realization. This realization is usually ignored by the "typical" positivistic attitude,
which involuntarily claims that the phenomenological method takes us away from
reality into some sort of "spaced out" dimensions; actually, the very opposite is true.
Very often, the consideration of human consciousness as a factor that forms our
notion of reality has a negative connotation among positivistic traditions. The negative
quality is what I described before as "spaced out." This mode o f reacting to new
approaches of self-understanding displays our daily fallacies, which actually prevent
us from gaining understanding of who we are as well as attaining communicative
depth between each other. This attitude, as the following section on intersubjectivity
will show, can destroy essential understandings of human communication and culture
(Husserl 1973). It is truly important to understand completely that—although the
experience is not reduced by any m eans-its meaning and manifestation is totally
different for the individual, because the viewpoint now allows the individual to
understand that the entities perceived are created by him/herself. Therefore, the
individual experiences the possibility of self-responsibility, because now, and only
now, it becomes apparent that change of perception and being is only possible from
the inside (i.e. through the phenomenological shift of an individual’s mind) and that it
64
is senseless to expect change to occur from the outside, because the outside is not the
essential basis of one’s own state of conscious perception and being.
Eventually, change must refer to the interrelationship and balance between
one’s ego and self. People who only perceive the world/reality as something exterior
(ego-oriented), and who cannot mentally refer to perception as something that they
created by themselves (self-oriented), will naturally expect change of any type to
emerge from the outside, but never from within themselves. Husserl calls this attitude
"naive" (Husserl 1987: 157).
The inner reflection of consciousness on an entity that is presented by
consciousness means nothing else but the reflection of consciousness on itself. This
act is called noesis. Due to the reflection of consciousness, a dialogue and a reaction
(proposing change and growth possibilities) become possible. In our example of the
apple tree, the noesis would be equivalent to the substitution of tree and joy by "tree"
and "joy," which appears due to conscious reflection of the self onto itself. The joy
about an apple tree in the material sense of the word (positivistic-empirical) would not
designate a noesis, because it does not automatically require self reflection. The
German distinction between erfahren and erleben reflects this:
I take the word experience to mean what the German language

refers to as Erlebnis. As the root implies, Erlebnis refers to an
individual living-through of some event. The other German
word for experience is Erfahrung, which means experience-in-
general. Erlebnis is a "first" experience, by which I mean a
first-order, and not first-hand, experience. This distinction
enables us to say that the Erlebnis of a twelve-tone composition
is different from the Erfahrung of deducing its se t....I see, hear,
and touch objects because I am in the world, and have eyes,
65
ears, and a body. But then these objects become objects-for-me

(Clifton 1983: 7-8).
It is interesting to note that there exist many analogies between the
phenomenological differentiation of noema and noesis and the differentiation of the
ego and the self, which is of greatest importance in several contemplative methods
(see, for that comparison, Tulku 1977 and d ’Aquili 1990). Actually, the
differentiation between ego and self, as well as the active role of the self due to self-
reflection (meaning self-reflecting on the ego), are the indispensable factors that make
contemplative methods effective (see, especially, introductions to transcendental
meditation, Za Zen, breathing exercises, etc.). In this sense the act of joy needs to be
seen from two different viewpoints: one is the ego and the other is the self. In the
case o f the ego, again we could not call the joy a noesis; in the case of the self, we
would have to call it noesis. This distinction was first developed by Husserl’s teacher
Brentano, who stated that real mental acts only refer to their own consciousness and
never to something peripherally outside, whereas "non-mental" acts do refer to
entities outside of the consciousness. Again this distinction reveals the greatest
differences in the possibilities of self-responsibility an individual has, depending on
his/her potential of self. A person with little or no self will automatically have little or
no potential for autonomous self-responsibility. It needs to be emphasized that this
relationship between a) noesis vs. noema, b) ego versus self, and c) the question of
self-responsibility is fundamental to the following discussions.
Based on this distinction, one can say that the noema includes a quality of
being that can be looked at, scrutinized, interpreted and mentally digested. The
66
quality of being that emerges through noesis only consists of essences that
simultaneously belong to the domain of "knowledge" of consciousness and of being.
Consequently, it would be appropriate to say that the noesis always includes an act of
being (as opposed to an intellectually reduced and deducted act of exclusively thinking
intellectually). The noema, contrarily, only includes objects that do not separate the
individual from its self.
Magill summarizes this concept in his discussion of the noema-noesis
relationship:
But in the present work Husserl does not consider mental acts
per se. He studies them, because they provide the key to the
various grades and types of objects which make up the noemata,
for corresponding to "perception" there is the realm of "colors,"
"shapes" and "sizes," and corresponding to "perceptual
enjoyment" there is "dainty" pink and "gloriously" scented,
these qualities owe their actuality in consciousness to the noesis,
but they are part of an order of being, which is absolute and
independent. Husserl calls all such absolute forms or essences
eideia, to avoid ambiguities of such words as Ideas and Essences
(Magill, v2 1961: 798).
Especially in his Logische Untersuchungen. Husserl (1975) has expressed several
times the importance of the timeless a priori character of the interrelationship between
noesis and noema.
67
Transcendental reduction
Husserl calls the second methodological step after the epoche "transcendental
reduction." The constellation at which we arrived after the introduction of the epoche
and the noema-noesis distinction leads to the discovery of a more complicated
structure of subjectivity, the ego. W ithin the phenomenological realm, the ego appears
twofold:
First, the ego defines its identity through the specific intentional acts in its
specific relationship to its individual intentional objects. This ego is bound in its
relation to the specific qualities of the experienced objects. This dimension of the ego-
pole is called "factual ego," and it refers to the natural attitude of the ego (Kim 1976:
26). The factual ego receives its qualities from the intentional object.
Second, the ego reveals a constitutional quality, which does not change from
intentional act A to intentional act B; it remains in its characteristic the same; its
function, its functioning, and its structure always persist as the same. Husserl calls
this dimension of the ego-pole the "transcendental ego." It is the ego that reflects
upon the factual ego and that looks at the noema-noesis relationships within itself. The
method of transcendental reduction leads to the revelation of the transcendental ego.
Husserl claims that through the act of transcendental reduction:
the living Ego in mental processes is not something taken for

itself and which can be made into an object proper of an
investigation. Aside from its "modes of relation" or "modes of
comportment," the < E g o > is completely empty of essence-
components, has no explicable content, is undescribable in and
for itself: it is pure Ego and nothing more (Reeder 1986: 74).
68
Now, the quality giving direction to the transcendental ego is reversed: "The
(transcendental - phenomenological) dimension represents...the direction from
consciousness to object" (de M uralt 1974: 358). W ith this methodological step, any
form of positivistic empiricism is eliminated from the phenomenological analysis
(Prechtel 1991: 60ff). Suzanne Cunningham (1976: 9) wrote in Language and the
Phenomenological Reductions o f Edmund H usserl:
The purpose of the transcendental reduction is more positive, the

uncovering of the subjective pole of consciousness, the
transcendental ego, as the necessary correlate o f the objective
pole in every conscious act...the ego’s only concretion is in its
acts and objects. Nevertheless, it is this subjective pole which
gives unity and direction to the various acts of consciousness
and which designates the objects of consciousness as being and
as being-thus-and-so. Hence, for Husserl the ego was termed
"transcendental," i.e., the meaning-giver for its entire universe
of consciousness. This function of the ego is bestowing unity
and meaning on all acts and objects o f consciousness, as well as
on itself, this is what Husserl calls "constitution." [emphasis
mine T. Z.]
In a sense, the transcendental ego is my personal ego; however, it is not what
constitutes my personality. As a personality, I am a musician, leader, student,
religious believer, but as a transcendental ego (pure ego), "I am the one living
through my every experience. Personality may change, but the structure of the
"I"...rem ains the same" (Reeder 1986: 73-74). The transcendental ego summarizes
the essence of all my object-bound experiences, but in itself it is not object-bound, or
as Reeder calls it, "a datum" (p. 74). It is pure processual and structural essence. The
past (historical, personal, and biological), heritage, and culture determine a subject’s
personality, but all this past is quite independent from what actually makes a subject a
69
person. Transcendental ego belongs to being a person, whereas the factual ego
belongs to having a personality (Reeder 1986: 78).
Earlier we defined the two structural components of the epoche as the ego-pole
and the object pole. The transcendental ego is the "correlate of the objective pole in
every conscious act" [emphasis mine T. Z.] (Cunningham 1976: 9), whereas the
factual ego is the correlate of the objective pole in each specific conscious act. The
quality of the factual ego changes, whereas the quality of the transcendental ego
remains the same. It is an a priori constituted consciousness itself and it is
transcendental reduction that reveals the transcendental ego. Because the awareness of
the transcendental ego is based on a reflective act of consciousness upon itself,
Husserl also calls it "transcendental reflection" (Miller 1984: 177).
For Husserl, the scientific methodology of formal logic was not free o f any
pre-suppositions. The phenomenological analysis that leads to the transcendental ego
consequently leads to an extension of formal logic. Husserl calls this extension
"transcendental logic." It is, according to Husserl, the subjective a priori by nature
(de M uralt 1974: 355).
As we have seen in previous examples, the actual empirical/physical
dimensions of experiences were never excluded; even if they were used, they were
still simultaneous parts of the specific state of being. For example, the experience of
the tree and the "tree" was bound to the utilization of the eyes (the senses do
something). The transcendental reduction is supposed to lead the individual towards a
"pure consciousness" which is characterized by the fact that it is separated from any
70
naturalistic viewpoint (factual ego and its objects). Because of this separation, the
transcendental ego has the capability to investigate the factual ego and its objects.
The reflection of the conscious towards itself now is not only separated from
the assumption of an exterior world13 (epoche), but it is also separated from all
appearances that are somehow related to specific factual information. Therefore, the
case of the perception of the tree and/or the "tree" does not contain the transcendental
reduction. Due to this methodological step, the "real" is crossed out and what is left
over is "pure" reality in its most fundamental form of any conscious content, namely
how something manifests itself for the transcendental ego.
Die Reduktion fuhrt vom Ding zur Dinghaftigkeit, vom

Gegenstand zur Gegenstandlichkeit, vom Raum zur
Raumlichkeit,. . .Dinghaftigkeit, Gegenstandlichkeit,
Raum lichkeit,...sind im transzendentalen Ego auffindbare und
dadurch in reiner Selbstgegebenheit evident zu beschreibende
Grundformen, die eine geschlossene Wissenschaft ermoglichen,
aber keine Schliisse auf die wirkliche Welt zulassen (Rombach
1980: 49ff).14
Things can never emerge within consciousness in their totality, because it is the
mechanism of intentionality and perspectiveness which is necessary for them to
13It needs to be consistently remembered that the term "exterior world" already
represents a dimension that is not part of the phenomenological analysis. It is used-so
to speak—to look at the phenomenological process from the outside which, indeed,
correlates with day-to-day traditional scientific thinking: namely, that there is a
factual, material, objective, and objectifiable world out there.
14The reduction leads from the thing to the thingness, from the object to
objectiveness, from space to spaceness....Thingness, objectiveness, and
spaceness...can be found within the transcendental ego and therefore are only
determinable in true self-evidence, which finally enables the possibility of a pure
science, but which does not allow us to draw any type of conclusion about the
exterior world at all. [Translation mine, T. Z.]
71
emerge in the first place. This does not apply to entities that emerge due to
transcendental reduction, which is based on the reflexive act of the self, in which the
self fills out all space that can possibly be mentally used. In relation to the act of self
reflection,15 according to Husserl, one can describe this as an act of "adequate
factuality," because any conscious factuality that arises due to transcendental reduction
can only appear in absolute self-authenticity (Prechtel 1991: 60). The transcendental
reduction, which is the most substantial part of the phenomenological encounter,
represents the part of human consciousness that can only reveal, if at all, the
conditions of knowledge (See Brauner 1978: 3 Iff).
I5Some of the available secondary literature uses in this context the English word
self-consciousness (for example Natanson 1973: 205). At first consideration, the usage
of this term might appear to be useful; however, because of the complexity of the
subject matter, it would at this point lead to more confusion than clarity.
72
Eidetic reduction
In quoting Immanuel Kant, Husserl states that "all knowledge begins with
experience, but it does not therefore arise from experience" (quoted from de Boer
1978: 247). Husserl tried to compare all transcendental reductions, in order to create
some sort of access to what is common in all transcendental reductions. This
commonness would then, as he hoped, enable one to determine scientifically objective
knowledge in the phenomenological sense of the term. The eidetic reduction simply
tries to eliminate all individualities, coincidences, and specific features that are not
common to all transcendental reductions. What Husserl wanted to investigate was the
commonness of these processes to achieve some sort of understanding of what is
universal and what is the ecumenical structure concerning the condition of human
consciousness. Prechtel comments on this problem as follows:
Da die gefundenen Wesensgesetze nicht nur die allgemeinen

Strukturen der vorgefundenen Denkakte, sondem auch die
idealiter denkbaren Moglichkeiten von Denkakten desselben
Gegenstandsbezuges umfassen, konnen sie fur sich unbedingte
Allgemeinheit beanspruchen. Jeder Einzelfall stellt ein Exemplar
dieser Allgemeinheit dar. Die eidetische (Variation) Reduktion
soil aber auch zu jenen notwendigen Strukturelementen fuhren,
die konstitutiv sind fur den spezifischen Gegenstandsbezug und
dessen Annahme unabdingbar ist (Prechtel 1991: 62ff).16
16Because the laws of entities are identical with the structures o f their (i.e. the
entities) appearances as thoughts, and further are identical with the structures of
potential appearances as thoughts, they can claim universal applicability. Every single
individual case, therefore, is an example of this universal structure. The eidetic
(variation) reduction should lead to those necessary elements of structure which are
constitutive for the specific object-relation and which must be indispensably accepted.
[Translation mine, T. Z .]
73
For Husserl, two very distinct types of experiences exist: First, the experience of
individual and particular objects that belong to the factual ego-pole. Second, the
experience o f eidetic intuition that create an idealized meaning of factualities. Edie
states,"the objects o f eidetic intuition are not real objects as such but rather the same
objects insofar as they are presented from the aspect of their essential types and
meanings" (Edie 1987: 8). These idealized essentials are neither a reproduction of an
"existing object (which would require an unprovable relation of causality between
object and consciousness); nor is it a term projected...by consciousness. Rather it is a
term "constituted" in [and by] consciousness" (Lauer 1958b: 54).
Reeder concludes (1986: 109):
Now that we have completed our exposition of Husserl’s

concept o f "essence," let us summarize his view. Essences are a
priori, universal meaning-structures, which are independent of
their actual appearances in thought and reality, and which
provide the de jure epistemological foundation for our claims.
These essences are objects o f a special sort, which may be
directly encountered in founded acts o f essential categorical
intuition, as a result of a careful exercise of free variation in
phantasy. The essences "govern" the world, not in a causal
sense, but in the sense that they are the a priori structures of
pure possibility, unaffected by beings, thoughts or theories. As
such, knowledge of essence provides a grounding for knowledge
which is "transcendental," in Husserl’s new sense o f the term.
74
PHENOMENOLOGY OF INTERNAL TIM E CONSCIOUSNESS
Husserl believed that for his phenomenological departure, the most important
structure of consciousness is that of time consciousness. He developed a complex
philosophy on this subject and based the beginning of his analysis on Franz
Brentano’s work (Bernet, Kern, and Marbach 1993: lO lff). Husserl made the
distinction between an appearance that is constituted in time and an appearance that
constitutes a time quality itself, which belongs to the realm o f transcendental
phenomenology. Husserl illuminates this point with his discussion of the now
(protention/retention relationships; Sokolowski 1974: 138-168). The now contains a
paradox, namely, that the experience of a now contains a fusion (simultaneous
existence) of the past and the future (which by definition exclude each other) and that
the now as a single entity is non-durational (non-flowing):
Time is motionless and yet it flows. In the flow of time, in the

continuous sinking away in the past, there is constituted a non
flowing, absolutely fixed identical objective time. This is the
problem ....A n objectivity such as a melody cannot itself be
originally given except as "perceived" in this form. The
constituted act constructed from now-consciousness and
retentional consciousness, is adequate perception of the temporal
object. In an ideal sense, then, perception...would be the phase
o f consciousness which constitutes the pure now, and memory
every other phase of the continuity (Fuchs 1976: 66-69).
Husserl used his discussions of internal time consciousness for the development of
intersubjective objectivity. He wrote:
Immanent time then becomes a manifesting of the objective

"sim ultaneous."...but objective temporality is intersubjectively
graspable and determinable, and there it is a priori clear that
such (temporality) can only be grasped and determ ined...through
the only possible medium of mutual understanding, through
75
animate organicity. Only by the fact that I take the animate

organism as a Now and take what is interpreted into it as
simultaneous with the animate organism, do I also grasp the
simultaneity and the temporal order of alien consciousness with
my own, and likewise conversely. Every time-determination
performable in physical nature, which time-determination leads
back to intersubjectively graspable periodic processes and space
measurements intersubjectively relatable thereto, can also serve
to determine something psychic according to its time, precisely
on the basis of the relations mentioned (Husserl 1980: 101:102)
The notion of the now-point has different dimensions. In his discussion, Husserl, first
refers to single images as points of now, but further on he develops the idea of the
unity of a flux of images and the unity of multiplicity (Husserl 1964b: 167 and
Husserl 1991: 79ff). In the context of transcendent perception (transcendental
ego/reduction), Husserl states that
it is not true that the preceding appearances are merely

preserved as appearances of what have been. The (primary)
consciousness of memory of earlier phases is memorial
consciousness, to be sure, but with regard to the earlier
perception. What was perceived earlier not only is present now
as the earlier perceived but is taken over into the now and is
posited as still in being now ....A nd the same is true with regard
to the future... Every thing seen can also be unseen but still
remains capable of being seen....These appearances bring about
the exhibition of one and the same objectivity in a way which is
always incomplete (Husserl 1964: 168-169).
This notion of "the exhibition of one and the same" through the perception of a
plurality of images by the transcendental ego is of great importance for the discussion
in the following chapters.
76
INTERSUBJECTIVITY
Husserl proposes (which is similar to his argument of temporal unity of a flux
of appearances) the possibility of a unity of two or more subjects/egos.17 This notion
of intersubjectivity is ultimately grounded in the aforementioned discussion of internal
time consciousness. Yoshimiro Nitta wrote that "Husserl assum es...that the identity of
the primordial world of the I and of the primordial world of the Other can be
grounded on the co-operation of presence and a-presence" (Nitta 1979: 29).H usserl’s
aim is to show that, even though there exist two distinct egos and two distinctly
experienced objectivities of transcendental egos, there only exists one world. For
Husserl, the transcendental ego is the bridge that allows us to suspend our naturalistic
separation from the world and each other to consequently eliminate the isolation of
the individual subject from all other subjects. In his phenomenology, the
transcendental ego is the key for the oneness of human existence.
Halten wir uns an das letzte transzendentale Ego und an das

Universum des in ihm onstituierten, so gehoert ihm unmittelbar
zu die Scheidung seines gesamten transzendentalen
Erfahrungsfeldes in die Sphaere seiner Eigenheit - mit der
zusammenhaengenden Schicht seiner eigenheitlich reduzierten
W elterfahrung (in der alles Fremde abgeblended ist) - und in die
Sphaere des Fremden. Dabei gehoert aber doch jedes
Bewusstsein von Fremdem, jede Erscheinungsweise von ihm mit
17Fuchs (1976: 74ff) and many others have pointed out that Husserl’s discussion
of intersubjectivity is inconsistent and ultimately "fails." The inadequacy of H usserl’s
argument is supported, according to Fuchs, by critical evaluations of Heidegger,
Sartre, M erleau-Ponty, and Levinas. Here, however, the phenomenological discussion
of intersubjectivity plays an essential role for the following chapters. It is not the
purpose o f this research project to reflect critically on the validity of Husserl’s
philosophy.
77
in die erste Sphaere. W as irgend das transzendentale Ego in

jener ersten Schicht als Nichtfremdes - als "Eigenes" -
konstituiert, das gehoert in der Tat zu ihm als Komponente
seines konkret eigenen W esens, wie noch zu zeigen sein wird;
es ist von seinem konkreten Sein untrennbar. Innerhalb und mit
den M itteln dieses Eigenen konstituiert es aber die "objektive"
Welt, als Universum eines Ihm fremden Seins, und in erster
Stufe das Fremde des Modus alter ego (Husserl 1987: 102-
103).18
W ithin the realm of the transcendental reduction, the "heres and theres" and the ego
and the alter ego are identical. The transcendental ego is universal since it not only
creates objectivity: it depends on it. Natanson points out that in reading Husserl, one
can either speak of the (universal) transcendental ego or of transcendental egos.
Consequently the meaning of "my" and "your" transcendental ego designates the
meaning of the transcendental ego. As Natanson writes, "referred to in the singular or
plural, "transcendental ego" signifies the primacy o f consciousness" (1973: 101).
Although not the same, the I is in the you and the you is in the I. Transcendental
reduction creates the ground for the ego’s realization of living within the same
objectivity of all other egos. Subjective objectivity is as well the objectivity of what
I8Restricting ourselves to the ultimate transcendental ego and the universe of what
is constituted in the universe, we can say that a division of his whole transcendental
field o f experience belongs to it immediately, namely the division into the sphere of
its ownness—with the coherent stratum consisting in his experience of a world reduced
to what is included in his ownness (an experience in which everything "other" is
screened o ff)-a n d the sphere o f what is "other." Yet every consciousness of what is
other, every mode of appearance of it, belongs in the former sphere. W hatever the
transcendental ego constitutes in that first stratum, whatever he constitutes as non-
other, as his "peculiar own"—that indeed belongs to him as a component o f his own
concrete essence...; it is inseparable from his concrete being. Within and by means of
this ownness the transcendental ego constitutes, however, the "Objective" world, as a
universe of being that is other than him self-and constitutes, at first level, the other in
the mode: alter ego (translation from Natanson 1973: 101).
78
Husserl calls the lifeworld (Lebenswelt). Lifeworld is the constitutional quality within
which human life exists; it is the common ground o f life and the medium that forms
the plurality of egos into one unity. In The Crisis o f European Sciences (Husserl
1982a) Husserl wrote:
so every ego-subject has his horizon of empathy, that of his

cosubjects, which can be opened up through direct and indirect
commerce with the chain of others, who are all others for one
another, for whom there can be still others, etc....B ut this
means at the same time that within the vitally flowing
intentionality in which the life of an ego-subject consists, every
other ego is already intentionally implied in advance by way of
empathy and the empathy horizon. Within the universal epoche
which actually understands itself, it becomes evident that there
is no separation of mutual externality at all for souls in their
own essential nature....all souls make up a single unity of
intentionality with the reciprocal implication of the life-fluxes of
the individual subjects, a unity that can be unfolded
systematically through phenomenology; what is a mutual
externality from the point of view of naive positivity or
objectivity is, when seen from the inside, an intentional mutual
internality (Husserl 1970: 255-257).
79
CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY
Husserl re-defined the notion of objectivity by relating it exclusively to
subjectivity, because objectivity can only appear within subjective experience. His
methodological goal is to define and describe the different ways in which subjective
experiences appear, how they function, and how their constituents relate to each
other. What positive science—to remove it from the positivistic/naturalistic analysis-
generally describes as merely subjective now becomes purely subjective, and last but
not least, the ground for objective knowledge.
The two major aspects of subjective experiences are intentionality, which
constitutes the dependent interrelationships between the ego-pole and the object-pole
within experience, and internal time consciousness, which is the most basic structural
level of consciousness. Consciousness appears simultaneously with temporalities of
various kinds.
I tried to demonstrate that the phenomenological approach consists of three
fundamental methodological steps:
1. Epoche (noema versus noesisj-R eduction-Bracketing: The world itself, but
only as it appears in consciousness.
2. Transcendental reduction. The bracketing of all physical/sensational
information and relations, and the exclusive concentration on pure self
reflection.
3. Eidetic reduction. The filtering of all common features of transcendental
reductions and the exclusion of specific individual features within
80
transcendental reductions in order to come to some sort of universal
conclusion about the condition of knowledge and truth.
The possibility of universals as knowledge and the constitution of the ego as being
part of one single universal ego through transcendental reduction leads towards the
deepest questions of ontology. Surely, this introduction of phenomenology was
selective in the sense that its purpose is to prepare for Celibidache’s philosophy.
At this point, it is fascinating to point out an interesting aspect of Husserl’s
work: it bears a very close relationship with Far Eastern philosophies (such as Zen,
for example). In 1925, Husserl published an article on the German publication of the
speeches of Gautamo Buddhos (Ueber die Reden Gautamo Buddhos) (Husserl 1989a:
125-126). In this article, Husserl described his profound fascination with Buddhist
thinking. He emphasized the cultural, political, and philosophical importance of these
writings. He considered the study of these translations as inestimably valuable for the
ethic, religious, and philosophic renewal of our "naive" culture (Husserl 1987: 157-
161). Apparently, Husserl did not perceive his understandings of Buddha’s writings as
contradictory to the goals and values of his own life-long philosophic endeavor in
which the struggle over the methodological possibilities of gaining objective
knowledge plays an essential role. Klaus Held stated:
The natural belief of existence reaches extreme dimensions

within science: In the assumption that a subject exists in the
world, as an isolated entity, all traces and possibilities of the
subjects relatedness and perspective interrelationship and
correlationship are destroyed. The radical liberation of scientific
knowledge from the limitation through subjectively relative
modes of appearances, the necessity for objectivity becomes the
highest norm (Klaus Held in Husserl 1986: 47).
81
H usserl’s comments on Buddhist thinking do not play a significant role in current
secondary literature on his works. However, current developments among scholars of
these matters support the relevance of the Far Eastern/phenomenology connection:
with the 1979 publication o f Japanese Phenomenology (Nitta and Tatematsu ed. 1979)
within the series of Analecta Husserliana,19 an East/W est forum for phenomenological
research was born. Other authors have made major contributions to the
phenomenology/Far East connection (see Laycock 1994 and Chattopadhyay, Ebree,
adn Mohanty 1992).20
The preceding introduction makes implications of phenomenology for music
readily apparent. Phenomenologically, music is not a subject m atter that exists
positively outside o f human consciousness, but exclusively inside. This shift from the
exterior to the interior of human experience allows a different focus. The laws of the
physics of (exterior) sound are quite different from the laws o f sound experienced by
human consciousness.
Chapter two gave an introductory view of literature related to the
phenomenological interpretation of music. This introduction to the variety of
phenomenological approaches to music together with the introduction to Husserl’s
phenomenology should serve as a sound basis for a closer look at Sergiu
19Analecta Husserliana is the yearbook o f phenomenological research, published in

cooperation with The World Institute fo r Advanced Phenomenological Research and
Learning.
20See for further discussions as well Chattopadhyaya 1992, Klein 1988,, Jones 1980,
Dubs 1987, Steindl-Rast n .d ., Santos 1991, and Veith 1978.
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Celibidache’s teachings on the phenomenology of music to better understand the
context o f his statements.
CHAPTER V
SERGIU CELIBIDACHE’S PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH TO MUSIC
INTRODUCTION
The following chapter is based on the primary sources of Celibidache’s
interviews, the documentation of his seminars, rehearsals and performances, and his
own texts. Celibidache’s main topics and central themes in these materials serve as
categories for applying the constant comparative analytical method. Each publication
was analyzed in reference to each of the previously determined categories.
Some discussions contain similar content analyses. The order of the
topics/categories is not hierarchical but rather sequential. The greatest difficulty in
this analytical approach is the scattered and unorganized structure of the material.
Celibidache jumps from one topic to the other and neither in his publications nor in
his seminars does he follow a well structured plan that could be described here as a
generic model. In his seminars, his teachings unfold through dialogue. Students
always ask questions which he then answers. Very often a single question can alter
the direction of how content unfolds during a seminar day. It is not possible in this
presentation to present simple concepts first and complex concepts later. Some initial
statements will help to make sense of the overall picture this chapter creates.
One of the most interesting aspects of this analytical approach, the method of
cross checking through the constant comparative method, is that all published
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interviews (the oldest being 34 years old) reveal an incredible consistency: first, the
choice of topics/themes mentioned are consistent throughout; second, the choice of
examples is consistent; and third, the explanations of his arguments are identical.
These research results are rather surprising because the primary material
consists of over 456 pages of photocopies, books, journals, magazines, and
newspapers, which have accumulated over a period of more than 34 years. Because of
the reiteration of the same arguments, examples, and topics, the material that has
been analyzed in this research project can be condensed to a very small fraction of the
original.
The material stems from two areas that were not examined in this research
project: a) anecdotal incidences, jokes, and personal matters that are not directly
related to the problem of music and phenomenology, and b) critical remarks by
Celibidache about colleagues and institutions, such as orchestras, conservatories,
broadcasting corporations, and journalists. Most of these comments are highly
provocative because of the choice of language or content, which was very often
perceived as highly cynical (Umbach 1995a: 195, 197, 206, and 260). It is interesting
to note that his commentary on colleagues makes up a rather large quantity of the
published materials; almost every interview found contained such remarks. Practically
all conductors of high reputation are negatively mentioned or criticized, including:
Muti, Mehta, Boehm, Maazel, von Karajan, Abbado, Fruehbeck de Burgos, Boulez,
Haitink, Swarovsky, Solti, Toscanini, and Knappertsbusch. The same is true for
orchestras such as the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra and the Vienna Philharmonic
85
Orchestra. Additionally, many extremely critical comments are made about
journalists, music critics, and authors. Altogether, this aspect of Celibidache’s
statements makes up more than fifty percent of the analyzed material.
The analytical representation of Celibidache’s comments concerning his
theoretical approach of a phenomenology of music is based on his language and his
choice of words for each individual example. Possible contradictions among and
between explanations of different topics are not further discussed.1 Instead, the topics
and their analytical representations are kept separate.
'One apparent contradiction appears in his theoretical discussion of transcendence,

pure consciousness, and reduction on the one side, and a metaphorical comment about
inner freedom and inner search on the other. Celibidache argues, as later parts of this
chapter will explain, that the state of pure consciousness, which is a result of total and
absolute reduction of the given material of a piece, excludes the existence of an object
per se. The phenomenological argument that consciousness is always consciousness o f
something does not apply. At the same time, Celibidache talks about growth, inner
search, and finding freedom in the context of pure consciousness. The choice of the
word finding indicates that there is something to find which hints at an object of
consciousness. This type of contradiction does not affect the overall presentation of
this analytical approach. It is important to mention, though, that these contradictions
exist on a strictly formal and literal level and that they were ignored in this
presentation.
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COSMOS, W ORLD, AND SOUND
Introduction
Three m ajor themes dominated Celibidache’s spiritual and artistic growth: a)
the analysis of tone in the context of its impact on human consciousness and its
specific static and dynamic aspects, b) the analysis o f the mind and spirit ( Geist) and
of how both, mind and spirit, react to the acoustic phenomena of music, and c) the
analysis of those aspects of music that cannot be interpreted and that cannot be
influenced by human will, aspects that existed a priori and which led Celibidache to
the conclusion that "in music nothing can be interpreted," but that instead "everything
is given" (Celibidache 1993a: 49).
One of Celibidache’s most fundamental distinctions points to music on one side
and to the conditions of music on the other. Music and the conditions of music are
two very distinct concepts which can only be approached and understood by two very
different methodologies: music by pure experience and pure consciousness, and the
conditions of music by logic and science. Music has no definition. Sound has
definitions, but sound is not music. Instead, sound is something that can lead to
music, but sound itself has nothing to do with music. Music, as opposed to sound, is
not logic and, as well, the laws of spatio temporality, such as physical time/tempo,
can not be applied to music. However, the conditions which are necessary for
something to become music need to be approached scientifically and logically. The
scientific method for the study and understanding of these conditions is the
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phenomenological method (Celibidache 1993a: 49-56).
The conductor himself has no impact on music itself. Instead, he is solely
responsible for the conditions that are required for something to become music. But
once these conditions themselves are realized, music happens beyond the realm of
human will, intelligence, understanding, and action. In looking back on his own
career and life, Celibidache points out that the first years o f his career were devoted
to being sensational, effective, and presenting a show to impress the audience, rather
than devoted to making music. At the age o f 31, he stood as a conductor for the first
time in front of a major orchestra - the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra. However, by
his own admission, he was 42 before he started to experience music in a state of
"pure and transcendental consciousness" (Celibidache 1993a: 54). As well, the
appearance of a transcendental reduction and pure consciousness in music is not a
guarantee itself; many unpredictable factors can prevent the desired goal. Only nine to
ten percent of all his performances can be called music. The rest o f his performances,
ninety percent, are sound production only (Celibidache 1993a: 54).
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Death - the natural tendency of everything
Celibidache very often creates an ontological connection with his work as a
conductor. Very fundamental points of view are seen and presented in an ontological
context. The natural tendency of sound is to disappear or to die. All natural
phenomena of music have the tendency to disappear. The same is true for anything in
life; life is a continual process of coming closer to death. A violin string is set into
vibration by a player. The player causes the string to change its existing mode from
that of passiveness into that of activeness. Nevertheless, right after the string is
brought into vibration, the cosmos—as Celibidache describes it—counteracts this
human impact by bringing the string back into passiveness. Consecutive sounds or
notes of a melody or a piece represent the "fight" against this natural tendency of
sounds to disappear. No string will vibrate infinitely long, and neither can nature
produce an ongoing, controlled, and stable pitch. Only the human being can do this.
The "fight" is kept alive by a pulsating balance of tensions and relaxations in all
music. Music does not consist of an infinite growth of tension or an infinite growth of
relaxation. When the cosmos or nature takes back what was initialized by a human
being (i.e. bringing the action or vibration of the string back into its original passive
state) a universal law comes into place. Death itself, the taking back of the impulse,
the act of becoming passive again and disappearing, is structured and is determined by
a universal law. The sequence and the appearance of infinite overtones is a priori
defined. The string, once it is set into vibration, starts to divide itself according to an
universal plan (Celibidache 1992i: 62). Celibidache says that each single process of
89
dying is structured. The way the cosmos takes everything back cannot be determined
by human will: instead, nature dictates this process. The human being can only
witness this process, but he can not influence it. Based on this ontological viewpoint,
Celibidiache argues that the phenomena of a continuously identical pitch, a melody, a
piece of music, music per se are created through human nature, but do not belong to
human nature; they belong to the unity of the cosmos (Celibidache 1992i: 62-63).
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Tension and direction
The phenomenon of tension is caused by two opposing factors that are
directing their energies against each other. Through this process o f directing their
opposing energies against each other, eventually, a climax or a point of highest
tension will appear, after which relaxation takes place. The two energetic tendencies
do not do anything by themselves. Only by working together and becoming one can
they develop naturally as a unit.
The tide is a good example2 of this principle: the interplay of gravity, physical
and material conditions, time, motion of moon and earth, etc. cause the oceans to
create tides. The phenomenon of the tide is the unified expression of the multiplicity
of all these elements, factors, and parameters. A tide, so to speak, is the transcended
quality that appears when this multiplicity o f opposing energies becomes one, or a
single unit. As well, the phenomenon of the tide does not appear because the water
itself is doing something. Instead, it is being affected by the interplay and context of
all forces of which water is an integral part. The tide is nothing but a form of
increase and decrease of tensions and relaxations. The cosmic pulsation and vibration
of opposing forces create a natural process which expresses harmony, stability, and
beauty for the human experience (Celibidache 1992i: 62-65).
It is part of human nature to search for this harmony, balance, stability, and
beauty that is created by cosmic laws and not by human will. W hen two or more
opposing tendencies are turned into a single unit, human consciousness experiences a
2Example chosen by author, not presented by Celibidache.
91
different temporal quality: that of eternity. With the experience of multiplicity it is
very different: here, human consciousness experiences physical time and duration.
When humans find love, or find themselves in love, they want to love eternally.
The quality of eternity and non-temporality is a crucial one.
In nature, the opposition of forces or energies is structured in any process that
utilizes opposing energies. Each process has a definite structure o f directions: either
the direction of increase or the direction of decrease,3 the direction towards the
climax, or the direction away from the climax. Music, melodies, and developments do
nothing else but this: they can either go towards the climax or they can go away from
the climax. No point or moment of this process can be without the context of this
overall structure of process, direction, and unity. It is not possible for a natural
process of opposing energies to unexpectedly liberate itself from this principle and be
without direction at all.
The natural tendency of the human mind is to search for this kind of stability,
the stability that emerges when two become one, when multiplicity disappears and
unity appears. This form of natural stability, balance, and harmony, even though it
can be called processual on a physical level, is non-processual on an experiential
level. Furthermore, it is non-durational, non-sequential, and individable. Stability is
nothing but truth. Truth does not change.
Each process of opposing energies (such as a tide) can be divided on a
in fin ite examples of opposites can be listed here: growth and decrease, light and
dark, male and female, up and down, etc.
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physical and material level into the following phases: beginning, increase of tension
and decrease of relaxation, climax and maximum of tension, decrease of tension and
increase of relaxation, and end. This structural sequence exists everywhere: the heart
beat, breathing, birth and death, etc. If the forces of the present moment are
balanced, stability exists. The essence of stability is truth. Stability, truth, balance,
oneness, and eternity are terms that are used by Celibidache equally; they are
interchangeable (Celibidache 1992i: 65).
Multiplicity exists when the appearance (for example, setting a string into
vibration) and the disappearance (for example, division of the string and creation of
infinite overtones) are perceived as separate phenomena; multiplicity disappears and
unity appears when that which was two or more becomes one.
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The fifth
The essential characteristic of the fifth is the opposition of two and three.
The mathematical opposition of two and three is the maximal opposition within one
single unit. Because the fifth is the interval that contains this maximum opposition, it
stands out in quality from all other intervals. There is another reason, however, why
the fifth is of greatest importance in comparison with all other intervals. The fifth is
the first interval in the sequence of appearing overtones that creates a real contrast.
The first overtone that appears in the natural sequence is the octave, but the octave
does not produce any opposition to the fundamental/root. The next overtone that
appears in the natural sequence is the fifth (Celibidache 1992: 62-63).
Celibidache draws many analogies to the opposition of the forces two and
three, which is an integral part of the interval fifth.4 The geometrical angles of 135
and 90 degrees which appear in the kinetic action of the human legs while walking is
a form of the two to three opposition. As well, he calls non-mathematical examples of
opposition a representation of the two to three opposition; for example, the opposition
of man and woman (Celibidache 1992i: 62-63).
Life could not exist in its current form without the structuring element of the
two to three opposition. Any internal structure of a single unit is affected by the
universal two to three opposition. Structure is not possible without it. Without
structure nothing can be communicated, nothing can be assimilated, nothing can be
4The second overtone is produced through the structural division of the string into
two and three parts.
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reduced (multiplicity reduced to unity), and finally, nothing can be articulated or
expressed. Communication without articulation is impossible. Thinking without
articulation and communication is impossible.
Again, Celibidache creates a universal and ontological context. The fifth not
only represents a unique structural component in life and in music; it represents an
unique temporal component of music as well. Because the fifth is the very first
interval of the overtone series that creates opposition, in temporal terms it can be
called the future o f the fundamental. The fifth is the future of its very own origin
(Celibidache 1992i: 64). Celibidache talked during his seminars on several occasions
about undertones as a phenomenon that structurally appears prior to its origin. In this
sense, the fifth is also the past of its own origin. Both the past and the future of the
original fundamental form the basic cadence of subdominant, dom inant, and tonic
(Zelle 1992: 86 and Kleinschroth n.d.: 16).
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Extroversion and introversion
The previously described process of bringing a string into motion and its
subsequent return to motionlessness can be described by two different qualities. In
order for a string to be set into motion, an extrovert attitude is necessary. An
extrovert attitude is a quality that desires something to get out of its original state.
The process o f returning back to motionlessness requires an introvert attitude. The
extrovert attitude belongs as a quality to the human being, whereas the introvert
attitude belongs to nature or the cosmos. Both qualities form a unified balance. The
introvert quality can only be as strong as the extrovert and vice versa. The
relationship between the extrovert attitude of human will to create something, and
nature’s introvert attitude to always take back what has left its own origin, resembles
the energetic characteristics of human emotions. Extroversion and introversion are
nothing else but analogies to all forms of vibration and pulsation o f all existing levels
of life (Celibidache 1992i: 62-63).
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Phrasing
Celibidache defines "phrasing" as follows: "Phrasing emerges when the
individuality of the components of the intervals of a melody are secured and
expressed" (Celibidache 1992i: 64-65). Phrasing has nothing to do with punctual
phenomena. It consists of the relationship between single and individual phenomena.
Phenomena of a melody can only do two things: a) they can expand (extroversion), or
b) they can decrease (introversion). Any melody, piece of music, or natural
phenomenon consists of these two aspects which are divided by a turning point or
climax, the point o f maximal expansion (and the point of maximal tension).
Celibidache stresses two important factors. First, the point of maximal expansion can
not be interpreted. Second, the relationship between the two single phenomena that
lead from the beginning to the point of maximal expansion and from the point of
maximal expansion to the end cannot be interpreted. Both the point of maximal
expansion and the coherent relationships that go with it are inseparably connected with
each other. If one part of this structure is changed, automatically the totality of the
structure itself is changed. The point of maximal expansion and its structural
relationships to the whole can either be ignored or witnessed, but they are not subject
to human will, taste, emotion, or interpretation. As well, the point of maxima!
expansion within a musical unit only exists once; it is unique (Celibidache 19921: 65).
When Celibidache talks about these relationships between the point of maximal
expansion and its structural relationships, very often he mentions Furtwaengler. For
Celibidache, Furtwaengler was the only conductor who approached music with the
97
two following questions: How far does the phase of expansion go? Where is the
turning point where expansion transforms into decrease? Too many times, he says,
people ignored the fact that music has a point where the return starts, and that
potentially the return is the point of departure. The end of a piece is the potential
beginning, because both, beginning and end, are an inseparable unit that
transcendentally exist in complete synchronicity as an inseparable unit (Celibidache
1992i: 65).
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Epiphenomena
Celibidache very often uses the term "epiphenomena" instead of "overtones."
However, in his thinking epiphenomena include overtones, but beyond that consist of
far more. The epiphenomena of sound are pre-determined. They create a structure
which excludes interpretation because the process of structuring is cosmically pre
defined. The character and constitution of epiphenomena are not controllable by
human will. The sequence of overtones, their quantity and quality are an ontological
fact o f life itself. Ontology categorically excludes human will, interpretation, beauty,
choice, and emotion. Celibidache sees an analogy between the structure of
epiphenomena of sound and the formal structure of pieces of music. In both cases, the
return (introversion) from the point of maximal expansion or the climax to the end is
a determination of the extrovert process consisting of the beginning to the point of
maximal expansion (Celibidache 1992i: 64).
The discussed principles of the phenomena of tone, death, tension, direction,
extroversion and introversions, and expansion and decrease, are the same. The
important aspect of these discussions is that Celibidache continuously emphasizes the
human position in the fundamental processes of life: there is no human impact,
influence, or interpretation that changes the given.
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THE MIND
Pure consciousness
F or a conductor, the study o f musical material (score, instrumentation, etc.) is
essential. The second component in Celibidache’s work is the phenomenological one
which includes the study o f the mind and consciousness, as well as the study of what
impact the musical material has on the mind.
Celibidache clearly advocates the study of Husserlian phenomenology, but in
some basic concepts he leaves the Husserlian route. He points at a contradiction
between Husserl and Husserl’s teacher Brentano: according to Celibidache, Brentano
felt that consciousness is always a consciousness o f something, even if consciousness
reflects upon itself and transcends the separation between the outside world and itself,
which is what Husserl called transcendental reduction. In the case o f self-reference,
consciousness is its own object. Celibidiache argues that pure consciousness is not
consciousness of something. Consciousness that refers only to its own self and being,
cannot be called pure consciousness, because it still implies a separation between
consciousness and an object of which consciousness is conscious or aware of
(Celibidache 1992i: 73).
Pure consciousness is a concept primarily originating from Far Eastern
philosophies, which holds that it is the goal to develop an "empty"or pure mind. Pure
consciousness has no object. Pure consciousness excludes any form o f separation, of
thinking. Language, especially grammatically structured and non-poetic language, can
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not explain or describe this quality called pure consciousness. For Celibidache, the
musical act is an act of pure consciousness. It is an act in which multiplicity,
ambiguity, or separation of subject and object do not exist. As well, logical structures
do not exist in a pure consciousness. Temporal structures do not exist; the only
temporal characteristic that might be able to describe it is eternity (Celibidache
1992i:73).
For a pure consciousness, the following is true: the beginning is in the end,
the end is in the beginning, opposites are the same, and nothing but eternal
synchronicity exists. It is only a mind that has developed a pure consciousness that
can potentially experience the beginning and the end of something as a synchronic
oneness (Celibidache 1992i:73).
Because music is not possible without the overcoming of separation and the
laws of spatio-temporal dimensions of the physical world, Celibidache encourages the
musician to develop the ability necessary for a pure consciousness to emerge. He
points out that inner peace and balance are essential to become able to experience
with a pure consciousness. The transcendental experience with a pure consciousness
experiences truth that has not been touched, influenced, or manipulated by the act of
thinking or will. For Celibidache, pure consciousness and truth always go together. In
keeping with the tradition of Zen, he points out that the truth exists behind and/or
after language and thinking. Truth in this sense cannot be thought, defined,
categorized, grasped, intellectually understood, or structured by contrast. Celibidache
considers pure consciousness and the elimination of thinking as an absolute condition
101
for music to emerge (Celibidache 1992i: 73-74).
In one of his student lectures, Celibidache was asked a question concerning a
passage of a Brahms symphony about its beauty. Celibidache’s response to the student
was, "We do not look for beauty, our ultimate goal is to look for truth. I have no
interest in beauty; it is truth that draws my attention" (Zelle 1992: 15).
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Noema and Noesis
Celibidache calls the very first and initial contact of consciousness with a
material (subject - object relationship) the noetic phase. The noetic phase is part of
any rehearsal during which the orchestra rehearses a piece for the first time under the
specific conditions of the present. He states that "noetic is that which comes to me,
which occupies my consciousness" (Celibidache 1992i: 73). That which imprints itself
onto consciousness consists of an infinite amount of information, aspects, ambiguities,
diversities, variations, and multiplicities. On several occasions, Celibidache talked
about the multiplicity of the world as something that can destroy a human being.
Human beings have the natural tendency to turn multiplicity into unity in order to
digest the pressure of chaotic multiplicity. They are forced to somehow organize their
perceptions and the only way they can do that is by reducing chaos and multiplicity
into unity. The mind cannot function without this process: orientation would not be
possible, and thinking would be impossible. Any word, for example, is a form of this
reducing process. The term tree is a unification of all possibilities of trees as well as a
unification of a single tree.
After the initial noetic phase, consciousness begins to turn the formerly
external information into its own. Consciousness incorporates what has occupied
consciousness. An exterior information/impact is transformed into an interior
component of consciousness itself. Then it cannot be called noetic anymore.
Celibidache defines the act of turning an information/impact from exterior to interior
as noeme (Celibidache 1992i: 73).
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Thinking
Any analogy between musical process and thought process is not applicable
because music is not semantically structured. The primary or fundamental values of
music are absolutely clear and exist without ambiguity, whereas in language they are
symbolic, ambiguous, and based on the specific past experiences of the individual.
Music does not contain linguistic meaning in a semantic sense. Celibidache points out
that it is a highly profound experience when a musician has liberated himself from the
process of thinking and when there is no separation between sound and being. Sound,
musical process, and being itself can be so identical that a distinction between the
experience and the object of the experience is not possible anymore (Celibidache
1994b: n.p.).
Sound by itself can be an object of experience. But in this phenomenological
approach, it is not the sound that is experienced. Sound appears as a musical medium,
but what appears (sound) is not what is actually appearing. Celibidache differentiates
between something5 appearing (music) through the appearance (sound). This process
is not logical, yet is true and real (Celibidache 1992j: 2). The world of appearance is
not the world of appearing, or the world of appearance is not the world of being.
Specific qualities of being, however, can be promoted through appearances.
Intelligence and thinking can be an incredible hindrance to someone’s
5Here, the choice of words becomes difficult. In the distinction between what
appears materially and physically (i.e. the sound) on the one side, and the appearing
the word something is not applicable in the context of the appearing. This is so
because Celibidache refers to an experience that contains no objects: consciousness
that does not want to grasp something.
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experiencing multiplicity (opposing tendencies) as one. To transcend multiplicity into
oneness, logical thinking must be excluded. Thinking has the tendency to materialize
or to objectify (i.e. to create objects of thought and consciousness) everything. In
order for something to be thought, there needs to be a something in the first place.
W ithout the objectification, the mind cannot think what it wants to think. Realities
that are not intelligible are turned into objects, things, items, or subjects in order for
thinking to take place. Thinking requires separation, pairings, confrontation, and
polarities in order for thinking to function. The human being cannot be separated
from the act of thinking. Thinking is an essential, indispensable fact of human
existence. But thinking is not all that the human being is capable of doing
(Celibidache 1992i: 66).
Celibidache often uses the terms "freedom" and "liberation" in the context of
the elimination o f thinking. Music does not teach one to become free; instead, only
the free person can make music, and by making music he practices being free, "which
means he meditates." For Celibdiache, music is meditation (Celibidache 1992i: 75).
M usic in its direct form does not allow thinking.
W hen it comes to the conditions of music which need to be organized in
rehearsals, thinking is crucial. A rehearsal is not music. The rehearsal ends when
music begins. Rehearsing is thinking. Thinking appears when music has not yet
appeared (Zelle 1992: 24).
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Language
Language is functional and it is always based on associations and symbols
which are ambiguous. Language can not be un-ambiguous. With music, it is quite
different. Nothing in music is ambiguous. W ith music, opposites, duality, and
multiplicity appear as one. The transformation of multiplicity into oneness is an act
that takes place through human consciousness (Celibidache 1992i: 66, and Celibidache
1986a: 322).
However, language is the structural component of human thinking. Because of
Celibidache’s view that thinking and language on one side and music on the other
exclude each other, he has never been actively involved in operatic conducting. Music
that is dominated by or originates from language, such as baroque recitatives, are not
music in his point of view. Although Celibidache acknowledges the semantic meaning
of language as it occurs in oratorios, songs, and arias, he always approaches the
material from the musical perspective. In a seminar at the University of Mainz he
once said: "I would rather spend six months in prison than listening to a performance
of Tristan and Isolde" (Zelle 1992: 84).
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Emotion, beauty, and interpretation
Celibidache insists on his point of view that emotion and beauty have no place
in music. Emotional experiences and the concept of beauty are the initial qualities that
draw the human being to music in the first place. In that sense they are necessary,
because if there was no beauty involved in the initial process of perception, no one
would turn to music. However, they are not the final qualities of musical experience.
In the complete musical experience, in a state of pure consciousness, emotional
qualities and so called beauty do not exist (Celibidache 1986a: 322).
Anyone who still has not gotten past the stage of the beauty of
music still knows nothing about music. Music is not beautiful. It
has beauty as well, but the beauty is only the bait. Music is
true. (Umbach 1995b: n.p.) [Translation mine, T.Z.]
Beauty and emotion are qualities that are transcended when music appears. The
beauty of music is only the catch to draw people to music in the first place. But
beauty is not its essential goal. Beauty is necessary for someone to be drawn to
something, but it is not the final goal.
What leads to interpretation is the confusion between music and emotions.
Certainly, music cannot be separated from emotions, just as thinking cannot be
separated from language. But music itself is not emotional. Music emerges where
emotions are transcended. Interpretation emerges when sound itself becomes the
center of attention and when sound remains an object of consciousness. In order for
musicians to become liberated from the material aspects of music, they must distance
themselves from sound as an independent entity (Celibidache 1978: n.p.).
Absolute identity between being and musical experience, which implies the
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elimination of the separation between experience and an object of experience,
excludes emotional involvement. The exclusion of emotional involvement excludes
interpretation. Interpretation represents a process in which human will and
arbitrariness have an effect on listening to or playing music. In a state of pure
consciousness, where the dichotomy between object and subject is transcended, the
human mind has no choice. To have no choice excludes the choice of interpretation,
or in other words, the choice to individualize music. In the context of pure
consciousness, Celibidache argues, freedom means to have no choice. This quality of
having no choice stands for the total elimination of human action. Here, the only
thing a human can do is to become conscious. To say the only thing a human can do
is to become conscious o f something would already distort the intended meaning
(Celibidache 1992b: 2).
Celibidache often uses the analogy between musical conditions and a
landscape. The musical material, in a sense, is like a landscape. It has mountains,
valleys, colors, and structural changes on various levels. All one can do is to become
aware of this landscape to then integrate all information into a single unity. One can
not interpret the landscape itself. Musically speaking, one cannot start to change the
landscape to make it more expressive or meaningful (Celibidache 1986a: 322).
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Truth and reality
Clearly, Celibidache believes in the existence of reality independently of the
human mind. The destruction of the ego allows a person to experience reality "as it
is" (Celibidache 1992i: 77). The experience of truth requires the elimination of human
ego and the emergence of pure consciousness. There are infinite possibilities of how
to not experience truth. But there is no alternative for how to experience truth. Truth
cannot be interpreted. In applying this viewpoint to music, Celibidache argues that in
the context of pure consciousness, only one single first symphony o f Brahms exists,
whereas in the realm of interpretation, an infinite number of versions of Brahms’ first
symphony exist. W hen Celibidache reduces Brahms’ first symphony to only one
single possible one, he is not referring to the material/physical object that one hears in
performance, and he is not referring to the material/physical conditions (i.e. the notes
for example). Instead, he is referring to the transcendental reduction and the
transformative appearance of multiplicity as oneness that takes place in the human
mind. In this sense, no alternative exists to what is experienced in pure consciousness.
Brahms’ first symphony does not exist as an object outside of human consciousness,
Neither does it exist as an object in human consciousness; each time it is played, it is
re-created as absolute identity between pure consciousness and human being. This is
an explanation for the following statement Celibidache has made on various occasions:
that a first symphony of Brahms never existed, nor exists, but that it can only be re
created (Zelle 1992: 18).
Music as truth cannot be "made" by a person. Music and truth can appear, can
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happen or can emerge within a person, if he/she establishes the right conditions for
this to happen. The essential condition for this to happen is the destruction of ego
(i.e. identification with the self and body as separated objects; or metaphorically
speaking, becoming a vessel for truth to manifest itself). Human life has no impact on
truth; the only choice human life has to offer is to work on the material conditions so
that truth can become apparent (Celibdiache 1992i: 77).
Freedom and spontaneity are the essential characteristics of how pure
consciousness manifests itself in this world. It is spontaneity that Celibidache asks for
in his musical approach, by destroying all constructs of thinking, logic, language,
physical time, and material empiricism (Celibidache 1994a:3).
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Intersubjective objectivity
The only way objectivity can become possible is when subjectivity is
eliminated. In quoting Husserl, Celibidache defines the state of objectivity as follows:
"When subjectivity (ego) is eliminated two people will find each other within the
other" (Kleinschroth n .d., Zelle 1992: 51, and Celibidache 1992i: 62). Celibidache
often uses the phrase: I find myself in you and you find yourself in me. In this state,
two subjects have eliminated the separation between the "I" and the "You".
Subject/object relationships are transcended. Intersubjective objectivity, a term that
originates from Husserl, is only possible through the emergence of pure
consciousness. Any impact of what the ego produces (for example, disappointments,
expectations, wishes, hopes, etc.) and any form of distinction between "I" and "not-I"
(i.e. "You" or "it") leads to interpretation and therefore away from music. Where
interpretation exists, there is ego. What Celibidache calls the ego hinders a person to
experience a musical phenomenon for what it is and causes a person to imprint
qualities onto the phenomenon that belong to the person (ego) but not to the
phenomenon itself. If this happens, conducting (or music making) becomes
mechanical and exclusively related to the material conditions of music (sound).
Ill
Conditions that something may become music
W e can now say the following about the conditions necessary for something
to become music:
1) Sound is an essential condition in the beginning.6 A phenomena is called
sound when the following three factors fall together:
a) vibration of something (string, instrument, etc.)
b) an organ that can perceive this vibration
c) consciousness that is conscious of what is perceived
Sound becomes a mentally valuable phenomenon once it is structured.
Structure and sound together allow the experience of relationships. Relationships and
proportions are a form of duality and multiplicity. The phenomenon o f relationships
and proportions make it possible to reduce multiplicity into oneness (Celibidache
19921: 62).
2) Sound itself has nothing to do with music. Sound disappears. What remains
is a function and a quality. Once music appears it has nothing to do anymore with
sound (Celibidache 1992i: 62).
3. Sound appears in human experience as a single phenomenon, whereas
physically the production of sound is always connected with the structured
disappearance (death) of sound. Nature does not offer a continuously equal vibration
(sound); only human beings can do that (Celibidache 1992i: 62-63). Sound as it
6Here, sound not only stands for the physical vibration that the human ear
perceives. It includes as well the experience of sound on an internal level, such as
Beethoven composing while already deaf.
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appears in music needs to be structured so that it can be perceived as relationships
and proportions on all possible levels. The process of structuring sound so that all
relationships and proportions can be perceived is the rehearsing process.
4. The transformation of multiplicity into unity through transcendental
reduction.
5. Pure consciousness, which excludes any form of subject/object relation
outside as well as inside of consciousness.
6. Elimination of all forms of ego-identification, such as emotions,
expectations, interpretation, human will, etc.
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REDUCTION
A piece of music, or a musical unit (melody, exposition, development, etc.)
contains a multiplicity of vertical points, information, and components. Human
consciousness can only perceive one entity at a time. Therefore, when dealing with
multiplicity, the human mind has the following choices:
1) To ignore multiple elements of perception
2) To separate elements to then perceive them successively
3) To reduce the multiplicity of elements and to then perceive them as one
Multiplicity cannot become an experiential part of the mind at a single given moment.
Only one punctual entity can become that. In music, two very basic forms of
multiplicity occur: 1) Multiplicity exists during a piece of music at a single moment;
various elements are active at the same time simultaneously and exist at one single
point (moment) o f time (for example, counterpoint, or chords o f more than one note).
This simultaneity is called vertical pressure. 2) Multiplicity exists through time. It
consists of the various successive vertical points and it exists in time successively.
This simultaneousexistence of multiple elements is called horizontal pressure, or
horizontal flow. Reduction occurs when the mind transcends multiplicity into oneness.
Both forms of multiplicity can be reduced individually and/or together. If this kind of
complete reduction appears, the beginning, end, part, and the whole are all identical;
as well, durational time or physical time ceases to exist.
To work with an orchestra is nothing else but to continuously face the
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responsibility to determine and create the material conditions that are necessary so
that duality and multiplicity on all existing levels disappears within the realm of
consciousness (Celibidache 1986a: 318).
Transcendence means nothing else but reduction of multiplicity. Celibidache
defines transcendence as "accumulating multiplicity and reducing it to oneness in
order to become able to perceive more multiplicity" (Celibidache 1986e: 118). Once
consciousness has achieved the reduction of multiplicity, it is ready to face and reduce
the next form of multiplicity. If the multiplicity of horizontal flow is reduced,
multiplicity then occurs from the outside through time, whereas from the inside
multiplicity does not exist anymore.
Short sentences, for example, can be forms of reduction. A sentence consists
of an infinite amount of information, such as words, letters, sounds, etc. But in
communication, the experience of a sentence can be a single one. The multiplicity of
information is reduced to a single unit of contents and expression. As discussed
above, the spoken or written sentence itself takes time in the physical dimensions of
time since it can only exist within the four-dimensional realm of spatio temporality.
But the reduced and transcended experience of it does not. The dimensions of pure
consciouss experience are not the same dimensions as those of the physical world with
its spatio temporal structure. If a sentence is truly reduced in this form by pure
consciousness, it can be said that the beginning of the sentence is in the end and the
end is in the beginning, and, furthermore, that the part relates to the whole as the
whole relates to the part. It is crucial to understand that the fact that a sentence is
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spoken does not allow any judgment of whether the execution of that sentence
occurred in the spatio temporal dimensions of the physical world, or if the execution
of the sentence occurred in the transcendental state of pure consciousness.
Even though the reduction of a sentence into oneness is a small-scale example,
the principle in music is the same. The four movements of a symphony, are in the
experience of pure consciousness, reduced to a single unit, if the specific structural
conditions of the musical material and its presentation are realized, and if the mind
liberates itself and realizes a pure consciousness. Here, beginning and end of a
symphony are one (Celibidache 1986c: 118-119).
Reduction is an achievement of the human mind. It only appears in the
dimensions of human consciousness and it cannot be realized through language,
thinking, writing, and or utilization of logic. The partial aspects of music, such as
melody, rhythm, harmony, dynamics, etc. need to be put together through the action
of the mind. The mind reduces complexity continuously and it can do this on an
infinite number of different levels.
The basic condition of humans in their confrontation with the universe is the
fight against multiplicity. Multiplicity, or in other words non-unity, is forced onto
them through their senses, through the cognitive structures and processes of their
brains. In order to function on a material level, they are genetically forced to utilize
those functions that perpetuate the separation between themselves ("I") and everything
else ("It", "You", "Non-I"). At the same time, multiplicity is against human internal
nature. In order to reduce multiplicity, and to create order, orientation, and to become
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capable of dealing with the world, the human consciousness unifies. This process of
unifying information is defined as reduction. Celibidache explains that the human
condition is that o f unifying and not that o f separating. He says: "The world
dispersed, scattered, and broke up, for reasons that are not known to us, and every
single human is on his way to put the world together again" (Celibidache 1992i: 73).
The reduction of a sentence is a different problem for the human mind than is
the reduction of the vertical and horizontal pressure o f an entire symphony. In
general, the mind needs training to develop this ability. This form of training is not
very common to the Western musician and student. Celibidache continuously
promotes the importance of Far Eastern techniques to achieve altered states of
consciousness.
Multiplicity is analyzed and defined in the discursive realm o f thinking. In
contrast to that, when making and experiencing music, we are all one and we
experience the infinite freedom of absolute oneness. However, in Celibidache’s
terminology: when we produce and coordinate sounds without this transformative
quality of our consciousness, we are not one, but instead a sum of players producing
a sum of sounds and rests. Reduction is the act of human consciousness that
transforms the experience of multiplicity into a conscious experience of unity
(Celibidache 1993a: 56).
Celibidache’s term of reduction is very distinct from H usserl’s. Husserl used
the notion o f reduction for the bracketing of the world and consciousness or to put the
world into parentheses. Here, the contents of consciousness are separated from the
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physical world outside o f consciousness.
Celibidache does something quite different: In his phenomenological approach,
Celibidache first insists on the logical and scientific acquisition of the given material
(score, knowledge, etc.). In this sense, he does not exclude the physical world from
the working process. Next, he does indeed concentrate on the transcendental quality
of pure consciousness. Here, reduction occurs and it implies the transformation of
multiplicity into oneness. Whereas Husserl refused to make any statement about the
physical world, Celibidache does. For Celibidache, reduction does not mean to reduce
something in quality. Rather, it means to establish a new quality that did not exist
before. To reduce in this way is an integral part of human nature that tries to confront
itself with the multiplicity o f the cosmos (Celibidache 1986e: 116).
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TIM E AND TEMPO
Time as a theoretical topic plays a fundamental role in Celibidache’s teachings.
The question of time is discussed on various levels:
1) The appearance of oppositeness, contrasts, and tensions within a piece of
music, which continuously revitalizes the fight to create sound against the natural
tendency of sound to disappear, introduces the dimension of time into music. Because
polarities in a melody can only appear through time, they are inseparable from time
itself. The degree of tension, opposition, and contrast among the main themes of a
piece very often determines the length of a piece. For example, the degree of contrast
and tension in a minuet of a classic symphony is usually smaller than that of a finale
or first movement. Consequently, minuets are usually smaller than the first or the last
movement of a symphony.
2) The natural tendency of the universe to take back all material phenomena
that emerge is structured. Death is structured. Concerning the phenomena of sound,
this structure is represented by the pre-defined sequence of overtones. Celibidache
calls the root of a tone the main-phenomenon {Hauptphaenomeri) and the following
overtones the sub-phenomena (Nebenerscheinung, or Nebenphaenomeri). The main
phenomenon and sub-phenomena form a pre-defined temporal relationship. All
phenomena that occur after the main phenomenon (root) represent the pre-defined
future of that main phenomenon. The first overtone that appears is the octave.
Because the octave contains so little contrast to the root, it is not very strong in its
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characteristic. The interval (overtone) that has the strongest structural impact on the
relationship of presence and future is the second overtone: the fifth (Celibidache
1992i: 62-63).
The analogy between the structured process of the appearance of overtones and
death as a natural phenomenon plays an essential part in Celibidache’s teachings.
Celibidache makes the important point that two different sides of one phenomenon are
interdenendenily connected with each other:
extroversion vs. introversion
creating a sound vs. how the sound disappears
birth vs. death
expansion vs. decrease
departure vs. return
increase of tension vs. decrease of tension
human vs. cosmos
multiplicity vs. unity
In his ontological understanding of the fundamental aspects of music, nothing can be
influenced by will, power, choice, or interpretation. Celibidache applies this concept
of opposites to the concept of time as well (Celibidache 1986a: 319-322).
Anything extrovert remains in time, meaning it is part of physical durational
time. Any motion of musical form, structure, and harmony is based on the law of
extroversion and introversion. A piece starts its way from the beginning to the point
of maximal tension (climax), and then returns by moving away (back) from the
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climax to the end.7 The first phase is an extrovert phase characterized by
extroversion; the second phase is characterized by introversion. In physical terms, a
piece as it is experienced transcendentally in the realm of pure consciousness
continuously goes through time during its extrovert phase, but then goes back in time
through its introvert phase. Both phases represent two opposite directions of time. At
the end of a piece of music, both opposites of time (past and future) have outbalanced
each other, and in the totality of the experience, never existed. The only temporal
quality that existed is eternity. Physical time and musical timelessness are two very
different aspects of the conditions of music itself. Physical time belongs to the
conditions of music, whereas musical timelessness belongs to the metaphysical
experience of pure consciousness (Celibidache 1992i: 64, and Celibidache 1978:
n.p.).
Pure consciousness is a form of transcendence. The physical world which
exists only on the structural cognitive basis of the distinction between I and not-I is
transcended. Transcendence, as well, excludes time. Musical experiences happen
7For Celibidache, there are compositions that do not fulfill this structural
requirement. Mahler symphonies, for example, do not contain the unity of
extroversion and introversion. Celibidache does not consider these pieces as music
and refuses to conduct them. The compositional process in music requires the non
intellectual utilization of intuitive being and the entering of the dimensions o f pure
consciousness; at the same time, intellectual craftsmanship is required as well.
However, logic and intellectual calculation by itself cannot produce a composition
which later on can be transformed into conditions that allow music to emerge. This
position might explain why Celibidache refused to conduct late Schoenberg pieces that
utilize twelve-tone techniques. For the discussion of the correlation between musical
form, composition and transcendence, see Adkins 1986, Thakar 1987 and Salzer
1962.
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outside of time; no duration is experienced (Celibidache 1992i: 76-77).
The various elements of music, which are more than pitch, length, color, etc.,
of the vertical pressure, affect consciousness at one single moment synchronically.
But, in addition, all elements that pass by successively in physical time affect pure
consciousness synchronically. The experience of the second note of a melody includes
and is inseparably connected with the experience of the first note (retention) and with
the following third note (protention).8 This specific double polarity (now/past and
now/future) constitutes the horizontal/vertical simultaneity of music (Celibidache
1976: 313).
The tempo is nothing but a condition which is necessary for that double
polarity to be experienced synchronically. If the vertical pressure, for example,
increases with increasing complexity (three notes as opposed to two) a different time
structure is required to realize the simultaneous connection between vertical pressure
and horizontal flow (Celibidache 1976: 313). The same is true if the horizontal
pressure increases.
Phenomenologically speaking, tempo is nothing but a condition so that the
simultaneous relationship of horizontal and vertical elements can stay alive within
human experience. If the tempo is too fast, the various elements cannot be perceived
in their unified relation and meaning (similar to a person speaking too fast and
consequently losing the ability to communicate). If the tempo is too slow, the
8Celibidache uses Husserl’s terminology. Protention and retention appear in

Husserl’s discussion on the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time
(1893-1917) (Husserl 1991).
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relationships fall apart, because the human mind cannot connect elements with each
other anymore (similar to speaking too slow). The relationship of mass, intensity, and
time is not a matter of interpretation for human consciousness. It is a determination of
the non-ambiguous law o f balance.
Haydn, for example, stated that the harmonic structure of a finale/presto has to
be rather simple. This is so because too many chromaticism and complexities would
not allow the desired tempo of a finale/presto (Celibidache 1986e: 126-128).
Celibidache states:
The concept of an external metronomic tempo that is

imposed onto the acoustic situation has no place in this
phenomenological approach....It is a completely inhuman idea to
suggest that music has to conform to metronome markings,
irrespective of the capacity of the instruments, of the expressive
powers of the players, of the acoustics, of the overblowing, of
the role of contrapuntal theory in the dialectic of what has to be
played!... If the variety of phenomena is great, I need more
time to reduce everything to a unity; if the variety is small,
correspondingly less time. That was why Haydn said that the
harmonies of a presto had to be kept very simple, so that it
would be understood. By contrast chromatic harmonies can be
developed in a largo because there is time for the middle parts
to mature and be consistently developed.... Also, of course
every musical space has different characteristics, and not every
such space amplifies the nine audible octaves to the same extent.
And there is no tempo which is suitable for all spaces. Only
physical time is always the same.
(Umbach 1995b: n.p.)9
’Celibidache never takes metronome markings as literal indications. Rather, he

uses them as means of direction. Sometimes he does not accept them at all (for
example, Beethoven symphony number nine, finale). Tempi are never based on the
metronome markings themselves. They are always a result o f the acts of
consciousness that reduce multiplicity to unity.
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Phenomenologically speaking, tempo is not a reality that exists autonomously
outside of music by itself. But instead, tempo is a consequence of several factors that
work together (consciousness, multiplicity of physical/material aspects, instruments,
acoustics, articulation appropriate for the specific piece, etc.). The experience of
music takes place in a non-metronomic mind (Celibidache 1976: 310-312).
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CONDUCTING BY MEMORY
Celibidache conducts everything by memory. But his understanding of "by
memory" is a phenomenological one. To memorize phenomenologially means to not
memorize the score or the pitches, and to not visualize the score, cues, and all other
information that play a role in conducting. Instead, to memorize phenomenologically
means to be able to correlate all aspects of the musical experience into one
transcendental unity. Because the unified transcendental experience is the only
reference point, it is possible to always know where one is in reference to, and in
correlation to, the structural and energetic proportion of the beginning, the climax,
and the end (Celibidache 1988:224ff). As indicated before, Celibidache does not
consider his work as a conductor as a form of interpretation.
Essential in his orchestral and rehearsal work is the distinction between
conventional and phenomenological analysis. The core principle of a
phenomenological analysis is to investigate how the musical material relates to human
consciousness. The study does not concentrate on the material itself (even though a
complete understanding and knowledge of the material is a prerequisite), but instead
only on its impact on consciousness (i.e. how consciousness reacts) (Celibidache
1988: 226).
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PHENOMENOLOGY
Phenomenology as Husserl has introduced it, especially in the meaning of
Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations (Husserl 1987), represents a science and a scientific
method. Because it is a scientific method, it can only explain what music is not, and
it can only deal with the conditions which are necessary for something to become
music. For Celibidache, the phenomenological discourse is of great importance. By
becoming aware of what music cannot be, one develops an intuition concerning what
music might be (Celibidache 1976: 312 and Celibidache 1993a: 57-59).
Even though Celibidache’s complete teachings are based in their roots on
Husserlian phenomenology, he points at severe contradictions and problems. In an
interview that took place in 1985, Celibidache said that he felt that he could not use
Husserl’s or Brentano’s terminology anymore. He still considers Husserl’s work as
his strongest point of departure. However, Celibidache followed a very different
direction in his work.
Brentano’s statement that consciousness is always consciousness of something
does not apply to the experience of pure consciousness, since pure consciousness does
not include objects. Meditation, as practiced in so many various cultural and religious
traditions, attempts to liberate the human being from thinking, objectification, and a
generic subject/object distinction.
The altered state of consciousness that is the goal of most forms of meditation,
and that appears when a symphony is reduced to a single unit, is not applicable to
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discussions o f phenomenologists such as Husserl or Brentano (Celibidache 1986e:
121).
According to Celibidache, Husserl was never able to solve the contradiction of
the following statements which are essential to his phenomenology: Celibidache states
that while Husserl said that humanity is the subjectivity that constitutes the world,
Husserl also said that humanity is dependently structured by the world outside o f the
human mind (Celibidache 1986e: 121-123).
Celibidache argues that in Husserl’s discussion of intentionality and with his
extreme emphasis on intentionality phenomenology in H usserl’s and Brentano’s
tradition always looks exclusively at consciousness (as consciousness of something)
and its objects, whereas in a transcendental experience o f pure consciousness,
consciousness itself is not intentional anymore and therefore does not focus on objects
(pure consciousness even eliminates itself as its own object) (Celibidache 1976: 310).
Husserl described intentionality as an inseparable quality of consciousness.
Intentionality implies duality, which is the duality between a) consciousness and b) the
object of which consciousness is conscious. Celibidache sets against this description of
Husserl’s work a very different kind of quality of consciousness: that of one-
pointedness; or in other words, as the Hindu tradition calls it: that o f advaita (i.e.
non-duality) (Celibidache 1986e: 120-122).
Nevertheless, even though these substantial contradictions exist between
Celibidache’s and H usserl’s approach, Celibidache clearly expresses the greatest
respect for H usserl’s work, without w hich-he believes-he would have never been
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able to reach his understanding of music (Celibidache 1986e: 122). Celibidache makes
the teachings on Husserl a fundamental part o f his teachings and his approach to
rehearsals.
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MUSIC
Celibidache consistently refuses to define music, because it is beyond linguistic
possibilities to explain (Celibidache 1978: n.p.). Considering the previous discussion
and accepting the affiliation of Celibidache’s approach to Far Eastern philosophies, it
appears appropriate to call music a form of nothingness. Music does not exist as a
continuous material or physical form. In that sense, it is wrong to say that music is
something at all. The semantic function of the word is puts music on an objectified
level which consists of the differentiation between subject and object. Celibidache
tried to solve this linguistic problem by saying that something becomes music, always
admitting that none of these attempts is satisfactory. The act of becoming is
continuous and never leads to an act of being something.
Using Beethoven’s fifth symphony as an example, Celibidache concludes that
there is no fifth symphony by Beethoven that exists; it can only be originated and re
created each time it is experienced.
Because music and the idea of objects (material objects, or objects of
consciousness) exclude each other in Celibidache’s phenomenological approach, it is
wrong to say that music becomes something: rather, it is more correct to say that
something can become music. This something is exclusively mental and conscious
energy of the actual experience (phenomenological reduction). At the same time, the
material conditions for this to happen are absolutely essential (Celibidache 1976: 305-
310).
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It is the human mind, spirit, and consciousness that transform the physical,
psychological energy into music, because the human mind correlates and transcends
factors that are materially separated into a unified experience in which separation does
not exist (Celibidache 1976: 305). If this does not happen, hearing remains linear and
successive. If it does happen, hearing is simultaneously spread out forwards and
backwards into the future and into the past at the very same time (Celibidache 1986a:
321-322).
The appearance is not the appearing. In referencing the ideas of Rudolf
Steiner, Celibidache says that it is not music that one hears, but that music unfolds in
the realm where one experiences beyond what one hears. Music is not in the notes,
nor between the notes; music is not anywhere, not even nowhere; music is not in
time. Music is not. Something allows something to become music (German: werden)
within the transcendental state o f pure consciousness (Celibidache 1976: 306).
With this phenomenological approach to music, the concept of now changes.
Now is not anymore the moment after what is experienced as past, nor is it the
moment before what is thought to be the future. Now expands over the totality of the
complete piece of music (Celibidache 1976: 306). In this synchronicity, the past still
becomes future and the future becomes past, until there is neither future nor past.
Music is not a form of searching or quest. Music has to do with the reality of
our being and the conditions into which we were born. In several seminars,
Celibidache expressed his viewpoint that it is natural for a young musician to not
understand the phenomenological world of music and to subconsciously, just as he
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himself did in the beginning o f his career until the age of 42, to ignore the reality in
which music exists. In the evolution of the individual, it is natural to start from the
physical, material, and external aspects of life, and to confuse them with the reality of
our life, to then eventually turn to the inside (experience, consciousness,
phenomenological reduction) and to leave (detachment) the exterior aspects as not
real, though essential, behind (Celibidache 1976: 311).
Music is not beautiful. Music is not sound; it has nothing to do with sound.
Music has nothing to do with the instrument. All these external factors need to be
transcended so that another reality can emerge (Celibidache 1984c: 15).
Music is not thinking.

Music is not beautiful
Music is not.
Music.
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W ILHELM FURTW AENGLER
Among all conductors that Celibidache has mentioned in the analyzed material,
one person very clearly stands apart from all others: Wilhelm Furtwaengler. The most
obvious reason why Celibidache talks about Furtwaengler quite differently is that he is
one of the very few conductors about whom Celibidache expresses positive judgment
(Celibidache 1984b: n .p ., Celibidache 1979: 11, Celibidache 1993e: 2, and
Celibidache 1984a: 21).
Several times, Celibidache has mentioned die following incident between him
and Furtwaengler: After a rehearsal, Celibidache asked Furtwaengler about the tempo
of a specific passage of a piece. Furtwaengler answered: "Well, that depends on how
it sounds" (Celibidache 1986d: 142, Celibidache 93a: 88, and Zelle 1992: 84). As
Celibidache has said many times, Furtwaengler’s answer was a revelation to him. In
Celibidache’s understanding, Furtwaengler tried to say that tempo is not an
intellectual reality that exists independently from the musical experience and that can
be imposed onto a performance situation. Rather, tempo is a condition of the
experience itself. If the multiplicity that needs to be reduced and correlated is great,
more time will be necessary to realize that. If the multiplicity is small, less time will
be necessary. That is why the temporal experience of a W agner overture is not
comparable to a Mozart symphony, even though physically and materially the pulse
may have the same metronome marking (Celibidache 1986d: 142).
Tempo is not the physical quality of sound, but rather a condition of sound
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necessary for consciousness to become able to reduce and to transcend multiplicity.
Beginning in 1936, Celibidache went to all of Furtwaengler’s concerts in
Berlin. Furtwaengler has been, since their very first meeting, one of the people who
had influenced him most. In the very beginning of his career, Celibidache was driven
by exterior aspects to music (sensation, emotion, sound, beauty). As well, from the
very beginning in Berlin, Celibidache was drawn to phenomenological theories.
Furtwaengler represented both to him; the implications phenomenology had to offer as
they were realized in the actual musicai experience, and his pragmatic and charismatic
personality.
Celibidache considers Furtwaengler as the only person who has been able to
fully understand what phenomenology calls "vertical pressure," which is the sum of
all factors that are active and that appear in the very present moment (punctual
pressure). Beyond that, Celibidache considers Furtwaengler as the only person who
was able to experience the vertical pressure in relation to the horizontal pressure (or
horizontal flow), which is the sum of all factors what are experienced as active in the
present moment but which do not appear materially/physically in the present moment
(Celibidache 1976; 313). All elements of the horizontal pressure have a lasting impact
on consciousness even though their material representation does not last. If there was
no lasting impression, there would be no horizontal pressure. A second tone is
perceived in relation to the impact the first one made on consciousness in the past.
This horizontal web of occurrences is always and continuously in relation to the
vertical web of the present moment. Music, therefore, structures and determines the
133
vertical pressure through its horizontal context (Celibidache 1986b: 106).
Furtwaengler’s outstanding ability was, according to Celibidache, to transcend and
reduce the two dimensions of vertical and horizontal pressure into a single and
absolute unity (Celibidache 1986d: 142-145, and Celibidache 1986b: 106). It appears
rather significant that Celibidache calls Furtwaengler the only person who was able to
do that. Furtwaengler matched in his approach to music what the phenomenological
method requested: reference of experience unto itself (i.e. pure experience or pure
consciousness). Furtwaengler realized this, as Celibidache explains, without being
able to theorize about it or even without being aware of what it is that he was actually
doing (Celibidache 1978: n.p., and Celibidache 1976: 314).
Furtwaengler was, throughout Celibidache’s life, the most significant person
(Celibidache calls him a "lighthouse") who provided guidance and orientation for his
career. "Everything I have done in my life is related to what Furtwaengler has given
me," Celibidache asserts. "Meeting him was pure grace and mercy" (Celibidache
1986d: 143).
Celibidache acknowledges as well Furtwaengler’s capacity as a composer
(Celibidache 1986b: 107). He points out that Furtwaengler himself was not aware of
what he had passed on to Celibidache. All musical matters of profound impact were
perceived and experienced by Celibidache through Furtwaengler, but they were never
directly taught. Furtwaengler communicated all these experiences subconsciously. He
conducted with a naivety and childlike innocence, of which he was not aware
(Celibidache 1986b: 106). In another interview, Celibidache describes Furtwaengler’s
134
influence on him as a trauma (Celibidache 1988: 329). For Celibidache, Furtwaengler
was the very first and only one who disclosed music to him. Although he describes
Furtwaengler as a conductor who had an inadequate and unclear sense of rhythm, and
a rather poor conducting technique, he points at Furtwaengler’s incredible capacity to
transcend the material conditions o f his work to rely purely on his own experience
(Celibidache 1993a: 58).
135
FAR EASTERN IN FLU EN C ES10
Only very few documents exist that were written autonomously by Celibidache
himself. An article by Celibidache that was published 34 years ago in 1962 in the
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung very clearly shows the influence Far Eastern
philosophies had on him (Celibidache 1962: n.p.). In this article, Celibidache asks the
reader to give more serious attention to Far Eastern philosophies, especially to those
of Zen and Buddhism. In this article, Celibidache refers to M artin Steinke, whose
teachings on Buddha had a profound impact on him in his very early years in Berlin.
Already in this article, Celibidache emphasizes that the significant contribution
of Buddha’s teachings for the W estern world is that understanding the reality o f our
life has nothing to do with any kind o f subject/object relationship, and that life in its
constituting form is not a m atter of interpretation. It exclusively consists o f the
directly experienced experience. All laws o f life are complete and total in the sense
that no aspect of our human life can escape from these realities.
As well, in this article, Celibidache critically mentions the limitations of
language, which is always ambiguous. He stresses that language cannot be a substitute
for the actual experience. He also discusses the fact that the contents of Buddha’s
teachings exclude logic.
10A good insight into the significance o f Far Eastern philosophies and the
teachings o f M artin Steinke for Celibidache already during his time in Berlin is
provided in the chapter on Sergiu Celibidache in Nicolaus Som bart’s book, Jugend in
Berlin (Sombart 1984: 223-236).
136
In this article, Celibidache makes a statement that has proven prophetic for his
life. He asks the reader to investigate the difference between static and fixed thinking,
and dynamic thinking. Static thinking consists of ego identification, wanting to grasp
an object in order to give consciousness something to look at, and subject/object
differentiation. Dynamic thinking, as he called it in this article, consists of the
infinitely continuous realization of the continuum of the laws of life, from which we
cannot escape, which we cannot change, but which we can only either ignore or not
ignore. The contents of this article sums up Celibidache’s lifelong quest and
proclaimed aesthetic position. It is important in the analysis of the given material to
mention that all materials show a rare and convincing consistency in what is being
said (Celibidache 1962: n.p.).
In a 1986 interview, Celibidache stated that he believes that his ability as a
conductor to reduce a whole symphony, and to accordingly know which conditions
are necessary for this to happen, is a direct result of his enduring practice of Yoga
(Celibidache 1986e: 129).
For Celibidache, the act of listening can have a strong impact on a
performance. This notion is a Far Eastern one, since it does not create a hierarchy
between the active doer and the passive listener. The consciousness of both groups,
the orchestra and the audience, have a significant impact on the performance itself. In
this context, Celibidache believes that Far Eastern audiences have a greater capacity
to listen to his performances than do many W estern audiences. This seems to be one
reason why his present orchestra, the Munich Philharmonic Orchestra, so often tours
137
Asia. In a 1990 interview, he stated that the act of listening with or in pure
consciousness is a responsibility that is equally shared by musicians and audiences.
Especially Asian audiences, in his opinion, have this capacity. Not only in this
respect, but also in many others, Celibidache severely critiques US - American
audiences (Celibidache 1991a: 96).
In a Zen experience, the beginning and the end are one, the ego does not
interfere, and life does not consist of separated entities (objects, subjects, I, non-I,
etc.). The experience through Zen is not intelligible; it can only be experienced.
The Zen-quality of the identity of the beginning and the end as one (absolute unity)
very much resonates with Celibidache’s approach to Bruckner symphonies. Bruckner’s
music is not a material phenomenon. It is not logic, but it is only true (Celibidache
1991a: 99).
The Zen quality of unity and identity of those things that our perceptive
sensory system perceives by the act of separating and distinguishing is a requirement
not only for the musician and the listener. In addition, this quality has to be inherent
in the composition itself. Celibidache, for example, does not see this quality of unity
in the form of Mahler symphonies. Although recognizing Mahler as one of the
greatest artists of instrumentation and sound balance, Celibidache calls the form and
structure of Mahler symphonies chaotic and confusing (Celibidache 1991a: 99). For
him, the structure and form of Mahler symphonies did not originate from the freedom
of pure consciousness and complete reduction. This is why Celibidache has refused to
conduct Mahler symphonies (Celibidache 1991a: 99).
138
Celibidache talks often about Zen and what an important role Zen has played
in his growth as a conductor, and his career (Zelle 1992: 75). He stresses the fact that
in Zen, the act of thinking is dismissed as trifling, and that, in Zen, teachers
consciously destroy the semantic grammatical structures of language in the poetic Zen
form of Haiku. Celibidache uses Haikus in his seminars and rehearsals; those Haikus
either conform to traditional Zen, or are of his own creation.
In a Haiku poem, causality and logic as the general structural elements of
language do not exist. In the poetic form of Japanese Haikus, there is no causality,
and there is no temporal structure as in language. One cannot find things/objects in a
Haiku. A Haiku has nothing to do with beauty. One can only experience a Haiku;
nothing can be fixed or repeated (Celibidache 1992i: 74).
Celibidache admires Zen masters. He points at the significance and profound
meaning of a human who has liberated himself from the acts of thinking,
conditioning, and logic, so that his existence in the presence of the present moment
reaches full and complete identity with the reality and truth of that very moment. This
kind of consciousness cannot function if thinking happens. Pure consciousness and
thinking exclude each other.
One personality of the Far Eastern context clearly stands out. Whereas Martin
Steinke was a German Zen master who had spent many years in Asia, Celibidache
mentions in the analyzed material an Indian spiritual leader of the present: Sathya Sai
Baba (Celibidache 1993c: 3). Celibidache has publicaliy mentioned his devotion to
Sathya Sai Baba several times (Celibidache 1994a: 2, Celibidache 1992k: 4, and
139
Celibidache 1993c: 3). He has also visited Sai Baba several times in South India.
Celibidache asserts his meetings with Sai Baba have been a continuous personal
inspiration (Celibidache 1993e: 1-2). In May 1992, Celibidache said that he is a
student of Sai Baba (Celibidache 1992b: 5), and he emphasized that he is a being who
tries to not distance him self from God (Celibidache 1992k: 6, and Celibidache 1992a:
27).
Indeed, Sathya Sai Baba’s teachings are perfectly congruent with the results of
the analyses of this research project:
God is omnipresent. That is, He is ever present. This moment is

God. There is only God. Truth is the same in the past, in the
present, and it will remain the same in the future. Therefore, the
time sequence of past, present, and future is just imagination.
But "I" am timeless, beyond time. "I" look at past, present,
future; they are not me. O f course, past, present, and future
must be taken into account in daily affairs. These two aspects of
time must be mixed and in operation at the same time. The
perception that the time sequence is only imagination, that "I"
am timeless and beyond time; both should be there at the very
moment that one is using the time sequence in his daily affairs
(Hislop 1978:72)
140
RECORDINGS AND REPETITION
For Celibidache, a recording is the antithesis of music. A recording cannot re
construct the original spontaneity of the original present moment (Celibidache 1992i:
75). He admits a serious conflict that arises when he refuses to make orchestral
recordings. That conflict is a financial one: Recordings are sometimes necessary for
an orchestra to survive economically. However, Celibidache has always been more
concerned with artistic issues, not economic or financial matters (Celibidache 1986e:
116-120, and Celibidache 1986c: 131-138). He feels that the multiplicity that is
reduced in the actual performance situation can never be identical with the multiplicity
that a recording of that very same performance offers. Therefore, the original
reduction that took place during the performance situation, and that was responsible
for all decisions that were made for the physical/material conditions of that
performance, is not possible when listening to the recording.
It is not possible to speak of the same situation and the same multiplicity of a
performance and of a recording of that performance. Any specific multiplicity
requires a specific tempo in order for reduction to take place. Tempo, therefore, is
the necessary condition for reduction to take place, and it is this tempo that does not
appear anymore as a physical quality of time. Consequently, the tempo of a recording
appears different. The tempo that appeares during the performance and which in that
specific situation had no alternative and is not influenced by interpretation or human
will, now appears differently in the recording. The tempo of the recording does not
141
relate to the specific uniqueness of the specific present moment.
What we experience in space (performance) cannot be preserved, documented,
or recorded. Celibidache criticizes the recording industry for being responsible for
training audiences to become insensitive. People are so strongly influenced, that they
cannot experience reality anymore (Celibidache 1986c: 116-118, Celibidache 1978:
n.p., Celibidache 1975: 1066, Celibidache 1993d: 3-4, and Celibidache 1993b: 45-
46). Time is not time consciousness.
Acoustical parameters and factors are a form-constituting elements. This means
that the form of music as it appears in a performance is partially determined by the
acoustic setting within which it takes place. The spatio-temporal setting and the given
material are inseparable. The tempo, for example, is the most direct consequence of
the specific acoustic setting. Celibidache calls the acoustic condition a living condition
(Celibidache 1988: 212):
because the musical space cannot be reduced. It cannot even be

photographed: what exists in the original musical space can not
be reproduced in the same form anywhere except in that same
space. The space has a back, a front, a right and a left, a
bottom, and a top. So it is polarized from the standpoint of the
observing intellect. The record can never recapture that. Do you
listen to the record in the same acoustic environment in which it
was recorded? O f course not! It kills the most important living,
unique, unrepeatable thing. It leads to a standardization of all
sensations, all aesthetics. A microphone cannot record the
harmonies of the human ear, so that on record you hear
completely different harmonies, completely different
instrumentation, different counterpoints; because the viability of
counterpoint depends on the harmonic zone which the human ear
can perceive.... So a record is a document but only a historical
one. It is not a musical actuality. (Umbach 1995b: n.p.)
His point of view on recordings seems to conflict with the fact that for many
142
years he preferred to work with European radio symphony orchestras which pre
dominantly work in order to record. But the reason for this long-time working
relationship (Italy, Sweden, Germany, and France) was not based on the goal to make
recordings. The reason was that these orchestras guarantee the longest possible
rehearsal times among all professional orchestras of this world (Germany, for
example, 8 - 12 rehearsals can be standard for new and difficult works). One of the
best orchestras in the world, the Orchestre National de l’ORTF, granted Celibidache
14 rehearsals for one single concert (Celibidache 1988: 213). Personality, spontaneity,
and uniqueness of truth cannot be recorded. Art is unique and can not be repeated
(Celibidache 1991a: 96, Celibidache 1992n: 2, and Celibidache 1992k: 4).
The musical situation (he calls it "musical room")11 cannot be reduced by
itself. Reduction can only take place within that room. Celibidache compared the
relationship of a recording to the originally recorded performance with a photograph
of a person and the actual person. The living dimensiona o f music are "killed"
through recordings (Celibidache 1986e: 132).
In a time when music recordings play a more and more important role,
Celibidache argues that the modes or perceptions and sensitivities of people’s
consciousness are standardized and cannot be called as free as they used to be.
The recording plays sound, but phenomenologically speaking, not music.
“ W hen Celibidache speaks of the musical room, he does not only refer to the
performance hall, stage, and building itself. The musical room has a historic, cultural,
and sociological dimension too, which plays an important role in musical experiences.
A Beethoven symphony played in 1945 in Germany appears in a very different
context than if it were played in 1995 in Tokyo.
143
Sound and tones are not music; they actually have nothing to do with music itself
(Celibidache 1986e: 132). They only represent the material/physical vehicle that
transports a metaphysical substance. Celibidache admits that a certain historic
documentary value is secured with the making of recordings (Celibidache 1986e: 134-
136).
Very similar assertions can be made about the concept of so-called repetitions.
Repetition only exists in the mathematical, mechanical domain. Phenomenologically,
repetition does not exist. If consciousness is confronted with subject X for the first
time, it will be different compared to how it was before. If consciousness is
confronted with subject X a second time, it cannot react or function as it did the first
time. Physical or mechanical repetition can mean phenomenologically only two
things: either increase of tension or decrease of tension (Celibidache 1992i: 65).
Music, therefore, does not contain repeats. The physical dimension of music does, but
not the phenomenological dimension (Celibidache 1976: 311, and Celibidache 1992k:
n.p.).
CHAPTER VI
SERGIU CELIBIDACHE’S REHEARSAL TECHNIQUES
Celibidache defines his role as a conductor through the purpose to create
conditions which make music possible (Celibidache 1986e: 128, and Celibidache
1986e: 128). The theoretical analyses o f the previous chapters, of course, have
practical implications. However, it is not possible to define practical rules that could
enable conductors to achieve results similar to Celibidache’s. The emphasis of his
rehearsal techniques is not a physical technique. His conducting style is extremely
reduced in motion and expression. The movement of his baton follows fundamental
rules of kinesthetics. To describe his rehearsal technique best, scholars need to focus
on the act of his consciousness, and the consciousness of the musicians. These acts
are not physically perceivable, but can only be experienced. The rehearsal process
itself is an educational and not an exclusively functional one (Celibidache 1980: n.p.).
Celibidache’s approach to an orchestra is manifold. Besides the aspect of the
actual rehearsing, a great deal of time and energy is invested in the education of the
orchestra members. This is the case with professional as well as non-professional
ensembles. The members o f the Munich Philharmonic Orchestra, for example, went
through a series o f lectures on phenomenology and music that were offered by
Celibidache (Celibidache 1984c: 15, and Zelle 1995: 16). The same is true for his
work with the orchestra of the Curtis Institute of Music (Zelle 1994: 2), and the
145
orchestra of the Schleswig Holstein Musik Festival 1992 (Zelle 1992: 11). The
motivation for this teaching effort was to give the orchestra the theoretical foundation
to better understand and cooperate in rehearsals (Celibidache 1992m: n.p.). Beyond
that, Celibidache believes that the human capacity and quality to transcend, to
correlate, to reduce, and to utilize a pure consciousness, is the same in all human
beings (Celibidache 1984c: 15). Consequently, he applies the same working ethic and
expectation to each individual player.
The rehearsals are conducted by memory, without a score (Celibidache 1992b:
4). Celibidache never lets the orchestra "read" a piece in rehearsals; he always starts
from the very beginning in detail. The essence of his conducting style, which he has
also taught during his seminars on phenomenology and music, consists of the
proportion of the arm/baton movement and the movement of the musical energy
(Celibidache 1984c: 15).1
After preparing a score, he insists on the fact that he "forgets everything" he
has studied in order for spontaneity to emerge (Celibidache 1993c: 2-3). He believes
that, music can only be lived; it cannot be understood. The score and its material do
not exist anymore in the conductor’s consciousness as stored objects during an ideal
performance. The mind does not recall any objects. Spontaneity is a quality that he
would not have been able to develop without his study of Buddhism, Yoga, Zen, and
phenomenology (Celibidache 1993c: 3). Orchestra and conductor need to become one
‘For the study of video documentation of Celibidache’s conducting see Celibidache

1991, 1992b, 1992c, 1992h, and n.d.b.
146
in order to make music (Celibidache 1993b: 44).
The essential ability that a conductor needs is to develop a mind that can
correlate all musical factors from beginning to end into one single unity and
simultaneity (Celibidache 1986e: 136). This is the antithesis of linear successive
thinking. What appears materially and physically, in a causal linear manner, needs to
be experienced in a transcended synchronicity (Celibidache 1993b: 44, and
Celibidache 1986b: 106).
As a conductor, Celibidache had to focus on the following main aspect: he had
to study what is objective in the given material. Objectivity, here, refers to Husserl’s
exclusive form of objectivity, which is the intersubjective one. Studying
intersubjective objectiveness means to only focus on what human will, taste, and
interpretation cannot influence. The transcended unity of a piece is a given truth that
can either be experienced or ignored. It can not be changed or influenced. This truth
is experienced through pure consciousness, reduction, and transcendence of
multiplicity into unity. There is only one possible way to experience that. And there
are infinite numbers of possibilities to not experience that (Celibidache 1978: n.p.).
Many and very long rehearsals are essential for Celibidache. As well, he
believes in a continuous educational process between the conductor and the orchestra
which is one of the reasons why he has not guest conducted very much in recent
years, but instead has only focused on the Munich Philharmonic Orchestra for which
he serves as music director (Celibidache 1991a: 98). The goal of this educational
process is to enable performances in freedom of mind. This means to allow pure
147
consciousness to work.
Celibidache never conducts operas. There are two reasons why he never
showed much interest in operas: first, the acoustical situation o f the pit does not allow
him to realize his understanding of music, and second, he feels that the predominance
of language and the word block the realization of transcendence, reduction, and pure
consciousness (Celibidache 1979: 11).
BIBLIOGRAPHY
SERGIU CELIBIDACHE
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Buddhistischer Sicht," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 7/28 (1962): no page
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__________________ . "Sergiu Celibidache ueber Musik und M usikleben heute."

Interview with Heinz Ludwig, Das Orchester. 5 (1976): 305-317.
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Gespraech mit Sergiu Celibidache?" Interview with Eberhard von Lewinski in
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__________________ . "Karajan - der ist wie Coca-Cola," Interview with Helmut

Lesch in AZ, 7/23-24 (1979): 11.
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Schreiber in Der Spiegel. 6/28 (1980): no page number.
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Hans Richard Stracke in AZ, 10/10 (1984b): no page number.
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Wolfgang Schreiber, Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 10/28 (1984c): 15.
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Eggebrecht, Sonderband der Muenchner Philharmoniker 1985/86. Direktion
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. "Sergiu Celibidache ueber Wilhelm Furtw aengler." Interview with

Joachim M atzner, Furtwaengler - Analyse Dokument Protokoll. Zuerich:
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Gehoergaenge - Zur Aesthetik der musikalischen Auffuehrung und ihrer
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__________ . "Wie ein Leuchtturm." In Ein Mass. das heute fehlt—Wilhelm

Furtwaengler im Echo der Nachwelt. Salzburg: Otto M ueller Verlag, (1986d):
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__________ . "Musik verschwindet." Interview with Matthias Fisher, Dietmar

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Ein Gespraech," Interview with Ursula Huebner, M usica. April 1987: 336
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Lieber H err Celibidache. Muenchen: Verlag Musik und Theorie, (1988): 209-
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n .p ., (1989): no page number, photocopy from Umbach 1995b.
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_________ . "Alles, was ich will, wird von diesem Orchester geleistet,"
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__________ . "Die Wirklichkeit hinter dem Denken." Interview with Jan

Schmidt-Garre, Celibidache - Man will nicths - man laesst es entstehen.
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Schmidt- Garre, Celibidache- Man will nichts - man laesst es entstehen.
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and directed by Jan Schmidt-Garre. Muenchen: Pars, 1992h. Videocasette.
__________ . Parts of interviews with Wolfgang Schreiber and Harald

Eggebrecht, Sergiu Celibidache. Bergisch Gladbach: Wolfgang Luebbe Verlag,
(1992i): 62-84.
__________ . Parts of an interview with Sergiu Celibidache published in Cronica

de H oy, no date, no author. Reprinted in Pressespiegel der Muenchner
Philharmoniker unter der Leitung von Maestro Sergiu Celibidache - Grosse
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__________ . "Keine Theologie hat fuer mich Gueltigkeit. Das sind Kruecken,
die die Leute als Stuetze benoetigen," Interview in El M ercurio. Santiago de
Chile, 5/5 (1992): no page number. Reprinted in Pressespiegel der Muenchner
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24. Mai 1992 - Exdpo’ 92. (1992k): no page number.
__________ . "Sergiu Celibidache: Ich habe die Musik nicht im Gedaechnis, ich
lebe sie," Interview in El M ercurio. Santiago de Chile, 5/10 (1992): no page
number.Reprinted in Pressespiegel der Muenchner Philharmoniker unter der
Leitung von Maestro Sergiu Celibidache - Grosse Suedamerika Tournee - 1.
bis 17. Mai 1992 - Gastspiele in Sevilla - 23. und 24. Mai 1992 - Exdpo’ 92.
(1992): no page number.
151
__________ . "Es ist eine Pflicht, die Jugend zu unterichten," Interview in

Globo. Rio de Janeiro, 5/14 (1992): no page number. Reprinted in
Pressespiegel der Muenchner Philharmoniker unter der Leitung von Maestro
Sergiu Celibidache - Grosse Suedamerika Tournee - 1. bis 17. Mai 1992 -
Gastspiele in Sevilla - 23. und 24. Mai 1992 - Exdpo’ 92. (1992m): no page
number.
__________ . "Nur Perfektion stellt Celibidache zufrieden," Parts of an

interview with Satoru Nagoya in Japan Times/Tokio. 10/18 (1992): no page
number. Reprinted in Pressespiegel der Muenchner Philharmoniker unter der
Leitung von Maestro Sergiu Celibidache - Grosse Suedostasien Tournee - 1.
bis 17 Oktober 1992. (1992n): no page number.
__________ . "Das Phaenomen Musik hat keine Grenzen- Madrid (2): Ein
Interview aus dem Jahr 1987," Interview with Antonio Morales in Scherzo. 2
(1987): no page number); printed in Jahrbuch der M uenchner Philharmoniker
1992(93. Direktion der Muenchner Philharmoniker ed., (1993a): 49-59.
__________ . "Sie koennen sich jeder Musik anpassen - Auszuege aus einem
Interview einer japanischen Musikzeitschrift mit Celibidache," reprinted in
Barth, Joachim. Die Muenchner Philharmoniker auf Japan-Tournee mit
Maestro Sergiu Celibidache. Beckingen-Haustadt: Verlag J. M. O. Barth,
(1993b): 44-47.
__________ . "Worauf es in der Musik ankommt, ist auf Spontaneitaet,"

Interview in Ideal, 7/2 (1993): no page number. Reprinted in Pressespiegel der
Muenchner Philharmoniker unter der Leitung von Maestro Sergiu Celibidache
Gastspiele in Granada am 2. und 3. Juli 1993 in der Alhambra zu Granada.
(1993c): no page number.
__________ . "Muenchner Philharmoniker mit befreienden Augenblicken,"

Interview in Folha de Sao Paulo. 10/6 (1993): no page number. Reprinted in
Sergiu Celibidache -Suedamerika - Spanien - Tournee - 1. bis 21. Oktober
1993. (1993d): no page number.
__________ . "Celibidache meint, dass man Musik nicht auf Schallplatten

verkaufen kann," Interview in Folha de Sao Paulo. 10/5 (1993): no page
Leitung von Maestro Sergiu Celibidache -Suedamerika - Spanien - Tournee -
1.bis 21. Oktober 1993. (1993e): no page number.
152
__________ . "Sergiu Celibidache zeichnet ein katastrophales Bild von der

Musikwelt," Interview in El Pais. 4/28 (1994): no page number. Reprinted in
Pressespiegel der M uenchner Philharmoniker unter der Leitung von Maestro
Sergiu Celibidache - Tournee "Europaeische Hauptstaedte" 1994:
Gastspielreisen nach Sofia und Wien vom 9. bis 13. April 1994 - Lissabon und
Madrid vom 22. bis 28. April 1994 - Koeln. Bonn und Amsterdam om 11. bis
18. Mai 1994. (1994a): no page number.
__________ . "Das Ende am Anfang innerlich zu erleben," Parts of an interview

with Ekaterina Tschamulijska in Demokratie 4/11 (1994): no page number.
Reprinted in Pressespiegel der Muenchner Philharmoniker unter der Leitung
von Maestro Sergiu Celibidache - Tournee "Europaeische Hauptstaedte" 1994:
18. Mai 1994. (1994b): no page number.
__________ . Johannes Brahms - The Piano Concertos - Daniel Barenboim -

Muenchner Philharmoniker - Sergiu Celibidache. Teldec Video, 1995a.
__________ . Robert Schumann - Piano Concerto in a M inor. Op. 54 - Pvotr

Ilyich Tchaikovsky - Piano Concerto No. 1 in B Flat Minor. Op. 23 - Daniel
Barenboim - Muenchner Philharmoniker - Sergiu Celibidache. Teldec Video,
1995b.
__________ . Antonin Dvorak - Symphony No. 9 in E M inor "From The New

World" - Muenchner Philharmoniker - Sergiu Celibidache - You don’t do
anything - you iust let it evolve - A documentary by Jan Schmidt-Garre.
Teldec Video 1995c.
__________ . Celibidache Conducts Bruckner - Anton Bruckner Symphony No.

6. Muenchner Philharmoniker - Recorded at the Muenchner Philharmonie am
Gasteig. Sony Classical, n.d. Videocassette.

7 - Muenchner Philharmoniker - Sergiu Celibidache - Recorded at Suntory
Hall, Tokyo. Sony Classical, n.d. Videocassette.

8 - Muenchner Philharmoniker - Sergiu Celibidache - Recorded at Suntaory
153
__________ . After 38 Years ... The Triumphant Return - Celibidache Conducts

the Berliner Philharmoniker - Anton Bruckner Symphony No. 7 - Docmentarv
and Performance - Recorded at the Schauspielhaus, Berlin. Sony Classical,
n.d. Videocassette.
__________ . Interview with Harald Eggebrecht, broadcasted at the

Norddeutscher Rundfunk, Hamburg, n.d. Audio-Cassette.
__________ . Sergiu Celibidache. Rehearsal of Faure’s Requiem, Broadcasted

by BBC London, n.d. Videocassette.
154
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_______________ . The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental

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______________ . Cartesianische M editationen. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1987.
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______________ . Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a

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______________ . On The Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893

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__________________________ . Philharmonische Blaetter 1988/89. Muenchen, 06/1989.
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______________________ . Towards a Cosmic Music - Texts by Karlheinz

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162
DISSERTATIONS AND THESES
Adkins, Donald Glenn. "Golden Mean Durational Analysis as a Guide to Orchestral

Repeats and Tem pos." D .M .A . diss., University of M issouri, 1986.
Altmann, Ronald W alter. "Being-In-The-World and Corporeality." Ph.D . diss.,

Duquesne University, 1981. DAI-A 41/11, p. 4737.
Arcaya, Jose M anuel. "A Social Psychological Investigation of Orchestra Conducting:

The Evolution of a Musical W ork from Inception to Performance." PhD.
diss., Union Graduate School, 1975.
Barfoot, James Houston. "A phenomenology of the Self as World in Walt W hitman’s
‘Song of M y se lf." Ph.D . diss., Auborn University, 1981. DAI-A 41/12, p.
5104.
Barnes, Thomas John. "Time Perception and Time Orientation as Assessment Devices
o f Suicide Potential." Ph.D . diss., Depaul University, 1977. DAI-B 38/01, p.
343.
Bartholomew, Douglas Roy. "A Phenomenology of Music: Themes Concerning the

‘M usical1 Object and Implications for Teaching and Learning." Ph.D . diss.,
Case W estern University, 1985.
Beaudreau, Pierre. "Recent Contributions to the Phenomenology o f Musical Time:

Critical Survey." Ph.D . diss., McGill University (Canada), 1992.
Bednarz, John Alexander. "The Development of the Concept of Foundation in

Husserl’s Philosophy." Ph.D . diss., New School for Research, 1981. DAI-A
42/02, p .733.
Brodhead, Gary L. "Structural Time in Twentieth-Century Tonal M usic." Ph.D .

diss., Indiana University, 1983. DAI-A 44/06, p. 1617.
Carpenter, Patricia. "The Janus-Aspect of Fugue: An Essay in the Phenomenology of

Musical Form ." Ph.D . diss., Columbia University, 1974. DAI-A 94/07, p.
4308.
Cordes, Robert. "Existentialism and Phenomenology: Objectivism and Non-Purpo-

siveness in the Music o f Selected Twentieth-Century Composers." MA. thesis,
California State University, Fullerton, 1971.
163
Dubs, John Gregson. "Acquisition of a Novel View of Reality: A Study of Psycho-

Spiritual Development in Zen Buddhism." Ph.D. diss., The University of
M ichigan, 1987. DAI-B 48/03, p .873.
Gallgher, Shaun Andrew. "Lived Body and Time: A Phenomenologically Based

Account of Human Nature." Ph.D . diss., Bryn M awr College, 1981. DAI-A
42/05. p. 2164.
Heine, Steven. "Existential and Ontological Dimensions of Time in Heidegger and

Dogen." Ph.D . diss., Temple University, 1980. DAI-A 41/05, p. 2166.
Herman, Paul Edward. "The Contributions of Ramana Maharshi and Heidegger to an

East-West Integral Psychology." Ph.D . diss., California Institute of Integral
Psychology, 1974.
Jones, Richard Hubert. "Mysticism and Science: A Comparative Study of the Claims
About Reality in W estern Natural Science, Theravada Buddhism, and Advaita
Vedanta." Ph.D . diss., Columbia University, 1980.
Kimmey, John A. "A Critique of Musicology (Phenomenology)." Ph.D . diss., The

Florida State University, 1984.
Lochhead, Judith Irene. "The Temporal Structures of Recent Music: a Phenomeno

logical Investigation." Ph.D . diss., State University of New York at Stony
Brook, 1982.
Magnusdottir, Anna Margret. "Toward a Phenomenology of Music (Perceptual

Experience)." Ph.D . diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1980.
Malik, Charles H. "The Metaphysics of Time in the Philosophies of A. N. Whitehead

and M. Heidegger." Ph.D . diss., Harvard University, 1937. ADD W1937.
Mason, David R. "A Study of Time in the Philosophies of Alfred North Whitehead
and Martin Heidegger with Implications for a Doctrine of Providence." Ph.D .
diss., The University o f Chicago, 1973. ADD X1973.
Millikan, James Dean. "Heidegger, Time, and Self-Transcendence." Ph.D . diss.,

Yale University, 1967. DAI-A 27/08, p. 2561.
Pageler, John Charles. "The Soul and Time: First Principles of M odern Metaphysical
Speculation as Represented in the Thought of M artin Heidegger." Ph.D . diss.,
Claremont Graduate School, 1967. DAI-A 20/01, p. 292.
164
Panzarella, Robert. "The Phenomenology of Peak Experiences in Response to Music

and Visual Art and Some Personality Correlates." Ph.D. diss., City University
of New York, 1977.
Pelt, Michael Albert. "Being Attuned: An Ontological Analysis of Music." Ph.D.

diss., The Florida State University, 1983.
Portmess. Lisa Rafferty. "Time and Paradox, a Phenomenology of Time."

Ph.D .diss.,Q ueen’s University at Kingston (Canada), 1978.
Reimann, Jeffrey Howard. "Time and the Epoche of Husserl." Ph.D . diss., The
Pennsylvania State University, 1969. DAI-A 30/03, p. 1205.
Shaerer, Robert Lawrence. "A Phenomenology of Aesthetic Value in Music." Ph.D.

diss., The Florida University, 1976.
Thakar, Markand. "The Transcendent Musical Experience: As Permitted by the

Structural Harmonic Activity of Sonata Form Development Sections." D.M .A .
diss., University of Cincinnati, 1987.
Tougas, Cecile Therese. "Internal Time-Consciousness and Transfinity." Ph.D . diss.,

Duquesne University, 1981. DAI-A 42/02, p .738.
White, Carol Jean. "Time and Temporality in the Existential Thought of Kirkegaard
and Heidegger." Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1977. DAI-
A 38/02, p. 853.
Zelle, Tom. Sergiu Celibidache und die Phaenomenologie der Musik. Diplom Arbeit.
Luebeck: Musikhochschule Luebeck 1992/93.
Zhang, Xianglong. "Heidegger and Taoism (Horizontal Thinking, China, Lao Tzu,
Huang Tzu)." Ph.D. diss., State University of New York at Buffalo, 1992.
DAI-A 53/03, p. 837.
165
ARTICLES AND INTERVIEWS
"Ab geht der Dvorak". P e r Spiegel. 14 (1992): 250-252.
Alexandersson, Claes. "Amedeo Giorgis Empirical Phenomenology." Swedish

Council for Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences, Stockholm.
Goteborg University, Molndal, Inst, of Education, (1981): 39.
Atkinson, Michael. "A Precise Phenomenology for the General Scholar." Journal of
General Education. 23/4 (1972): 261-297.
Celibidache, Sergiu. "Verstehende sind schwer zu finden - Lebensfragenin

Buddhistischer Sicht," Frankfurter Alleemeine Zeitung. 7/28 (1962): no page
number.
. "Interview mit Sergiu Celibidache," Interview with Klaus Lang

in Hifi-Stereophonie. 11 (1975): 1065-1976.
__________________ . "Sergiu Celibidache ueber Musik und Musikleben heute."

Interview with Heinz Ludwig, Das Orchester. May 1976: 305-317.
. "Sind die Dirigenten all Ignoranten - Ein sehr offenes

Gespraech mit Sergiu Celibidache?" Interview with Eberhard von Lewinski in
Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 8/17 (1978): no page number.
__________________ . "Karajan - der ist wie Coca-Cola," Interview with Helmut

Lesch in AZ, 7/23-24 (1979): 11.
__________________ . "Nichts kann mich aufhalten," Interview with Wolfgang

Schreiber in Der Spiegel. 6/28 (1980): no page number.
__________________ . "He leaves both discord and Disciples in his Wake," Parts of an
interview with Daniel Webster in The Philadelphia Inquirer. 2/25 (1984a):
D01.
__________________ . "Kritiker sind Flaschen mit Sauerkraut-Ohren," Interview with

Hans Richard Stracke in AZ, 10/10 (1984b): no page number.
________________ . "Ich habe fuer das Orchester gekaem pft." Interview with
Wolfgang Schreiber, Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 10/28 (1984c): 15.
________________ . "Es gibt keine Alternative zur M usik." Interview with Harald
Eggebrecht, Sonderband der Muenchner Philharmoniker 1985/86. Direktion
der Muenchner Philharmoniker, 1986a: 315-324.
166
__________ . "Sergiu Celibidache ueber Wilhelm Furtw aengler." Interview with

Joachim M atzner, Furtwaengler - Analyse Dokument Protokoll. Zuerich:
Atlantis Musikbuch Verlag - Moos & Partner, 1986b: 105-108.
__________ . "Sergiu Celibidache." Interview with Joachim M atzner,

Gehoergaenge - Zur Aesthetik der musikalischen Auffuehrung und ihrer
technischen Reproduktion. Muenchen: Peter Kirchheim Verlag, 1986c: B i
ns.
__________ . "Wie ein Leuchtturm." In Ein Mass. das heute fehlt—Wilhelm

Furtwaengler im Echo der Nachwelt. Salzburg: Otto Mueller Verlag, (1986d):
141-143.
__________ . "Musik verschwindet." Interview with Matthias Fisher, Dietmar

Holland, and Bernhard Rzehulka, Gehoergaenge - Zur Aesthetik der
musikalischen Auffuehrung und ihrer technischen Reproduktion. Muenchen:
Peter Kirchheim Verlag, 1986e): 115-130
__________ . "Ursula Huebner - Zum 75. Geburtstag von Sergiu Celibidache -

Ein Gespraech," Interview with Ursula Huebner, M usica. April 1987: 336
-341.
__________ . "Durch Furtwaengler Traumatisiert." Interview with Klaus Lang,

Lieber Herr Celibidache. Muenchen: Verlag Musik und Theorie, (1988): 209-
231.
. "In Pursuit of Truth," Parts of an interview with Jeffrey Gantz,

n.p., (1989): no page number, photocopy from Umbach 1995b.
Bibliographical reference: (Celibidache 1989/Umbach 1995b).
. "Alles, was ich will, wird von diesem Orchester geleistet,"

Interview published in Jahrbuch der Muenchner Philharmoniker 1990/91.
Direktion der M uenchner Philharmoniker ed., (1991a): 96-101.
__________ . Sergiu Celibidache - Prokofiev - Svmphonie Classique- Rehearsal

and Performance - M uenchner Philharmoniker. A coproduction of the
Bayrischer Rundfunk and Metropolitan, 1991. 57 min. Teldec Video, 1991b.
Laser Disc.
__________ . "Musik ist Etwas Ganz Anderes." Interview in El M ercario,

Santiago de Chile. 5.5.1992, Jahrbuch der M uenchner Philharmoniker
1991/92. Direktion der Muenchner Philharmoniker, 1992a: 27-29.
167
__________ . "Die W irklichkeit hinter dem Denken." Interview with Jan

Schmidt-Garre, Celibidache - Man will nicths - man laesst es entstehen.
Muenchen/Germany: Pars, (1992d): 11-28.
__________ . "Musik dauert nicht." Interview with Jan Schmidt-Garre,

Celibidache - Man will nichts - man laesst es entstehen. Muenchen: Pars,
(1992e): 29-42.
__________ . "Ende im Anfang - Anfang im Ende." Interview with Jan

Schmidt- Garre, Celibidache- Man will nichts - man laesst es entstehen.
Muenchen: Pars, (1992f): 43-68.
__________ . "Ueber musikalische Phaenomenologie." Speech given for the

Beethoven Gesellschaft at the Universitaet Muenchen , 06. 26.1985, published
in: Jan Schmidt-Garre, Celibidache - Man will nichts - man laesst esentstehen.
Muenchen: Pars. (1992g): 43-68.
__________ . Parts of interviews with Wolfgang Schreiber and Harald

Eggebrecht, Sergiu Celibidache. Bergisch Gladbach: Wolfgang Luebbe Verlag,
(1992i): 62-84.
__________ . Parts of an interview with Sergiu Celibidache published in Cronica

de H oy, no date, no author. Reprinted in Pressespiegel der Muenchner
Suedamerika-Tournee - 1. bis 17. Mai 1992 - Gastspiele in Sevilla - 23. und
24. Mai 1992 - Expo’ 92. (1992j): no page number.
__________ . "Keine Theologie hat fuer mich Gueltigkeit. Das sind Kruecken,
die die Leute als Stuetze benoetigen," Interview in El M ercurio. Santiago de
Chile, 5/5 (1992): no page number. Reprinted in Pressespiegel der Muenchner
Suedamerika Tournee - 1. bis 17. Mai 1992 - Gastspiele in Sevilla - 23. und
24. Mai 1992 - Exdpo’ 92. (1992k): no page number.
__________ . "Sergiu Celibidache: Ich habe die Musik nicht im Gedaechnis, ich
lebe sie," Interview in El M ercurio. Santiago de Chile, 5/10 (1992): no page
Leitung von Maestro Sergiu Celibidache - Grosse Suedamerika Tournee - 1.
bis 17. Mai 1992 - Gastspiele in Sevilla - 23. und 24. Mai 1992 - Exdpo’ 92.
(1992): no page number.
168
__________ . "Es ist eine Pflicht, die Jugend zu unterichten," Interview in

G lobo. Rio de Janeiro, 5/14 (1992): no page number. Reprinted in
Sergiu Celibidache - Grosse Suedamerika Tournee - 1. bis 17. Mai 1992 -
Gastspiele in Sevilla - 23. und 24. Mai 1992 - Exdpo’ 92. (1992m): no page
number.
__________ . "Nur Perfektion stellt Celibidache zufrieden," Parts o f an

interview with Satoru Nagoya in Japan Times/Tokio. 10/18 (1992): no page
Leitung von Maestro Sergiu Celibidache - Grosse Suedostasien Tournee - 1.
bis 17 Oktober 1992. (1992n): no page number.
__________ . "Das Phaenomen Musik hat keine Grenzen- Madrid (2): Ein
Interview aus dem Jahr 1987," Interview with Antonio Morales in Scherzo. 2
(1987): no page number); printed in Jahrbuch der Muenchner Philharmoniker
1992/93. Direktion der Muenchner Philharmoniker ed., (1993a): 49-59.
__________ . "Sie koennen sich jeder Musik anpassen - Auszuege aus einem
Interview einer japanischen Musikzeitschrift mit Celibidache," reprinted in
Barth, Joachim. Die Muenchner Philharmoniker auf Japan-Tournee mit
Maestro Sergiu Celibidache. Beckingen-Haustadt: Verlag J. M. O. Barth,
(1993b): 44-47.
__________ . "Worauf es in der Musik ankommt, ist auf Spontaneitaet,"

Interview in Ideal, 7/2 (1993): no page number. Reprinted in Pressespiegel der
M uenchner Philharmoniker unter der Leitung von Maestro Sergiu Celibidache
Gastspiele in Granada am 2. und 3. Juli 1993 in der Alhambra zu Granada.
(1993c):no page number.
__________ . "Muenchner Philharmoniker mit befreienden Augenblicken,"

Interview in Folha de Sao Paulo. 10/6 (1993): no page number. Reprinted in
Sergiu Celibidache -Suedamerika - Spanien - Tournee - 1. bis 21. Oktober
1993. (1993d): no page number.
__________ . "Celibidache meint, dass man Musik nicht auf Schallplatten

verkaufen kann," Interview in Folha de Sao Paulo. 10/5 (1993): no page
Leitung von Maestro Sergiu Celibidache -Suedamerika - Spanien - Tournee -
l.b is 21. Oktober 1993. (1993e): no page number.
169
________________ . "Sergiu Celibidache zeichnet ein katastrophales Bild von der

Musikwelt," Interview in El Pais. 4/28 (1994): no page number. Reprinted in
Sergiu Celibidache - Tournee "Europaeische Hauptstaedte" 1994:
18. Mai 1994. (1994a): no page number.
________________ . "Das Ende am Anfang innerlich zu erleben," Parts of an interview

with Ekaterina Tschamulijska in Demokratie 4/11 (1994): no page number.
Reprinted in Pressespiegel der Muenchner Philharmoniker unter der Leitung
von Maestro Sergiu Celibidache - Tournee "Europaeische Hauptstaedte" 1994:
18. Mai 1994. (1994b): no page number.
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Harald Eggebrecht, and Wolfgang Schreiber. Sergiu Celibidache. Bergisch
Gladbach: Gustav Luebbe Verlag, (1992a): 61-84.
__________________ , "Nur der Freie Kann Musik Machen," in M uellerr, Konrad R.,
Harald Eggebrecht, and Wolfgang Schreiber. Sergiu Celibidache. Bergisch
Gladbach: Gustav Luebbe Verlag, (1992): 86-116.
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Eggebrecht, and Wolfgang Schreiber. Sergiu Celibidache. Bergisch Gladbach:
Gustav Luebbe Verlag, (1992): 118-130).
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Classique - Rehearsal and Performance - M uenchner Philharm oniker. by
Bayrischer Rundfunk and M etropolitan, Teldec Video, 1991.
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Biographie ueber Sergiu Celibidache." Allgemeine Zeitung/Germanv. (1995):
n.p.
Rockwell, John. "Music: Celibidache In America Debut." The New York Tim es. 29
February 1984. Photocopy obtained through the library o f The Curtis Institute
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______________ . "A Musical Free Spirit Warms Up for Carnegie," The New York
Tim es. 4/20 (1989): C17.
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"classicization" o f Asian Music." Canzona. 14/34 (1991): 16-21.
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Existential Past, Present and Future." Review o f Existential Psychology and
Psychiatry. 15/2-3 (1977): 150-162.
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musikalisches W issen weitergibt." Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 7/144 (1987): 27/28.
_________________ . "Sergiu Celibidache: Naehe zur Musik - Treue zu sich selbst." In

Sonderband der M uenchner Philharm oniker. Direktion der Muenchner
Philharmoniker, n.d.: 139-142.
_________________ . "Andere Wege zur M usik," in M ueller, Konrad P ., Harlad

Eggebrecht, and W olfgang Schreiber. Sergiu Celibidache. Bergisch Gladbach:
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173
PAPERS
Schrag, Calvin-O. "A Phenomenological Perspective on Communication." Paper

presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Communication
Association. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, May 1-5, 1979.
174
UNPUBLISHED SOURCES
Kleinschroth, Dorothee. "Privataufzeichungen", unpublished notes from

Celibidache’s seminars and classes, n.d.
de Lancie, John. "The Corporate Sound." TMs [photocopy], n.d.
Reverter, Arturo. "Sergiu Celibidache - Auf der Suche nach der Wahrheit - Dossier -
Celibidache ein Sonderfall." Typewritten manuscript, n.d.
Thakar, Markand. "On the Listener’s Contribution." TMs [photocopy], n.d.
______________ . "Tribute to a Teacher." TMs [photocopy], 1988.
Zelle, Tom. Privataufzeichnungen - Phaenomenologie der Musik. Soltau/Germany.

By author, 1992.
________ . Interview with John de Lancie. The interview was held on the topic of
John de Lancie’s experiences with Sergiu Celibidache at the Curtis Institute of
Music. Aspen, Colorado, 1994.
________ . Interview with Klaus Umbach, chief editor of the feuilleton/music of the
Der Speieel/Germanv. The interview was held on the topic of Klaus Umbach’s
experiences with Celibidache at the office of D er Spiegel in Cologne/Germany,
1995.
175
LASER DISCS, VIDEO TAPES, AUDIO TAPES
Celibidache, Sergiu. Sergiu Celibidache - Prokofiev - Svmphonie Classique-

Rehearsal and Performance -Muenchner Philharm oniker. A coproduction of
Bayrischer Rundfunk and Metropolitan, 1991. 57 min. Teldec video, 1991.
Laser Disc.
__________________ . Grandi Interpreti: Sergiu Celibidache. M ozart Piano Concerto

KV.271, produced by Raitre/Italy, 1967. Broadcasted by Raitre/Italy
6.28.1992b. Videocassette.
________________ . Grandi Interpreti: Sergiu Celibidache. Bruckner Symphony No. 9,

produced by Raitre/Italy, 1968. Broadcasted by Raitre/Italy,
6.29.1992c. Videocassette.
________________ . Celibidache - Man will nichts - man laesst es entstehen. Produced

and directed by Jan Schmidt-Garre. Muenchen: Pars, 1992h. Videocasette.
________________ . Interview with Harald Eggebrecht, broadcasted at the

Norddeutscher Rundfunk, Hamburg, n.d. Audio-Cassette.
________________ . Sergiu Celibidache. Rehearsal of Faure’s Requiem, Broadcasted

by BBC London, n.d. Videocassette.
________________ . Johannes Brahms - The Piano Concertos - Daniel Barenboim -

Muenchner Philharmoniker - Sergiu Celibidache. Teldec Video, 1995a.
Videocassette.
________________ . Robert Schumann - Piano Concerto in a Minor. Op. 54 - Pvotr

Ilyich Tchaikovsky - Piano Concerto No. 1 in B Flat M inor. Op. 23 - Daniel
Barenboim - M uenchner Philharmoniker - Sergiu Celibidache. Teldec Video,
1995b. Videocassette.
________________ . Antonin Dvorak - Symphony No. 9 in E M inor "From The New

World" - M uenchner Philharmoniker - Sergiu Celibidache - You don’t do
anything - you just let it evolve - A documentary by Jan Schmidt-Garre.
Teldec Video 1995c. Videocassette.
________________ . Celibidache Conducts Bruckner - Anton Bruckner Symphony No.

6. Muenchner Philharmoniker - Recorded at the M uenchner Philharmonie am
Gasteig. Sony Classical, n.d. Videocassette.
176
Celibidache Conducts Bruckner - Anton Bruckner Symphony No.

7 - M uenchner Philharmoniker - Sergiu Celibidache - Recorded at Suntory

8 - M uenchner Philharmoniker - Sergiu Celibidache - Recorded at Suntaory
__________ . After 38 Years ... The Triumphant Return - Celibidache Conducts

the Berliner Philharmoniker - Anton Bruckner Symphony No. 7 - Docmentarv
and Performance - Recorded at the Schauspielhaus, Berlin. Sony Classical,
n.d. Videocassette.
177
ARCHIVES
Umbach, Klaus. Archive of Der Spiegel. Koeln/Germany, 1995b.

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ANALYTICAL APPROACHES TO HIS TEACHINGS ON

PHENOMENOLOGY AND MUSIC

A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment

ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY

All rights reserved.

UMI Microform 9625105

This microform edition is protected against unauthorized

ANALYTICAL APPROACHES TO HIS TEACHINGS ON

PHENOM ENOLOGY AND MUSIC

has been approved

Director o f the School

Published materials on Sergiu Celibidache’s teachings on phenomenology and

research project concentrates on the following primary sources: Celibidache’s

analytical method. Each publication was analyzed in reference to each of the

Celibidache’s rehearsal techniques and a bibliography of primary sources on the

subject of Celibidache's teachings for future research.

This dissertation owes its existence to Sergiu Celibidache, whose impact on my

example and work have served as a constant source of inspiration.

II. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

III. SERGIU CELIBIDACHE - A BIOGRAPHICAL OVERVIEW

IV. INTRODUCTION TO PHENOMENOLOGY

V. SERGIU CELIBIDACHE’S PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH

VI. SERGIU CELIBIDACHE’S REHEARSAL T E C H N IQ U E S ..................144

BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................... 148

philosophical impact on musicians and music making.

Celibidache was born in 1912 in Rumania. He studied in Berlin, including

of the Berlin Philharmonic in 1954, Celibidache left Berlin to conduct in Italy,

Germany, Denmark, and Sweden. In 1972, Celibidache started teaching conducting

Celibidache’s theoretical influence on the musical world originates from his

which is based on phenomenology. During the twentieth century, phenomenology has

Phenomenologically influenced ideas have especially entered discussions concerning

made in recent years to create a well-defined theoretical system for a phenomenology

of music. However, most conductors seem to struggle in an attempt to integrate

philosophy in general or specifically phenomenology into their actual practice

(Reverter n.d.: 1-5). Celibidache can be seen as unique in twentieth-century

approaches to conducting, especially from the standpoint of how conductors integrate,

1993: 352 and Umbach 1995a: 7-16).

In 1984, Celibidache conducted a concert with the orchestra of the Curtis

Times called Celibidache a "musical spiritualist" whose performances he would

Philharmonic under Celibidache’s baton left a profound impression on the music

his background, his teachings, and his philosophical positions.

Context of the Study

In order to comprehend more adequately Celibidache’s work and

achievements, it is necessary to look at his career from an historical standpoint as

well as a philosophical one.

The Historical Context

Although bom in Rumania, historically Celibidache will always be perceived

within the German tradition of conducting. Celibidache himself consistently referred

the figure who personifies his musical ideals.

Philharmonic, and even though he was generally considered to be Furtwaengler’s

2Furtwaengler was struggling with a complex de-nazification