" S p i r i t u a l i t y embraces t h e whole, e n t i r e

Christian person's existence (Dasein)

as a p a r t i c u l a r , i n d i v i d u a l human -,
w i t h special emphasis on t h e person's
precise r e l a t i o n s h i p to God."

C H A P T E R V

SINGULAR I N ABSOLUTE RELATION TO COD

1. Some Reflectionson Ethics and Religion

The s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r Climacus' discussion on r e l i g i o n is

the understanding of the relationship between r e l i g i o n and ethics.

He speaks of a close r e l a t i o n s h i p between e t h i c s and r e l i g i o n and thus

comments, b y way o f evaluating t h e Stages on L i f e ' s Way, i n the Con-

cluding Unscientific Postscript:

But despite t h i s t r i p a r t i t i o n , the book i s nevertheless

an e i t h e r l o r . That is, t h e e t h i c a i and t h e religious stages
have an essential r e l a t i o n to each other.

The e t h i c a l l i f e which i s an attempt t o become one's s e l f through

choice and commitment forms t h e s t a r t i n g place o f r e l i g i o u s l i f e . With-

out t h e presence of t h e ethical, t h e religious l i f e can be confused

w i t h t h e aesthetic. Though r e l i g i o u s l i f e cannot be reduced t o the

ethical, it i s inseparable from it. Religious l i f e i s impossible without

the ethicai, though some s o r t of e t h i c a l l i f e i s possible a p a r t from

religious existence. Therefore, Climacus' way of making t h e d i s t i n c t i o n

between t h e e t h i c a l and t h e religious i s not through t h e presence o r

absence of God i n religious existence. He believes, on t h e contrary,

that ethical life i n a deep sense involves God-relationship because

ethical duties as absolute and eternal have d i v i n e origion. So the

d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e two, i.e. the ethical and t h e r e l i g i o u s is

based on the manner of God-relationship.

The ethical individual senses a kind of self-sufficiency

though h e l s h e may o r may not relate himselflherself to God through

h i s l h e r duties. T h i s i s a reflection on Kant's v i e w of ethics, which

Climacus calls "ethico-religiousness." Climacus c l a s s i f i e s most of

the world religions under this category of ethico-religiousness.

His aim here i s not to condemn o r depreciate such a category o f reli-

gious existence, but merely t o distinguish such l i f e - v i e w s from t h e

Christian view o f religious l i f e [ i n t h e true sense).

The d i s t i n c t i o n between the e t h i c a l and the religious sphe-

res of existence i s drawn b y Climacus through an analysis o f t h e d i s -

covery of the self. According to him, though the religious person

i s as committed to e t h i c a l ideals as the e t h i c a l person, h e l s h e does

not t r u s t e t h i c a l ideals alone as a means o f transforming h i s l h e r charac-

ter. The task of t h e religious person, then, i s t o achieve God-reia-

tionship not b y f u l f i l l i n g moral duties, but b y c u l t i v a t i n g a state of

i n w a r d obedience to God, i.e. b y allowing God t o transform h i s l h e i

character. This is aptly conveyed b y Johannes d e Sllentio i n t h e

Fear and Trernbline thus: "An e t h i c s t h a t ignores s i n i s a completely

futile discipline, b u t if i t a f f i r m s sin, then it has eo i p s o exceeded

itse~f."~ The reason f o r such a claim follows immediately b y way

of a foot-note:

As soon as s i n emerges, e t h i c s founders p r e c i s e l y on repen-

tance; f o r repentance i s the highest e t h i c a l expression,
b u t p r e c i s e l y as such it i s t h e deepest e t h i c a l self-con-
tradiction. 3

The above passage d r i v e s home t h e idea that, with t h e awareness

of sin, w h i c h i s brought to an i n d i v i d u a l b y way of d i v i n e r e v e l a t i o n

(as discussed i n Chapter 11). a sense of repentance enters and replaces

the e t h i c a l . But, then, t h e paradox h e r e i s that, though repentance

i s t h e highest expression of t h e ethical, i t s t i l l remains as t h e deep-

est e t h i c a l self-contradiction. This i s because t h e process o f the

self being transformed b y God i s a painful one r e q u i r i n g t h e death

of the autonomous e t h i c a l s e l f ( t h e e t h i c a l s e l f i s considered autono-

mous because it expresses i t s self-sufficiency b y t a k i n g upon i t s e l f

the task of transforming i t s e l f ) .

The term "ethical" may be used here i n two d i f f e r e n t senses:

as a sphere of existence and as a component of human existence.

A person whose e x i s t e n t i a l category i s t h e e t h i c a l sphere has a God-

relationship, but one i n which the individual sees herselflhimself

as self-sufficient. whereas a religious person no longer t r i e s to achi-

eve God-relationship simply through ethical action. Climacus maintains

the view that. though a religious l i f e has i t s roots i n the ethical,

it i s not reducible to the latter. As the religious l i f e develops,

God who i s f i r s t discovered through ethical s t r i v i n g becomes a d l s -

tinct r e a l i t y to the religious believer, who can be related t o i t in

a d i r e c t way. The relationship between the ethical and the religious

for Climacus i s that. though the former gets into the religious llfe

as a regulative principle, it i s always somewhat removed from absolute

God-relationship. This i s echoed by Johannes de Silentio, I n the

Fear and Trembling, thus:

... when the single individual b y h i s g u i l t has come

outside the universal (the ethical), he can return
only b y v i r t u e o f having come as the single individual
into an absolute relation to the absolute. 4

Climacus' thesis that the religious life is irreducib,le to

the ethical life i s against a few of the then existing views, e.g.

that of Kant. For Kant, the essence of true religion i s good l i f e

in the sense of good conduct. This was also the view h e l d b y most

of the classical liberal theologians whereas Climacus maintains t h a t

a religious life i s distinctively religious i n nature. He makes the

distinction between the ethical and the religious b y bringing in the

phenomenon of s p i r i t u a l t r i a l (Aufaegtelse) . Cl imacus observes:

 Therefore, s p i r i t u a l t r i a l begins only i n the sphere
of the religious proper, and there only i n the final
course. and quite r i g h t l y increases i n proportion to
the re1 igiousness. 5

Comparing s p i r i t u a l t r i a l w i t h temptation, Cl imacus des-

cribes the former as being i n the sphere of Cod-relationship unlike

temptation which i s i n the ethical sphere. In temptation, a persong

weakness forces h i m s e l f l h e r s e l f to indulge i n a vice; but in spiritual

trial the individual i s expected to cross the h u r d l e w i t h a view

to b u i l d up a relationship to the higher, Cod himself. As one rea-

lizes the stress o r suffering involved i n s p i r i t u a l t r i a l , one i s repel-

led o r tempted to s l i d e back. Therefore, in a spiritual t r i a l an

i n d i v i d u a l i s tempted to r e f r a i n from ascending to the higher, thus

slipping back from the stress of religious l i f e into a more comfor-

table category of the ethical, which i s universally approved. Silen-

t i o gives an i l l u s t r a t i o n of a s p i r i t u a l t r i a l i n the Fear and Trem-

bling b y bringing i n the b i b l i c a l s t o r y of Abraham and Isaac. Abra-

ham i s s p i r i t u a l l y tested b y Cod i n being called to sacrifice h i s

son, Isaac ( t o be discussed i n d e t a i l later i n t h l s chapter). Ab-

raham i s tempted here to take shelter i n the ethical b y deciding

not to sacrifice h i s son from an ethical point of view. Here, the

individual i s repelled b y the frightening uncertainty o f the religious

l i f e and i s inclined to take shelter i n the ethical, w h i c h i s r e l a t i -

v e l y comfortable. Thus, Climacus elucidates the distinction between

 t h e r e l i g i o u s and t h e e t h i c a l l i f e b y b r i n g i n g i n t h e concept o f s p i -

ritual trial .

2. The Immanent and Transcendent Religious

Climacus' reflections on r e l i g i o n p e r se, i.e. Religion ' A '

w h i c h i s supposed to be possible f o r any human being i n v i r t u e o f

human a b i l i t i e s as against Religion 'B' w h i c h i s i d e n t i f i e d w i t h Chris-

t i a n i t y and w h i c h i s dependent on transcendent revelation (Christ's

revelation), a r e b o t h interesting and offensive t o human comprehenslon.

His analysis of Religion ' A ' does not s p e c i f i c a l l y r e f e r t o any institu-

tionalized r e l i g i o n o r c u l t u r a l entity, but to r e l i g i o n as a universal

form of human existence, i.e. man's general religious consciousness.

The terms "immanence" and "transcendence" are not used

b y Climacus i n an o r d i n a r y sense. I n describing r e l i g i o n i n general

as immanent, Climacus i s not denying the fact t h a t i n immanent r e l i g i o n

i n d i v i d u a l s can form t h e idea o f God as transcendent being. He i s

aware o f t h e fact t h a t r e l i g i o n can be b o t h t h e i s t i c and pantheistic.

The terms "immanent" and "transcendent" do not r e f e r to t h e ontological

status of God, b u t to t h e mode through which i n d i v i d u a l s know and

r e l a t e t o Cod. He accepts t h e fact t h a t natural knowledge o f God

, is possible to all human beings. Such a knowledge pressupposes

t h a t Cod i s immanent i n a person's consciousness. T h i s belongs to

the category of what t h e theologians c a l l "general" o r "natural," reve-

lation. Therefore, any r e l i g i o n which claims God-knowledge to be

immanent i n an i n d i v i d u a l ' s consciousness i s characterized as immanent.

Such a religious consciousness i s achievable b y man himself, though

Cod known i n t h i s way may be regarded as transcendent.

A transcendent religion, on t h e other hand, i s one i n w h i c h

God is said to be "outside" an individual's general consciousness.

I t i s a r e l i g i o n i n which Cod i s said to have o b j e c t i f i e d h i m s e l f b y

entering into h i s t o r y . It i s a r e l i g i o n i n w h i c h God incarnated i n

a human form and revealed himself i n time. Such a religious b e l i e f

holds that only i n t h i s manner individuals acquire t h e knowledge o f

God. T h i s view involves absolute paradox and a b s u r d i t y because Cod

who i s eternal enters h i s t o r y and reveals h i s existence. The question

is: how can i n d i v i d u a l s b u i l d t h e i r eternal happiness on such a h i s -

t o r i c a l knowledge which i s b y i t s v e r y nature contingent? It i s here

that Kierkegaard believes t h a t f a i t h i n God requires a leap and that

it i s embracing t h e absurd. Therefore, t h e concepts such as absolute

paradox and absurd are related to Religiousness "6" (Christianity),

and not to Religiousness "A". Though h e admits that some s o r t o f

faith i s required to know God i n general religious consciousness, he

distinguishes it from t h e d i s t i n c t i v e k i n d o f f a i t h involved i n Chris-

'tianity, i.e. f a i t h in the "eminent sense."

Climacus' discussion on religion in general i s ' intended

to shed l i g h t on the nature of Christianity. It i s also philosophical

because he makes an analysis of the religious dimensions of human

activity. He examines the key concepts such as "resignation," "suff-

ering," and "guilt," which, by mutual interrelationship, define the

religious life. He demarcates the religious usage of these concepts

from the ordinary usage. That is, every concept, which forms the

very content of religious life, i s understood in relation to i t s function

w i t h i n the religious realm. From t h i s angle i t i s comparableto later

Wittgensteinian discussion of religious language and i t s meaning in

the religious forms of life. However, it may also be considered

as an attempt at a genuine phenomenology of religion, for through

this he describes various forms of consciousness of the religious

l i f e and t h e i r significance.

3. A Phenomenological Study o f the Religious Life

Climacus describes religious life, i n geneal, as a gradual

increase i n i n d i v i d u a l ' s commitment towards absolute w, a quest

for eternal happiness o r God-relationship, using three perspectiveslcon-

cepts to indicate the same process. He h i g h l i g h t s three aspects

of religious life, G. i n t i a l task, essential task, and decisive task,

taking into consideration the way i n which it expresses itself. The

concepts w h i c h he uses t o elucidate these t h r e e aspects o f r e l i g i o u s

l i f e a r e "resignation", "suffering", and *guilt" respectively. , A l l the

t h r e e seem to be negative i n t h e i r orientation. The following discussion

aims to e x p l i c a t e these concepts which form t h e v e r y content o f r e l i -

gious l i f e .

A short comparision between Kierkegaard and Hegel would

b e h e l p f u l a t t h i s point. F o r Hegel, n e g a t i v i t y i s a moving force i n

history, i.e. unless S p i r i t becomes what i t i s not, b y negating t h e

e x i s t i n g position, it cannot become what i t has t o become ultimately.

Again, f o r Hegel, as Climacus i n t e r p r e t s him, t h i s n e g a t i v i t y i s annulled

b y a new p o s i t i v i t y through a d i a l e c t i c a l process - thesis 4 anti-

thesis -3 synthesis. Climacus rejects t h i s v i e w o f Hegel on t h e ground

t h a t such a view expresses the finality o f existence, o r existence

as a f i n i s h e d product, which can be t a l k e d about i n a systematic man-

ner. Climacus treats system, o r finality, o r conclusiveness as one

and t h e same. As against t h i s he h o l d s t h e position that, f o r the

i n d i v i d u a l who i s i n existence, existence i s never "finished" and hence

a system is impossible i n t h e existential realm. There remains a

gap between t h e existential reality and t h e ideal w h i c h demands a

negation o f the status quo. Therefore, f o r Climacus n e g a t i v i t y cannot

be overcome b y p o s i t i v i t y i n human existence, i.e. an e x i s t i n g i n d i v i -

dual can never f u l l y realize the ideal i n existence and hence must
continuously negate the status .quo to make existential progress. Exis-
tential growth i s recognized only b y the negative. This negativity,

according to Climacus, i s the salient feature of the religious life;

and i n the religious l i f e the positive i s distinguished b y the negative

rather than mediated, as i n the case of Hegel's position.

... revelation i s marked b y mystery, eternal happiness

[Salighedl b y suffering, the certitude o f f a i t h b y uncer-
tainty. easiness b y d i f f i c u l t y , t r u t h b y absurdity 6...

The I n i t i a l Task -- Resignation

Climacus i n i t i a l l y defines the religious l i f e as a task of

existentially realizing an absolute commitment to the absolute telos

simultaneously w i t h a r e l a t i v e end to which the individual finds him-

self related.' By absolute = Climacus means the highest good

o r the summum bonum. Climacus describes absolute telos thus:

A l l r e l a t i v e w i l l i n g i s distinguished b y w i l l i n g something
f o r something else, but the highest telos must be w i l l e d
f o r i t s own sake. And t h i s highest ielos i s not a some-
thing, because then i t r e l a t i v e l y corresponds to something
else and i s finite. But i t i s a contradiction absolutely
to w i l l something f i n i t e since the f i n i t e must indeed
come t o an end and consequently there must come a time
when it can no longer be willed. But to w i l l absolutely
i s to w i l l the infinite, and to w i l l an eternal happiness
i s to w i l l absolutely, because it must be capable of
being w i l l e d a t every moment.
This entails the view t h a t t h e highest good o r absolute telor i n an

individual's existence i s seeking f o r eternal happiness o r God-relation-

ship. Therefore. according t o Climacus, i m m o r t a l i t y i s the paramount

human concern. There i s such an absolute telos i n an i n d i v i d u a l ' s

existence; one's ethical obligation towards that telos must also b e
absolute i n character. F o r Climacus, t h e e t h i c a l task i s a t t h e same

time religious because realizing one's highest e t h i c a l good i s as good

as self-realization.

But, what does Climacus mean b y "absolutely committed to

the absolute, relatively to the relative?" Climacus maintains that,

when there i s a c a l l from t h e absolute, t h e i n d i v i d u a l stays resigned

to t h e r e l a t i v e . The d e c i s i v e c r i t e r i o n f o r an absolute r e l a t i o n t o

the absolute i s t h a t one i s w i l l i n g t o g i v e up the r e l a t i v e whenever

the r e l a t i v e conflicts with the abso~ute.~ If t h e i n d i v i d u a l I s not

w i l l i n g to do this, then i t shows t h a t h e l s h e i s not absolutely com-

m i t t e d to t h e absolute. But when an i n d i v i d u a l does t h i s , i.e. wllling

to g i v e up any and e v e r y f i n i t e (relative) good f o r the sake o f t h e

i n f i n i t e (absolute), then h e l s h e has achieved t h e state o f resignation.

Resignation, according to Climacus, means t h e state i n w h i c h t h e i n d i -

vidual i s w i l l i n g t o s a c r i f i c e any f i n i t e good f o r t h e sake of t h e ab-

solute. It i s necessary to emphasize here t h a t t h e state o f resignation

is different from "suffering," which is another aspect of religious

l i f e as mentioned e a r l i e r , i n the sense t h a t suffering i s t h e condition

o f t h e i n d l v i d u a l who i s attempting to r e a l i z e resignation, but, as not

f u l l y done so, and hence i n the process experiences pain, i.e. the

pain o f abolishing one's self. Resignation, therefore, i s another way

of explaining t h e task o f being absolutely committed t o t h e absolute

and r e l a t i v e l y to t h e r e l a t i v e .

Resignation i s against any k i n d o f mediation according to

Climacus. "Mediation", a concept t o w h i c h Climacus pays much attentlon

i n t h e Concluding Unscientific Postscript, i s o f two types: the flrrt

attempts t o mediate between existence and thought, and t h e second

concerns the ethical life. The former r e f e r s t o t h e reconciliation

o r resolving of t h e differences between existence and thought i n t h e

realm of thought. I n t h i s case one i s not dealing w i t h existence,

b u t w i t h existence as thought, and hence Ciimacus c a l l s i t an illusion.

It i s a polemical c r i t i q u e of Hegells ideal t h a t "the r e a l i s rational

and t h e rational i s real."

The second type, i.e. mediation involved i n e t h i c a l life,

w h i c h i s Climacus' concern r i g h t now, refers to the process of "giving

to Ceasar what i s Ceasar's". With respect to r e l a t i v e goods such

as food, shelter, career, etc., the i n d i v i d u a l must assign to each

i t s proper share. What Climacus i s r e a l l y concerned about i s not

the mediation of t h i s kind; on the contrary, he wants to show t h a t

the absolute telos i s not one among these goods. I f that were the

case, i t would just be an addition to the l i s t of r e l a t i v e goods and

hence, would f a i l to remain absolute. The only way out, which Cli-

macus sees here, is resignation.

Why does Climacus, one may legitimately ask, assume con-

flicts between the absolute and the relative i n human existence?

The answer is that he does not assume i t s necessity, but merely

i t s possibility, i.e. such a conflict may crop up i n the process of

existence. Resignation as such i s a hypothetical state; I t i s wllling-

ness to give up, when there i s a conflict between the r e l a t i v e and

the absolute. Again, one may further raise the issue: "Why does

t h i s conflict seem to be possible f o r Climacus?" Climacus' answer

i s that such a p o s s i b i l i t y i s inherent in the v e r y notion o f absolute

-
telos; if the absolute does not conflict with r e l a t i v e goods,

then it e i t h e r becomes one among the r e l a t i v e goods o r is content-

less, a concept w i t h no definite meaning.

Mediation e i t h e r allows the relation to the absolute telos

to be mediated i n r e l a t i v e ends, whereby it becomes rels-
t i v e itself, o r allows the relation to the absolute telos
as an abstract noun to exhaust i t s e l f in r e l a t i v e enas
as predicates, whereby the majesty of the absolute relation
becomes meaningless. ..
l i k e a t i t l e page that i s not inclu-
ded when the book i s bound. 10
 It has been observed i n human experience t h a t t h e l n d i v l -

duals who are committed t o God-relationship o r absolute telos have

been required to willingly sacrifice many of the relative values.

It must be borne i n mind t h a t Climacus v i e w i s not completely other-

worldly. Resignation i s not indifference t o t h e w o r l d l y a c t i v i t i e s .

Climacus gives a beautiful analogy to elucidate t h i s point:

An a d u l t may v e r y w e l l join i n c h i l d r e n ' s p l a y w i t h

total interest, may be t h e one who r e a l l y makes t h e
game l i v e l y , b u t he s t i l l does not p l a y as a c h i l d .
The person who understands it as h i s task t o p r a c t i s e
t h e absolute d i s t i n c t i o n relates h i m s e l f t o t h e f i n i t e
i n t h e same way. l 1

Climacus observes here t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l who has an absolute commit-

ment towards hislher salvation can s t i l l have a r e l a t i v e commitment

to the relative, though h e l s h e i s ready to g i v e up t h e r e l a t i v e a t

any time i f t h e r e i s a demand from t h e absolute. Therefore, Cli-

rnacus' only attack i s on t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s attempt t o regard t h e ab-

solute telos as one among o t h e r goods. it i s i n t h i s sense h e d i s -

misses mediation. He observes:

Mediation, on t h e o t h e r hand, i s a r e v o l t o f t h e rela-

t i v e ends against t h e majesty o f t h e absolute, which
i s to be drawn down to t h e l e v e l o f e v e r y t h i n g else,
and against t h e d i g n i t y o f t h e human being, who i s to
be made a servant s o l e l y o f t h e r e l a t i v e ends.12

The above analysis reveals t h e t r u t h t h a t resignation i s an essential

and i n t r i n s i c p a r t of r e l i g i o u s l i f e .
The Essencial Task - Suffering

Resignation is the willingness to s a c r i f i c e any f i n i t e good

f o r the sake of the absolute. It functions as a test w h i c h en i n d i v i -

dual can a p p l y to know t h e extent of commitment one has t o t h e abso-

lute. This i s an existential task. Therefore, Climacus remarks:

In o r d e r to r e l a t e himself absolutely to t h e absolute

telos, the i n d i v i d u a l must have practised renunciation
o f h e r e l a t i v e ends, and only then can t h e r e b e any
question o f the ideal task. j 3

To achieve the state of resignation i s a Herculean task to t h e individual,

because u n t i l the i n d i v i d u a l has passed the test o f resignation. helshe

i s f i r m l y caught up i n t h e r e l a t i v e situations such as career, family,

money, etc. Therefore, one begins b y dying to immediacy. This

implies t h a t one must p r a c t i s e renunciation o f the r e l a t i v e o r immediacy

which entails suffering. What, then, i s t h i s suffering? Climacus clalms,

on the basis o f experiential support, t h a t religious action i s recogni-

zed only by suffering, i.e. suffering becomes the prerequisite for

one's upliftment. Therefore, h e i s convinced t h a t t h e essential task

of religious l i f e i s suffering.

At the outset, Climacus makes a distinction between the

religious concept of suffering and the aesthetic concept of suffering

which emerges from misfortune, etc. The aesthetic suffering is

< accidental i n the sense that some are fortunate, while others are

unfortunate i n t h i s regard. One may, however, point out that such

sufferings too can have religious significance. Climacus does not d i s -

pute t h i s fact, b u t asserts that such an accidental suffering gains

religious connotation depending upon the manner i n which it i s received,

i.e. any ordinary human suffering gains religious significance only

to those who accept these sufferings from God's hand and then learn

to benefit therefrom. The non-religious sufferer responds to suffering

i n two ways - either he consoles himself w i t h what Climacus c a l l s

" w o r l d l y wisdom" o r he takes shelter i n imagination, 1.e. "poetic".

"Worldly wisdom" comforts the sufferer b y assuring that i n a l l proba-

b i l i t y things would change f o r better soon. "Poetic" respons seeks

solace i n imagination, through art, etc., which Climacus c a l l s a beauti-

ful illusion, because it serves as an escape from existence.

The religious exister, on t h e contrary, understands suffering

as an essential element i n existence. Religious suffering cannot be

identified directly with illness, pain, and the l i k e because even

the most outwardly fortunate i n d i v i d u a l may be a religious sufferer.

What i s t h i s religious suffering, i f i t i s not suffering i n the ordinary

sense? It is precisely resignationlrenunciation of the relative for

the sake of the absolute commitment, says Climacus. In other words,

it i s self-annihilation which i s an essential component i n Cod-relationship.

Self-annihilation i s to express e x i s t e n t i a l l y the idea that an individual

can do absolutely nothing b y himself 1 herself and therefore stands

as nothing before Cod.

... dying to immediacy o r existentially expressing that

the individual i s capable of doing nothing himself but
i s nothing before God, because here again the relation-
s h i p w i t h God i s distinguishable b y the negative, and
self-annihilation i s the essential form f o r the relation-
s h i p w i t h God. l 4

The person who stands before God w i t h a consciousness of nothing-

ness has d i e d to immediacy. Climacus now gives reasons f o r h i s

earlier claim that suffering Is essential and universal i n religious

existence. I f God i s the creator, not in the sense that he started

creation, but i n a more decisive and deeper sense that everything

exists only b y v i r t u e of his will, then i t i s obvious that, apart

from God, created objects are nothing, o r that they have only r e l a t i v e

existence. I t i s only because of God man i s something. The recogni-

tion o f true relationship between the creator and the created i s true

worship, because human beings are proud and self-assertive b y nature

and therefore it becomes a painful event to shed away one's p r i d e

and t o t a l l y depend on God. True religious l i f e consists i n obliterating

one's pseudo-independence and continuously depending upon Cod.

Religious suffering. which forms the essential religious task, is

becoming passive and allowing God to d i r e c t and govern one's life.

Climacus' view on religious suffering as a task of acquiring passive

relation to God i s well illustrated thus:

 Now, to act might seem t h e v e r y opposite o f t o suffer,
and thus i t might seem strange t o say t h a t t h e essen-
t i a l expression o f e x i s t e n t i a l pathos ( w h i c h I s acting)
is s~ffering!~

The most strenuous action f o r a r e l i g i o u s individual, then, i s the

recognition of h i s l h e r own p a s s i v i t y before Cod, continuous dependence

on Cod. One may be tempted to t h i n k t h a t Climacus' v i e w o f r e l l g l o u s

suffering is nothing but masochism. He refutes this criticism b y

stating t h a t r e l i g i o u s suffering i n t h i s context does not r e f e r t o any

k i n d o f self-torture.

Suffering as d y i n g to immediacy is, therefore, not f l a -

gellation and o t h e r such things; i t i s not self-torment.
In other words, t h e self-tormentor b y no means expresses
t h a t he i s capable o f nothing before God, because he
considers self-torment to b e indeed something.16

The Decisive Task - Guilt

Climacus begins t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f religious task as t h a t

which i s to r e l a t e oneself absolutely t o t h e absolute and r e l a t i v e l y

t o the relative; and t h e t e s t f o r i t i s resignation. To accomplish

this task the religiously oriented individual discovers that helshe

must f i r s t "die to immediacy". This i s suffering, an e x i s t e n t i a l

r e a l i z a t i o n of one's t o t a l dependence on Cod, w h i c h i s t h e most essen-

tial form of religiousness. Next, Climacus considers the existential

status of the religiously orien-ted individual who tries to embark

upon the religious task. He proclaims t h a t a person who f a i l s t o

realize God i n entirety i s g u i l t y before God; hence, the decisive

expression of re1 igiousness i s g u i l t along w i t h i t s corollary, repen-

tance. Cl imacus' exposition of gui It seems to be phenomenological

in i t s orientation. Why i s guilt, one may ask, the decisive express-

ion of religiousness f o r Climacus? The individual's awareness o f

h i s l h e r lack of self-sufficiency i s the point o f departure from the

ethical to the religious. However, not every k i n d of human f a i l u r e

can b e r i g h t l y called g u i l t i n the religious sense.

For Climacus, g u i l t i n no sense i s a gloomy concept, be-

cause i t i s the measure of existential growth.

The essential consciousness o f g u i l t i s the greatest

possible immersion i n existence, and it also expresses
that an existing person relates himself to an eternal
happiness, expresses the relation b y expressing the
misrelation. 17

One may be tempted t o ask the question: why is guilt

"the deepest possible plunge into existence"? Climacus' answer

i s t h a t the individual who recognizes h i m s e l f l h e r s e l f as g u i l t y takes

the f u l l existential responsibility for h i s l h e r becoming. In t h i s

sense one exists f u l l y .

 Though Climacus makes a clear-cut d i s t l n c t l o n between g u i l t

i n t h e o r d i n a r y sense and t h a t w h i c h i s s p e c i f i c a l l y i n t h e C h r i s t i a n

concept of sin, h i s view i s v e r y much l i k e t h e Christians', because

he claims, as they do i n t h e doctrine of o r i g i n a l sin, that guilt i s

b o t h a universal condition and an i n d i v i d u a l ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . However,

t h i s does not i m p l y t h a t a l l men a r e g u i l t y because o f t h e v e r y nature

o f t h e conditions o f t h e i r existence. It may appear as though g u i l t

can be transferred to existence i t s e l f . If g u i l t can b e t o t a l l y t h r o w n

on existence, then t h e r e would be no such thing as human g u i l t . "In

t h a t case, t h e guilt-consciousness i s only a new expression f o r suff-

ering i n existence." l 8

Climacus explains the universality-individuality of guilt

consciousness by quoting the existential fact that the very attempt

made b y a l l humans to cast o f f g u i l t and excuse oneself demonstrates

the individual's responsibility. In t h e words o f Climacus:

The proposed procedure contains a contradiction. It

can never occur to someone who i s e s s e n t i a l l y g u i l t l e s s
to shove g u i l t away from himself, because t h e g u i l t l e s s
person has nothing a t a l l t o do w i t h t h e category o f
guilt. ' 9

He f u r t h e r quotes an o l d proverb, "Whoever excuses h i m s e l f accuses

himself," 20 w h i c h i s significant i n t h i s context. By this Climacus

does not intend to deny any genuine c l a i m o f a person's innocence

w i t h regard to certain p a r t i c u l a r matters. His point i s that a totally

innocent person w i l l not have any r e l a t i o n w i t h g u i l t .

I n speaking about guilt, Climacus does not use t h e t e r m

guilt i n t h e sense of quantity, but quality. Generally i t is r a i d

t h a t a person i s g u i l t y of t h i s o r t h a t deed, o r g u i l t y t o a greater

or lesser extent, and hence innocent i n other respects. These a r e

cases of viewing g u i l t i n t h e quantitative sense, which i s different

from Climacus' use of t h e term, "guilt." Every individual's life

f a l l s under the category o f g u i l t because b y contrast nobody i s t o t a l l y

or essentially innocent l i k e Adam and Eve before t h e f a l l . Each

person i s aware o f h i s l h e r failings, however much h e l s h e a t t r i b u t e s

it to the finitude o r situations, as d i s t i n c t i v e l y h i s l h e r own. There-

fore, according to Climacus, such a q u a l i t a t i v e concept o f g u i i t cannot

s i m p l y be determined e m p i r i c a l l y . He says,

The t o t a l i t y o f g u i l t comes into existence f o r t h e i n d i v i -

dual b y joining h i s guiit, be i t just one, be it u t t e r l y
trivial together w i t h t h e r e l a t i o n to an eternal h a p p i -
..me.= 21'

What Climacus t r i e s to convey here i s t h a t t h e seriousness o f g u i l t

comes into being o n l y when it i s r e l a t e d to God-relationship o r eternal

happiness. That i s why h e begins b y saying t h a t consciousness o f

guilt is the decisive expression f o r t h e r e l a t i o n to an eternal

happiness. The i n d i v i d u a l ' s assessment of h i s l h e r g u i l t becomes

the standard w i t h which helshe measures h i m s e l f l h e r s e l f . I n the

opinion of Ciimacus, the individual's primary duty is to retain

p r i s t i n e p u r i t y and relate f r e e l y to Cod f o r a l l e t e r n i t y . This

i s the model, the paradigm, o f human existence, and man's f a i l u r e

i s i n relation to t h i s standard w h i c h i s demanded o f him. Hence,

Climacus says t h a t g u i l t i s the decisive expression o f religiousness

and not a gloony, pessimistic view of human existence. Thus,

Climacus' f i n a l d e f i n i t i o n o f religiousness is:

The t o t a l i t y o f guilt-consciousness i n t h e single i n d i -

vidual before God i n relation to an eternal happiness
i s the religious. 2 2

4. I s t h e r e an Absolute Duty t o Cod?

The Genesis story of Abraham and Isaac seems to be

one w h i c h i s fascinating and y e t r e p e l l i n g because i t holds together

a steadfast l o y a l t y and a murderous c r u e l t y . I n the Fear and Trem-

bling, Johannes de Silentio (henceforth w i l l b e r e f e r r e d t o as Silen-

tio), i n the course o f the treatment of t h i s B i b l i c a l story, raises

certain profound, b u t controversial questions. They are:

1. I s there such a thing as absolute d u t y towards

Cod?
 2. I f so, does it take predominance over e t h i c a l
obligations! That is, i s teleological suspension
o f the ethical legitimate i n absolute d u t y towards
God?

By absolute d u t y towards God Silentio means absolutely overriding

d u t y to obey Cod's commands. T h i s d u t y i s absolute i n the sense

that it takes precedence over e v e r y other concern, even e t h i c a l

obligation. In t h i s context he quotes from the C-of St.Luke

(14:26) -a passage which deals w i t h the teaching on the absolute

d u t y to Cod:

I f any one comes to me and does not hate h i s own

father and mother and wife and c h i l d r e n and b r o t h e r s
and sisters, ye%> and even h i s own l i f e . h e cannot
b e my d i s c i p l e .

T h i s seems to be a h a r d saying, b u t Silentio explains i t b y r e f e r -

r i n g to one o f the exegetical resource books w h i c h interprets the

word "to hate" i n the above passage as "to love less", "to esteem

less". meaning that Cod is the one who demands absolute love.

Such an absolute'duty is clearly distinguished by Silentio from

ethical duties p e r se, though h e does understand t h a t ethical duties

in some sense are duties towards Cod. Consider the following

passage:

The ethical i s the universal, and as such it i s also

the divine. Thus it i s p r o p e r t o say t h a t e v e r y
duty i s essentially d u t y to God, b u t i f no more can
 be said than this, then i t i s also s a i d t h a t I actually
have no d u t y to Cod. The d u t y becomes d u t y b y
being traced back t o Cod, b u t i n the d u t y i t s e l f
I do not enter into relation to Cod. F o r example,
i t i s a d u t y t o love one's neighbour. It i s a d u t y
b y i t s being traced back to Cod, b u t i n t h e d u t y
I enter into r e l a t i o n not t o Cod b u t t o t h e neighbour
I love. I f i n t h i s connection I then say t h a t i t
i s my duty to love Cod, I am actually pronouncing
only a tautology, inasmuch as "Cod" i n a t o t a l l y
abstract sense i s here understood as the d i v i n e t h a t
is, the universal, t h a t is, the duty. 24

Silentio observes that from this perspective the e t h i c a l becomes

the content and the l i m i t of religious l i f e and hence c a l l s such

a re1 igious orientation as ethico-religious life. Cod becomes here

secondary. Therefore, according to Silentio, a religious l i f e w h i c h

equates Cod's command and one's ethical duties does not possess

d i s t i n c t i v e l y "religious" elements. Silentio finds such a conception

of ethico-religious l i f e i n Kant's view o f morality. Kant, in his

Reliaion within the Limits of Reason Alone, says that "religion

i s the recognition of a l l duties as d i v i n e commands".25 According

to Kant, moral l i f e and true religious life are indistinguishable.

Commenting on the story of Abraham, Kant rejects the supposed

apprehension that "Cod commands a father to k i l l h i s son," because

such a command contradicts morality, and Cod being good would

not demand i t . One's d u t y i s not t o go against the e t h i c a l d i c -

ta; one must please Cod through performing the moral duties, which

are universal i n character, and then alone w i l l one r e l a t e oneself

to Cod. Silentio agrees w i t h t h i s view o f Kant p r o v i d e d one does

not consider such a thing as an absolute d u t y towards Cod.

... h i s [Cod's] power i s only i n the ethical, w h i c h

f i l l s a l l of existence. Insofar. then. as someone might
wish to love Cod i n any other sense than this, he
i s a visionary, i s i n love w i t h a phantom, which,
i f it only had enough power t o speak, would say t o
him: I do not ask f o r your love -
just stay where
you belong?

Silentio characterizes Kant's moral f a i t h as a r e l i g i o n o f immanence,

w h i c h presupposes t h e fact t h a t there i s nothing i n human existence

which is incommensurable w i t h moral dictates. Then, i f there

i s t o be an absolute d u t y t o Cod, Silentio believes t h a t t h i s d u t y

must essentially be non-moral (not immoral o r unethical) i n nature.

The ethical here i s not invalidated, but receives religious expres-

sion. Silentio claims, i n t h i s context, t h a t Abraham, t h e Knight

of Faith, acts i n a sphere which i s beyond good and e v i l as

an absolute d u t y towards Cod, teleologically suspending the ethical.

Abraham oversteps the e t h i c a l e n t i r e l y f o r t h e sake o f t h e higher,

b u t non-ethical e.

Silentio applies certain c r i t e r i a t o moral f a i t h i n the

same way as Kant does, i.e. pure moral f a i t h i s distinguishable

from superstition and fanaticism b y i t s u n i v e r s a l i t y and rational

intel l i g i b i i i t y , but he d i f f e r s from Kant b y claiming t h a t t h e e t h i c a l

i s t h e universal, and t h a t f a i t h i s a paradox w h i c h t h e i n d i v i d u a l

cannot make himselflherself understandable to anybody; the ethical

i s rationally intelligible, w h i l e f a i t h i s absurd; t h e e t h i c a l i s commu-

nicable, while faith i s silent. Thus, t h e sphere o f f a i t h and t h a t

o f e t h i c a l d u t y a r e incommensurable t o Siientio. Moral sphere presup-

poses r a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s , b u t t h e sphere o f f a i t h presupposes a d i r e c t

relationship between God and the individual. An absolute d u t y to

God i s demanded generally through a s p e c i f i c communication o r reve-

l a t i o n from God to t h e i n d i v i d u a l . Such a revelation, being dependent

upon contingent historical facts for its transmission, cannot be the

ground f o r moral duties. The e t h i c a l as such i s universal; and as

a universal p r i n c i p l e it a p p l i e s t o everyone a t a l l times. From t h i s

perspective, religion lacks t h e most important c r i t e r i o n of truth -

universality. Hence, Silentio, commenting upon t h e a c t o f Abraham,

remarks :

The e t h i c a l expression f o r what Abraham d i d i s t h a t he

meant t o murder Isaac; th4, r e l i g i o u s expression i s t h a t
he meant to s a c r i f i c e Isaac.

Siientio, therefore, concludes that Abraham, the Knight of Faith,

who received a special command from Cod and who f u l f i l l e d h i s ab-

solute d u t y towards God, acted i n a manner, w h i c h w i l l b e character-

i z e d as absurd, when judged b y t h e universal standard.

He [Abraham] h a d f a i t h b y v i r t u e o f t h e absurd, f o r
human calculation was out of t h e question, and i t c e r t a i n l y
 was absurd t h a t God, who r e q u i r e d it o f him, should
i n t h e next moment r e s c i n d t h e requirement ...
and there-
fore he received lsaac more j o y f u l l y than t h e f i r s t time
... He had f a i t h b y v i r t u e o f t h e absurd, f o r a l l human
calculation ceased long ago.28

Is there any generic quality of faith i n human beings?

Silentio i s of the view t h a t t h e r e may be natural capacities, but

one has to c u l t i v a t e and thus acquire the q u a l i t y o f f a i t h . He ob-

serves :

F a i t h i s not t h e f i r s t immediacy b u t a l a t e r immediacy

[immediacy a f t e r r e f l e c t i o n ] . The f i r s t immediacy i s
t h e aesthetic [sensuous], and here t h e Hegelian p h i l o s o p h y
c e r t a i n l y may v e r y w e l l be r i g h t . But f a i t h i s not t h e
aesthetic [natural 1 .29

He continues:

P r e c i s e l y because resignation i s antecedent to f a i t h , f a i t h

i s no e s t h e t i c emotion b u t something f a r h i g h e r ; i t i s
not soontaneous inclination o f t h e h e a r t b u t t h e paradox
o f existence 30

To h i g h l i g h t the characteristics of faith, Silentio makes

a d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e Knight o f F a i t h and t h e Kinght o f Resignation.

The Knight of Resignation, remarks Si ientio, would h a v e renounced

lsaac not expecting t o get h i m back, as p e r God's promise. The

Knight of Resignation would h a v e performed the f i r s t movement o f

s a c r i f i c i n g Isaac. On t h e contrary, t h e Knight of Faith, a f t e r having

performed the f i r s t movement, would have proceeded t o the second,

that is, having f a i t h and f i r m conviction t h a t h e would get back

Isaac, because it was a promise b y Cod. Silentio admires Abraham's

f a i t h i n getting back Isaac, i.e. f a i t h i n absurdity. Thus, Abraham,

as the Knight o f Faith, goes one step ahead o f the Knight of Resig-

nation.

He [Abraham] resigned everything infinltely, and then

he grasped everything again b y v i r t u e of the absurd.
He i s continuously making the movement o f i n f l n i t y , but
he does it w i t h such precision and assurance t h a t he
continually gets finitude out of i t , and no one ever sus-
pects anything else. 31

Silentio compares Abraham to a b a l l e t dancer, who leaps to a specific

posture i n such a way t h a t he never strains f o r the posture, but

in the v e r y leap assumes the posture. Marvelling a t h i s feat meta-

phorical l y he comments:

Perhaps there i s no b a l l e t dancer who can do i t but -

t h i s Knight does it. Most people l i v e completely absor-
bed i n w o r l d l y joys and sorrows; they are bench warmers
who do not take p a r t in the dance.32

Silentio views i n f i n i t e resignation as a last stage before f a i t h f o r

the simple reason that any one who has not made t h i s movement

w i l l not have faith. In other words, only through i n f i n i t e resignation

does one become conscious of one's eternal v a l i d i t y . Such a move-

ment i s c a r r i e d out only through passion; on the contrary, reflection

o r mere thinking cannot produce such a movement, w h i c h i s a continu-

ous leap. Silentio says t h a t if, Abraham h a d known t h a t it we;

Cod's test and cleverly showed h i s willingness to sacrifice Isaac

expecting t h a t God would r e t u r n Isaac, then t h e r e i s no r e a l f a i t h

and i n f i n i t e resignation, because i n such an a t t i t u d e h e would have

no passionate involvement; b u t f a i t h i s a passion.

The act of resignation does not require faith, according

t o Silentio, because t h e movement i s made b y t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s e f f o r t .

But t h e act of faith entails resignation, and o v e r and above t h a t

makes another movement b y v i r t u e o f t h e absurd.

In i n f i n i t e resignation t h e r e i s a peace and r e s t and com-

f o r t i n the pain, t h a t is, when t h e movement i s made
normatively.. ..
But then t h e marvel happens; h e [Knight
of F a i t h ] makes one more movement even more wonderful..
f o r he says:Nevertheless I have f a i t h t h a t I w i l l get h e r
.
- t h a t is, b y v i r t u e o f t h e absurd, b y v i r t u e o f t h e
fact t h a t f o r Cod a l l things a r e possible. 33

The Knight of Resignation, through t h e a c t of resignation, renounces

everything, b u t t h e Knight o f Faith, after renouncing e v e r y t h i n g b y

t h e act of f a i t h , receives everything. Therefore, b y t h e act o f resig-

nation Abraham renounced Isaac, and by faith received h i m more

joufully than the ' f i r s t time, thus becoming t h e guiding s t a r t o save

t h e anguished.

What Kierkegaard i s anxious t o show i n t h e Fear and Trem-

bling i s t h a t Abraham, t h e Knight o f Faith, i n a non-despairing and

unanguished manner, w i t h t r u s t and f a i t h i n God's fulfllment o f h i s

promise, goes ahead t o sacrifice Isaac. Hence, Abraham represents

a higher form of religious existence. Kierkegaard I s o f the view

that religion i n general revolves i n i n f i n i t e resignation, where renun-

ciation i s considered as the human ideal. So, most o f the religions

remain at the level of i n f i n i t e resignation. But t h a t i s not the

case w i t h Abraham, f o r moving one step ahead, he enters into the

religion of the transcendent. It may be noted that Kierkegaard d i v i -

des religions into Religion "A" and Religion "B" on the basis of

i n f i n i t e resignation and f a i t h respectively. It must be emphasized

here that Kierkegaard's aim i s not to b e l i t t l e a l l the other religions,

but merely to show the characteristic feature o f the Christian religion,

which i s based on f a i t h i n the eminent sense. That he i s concerned

more with C h r i s t i a n i t y than w i t h other religions i s evident from

the fact t h a t he does not discuss other religions i n detail and i n

depth. He clubs them together and c a l l s them "religion i n general."

5. Singular i n Relation t o t h e Universal

The book, Fear and Tremblinp, emphasizes the conflict

between the singular and the universal. I t centres around the ques-

tion o f one's freedom (excercised i n the religious realm) i n relation

to the ethical. Therefore, it deals w i t h the conflict one experiences

when one wishes t o express r e l i g i o u s freedom, w h i c h clashes w l t h

one's duties. T h i s i s t h e c o n f l l c t w h i c h arises when a person i s

confronted w i t h t h e demand o f t h e eternal. One may r a i s e a genulne

doubt: "how does one know t h a t t h e r e i s a c a l l from t h e eternal?"

Certainly i t cannot b e known through t h e universal standards. To

perceive it one has t o d i s c o v e r t h e f a c u l t y of openness, openness

t o Cod, through a t h i r d ear,34 as John Mayer would p u t it, w h i c h

r e f e r s n e i t h e r t o reason nor to feelings, b u t to f a i t h . Silentio speaks

o f such an encounter w h i c h i s impossible f o r logical thinking, which

i s absurd i n terms o f reason. Here, reason has to g i v e u p i t s place

to f a i t h . Using Abraham as an example o f t h e encounter o f human

beings w i t h t h e absurd, Silentio describes t h e c o n f l i c t as follows:

The t e r r i f y i n g t h i n g i n t h e c o l l i s i o n i s t h i s - t h a t it
i s not a c o l l i s i o n between Cod's command and man's
command, b u t between Cod's command and God's demand.35

It i s Cod's command t h a t Abraham should love h i s son, but a t the

same time i t i s h i s demand t h a t he must s a c r i f i c h i s son. I f one

'reflects over the purpose o f such a demand from Cod, one w i l l unders-

tand, Silentio says, t h a t Cod wanted to demonstrate what faith is.

Cod demands a p r o o f o f f a i t h from Abraham to r e v e a l h i s greatness.

He who loved h i m s e l f became great b y v i r t u e o f himself,

and h e who l o v e d o t h e r men became great b y h i s devoted-
ness, b u t h e who loved Cod became t h e greatest o f a l l
... [because h e ] expected t h e impossible [and thus1
became the greatest o f a11.36
Abraham's greatness l i e s not o n l y i n obeying Cod's command t o s a c r i f i c e

Isaac, b u t simultaneously i n having f a i t h i n t h e absurd, c.t h a t

Cod w i l l g i v e Isaac back t o him. B y h i s hope i n t h e l a t t e r , he

became t h e p r o t o t y p e f o r a believer.

I n t h e r e l a t i o n between w i s h and d u t y of an individual,

t h e r e a r e two p o s s i b i l i t i e s - either t h e i n d i v i d u a l comes i n t o con-

f l i c t w i t h duty, o r submits to it. Abraham faced t h e former situ-

ation because of h i s absolute r e l a t i o n s h i p t o Cod. Abraham's c o n f l i c t

i n v o l v e d non-moral elements, i.e. t h e c o n f l i c t was between a univer-

sal e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e and a r e l i g i o u s demand. However, f o r Kierke-

gaard dilemmas a r e crucial, revelatory moments. Kierkegaard con-

demns t h e age w h i c h i s b l i s s f u l l y ignorant of t h e d e p t h o f experience

which dilemmas expose. With regard to Bradley's theory of

"My Station and its Duties," one may pose t h e question whether

one's station i s always e v i d e n t and whether one's d u t i e s never con-

flicted. Kierkegaard's emphasis on Abraham's dilemma i s to expose

t h e l i m i t a t i o n of t h e age of reason.

Any dilemma i s bad enough. Silentio distinguishes Abraham's

dilemma, t h e dilemma o f faith, from t h e dilemma of t r a g i c heroes.

He enumerates t h e following as t h e cases o f t r a g i c heroes:

1. Agamemnon was t h e leader of t h e Achaeans. The

success of t h e invasion o f T r o y depended upon h i s
 s a c r i f i c i n g h i s daughter. Therefore, he made the sacri-
fice f o r which he i s admired.

2. Jeptha (The Book of Judges) l e d t h e Jews against t h e

Amorites. He vowed to God t h a t i f he succeeded I n war,
w h i c h he had taken up w i t h Isreal, he would s a c r i f i c e
t h e f i r s t thing h e saw on h i s return. The f i r s t t h i n g
he saw was h i s daughter. Therefore, he s a c r i f i c e d h i s
daughter for w h i c h he i s prasied.

3. Brutus as consul was charged w i t h the enforcement o f

t h e Roman Law. Brutus' son committed a c r i m e punishable
b y death according t o t h e Roman Law. Therefore h e made
t h e s a c r i f i c e f o r which h e was admired.

Both t h e t r a g i c hero and Abraham h a d to s a c r i f i c e a c h i l d ; but a

t r a g i c hero's dilemma i s a c o n f l i c t w i t h i n t h e realm o f e t h i c s - a

conflict between the universal, "objective" principles. Abraham's

dilemma, however, involves religious elements. The tragic hero's

case i s r e f e r r e d to as tragedy r a t h e r than senseless murder, because

duties attached to h i s r o l e as a parent and as an i n d i v i d u a l who i s

expected to follow t h e code o f e t h i c s get counter-balanced b y the

duties attached to h i s r o l e as a king, t h e protector of t h e common

good. Both t h e duties here belong to the realm o f t h e universal.

The tragic hero, through h i s sacrifice, s t i l l remains i n t h e e t h i c a l

realm, because h i s d u t y s h i f t s from one e t h i c a l realm, i.e. from t h e

d u t y of a f a t h e r w h i c h i s lower i n r e l a t i o n to h i s d u t y towards h i s

state, to another e t h i c a l realm w h i c h i s higher. Therefore, the tragic

hero surrenders himself to t h e universal. Abraham's situation i s t h e

opposite. B y h i s deed of s a c r i f i c e he has transgressed t h e e t h i c a l

altogether, but for a higher cause outside the realm o f ethics.

He does not sacrifice h i s c h i l d t o save the nation, b u t p u r e l y from

a personal ground. Therefore, w h i l e the tragic hero i s great because

of moral virtue, Abraham i s great because of personal v i r t u e -

v i r t u e of religious faith. The story of Abraham, as Silentio points

out, then, contains a teleological suspension o f the ethical, a sus-

pension of the ethial f o r a higher goal.

The tragic hero expresses the universal and sacrifices

himself f o r it. But the Knight of Faith, on the other
hand, i s a paradox; he i s the single i n d i v i d u a l s i m p l y
and solely, the single individual without any connections
and complications. 37

Abraham, b y an absolute relation to the absolute, i s hidden from

the universal. He ventures beyond the borders of i n t e l l i g i b i l i t i e s ,

i.e. h i s inner struggle and v i c t o r y are hidden.

... h i s [ t h e tragic hero's] act and every emotion i n

h i m belong to the universal, he i s open. and i n t h i s
disclosure he i s the beloved son of ethics. This does
not f i t Abraham, he does nothing f o r the universal and
he i s hidden. 38

Here, Si lentio makes a comparison between the hiddenness involved

i n aesthetic stage and the religious one. In the aesthetic stage

there is a p r i m i t i v e form of hiddenness, where the individual's

wishes against h i s l h e r duties are private. But then Abraham was

not aesthetic i n nature, f o r he obeyed the laws o f the ethical u n t i l

he was forced to break them i n order to obey the power w h i c h

is h i g h e r than these laws. He cannot make t h i s understandable

t o the universal; thus, h i s hiddenness i s a hiddenness which l i e s

outside the universal.

By f a i t h Abraham emigrated from the land o f h i s fathers

and became an alien i n the promised land... he l e f t
behind h i s w o r l d l y understanding, and he took along
h i s f a i t h . 39

The tragic hero can count on being understood even i n the midst

of the dilemma, because h e can count on social agreement about the

relevant universal rule. However, a command from God i s not p u b l i c

o r socially understandable; on the contrary, it i s p u r e l y private.

Communication here is not only difficult, but totally ineffable.

It i s well known t h a t communication (language) requires universal

concepts. God's command t o Abraham i s p u r e l y particular, involving

no one else. Therefore, Abraham cannot communicate h i s pllght.

He has nothing t o say i n defence of h i s preparation which h e makes

to s a c r i f i c e Isaac. The Knight o f Faith, u n l i k e the tragic hero,

must undergo the ordeal of silence.

Abraham remains s i l e n t
l i e s the distress and anxiety.
-
b u t he cannot speak. Therein
Even though I go on
talking n i g h t and day without interruption, i f 1 cannot
make myself understood when I speak, then I am not
speaking. This i s the case w i t h Abraham. He can say
everything, but one thing h e cannot say, and i f he cannot
say t h a t - t h a t is, say i t i n such a way t h a t the other
understands i t - then he i s not speaking. The r e l i e f
p r o v i d e d t ~ xspeaking i s . t h a t i t translates me into the
universal .
Silentio points out t h a t Abraham's silence i s not w i t h i n the stop;
o f aesthetics, because h i s silence was not t o save Isaac. Moreover,

Abraham's sacrifice i s an offence t o t h e aesthetic hero, because he

is able to understand t h a t one s a c r i f i c e s oneself. b u t not someone

else. f o r one's sake.

Esthetics allowed, indeed demanded, silence o f t h e single

i n d i v i d u a l i f he knew t h a t b y remaining s i l e n t he could
save another. T h i s alone adequately shows t h a t Abraham
i s not w i t h i n t h e scope o f esthetics.41

Having outlined t h e nature o f Abraham's dilemma, Silentio

raises t h e central issue: can t h e teleological suspension of t h e e t h i c a l

e v e r b e legitimate? I n o t h e r words, the ethical i s t h e universal,

w h i c h means t h a t it a p p l i e s t o everyone, a t a l l times. The e t h i c a l

as such i s immanent i n i t s e l f i n t h e sense t h a t it has nothing outside

i t s e l f w h i c h forms i t s e,
b u t it serves as t h e Je& f o r everyone.

The single i n d i v i d u a l has h i s l h e r telos i n t h e universal, i.e. helshe

must l i v e e t h i c a l l y w h i c h i s h i s l h e r purpose. Therefore, the indivi-

duals have to overcome t h e i r singular instincts i n o r d e r t o become

the universal. If t h e y transgress i t even temporarily, do they sin?

Silentio says: no. Why? B y way answer to t h e question, Silentio

puts another question: what is t h e purpose behind such an a c t o f

Abraham? Silentio i s convinced t h a t Abraham does it f o r Cod's sake,

because Cod demands proof of h i s faith; also, h e does it f o r his

own sake so t h a t h e can p r o v e it, The u n i t y of t h e two i s considered

.by Silentio as an ordeal. a "temptation." Generally, t h e term "temp-

tationU means t h a t w h i c h h o l d s a person from obeying h i s l h e r duties.

But here temptation i s t h e e t h i c a l i t s e l f , i.e. not t o suspend the ethi-

cal, w h i c h would then mean h o l d i n g a person back from obeying Godts

command.

Again, that which gets suspended here, Silentio observes,

i s not the ethical, b u t merely t h e power o f e t h i c s to p r o v i d e j u s t i f i -

cation. Ethics i s not abolished, because a t no p o i n t does Abraham

withdraw h i s love f o r h i s son, a love u n i v e r s a l l y r e q u i r e d o f a father.

His dilemma i s caused b y h i s sense t h a t Cod's demand must be honoured.

He i s caught i n the subjective conviction and not a whimsical desire,

a demand which i s c r u c i a l f o r self-integration. Teleological suspen-

sion i s to j u s t i f y t h e choice and to reveal t h e fact t h a t ethics cannot

guide, cannot j u s t i f y our choice. Then, t h e answer to t h e question

whether teleological suspension i s j u s t i f i e d b y Abraham, i s a paradox,

for he i s not j u s t i f i e d i n t h e universal sense, b u t merely b y v i r t u e

of being a single i n d i v i d u a l i n r e l a t i o n to h i s f a i t h .

After t h e teleological suspension o f t h e ethical, how does

the single i n d i v i d u a l e x i s t ? Silentio's r e p l y i s t h a t he e x i s t as the

single i n d i v i d u a l i n contrast t o t h e universal. He j u s t i f i e s t h e point

thus:
 i s h i g h e r than t h e universal -
F a i t h i s namely t h i s paradox t h a t t h e single i n d i v i d u a l
yet, please note, i n such
a way t h a t t h e movement repeats itself, so t h a t a f t e r
having been i n t h e universal h e as t h e slngle i n d i v i d u a l
isolates h i m s e l f as h i g h e r than t h e universal... if this
i s not faith, then Abraham i s lost, then f a i t h has never
e x i s t e d i n t h e w o r l d p r e c i s e l y because i t has always
existed. 42

Thus, faith, according to Kierkegaard, is precisely this paradox

w h i c h i s echoed i n S i i e n t i o ' s words.

... t h e single i n d i v i d u a l as t h e single i n d i v i d u a i i s

h i g h e r than t h e universal,
as i n f e r i o r t o it b u t as superior
t h e single i n d i v i d u a l who,
-
i s j u s t i f i e d before it, not
y e t i n such a way.
a f t e r being subordinate as
..
t h e single i n d i v i d u a l t o t h e universal, now b y means o f
t h e universal becomes t h e single i n d i v i d u a l who as t h e
single i n d i v i d u a l i s superior, t h a t t h e single i n d i v i d u a i
as t h e single i n d i v i d u a l stands i n an absolute r e l a t i o n
to t h e absolute. 43

What one notices h e r e i s t h a t t h e realm o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l ,

what Kierkegaard c a l l s s u b j e c t i v i t y , concerns t h e non-universalizable '

i n t e g r i t y of t h e self. Hence, f o r Kierkegaard, t h e non-moral demand,

nevertheless, can r e s u l t i n t h e most exemplary moral act -Abraham

as an exemplary of faith. This, then, i s t h e singular u n i v e r s a l -

singluar, i n contrast to t h e universal, b y v i r t u e o f f a i t h .