G.R. No.

L-22545, November 28, 1969

BALDOMERO S. LUQUE AND OTHER PASSENGERS FROM THE PROVINCES
OF CAVITE AND BATANGAS; AND PUBLIC SERVICE OPERATORS FILOMENA
ABALOS, AND OTHERS, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS,
MAYOR OF MANILA; MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA; MANILA POLICE
DEPARTMENT; HON. ENRIQUE MEDINA, PSC COMMISSIONER; PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION; SAULOG TRANSIT, INC.; AND BATANGAS
TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:
 Original petitioners are passengers from the provinces of Cavite and Batangas who ride
on buses plying along the routes between the said provinces and Manila. Other petitioners
are public service operators operating PUB and PUJ public service vehicles from the
provinces with terminals in Manila, while the rest are those allegedly operating PUB, PUJ
or AC motor vehicles operating within Manila and suburbs.
 They assailed the validity of Ordinance 4986 and A.O. No. 1 s. 1964. Under Ordinance
4986, PUB and PUJs shall be allowed to enter Manila only from 6:30am to 8:30pm every
day except Sundays and holidays. Meanwhile, A.O. No.1 issued by Commissioner of
Public Service states that all jeeps authorized to operate from Manila to any point in Luzon,
beyond the perimeter of Greater Manila, shall carry the words "For Provincial Operation".
 Petitioners contend that since they possess a valid Certificate of Public Convenience
(CPC), they have already acquired a vested right to operate. Moreover, Ordinance 4986
destroys vested rights of petitioning public services to operate inside Manila and to proceed
to their respective terminals located in the City. They would want likewise to nullify said
ordinance upon the averment that it impairs the vested rights of petitioning bus passengers
to be transported directly to downtown Manila.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the said regulations are valid.

RULING:
YES. Using the doctrine in Lagman vs. City of Manila, petitioner's CPC was issued subject to the
condition that operators shall observe and comply with all the rules and regulations of the PSC
relative to PUB service. The purpose of the ban is to minimize the problem in Manila and the traffic
congestion, delays and accidents resulting from the free entry into the streets of Manila and the
operation around said streets.

Public welfare, we have said, lies at the bottom of any regulatory measure designed "to relieve
congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety." As a corollary,
measures calculated to promote the safety and convenience of the people using the
thoroughfares by the regulation of vehicular traffic, present a proper subject for the exercise of
police power.

Both Ordinance 4986 and the Commissioner's administrative orders fit into the concept of
promotion of the general welfare, Expressive of the purpose of Ordinance 4986 is Section 1
thereof, thus - "As a positive measure to relieve the critical traffic congestion in the City of Manila,
which has grown to alarming and emergency proportions, and in the best interest of public welfare
and convenience, the following traffic rules and regulations are hereby promulgated." Along the
same lines, the bus ban instituted by the Commissioner has for its object "to minimize the 'traffic
problem in the City of Manila' and the 'traffic congestion, delays and even accidents' resulting from
the free entry into the streets of said City and the operation 'around said streets, loading and
unloading or picking up passengers and cargoes' of PU buses in great 'number and size.'"

Police power in both was properly exercised.

FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the petition herein is denied. Costs against petitioners.
So ordered.
 G.R. No. 77372, April 29, 1988
LUPO L. LUPANGCO, RAYMOND S. MUNGKAL, NORMAN A. MESINA,
ALEXANDER R. REGUYAL, JOCELYN P. CATAPANG, ENRICO V. REGALADO,
JEROME O. ARCEGA, ERNESTO C. BLAS, JR., ELPIDIO M. ALMAZAN, KARL
CAESAR R. RIMANDO, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:
 Petitioners contended that Ordinance No. 84 is invalid, tainted with nullity, the municipality
being devoid of power to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling. Petitioners at the
same time alleging that their rights to due process and equal protection of the laws were
violated as the licenses previously given to them was in effect withdrawn without judicial
hearing.
 The provisions of the assailed Ordinance No. 84 include Section 3, which prohibits the
issuance and renewal of licenses of night clubs, cabarets, and dance halls, and Section 4,
which revokes existing permits and licenses, thereby rendering the operations of said
establishments illegal.
 Petitioners contended that RA 938 which prohibits the operation of night clubs would give rise
to a constitutional question. The lower court upheld the constitutionality and validity of
Ordinance No. 84 and dismissed the cases. Hence this petition for certiorari by way of appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid

NO. It is unconstitutional. This Court is unable to agree with such a conclusion and for reasons
herein set forth, holds that reliance on the police power is insufficient to justify the enactment of
the assailed ordinance. It must be declared null and void.

Police power is granted to municipal corporations in general terms as follows:

"General power of council to enact ordinances and make regulations.— The municipal council
shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and
such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the
prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality
and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein."

It is a general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general
welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the
corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State."

If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance
would pass the test of validity. This Court had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the
general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or
policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by
Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy
and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field.
Certainly, the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be
achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute
prohibition. The admonition in Salaveria should be heeded: "The Judiciary should not lightly set
aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the
guise of police regulation."

It is clear that in the guise of a police regulation, there was in this instance a clear invasion of
personal or property rights, personal in the case of those individuals desirous of patronizing those
night clubs and property in terms of the investments made and salaries to be earned by those
therein employed.

Herein what was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise
of an assumed power to prohibit.
 G.R. No. 77372, April 29, 1988
LUPO L. LUPANGCO, RAYMOND S. MUNGKAL, NORMAN A. MESINA,
ALEXANDER R. REGUYAL, JOCELYN P. CATAPANG, ENRICO V. REGALADO,
JEROME O. ARCEGA, ERNESTO C. BLAS, JR., ELPIDIO M. ALMAZAN, KARL
CAESAR R. RIMANDO, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:

 On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission

(PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as part of its "Additional Instructions to Examinees," to
all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy.
 The resolution embodied the following pertinent provisions: "No examinee shall attend any
review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out,
review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or
the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the
aforementioned or similar institutions during the three days immediately preceding every
examination day including the examination day.
 On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure
examinations in accountancy scheduled on October 25 and November 2 of the same year,
filed in their own behalf and in behalf of all others similarly situated like them, a complaint
for injunction with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against
respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and
to declare the same unconstitutional.
 Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that the
lower court had no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution. In
an Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the
case and enjoined the respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to
Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional. Not satisfied therewith,
respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, appealed with the Court of Appeals. The petition
was granted.

ISSUE:
Whether of not Resolution No. 105 is constitutional.

RULING:
NO. The measure was declared by the Court not only to be unreasonable and violative of
academic freedom, but also to be more sweeping than what was necessary.

As to the validity of Resolution No. 105, although the resolution has a commendable purpose
which is to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations, the resolution is
unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend and review class, briefing, conference or
the like or receive hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or
any review center. The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing
the prohibited acts even without ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations.

Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees’ right
to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to
how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations specially if the steps they
take are lawful.

Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academic freedom of the
schools concerned. PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review schools and
centers believe would best enable their enrollees to pass the examination. Unless the means and
methods of instruction are clearly found to be inefficient, impractical, or riddled with corruption,
review schools and centers may not be stopped from helping out their students.

The decision of the CA was REVERSE and SET ASIDE.

 G.R. No. 22008, November 03, 1924
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS.
JULIO POMAR, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

FACTS:
 Julio Pomar, the manager and person - in charge of La Flor de la Isabela, a tobacco factory
pertaining to La Campania General de Tabacos de Filipinas, a corporation duly authorized to
transact business in Manila, employed Macaria Fajardo as cigar-maker. She was granted a
vacation leave beginning July 16, 1923 by reason of pregnancy.
 On October 26, 1923 a case was filed against defendant Pomar for failing to pay Fajardo her regular
wages corresponding to 30 days before and 30 days after her delivery and confinement, in
accordance with the provision of Act. 3071 which states that; “Section 13-Every person, firm or
corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor of any description shall be obliged
to grant to any woman employed by it as laborer who may be pregnant, thirty days' vacation with
pay before and another thirty days after confinement: Provided, That the employer shall not
discharge such laborer without just cause, under the penalty of being required to pay to her wages
equivalent to the total of two months counted from the day of her discharge.”
 The judge found the defendant guilty of the alleged offense. From that sentence, the defendant
appealed contending that his act did not constitute any offense because such provision of the Act
No. 3071 is unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of sections 13 and 15 of Act No. 3071 are a reasonable and lawful
exercise of the police power of the state

RULING:
NO. The provisions of section 13, of Act No. 3071 of the Philippine Legislature, are
unconstitutional and void, in that they violate and are contrary to the provisions of the first
paragraph of section 3 of the Act of Congress of the United States of August 29, 1916.

Said section 13 was enacted by the Legislature of the Philippine Islands in the exercise of its
supposed police power, with the praiseworthy purpose of safeguarding the health of pregnant
women laborers in "factory, shop or place of labor of any description," and of insuring to them, to
a certain extent, reasonable support for one month before and one month after their delivery.

The statute now under consideration is attacked upon the ground that it authorizes an
unconstitutional interference with the freedom of contract including within the guarantees of the
due process clause of the 5th Amendment. That the right to contract about one's affairs is a part
of the liberty of the individual protected by this clause is settled by the decision of this court, and
is no longer open to question. The law takes account of the necessities of only one party to the
contract. It ignores the necessities of the employer by compelling him to pay not less than a certain
sum, not only whether the employee is capable of earning it, but irrespective of the ability of his
business to sustain the burden, generously leaving him, of course, the privilege of abandoning his
business as an alternative for going on at a loss. Liberty includes not only the right to labor, but to
refuse to labor, and, consequently, the right to contract to labor or for labor, and to terminate such
contracts, and to refuse to make such contracts. Hence, we are of the opinion that this Act
contravenes those provisions of the state and Federal constitutions, which guarantee that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.

Clearly, therefore, the law has deprived, every person, firm, or corporation owning or managing a
factory, shop or place of labor of any description within the Philippine Islands, of his right to enter
into contracts of employment upon such terms as he and the employee may agree upon. The law
creates a term in every such contract, without the consent of the parties. Such persons are,
therefore, deprived of their liberty to contract. The constitution of the Philippine Islands guarantees
to every citizen his liberty and one of his liberties is the liberty to contract. It has been decided in
a long line of decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, that the right to contract about
one's affairs is a part of the liberty of the individual, protected by the "due process of law" clause
of the constitution. The rule in this jurisdiction is, that the contracting parties may establish any
agreements, terms, and conditions they may deem advisable, provided they are not contrary to
law, morals or public policy. (Art. 1255, Civil Code.)
 G.R. No. 7595, February 04, 1913
EDWIN WILLIAM CASE ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. LA JUNTA
DE SANIDAD DE MANILA, AND ITS DIRECTOR, VICTOR G. HEISER,
DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

FACTS:
the plaintiff, Edwin William Case, is the owner of a certain house and lot, located at No. 202 Calle
Solana, within the walled city of Manila; that said house is occupied, from time to time, by a large
number of persons. It seems to be an apartment house, gymnasium, or dormitory.

On or about the 20th of November, 1909, the assistant sanitary engineer of the Bureau of Health,
by order of the Director of Health, addressed a letter to the representatives of the plaintiffs,
informing them that the sanitary condition of said premises (202 Calle Solana) was very bad, and
directing them to make connections with the new sewer system.

The plaintiff not having complied with the order contained in said notice (November 20, 1909), on
the 28th of December, 1909, the said assistant engineer of the Bureau of Health addressed
another letter (Exhibit B) to the representatives of the plaintiff, calling attention to the fact that the
instructions in the former order not having been carried out he would be given ten days in which
to comply with the same.

Thereafter, on the 12th of January, 1910, the plaintiff filed a petition in the Court of First Instance
of the city of Manila, praying that the defendants be enjoined from carrying out the performance
of said orders requiring the improvements in the sanitary conditions of said premises, and for a
judgment of the court, declaring that the sanitary conditions of said property are good and in no
manner injurious to the public health; and further, that the defendants were without lawful power
or authority to order and compel the plaintiff to make on said premises the improvements ordered
by said Director of Health.

On the 25th of January, 1910, the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, after considering
the facts alleged in said petition, granted a preliminary injunction, as prayed for by the plaintiffs.

The trial court reached the conclusion that said Ordinance No. 125 was null and without force,
and made the preliminary injunction issued on the 25th of January, 1910, permanent, perpetually
prohibiting the defendants from carrying into effect said orders of November 20, 1909.

From that conclusion of the lower court the defendants appealed, after having made a motion for
a new trial in the lower court. The defendants allege that the premises are in an insanitary
condition and maintain that the city of Manila had authority to adopt and enforce said ordinance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 25 is a valid exercise of police power.

RULING:
YES. The Court ruled that Ordinance No. 125, having been adopted by express authority of law,
and being a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State, is valid and enforceable.

The particular ordinance now under consideration was clearly designed to preserve and protect
the health, comfort, and convenience of the inhabitants of the thickly populated city of Manila, and
therefore, in its scope, falls directly under what is generally known as the police power of the
Government. This power of the State has but few limitations when it is exercised to secure the
peace, safety health, morals, and the best and highest interests of the public.

Judge Cooley, one of the best and clearest law writers and jurists, in discussing this power, said:
"No definition of the power can be more complete and satisfactory than some which have been
given by eminent jurists in deciding cases which have arisen from its exercise, and which have
been so often approved and adopted that to present them in any other than the language of the
decisions would be unwise, if not inexcusable. Says Chief Justice Shaw: 'We think it is a settled
principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil society, that every holder of property,
however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use
of it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment
of their property, nor injurious to the right s of the community. All property in this Commonwealth
is * * * held subject to those general regulations which are necessary the common good and
general welfare. Right of property like all other social and convention rights, are subject to such
reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious and to such
reasonable restraints and regulations established by law as the legislature, under the governing
and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient. The
power we allude to is to rather the police power; the power vested in the legislature by the
constitution to make, ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes, and ordinances either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they
shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the Commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.
It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this power than to mark its
boundaries, or prescribe limits to its exercise.

" This police power of the State', says another eminent judge, 'extends to the protection of the
lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and the protection of all property within the
State. According to the maxim, Sicutere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which being of universal
application, it must, of course, be within the range of legislative action to define the mode and
manner in which every one may so use his own as not to injure others.' And again: (By this)
'general police power of the State, persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restrains and
burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State; of the perfect
right in the legislature to do which, no question ever was, or upon acknowledged general
principles, ever can be made, so far as natural persons are concerned.' And neither the power
itself, nor the discretion to exercise it as need may require, can be bargained away by the State."