G.R. No.

78214, December 5, 1988

Yolanda Caballes
vs
Dept. Agrarian Reform, Hon. Heherson Alvarez and Bienvenido Abajon

Facts:
The landholding subject of the controversy is consists of 60 sqm was acquired by spouses Arturo and Yolanda
Caballes by virute of a Deed of Sale executed by Andrea Alicaba Millenes, this land is situated in Lawaan Talisay,
Cebu. Before the sale of the property to Caballes, Bienvenido Abajon constructed his house on a protion of the
land, paying monthly rental to Andrea Millenes. Abjon was likewise allowed to plant thereon, and they have agreed
that the produce thereon would be shred by them 50-50.
When the property was sold, Caballes told Abajon that they will put up a poultry on the land and they intended to
build it close to Abajon's house and they pursuaded Abajon to transfer his dwelling to the opposite portion of the
land. Abajon offered to pay renta; to the new owners, but they refuse and later demanded for Abajon to vacate.
Abajon refused to leave.
DAR concluded that Abajon was a tenant of the former owner, Andrea.

Issue:
Whether Abajon is a tenant under the new owners.

Ruling:

Abajon is not a tenant for it only occupied a miniscule portion of the land which cannot be interpreted as economic-
family size farm under the definition of RA 3844.
The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:

1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant; 4. The purpose is agricultural production;
2. The subject is agricultural land; 5. There is personal cultivation; and
3. There is consent; 6. There is sharing of harvests.
All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties. The absence of one
does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. This
is so because unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure
nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.
Therefore, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. Certainly, it is not unusual
for a landowner to accept some of the produce of his land from someone who plants certain crops thereon. This
is a typical and laudable provinciano trait of sharing or patikim, a native way of expressing gratitude for favor
received. This, however, does not automatically make the tiller-sharer a tenant thereof especially when the area
tilled is only 60, or even 500, square meters and located in an urban area and in. the heart of an industrial or
commercial zone at that. Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been given its
possession for the primary purpose of agricultural production. The circumstances of this case indicate that the
private respondent's status is more of a caretaker who was allowed by the owner out of benevolence or
compassion to live in the premises and to have a garden of some sort at its south western side rather than a tenant
of the said portion.
Anent the second assignment of error, the petitioner argues that since Abajon, is not an agricultural tenant, the
criminal case for malicious mischief filed against him should be declared as proper for trial so that proceedings in
the lower court can resume.
G.R. No. 86186 May 8, 1992
GELOS
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS

TOPIC: Definition of Agricultural Tenancy

FACTS:
The Private Respondent owned the subject land of 25,000 square meters in Laguna. The Landowner then entered
in to a contract with the petitioner and employed him to be laborer on the land with the wage of 5.00 peso a day.
The Petitioner first went the Court of Agrarian Relation and then went to Ministry of Agrarian reform and asked the
court to fix the agricultural lease rental of the land and his request was granted.

The private respondent then filed a complaint of illegal detainer against the petitioner that was that was dismissed
by the Ministry of Agrarian reform for the existence of Tenancy relations between the parties. The Private
respondents appealed to the office of the President alleging that there was no tenancy relation between the parties.
The RTC rendered dismissed the complaint and assailed that there was a tenancy relation between the parties.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Is there a Tenancy relation between the parties?
HELD:
No, it was clear that the petitioner was not intended to be tenant but a mere employee of the private respondent
as showed in the contract. The petitioner was paid for specific kind of work. The court stressed many cases that:
"tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a
legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and as in this case,
their written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more important."

It should also be considered that a tenant is defined under Section 5(a) R.A 1199 as a person who himself and
with the aid available from within his immediate farm household cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by
another, with the latter's consent, for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the
share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price-certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both,
under the leasehold tenancy system.
Therefore, the court laid down the requisites for the tenancy relationship to exist:
1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant;

2) The subject is agricultural land;

3) There is consent;
4) The purpose is agricultural production;
5) There is personal cultivation; and

6) There is sharing of harvest or payment of rental.

Absence of this clearly does not qualify someone to be a tenant. It is clear that it is not a tenancy relationship that
exists between the parties, what they have is employee-employer relationship.
GR 185669
GALOPE
vs.
BUGARIN

FACTS:
Respondent owns a parcel of land located in Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, while petitioner farms the land. Parties
respective contentions are as follows: (a) respondent complained that she lent the land to petitioner in 1992 without
an agreement, that what she receives in return from petitioner is insignificant, and that she wants to recover the
land to farm it on her own; (b) petitioner countered that respondent cannot recover the land yet for he had been
farming it for a long time and that he pays rent ranging from P4,000 to P6,000 or 15 cavans of palay per harvest.
Respondent filed a petition for recovery of possession, ejectment and payment of rentals before the DARAB,
claiming that respondent lent the land to petitioner in 1991 and that the latter gave nothing in return as a sign of
gratitude or monetary consideration for the use of the land. It was also claimed that petitioner mortgaged the land
to Jose Allingag who allegedly possesses the land.
After due proceedings, the Provincial Adjudicator dismissed the petition and ruled that petitioner is a tenant entitled
to security of tenure. On appeal, the DARAB disagreed with the Adjudicator and ruled that petitioner is not a de
jure tenant. The DARAB ordered petitioner to pay rentals and vacate the land. Petitioner appealed, but the CA
affirmed DARAB’s ruling that no tenancy relationship exists; that the elements of consent and sharing are not
present; that respondent’s act of lending her land without consideration cannot be taken as implied tenancy; and
that no receipts prove petitioner’s payment of rentals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there exists a tenancy relationship between the parties.

HELD:
The court found the petition impressed with merit and held that the CA and DARAB erred in ruling that there is no
tenancy relationship between the parties.
The essential elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant
or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between
the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) there
is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
Contrary also to the CA and DARAB pronouncement, respondent’s act of allowing the petitioner to cultivate her
land and receiving rentals therefor indubitably show her consent to an unwritten tenancy agreement. An
agricultural leasehold relation is not determined by the explicit provisions of a written contract alone. Section 5 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, recognizes that an
agricultural leasehold relation may exist upon an oral agreement.
Thus, all the elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are present. Respondent is the landowner; petitioner
is her tenant. The subject matter of their relationship is agricultural land, a farm land. They mutually agreed to the
cultivation of the land by petitioner and share in the harvest. The purpose of their relationship is clearly to bring
about agricultural production. After the harvest, petitioner pays rental consisting of palay or its equivalent in cash.
Respondent’s motion to supervise harvesting and threshing, processes in palay farming, further confirms the
purpose of their agreement. Lastly, petitioner’s personal cultivation of the land is conceded by respondent who
likewise never denied the fact that they share in the harvest.
Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corp
vs.
Court of Appeals

FACTS:
The case is a petition regarding Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board’s (DARAB) order of
compulsory acquisition of petitioner’s property under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Sta.
Rosa was the registered owner of two parcels of land in Cabuyao Laguna. According to them, these lands are
watersheds which provide clean and potable (drinkable) water to the Canlubang community and that 90 light
industries are located in that area. They were alleging respondents usurped its rights over their property thereby
destroying the ecosystem. Since the said land provides water to the residents, respondents sought an easement
of a right of a way to and from Barangay Castile, to which, by counterclaim, Sta. Rosa sought ejectment against
respondents. Respondents went to the DAR and filed a case for compulsory acquisition of the Sta. Rosa Property
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Compulsory acquisition is the power of the government to
acquire private rights in land without the willing consent of its owner or occupant in order to benefit the society.
The said land was inspected by the Municipal and Agrarian Reform Officer, and upon consensus of the authorities
concerned, they decided that the said land must be placed under compulsory acquisition. Petitioners filed an
objection on the ground that: The area is not appropriate for agricultural purposes. The area was rugged in terrain
with slopes 18% and above. (which falls under the exception in compulsory acquisition of CARP) The occupants
of the land were illegal settlers or (squatters) who by no means are entitled to the land as beneficiaries. Another
issue raised by the petitioners was that the DAR failed to follow the due process because instead of paying just
compensation, a trust account was made in favour of the petitioners.

ISSUES:
1. Whether these parcels of land fall within the coverage of the Compulsory Acquisition Program of the CARP?

2. Whether the petition of land conversion of the parcels of land may be granted?

RULING:
1. Art. 67 of the Water Code: Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water or overlying any
ground water may be declared by DENR as a protected area. In this case, the DENR did not declare the land as
a protected area, In the past the municipality issued a resolution that the said land is an agricultural land.

2. Although evidence of petitioners is strong, the Supreme Court opines that the area must be maintained for
watershed purposes for ecological and environmental considerations despite the 88 families who are beneficiaries
of the CARP. It is important that a larger view of the situation be taken because of the thousands of residents
downstream if the watershed will not be protected and maintained for its natural purpose.

3. Despite Supreme Court’s strong opinion of protection of watersheds as an intergenerational responsibility, they
however ordered to DARAB to conduct a re-evaluation of the case since the said land falls under exception.
Heirs of Jose Deleste
vs.
Landbank of the Philippines (June 8, 2011)

FACTS:
The spouses Gregorio Nanaman (Gregorio) and Hilaria Tabuclin (Hilaria) were the owners of a parcel of
agricultural land located in Tambo, Iligan City. Said spouses were childless, but Gregorio had a son named Virgilio
Nanaman (Virgilio) by another woman.

When Gregorio died in 1945, Hilaria and Virgilio administered the subject property and sold the subject property
to Dr. Jose Deleste (Deleste) for PhP 16,000. The deed of sale was notarized on February 17, 1954 and registered
on March 2, 1954. Also, the tax declaration in the name of Virgilio was canceled and a new tax declaration was
issued in the name of Deleste.

On May 15, 1954, Hilaria died. Gregorio’s brother, Juan Nanaman, was appointed as special administrator of the
estate of the deceased spouses. Subsequently, Edilberto Noel (Noel) was appointed as the regular administrator
of the joint estate. Noel, as the administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased spouses, filed an action against
Deleste for the reversion of title over the subject property. The decision stated that the subject property was the
conjugal property of the late spouses Gregorio and Hilaria and that the latter could only sell her one-half (1/2)
share of the subject property to Deleste. As a result, Deleste, who died in 1992, and the intestate estate of Gregorio
were held to be the co-owners of the subject property, each with a one-half (1/2) interest in it.
Thereafter, Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 was issued. This law mandates that tenanted rice and corn lands be
brought under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries. Thus, the subject
property was placed under the said program.
However, only the heirs of Gregorio were identified by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) as the
landowners. Petitioners contend that DAR failed to notify them that it is subjecting the subject property under the
coverage of the agrarian reform program; hence, their right to due process of law was violated
Eventually, on February 12, 1984, DAR issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) in favor of private respondents
who were tenants and actual cultivators of the subject property.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the e failure of the administrative body to give written notice that the property bought by the
ascendant of the petitioner is subject to PD 27 a violation of the heir’s due process.

HELD:
YES. PD 27 is a statutory notice to all owners of agricultural lands devoted to rice and/or corn production, implying
that there was no need for an actual notice. The importance of an actual notice in subjecting a property under the
agrarian reform program cannot be underrated, as non-compliance with it trods roughshod with the essential
requirements of administrative due process of law.
Since land acquisition under either Presidential Decree No. 27 and the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
govern the extraordinary method of expropriating private property, the law must be strictly construed. Faithful
compliance with legal provisions, especially those which relate to the procedure for acquisition of expropriated
lands should therefore be observed. In the instant case, no proper notice was given to Virginia A. Roa by the DAR.
Neither did the DAR conduct an ocular inspection and investigation. Hence, any act committed by the DAR or any
of its agencies that results from its failure to comply with the proper procedure for expropriation of land is a violation
of constitutional due process and should be deemed arbitrary, capricious, whimsical and tainted with grave abuse
of discretion.
In addition, DAR must have notified Deleste, being the landowner of the subject property. It should be noted that
the deed of sale executed by Hilaria in favor of Deleste was registered on March 2, 1954, and such registration
serves as a constructive notice to the whole world that the subject property was already owned by Deleste by
virtue of the said deed of sale. DAR does not have the reason to feign ignorance of the transfer of ownership over
the subject property.

Moreover, DAR should have sent the notice to Deleste, and not to the Nanamans, since the tax declaration in the
name of Virgilio was already canceled and a new one issued in the name of Deleste. Although tax declarations
are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they are nonetheless “good indicia of possession in the concept of an
owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or, at least,
constructive possession”.

Petitioners’ right to due process of law was, indeed, violated when the DAR failed to notify them that it is subjecting
the subject property under the coverage of the agrarian reform program.