PEOPLE VS.

VILLACORTE
G.R. No. L-21860

February 28, 1974

J. Fernandez

FACTS:
Benito Ching, a Chinese merchant, left his sari-sari store in the public market of Caloocan to go home, bringing with
him the proceeds of his sales of the day which were placed in a paper bag. He was accompanied by his two employees,
Libantino and Galvez, who acted as his bodyguards. On the way towards his home, Ching and his companions were
accosted by four persons. At that time, Libantino was some three or four meters in front of Ching, while Galvez was walking
directly behind the Chinese merchant.

One of the holduppers pointed a .45 cal. pistol at Ching. Another placed his left arm around the neck of Galvez,
while the third held both his arms. The first who pointed a pistol at Ching snatched from him the paper bag containing the
money. The fourth got that paper bag from the snatcher.

Ching shouted for help, crying aloud "Pedie, Pedie"; his companion Libantino turned around to respond to his employer's
call; but upon seeing the bag snatcher pointing a pistol at Ching, Libantino fled. When Ching shouted: "Pedie, Pedie," the
pistol-holder fired at him. Galvez, Ching's other companion, was able to free himself from two of the holduppers holding
him, and he too ran away. Ching fell down sprawled on the street and the four holduppers ran away. Benito Ching,
notwithstanding his wound, was able to walk, staggering towards his home. His common-law wife immediately called for a
taxicab, brought Ching to the North General Hospital in Manila where he died the following day.

The accused Villacorte, Inoferio, Yusay and Handig were charged by the lower court for robbery with homicide.
Villacorte was positively identified by prosecution witnesses Libantino and Galvez. And in an extrajudicial statement secured
from him by CIS investigators and which he signed and swore to before the Assistant Fiscal of Rizal in Pasig, Villacorte
admitted his role as mastermind of the plan to waylay Benito Ching and his having grabbed the paper bag containing the
proceeds of the sales of the sari-sari store of the Chinaman. He likewise admitted responsibility for firing the pistol that
snuffed the life of Benito Ching.

Yusay was equally identified positively by Pedro Libantino and Modesto Galvez as one of those present when
Villacorte was planning the holdup and at the time of the holdup. And in the ante mortem statement of Benito Ching made
to his wife Candida Pasion, he said that Marciano Yusay was one of those who held him up.

Handig, on the other hand, although mentioned by accused Villacorte as one of his companions in the planning
and in the execution of the robbery, prosecution witnesses Libantino and Galvez never identified him positively because of
which he was acquitted by the trial court.

With respect to the appellant Inoferio, the evidence of the prosecution to the effect that he was one of the holduppers is
weak and unconvincing.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellant should be convicted of the crime of attempted homicide?

HELD:

No. There is not that sufficient evidence to prove that he actually took part in the robbery holdup. For after taking
part in the planning, he could have desisted from taking part in the actual commission of the crime by listening to the call of
his conscience. This exempts him from criminal liability whatsoever.

The flow of events as related by Inoferio in his testimony, is so natural and convincing as to set at ease the mind
and the conscience of the Court that he was telling the truth. He denied any participation in the robbery holdup in question.
Moreover, that he did not know co-accused Villacorte and Handig at the time the crime was committed on August 27, 1959.
He came to know them only when these two were already arrested, a fact corroborated by Villacorte and Handig. Even at
the confrontation before police officers and CIS agents, Inoferio, on one hand, and his two co-accused, on the other, already
denied having known each other earlier.
 This is good a time as any to emphasize the fact that courts should not at once look with disfavor at the defense of
alibi. Although inherently weak and easily fabricated, the evidence presented by an accused in support of that defense must
be scrutinized with the same care that evidence supporting other defenses deserves. When an accused puts up the defense
of alibi, the court should not at once have a mental prejudice against him. For, taken in the light of all the evidence on record,
it may be sufficient to acquit him, as in the case of appellant Inoferio.

The accused Inoferio was acquitted.

Art.6 (Other than his own spontaneous desistance)

If the actor does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of his own spontaneous desistance, there is
no attempted felony. The law does not punish him.

Reason: It is a sort of reward granted by law to those who, having one foot on the verge of crime, heed the call of their
conscience and return to the path of righteousness. (Viada, Cod.Pen., 35-36)
ARANETA VS. CA
G.R. No. L-43527

July 3, 1990

J. Gancayco

FACTS:
The victim Manuel Esteban, Jr. and his companions Jaime Roque, Eduardo Saguil, Jesus Dizon and Charles Go
were having a drinking spree at the mezzanine floor of the Sands Kitchenette when a napkin container was thrown to their
table coming from a group of three or four persons, which included the petitioners. The victim approached the group of
petitioner Araneta, Jr. after which a heated argument ensued. Petitioner Bautista pushed the left shoulder of the victim
causing the latter to spin at which time, petitioner Araneta, Jr. fired his gun with his left hand (his right hand is atrophied),
hitting the victim, who was then in a stooping position, at the back. Having been shot, the victim drew his gun and fired
indiscriminately hitting Manuel de Guzman, a companion of petitioner Araneta, Jr. on his left thigh. The bullet which wounded
De Guzman hit the wall and ricocheted, hitting one of the accused Eden Ng along his umbilical cord. Petitioner Bautista
then held the victim who was bent forward, on his right wrist and poked a gun at him. At this point, petitioner Bautista
suddenly fired his gun hitting the chest of the victim. Roque and Saguil together with a bouncer from a nearby Soda Fountain
brought the victim to the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.

Eliseo Araneta, Jr. and Benjamin Bautista appealed their conviction to the Court of Appeals.They filed separate
petitions for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals which were consolidated per resolution of this Court
dated September 6, 1976.

Araneta raised the issue that he should be acquitted on the ground of self-defense and/or defense of stranger,
however, the indispensable requirement which is unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is not present. For unlawful
aggression to be present in self-defense, there must be an assault or at least a threatened assault of an immediate and
imminent kind on the person defending himself. In this case, there was no actual physical assault on petitioner Araneta, Jr.
or any member of his group. Neither was it shown that the victim exhibited an intimidating attitude that is offensive and
positively strong, showing the wrongful intent to cause an injury. 7 When the victim approached the group of Araneta, Jr.,
presumably to confront them as to the napkin container thrown at their table, he was not yet brandishing his gun as testified
to by the prosecution witnesses. A mere threatening attitude on the part of the victim will not constitute unlawful
aggression. If there was any unlawful aggression, it came from the group of petitioner Araneta, Jr. when Bautista pushed
the victim's shoulder after which petitioner Araneta, Jr. fired the first shot hitting the victim. It was only at this time when the
victim drew his gun and fired indiscriminately. There being no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, petitioner
cannot claim the justifying circumstance of self-defense to absolve him from criminal liability for inflicting injury
upon the victim.

ISSUE:
Should an accused who admittedly shot the victim but is shown to have inflicted only a slight wound be held
accountable for the death of the victim due to a fatal wound caused by his co-accused?

HELD:
Yes. The slight wound did not cause the death of the victim nor materially contribute to it. His liability should
therefore be limited to the slight injury he caused. However, the fact that he inflicted a gunshot wound on the victim shows
the intent to kill. The use of a gun fired at another certainly leads to no other conclusion than that there is intent to kill. He is
therefore liable for the crime of attempted homicide and not merely for slight physical injury.
The SC affirmed the CA’s decision with modification the decision of the trial court dated August 20, 1973 is
hereby AFFIRMED as to the conviction of Benjamin Bautista y Mendoza for homicide, and MODIFIED as regards Eliseo
Araneta, Jr. y Macute, who is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted homicide penalized
under Article 249 in relation with Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, and considering the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender without any other attendant circumstances , petitioner Araneta, Jr. is imposed the penalty of
imprisonment for ten (10) months of prision correccional.
PEOPLE VS. HERNANDEZ
G.R. No. L-31770

December 5, 1929

J. Avanceña

FACTS:
The offended party, Dayrit, who was living with his children in his house retired a little past midnight when he noticed
that the thatched roof of his house was on fire. He got up to fetch some water with which to extinguish the fire, when, looking
out of the window, he saw the appellant beside the house, carrying a stick (Exhibit A). Dayrit shouted for help, and started
to put out the fire, which he succeeded in doing, after a small part of the roof had burned. In answer to his cries for help,
Artemio Tanglao repaired to the place and saw the defendant running away. Daniel Mallari also came, and on his way to
the house met the defendant. The appellant knew that Miguel Dayrit and his children lived and were in the house that night.

The testimony of the offended party, corroborated by that of Artemio Tanglao and Daniel Mallari, establishes beyond
all doubt the fact that it was the appellant who set fire to the house. The stick which Miguel Dayrit saw in the appellant's
possession on that night was found leaning against the house with the end burnt and a rag soaked with petroleum dangling
from it. Daniel Mallari recognized it as the stick which the appellant used in getting guava fruits.

Prior to the crime, the appellant and the offended party, Dayrit, had some disagreements because the offended
party suspected that the appellant was stealing his paddy piled up behind his house. The offended party communicated his
suspicions to the barrio lieutenant, who, together with the complainant, went to the appellant's house, but the latter armed
with a bolo, barred their way, saying that he would cut them to pieces, and that he recognized no authority. This characteristic
violence on the part of the appellant was also shown when, in pursuance of this information, he was arrested; for he refused
to give himself up.

The trial court held that the crime committed was only frustrated arson.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime committed was frustrated arson.
HELD:
No. The crime committed was consummated arson. The SC agreed with the Attorney-General that the crime
was consummated. The appellant did in fact, set fire to the roof of the house, and said house was in fact partially burned.
With this, the crime of arson was consummated, notwithstanding the fact that the fire was afterwards extinguished, for,
once the fire has been started, the consummation of the crime of arson does not depend upon the extent of the damage
caused. This court has so held in the cases of United States vs. Go Foo Suy and Go Jancho (25 Phil., 187) and United
States vs. Po Chengco (23 Phil., 487).

The judgment appealed from is modified, and in accordance with article 549 of the Penal Code the appellant is
found guilty of the crime of arson, committed in a dwelling, knowing that within it were the offended party and his children;
and, considering one aggravating circumstance which is nighttime in the commission of the crime, the defendant is
sentenced to life imprisonment, with the accessaries, and the costs.

The appellant is an old man, about 85 years of age, and in view of this, and of the fact that the damage caused
was very slight, the Attorney-General recommends that, in pursuance of the second paragraph of article 2 of the Penal
Code, these facts be explained to the Executive, for the exercise of his clemency to such an extent as he may deem proper.
The suggestion is accepted, and it is hereby ordered that the clerk forward a copy of this decision, once it becomes final, to
the Governor-General for consideration.
PEOPLE VS. GERONIMO
G.R. No. L-35700

October 15, 1973

J. Esguerra

FACTS:
Accused-appellants Enrico Geronimo, Romeo Geronimo and Jose Geronimo, and the deceased, Fermin
Magbanua, arrived from the market place of Sigma, Capiz, already drunk and stopped at the store of one Fesertas
Bacalangco to buy ten liters of tuba. After drinking, Fermin Magbanua and the accused started to go home, but after having
gone several meters away from the store of Fesertas Bacalangco, Fermin Magbanua was hit on the face by a sling shot
wielded by one Eleodoro Carlos. Fermin fell to the ground and Romeo Geronimo ran to where he had fallen and held him,
while Jose Geronimo went around and hit Fermin on the head with a stone, rendering him unconscious. While Fermin was
held unconscious by Romeo, Enrico Geronimo took Fermin's bolo from his waist and hacked the latter on the right ankle
joint and Jose also boloed his left ankle joint, almost severing it. Fermin Magbanua died as a result of his wounds.

They were charged before the CFI-Capiz with murder and upon arraignment, Enrico pleaded GUILTY to the
charge but he manifested that he ALONE inflicted the injuries of the deceased. The case for the prosecution rests mainly
on the testimony of Bonifacio Bacalangco and Teresita Delfin and on the ante-mortem declaration of the deceased.
The CFI convicted the accused Romeo and Jose with murder after the hearing and sentenced them with the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA. Hence, the present appeal of Romeo and Jose Geronimo claiming that the lower court erred in
convicting them by holding that they conspired with Enrico in killing the deceased.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in holding that Jose and Romeo Geronimo conspired with Enrico in killing
the deceased.

HELD:
Yes. There is no conspiracy. It has been laid down as a rule that when the defendants by their acts aimed at the
same object, one performing one part and another performing another part so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment
of the same object, and their acts, though apparently independent were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating
closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments, the court will be justified in concluding
that said defendants were engaged in a conspiracy (People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 64, 66; People vs. Carbonell, 48 Phil.
868). When conspiracy has been proven, all conspirators are liable as co-principals for the wrongful act and its
consequences (U. S. vs. Bundal, 3 Phil. 89; People vs. Villamora, 47 O.G. 6180).

However, on the case at hand, the prosecution’s witness Bacalangco exculpated Romeo when he testified that the
persons who boloed Fermin were Enrico and Jose only. The evidence clearly shows that Romeo did not participate in the
killing.

It should be noted that all the accused and the victim were drinking together in a tuba store on the day of the
incident. No other evidence was presented by the prosecution to show conspiracy which according to the settled rule, must
be proved as clearly and as convincingly as the commission of the crime itself. It must be real and not presumptive. In the
absence of clear proof that the killing was in fact envisaged by them, and there being no satisfactory showing that the killing
was done in furtherance of the conspiracy, they cannot be held responsible therefor (People vs. Basisten, 47 Phil. 493;
People vs. Cerdenia, 51 Phil. 393; People vs. Carillo, 85 Phil. 611; People vs. Daligdig, 89 Phil. 598).

In People vs. Portugueza7 We ruled that:

Although the defendants are relatives and had acted with some degree of simultaneity in attacking their victim,
nevertheless, this fact alone does not prove conspiracy (People vs. Caayao, 48 O. G. 637).
PEOPLE VS. CLEMENTE
G.R. No. L-23463

September 28, 1967

J. Reyes, J.B.L.

FACTS:
Three Clemente brothers were formally charged before the CFI-Samar of the crime of murder.
That on or about the 5th day of February, 1962, in the afternoon, in Bo. San Miguel, Lavezares Samar, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, armed with a bolo and knives locally known as
"kinogon", conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, evident premeditation
and treachery and taking advantage of their superior strength and number, and without any justifiable motive at all, did,
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, chase, stab and wound one Reyes Matnog,
a barrio lieutenant of Bo. MacArthur, Lavezares, Samar, with said weapons, which the herein accused had then at hand,
thereby inflicting upon said Reyes Matnog several grave wounds on the different parts of his body, which wounds directly
caused the death of the latter.

Upon arraignment, the three accused pleaded NOT GUILTY.

ISSUE:
HELD:
PEOPLE VS. OBILLO
G.R. No.139323

June 6, 2001

J. Gonzaga-Reyes

FACTS: