Cariño vs Cariño

GR No. 102569, Feb 2, 2001

Facts:

In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Cariño married Susan Nicdao Cariño. He had 2 children with
her. In 1992, SPO4 contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee Cariño. In
1988, prior to his second marriage, SPO4 is already bedridden and he was under the
care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13 days after his marriage with Yee. Thereafter, the
spouses went on to claim the benefits of SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a total of
P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect a total of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an
action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the
P140k. Yee admitted that her marriage with SPO4 was solemnized during the
subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but the said marriage between
Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a valid marriage license as
certified by the local civil registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found out about the
previous marriage on SPO4’s funeral.

ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim
presumptive legitimes.

HELD: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a
valid marriage license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void
for the same has been solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the
marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected
marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but
not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter,
the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties
thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said
marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances,
evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be
limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage
void.

The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman for
their marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Wages
and salaries earned by each party shall belong to him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of
FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their
marriage is likewise void. This is because the two were capacitated to marry each
other for there were no impediments but their marriage was void due to the lack of a
marriage license; in their situation, their property relations is governed by Art 147 of
the FC which provides that everything they earned during their cohabitation is
presumed to have been equally contributed by each party – this includes salaries and
wages earned by each party notwithstanding the fact that the other may not have
contributed at all.

Republic vs CA and Castro

GR No. 103047, September 12, 1994

FACTS:

Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with Edwin
Cardenas. They did not immediately live together and it was only upon Castro found
out that she was pregnant that they decided to live together wherein the said
cohabitation lasted for only 4 months. Thereafter, they parted ways and Castro gave
birth that was adopted by her brother with the consent of Cardenas.

The baby was brought in the US and in Castro’s earnest desire to follow her daughter
wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving for US. She filed a petition
seeking a declaration for the nullity of her marriage. Her lawyer then found out that
there was no marriage license issued prior to the celebration of their marriage proven
by the certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig.

ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to by

Castro is sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued to the parties prior
to the solemnization of their marriage.
HELD:

The court affirmed the decision of CA that the certification issued by the Civil
Registrar unaccompanied by any circumstances of suspicion sufficiently prove that
the office did not issue a marriage license to the contracting parties. Albeit the fact
that the testimony of Castro is not supported by any other witnesses is not a ground
to deny her petition because of the peculiar circumstances of her case. Furthermore,
Cardenas was duly served with notice of the proceedings, which he chose to ignore.

Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence
presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the
subject marriage license.

Eugenio v. J. Velez
GR No. 85140, May 17, 1990

Case Doctrine:

● Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not
legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent
themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband
and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally married in
common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines

Facts: Vitaliana Vargas’ brothers and sisters unaware of the former’s death on August
28, 1988 filed a petition for Habeas Corpus on September 27, 1988 before the RTC of
Misamis Oriental alleging that she was forcible taken from her residence sometime in
1987 and was confined by the herein petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his palacial
residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental.

The respondent court in an order dated 28 September 1988 issued the writ of habeas
corpus, but the writ was returned unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to surrender the
body of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to the respondent sheriff,
reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject of habeas corpus proceedings; besides,
according to petitioner, he had already obtained a burial permit. Petitioner claims
that as her common law husband, he has legal custody of her body.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody of the deceased.

Held: The custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to the
surviving brothers and sisters. Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code which
provides:

“Persons charged with duty of burial - if the deceased was an unmarried man or
woman or a child and left any kin; the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the
nearest kin of the deceased.

Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not
legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent
themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband
and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally married in
common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.

While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships
are present in our society, and that they produce a community of properties and
interests which is governed by law, authority exists in case law to the effect that such
form of co-ownership requires that the man and woman living together must not in
any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. In any case, herein petitioner has a
subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him
from even legally marrying Vitaliana.(Eugenio vs Velez, G.R. No. 85140, May 17,
1990).

Republic of the Philippines

 SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 116607 April 10, 1996

EMILIO R. TUASON, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA VICTORIA L. TUASON, respondents.

PUNO, J.:p

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision dated
July 29, 1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37925 denying petitioner's
appeal from an order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati in Civil Case No.
3769.

This case arose from the following facts:

In 1989, private respondent Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 149, Makati a petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of her
marriage to petitioner Emilio R. Tuason. In her complaint, private respondent alleged
that she and petitioner were married on June 3, 1972 and from this union, begot two
children; that at the time of the marriage, petitioner was already psychologically
incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations which became manifest
afterward and resulted in violent fights between husband and wife; that in one of
their fights, petitioner inflicted physical injuries on private respondent which impelled
her to file a criminal case for physical injuries against him; that petitioner used
prohibited drugs, was apprehended by the authorities and sentenced to a one-year
suspended penalty and has not been rehabilitated; that petitioner was a womanizer,
and in 1984, he left the conjugal home and cohabited with three women in
succession, one of whom he presented to the public as his wife; that after he left the
conjugal dwelling, petitioner gave minimal support to the family and even refused to
pay for the tuition fees of their children compelling private respondent to accept
donations and dole-outs from her family and friends; that petitioner likewise became
a spendthrift and abused his administration of the conjugal partnership by alienating
some of their assets and incurring large obligations with banks, credit card companies
and other financial institutions, without private respondent's consent; that attempts
at reconciliation were made but they all failed because of petitioner's refusal to
reform. In addition to her prayer for annulment of marriage, private respondent
prayed for powers of administration to save the conjugal properties from further
dissipation.1

Petitioner answered denying the imputations against him. As affirmative defense, he

claimed that he and private respondent were a normal married couple during the first
ten years of their marriage and actually begot two children during this period; that it
was only in 1982 that they began to have serious personal differences when his wife
did not accord the respect and dignity due him as a husband but treated him like a
persona non grata; that due to the "extreme animosities " between them, he
temporarily left the conjugal home for a "cooling-off period" in 1984; that it is private
respondent who had been taking prohibited drugs and had a serious affair with
another man; that petitioner's work as owner and operator of a radio and television
station exposed him to malicious gossip linking him to various women in media and
the entertainment world; and that since 1984, he experienced financial reverses in his
business and was compelled, with the knowledge of his wife, to dispose of some of
the conjugal shares in exclusive golf and country clubs. Petitioner petitioned the court
to allow him to return to the conjugal home and continue his administration of the
conjugal partnership.

After the issues were joined, trial commenced on March 30, 1990. Private respondent
presented four witnesses, namely, herself; Dr. Samuel Wiley, a Canon Law expert and
marriage counselor of both private respondent and petitioner; Ms. Adelita Prieto, a
close friend of the spouses, and Atty. Jose F. Racela IV, private respondent's counsel.
Private respondent likewise submitted documentary evidence consisting of
newspaper articles of her husband's relationship with other women, his apprehension
by the authorities for illegal possession of drugs; and copies of a prior a church
annulment decree.2 The parties' marriage was clerically annulled by the Tribunal
Metropolitanum Matrimonial which was affirmed by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal in 1986.3
During presentation of private respondent's evidence, petitioner, on April 18, 1990,
filed his Opposition to private respondent's petition for appointment as administratrix
of the conjugal partnership of gains.

After private respondent rested her case, the trial court scheduled the reception of
petitioner's evidence on May 11, 1990.

On May 8, 1990, two days before the scheduled hearing , a counsel for petitioner
moved for a postponement on the ground that the principal counsel was out of the
country and due to return on the first week of June.4 The court granted the motion
and reset the hearing to June 8, 1990.5

On June 8, 1990, petitioner failed to appear. On oral motion of private respondent,

the court declared petitioner to have waived his right to present evidence and
deemed the case submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence presented.

On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of private
respondent's marriage to petitioner and awarding custody of the children to private
respondent. The court ruled:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the marriage contracted by Ma. Victoria L.

Tuason and Emilio R. Tuason on June 3, 1972 is declared null and void ab initio on the
ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the defendant under Sec. 36 of the
Family Code. Let herein judgment of annulment be recorded in the registry of
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila where the marriage was contracted and in the registry
of Makati, Metro Manila where the marriage is annulled.

The custody of the two (2) legitimate children of the plaintiff and the defendant is
hereby awarded to the plaintiff.

The foregoing judgment is without prejudice to the application of the other effects of
annulment as provided for under Arts . 50 and 51 of the Family Code of the
Philippines.6
Counsel for petitioner received a copy of this decision on August 24, 1990. No appeal
was taken from the decision.

On September 24, 1990, private respondent filed a "Motion for Dissolution of

Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal
Properties."7 Petitioner opposed the motion on October 17, 1990.8

Also on the same day, October 17, 1990, petitioner, through new counsel, filed with
the trial court a petition for relief from judgment of the June 29, 1990 decision.

The trial court denied the petition on August 8, 1991.9

Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals the order of the trial court denying
his petition for relief from judgment. On July 29, 1994, the Court of Appeals dismissed
the appeal and affirmed the order of the trial court. 10

Hence this petition.

The threshold issue is whether a petition for relief from judgment is warranted under
the circumstances of the case.

We rule in the negative.

A petition for relief from judgment is governed by Rule 38, Section 2 of the Revised
Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 2. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from judgment or other
proceeding thereof. — When a judgment or order is entered, or any other proceeding
is taken, against a party in a Court of First Instance through fraud, accident, mistake,
or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same cause
praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.

Under the rules, a final and executory judgment or order of the Regional Trial Court
may be set aside on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence.
In addition, the petitioner must assert facts showing that he has a good, substantial
and meritorious defense or cause of action. 11 If the petition is granted, the court
shall proceed to hear and determine the case as if a timely motion for new trial had
been granted therein. 12

In the case at bar, the decision annulling petitioner's marriage to private respondent
had already become final and executory when petitioner failed to appeal during the
reglementary period. Petitioner however claims that the decision of the trial court
was null and void for violation of his right to due process. He contends he was denied
due process when, after failing to appear on two scheduled hearings, the trial court
deemed him to have waived his right to present evidence and rendered judgment on
the basis of the evidence for private respondent. Petitioner justifies his absence at the
hearings on the ground that he was then "confined for medical and/or rehabilitation
reason." 13 In his affidavit of merit before the trial court, he attached a certification
by Lt. Col. Plaridel F. Vidal, Director of the Narcotics Command, Drug Rehabilitation
Center which states that on March 27, 1990 petitioner was admitted for treatment of
drug dependency at the Drug Rehabilitation Center at Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan,
Taguig, Metro Manila of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police. 14
The records, however, show that the former counsel of petitioner did not inform the
trial court of this confinement. And when the court rendered its decision, the same
counsel was out of the country for which reason the decision became final and
executory as no appeal was taken therefrom. 15

The failure of petitioner's counsel to notify him on time of the adverse judgment to
enable him to appeal therefrom is negligence which is not excusable. Notice sent to
counsel of record is binding upon the client and the neglect or failure of counsel to
inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a
ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face. 16

Similarly inexcusable was the failure of his former counsel to inform the trial court of
petitioner's confinement and medical treatment as the reason for his non-appearance
at the scheduled hearings. Petitioner has not given any reason why his former counsel,
intentionally or unintentionally, did not inform the court of this fact. This led the trial
court to order the case deemed submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence
presented by the private respondent alone. To compound the negligence of
petitioner's counsel, the order of the trial court was never assailed via a motion for
reconsideration.

Clearly, petitioner cannot now claim that he was deprived of due process. He may
have lost his right to present evidence but he was not denied his day in court. As the
record show, petitioner, through counsel, actively participated in the proceedings
below. He filed his answer to the petition, cross-examined private respondent's
witnesses and even submitted his opposition to private respondent's motion for
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains. 17

A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed only in

exception cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party
has another remedy available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy
available to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an
adverse decision of the trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and
he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing
such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition. 18 Indeed,
relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the
judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence;
otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had
been lost thru inexcusable negligence. 19

Petitioner also insists that he has a valid and meritorious defense. He cites the Family
Code which provides that in actions for annulment of marriage or legal separation,
the prosecuting officer should intervene for the state because the law "looks with
disfavor upon the haphazard declaration of annulment of marriages by default." He
contends that when he failed to appear at the scheduled hearings, the trial court
should have ordered the prosecuting officer to intervene for the state and inquire as
to the reason for his non-appearance. 20

Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code read as follows:

Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the
Court shall order the prosecution attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf
of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care
that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon
a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.

xxx xxx xxx

Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a
confession of judgment.

In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to
take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. 21

A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the

danger of collusion. 22 Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of
marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear
on behalf of the state for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties
and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant
spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default
but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists
between the parties.23 The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application
for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in
his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.24 Our Constitution is
committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. 25
Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social
institution in which the state is vitally interested. The state can find no stronger
anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break up of families weakens our
social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the
family members.

The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles 48 and 60 of
the Family Code. For one, petitioner was not declared in default by the trial court for
failure to answer. Petitioner filed his answer to the complaint and contested the
cause of action alleged by private respondent. He actively participated in the
proceedings below by filing several pleadings and cross-examining the witnesses of
private respondent. It is crystal clear that every stage of the litigation was
characterized by a no-holds barred contest and not by collusion.

The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal
separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties
and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner's
vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that
collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation by the petitioner that
evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these
circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney
to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity
of the proceedings in the trial court.

Petitioner also refutes the testimonies of private respondent's witnesses, particularly

Dr. Samuel Wiley and Ms. Adelita Prieto, as biased, incredible and hearsay. Petitioner
alleges that if he were able to present his evidence, he could have testified that he
was not psychologically incapacitated at the time of the marriage as indicated by the
fact that during their first ten years, he and private respondent lived together with
their children as one normal and happy family, that he continued supporting his
family even after he left the conjugal dwelling and that his work as owner and
operator of a radio and television corporation places him in the public eye and makes
him a good subject for malicious gossip linking him with various women. These facts,
according to petitioner, should disprove the ground for annulment of his marriage to
petitioner.

Suffice it to state that the finding of the trial court as to the existence or
non-existence of petitioner's psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage is
final and binding on us. 26 Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that the trial court's
factual findings and evaluation of the testimonies of private respondent's witnesses
vis-a-vis petitioner's defenses are clearly and manifestly erroneous. 27

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied and the decision dated July 29, 1994 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37925 is affirmed.

Regalado, Romero and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Torres, Jr., J., is on leave.

PEOPLE V. JANSSEN

FACTS: On December 26, 1928, Pedro N. Cerdeña and Juana S. del Rosario appeared
before Reverend Father H. Janssen, a Catholic parish priest of the municipality of San
Jose, Antique, to have their names inscribed in the marriage registry, which was done.
On
December 30, 1928, the banns were published in his parish in San Jose, Antique.
As the classes opened on January 7, 1929, the contracting parties asked the
defendant-appellant to marry them before that date. Upon petition of the
defendant-appellant, the Bishop of Jaro issued the following dispensation on
December 29, 1928 authorizing the solemnization of the marriage as long as there are
no legal impediments to the marriage. On January 4, 1929, the municipal secretary of
San Jose, Antique, gave the authority to solemnize marriage. By virtue of the
above-quoted dispensation, and in view of said authority of the municipal secretary of
San Jose, Antique, the defendant-appellant on January 6, 1929, solemnized the
marriage of Pedro N. Cerdeña to Juana S. del Rosario

ISSUE:Whether or not appellant violated violated section 2 of Act No. 3412,

HELD:The law does not impose upon priests or ministers of religion the duty In
holding that it is the duty of the accused to inquiring into and determining the
residence of the contracting parties before solemnizing marriage. It is sufficient to
know that the license has been issued by a competent official, and it may be
presumed from the issuance of said license that said official has complied with his
duty of ascertaining whether the woman who desires to get married resides
habitually in his municipality.

Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold, that when a marriage is solemnized by a

church, sect, or religion whose rules and practices require proclamation or publicity, it
is not necessary that said proclamation be made during ten days, unless said rules or
practices so require.