TORTS AND DAMAGES ©
Atty. Jess Zachael Espejo | Ateneo de Davao University | Uno Manresa & Friends Case Pool | 2014 to 2015
FIRST BATCH OF CASES
Quasi-delicts or Article 2176
DRA. LEILA A. DELA LLANA vs. REBECCA BIONG, doing
business under the name and style of PONGKAY
TRADING | G.R. No. 182356 | December 04, 2013 |
Harun
 On March 30, 2000, Juan Dela Llana was driving along with
his sister Dra. Dela Llana who was seated at the front
passenger seat. When the signal light turned red, the car
halted and a few seconds after, a dump truck driven by Joel
Primero , rammed into the car's rear end violently pushing
the car forward
 As a result of the impact, the glass was shattered puncturing
Dra Dela Llana. Apart from these minor injuries, no other
visible physical injuries were found on her.
 The driver was found to be recklessly imprudent in driving
the truck. Joel later revealed that his employer was Rebecca
Biong.
 Thereafter, Dra Dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate
pain on the left side of her neck and shoulder and as a
result, her health deteriorated.
 She then consulted several doctors and found that she
suffered a whiplash injury, an injury caused by the
compression of the nerve running to her left arm and hand.
She underwent 3 months of extensive therapy, but it did not
improve her condition. After several consultations, she
underwent a cervical spine surgery which released the
impingement of the nerve but it incapacitated Dra Dela Llana
from the practice of her profession despite the surgery.
 Dra Dela Llana then demanded from Rebecca Biong, the
employer of the dump truck, a compensation for her injuries
but the latter refused to pay. As a result, Dra Dela Llana
sued Rebecca for damages.
Dela Llana's contention: She alleges that she lost the mobility of
her arm as a result of the vehicular accident and claimed
150,000 for her medical expenses; that Joel's reckless driving (or
negligent act) was the proximate cause of her whiplash injury.
Rebecca's contention: She asserted that Dela Llana was in
physical good condition when they met after the vehicular
accident; that she exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of the driver, Joel.
RTC: ruled in favor of Dela Llana. It held that the injury suffered
by Dela Lllana was due to Joel's reckless driving. It further held
that Joel's negligence gave rise to a presumption that Rebecca
Biong did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family
in the supervision and selection of Joel.
CA: Reversed. It held that Dela Llana failed to establish by
preponderance of evidence the connection between the accident
and her whiplash injury.
ISSUE: WON Joel's reckless driving is the proximate cause of
Dra dela Llana's whiplash injury. NO.
RULING:
Dra Dela Llana failed to establish that the proximate causation of
her whiplash injury was the vehicular accident.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that "whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being fault of
negligence, is obliged to pat for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, IF THERE IS NO PRE EXISTING CONTRACTUAL
RELATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES, is a quasi delict. Under this
provision, the elements are:
1. Damages to the plaintiff
2. Negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or
by some other person for whose acts the defendant
must respond, was guilty
3. The connection of cause and effect between
such negligence and the damages.
Based on these requisites, Dela Llana must first establish by
preponderance of evidence the 3 elements before the
determination of Rebecca's liability as Joel's employer. Only after
the presentation of evidences can the presumption that Rebecca
did not exercise the diligence required for the selection and
supervision of Joel.
Under Article 2176 in relation to 2180, an action predicated on
an employee's act or omission may be instituted against the
employer who is held liable for the negligent act or omission by
his employee.
On the burden of proof ̶
In this case, the burden of proving the proximate causation
between Joel's negligence and Dra dela Llana's injury rests on
Dra Dela Llana which she failed to adduce the factum probans or
the evidentiary facts by which the factum probandum or ultimate
fact can be established.
The Court did not give credence to the pictures and the medical
certificate presented by Dra Dela Llana as the former only
demonstrated the impact of the collision while the latter was not
admitted in evidence (for failure to present the doctor, as an
expert witness, who issued the med cert). (Assuming if the med
cert was considered, still it has no probative value for being
hearsay). Moreover the medical certificate did not categorically
state that the whiplash injury was the result of the vehicular
accident.
Lastly, since Dra Dela Llana failed to present and testimonial and
documentary evidence that directly shows the causal relation
between the accident and her injury, the Court pointed that it
cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause
whiplash injuries.
Hence, the Court denied her petition for lack of merit.
SMITH BELL DODWELL SHIPPING AGENCY vs. CATALINO
BORJA, INTL TOWAGE AND TRANSPORT CORPORATION
| G.R. No. 143008 | June 10, 2002 | Andoy
FACTS: On September 23, 1987, Petitioner Smith Bell filed a
written request with the Bureau of Customs for the attendance of
the latter’s inspection team on vessel M/T King Family which
was due to arrive at the port of Manila on September 24, 1987.
The vessel contained 750 metric tons of alkyl benzene and
methyl methacrylate monomer. On the same day, Supervising
Customs Inspector Manuel Ma. D. Nalgan instructed
Respondent Catalino Borja to board said vessel and perform
his duties as customs inspector upon the vessel’s arrival until its
departure.
At about 11 o’clock in the morning on September 24, 1987, while
M/T King Family was unloading chemicals unto two (2) barges
ITTC 101 and CLC-1002 owned by Respondent
International Towage and Transport Corporation (ITTC),
a sudden explosion occurred setting the vessels afire. Upon
hearing the explosion, Borja who was at that time inside the
cabin preparing reports, ran outside to check what happened.
Again, another explosion was heard. He hurriedly jumped over
board to save himself. However, the water was likewise on fire
due mainly to the spilled chemicals. Despite the tremendous
heat, he swam his way for one hour until he was rescued by the
people living in the squatters’ area and sent to San Juan De Dios
Hospital. After weeks of intensive care at the hospital, his
attending physician diagnosed him to be permanently disabled
due to the incident. Thus, he made demands against Smith Bell
and ITTC for the damages caused by the explosion. However,
both denied liabilities and attributed to each other negligence.
RTC ruled in favor of Borja and held petitioner liable for damages
and loss of income. CA affirmed the decision of RTC. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Smith Bell is liable for Borja’s injuries.
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled YES. Both the RTC and the
CA ruled that the fire and the explosion had originated in
petitioner’s vessel as supported by substantial evidence.
 TORTS AND DAMAGES ©
Atty. Jess Zachael Espejo | Ateneo de Davao University | Uno Manresa & Friends Case Pool | 2014 to 2015
Negligence is conduct that creates undue risk of harm to
another. It is the failure to observe that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand,
whereby that other person suffers injury. Petitioner’s vessel was
carrying chemical cargo -- alkyl benzene and methyl
methacrylate monomer. While knowing that their vessel was
carrying dangerous inflammable chemicals, its officers and crew
failed to take all the necessary precautions to prevent an
accident. Petitioner Smith Bell was, therefore, negligent.
The three elements of quasi-delict are: (GUIDE QUESTION
#4)
(a) Damages suffered by the plaintiff,
(b) Fault or negligence of the defendant, and
(c) The connection of cause and effect between the
fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages
inflicted on the plaintiff
All these elements were established. Knowing fully well that it
was carrying dangerous chemicals, petitioner was negligent in
not taking all the necessary precautions in transporting the
cargo. As a result of the fire and the explosion during the
unloading of the chemicals from petitioner’s vessel, Respondent
Borja suffered damages and injuries. Hence, the owner or the
person in possession and control of a vessel and the
vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damage
caused to persons and property by reason of negligent
management or navigation.
As to amount of liability, the Court uses the American
Experience/Expectancy Table of Mortality which consistently pegs
the life span of the average Filipino at 80 years, from which it
extrapolates the estimated income to be earned by the deceased
had he or she not been killed. For purposes of determining loss
of earning capacity, life expectancy remains at 80. Otherwise, the
computation of loss of earning capacity will never become final,
being always subject to the eventuality of the victim’s death. The
computation should not change even if Borja lived beyond 80
years.
Based on the foregoing discussion, the award for loss of earning
capacity should be computed as follows:
The formula for the computation of loss of earning capacity is as
follows:
Net earning capacity = Life expectancy x [Gross Annual Income
- Living Expenses (50% of gross annual income)], where life
expectancy = 2/3 (80 - the age of the deceased).
Loss of earning = [2 (80-50)] x [(P2,752x12)-16,512]
capacity 3 Being the operator of taxicab, Abiad would wake up early and
= P330,240
Hence, Petitioner is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim
damages in the amount of P320,240 as loss of earning capacity,
moral damages in the amount of P100,000, plus another P50,000
as attorney’s fees.
THE HEIRS OF REDENTOR COMPLETO and ELPIDIO
ABIAD, vs. SGT. AMANDO C. ALBAYDA, JR. | Astillo
FACTS: Respondent Amando C. Albayda, Jr. (Albayda) is a
Master Sergeant of the Philippine Air Force. Petitioner Redentor
Completo (Completo) was the taxi driver of a Toyota Corolla,
owned and operated by co-petitioner Elpidio Abiad (Abiad).
Albayda and Completo figured in an accident along the
intersection of 8th and 11th Streets, VAB. Albayda filed a
complaint for damages before the RTC of Pasay City.
The amended complaint alleged that, on August 27, 1997, while
Albayda was on his way to the office to report for duty, riding a
bicycle along 11th Street, the taxi driven by Completo bumped
and sideswiped him, causing serious physical injuries. Albayda
was brought to the Philippine Air Force General Hospital (PAFGH)
inside VAB. However, he was immediately transferred to the
Armed Forces of the Philippines Medical Center (AFPMC) because
there was a fracture in his left knee and there was no orthopedic
doctor available at PAFGH.
Albayda filed a complaint for physical injuries through
reckless imprudence. On the other hand, Completo filed a
counter-charge of damage to property through reckless
imprudence against Albayda.
Albayda alleged that the proximate cause of the incident which
necessitated his stay in the hospital for approximately 7 months
was the negligence of Completo who, at the time of the accident,
was in the employ of Abiad. The pain he suffered required him to
undergo medical physiotherapy for a number of years to regain
normality of his left knee joint, and he claimed that he incurred
actual damages totaling P276,550.00, inclusive of his anticipated
operations.
He further stated that aggravating the physical sufferings, mental
anguish, frights, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation resulting
from his injuries, his wife abandoned him in May 1998, and left
their children in his custody. He thus demanded the amount of
P600,000.00 as moral damages. He likewise asked for exemplary
damages in the amount of P200,000.00 and attorney’s fees of
P25,000.00, plus P1,000.00 per court appearance.
Completo alleged that, on August 27, 1997, he was carefully
driving the taxicab along 8th Street, VAB, when suddenly he
heard a strange sound from the rear right side of the taxicab.
When he stopped to investigate, he found Albayda lying on the
road and holding his left leg. He immediately rendered assistance
and brought Albayda to PAFGH for emergency treatment.
Completo also asserted that he follows traffic rules and
regulations and travelling at 20 KM per hour even before
reaching the intersection of 8th and 11th Streets. In contrast,
Albayda rode his bicycle at a very high speed, causing him to
suddenly lose control of the bicycle and hit the rear door on the
right side of the taxicab. The deep indentation on the rear right
door of the taxicab was caused by the impact of Albayda’s body
that hit the taxicab after he had lost control of the bicycle; while
the slight indentation on the right front door of the taxicab was
caused by the impact of the bike that hit the taxicab after
Albayda let go of its handles when he had lost control of it.
On the otherhand, Abiad testified that, aside from being a
soldier, he was also a franchise holder of taxicabs and passenger
jeepneys. When Completo applied as a driver of the taxicab,
Abiad required the former to show his bio-data, NBI clearance,
and driver’s license. Completo never figured in a vehicular
accident since the time he was employed in February 1997.
Abiad averred that Completo was a good driver and a good man.
personally check all the taxicabs.
RTC and CA rendered favorable decision to respondent.
ISSUES
1) WON Completo caused the collision.
2) WON Abiad failed observe diligence of a good father of
the family.
3) WON the award of moral and temperate damages and
attorney’s fees to Albayda had basis.
(GUIDE QUESTION #10: Who bears the burden of
proving negligence?)
RATIO:
1) YES!
The instant case involved a collision between a taxicab and a
bicycle which resulted in serious physical injuries to the bicycle
rider, Albayda. It is a rule in negligence suits that the
PLAINTIFF has the burden of proving by a preponderance
of evidence the motorist’s breach in his duty of care
owed to the plaintiff, that the motorist was negligent in
failing to exercise the diligence required to avoid injury
to the plaintiff, and that such negligence was the
proximate cause of the injury suffered.
 TORTS AND DAMAGES ©
Atty. Jess Zachael Espejo | Ateneo de Davao University | Uno Manresa & Friends Case Pool | 2014 to 2015

Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict. In this regard, the question of
the motorist's negligence is a question of fact.
It was proven by a preponderance of evidence that Completo
failed to exercise reasonable diligence in driving the taxicab
because he was over-speeding at the time he hit the bicycle
ridden by Albayda. Such negligence was the sole and proximate
cause of the serious physical injuries sustained by Albayda.
Completo did not slow down even when he approached the
intersection of 8th and 11th Streets of VAB. It was also proven
that Albayda had the right of way, considering that he reached
the intersection ahead of Completo.
It is obvious that a motor vehicle poses a greater danger of harm
to a bicyclist than vice versa. Accordingly, while the duty of using
reasonable care falls alike on a motorist and a bicyclist, due to
the inherent differences in the two vehicles, more care is
required from the motorist to fully discharge the duty than from
the bicyclist. The physical advantages that the motor vehicle has
over the bicycle make it more dangerous to the bicyclist than
vice versa.
2) YES!
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the obligation imposed
by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own
acts or omissions, but also for those persons for whom
one is responsible. Employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees, but the employers’ responsibility
shall cease upon proof that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection
and supervision of their employees.
When an injury is caused by the negligence of an
employee, a legal presumption instantly arises that the
employer was negligent. This presumption may be rebutted
only by a clear showing on the part of the employer that he
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of his employee. If the employer
successfully overcomes the legal presumption of negligence, he
is relieved of liability. In other words, the burden of proof is on
the employer.
The trial court’s finding that Completo failed to exercise
reasonable care to avoid collision with Albayda at the intersection
of 11th and 8th Streets of VAB gives rise to liability on the part of
Completo, as driver, and his employer Abiad. The responsibility
of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary.
The civil liability of the employer for the negligent acts of his
employee is also primary and direct, owing to his own negligence
in selecting and supervising his employee. The civil liability of the
employer attaches even if the employer is not inside the vehicle
at the time of the collision.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are
required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience,
and service records. On the other hand, with respect to the
supervision of employees, employers should formulate standard
operating procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose
disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. To establish these
factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious liability,
employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary
evidence.
Abiad testified that before he hired Completo, he required the
latter to show his bio-data, NBI clearance, and driver’s license.
Abiad likewise stressed that Completo was never involved in a
vehicular accident prior to the instant case, and that, as operator
of the taxicab, he would wake up early to personally check the
condition of the vehicle before it is used. The protestation of
Abiad to escape liability is short of the diligence required under
the law. Abiad’s evidence consisted entirely of testimonial
evidence, and the unsubstantiated and self-serving testimony of
Abiad was insufficient to overcome the legal presumption that he
was negligent in the selection and supervision of his driver.
3) YES!
The CA rightfully deleted the award of actual damages by the
RTC because Albayda failed to present documentary evidence to
establish with certainty the amount that he incurred during his
hospitalization and treatment for the injuries he suffered.
While the amount of actual damages was not duly established
with certainty, the Court recognizes the fact that, indeed,
Albayda incurred a considerable amount for the necessary and
reasonable medical expenses, loss of salary and wages, loss of
capacity to earn increased wages, cost of occupational therapy,
and harm from conditions caused by prolonged immobilization.
Thus, the Court finds the award of P100,000.00 as temperate
damages reasonable under the circumstances. [Temperate] is
more than nominal but less than compensatory damages,
recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has
been suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty.
Doubtless, Albayda suffered immeasurable pain because of the
incident caused by petitioners’ negligence.
Moral damages are awarded in quasi-delicts causing physical
injuries. The permanent deformity and the scar left by the
wounds suffered by Albayba will forever be a reminder of the
pain and suffering that he had endured and continues to endure
because of petitioners’ negligence. Thus, the award of moral
damages in the amount of P500,000.00 is proper. The award of
attorney’s fees is hereby deleted for failure to prove that
petitioners acted in bad faith in refusing to satisfy respondent’s
just and valid claim.
Ilocos Norte vs. CA | Dela Cruz
On June of 1967, typhoon Gening buffeted the province of Ilocos
Norte with strong winds and heavy rains. After the storm, Isabel
Lao Juan ventured out of the house (located at Guerrero St.) to
check the status of her business properties (grocery stores).
Wading on waist-deep flood, she was followed by her employees
who walked side by side at a distance behind Isabel. Suddenly,
Isabel screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the water. The two
employees attempted to help, but fear dissuaded them from
doing so because on the spot where the deceased sank they saw
an electric wire dangling from a post and moving in
snake-like fashion in the water. The two shouted for help
and Ernesto dela Cruz tried to rescue Isabel but he turned back
and said that the water is grounded. When Antonio Yabes was
informed by Ernesto that his mother-in law had been
electrocuted, he passed by the City Hall of Laoag to request the
police to ask the people of Ilocos Norte Electric Company
(INELCO) to cut off the electric current.
In another place, on that fateful date, Engr. Juan, Power Plant
Engineer of the NAPOCOR at the Laoag Diesel-Electric Plant,
noticed certain fluctuations in their electric meter which indicated
such abnormalities as grounded or short-circuited lines. He saw
grounded and disconnected lines. Electric lines were hanging
from the posts to the ground. Since he could not see any INELCO
lineman, he decided to go to the INELCO Office. As he turned
right at the intersection of Guerrero and Rizal, he saw an electric
wire about 30 meters long strung across the street "and the
other end was seeming to play with the current of the water."
INELCO asserts that on and even before June 29, 1967 the
electric service system of the INELCO in the whole franchise
area, including Guerrero Street, did not suffer from any defect
that might constitute a hazard to life and property. The service
lines, devices and other INELCO equipment had been newly-
installed prior to the date in question. As a public service
operator and in line with its business of supplying electric current
to the public, defendant had installed safety devices to prevent
and avoid injuries to persons and damage to property in case of
natural calamities such as floods, typhoons, fire and others.
Defendant had 12 linesmen charged with the duty of making a
round-the-clock check-up of the areas respectively assigned to
them.
 TORTS AND DAMAGES ©
Atty. Jess Zachael Espejo | Ateneo de Davao University | Uno Manresa & Friends Case Pool | 2014 to 2015
ISSUE: W/N INELCO may be held liable for the death of Isabel
Lao. YES (There are 3 issues but I think this one is the one
related to our topic)
RULING: While it is true that typhoons and floods are
considered Acts of God for which no person may be held
responsible, it was not said with eventuality which directly
caused the victim's death. It was through the intervention of
petitioner's negligence that death took place. We subscribe to the
conclusions of the respondent CA when it found:
Conrado Asis, INELCO's electrical engineer, testified that
he conducted a general inspection of the franchise area
of the INELCO only on June 30, 1967, the day following
the typhoon. The reason he gave for the delay was that
all their vehicles were submerged.
In times of calamities such as the one which occurred in
Laoag City on the night of June 28 until the early hours
of June 29, 1967, extraordinary diligence requires
a supplier of electricity to be in constant vigil to
prevent or avoid any probable incident that
might imperil life or limb. The evidence does not
show that defendant did that. On the contrary, evidence
discloses that there were no men (linemen or
otherwise) policing the area, nor even manning its
office.
Indeed, under the circumstances of the case, petitioner was
negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done to the
general public"... considering that electricity is an
agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required
of electric companies must be commensurate with or
proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this
high degree of diligence and care extends to every place
where persons have a right to be" (Astudillo vs. Manila
Electric, 55 Phil. 427). The negligence of petitioner having been
shown, it may not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that
the victim's death was solely due to a fortuitous event. "When
an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of
the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is
liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his
own negligent conduct or omission".
Likewise, the maxim "volenti non fit injuria" (to one who
voluntarily consents to and takes the risk, no injury is done)
relied upon by INELCO finds no application in the case at bar. It
is imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which
impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a roof and brave
the subsiding typhoon. As testified by the two employees, the
deceased, accompanied by the former two, were on their way to
the latter's grocery store "to see to it that the goods were not
flooded." As such, shall We punish her for exercising her right to
protect her property from the floods by imputing upon her the
unfavorable presumption that she assumed the risk of personal
injury? Definitely not. For it has been held that a person is
excused from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily
assents to a known danger he must abide by the
consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or
property of another is in peril or when he seeks to rescue his
endangered property. Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the
deceased's property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with
an impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time
the fatal incident occurred, was at a place where she had
a right to be without regard to petitioner's consent as
she was on her way to protect her merchandise. Hence,
the heirs may not be barred from recovering damages as a result
of the death caused by petitioner's negligence.
"When a storm occurs that is liable to prostrate the wires, due
care requires prompt efforts to discover and repair broken lines".
The fact is that when Engr. Juan set out in the early morning of
June 29, 1967 on an inspection tour, he saw grounded and
disconnected lines hanging from posts to the ground but did not
see any INELCO lineman either in the streets or at the INELCO
office. The foregoing shows that petitioner's duty to exercise
extraordinary diligence under the circumstance was not
observed, confirming the negligence of petitioner.
SAMSUNG CONSTRUCTION COMPANY PH., INC. vs. FAR
EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, CA | G.R. No. 129015
| August 13, 2004 | Mier
FACTS: Samsung Construction, maintained a current account
with defendant Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC). The
sole signatory to Samsung Construction’s account was Jong Kyu
Lee (“Jong”), its Project Manager, while the checks remained in
the custody of the company’s accountant, Kyu Yong Lee (“Kyu”).
On 19 March 1992, a certain Roberto Gonzaga presented for
payment FEBTC Check No. 432100 to the bank. The check,
payable to cash and drawn against Samsung Construction’s
current account, was in the amount of P999,500.00. Following
the internal banking procedures, after the teller was satisfied
with the authenticity of the signature appearing on the check,
she forwarded the same to the Branch Senior Assistant Cashier,
who concluded that the check was indeed signed by Jong.
Finally before approval, another bank officer (Syfu) had to verify
the check. Noticing Jose Sempio III (“Sempio”), who is well-
known to Syfu and to the other bank officers, Syfu showed the
check to Sempio, who vouched for the genuineness of Jong’s
signature. Confirming the identity of Gonzaga Satisfied with the
genuineness of the signature of Jong, Syfu authorized the bank’s
encashment of the check to Gonzaga.
The following day, the accountant of Samsung Construction, Kyu,
examined the balance of the bank account and discovered that a
check in the amount of P999,500.00 had been encashed. Aware
that he had not prepared such a check for Jong’s signature, Kyu
perused the checkbook and found that the last blank check was
missing. He reported the matter to Jong, who then proceeded to
the bank. Jong learned of the encashment of the check, and
realized that his signature had been forged. The Bank Manager
reputedly told Jong that he would be reimbursed for the amount
of the check.
Samsung Construction filed a Complaint on 10 June 1992 for
violation of Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, and
prayed for the payment of the amount debited as a result of the
questioned check plus interest, and attorney’s fees. RTC held
that Jong’s signature on the check was forged and accordingly
directed the bank to pay or credit back to Samsung
Construction’s account the amount of P999,500.00, together with
interest tolled from the time the complaint was filed, and
attorney’s fees in the amount of P15,000.00.
CA reversed the RTC Decision and absolved FEBTC from any
liability. The Court of Appeals concluded that Samsung
Construction was negligent, and invoked the doctrines that
“where a loss must be borne by one of two innocent person, can
be traced to the neglect or fault of either, it is reasonable that it
would be borne by him, even if innocent of any intentional fraud,
through whose means it has succeeded or who put into the
power of the third person to perpetuate the wrong.”
ISSUE #1: Who bears the burden of proving negligence?
(GUIDE QUESTION #10)
RULING: FEBTC
The bare fact that the forgery was committed by an employee of
the party whose signature was forged cannot necessarily imply
that such party’s negligence was the cause for the forgery.
Employers do not possess the preternatural gift of cognition as to
the evil that may lurk within the hearts and minds of their
employees.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we can conclude that
there was no negligence on Samsung Construction’s part. The
presumption remains that every person takes ordinary
care of his concerns, and that the ordinary course of
business has been followed. Negligence is not presumed,
but must be proven by him who alleges it. While the
complaint was lodged at the instance of Samsung Construction,
the matter it had to prove was the claim it had alleged - whether
the check was forged. It cannot be required as well to prove
that it was not negligent, because the legal presumption remains
that ordinary care was employed.
 TORTS AND DAMAGES ©
Atty. Jess Zachael Espejo | Ateneo de Davao University | Uno Manresa & Friends Case Pool | 2014 to 2015
Thus, it was incumbent upon FEBTC, in defense, to prove
the negative fact that Samsung Construction was
negligent. While the payee, as in this case, may not have the
personal knowledge as to the standard procedures observed by
the drawer, it well has the means of disputing the presumption
of regularity. Proving a negative fact may be “a difficult office,”
but necessarily so, as it seeks to overcome a presumption in law.
FEBTC was unable to dispute the presumption of ordinary
care exercised by Samsung Construction.
The CA Decision replicated the extensive efforts which FEBTC
devoted to establish that there was no negligence on the part of
the bank in its acceptance and payment of the forged check.
However, the degree of diligence exercised by the bank
would be irrelevant if the drawer is not precluded from
setting up the defense of forgery under Section 23 by his
own negligence.
ISSUE #2: What situations require extraordinary diligence?
(GUIDE QUESTION #10)
RULING: Bank transactions
The following are the circumstances that should have aroused
suspicion of the bank and necessitated the exercise of
extraordinary diligence:
 The fact that the check was made out in the amount of
nearly P1,000,000 .
 The check was also payable to cash.
 The check was presented for payment by one Roberto
Gonzaga, who was not designated as the payee of the
check, and who did not carry with him any written proof that
he was authorized by Samsung Construction to encash the
check. Worse, Gonzaga was not an employee of Samsung
Construction.
Given the shadiness attending Gonzaga’s presentment of the
check, it was not sufficient for FEBTC to have merely complied
with its internal procedures, but mandatory that all earnest
efforts be undertaken to ensure the validity of the check,
and of the authority of Gonzaga to collect payment therefor.
FEBTC alleges that Sempio was well-known to the bank officers,
as he had regularly transacted with the bank in behalf of
Samsung Construction. Even assuming that FEBTC had a
standing habit of dealing with Sempio, acting in behalf of
Samsung Construction, the irregular circumstances
attending the presentment of the forged check should
have put the bank on the highest degree of alert. The
Court recently emphasized that the highest degree of
care and diligence is required of banks.
The Court reminds that: Banks are engaged in a business
impressed with public interest, and it is their duty to protect
in return their many clients and depositors who transact business
with them. They have the obligation to treat their client’s
account meticulously and with the highest degree of care,
considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship. The
diligence required of banks, therefore, is more than that
of a good father of a family.
Given the circumstances, extraordinary diligence dictates that
FEBTC should have ascertained from Jong personally that the
signature in the questionable check was his.
GREGORIO H. REYES and CONSUELO PUYAT-REYES, vs.
THE HON. CA and FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY
| G.R. No. 118492 | August 15, 2001 | Juyo
PRCI, for brevity sent 4 delegates to the Asian Conference, so
the director of PRCI (Reyes) applied to the respondent bank
foreign exchange (forex) demand draft in Australian dollars.
Godofredo, the PRCI’s chief cashier, went to the respondent bank
to apply for a demand draft in the amount of AU$1,610.00
payable to the order of the 20th Asian Racing Conference
Secretariat of Sydney, Australia. Respondent Bank’s assistant
cashier denied the application stating that the bank did not have
an AU dollar account in any bank in Sydney.
However, the said bank’s cashier informed Godofredo an
alternative. He said that respondent bank would draw a demand
draft against Westpac Bank in Sydney and have Westpac-Sydney
reimburse itself from the U.S. dollar account of the respondent in
Westpac Bank in New York, PRCI conformed.
The respondent bank approved the said application of PRCI and
issued Foreign Exchange Demand Draft in the sum applied for,
that is AU$ 1,610.00, payable to the order of the 20th Asian
Racing Conference and addressed to Westpac-Sydney as the
drawee bank.
The foreign exchange demand draft was dishonored, with the
notice of dishonor stating the following: "xxx No account held
with Westpac."
Respondent bank again informed Westpac-Sydney of the
issuance of the said demand draft and informing the latter to be
reimbursed from the respondent bank's dollar account in
Westpac-New York. The respondent bank on the same day
likewise informed Wespac-New York requesting the latter to
honor the reimbursement claim of Wespac-Sydney. On
September 14, 1988, upon its second presentment for payment,
the demand draft was dishonored again.
When petitioner spouses arrived in Sydney in the morning of
September 18, 1988, they were told that they could not register
because the foreign exchange demand draft for their registration
fee had been dishonored for the second time.
On November 23, 1988, the petitioners filed in RTC a complaint
for damages against the respondent bank due to the dishonor of
the said foreign exchange demand draft issued by the
respondent bank. The petitioners claim that as a result of the
dishonor of the said demand draft, they were exposed to
unnecessary shock, social humiliation, and deep mental anguish
in a foreign country, and in the presence of an international
audience.
The petitioners contend that due to the fiduciary nature of the
relationship between the respondent bank and its clients, the
respondent should have exercised a higher degree of diligence
than that expected of an ordinary prudent person in the handling
of its affairs as in the case at bar.
ISSUES:
(1) What degree of diligence is required in this case?
Ordinary Diligence (good father)
(2) WON the bank exercised due diligence in handling the
commercial transaction? YES, therefore no liability
for damages.
RATIONALE:
The facts as found by the courts a quo show that respondent
bank did not cause an erroneous transmittal of its SWIFT cable
message to Westpac-Sydney. It was the erroneous decoding of
the cable message on the part of Westpac-Sydney that caused
the dishonor of the subject foreign exchange demand draft.
An employee of Westpac-Sydney in Sydney, Australia
mistakenly read the printed figures in the SWIFT cable
message of respondent bank as "MT799" instead of as
"MT199".
The evidence also shows that the respondent bank exercised that
degree of diligence expected of an ordinary prudent person
under the circumstances obtaining.
In Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals15 upholding
a long standing doctrine, we ruled that the degree of diligence
required of banks, is more than that of a good father of a
family where the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their
depositors is concerned. BUT the same higher degree of
diligence is not expected to be exerted by banks in commercial
transactions that do not involve their fiduciary relationship with
their depositors.
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The case at bar does not involve the handling of petitioners'
deposit, if any, with the respondent bank. Instead, the
RELATIONSHIP INVOLVED WAS THAT OF A BUYER AND
SELLER, that is, between the respondent bank as the
seller of the subject foreign exchange demand draft, and
PRCI as the buyer of the same, with the 20th Asian
Racing conference Secretariat in Sydney, Australia as the
payee thereof.
The evidence shows that the respondent bank did everything
within its power to prevent the dishonor of the subject foreign
exchange demand draft. The erroneous reading of its cable
message to Westpac-Sydney by an employee of the latter could
not have been foreseen by the respondent bank.
ARSENIA B. GARCIA, vs. HON. CA and the PP. OF THE PH
| G.R. No. 157171 | March 14, 2006 | Diesto
FACTS: Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., who ran in the 1995 senatorial
elections, filed a complaint against Election Officer Arsenia B.
Garcia, Municipal Treasurer Herminio R. Romero, Public School
District Supervisor Renato R. Viray, Chairman, Vice-Chairman,
and Member-Secretary, respectively, of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Alaminos, Pangasinan, tabulators Rachel Palisoc
and Francisca de Vera with violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act
No. 6646 for willfully, and unlawfully decrease[d] the votes
received by senatorial candidate Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. from
6,998 votes, as clearly disclosed in the total number of votes in
the 159 precincts of the Statement of Votes by Precincts of said
municipality, to 1,921 votes as reflected in the Statement of
Votes by Precincts and Certificate of Canvass with a difference of
5,077 votes.
RTC acquitted all the accused for insufficiency of evidence,
except petitioner who was convicted. CA affirmed with
modification the RTC Decision.
On appeal, one of petitioner’s contention is that there was no
motive on her part to reduce the votes of private complainant.
Respondent on the other hand contends that good faith is not a
defense in the violation of an election law, which falls under the
class of mala prohibita.
ISSUE (main): Is a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No.
6646, classified under mala in se or mala prohibita? Could good
faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?
RULING: (When the acts complained of are inherently immoral,
they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a
special law. in crimes that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts
are not inherently immoral but become punishable only because
the law says they are forbidden.)
The acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se. For
otherwise, even errors and mistakes committed due to overwork
and fatigue would be punishable. Given the volume of votes to
be counted and canvassed within a limited amount of time,
errors and miscalculations are bound to happen. And it could not
be the intent of the law to punish unintentional election canvass
errors. However, intentionally increasing or decreasing the
number of votes received by a candidate is inherently immoral,
since it is done with malice and intent to injure another. Criminal
intent is presumed to exist on the part of the person who
executes an act which the law punishes, unless the contrary shall
appear. Thus, whoever invokes good faith as a defense has the
burden of proving its existence.
Xxx there is a noticeable discrepancy in the addition of the
subtotals to arrive at the grand total of votes received by each
candidate for all 159 precincts in SOV No. 008423.The grand
total of the votes for private complainant, Senator Aquilino
Pimentel, was only 1,921 instead of 6,921, or 5,000 votes less
than the number of votes private complainant actually received.
This error is also evident in the Certificate of Canvass (COC) No.
436156 signed by petitioner, Viray and Romero. During trial of
this case, petitioner admitted that she was indeed the one who
announced the figure of 1,921, which was subsequently entered
by then accused Viray in his capacity as secretary of the board.
Petitioner likewise admitted that she was the one who prepared
the COC (Exhibit A-7), though it was not her duty. To our mind,
preparing the COC even if it was not her task, manifests an
intention to perpetuate the erroneous entry in the COC.
Neither can this Court accept petitioner’s explanation that the
Board of Canvassers had no idea how the SOV (Exhibit "6") and
the COC reflected that private complainant had only 1,921 votes
instead of 6,921 votes. As chairman of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers, petitioner’s concern was to assure accurate, correct
and authentic entry of the votes. Her failure to exercise
maximum efficiency and fidelity to her trust deserves not only
censure but also the concomitant sanctions as a matter of
criminal responsibility pursuant to the dictates of the law. The
fact that the number of votes deducted from the actual votes
received by private complainant, Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. was
not added to any senatorial candidate does not relieve petitioner
of liability under Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646. The mere
decreasing of the votes received by a candidate in an election is
already punishable under the said provision. At this point, we see
no valid reason to disturb the factual conclusions of the appellate
court.
Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should
be exercised by the members of the board of canvassers
in canvassing the results of the elections. Any error on
their part would result in the disenfranchisement of the
voters. The Certificate of Canvass for senatorial
candidates and its supporting statements of votes
prepared by the municipal board of canvassers are
sensitive election documents whose entries must be
thoroughly scrutinized.
(GUIDE QUESTION #7) What situations require extraordinary
diligence? In this case, Canvassing the results of the
elections.
BURGOS vs. ESPERON JR. | Muñoz
- These incidents stemmed from our June 22, 2010 Resolution
referring the present case to the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR) as the Court’s directly commissioned agency, tasked with
the continuation of the investigation of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos’
abduction with the obligation to report its factual findings and
recommendations to this Court.
- This referral was necessary as the investigation by the
Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group (PNP-CIDG), by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
Provost Marshal, and even the initial CHR investigation had been
less than complete.
- In all of them, there were significant lapses in the handling of
the investigation. In particular, we highlighted the PNP-CIDG’s
failure to identify the cartographic sketches of two (one male and
one female) of the five abductors of Jonas, based on their
interview with the eyewitnesses to the abduction. In this same
Resolution, the court also affirmed the CA’s dismissal of the
petitions for Contempt and issuance of a Writ of Amparo.
- On March 15, 2011, the CHR submitted to the Court its
Investigation Report: CHR findings: Based on the facts developed
by evidence obtaining in this case, the CHR finds that the
enforced disappearance of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos had
transpired; and that his constitutional rights to life liberty and
security were violated by the Government have been fully
determined.
- Most if not all the actual abductors would have been identified
had it not been for what is otherwise called as evidentiary
difficulties shamelessly put up by some police and military elites.
- The deliberate refusal of TJAG Roa to provide the CHR with the
requested documents does not only defy the Supreme Court
directive to the AFP but ipso facto created a disputable
presumption that AFP personnel were responsible for the
abduction and that their superiors would be found accountable, if
not responsible, for the crime committed. This observation finds
support in the disputable presumption “That evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced.”
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- Interview with Virgilio Eustaquio, Chairman of the Union Masses
for Democracy and Justice (UMDJ), revealed that the male
abductor of Jonas Burgos appearing in the cartographic sketch
was among the raiders who abducted him and four others,
identified as Jim Cabauatan, Jose Curament, Ruben Dionisio and
Dennis Ibona otherwise known as ERAP FIVE. The Judge
Advocate General (TJAG) turned down the request of the Team
for a profile of the operatives in the so-called “Erap 5” abduction
on the ground of relevancy and branded the request as a fishing
expedition.
ISSUE: WON the AFP and the PNP accountable for having failed
to discharge the burden of extraordinary diligence in the
investigation of the enforced disappearance of Jonas.
RULING: YES. The PNP-CIDG failed to identify the cartographic
sketches of two (one male and one female) of the five abductors
of Jonas, based on their interview with eyewitnesses to the
abduction. For this reason, the Court directly commissioned the
CHR to continue the investigation of Jonas’ abduction and the
gathering of evidence.
The Court resolve to grant the CHR access to these requested
documents to allow them the opportunity to ascertain the true
identities of the persons depicted in the cartographic sketches.
At this point, we emphasize that the sworn affidavit of Eustaquio
(that attests to the resemblance of one of Jonas’ abductors to
the abductors of the ERAP 5) constitutes the sought-after
missing link that establishes the relevance of the requested
documents to the present case. We note that this lead may help
the CHR ascertain the identities of those depicted in the
cartographic sketches as two of Jonas’ abductors (one male and
one female) who, to this day, remain unidentified.
To fully fulfill the objective of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo,
further investigation using the standard of extraordinary diligence
should be undertaken by the CHR to pursue the lead provided by
Eustaquio. We take judicial notice of the ongoing investigation
being conducted by the Department of Justice (DOJ), through
the NBI, on the disappearance of Jonas. In this regard, the Court
direct the NBI to coordinate and provide direct investigative
assistance to the CHR as the latter may require, pursuant to the
authority granted under the Court’s June 22, 2010 Resolution.
For this purpose, the Court require the CHR to submit a
supplemental investigation report to the DOJ, copy furnished the
petitioner, the NBI, the incumbent Chiefs of the AFP, the PNP
and the PNP-CIDG, and all the respondents within 60 days from
receipt of this Resolution. The Court note and conclude, based on
the developments highlighted above, that the beneficial purpose
of the Writ of Amparo has been served in the present case. As
we held in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, the writ merely embodies the
Court’s directives to police agencies to undertake specified
courses of action to address the enforced disappearance of an
individual. The Writ of Amparo serves both a preventive and a
curative role. It is curative as it facilitates the subsequent
punishment of perpetrators through the investigation and
remedial action that it directs. The focus is on procedural
curative remedies rather than on the tracking of a specific
criminal or the resolution of administrative liabilities. The unique
nature of Amparo proceedings has led us to define terms or
concepts specific to what the proceedings seek to achieve. In
Razon Jr., v. Tagitis, we defined what the terms “responsibility”
and “accountability” signify in an Amparo case. We said:
Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been
established by substantial evidence to have participated in
whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced
disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall
craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal
and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper
courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure
of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited
involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the
level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined
above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the
enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure;
or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance.
In the present case, while Jonas remains missing, the series of
calculated directives issued by the Court outlined above and the
extraordinary diligence the CHR demonstrated in its
investigations resulted in the criminal prosecution of Lt. Baliaga.
We take judicial notice of the fact that the Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 216, has already found probable cause for
arbitrary detention against Lt. Baliaga and has ordered his arrest
in connection with Jonas’ disappearance.
The Court also emphasize that the CA in its March 18, 2013
decision already ruled with finality on the entities responsible and
accountable (as these terms are defined in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis)
for the enforced disappearance of Jonas.
In the same Decision, the CA also held the AFP and the PNP
accountable for having failed to discharge the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance of Jonas. Thus, the CA issued the following
directives to address the enforced disappearance of Jonas:
(1) DIRECT the PNP through its investigative arm, the
PNP-CIDG, to identify and locate the abductors of Jonas
Burgos who are still at large and to establish the link
between the abductors of Jonas Burgos and those
involved in the ERAP 5 incident; (2) DIRECT the
incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Director General of the Philippines
National Police, and their successors, to ensure the
continuance of their investigation and coordination on
the enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos until the
persons found responsible are brought before the bar of
justice; xxx (4) DIRECT the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National Police to extend
full assistance to the Commission on Human Rights in
the conduct of the latter’s investigation; and (5) DIRECT
the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, the
Director General, Philippine National Police and the
Chairman, Commission on Human Rights to submit a
quarterly report to the Court on the results of their
respective investigation.
The final ruling of the CA that confirmed the validity of the
issuance of the Writ of Amparo and its determination of the
entities responsible for the enforced disappearance of Jonas, the
court resolve to deny the petitioner’s prayer to issue the writ of
Amparo anew and to refer the case to the CA based on the newly
discovered evidence.
The emphasize that while the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
accords the Court a wide latitude in crafting remedies to address
an enforced disappearance, it cannot (without violating the
nature of the writ of Amparo as a summary remedy that provides
rapid judicial relief) grant remedies that would complicate and
prolong rather than expedite the investigations already ongoing.
Note that the CA has already determined with finality that Jonas
was a victim of enforced disappearance.
Maria Benita A. Dulay vs. Court of Appeals | G.R. No.
108017 | April 3, 1995 | Quidet
BENIGNO TORZUELA is an employee of Safeguard Investigation
and Security Co., Inc., (SAFEGUARD) and/or Superguard Security
Corp. (SUPERGUARD) and, at the time of the incident complained
of, was under their control and supervision.
On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Torzuela and
Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the "Big Bang sa Alabang,"
Alabang Village, as a result of which Torzuela, the security
guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Dulay.
Action for damages was filed against Torzuela and
Safeguard and/or Superguard, alleged employers of
defendant Torzuela.
SUPERGUARD claimed that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay
was beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the alleged
act of shooting was committed with deliberate intent (dolo),
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the civil liability therefor is governed by Article 100 RPC. That a
complaint for damages based on negligence under Article 2176
NCC, such as the one filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since the
civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses
under Article 365 RPC.
Petitioners stated that their cause of action against the private
respondents is based on their liability under Article 2180 of the
New Civil Code, which provides:
"ARTICLE 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope
of their assigned tasks even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
RTC ruled that the complaint did not state facts
necessary or sufficient to constitute a quasi-delict since
it does not mention any negligence on the part of
Torzuela in shooting Dulay or that the same was done
in the performance of his duties. That mere allegations
of the concurring negligence of Safeguard without
stating the facts showing such negligence are
mere conclusions of law. It declared that the complaint
was one for damages founded on crimes punishable
under Art. 100 and 103 of the RPC as distinguished
from those arising from quasi-delict.
ISSUE: WON the act of shooting Dulay constitutes a
quasi-delict.
RULING: YES
Quasi-Delict; Construed. — Well-entrenched is the doctrine that
Art. 2176 covers not only acts committed with
negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and
intentional. As far back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill,
this Court already held that:
". . . Article 2176, where it refers to 'fault or negligence,'
covers not only acts 'not punishable by law' but also acts
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary
or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies
against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided
that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually
charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores,
and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary.
In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in
Sec. 3(e), Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded
on Article 100 of the RPC, whereas the civil liability for the
same act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime
is not extinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not
happened or has not been committed by the accused.
Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that
culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which
may be punishable by law."
The same doctrine was echoed in the case of Andamo v. IAC,
wherein the Court held:
"Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence,"
covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or
negligent. Consequently, a civil action lies against the
offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is prosecuted or
found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is
not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually also charged
criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the
two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary."
Rule When an Injury is caused by the Negligence of the
Employee. — Under Article 2180 NCC, when an injury is caused
by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the
master or employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both
(Layugan v. IAC,). The liability of the employer under Article
2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior
recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of
the insolvency of such employee (Kapalaran Bus Lines v.
Coronado)
Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove
that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of their employee.
Calang vs. PP | GR 190696 | Aug. 3, 2010 | Murcia
FACTS: At around 2PM of April 22, 1989, Rolito Calang was
driving Philtranco Bus No. 7001, owned by Philtranco along
Daang Maharlika Highway in Barangay Lambao, Sta. Margarita,
Samar when its rear left side hit the front left portion of a Sarao
jeep coming from the opposite direction. As a result of the
collision, Cresencio Pinohermoso, the jeep’s driver, lost control of
the vehicle, and bumped and killed Jose Mabansag, a
bystander who was standing along the highway’s shoulder. The
jeep turned turtle 3 times before finally stopping at about 25
meters from the point of impact. 2 of the jeep’s passengers,
Armando Nablo and an unidentified woman, were instantly
killed, while the other passengers sustained serious
physical injuries.
The RTC found Calang guilty of reckless imprudence resulting to
multiple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to
property. It also ordered Calang and Philtranco, jointly and
severally, to pay P50,000.00 as death indemnity to the heirs of
Armando; P50,000.00 as death indemnity to the heirs of
Mabansag; and P90,083.93 as actual damages to the private
complainants.
The CA ruled that Calang failed to exercise due care and
precaution in driving the Philtranco bus. According to the CA,
various eyewitnesses testified that the bus was traveling fast and
encroached into the opposite lane when it evaded a pushcart
that was on the side of the road. In addition, he failed to
slacken his speed, despite admitting that he had already seen the
jeep coming from the opposite direction when it was still half a
kilometer away. The CA further ruled that Calang demonstrated a
reckless attitude when he drove the bus, despite knowing that it
was suffering from loose compression, hence, not roadworthy.
The CA added that the RTC correctly held Philtranco jointly and
severally liable with petitioner Calang, for failing to prove that it
had exercised the diligence of a good father of the family to
prevent the accident.
ISSUE: WON Philtranco should be held JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY LIABLE with Calang?
HELD: NO.
The Court, however, hold that the RTC and the CA both erred in
holding Philtranco jointly and severally liable with Calang. We
emphasize that Calang was charged criminally before the RTC.
Undisputedly, Philtranco was not a direct party in this case. Since
the cause of action against Calang was based on delict, both the
RTC and the CA erred in holding Philtranco jointly and severally
liable with Calang, based on quasi-delict under Articles 2176 and
2180 of the Civil Code. Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code
pertain to the vicarious liability of an employer for quasi-delicts
that an employee has committed. Such provision of law does not
apply to civil liability arising from delict.
If at all, Philtranco’s liability may only be subsidiary. Article
102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil liabilities
of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments,
as follows:
In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers,
tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations
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shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their
establishments, in all cases where a violation of
municipal ordinances or some general or special police
regulations shall have been committed by them or their
employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for the restitution
of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses
from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the
value thereof, provided that such guests shall have
notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person
representing him, of the deposit of such goods within
the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the
directions which such innkeeper or his representative
may have given them with respect to the care of and
vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in
case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of
persons unless committed by the innkeeper’s
employees.
The foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers,
according to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:
The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding
article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons,
and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for
felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen,
apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their
duties.
The provisions of the RPC on subsidiary liability – Articles 102
and 103 – are deemed written into the judgments in cases to
which they are applicable. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its
decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce
the subsidiary liability of the employer. Nonetheless, before the
employers’ subsidiary liability is enforced, adequate evidence
must exist establishing that
(1) They are indeed the employers of the convicted employees;
(2) They are engaged in some kind of industry;
(3) The crime was committed by the employees in the discharge
of their duties; and
(4) The execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to
insolvency.
The determination of these conditions may be done in the same
criminal action in which the employee’s liability, criminal and civil,
has been pronounced, in a hearing set for that precise purpose,
with due notice to the employer, as part of the proceedings for
the execution of the judgment.
Calang’s culpability was affirmed by SC. No issue about it.
SPS. BERNABE AFRICA and SOLEDAD AFRICA, and HEIRS
OF DOMINGA ONG vs. CALTEX PH INC., MATEO
BOQUIREN and Court of Appeals | Remullo
Nature of the case: The action is for damages under Articles
1902 and 1903 of the old Civil Code.
FACTS: In the afternoon of March 18, 1948 a fire broke out at
the Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo st. and Rizal
Ave., Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a
tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of
the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted.
The fire spread to and burned several neighboring houses,
including the personal properties and effects inside them.
Their owners, among them petitioners here, sued respondents
Caltex (Phil.), Inc. and Mateo Boquiren, the first as alleged
OWNER of the station and the second as its AGENT in charge of
operation. Negligence on the part of both of them was attributed
as the cause of the fire.
The trial court and the CA found that petitioners failed to prove
negligence and that respondents had exercised due care in the
premises and with respect to the supervision of their employees.
Hence, this petition
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not, without proof as to the cause and origin of
the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply so as
to presume negligence on the part of appellees.
2) Whether or not Caltex should be held liable for the damages
caused to appellants.
RULING:
1) Yes. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable in the
case at bar.
It is true of course that decisions of the CA do not lay down
doctrines binding on the SC, but we do not consider this a reason
for not applying the particular doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the
case at bar. Gasoline is a highly combustible material, in the
storage and sale of which extreme care must be taken. On the
other hand, fire is not considered a fortuitous event, as it arises
almost invariably from some act of man. A case strikingly similar
to the one before Us is Jones vs. Shell Petroleum Corporation, et
al., 171 So. 447:
Arthur O. Jones is the owner of a building in the city of
Hammon which in the year 1934 was leased to the Shell
Petroleum Corporation for a gasoline filling station. On
October 8, 1934, during the term of the lease, while
gasoline was being transferred from the tank wagon,
also operated by the Shell Petroleum Corporation, to the
underground tank of the station, a fire started with
resulting damages to the building owned by Jones.
Alleging that the damages to his building amounted to
$516.95, Jones sued the Shell Petroleum Corporation for
the recovery of that amount. The judge of the district
court, after hearing the testimony, concluded that
plaintiff was entitled to a recovery and rendered
judgment in his favor for $427.82. The Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit reversed this judgment, on the
ground the testimony failed to show with reasonable
certainty any negligence on the part of the Shell
Petroleum Corporation or any of its agents or
employees. Plaintiff applied to this Court for a Writ of
Review which was granted, and the case is now before
us for decision.
In resolving the issue of negligence, the Supreme Court of
Louisiana held:
Plaintiff's petition contains 2 distinct charges of
negligence — one relating to the cause of the fire
and the other relating to the spreading of the
gasoline about the filling station.
Other than an expert to assess the damages caused plaintiff's
building by the fire, no witnesses were placed on the stand by
the defendant.
Taking up plaintiff's charge of negligence relating to the cause of
the fire, we find it established by the record that the filling
station and the tank truck were under the control of the
defendant and operated by its agents or employees. We further
find from the uncontradicted testimony of plaintiff's witnesses
that fire started in the underground tank attached to the filling
station while it was being filled from the tank truck and while
both the tank and the truck were in charge of and being
operated by the agents or employees of the defendant, extended
to the hose and tank truck, and was communicated from the
burning hose, tank truck, and escaping gasoline to the building
owned by the plaintiff.
Predicated on these circumstances and the further circumstance
of defendant's failure to explain the cause of the fire or to show
its lack of knowledge of the cause, plaintiff has evoked the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. There are many cases in which the
doctrine may be successfully invoked and this, we think, is one of
them.
Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown
to be under the management of defendant or his servants and
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the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not
happen if those who have its management or control use proper
care, it affords reasonable evidence, in absence of explanation by
defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. (45 C.J.
#768, p. 1193).
This statement of the rule of res ipsa loquitur has been widely
approved and adopted by the courts of last resort. Some of the
cases in this jurisdiction in which the doctrine has been applied .
The principle enunciated in the aforequoted case applies with
equal force here. The gasoline station, with all its appliances,
equipment and employees, was under the control of appellees. A
fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring
houses. The persons who knew or could have known how the
fire started were appellees and their employees, but they gave
no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable
inference that the incident happened because of want of care.
2) Yes. Caltex should be liable.
Caltex admits that it owned the gasoline station as well as the
equipment therein, but claims that the business conducted at the
service station in question was owned and operated by Boquiren.
But Caltex did not present any contract with Boquiren that would
reveal the nature of their relationship at the time of the fire.
There must have been one in existence at that time. Instead,
what was presented was a license agreement manifestly tailored
for purposes of this case, since it was entered into shortly before
the expiration of the one-year period it was intended to operate.
This so-called license agreement (Exhibit 5-Caltex) was executed
on November 29, 1948, but made effective as of January 1, 1948
so as to cover the date of the fire, namely, March 18, 1948. This
retroactivity provision is quite significant, and gives rise to the
conclusion that it was designed precisely to free Caltex from any
responsibility with respect to the fire, as shown by the clause
that Caltex "shall not be liable for any injury to person or
property while in the property herein licensed, it being
understood and agreed that LICENSEE (Boquiren) is not an
employee, representative or agent of LICENSOR (Caltex)."
But even if the license agreement were to govern, Boquiren can
hardly be considered an independent contractor. Under that
agreement Boquiren would pay Caltex the purely nominal sum of
P1.00 for the use of the premises and all the equipment therein.
He could sell only Caltex Products. Maintenance of the station
and its equipment was subject to the approval, in other words
control, of Caltex. Boquiren could not assign or transfer his rights
as licensee without the consent of Caltex. The license agreement
was supposed to be from January 1, 1948 to December 31,
1948, and thereafter until terminated by Caltex upon two days
prior written notice. Caltex could at any time cancel and
terminate the agreement in case Boquiren ceased to sell Caltex
products, or did not conduct the business with due diligence, in
the judgment of Caltex. Termination of the contract was
therefore a right granted only to Caltex but not to Boquiren.
These provisions of the contract show the extent of the control of
Caltex over Boquiren. The control was such that the latter was
virtually an employee of the former.
Taking into consideration the fact that the operator owed his
position to the company and the latter could remove him or
terminate his services at will; that the service station belonged to
the company and bore its tradename and the operator sold only
the products of the company; that the equipment used by the
operator belonged to the company and were just loaned to the
operator and the company took charge of their repair and
maintenance; that an employee of the company supervised the
operator and conducted periodic inspection of the company's
gasoline and service station; that the price of the products sold
by the operator was fixed by the company and not by the
operator; and that the receipts signed by the operator indicated
that he was a mere agent, the finding of the Court of Appeals
that the operator was an agent of the company and not an
independent contractor should not be disturbed.
To determine the nature of a contract courts do not have or are
not bound to rely upon the name or title given it by the
contracting parties, should thereby a controversy as to what they
really had intended to enter into, but the way the contracting
parties do or perform their respective obligations stipulated or
agreed upon may be shown and inquired into, and should such
performance conflict with the name or title given the contract by
the parties, the former must prevail over the latter. (Shell
Company of the Philippines, Ltd. vs. Firemens' Insurance
Company of Newark, New Jersey, 100 Phil. 757).
The written contract was apparently drawn for the purpose of
creating the apparent relationship of EMPLOYER and independent
contractor, and of avoiding liability for the negligence of the
employees about the station; but the company was not satisfied
to allow such relationship to exist. The evidence shows that it
immediately assumed control, and proceeded to direct the
method by which the work contracted for should be performed.
By reserving the right to terminate the contract at will, it retained
the means of compelling submission to its orders. Having elected
to assume control and to direct the means and methods by
which the work has to be performed, it must be held liable for
the negligence of those performing service under its direction.
We think the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict of the
jury.
Caltex further argues that the gasoline stored in the station
belonged to Boquiren. But no cash invoices were presented to
show that Boquiren had bought said gasoline from Caltex.
Neither was there a sales contract to prove the same.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Luzon Stevedoring
Corporation | Tan
On August 17, 1960, barge L-1892, owned by the Luzon
Stevedoring Corporation was being towed down the Pasig river
by tugboats "Bangus" and "Barbero" also belonging to the same
corporation, when the barge rammed against one of the wooden
piles of the Nagtahan bailey bridge, smashing the posts and
causing the bridge to list. The river, at the time, was swollen and
the current swift, on account of the heavy downpour of Manila
and the surrounding provinces on August 15 and 16, 1960.
The Republic sued Luzon Stevedoring for actual and
consequential damages amounting to P 200,000. Luzon
disclaimed liability saying that it had exercised due diligence in
the selection and supervision of its employees, the employees
also exercised the diligence and precaution required them in
towing the barge and that the damages to the bridge were
caused by force majeure.
ISSUE: Whether or not Luzon Stevedoring is liable for the
damage caused to the Nagtahan Bailey bridge.
RULING: Considering that the Nagtahan bridge was an
immovable and stationary object and provided with adequate
openings for the passage of water craft, including barges like
that of Luzon's, it is undeniable that the unusual event that the
barge, exclusively controlled by Luzon, rammed the bridge
supports raises a presumption of negligence on the part of Luzon
or its employees manning the barge or the tugs that towed it.
For in the ordinary course of events, such a thing does not
happen if proper care is used. In Anglo American Jurisprudence,
the inference arises by what is known as the "res ipsa loquitur"
rule (the thing speaks for itself).
Luzon strongly stresses the precautions taken by it on the day in
question: that it assigned two of its most powerful tugboats to
tow down river its barge L-1892; that it assigned to the task the
more competent and experienced among its patrons, had the
towlines, engines and equipment double-checked and inspected;
that it instructed its patrons to take extra precautions; and
concludes that it had done all it was called to do, and that the
accident, therefore, should be held due to force majeure or
fortuitous event.
These very precautions, however, completely destroy the Luzon's
defense. For caso fortuito or force majeure (which in law are
identical in so far as they exempt an obligor from liability) by
definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable,
"events that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen,
were inevitable" (Art. 1174, Civ. Code of the Philippines). It is,
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therefore, not enough that the event should not have been
foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be
one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to
foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same.
The very measures adopted by Luzon prove that the possibility of
danger was not only foreseeable, but actually foreseen, and was
not caso fortuito.
Otherwise stated, Luzon Stevedoring Corporation, knowing and
appreciating the perils posed by the swollen stream and its swift
current, voluntarily entered into a situation involving obvious
danger; it therefore assured the risk, and can not shed
responsibility merely because the precautions it adopted turned
out to be insufficient.
On the issue that the bridge was an obstruction to navigation:
It avails Luzon naught to argue that the bridge were improperly
located. Even if true, these circumstances would merely
emphasize the need of even higher degree of care on Luzon's
part in the situation involved in the present case. Luzon whose
barges and tugs travel up and down the river everyday, could not
safely ignore the danger posed by these allegedly improper
constructions that had been erected, and in place, for years.
SC affirmed CFI's ruling: Luzon liable for the damage caused to
the bridge.
MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC. vs. RODELIO ALBERTO
and ENRICO ALBERTO REYES| G.R. No. 194320 |
February 1, 2012 | Harun
On December 17, 1995, an accident occurred at the corner of
EDSA and Ayala Avenue, Makati City involving 4 vehicles, to wit:
1. a NISSAN BUS operated by Aladdin Transit; 2. an ISUZU
TANKER; 3. a FUZO CARGO TRUCK and; 4. a MITSUBISHI
GALANT.
Based on the police report, the ISUZU TANKER was in front of
the MITSUBISHI GALANT, with the NISSAN BUS on their right
side before the vehicular accident. All 3 vehicles were at a halt
along EDSA facing the south direction when the FUZO CARGO
TRUCK simultaneously bumped the rear portion of the
MITSUBISHI GALANT and the rear left portion of the NISSAN
BUS. Due to the strong impact, these 2 vehicles were shoved
forward and the front left portion of the MISTUBISHI GALANT
rammed into the rear portion of the ISUZU TANKER.
Malayan Insurance (MALAYAN) paid the damages sustained by
the MISTUBISHI GALANT amounting to 700,000. Having been
subrogated to the rights of the assured upon its payment of the
insurance, Malayan sent several demand letters to respondents
RODELIO ALBERTO (ALBERTO) and ENRICO ALBERTO REYES
(REYES), the registered owner and the driver, respectively, of the
FUZO CARGO TRUCK but both refused to settle their liability.
Malayan then filed a complaint for damages against Alberto and
Reyes.
ALBERTO AND REYES’ contention: They contend that the
proximate cause of the vehicular accident was the reckless
driving of the NISSAN BUS driver hence they cannot be held
liable. They further contend that the speeding bus, maneuvered
its way towards the middle lane without due regard to Reyes’
right of way. When the Nissan Bus abruptly stopped, Reyes
stepped hard on the brakes but the braking action could not
cope with the inertia and failed to gain sufficient traction. As a
consequence, the Fuzo Cargo Truck hit the rear end of the
Mitsubishi Galant, which, in turn, hit the rear end of the vehicle
in front of it. The Nissan Bus, on the other hand, sideswiped the
Fuzo Cargo Truck, causing damage to the latter.
MALAYAN’s contention: It content that since Reyes, the driver of
FUZO CARGO TRUCK, bumped into the rear of the MITSUBISHI
GALANT, he is presumed to be negligent unless proved otherwise
and that the respondents failed to present any evidence to
overturn the presumption of negligence.
RTC: Ruled in favor of MALAYAN and held respondents liable for
damages.
CA: Reversed the trial court’s decision finding that the evidence
presented failed to establish negligence on the part of the
respondents and compliance with the other requisites.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not MALAYAN failed to overcome the burden of
proof required to establish the negligence of the respondents.
NO
2. Whether or not the pieces of evidence presented by MALAYAN
are sufficient to claim for the amount of damages. YES
RULING:
(GUIDE QUESTION # 11: RES IPSA LOQUITUR
DOCTRINE)
SC ruled that despite the inadmissibility of the police report,
respondents Alberto and Reyes cannot evade liability by virtue of
the res ipsa loquitur.
The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and
while the mere happening of an accident or injury will not
generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was due
to negligence on defendant’s part, under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, which means, literally, the thing or transaction speaks
for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality
speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances accompanying an
injury may be such as to raise a presumption, or at least permit
an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, or some
other person who is charged with negligence.
One of the theoretical bases for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e.,
that necessary evidence is absent or not available.
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory
that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes
the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best
opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such
knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege negligence in
general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the
accident in order to establish negligence. The inference which
the doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief
evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is
practically accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the
injured person.
It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes a
bridge by which a plaintiff, without knowledge of the cause,
reaches over to defendant who knows or should know the cause,
for any explanation of care exercised by the defendant in respect
of the matter of which the plaintiff complains. The res ipsa
loquitur doctrine, another court has said, is a rule of necessity, in
that it proceeds on the theory that under the peculiar
circumstances in which the doctrine is applicable, it is within the
power of the defendant to show that there was no negligence on
his part, and direct proof of defendant’s negligence is beyond
plaintiff’s power. Accordingly, some courts add to the three
prerequisites for the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine
the further requirement that for the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to
apply, it must appear that the injured party had no knowledge or
means of knowledge as to the cause of the accident, or that the
party to be charged with negligence has superior knowledge or
opportunity for explanation of the accident.
In other words, the defendant’s negligence is presumed or
inferred when the plaintiff establishes the requisites for the
application of res ipsa loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes out a
prima facie case of all the elements, the burden then shifts to
defendant to explain. The presumption or inference may be
rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate
circumstances a disputable presumption, such as that of due care
or innocence, may outweigh the inference. It is not for the
defendant to explain or prove its defense to prevent the
presumption or inference from arising. Evidence by the
defendant of say, due care, comes into play only after the
circumstances for the application of the doctrine has been
established.
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In this case, all the requsities for the application of the rule of res
ipsa loquitur are present. To reiterate, res ipsa loquitur is a rule
of necessity which applies where evidence is absent or not
readily available. As explained in D.M. Consunji, Inc., it is partly
based upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the
instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of
the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and
that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and, therefore, is
compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon
the proof of the happening of the accident in order to establish
negligence.
As mentioned above, the requisites for the application of the res
ipsa loquitur rule are the following:
(1) the accident was of a kind which does not
ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
(2) the instrumentality or agency which caused
the injury was under the exclusive control of the
person charged with negligence; and
(3) the injury suffered must not have been due to
any voluntary action or contribution on the part
of the person injured.
In the instant case, the Fuzo Cargo Truck would not have had hit
the rear end of the Mitsubishi Galant unless someone is
negligent. Also, the Fuzo Cargo Truck was under the exclusive
control of its driver, Reyes. Even if respondents avert liability by
putting the blame on the Nissan Bus driver, still, this allegation
was self-serving and totally unfounded. Finally, no contributory
negligence was attributed to the driver of the Mitsubishi Galant.
Consequently, all the requisites for the application of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur are present, thereby creating a reasonable
presumption of negligence on the part of respondents.
It is worth mentioning that just like any other disputable
presumptions or inferences, the presumption of
negligence may be rebutted or overcome by other
evidence to the contrary. However, in this case, the
respondents failed to present any evidence before the
trial court. Thus, the presumption of negligence remains.
Consequently, the CA erred in dismissing the complaint for
Malayan Insurance’s adverted failure to prove negligence on the
part of respondents.
Dr. EMMANUEL JARCIA, Jr. and Dr. MARILOU BASTAN vs.
PP. OF THE PHILIPPINES | G.R. No. 187926 | February
15, 2012 | Andoy
FACTS: Belinda Santiago (Mrs. Santiago) lodged a
complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) against
the petitioners, Dr. Emmanuel Jarcia, Jr. (Dr. Jarcia) and Dr.
Marilou Bastan (Dr. Bastan), for their alleged neglect of
professional duty which caused her son, Roy Alfonso
Santiago (Roy Jr.), to suffer serious physical injuries. Upon
investigation, the NBI found that Roy Jr. was hit by a taxicab and
he was rushed to the Manila Doctors Hospital for an emergency
medical treatment. An X-ray of the victim’s ankle was ordered
and that the result showed no fracture as read by Dr. Jarcia. Dr.
Bastan entered the emergency room and, after conducting her
own examination of the victim, informed Mrs. Santiago that since
it was only the ankle that was hit, there was no need to examine
the upper leg. Eleven days later, Roy Jr. developed fever,
swelling of the right leg and misalignment of the right foot and
that Mrs. Santiago brought him back to the hospital. The X-ray
revealed a right mid-tibial fracture and a linear hairline fracture in
the shaft of the bone.
On June 14, 2005, the petitioners were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Imprudence
Resulting to Serious Physical Injuries. Dissatisfied, the
petitioners appealed to the CA. As earlier stated, the CA affirmed
the RTC decision in toto which said:
“Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons of skill and experience
are competent to testify as to whether a patient has been treated
or operated upon with a reasonable degree of skill and care.
However, testimony as to the statements and acts of physicians,
external appearances, and manifest conditions which are
observable by any one may be given by non-expert witnesses.
Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the
court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof
of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony,
where the court from its fund of common knowledge can
determine the proper standard of care. Where common
knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury would not
have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised, an
inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical
evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not only what
occurred but how and why it occurred. In the case at bench, we
give credence to the testimony of Mrs. Santiago by applying the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was
denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
[1] Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable
in this case.
[2] Whether or not the petitioners are liable for criminal.
RULING:
[1] The Supreme Court ruled NO. The CA is correct in finding
that there was negligence on the part of the petitioners.
However, the Court is not convinced that the petitioners are
guilty of criminal negligence complained of. The Court is also of
the view that the CA erred in applying the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur in this particular case.
(GUIDE QUESTION #11) This doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur means "Where the thing which causes injury is shown
to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident
is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if
those who have the management use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the
defendant, that the accident arose from want of care."
The Black's Law Dictionary defines the said doctrine. Thus:
The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable presumption or
inference that defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof
that the instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's
exclusive control, and that the accident was one which ordinarily
does not happen in absence of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is a
rule of evidence whereby negligence of the alleged wrongdoer
may be inferred from the mere fact that the accident happened
provided the character of the accident and circumstances
attending it lead reasonably to belief that in the absence of
negligence it would not have occurred and that thing which
caused injury is shown to have been under the management and
control of the alleged wrongdoer. Under this doctrine, the
happening of an injury permits an inference of negligence where
plaintiff produces substantial evidence that the injury was caused
by an agency or instrumentality under the exclusive control and
management of defendant, and that the occurrence was such
that in the ordinary course of things would not happen if
reasonable care had been used.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is unusual
to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima
facie negligence may be established without direct proof and
furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The
doctrine, however, is not a rule of substantive law, but merely a
mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The rule, when
applicable to the facts and circumstances of a given case, is not
meant to and does not dispense with the requirement of proof of
culpable negligence on the party charged. It merely determines
and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and
helps the plaintiff in proving a breach of the duty. The doctrine
can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances
involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available.11
The requisites for the application of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur are:
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(1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur
unless someone is negligent;
(2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was
under the exclusive control of the person in charge; and
(3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution of the person injured.
In this case, the circumstances that caused patient Roy Jr.’s
injury and the series of tests that were supposed to be
undergone by him to determine the extent of the injury suffered
were not under the exclusive control of Drs. Jarcia and Bastan. It
was established that they are mere residents of the Manila
Doctors Hospital at that time who attended to the victim at the
emergency room. While it may be true that the circumstances
pointed out by the courts below seem doubtless to constitute
reckless imprudence on the part of the petitioners, this
conclusion is still best achieved, not through the scholarly
assumptions of a layman like the patient’s mother, but by the
unquestionable knowledge of expert witnesses. As to whether
the petitioners have exercised the requisite degree of skill and
care in treating patient Roy, Jr. is generally a matter of expert
opinion.
[2] The Supreme Court ruled NO. The totality of the evidence on
record clearly points to the negligence of the petitioners. At the
risk of being repetitious, the Court, however, is not satisfied that
Dr. Jarcia and Dr. Bastan are criminally negligent in this case.
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection
of the interests of another person that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury. Reckless imprudence
consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an
act from which material damage results by reason of an
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act. The elements of simple
negligence are: (1) that there is lack of precaution on the part of
the offender, and (2) that the damage impending to be caused is
not immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest. In this case,
the Court is not convinced with moral certainty that the
petitioners are guilty of reckless imprudence or simple
negligence. The elements thereof were not proved by the
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court, nevertheless, finds the petitioners civilly liable for
their failure to sufficiently attend to Roy Jr.’s medical needs when
the latter was rushed to the ER, for while a criminal conviction
requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance
of evidence is required to establish civil liability. Taken into
account also was the fact that there was no bad faith on their
part.
To repeat for clarity and emphasis, if these doctors knew from
the start that they were not in the position to attend to Roy Jr., a
vehicular accident victim, with the degree of diligence and
commitment expected of every doctor in a case like this, they
should have not made a baseless assurance that everything was
all right. By doing so, they deprived Roy Jr. of adequate medical
attention that placed him in a more dangerous situation than he
was already in. What petitioners should have done, and could
have done, was to refer Roy Jr. to another doctor who could
competently and thoroughly examine his injuries.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 29, 2008 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is
entered ACQUITTING Dr. Emmanuel Jarcia, Jr. and Dr. Marilou
Bastan of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to serious
physical injuries but declaring them civilly liable in the amounts
of:
(1) P 3,850.00 as actual damages;
(2) P 100,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) P 50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
(4) Costs of the suit with interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from the date of the filing of the Information. The rate
shall be 12% interest per annum from the finality of judgment
until fully paid.
DR. FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES | Astillo
Petitioner Solidum is a physician-anesthesiologist who has been
pronounced guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in serious
physical injuries by the RTC and the CA. He had been part of the
team of anesthesiologists during the surgical pull-through
operation conducted on a three-year old patient born with an
imperforate anus.
Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born on June 2, 1992 with an
imperforate anus. Two days after his birth, Gerald underwent
colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end of the large
intestine out through the abdominal wall, enabling him to excrete
through a colostomy bag attached to the side of his body.
On May 17, 1995, Gerald, then 3 years old, was admitted at the
Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-through operation. Dr. Leandro
Resurreccion headed the surgical team and the anesthesiologists
included Dr. Fernando Solidum (Dr. Solidum). During the
operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia, and went into a
coma. His coma lasted for two weeks, but he regained
consciousness only after a month. He could no longer see, hear
or move.
Agitated by her son’s helpless and unexpected condition, Ma. Luz
Gercayo (Luz) lodged a complaint for reckless imprudence
resulting in serious physical injuries with the City Prosecutor’s
Office of Manila against the attending physicians.
Upon a finding of probable cause, the City Prosecutor’s Office
filed an information solely against Dr. Solidum,13 alleging: –
… the said accused, being then an anesthesiologist at
the Ospital ng Maynila, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously fail and neglect to use the
care and diligence as the best of his judgment would
dictate under said circumstance, by failing to monitor
and regulate properly the levels of anesthesia
administered to said GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO
and using 100% halothane and other anesthetic
medications, causing as a consequence of his said
carelessness and negligence, said GERALD ALBERT
GERCAYO suffered a cardiac arrest and consequently a
defect called hypoxic encephalopathy meaning
insufficient oxygen supply in the brain, thereby
rendering him to be incapable of moving his body,
seeing, speaking or hearing, to his damage and
prejudice.
RTC found the accused guilty, which was affirmed by the CA. CA
ruled that the case appears to be a textbook example of res
ipsa loquitur.
ISSUE
1) Whether or not Res Ipsa Loquitor is applicable in this
case.
2) Whether or not SOLIDUM is negligent in this case.
3) Whether or not OSPITAL NG MAYNILA is solidarily liable.
HELD:
1. NO!
In order to allow resort to the doctrine, therefore, the following
essential requisites must first be satisfied, to wit: (1) the
accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur
unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or
agency that caused the injury was under the exclusive
control of the person charged; and (3) the injury suffered
must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution of the person injured.29
The Court considers the application here of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur inappropriate. Although it should be
conceded without difficulty that the second and third elements
were present, considering that the anesthetic agent and the
instruments were exclusively within the control of Dr. Solidum,
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and that the patient, being then unconscious during the
operation, could not have been guilty of contributory negligence,
the first element was undeniably wanting. Luz delivered
Gerald to the care, custody and control of his physicians for a
pull-through operation. Except for the imperforate anus, Gerald
was then of sound body and mind at the time of his submission
to the physicians. Yet, he experienced bradycardia during the
operation, causing loss of his senses and rendering him
immobile. Hypoxia, or the insufficiency of oxygen supply to the
brain that caused the slowing of the heart rate, scientifically
termed as bradycardia, would not ordinarily occur in the process
of a pull-through operation, or during the administration of
anesthesia to the patient, but such fact alone did not prove
that the negligence of any of his attending physicians,
including the anesthesiologists, had caused the injury. In
fact, the anesthesiologists attending to him had sensed in the
course of the operation that the lack of oxygen could have been
triggered by the vago-vagal reflex, prompting them to administer
atropine to the patient.30
Res ipsa loquitur is literally translated as "the thing or the
transaction speaks for itself." The doctrine res ipsa loquitur
means that "where the thing which causes injury is shown to be
under the management of the defendant, and the accident is
such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those
who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant,
that the accident arose from want of care."24 It is simply "a
recognition of the postulate that, as a matter of common
knowledge and experience, the very nature of certain types of
occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the part of
the person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury in
the absence of some explanation by the defendant who is
charged with negligence. It is grounded in the superior logic of
ordinary human experience and on the basis of such experience
or common knowledge, negligence may be deduced from the
mere occurrence of the accident itself.
Hence, res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction with the
doctrine of common knowledge."25
Jarcia, Jr. v. People has underscored that the doctrine is not a
rule of substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a mere
procedural convenience. The doctrine, when applicable to the
facts and circumstances of a given case, is not meant to and
does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable
negligence against the party charged. It merely determines and
regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof, and helps
the plaintiff in proving a breach of the duty. The doctrine can
be invoked when and only when, under the
circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not
readily available.
The applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in medical
negligence cases was significantly and exhaustively explained in
Ramos v. Court of Appeals, where the Court said –
Medical malpractice cases do not escape the application
of this doctrine. Thus, res ipsa loquitur has been applied
when the circumstances attendant upon the harm are
themselves of such a character as to justify an inference
of negligence as the cause of that harm. The application
of res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence cases presents
a question of law since it is a judicial function to
determine whether a certain set of circumstances does,
as a matter of law, permit a given inference.
Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in
malpractice suits to prove that a physician has done a negligent
act or that he has deviated from the standard medical procedure,
when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff,
the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with
because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence.
The reason is that the general rule on the necessity of expert
testimony applies only to such matters clearly within the
domain of medical science, and not to matters that are
within the common knowledge of mankind which may be
testified to by anyone familiar with the facts. Ordinarily,
only physicians and surgeons of skill and experience are
competent to testify as to whether a patient has been
treated or operated upon with a reasonable degree of
skill and care. However, testimony as to the statements
and acts of physicians and surgeons, external
appearances, and manifest conditions which are
observable by any one may be given by non-expert
witnesses. Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is
applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent
upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of
expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common
knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. Where
common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury
would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been
exercised, an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise
to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without
medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not only
what occurred but how and why it occurred. When the doctrine
is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus
between the particular act or omission complained of and the
injury sustained while under the custody and management of the
defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to
establish the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is
allowed because there is no other way, under usual and ordinary
conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for injury
suffered by him.
Thus, courts of other jurisdictions have applied the
doctrine in the following situations: leaving of a foreign
object in the body of the patient after an operation,
injuries sustained on a healthy part of the body which
was not under, or in the area, of treatment, removal of
the wrong part of the body when another part was
intended, knocking out a tooth while a patient’s jaw was
under anesthetic for the removal of his tonsils, and loss
of an eye while the patient plaintiff was under the
influence of anesthetic, during or following an operation
for appendicitis, among others.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa loquitur
has been measurably enlarged, it does not automatically apply to
all cases of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the
burden of proof to the defendant to show that he is not guilty of
the ascribed negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or
ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be
cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances of each
case. It is generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases
where a layman is able to say, as a matter of common
knowledge and observation, that the consequences of
professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have
followed if due care had been exercised. A distinction must be
made between the failure to secure results, and the occurrence
of something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the service
or treatment rendered followed the usual procedure of those
skilled in that particular practice. It must be conceded that
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application
in a suit against a physician or surgeon which involves
the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. The
physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why
any particular diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular
scientific treatment did not produce the desired result. Thus, res
ipsa loquitur is not available in a malpractice suit if the
only showing is that the desired result of an operation or
treatment was not accomplished. The real question,
therefore, is whether or not in the process of the
operation any extraordinary incident or unusual event
outside of the routine performance occurred which is
beyond the regular scope of customary professional
activity in such operations, which, if unexplained would
themselves reasonably speak to the average man as the
negligent cause or causes of the untoward consequence.
If there was such extraneous intervention, the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur may be utilized and the defendant is called upon to
explain the matter, by evidence of exculpation, if he could.
2. NO!
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection
of the interests of another person that degree of care,
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Atty. Jess Zachael Espejo | Ateneo de Davao University | Uno Manresa & Friends Case Pool | 2014 to 2015
precaution, and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury. Reckless imprudence,
on the other hand, consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do,
without malice, an act from which material damage results by
reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
person performing or failing to perform such act.33
In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the
burden of establishing appellant's negligence and for a
reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof
of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a
causal connection of such breach and the resulting death
of his patient. In Chan Lugay v. St Luke's Hospital, Inc., where
the attending physician was absolved of liability for the death of
the complainant’s wife and newborn baby, this Court held that:
"In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it
must be shown that the ‘injury for which recovery is
sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong
done; the connection between the negligence and the
injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events,
unbroken by intervening efficient causes.’ In other
words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of
the injury. For, ‘negligence, no matter in what it consists,
cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate
cause of the injury complained of.’ And ‘the proximate
cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred.’"
In the medical profession, specific norms or standards to protect
the patient against unreasonable risk, commonly referred to as
standards of care, set the duty of the physician to act in respect
of the patient. Unfortunately, no clear definition of the duty
of a particular physician in a particular case exists.
Because most medical malpractice cases are highly
technical, witnesses with special medical qualifications
must provide guidance by giving the knowledge
necessary to render a fair and just verdict. As a result, the
standard of medical care of a prudent physician must be
determined from expert testimony in most cases; and in the case
of a specialist (like an anesthesiologist), the standard of care by
which the specialist is judged is the care and skill commonly
possessed and exercised by similar specialists under similar
circumstances. The specialty standard of care may be higher
than that required of the general practitioner.
The standard of care is an objective standard by which the
conduct of a physician sued for negligence or malpractice may be
measured, and it does not depend, therefore, on any individual
physician’s own knowledge either. In attempting to fix a standard
by which a court may determine whether the physician has
properly performed the requisite duty toward the patient, expert
medical testimony from both plaintiff and defense experts is
required. The judge, as the trier of fact, ultimately determines
the standard of care, after listening to the testimony of all
medical experts.
Here, the Prosecution presented no witnesses with special
medical qualifications in anesthesia to provide guidance to the
trial court on what standard of care was applicable. It would
consequently be truly difficult, if not impossible, to determine
whether the first three elements of a negligence and malpractice
action were attendant.
Although the Prosecution presented Dr. Benigno Sulit, Jr., an
anesthesiologist himself who served as the Chairman of the
Committee on Ethics and Malpractice of the Philippine Society of
Anesthesiologists that investigated the complaint against Dr.
Solidum, his testimony mainly focused on how his Committee
had conducted the investigation. Even then, the report of his
Committee was favorable to Dr. Solidum, to wit:
Presented for review by this committee is the case of a 3 year
old male who underwent a pull-thru operation and was
administered general anesthesia by a team of anesthesia
residents. The patient, at the time when the surgeons was
manipulating the recto-sigmoid and pulling it down in preparation
for the anastomosis, had bradycardia. The anesthesiologists,
sensing that the cause thereof was the triggering of the vago-
vagal reflex, administered atropine to block it but despite the
administration of the drug in two doses, cardiac arrest ensued.
As the records show, prompt resuscitative measures were
administered and spontaneous cardiac function re-established in
less than 5 minutes and that oxygen was continuously being
administered throughout, unfortunately, as later become
manifest, patient suffered permanent irreversible brain damage.
In view of the actuations of the anaesthesiologists and the
administration of anaesthesia, the committee find that the same
were all in accordance with the universally accepted standards of
medical care and there is no evidence of any fault or negligence
on the part of the anaesthesiologists.
3. NO!
Although the result now reached has resolved the issue of civil
liability, we have to address the unusual decree of the RTC, as
affirmed by the CA, of expressly holding Ospital ng Maynila civilly
liable jointly and severally with Dr. Solidum. The decree was
flawed in logic and in law.
In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability that is deemed instituted with the criminal action refers
only to that arising from the offense charged.48 It is puzzling,
therefore, how the RTC and the CA could have adjudged
Ospital ng Maynila jointly and severally liable with Dr.
Solidum for the damages despite the obvious fact that
Ospital ng Maynila, being an artificial entity, had not
been charged along with Dr. Solidum. The lower courts
thereby acted capriciously and whimsically, which
rendered their judgment against Ospital ng Maynila void
as the product of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction.
Not surprisingly, the flawed decree raises other material concerns
that the RTC and the CA overlooked. We deem it important,
then, to express the following observations for the instruction of
the Bench and Bar.
For one, Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the
proceedings. Hence, its fundamental right to be heard
was not respected from the outset. The R TC and the CA
should have been alert to this fundamental defect. Verily,
no person can be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an
action or proceeding in which he was not made a party.
Such a rule would enforce the constitutional guarantee of
due process of law.
Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only
when subsidiary liability would be properly enforceable pursuant
to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. But the subsidiary
liability seems far-fetched here. The conditions for subsidiary
liability to attach to Ospital ng Maynila should first be complied
with. Firstly, pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code,
Ospital ng Maynila must be shown to be a corporation "engaged
in any kind of industry." The term industry means any
department or branch of art, occupation or business, especially
one that employs labor and capital, and is engaged in industry.
However, Ospital ng Maynila, being a public hospital, was not
engaged in industry conducted for profit but purely in charitable
and humanitarian work. Secondly, assuming that Ospital ng
Maynila was engaged in industry for profit, Dr. Solidum must be
shown to be an employee of Ospital ng Maynila acting in the
discharge of his duties during the operation on Gerald. Yet, he
definitely was not such employee but a consultant of the
hospital. And, thirdly, assuming that civil liability was adjudged
against Dr. Solidum as an employee (which did not happen
here), the execution against him was unsatisfied due to his being
insolvent.
Air France vs. Carrascoso | Dela Cruz
Carrascoso went on a pilgrimage from Manila to Rome with a
"first class" ticket issued by Air France (AF) through its agent,
PAL. From Manila to Bangkok, he travelled in "first class".
However, in Bangkok, he was forced by the Manager of AF to
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vacate his seat and transfer to the "tourist class" as a "white
man" had a better right to the seat. He did so under protest.
AF contends that there is a need to confirm the ticket before the
passenger can actually take the "first class" seat. Carrascoso filed
a case claiming for moral and exemplary damages. AF contended
that the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he
would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon
the availability of first class seats.
ISSUE: W/N AF is liable to pay damages for the tortious acts of
its employee (Manager) in favor of Carrascoso. YES
RULING: It is evident that: First, There was a contract to
furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongst others,
the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That said contract was
breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class
transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith
when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his
first class accommodation berth "after he was already,
seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which
he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations,
thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded
feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. The
stress of the action is put on wrongful expulsion.
The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its
employees is well settled in law. For the willful malevolent act of
petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer.
Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury
to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept;
and, we held that upon the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil
Code, moral damages are recoverable.
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and
degree from any other contractual relation. And this, because of
the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its
business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to
avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air
carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public
duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees,
naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have
a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness,
respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be
protected against personal misconduct, injurious language,
indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any
rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a
passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the
carrier.
Although the relation of passenger and carrier is
"contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the
act that breaks the contract may be also a tort".
Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public
duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action is placed upon his
wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the
petitioner air carrier — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are
proper.
COCA-COLA Bottlers PH vs. CA and Ms. Lydia GERONIMO
| G.R. No. 110295 | October 1993 | Javier
 Geronimo is the owner of Kindergarten Wonderland
Canteen, an enterprise engaged in the sale of softdrinks and
other goods to the students of Kindergarten Wonderland and
to the public
 On or about 12 August 1989, some parents of the students
complained to her that the Coke and Sprite sold by her
contained fiber-like matter and other foreign substances or
particles; he then went over her stock of softdrinks and saw
the same substances as well; she brought the said bottles to
the Regional Health Office of DOH for examination;
subsequently, they informed her that the samples "are
adulterated”
 Her sales of soft drinks severely plummeted from the usual
10 cases per day to as low as 2 to 3 cases per day resulting
in losses of from P200.00 to P300.00 per day
 On 12 December 1989, she had to lose shop; she became
jobless and destitute
 On 7 May 1990, she filed a complaint for damages
 RTC: Dismissed the case. CA: Reversed such dismissal.
 Geronimo’s contention: Her cause of action is based on
quasi-delict under Article 2176, the prescriptive period
therefore is 4 years in accordance with Article 1144, thus the
filing of the complaint was well within the said period
 Coca-cola’s contention: The case is one for breach of
implied warranty against hidden defects or merchantability
under Article 1561 which prescribes within 6 months from
delivery of the softdrinks pursuant to Article 1571. No quasi-
delict since there is a pre-existing contractual obligation
between them
ISSUE/S:
(GUIDE QUESTION #13) Is the rule that there must be no
pre-existing contractual relations bet. Parties in a quasi-delict
absolute?
While it may be true that the pre-existing contract between the
parties may, as a general rule, bar the applicability of the law on
quasi-delict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise from
quasi-delict. Otherwise put, liability for quasi-delict may
still exist despite the presence of contractual relations.
Under American law, the liabilities of a manufacturer or seller of
injury-causing products may be based on negligence, breach of
warranty, tort, or other grounds such as fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation.
(GUIDE QUESTION #2) Quasi-delict, as defined in Article 2176
of the Civil Code, (which is known in Spanish legal treaties as
culpa aquiliana, culpa extra-contractual or cuasi-delitos) is
homologous but NOT identical to tort under the common law,
which includes not only negligence, but also intentional criminal
acts, such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit.
Main Issue: WON the action for damages is to be treated as
BREACH OF WARRANTY or on the basis of QUASI-DELICT?
(latter)
RULING: The vendee's remedies against a vendor with respect
to the warranties against hidden defects of or encumbrances
upon the thing sold are not limited to those prescribed in Article
1567 (which covers 1561). The vendee may also ask for the
annulment of the contract upon proof of error or fraud, in which
case the ordinary rule on obligations shall be applicable. The
vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-delict under
Article 2176.
Geronimo’s action was neither an action for rescission nor for
proportionate reduction of the price (under 1567), but for
DAMAGES arising from a quasi-delict. The CA was correct in
ruling that the existence of a contract did not preclude the action
for quasi-delict.
KHRISTINE REA M. REGINO, Assisted and Represented
by ARMANDO REGINO vs. PANGASINAN COLLEGES OF
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, RACHELLE A. GAMUROT and
ELISSA BALADAD | G.R. No. 156109 | November 18,
2004 | Juyo
Petitioner Regino was a first year computer science student at
Respondent PCST. The said school held a fund raising campaign.
Each student was required to pay for two tickets at the price of
P100 each. The students who purchased tickets will have
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Atty. Jess Zachael Espejo | Ateneo de Davao University | Uno Manresa & Friends Case Pool | 2014 to 2015
additional points in their test scores; those who refused to pay
were denied the opportunity to take the final examinations.
Financially strapped and prohibited by her religion from attending
dance parties and celebrations, Regino refused to pay for the
tickets. Next day, Baladad, after announcing to the entire class
that she was not permitting petitioner and another student to
take their statistics examinations for failing to pay for their
tickets, allegedly ejected them from the classroom. Petitioner's
pleas ostensibly went unheeded by Gamurot and Baladad, who
unrelentingly defended their positions as compliance with PCST's
policy.
Petitioner filed, as a pauper litigant, a Complaint5 for damages
against PCST, Gamurot and Baladad.
Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Respondents anchored their Motion to Dismiss on petitioner's
alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies before
resorting to the RTC. According to them, the determination of
the controversy hinge on the validity, the wisdom and the
propriety of PCST's academic policy.
Thus, the Complaint should have been lodged in the CHED.
Petitioner counters that the doctrine finds no relevance to the
present case since she is praying for damages, a remedy beyond
the domain of the CHED and well within the jurisdiction of the
courts.
ISSUES:
(1) WON this a civil case for damages. YES. Therefore,
exhaustion of admin remedies does not apply.
(2) WON respondents are liable for tort. The court a quo
is yet to find out. Case was remanded.
RATIONALE:
Petitioner is correct. First, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies has no bearing on the present case.
Petitioner is not asking for the reversal of the policies of PCST.
Neither is she demanding it to allow her to take her final
examinations; she was already enrolled in another educational
institution. A reversal of the acts complained of would not
adequately redress her grievances; under the circumstances, the
consequences of respondents' acts could no longer be undone or
rectified.
Second, exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when
there is competence on the part of the administrative body to act
upon the matter complained of. Administrative agencies are not
courts; they are neither part of the judicial system, nor are they
deemed judicial tribunals. Specifically, the CHED does not have
the power to award damages. Hence, petitioner could not have
commenced her case before the Commission.
Third, the exhaustion doctrine admits of exceptions, one of which
arises when the issue is purely legal and well within the
jurisdiction of the trial court. Petitioner's action for damages
inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation of the
Civil Code, a function that falls within the jurisdiction of the
courts.
Liability for Tort ̶
In her Complaint, petitioner also charged that private
respondents "inhumanly punish students x x x by reason only of
their poverty, religious practice or lowly station in life, which
inculcated upon [petitioner] the feelings of guilt, disgrace and
unworthiness;" as a result of such punishment, she was allegedly
unable to finish any of her subjects for the second semester of
that school year and had to lag behind in her studies by a full
year.
The acts of respondents supposedly caused her extreme
humiliation, mental agony and "demoralization of unimaginable
proportions" in violation of Articles 19, 21 and 26 of the Civil
Code. These provisions of the law state thus:
"Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith."
"Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury
to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage."
"Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors
and other persons. The following and similar acts,
though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall
produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and
other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's
residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life
or family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated
from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account
of his beliefs, lowly station in life, place of
birth, physical defect, or other personal
condition."
Generally, liability for tort arises only between parties not
otherwise bound by a contract. An academic institution, however,
may be held liable for tort even if it has an existing contract with
its students, since the act that violated the contract may also be
a tort.
In sum, the Court holds that the Complaint alleges sufficient
causes of action against respondents, and that it should not have
been summarily dismissed. Needless to say, the Court is not
holding respondents liable for the acts complained of. That will
have to be ruled upon in due course by the court a quo.
LOADMASTERS CUSTOMS SERVICES, INC. vs. GLODEL
BROKERAGE CORPORATION and R&B INSURANCE
CORPORATION | G.R. No. 179446 | January 10, 2011 |
Diesto
FACTS: R&B Insurance issued Marine Policy in favor of Columbia
to insure the shipment of 132 bundles of electric copper cathodes
against All Risks. On August 28, 2001, the cargoes were shipped
on board the vessel "Richard Rey" from Isabela, Leyte, to Pier
10, North Harbor, Manila. They arrived on the same date.
Columbia engaged the services of Glodel for the release and
withdrawal of the cargoes from the pier and the subsequent
delivery to its warehouses/plants. Glodel, in turn, engaged the
services of Loadmasters for the use of its delivery trucks to
transport the cargoes to Columbia’s warehouses/plants in
Bulacan and Valenzuela City.
The goods were loaded on board twelve (12) trucks owned by
Loadmasters, driven by its employed drivers and accompanied by
its employed truck helpers. Six (6) truckloads of copper cathodes
were to be delivered to Balagtas, Bulacan, while the other six (6)
truckloads were destined for Lawang Bato, Valenzuela City. The
cargoes in six truckloads for Lawang Bato were duly delivered in
Columbia’s warehouses there. Of the six (6) trucks en route to
Balagtas, Bulacan, however, only five (5) reached the
destination. One (1) truck, loaded with 11 bundles or 232 pieces
of copper cathodes, failed to deliver its cargo.
Later on, the said truck, an Isuzu, was recovered but without the
copper cathodes. Because of this incident, Columbia filed with
R&B Insurance a claim for insurance indemnity in the amount
ofP1,903,335.39. After the requisite investigation and
adjustment, R&B Insurance paid Columbia the amount
ofP1,896,789.62 as insurance indemnity.
R&B Insurance, thereafter, filed a complaint for damages against
both Loadmasters and Glodel. It sought reimbursement of the
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amount it had paid to Columbia for the loss of the subject cargo.
It claimed that it had been subrogated "to the right of the
consignee to recover from the party/parties who may be held
legally liable for the loss."2
RTC rendered a decision3 holding Glodel liable for damages for
the loss of the subject cargo and dismissing Loadmasters’
counterclaim for damages and attorney’s fees against R&B
Insurance. CA partly granted the appeal by holding that
Loadmasters as agent of Glodel is also liable to R&B Insurance in
the same amount as of that of Glodel.
ISSUE (main): Who, between Glodel and Loadmasters, is liable
to pay R&B Insurance for the amount of the indemnity it paid
Columbia.
RULING: Glodel and Loadmasters are solidarily liable.
Loadmasters and Glodel, being both common carriers,
are mandated from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, to observe the extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by
them according to all the circumstances of such case, as
required by Article 1733 of the Civil Code. When the Court
speaks of extraordinary diligence, it is that extreme measure of
care and caution which persons of unusual prudence and
circumspection observe for securing and preserving their own
property or rights.15 This exacting standard imposed on common
carriers in a contract of carriage of goods is intended to tilt the
scales in favor of the shipper who is at the mercy of the common
carrier once the goods have been lodged for shipment.16 Thus, in
case of loss of the goods, the common carrier is presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently.17This
presumption of fault or negligence, however, may be rebutted by
proof that the common carrier has observed extraordinary
diligence over the goods.
With respect to the time frame of this extraordinary
responsibility, the Civil Code provides that the exercise of
extraordinary diligence lasts from the time the goods are
unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by, the
carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or
constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person
who has a right to receive them.18
Premises considered, the Court is of the view that both
Loadmasters and Glodel are jointly and severally liable to R & B
Insurance for the loss of the subject cargo. Under Article 2194 of
the New Civil Code, "the responsibility of two or more persons
who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary."
Loadmasters’ claim that it was never privy to the contract
entered into by Glodel with the consignee Columbia or R&B
Insurance as subrogee, is not a valid defense. It may not have a
direct contractual relation with Columbia, but it is liable for tort
under the provisions of Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-
delicts which expressly provide: ART. 2176. Whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Pertinent is the ruling enunciated in the case of Mindanao
Terminal and Brokerage Service, Inc. v. Phoenix Assurance
Company of New York,/McGee & Co., Inc.19 where this Court
held that a tort may arise despite the absence of a contractual
relationship, to wit:
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the complaint filed by
Phoenix and McGee against Mindanao Terminal, from which the
present case has arisen, states a cause of action. The present
action is based on quasi-delict, arising from the negligent and
careless loading and stowing of the cargoes belonging to Del
Monte Produce. Even assuming that both Phoenix and McGee
have only been subrogated in the rights of Del Monte Produce,
who is not a party to the contract of service between Mindanao
Terminal and Del Monte, still the insurance carriers may have a
cause of action in light of the Court’s consistent ruling that the
act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. In fine, a
liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is
that which breaches the contract. In the present case, Phoenix
and McGee are not suing for damages for injuries arising
from the breach of the contract of service but from the
alleged negligent manner by which Mindanao Terminal
handled the cargoes belonging to Del Monte Produce. Despite
the absence of contractual relationship between Del Monte
Produce and Mindanao Terminal, the allegation of negligence on
the part of the defendant should be sufficient to establish a
cause of action arising from quasi-delict. [Emphases supplied]
In connection therewith, Article 2180 provides: The obligation
imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
It is not disputed that the subject cargo was lost while in the
custody of Loadmasters whose employees (truck driver and
helper) were instrumental in the hijacking or robbery of the
shipment. As employer, Loadmasters should be made answerable
for the damages caused by its employees who acted within the
scope of their assigned task of delivering the goods safely to the
warehouse. Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage
or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption juris
tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris
families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa
in vigilando) of its employees.20 To avoid liability for a quasi-
delict committed by its employee, an employer must overcome
the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of his employee. In this regard,
Loadmasters failed.
Glodel is also liable because of its failure to exercise
extraordinary diligence. It failed to ensure that Loadmasters
would fully comply with the undertaking to safely transport the
subject cargo to the designated destination. It should have been
more prudent in entrusting the goods to Loadmasters by taking
precautionary measures, such as providing escorts to accompany
the trucks in delivering the cargoes. Glodel should, therefore, be
held liable with Loadmasters. Its defense of force majeure is
unavailing.
ISSUE 2: What then is the extent of the respective liabilities of
Loadmasters and Glodel?
RULING: Each wrongdoer is liable for the total damage suffered
by R&B Insurance. Where there are several causes for the
resulting damages, a party is not relieved from liability, even
partially. It is sufficient that the negligence of a party is an
efficient cause without which the damage would not have
resulted. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors
that the damage would not have resulted from his negligence
alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other
concurrent tortfeasor. As stated in the case of Far Eastern
Shipping v. Court of Appeals x x x Where several causes
producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause
without which the injury would not have happened, the injury
may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may
be had against any or all of the responsible persons although
under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of
them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the
injured person was not the same. No actor's negligence ceases
to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the
negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the
entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause
of the injury.
There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability
is solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage.
Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions
of two or more persons, although acting independently, are in
combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to
 TORTS AND DAMAGES ©
Atty. Jess Zachael Espejo | Ateneo de Davao University | Uno Manresa & Friends Case Pool | 2014 to 2015
a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion
each contributed to the injury and either of them is
responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring
negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they
become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting
damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code. [Emphasis supplied]
(GUIDE QUESTION #7) What situations require extraordinary
diligence? In this case, when you are a common carrier.
Note: Kamo na pangita sa ubang issue related sa atong
topic.
Barredo vs. Garcia | GR 48006 | July 8, 1942 | Muñoz
- On the road between Malabon and Navotas, Province of Rizal,
there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate
Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by
Pedro Dimapilis.
- The carretela was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-
year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he
died two days later. - A criminal action was filed against
Fontanilla in the CFI of Rizal, and he was convicted and
sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day
to two years of prision correccional.
- The court in the criminal case granted the petition that the right
to bring a separate civil action be reserved.
- Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased,
on March 7, 1939, brought an action in the CFI of Manila against
Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and
employer of Pedro Fontanilla.
- CFI of MANILA awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs. CA
modified by reducing the damages to P1,000 with legal interest
from the time the action was instituted. It is undisputed that
Fontanilla's negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he was
driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high speed. As to
Barredo's responsibility.
- CA found: There is no proof that Fontanilla's employer
(Barredo) exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage. He was careless in employing Fontanilla
who had been caught several times for violation of the
Automobile Law and speeding violations. Therefore, he must
indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of article 1903 of the
Civil Code.
- The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto
Barredo is governed by the Revised Penal Code; hence, his
liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil action
against Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo
cannot be held responsible in this case.
- CA insists on applying in this case article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Article 1903 of the Civil Code is found in Chapter II, Title 16,
Book IV of the Civil Code. This fact makes said article
inapplicable to a civil liability arising from a crime as in the case
at bar simply because Chapter II of Title 16 of Book IV of the
Civil Code, in the precise words of article 1903 of the Civil Code
itself, is applicable only to "those (obligations) arising from
wrongful or negligent acts or omissions not punishable by law.
- CA held Fausto Barredo, liable in damages for the death of
Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a
taxi driver employed by said Fausto Barredo.
ISSUE: WON Fausto Barredo is primarily and directly responsible
under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro
Fontanilla.
RULING: YES. (CA’s decision is affirmed)
A quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana" is a separate legal institution
under the Civil Code, with a substantivity all its own, and
individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict
or crime. Upon this principle, and on the wording and spirit of
article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct
responsibility of employers may be safely anchored. The
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code are
as follows:
CIVIL CODE - ART. 1089, 1092, 1093, 1902, 1903, 1904
REVISED PENAL CODE - Art. 100, 101, 102, 103, 365.
It will thus be seen that while the terms of article 1902 of the
Civil Code seem to be broad enough to cover the driver's
negligence in the instant case, nevertheless article 1093 limits
cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions "not punishable by law." But
inasmuch as article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes not
only reckless but even simple imprudence or negligence, the fault
or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code has apparently
been crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the
"confusion worse confounded."
However, a closer study shows that such a concurrence of scope
in regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction
between the civil liability arising from a crime and the
responsibility for cuasi- delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The
same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability
arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual
under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. The individuality of
cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and
unmistakable. In Spanish legal terminology, this responsibility is
often referred to as culpa aquiliana. The distinctive nature of
cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According to article 1089,
one of the five sources of obligations is this legal institution of
cuasi-delito or culpa extra- contractual. Then article 1093
provides that this kind of obligation shall be governed by Chapter
II of Title XVI of Book IV, meaning articles 1902-1910. This
portion of the Civil Code is exclusively devoted to the legal
institution of culpa aquiliana.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code
and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are
only of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the
criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification,
merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the
former are punished only if there is a penal law clearly covering
them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any
kind of fault or negligence intervenes."
However, it should be noted that not all violations of the penal
law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention
of ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of the rules
of traffic when nobody is hurt. The foregoing authorities clearly
demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa
aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there
is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal
negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for
fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code,
and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil
liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate
responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910
of the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the authorities above
cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer
(BARREDO) - in this case the defendant-petitioner - is primarily
and directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only
reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or
negligence not punished by law, according to the literal import of
article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa
aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual
life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property through
any degree of negligence even the slightest would have to be
indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from
a crime. We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to
bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous.
 TORTS AND DAMAGES ©
Atty. Jess Zachael Espejo | Ateneo de Davao University | Uno Manresa & Friends Case Pool | 2014 to 2015
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case,
preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant
pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal
negligence which cannot be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but
can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases,
the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil
action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise,
there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's
liability effective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his
(the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to compelling
the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of
obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but
there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the
primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under article
1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to
facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the procedure
indicated by the defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it
being a matter of common knowledge that professional drivers of
taxis and similar public conveyances usually do not have
sufficient means with which to pay damages. In construing the
laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the
pathways of right and justice. At this juncture, it should be said
that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and their
presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society.
Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and
supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters
or employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the
services of these servants and employees. It is but right that
they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct for the
personnel and patrimonial safety of others. Many jurists also
base this primary responsibility of the employer on the principle
of representation of the principal by the agent. All these
observations acquire a peculiar force and significance when it
comes to motor accidents, and there is need of stressing and
accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both
the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has
given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already
discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and
efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a
common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil
responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is
another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the
Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws,
it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the
more expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana
or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to
help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time
we pointed out to the harm done by such practice and to restore
the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles
1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we
caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its
own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be
diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is
believed, make for the better safeguarding of private rights
because it re-establishes an ancient and additional remedy, and
for the further reason that an independent civil action, not
depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal
prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his
counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious
redress.
BATANGAS LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY, INC. (BLTB
Co.) and ANDRES I. ILAGAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS |
G.R. Nos. L-33138-39 | June 27, 1975 | Quidet
Andres I. Ilagan is a driver of petitioner Batangas Laguna
Tayabas Bus Company, Inc. (BLTB Co).
Ricardo de los Reyes while driving his Chevrolet car bound for
Manila, upon reaching Manila South Super Highway, BTCO bus
driven by Ilagan, and coming from the opposite direction
suddenly overtook a big cargo truck. In so doing, the bus took
the left or the lane on which De los Reyes was travelling. The
bus hit the car which resulted to de los Reyes’ and his niece’s
death, and causing serious injuries to the other car passengers.
2 civil cases (for damages arising from the vehicular accident)
were filed against Ilagan and BLTB Co. Thereafter, a criminal
action (reckless imprudence resulting to homicide) was filed
against Ilagan.
Then both RTC and CA ruled (in the civil cases) that the collision
was caused by the negligence of Ilagan.
To avoid the consequences of such culpable conduct, BLTB Co.
invoked Corpus v. Paje that the CRIMINAL action against its
driver must first be resolved and, until final resolution, it is
premature to proceed in the civil cases.
ISSUE:
WON civil action based on culpa aquiliana needs to await the
outcome of criminal action. NO
RULING:
The principal reliance of BLTB Co is on that portion of the opinion
of Justice Capistrano in Corpus v. Paje which reads thus:
As reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one
to the three crimes mentioned in Art.33 of the Civil
Code, there is no independent civil action for damages
that may be instituted in connection with said offense.
Hence, homicide through reckless imprudence or
criminal negligence comes under the general rule that
the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal action is a
bar to his civil liability based upon the same criminal act
notwithstanding that the injured party reserved his right
to institute a separate civil action.
From which, they would infer that "the criminal action against
driver Ilagan must first be resolved by respondent CA and, until
final resolution thereon, it is premature to proceed in the 2 civil
cases”.
However, the facts are dissimilar, and therefore Corpus vs. Paje
ruling cannot control. It cannot escape attention likewise that
less than a majority of the Court gave their approval to the
opinion penned by Justice Capistrano. The most serious objection
though is that the interpretation sought to be fastened by
petitioners, considering that as pointed out in the appealed
decision this is an action based on culpa aquiliana, is its
disregard of codal provisions as well as of an impressive number
of pronouncements of this Tribunal.
BLTB Co, moreover, ignored the crucial distinction that is readily
discernible between the facts in Corpus v. Paje and the facts in
the present case. As was pointed out in the opinion of Justice
Capistrano, the civil action for damages was made to rest "upon
the same criminal negligence" of which the defendant Felardo
Paje was acquitted in the criminal action.
From the opening paragraph of the opinion of the CA, now
sought to be reviewed, it is quite apparent that the liability of
petitioners was NOT predicated on criminal negligence but
rather on a quasi-delict which, as is clearly pointed out by
the Civil Code, is an independent source of obligation.
As a matter of fact, in Corpus case, the civil complaint was
dismissed by the lower court precisely on the ground that the
action based upon the quasi-delict had prescribed. That certainly
cannot be said of the present litigation. In this case, from the
beginning, both parties were fully aware that it was the
negligence of Ilagan as driver of BLTB Co, Inc. that gave rise to
the civil suit. It does not admit of doubt, therefore the invocation
of Corpus v. Paje is misplaced considering the dissimilarity in
the facts of the case and the equally relevant consideration that
the portion of the ponencia of Justice Capistrano, insofar as it
could be made to lend support to petitioner's plea, is not
doctrinal in character, lacking one vote for it to be the expression
of the opinion of this Court.
It is to misread the opinion of Justice Capistrano in Corpus case if
it is made to yield a significance that would under the
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Atty. Jess Zachael Espejo | Ateneo de Davao University | Uno Manresa & Friends Case Pool | 2014 to 2015

circumstances of this case reduce to a barren form of words the  On August 13, 1976 the defendants, private respondents
jural concept of a quasi-delict as an independent source of filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that there is another
obligation. The law is anything but that. The Civil Code speaks action, Criminal Case No. 3162-P, pending between the
unequivocally to the contrary. Article 2176 provides: same parties for the same cause
"Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,  On September 8, 1976 the Court of First Instance of Rizal at
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the Pasay City a decision in Criminal Case No. 3612-P acquitting
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre- the accused Maximo Borilla on the ground that he caused an
existing contractual relations between the parties, is called a injury by name accident
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
ISSUE: WON the heirs of Arsenio Virata, can prosecute an action
Chapter."
for the damages based on quasi-delict against Maximo Borilla
The liability of an employer is made clear under Art. 2180 in this and Victoria Ochoa
wise:
(GUIDE Q. #14: What is prohibited under Art. 2177?)
"Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
HELD: YES. It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
parties may choose between an action under the Revised Penal
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged
Code or of quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the
in any business or industry."
Philippines. What is PROHIBITED by Article 2177 of the Civil
So it was under the former Civil Code, although there is a slight Code of the Philippines is to recover twice for the same
difference in phraseology. What is more, there is this new negligent act.
provision in Article 2177: "Responsibility for fault or negligence
Article 2176, where it refers to fault, covers not only acts 'not
under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from
punishable by law' but also criminal in character, whether
the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.
intentional and voluntary, and consequently, a separate civil
But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act
action lies against the accused in a criminal act, whether or not
or omission of the defendant."
he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty and acquitted,
Then, in 1907 in the leading case of Rakes v. Atlantic, Manresa provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually
was quoted to the effect that culpa or negligence or culpa charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and
aquiliana is an independent source of obligation between 2 would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of
persons not so formerly bound by any juridical tie. The civil the, two assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In
liability that may arise according to Justice Tracey in his opinion other words the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (c) of
"was not intended to be merged in the criminal… Where an Section 13, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded
individual is civilly liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil
required that the injured party should seek out a third person liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not
criminally liable whose prosecution must be a condition as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the
precedent to the enforcement of the civil right." criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or
has not been committed by the accused. Brief stated, We hold,
Employers and Employees; Civil Action Based on Culpa Aquiliana
that culpa aquilina includes voluntary and negligent acts which
Need Not Await the Outcome of Criminal Action. — If the liability
may be punishable by law. 3
of the employer for the negligence of an employee is not
predicated on criminal negligence but rather on a quasi-delict The petitioners are not seeking to recover twice for the same
which by the Civil Code (Art. 1157 in relation to Art. 2180, 2176 negligent act. Before Criminal Case No. 3162-P was decided, they
and 2177) is an independent source of obligation, the contention manifested in said criminal case that they were filing a separate
that the criminal action against the employee must first be civil action for damages against the owner and driver of the
resolved will be rejected as without basis. passenger jeepney based on quasi-delict. The acquittal of the
driver, Maximo Borilla, of the crime charged in Criminal Case No.
Culpa Aquiliana Defined. (GUIDE QUESTION #9) — Culpa or
3162-P is not a bar to the prosecution of Civil Case No. B-134 for
negligence or culpa aquiliana is an independent source of
damages based on quasi-delict The source of the obligation
obligation between two persons not so formerly bound by any
sought to be enforced in Civil Case No. B-134 isquasi-delict, not
juridical tie. And the civil liability that may arise therefrom is not
an act or omission punishable by law. Under Article 1157 of the
intended to be merged in the criminal. Thus, where an individual
Civil Code of the Philippines, quasi-delict and an act or omission
is civilly liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not required
punishable by law are two different sources of obligation.
that the injured party should seek out a third person criminally
liable. Moreover, for the petitioners to prevail in the action for damages,
Civil Case No. B-134, they have only to establish their cause of
action by preponderance of the evidence.
Virata vs. Ochoa | GR L- 46179 | Jan. 31, 1978, Murcia
 On September 24, 1975 one Arsenio Virata died as a result
oOo
of having been bumped while walking along Taft Avenue,
Pasay City by a passenger jeepney driven by Maximo Borilla
and registered in the name Of Victoria Ochoa
 Borilla is the employer of Ochoa
 For the death of Arsenio Virata, an action for homicide
through reckless imprudence was instituted on September
25, 1975 against Maximo Borilla in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal
 On June 29, 1976 the heirs of Arsenio Virata reserved their
right to institute a separate civil actionon July 19, 1977 the
heirs of Arsenio Virata, petitioners herein, commenced Civil
No. B-134 in the Court of First Instance of Cavite for
damages based on quasi-delict against the driver Maximo
Borilla and the registered owner of the jeepney, Victorio
Ochoa