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Petitioner Amelia J.

Delos Santos seeks in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
to nullify and set aside the decision and resolution dated 21 March 2002 [1] and 03 July 2002[2], respectively, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62229.

From the petition and its annexes, the respondents comment thereto, and the parties respective memoranda, the
Court gathers the following factual antecedents:

On 10 August 1995, or thereabout, herein respondent Jebsen Maritime, Inc., for and in behalf of Aboitiz Shipping
Co. (Aboitiz Shipping, for short), hired petitioners husband, Gil R. Delos Santos (hereinafter, Delos Santos) as third
engineer of MV Wild Iris. The corresponding contract of employment, as approved by the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA), was for a fixed period of one (1) month and for a specific undertaking of
conducting said vessel to and from Japan. It quoted Delos Santos basic monthly salary and other monetary benefits
in US currency. Under POEA rules, all employers and principals are required to adopt the POEA - standard
employment contract (POEA-SEC) without prejudice to their adoption of terms and conditions over and above the
minimum prescribed by that agency.[3]

On the vessels return to the Philippines a month after, Delos Santos remained on board, respondent having opted
to retain his services while the vessel underwent repairs in Cebu. After its repair, MV Wild Iris, this time
renamed/registered as MV Super RoRo 100, sailed within domestic waters, having been meanwhile issued by the
Maritime Industry Authority a Certificate of Vessel Registry and a permit to engage in coastwise trade on the Manila-
Cebu-Manila-Zamboanga-General Santos-Manila route.[4] During this period of employment, Delos Santos was paid
by and received from respondent his salary in Philippine peso thru a payroll-deposit arrangement with the Philippine
Commercial & Industrial Bank.[5]

Some five months into the vessels inter-island voyages, Delos Santos experienced episodes of chest pain, numbness
and body weakness which eventually left him temporarily paralyzed. On 17 February 1996, he was brought to
the Manila Doctors Hospital a duly accredited hospital of respondent - where he underwent a spinal column
operation. Respondent shouldered all operation-related expenses, inclusive of his post operation confinement.

As narrated in the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, the following events next transpired:

1. After his discharge from the Manila Doctors, Delos Santos was made to undergo physical therapy sessions at the
same hospital, which compelled the Batangas-based Delos Santoses to rent a room near the hospital at P3,000.00 a
month;

2. Delos Santos underwent a second spinal operation at the non-accredited Lourdes Hospital at the cost of P119,
536.00; and

3. After Lourdes, Delos Santos was confined in a clinic in San Juan, Batangas where P20,000.00 in hospitalization
expenses was incurred.

It would appear that the spouses Delos Santos paid all the expenses attendant the second spinal operation as well
as for the subsequent medical treatment. Petitioners demand for reimbursement of these expenses was rejected by
respondent for the reason that all the sickness benefits of Delos Santos under the Social Security System (SSS) Law
had already been paid.

Thus, on 25 January 1997, petitioner filed a complaint[6] with the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) against respondent and Aboitiz Shipping for recovery of disability benefits, and sick wage
allowance and reimbursement of hospital and medical expenses. She also sought payment of moral damages and
attorneys fees.

After due proceedings, the labor arbiter rendered, on 08 January 1999, [7] judgment finding for petitioner and
ordering respondent and Aboitiz Shipping to jointly and severally pay the former the following:
On appeal, the NLRC, in a decision[8] dated 29 August 2000, modified that of the labor arbiter, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED to the extent that respondents Jebsen Maritime, Inc., and
Aboitiz Shipping Company are hereby ordered jointly and severally liable to pay Gil delos Santos through Amelia
delos Santos the Philippine peso equivalent at the time of actual payment of US DOLLARS SIXTY THOUSAND
(US$60,000.00) and US DOLLARS TWO THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRD (sic) FIFTY TWO (US$2,452.00) representing total
disability compensation benefits and sickness wages, and the amount of ONE HUNDRED THREE THOUSAND EGHT
(sic) HUNDRED FOUR AND 87/100 PHILIPPINE PESOS (P103,804.87) representing reimbursement of surgical, medical
and hospital expenses, plus the equivalent of five percent (5%) of the aggregate award as and for attorneys fees.

All other dispositions are SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Like the labor arbiter, the NLRC predicated its ruling mainly on the theory that the POEA-approved contract of
employment continued to govern Delos Santos employment when he contracted his illness. In specific terms, the
NLRC states that the same contract was still effective when Delos Santos fell ill, thus entitling him to the payment of
disability and like benefits provided in and required under the POEA-SEC.

Following the denial of its motion for reconsideration per NLRC Resolution[9] of 31 October 2000, respondent went
to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari, thereat docketed as CA-G.R. No. 62229, imputing on the NLRC
grave abuse of discretion. In its petition, respondent scored the NLRC for, among other things, extending the
application of the expired POEA-approved employment contract beyond the one-month limit stipulated therein.

On 21 March 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment[10], modifying the NLRCs decision by deleting altogether
the award of disability compensation benefits, sickness wages and attorneys fees, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DENIED, finding no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC. The Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated August
29, 2000 and the Resolution of October 31, 2000 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration are hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, that the disability compensation benefits of US$60,000.00 and the sickness wages
of US$2,452.00 are hereby deleted, without prejudice to claiming the same from the proper government agency.
The award of attorneys fees is likewise deleted.

In time, petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court denied the motion per its resolution of 03 July
2002.[11]

Hence, petitioners present recourse on the grounds that the Court of Appeals seriously erred: [12]

IN DELETING THE AWARD OF US$60,000.00 REPRESENTING THE MAXIMUM DISABILITY BENEFITS APPLYING THE
PROVISIONS OF THE POEA STANDARD EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT.

(A) PRIOR TO HIS ACCIDENT, THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT OF SEAFARER DELOS SANTOS HAS NOT YET BEEN
TERMINATED, IN RELATION TO SECTION 2, PARAGRAPHS (A) AND (B) AND SECTION 18 (A), POEA STANDARD
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT.

(B) THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT AT THE TIME OF SEAFARER DELOS SANTOS ACCIDENT HAS NOT YET EXPIRED
BECAUSE IT WAS MUTUALLY EXTENDED BY THE PARTIES WHEN DELOS SANTOS WAS NOT SIGNED OFF AND
REPATRIATED PRIOR TO SAID ACCIDENT.
II

IN CONCLUDING THAT NOTWITHSTANDING THE CONTINUATION OF DELOS SANTOS EMPLOYMENT ON BOARD THE
SAME VESSEL AND UNDER THE SAME CONTRACT, IT IS THE PROVISIONS OF THE LABOR CODE, AS AMENDED, THAT
SHALL GOVERN HIS EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS.

III

IN DELETING THE AWARD OF SICKNESS ALLOWANCE IN THE AMOUNT OF US$2,452.00.

(A) THERE IS NO BASIS IN THE DELETION OF THE AWARD OF SICKNESS ALOWANCE (sic) SINCE PAYMENT OF SOCIAL
SECURITY SYSTEM SICK LEAVE BENEFIT IS INDEPENDENT, SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM THE SICKNESS ALLOWANCE
PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE POEA STANDARD EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT.

The petition is devoid of merit.

As a rule, stipulations in an employment contract not contrary to statutes, public policy, public order or morals have
the force of law between the contracting parties.[13] An employment with a period is generally valid, unless the term
was purposely intended to circumvent the employees right to his security of tenure. [14] Absent a covering specific
agreement and unless otherwise provided by law, the terms and conditions of employment of all employees in the
private sector shall be governed by the Labor Code[15] and such rules and regulations as may be issued by the
Department of Labor and Employment and such agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of the
Code.

The differing conclusions arrived at by the NLRC, finding for the herein petitioner, and the Court of Appeals, siding
in part with the herein respondent, on Delos Santos entitlement to disability benefits and sickness allowance are
veritably attributable to the question of applicability, under the premises, of the POEA-SEC. The principal issue to be
resolved here, therefore, boils down to: which, between the POEA-SEC and the Labor Code, governs the employer-
employee relationship between Delos Santos and respondent after MV Wild Iris, as later renamed Super RoRo
100, returned to the country from its one-month conduction voyage to and from Japan.

The Court of Appeals ruled against the governing applicability of the POEA-SEC and, on that basis, deleted the NLRCs
award of US$60,000.00 and US$2,452.00 by way of disability benefits and sickness allowance, respectively. An
excerpt of the appellate courts explanation:

xxx Both parties do not dispute the existence of the POEA approved contract signed by the parties. The said contract
is the law between the contracting parties and absent any showing that its provisions are wholly or in part contrary
to law, morals, good policy, it shall be enforced to the letter by the contracting parties (Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Co. vs. Wong, G.R. No. 120859, June 26, 2001). The contract in question is for a duration of one (1) month. Being a
valid contract between Delos Santos and the [respondent], the provisions thereof, specifically with respect to the
one (1) month period of employment has the force of law between them (D.M. Consunji vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 116572,
December 18, 2000). Perforce, the said contract has already expired and is no longer in effect.

The fact that Delos Santos continued to work in the same vessel which sailed within Philippine waters does not mean
that the POEA standard employment contract continues to be enforced between the parties. The employment of
Delos Santos is within the Philippines, and not on a foreign shore. As correctly pointed out by [respondent], the
provisions of the Labor Code shall govern their employer-employee relationship. xxx. (Words in bracket added.)
The Court agrees with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals for two (2) main reasons. First, we the start with
something elementary, i.e., POEA was created primarily to undertake a systematic program for overseas
employment of Filipino workers and to protect their rights to fair and equitable employment practices. [16] And to
ensure that overseas workers, including seafarers on board ocean-going vessels, are amply protected, the POEA is
authorized to formulate employment standards in accordance with welfare objectives of the overseas employment
program.[17] Given this consideration, the Court is at a loss to understand why the POEA-SEC should be made to
continue to apply to domestic employment, as here, involving a Filipino seaman on board an inter-island vessel.

Just as basic as the first reason is the fact that Delos Santos POEA-approved employment contract was for a definite
term of one (1) month only, doubtless fixed to coincide with the pre-determined one-month long Philippines-Japan-
Philippines conduction-voyage run. After the lapse of the said period, his employment under the POEA-approved
contract may be deemed as functus oficio and Delos Santos employment pursuant thereto considered automatically
terminated, there being no mutually-agreed renewal or extension of the expired contract.[18] This is as it should be.
For, as we have held in the landmark case of Millares v. National Labor Relations Commission:[19]

From the foregoing cases, it is clear that seafarers are considered contractual employees. Their employment is
governed by the contracts they sign every time they are rehired and their employment is terminated when the
contract expires. Their employment is contractually fixed for a certain period of time. They fall under the exception
of Article 280 [of the Labor Code] whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking . . . We
need not depart from the rulings of the Court in the two aforementioned cases which indeed constitute stare
decisis with respect to the employment status of seafarers. (Underscoring and words in bracket added)

Petitioners posture, citing Section 2 (A)[20] in relation to Section 18[21] of the POEA-SEC about the POEA approved
contract still subsisting since Delos Santos was never signed off from the vessel and repatriated to Manila, the point
of hire, is untenable. With the view we have of things, Delos Santos is deemed to have been signed off when he
acceded to a new employment arrangement offered by the respondent. A seaman need not physically disembarked
from a vessel at the expiration of his employment contract to have such contract considered terminated. And the
repatriation aspect of the contract assumes significance only where the vessel remains in a foreign port. For,
repatriation presupposes a return to ones country of origin or citizenship. [22] In the case at bar, however, there can
be quibbling that MV Wild Iris returned to the port of Cebu with Delos Santos on board. Parenthetically, while the
parties are agreed that their underlying contract was executed in the country, the records do not indicate what city
or province of the Philippines is the specific point of hire. While petitioner says it is Manila, she did not bother to
attach to her petition a copy of the contract of employment in question.

Petitioner next submits, echoing the NLRCs holding, that the POEA-approved contract remained in full force and
effect even after the expiry thereof owing to the interplay of the following circumstances: 1) Delos Santos, after such
contract expiration, did not conclude another contract of employment with respondent, but was asked to remain
and work on board the same vessel just the same; and 2) If the parties intended their employer-employee
relationship to be under the aegis of a new contract, such intention should have been embodied in a new agreement.

Contract extension or continuation by mutual consent appears to be petitioners thesis.

We are not persuaded.

The fact that respondent retained Delos Santos and allowed him to remain on board the vessel cannot plausibly be
interpreted, in context, as evidencing an intention on its part to continue with the POEA-SEC. In the practical
viewpoint, there could have been no sense in consenting to renewal since the rationale for the execution of the
POEA-approved contract had already been served and achieved.
At any rate, factors obtain arguing against the notion that respondent consented to contract extension under the
same terms and conditions prevailing when the original contract expired. Stated a bit differently, there are
compelling reasons to believe that respondent retained the services of the acceding Delos Santos, as the Court of
Appeals aptly observed, but under domestic terms and conditions. We refer first to the reduced salary of Delos
Santos payable in Philippine peso[23] which, significantly enough, he received without so much of a protest. As
respondent stated in its Comment, without any controverting response from petitioner, Delos Santos, for the period
ending October 31, 1995, was drawing a salary at the rate of P8,475.00 a month, whereas the compensation package
stipulated under the POEA-approved contract provided for a US$613 basic monthly salary and a US$184 fixed
monthly overtime pay. And secondly, MV Super RoRo 100 was no longer engaged in foreign trading as it was no
longer intended as an ocean-going ship. Accordingly, it does not make sense why a seafarer of goodwill or a manning
agency of the same disposition would insist on being regulated by an overseas employment agency under its
standard employment contract, which governs employment of Filipino seamen on board ocean-going vessels.[24]

Petitioners submission about the parties not having entered into another employment contract after the expiration
of the POEA-approved employment contract, ergo, the extension of the expired agreement, is flawed by the logic
holding it together. For, it presupposes that an agreement to do or to give does not bind, unless it is embodied in a
written instrument. It is elementary, however, that, save in very rare instances where certain formal requisites go
into its validity, a contract, to be valid and binding between the parties, need not be in writing. A contract is perfected
when the contracting minds agree on the object and cause thereof. [25] And, as earlier discussed, several
circumstantial indicia tended to prove that a new arrangement under domestic terms was agreed upon by the
principal players to govern the employment of Delos Santos after the return of MV Wild Iris to the country to engage
in coastwise trading.

Given the foregoing perspective, the disallowance under the decision subject of review of the petitioners claim for
maximum disability benefits and sickness allowance is legally correct. As it were, Delos Santos right to such benefits
is predicated on the continued enforceability of POEA-SEC when he contracted his illness, which, needless to stress,
was not the case.

Likewise legally correct is the deletion of the award of attorneys fees, the NLRC having failed to explain petitioners
entitlement thereto. As a matter of sound policy, an award of attorneys fee remains the exception rather than the
rule. It must be stressed, as aptly observed by the appellate court, that it is necessary for the trial court, the NLRC in
this case, to make express findings of facts and law that would bring the case within the exception. In fine, the
factual, legal or equitable justification for the award must be set forth in the text of the decision. [26] The matter of
attorneys fees cannot be touched once and only in the fallo of the decision, else, the award should be thrown out
for being speculative and conjectural.[27] In the absence of a stipulation, attorneys fees are ordinarily not
recoverable; otherwise a premium shall be placed on the right to litigate.[28]They are not awarded every time a party
wins a suit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
INTEGRATED CONTRACTOR AND PLUMBING WORKS vs NLRC Case Digest
[G.R. No. 152427. August 9, 2005]

FACTS: Petitioner is a plumbing contractor. Its business depends on the number and frequency of the
projects it is able to contract with its clients. Private respondent Solon worked for petitioner. And his
employment record shows that he has by petitioner from December 1994 to January 1998 in 10 projects.
On February 23, 1998, while private respondent was about to log out from work, he was informed by the
warehouseman that the main office had instructed them to tell him it was his last day of work as he had
been terminated. When private respondent went to the petitioner’s office on February 24, 1998 to verify his
status, he found out that indeed, he had been terminated. He went back to petitioner’s office on February
27, 1998 to sign a clearance so he could claim his 13th month pay and tax refunds. However, he had
second thoughts and refused to sign the clearance when he read the clearance indicating he had resigned.
On March 6, 1998, he filed a complaint alleging that he was illegally dismissed without just cause and
without due process.

The petitioner asserts that the private respondent was a project employee. Thus, when the project was
completed and private respondent was not re-assigned to another project, petitioner did not violate any law
since it was petitioner’s discretion to re-assign the private respondent to other projects.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent is a project employee of the petitioner or a regular employee.

HELD: The SC held that the principal test in determining whether an employee is a “project employee” or
“regular employee,” is, whether he is assigned to carry out a “specific project or undertaking,” the duration
(and scope) of which are specified at the time the employee is engaged in the project. “Project” refers to a
particular job or undertaking that is within the regular or usual business of the employer, but which is distinct
and separate and identifiable from the undertakings of the company. Such job or undertaking begins and
ends at determined or determinable times.

The SC was convinced he was initially a project employee. The services he rendered, the duration and
scope of each project are clear indications that he was hired as a project employee.

However, once a project or work pool employee has been: (1) continuously, as opposed to intermittently,
re-hired by the same employer for the same tasks or nature of tasks; and (2) these tasks are vital, necessary
and indispensable to the usual business or trade of the employer, then the employee must be deemed a
regular employee.

The test to determine whether employment is regular or not is the reasonable connection between the
particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer.
Also, if the employee has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not
continuous or merely intermittent, the law deems the repeated and continuing need for its performance as
sufficient evidence of the necessity, if not indispensability of that activity to the business. Thus, we held that
where the employment of project employees is extended long after the supposed project has been finished,
the employees are removed from the scope of project employees and are considered regular employees.

While length of time may not be the controlling test for project employment, it is vital in determining if the
employee was hired for a specific undertaking or tasked to perform functions vital, necessary and
indispensable to the usual business or trade of the employer. Here, private respondent had been a project
employee several times over. His employment ceased to be coterminous with specific projects when he
was repeatedly re-hired due to the demands of petitioner’s business. Where from the circumstances it is
apparent that periods have been imposed to preclude the acquisition of tenurial security by the employee,
they should be struck down as contrary to public policy, morals, good customs or public order.

Further, Policy Instructions No. 20 requires employers to submit a report of an employee’s termination to
the nearest public employment office every time his employment was terminated due to a completion of a
project. The failure of the employer to file termination reports is an indication that the employee is not a
project employee. Department Order No. 19 superseding Policy Instructions No. 20 also expressly provides
that the report of termination is one of the indications of project employment. In the case at bar, there was
only one list of terminated workers submitted to the Department of Labor and Employment. If private
respondent was a project employee, petitioner should have submitted a termination report for every
completion of a project to which the former was assigned.

Juxtaposing private respondent’s employment history, vis the requirements in the test to determine if he is
a regular worker, we are constrained to say he is.

As a regular worker, private respondent is entitled to security of tenure under Article 279 of the Labor Code
and can only be removed for cause. We found no valid cause attending to private respondent’s dismissal
and found also that his dismissal was without due process.
Universal Robina Corporation vs. Catapang

473 SCRA 189October 14, 2005CertiorariCallejo, Sr.

FACTS:

Pet: Universal Robina Corporation-company

Randy Gregorio – manager of company’s duck farm in Calauan, Laguna

Resp:30 people-Respondents were hired by the company on various dates from 1991-1993 to work at its duck farm.
Their contracts were only for a 5-month period, renewed every expiration/ in 1996, the company told the
respondents that their contract won’t be renewed anymore. Respondents filed complaints for illegal dismissal,
reinstatement, back wages, damages and attorney’s fees against petitioners.

-LA: illegal dismissal. Respondents must be reinstated to former positions without loss of seniority rights and must
pay back wages-Petitioners appealed to NLRC while respondents filed Writ of Execution with LA-Petitioners told LA
that they can only reinstate 17 of the 30 respondents (reason: phase out). For the 13, there are no other positions
similar to their previous ones but 10 may be accommodated for a 3-day-per-week work -Petitioners initially failed
to comply with LA’s order but the 17 were eventually reinstated. The duck farm was closed.-The 13 respondents
wanted garnishment to collect the wages awarded by the LA. Petitioners wanted to quash, saying that they can’t
accommodate the 13 anymore because of phase out and their previous positions were already filled up-NLRC: affirm
LA decision-CA: respondents were regular employees. Their being hired for more than 1 year doing the same work
made them regular and not just project employees. 5-month contracts are only a means tore fuse them security of
tenure. The 13 should have been paid even if they were not reinstated.

ISSUE and HELD:

WON respondents are regular employees--- YES.

-[there was a discussion regarding procedure. Petitioners weren’t able to file MR within the reglementary period,
saying that they did not receive the decision on time and they miscounted the period for filing.SC said NO, the
petition is late, this should have been dismissed.]-

Abasolo vs. NLRC:

test in determining whether one is a regular employee:

Primary standard:

reasonable connection between the particular activity performed bythe employee in relation to the usual trade or
business of the employer.

Is the activity usually necessary or desirable to employer’s trade or business?

Must consider the nature of work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its
entirety

If employee has been performing the work for at least a year, even if intermittently, this is sufficient to say that the
work is necessary and indispensable to the business. Thus, he is regular with respect to that work and while it lasts.-
Affirm CA’s findings. The 5-month contract was only used to prevent respondents from being regulars. This is
contrary to public policy or morals. 3-5 years of continuous hiring negates petitioners’ argument that they are only
for a specific project-Factual findings of labor officials who have expertise are accorded not only respect but even
finality and is binding on SC when supported by substantial evidence
Mercado v. NLRC Digest

Mercado v. NLRC

Facts:

1. Petitioners were agricultural workers of the private respondent's sugar land who were dismissed. They had
worked in all agriculture phases for several years in the said sugar land. The respondent denied that petitioners were
regular employees alleging that their services were engaged through 'mandarols' or supply workers to do a particular
phase of the agricultural work.

2. As a result, the petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter held that the petitioners were
not regular employees and the NLRC affirmed this ruling.

Issue: W/N the petitioners are regular and permanent farm workers

RULING: No, they are project/seasonal employees. A project employee is one whose employment has been fixed for
a specific project or undertaking, the completion has been determined at the time of engagement, or where work
or service is seasonal in nature and employment is for the duration of the season.

As such, the termination of employment cannot be considered as illegal dismissal. The petitioners are free to
contract their services to work for other farm owners.
Abasolo v. NLRC

Facts:
1. The private respondent La Union Tobacco (Lutorco), owned by See Lun Chan is engaged in
buying/processing of tobacco and its by-products. The petitioners worked in respondent company but
work was interrupted when Tabacalera took over the Lutorco operations due to alleged losses.
Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a complaint for separation pay and dismissal. The respondent
contended that it is exempt from payment of separation pay and denied that there was termination of
employees' services.

2. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint and held that the petitioners are not entitled to separation
benefits since Lutorco ceased operations due to serious business losses. The NLRC affirmed said
ruling.

Issue: W/N the petitioners are seasonal workers

RULING: No, the petitioners are considered regular and seasonal employees. They performed services
necessary and indispensable to Lutorco's business. The nature of one's employment does not depend
solely on the will or word of the employer nor on the procedure of hiring and manner of designating
the employee but on the nature of the activity to be performed considering the employer's nature of
business and the duration and scope of work to be done.

As held in previous decisions, seasonal workers are those who are called to work from time to time
and are temporarily laid off during off-season are not separated from service in said period but merely
considered on-leave until re-employed.
BENARES V PANCHO

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] is the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
National Labor Relations Commissions (NLRC) decision[3] holding that respondents were illegally dismissed and
ordering petitioner to pay respondents separation pay, backwages, 13th month pay, Cost of Living Allowance (COLA),
emergency relief allowance (ERA), salary differentials and attorneys fees. The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiters
finding that respondents failed to lay down the facts and circumstances surrounding their dismissal and to prove
their entitlement to monetary awards.[4]

The antecedents, as narrated by the NLRC, follow.

Complainants alleged to have started working as sugar farm workers on various dates, to wit:

1. Jaime Pancho November 15, 1964

2. Rodolfo Pancho, Jr. February 1, 1975

3. Joselito Medalla November 15, 1964

4. Paquito Magallanes March 10, 1973

5. Felomino Magallanes November 15, 1964

6. Alicia Magallanes January 15, 1964

7. Evelyn Magallanes January 1, 1974

8. Violeta Villacampa December 1, 1979

9. Maritess Pancho December 15, 1985

10. Rogelio Pancho December 1, 1979

11. Arnolfo Pancho February 1, 1975

Respondent Hda. Maasin II is a sugar cane plantation located in Murcia, Negros Occidental with an area of 12-24
has. planted, owned and managed by Josefina Benares, individual co-respondent.

On July 24, 1991, complainants thru counsel wrote the Regional Director of the Department of Labor and
Employment, Bacolod City for intercession particularly in the matter of wages and other benefits mandated by law.

On September 24, 1991, a routine inspection was conducted by personnel of the Bacolod District Office of the
Department of Labor and Employment. Accordingly, a report and recommendation was made, hence, the
endorsement by the Regional Director of the instant case to the Regional Arbitration Branch, NLRC, Bacolod City for
proper hearing and disposition.

On October 15, 1991, complainants alleged to have been terminated without being paid termination benefits by
respondent in retaliation to what they have done in reporting to the Department of Labor and Employment their
working conditions viz-a-viz (sic) wages and other mandatory benefits.

On July 14, 1992, notification and summons were served to the parties wherein complainants were directed to file
a formal complaint.

On July 28, 1992, a formal complaint was filed for illegal dismissal with money claims.

From the records, summons and notices of hearing were served to the parties and apparently no amicable
settlement was arrived, hence, the parties were directed to file their respective position papers.
On January 22, 1993, complainant submitted their position paper, while respondent filed its position paper on June
21, 1993.

On March 17, 1994, complainants filed their reply position paper and affidavit. Correspondingly, a rejoinder was
filed by respondent on May 16, 1994.

On August 17, 1994, from the Minutes of the scheduled hearing, respondent failed to appear, and that the Office
will evaluate the records of the case whether to conduct a formal trial on the merits or not, and that the
corresponding order will be issued.

On January 16, 1996, the Labor Arbiter issued an order to the effect that the case is now deemed submitted for
resolution.

On April 30, 1998, the Labor Arbiter a quo issued the assailed decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.

On June 26, 1998, complainants not satisfied with the aforecited ruling interposed the instant appeal anchored on
the ground that:

THE HONORABLE LABOR ARBITER GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
COMPLAINANTS FAILED TO DISCUSS THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THEIR DISMISSAL, HENCE,
THERE IS NO DISMISSAL TO SPEAK OF AND THAT COMPLAINANTS FAILED TO ALLEGE AND PROVE THAT THEIR CLAIMS
ARE VALID, HENCE THE DISMISSAL OF THEIR COMPLAINT WOULD CAUSE GRAVE AND IRREPARABLE DAMAGE TO
HEREIN COMPLAINANTS.[5]

The NLRC held that respondents attained the status of regular seasonal workers of Hda. Maasin II having worked
therein from 1964-1985. It found that petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proving that the termination of
respondents was for a just or authorized cause. Hence, respondents were illegally dismissed and should be awarded
their money claims.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration[6] dated May 12, 1999 was denied in the resolution[7] dated October 29, 1999.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRCs ruling, with the modification that the backwages and other monetary
benefits shall be computed from the time compensation was withheld in accordance with Article 279 of the Labor
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6715.

In its Resolution[8] dated November 28, 2001, the appellate court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration for
lack of merit.

Petitioner is now before this Court averring that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the NLRC.
While petitioner concedes that the factual findings of the NLRC are generally binding on the appellate court,
petitioner insists that the findings of the NLRC are vague and contradictory, thereby necessitating review.

According to petitioner, the fact that she was able to present sufficient proof to rebut the claim of illegal dismissal
should be considered in light of the NLRCs admission that there are gray areas in the case which require clarification.
Petitioner avers that the NLRC should have at least remanded the case to the labor arbiter to thresh out these gray
areas. She further claims that the NLRC was overly zealous in awarding COLA and ERA despite the fact that
respondents did not even pray for these awards in their complaint. She also questions the NLRCs general statement
to the effect that the payroll she submitted is not convincing asserting that she submitted 235 sets of payroll, not
just one, and that the NLRC did not even bother to explain why it found the payroll unconvincing.

Respondents filed a Comment[9] dated May 10, 2002 alleging that petitioner failed to submit certified true copies of
the assailed decisions and resolutions, and that the petition lacks proof of service and raises questions of fact.
In her Reply to Comment[10] dated September 17, 2002, petitioner points out that the Rules of Court do not require
that all copies of the petition contain certified true copies of the questioned decisions and resolutions. Further, all
copies of the petition filed with the Court contain an affidavit of service. Respondents copy does not have an affidavit
of service because the sworn declaration can not be executed before service of the petition is actually made.
Petitioner also maintains that the rule on review of findings of fact by the Supreme Court admits of certain exceptions
such as when the conclusions arrived at are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures as in this
case.

The petition was given due course and the parties were required to submit their respective memoranda in
the Resolution[11] dated March 3, 2003. Petitioner filed a Manifestation and Compliance[12] dated April 22, 2003
adopting the allegations in her Petition for Review on Certiorari and Reply to Comment as her memorandum. For
their part, respondents filed a Memoranda For Private Respondents[13] dated May 7, 2003 alleging that the Court of
Appeals correctly relied upon the factual findings of the NLRC after having found the same to be supported by
substantial evidence. They insist that they are regular seasonal employees of the sugar plantation. As such, petitioner
has the burden of proving that their dismissal was for a just or authorized cause.

As regards the contention that the NLRC erroneously awarded COLA and ERA, respondents cite Osias Academy v.
DOLE,[14] which provides that the NLRC can extend monetary awards even if these are not prayed for if the monetary
benefits are statutory grants intended to alleviate the laborers plight like the COLA and ERA.

The main question raised by the present petition is whether respondents are regular employees of Hacienda Maasin
and thus entitled to their monetary claims. Related to this is the issue of whether respondents were illegally
terminated.

This case presents a good opportunity to reiterate the Courts rulings on the subject of seasonal employment. The
Labor Code defines regular and casual employment, viz:

Art. 280. REGULAR AND CASUAL EMPLOYMENT.The provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular
where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking
the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or
where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the
season.

An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any
employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be
considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall
continue while such activity exists.

The law provides for three kinds of employees: (1) regular employees or those who have been engaged to perform
activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer; (2) project
employees or those whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or
termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or
service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season; and (3) casual
employees or those who are neither regular nor project employees. [15]

In Mercado v. NLRC,[16] the Court ruled that seasonal workers do not become regular employees by the mere fact
that they have rendered at least one year of service, whether continuous or broken, because the proviso in the
second paragraph of Article 280 demarcates as casual employees, all other employees who do not fall under the
definition of the preceding paragraph. It deems as regular employees those casual employees who have rendered
at least one year of service regardless of the fact that such service may be continuous or broken.
The factual circumstances obtaining in the Mercado case, however, are peculiar. In that case, the workers were
engaged to do a particular phase of agricultural work necessary for rice and/or sugarcane production, after which
they would be free to render services to other farm workers who need their services.

In contrast, in the case of Hacienda Fatima v. National Federation of Sugarcane Workers-Food and General
Trade,[17] respondents performed the same tasks for petitioners every season for several years. Thus, they were
considered the latters regular employees for their respective tasks. The fact that they do not work continuously for
one whole year but only for the duration of the season does not detract from considering them in regular
employment since in a litany of cases this Court has already settled that seasonal workers who are called to work
from time to time and are temporarily laid off during off-season are not separated from service in that period, but
merely considered on leave until re-employed.[18]

Citing jurisprudence, the Court, in Hacienda Fatima, condensed the rule that the primary standard for determining
regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee vis--
vis the usual trade or business of the employer. This connection can be determined by considering the nature of the
work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. If the employee has
been performing the job for at least a year, even if the performance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the
law deems repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not
indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the employment is considered regular, but only with respect
to such activity and while such activity exists.[19]

In this case, petitioner argues that respondents were not her regular employees as they were merely pakiao workers
who did not work continuously in the sugar plantation. They performed such tasks as weeding, cutting and loading
canes, planting cane points, fertilizing, cleaning the drainage, etc. These functions allegedly do not require
respondents daily presence in the sugarcane field as it is not everyday that one weeds, cuts canes or applies fertilizer.
In support of her allegations, petitioner submitted cultivo and milling payrolls.

The probative value of petitioners evidence, however, has been passed upon by the labor arbiter, the NLRC and the
Court of Appeals. Although the labor arbiter dismissed respondents complaint because their position paper is
completely devoid of any discussion about their alleged dismissal, much less of the probative facts thereof, [20] the
ground for the dismissal of the complaint implies a finding that respondents are regular employees.

The NLRC was more unequivocal when it pronounced that respondents have acquired the status of regular seasonal
employees having worked for more than one year, whether continuous or broken in petitioners hacienda.

According to petitioner, however, the NLRCs conclusion is highly suspect considering its own admission that there
are gray areas which requires (sic) clarification. She alleges that despite these gray areas, the NLRC chose not to
remand the case to the Labor Arbiter.as this would unduly prolong the agony of the complainants in particular. [21]

Petitioner perhaps wittingly omitted mention that the NLRC opted to appreciate the merits of the instant case based
on available documents/pleadings.[22] That the NLRC chose not to remand the case to the labor arbiter for
clarificatory proceedings and instead decided the case on the basis of the evidence then available to it is a judgment
call this Court shall not interfere with in the absence of any showing that the NLRC abused its discretion in so doing.

The Court of Appeals, in fact, found no such grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC. Accordingly, it
dismissed the petition for certiorari and affirmed with modification the findings of the NLRC. It is well to note at this
point that in quasi-judicial proceedings, the quantum of evidence required to support the findings of the NLRC is
only substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to justify a conclusion.[23]

The issue, therefore, of whether respondents were regular employees of petitioner has been adequately dealt with.
The labor arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals have similarly held that respondents were regular employees
of petitioner. Since it is a settled rule that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies which have acquired expertise
in the matters entrusted to their jurisdiction are accorded by this Court not only respect but even finality, [24] we shall
no longer disturb this finding.

Petitioner next underscores the NLRC decisions mention of the payroll she presented despite the fact that she
allegedly presented 235 sets of payroll, not just one payroll. This circumstance does not in itself evince any grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC as it could well have been just an innocuous typographical error.

Verily, the NLRCs decision, affirmed as it was by the Court of Appeals, appears to have been arrived at after due
consideration of the evidence presented by both parties.

We also find no reason to disturb the finding that respondents were illegally terminated. When there is no showing
of clear, valid and legal cause for the termination of employment, the law considers the matter a case of illegal
dismissal and the burden is on the employer to prove that the termination was for a just or authorized cause. [25] In
this case, as found both by the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, petitioner failed to prove any such cause for the
dismissal of respondents.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
respectively dated June 29, 2001 and November 28, 2001 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
[G.R. No. 149440. January 28, 2003]

HACIENDA FATIMA and/or PATRICIO VILLEGAS, ALFONSO VILLEGAS and CRISTINE SEGURA, petitioners,
vs. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE WORKERS-FOOD AND GENERAL TRADE, respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Although the employers have shown that respondents performed work that was seasonal in nature, they failed to
prove that the latter worked only for the duration of one particular season. In fact, petitioners do not deny that
these workers have served them for several years already. Hence, they are regular -- not seasonal -- employees.

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the February 20,
2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals[1] (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 51033. The dispositive part of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant special civil action for certiorari is hereby DENIED. [2]

On the other hand, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Decision, [3] upheld by the CA, disposed in this
wise:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Labor Arbiter is hereby SET ASIDE and VACATED and a new
one entered declaring complainants to have been illegally dismissed. Respondents are hereby ORDEREDto reinstate
complainants except Luisa Rombo, Ramona Rombo, Bobong Abriga and Boboy Silva to their previous position and
to pay full backwages from September 1991 until reinstated. Respondents being guilty of unfair labor practice are
further ordered to pay complainant union the sum of P10,000.00 as moral damages and P5,000.00 as exemplary
damages.[4]

The Facts

The facts are summarized in the NLRC Decision as follows:

Contrary to the findings of the Labor Arbiter that complainants [herein respondents] refused to work and/or were
choosy in the kind of jobs they wanted to perform, the records is replete with complainants persistence and dogged
determination in going back to work.

Indeed, it would appear that respondents did not look with favor workers having organized themselves into a
union. Thus, when complainant union was certified as the collective bargaining representative in the certification
elections, respondents under the pretext that the result was on appeal, refused to sit down with the union for the
purpose of entering into a collective bargaining agreement. Moreover, the workers including complainants herein
were not given work for more than one month. In protest, complainants staged a strike which was however settled
upon the signing of a Memorandum of Agreement which stipulated among others that:

a) The parties will initially meet for CBA negotiations on the 11th day of January 1991 and will endeavor to conclude
the same within thirty (30) days.

b) The management will give priority to the women workers who are members of the union in case work relative x
x x or amount[ing] to gahit and [dipol] arises.

c) Ariston Eruela Jr. will be given back his normal work load which is six (6) days in a week.
d) The management will provide fifteen (15) wagons for the workers and that existing workforce prior to the actual
strike will be given priority. However, in case the said workforce would not be enough, the management can hire
additional workers to supplement them.

e) The management will not anymore allow the scabs, numbering about eighteen (18) workers[,] to work in the
hacienda; and

f) The union will immediately lift the picket upon signing of this agreement.

However, alleging that complainants failed to load the fifteen wagons, respondents reneged on its commitment to
sit down and bargain collectively. Instead, respondent employed all means including the use of private armed guards
to prevent the organizers from entering the premises.

Moreover, starting September 1991, respondents did not any more give work assignments to the complainants
forcing the union to stage a strike on January 2, 1992. But due to the conciliation efforts by the DOLE, another
Memorandum of Agreement was signed by the complainants and respondents which provides:

Whereas the union staged a strike against management on January 2, 1992 grounded on the dismissal of the union
officials and members;

Whereas parties to the present dispute agree to settle the case amicably once and for all;

Now therefore, in the interest of both labor and management, parties herein agree as follows:

1. That the list of the names of affected union members hereto attached and made part of this agreement shall be
referred to the Hacienda payroll of 1990 and determine whether or not this concerned Union members are hacienda
workers;

2. That in addition to the payroll of 1990 as reference, herein parties will use as guide the subjects of a Memorandum
of Agreement entered into by and between the parties last January 4, 1990;

3. That herein parties can use other employment references in support of their respective claims whether or not any
or all of the listed 36 union members are employees or hacienda workers or not as the case may be;

4. That in case conflict or disagreement arises in the determination of the status of the particular hacienda workers
subject of this agreement herein parties further agree to submit the same to voluntary arbitration;

5. To effect the above, a Committee to be chaired by Rose Mengaling is hereby created to be composed of three
representatives each and is given five working days starting Jan. 23, 1992 to resolve the status of the subject 36
hacienda workers. (Union representatives: Bernardo Torres, Martin Alas-as, Ariston Arulea Jr.)

Pursuant thereto, the parties subsequently met and the Minutes of the Conciliation Meeting showed as follows:

The meeting started at 10:00 A.M. A list of employees was submitted by Atty. Tayko based on who received their
13th month pay. The following are deemed not considered employees:

1. Luisa Rombo

2. Ramona Rombo

3. Bobong Abrega

4. Boboy Silva

The name Orencio Rombo shall be verified in the 1990 payroll.

The following employees shall be reinstated immediately upon availability of work:


1. Jose Dagle 7. Alejandro Tejares

2. Rico Dagle 8. Gaudioso Rombo

3. Ricardo Dagle 9. Martin Alas-as Jr.

4. Jesus Silva 10. Cresensio Abrega

5. Fernando Silva 11. Ariston Eruela Sr.

6. Ernesto Tejares 12. Ariston Eruela Jr.

When respondents again reneged on its commitment, complainants filed the present complaint.

But for all their persistence, the risk they had to undergo in conducting a strike in the face of overwhelming odds,
complainants in an ironic twist of fate now find themselves being accused of refusing to work and being choosy in
the kind of work they have to perform.[5] (Citations omitted)

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA affirmed that while the work of respondents was seasonal in nature, they were considered to be merely on
leave during the off-season and were therefore still employed by petitioners. Moreover, the workers enjoyed
security of tenure. Any infringement upon this right was deemed by the CA to be tantamount to illegal dismissal.

The appellate court found neither rhyme nor reason in petitioners argument that it was the workers themselves
who refused to or were choosy in their work. As found by the NLRC, the record of this case is replete with
complainants persistence and dogged determination in going back to work. [6]

The CA likewise concurred with the NLRCs finding that petitioners were guilty of unfair labor practice.

Hence this Petition.[7]

Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues for the Courts consideration:

A. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondents, admittedly seasonal workers, were regular
employees, contrary to the clear provisions of Article 280 of the Labor Code, which categorically state that seasonal
employees are not covered by the definition of regular employees under paragraph 1, nor covered under paragraph
2 which refers exclusively to casual employees who have served for at least one year.

B. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in rejecting the ruling in Mercado, xxx, and relying instead on rulings
which are not directly applicable to the case at bench, viz, Philippine Tobacco, Bacolod-Murcia, and Gaco, xxx.

C. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the NLRCs conclusion that
private respondents were illegally dismissed, that petitioner[s were] guilty of unfair labor practice, and that the
union be awarded moral and exemplary damages.[8]

Consistent with the discussion in petitioners Memorandum, we shall take up Items A and B as the first issue and
Item C as the second.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

First Issue:
Regular Employment

At the outset, we must stress that only errors of law are generally reviewed by this Court in petitions for review on
certiorari of CA decisions.[9] Questions of fact are not entertained.[10] The Court is not a trier of facts and, in labor
cases, this doctrine applies with greater force.[11] Factual questions are for labor tribunals to resolve.[12] In the
present case, these have already been threshed out by the NLRC. Its findings were affirmed by the appellate court.

Contrary to petitioners contention, the CA did not err when it held that respondents were regular employees.

Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, states:

Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. - The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding
and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the
employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or
trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the
completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where
the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.

An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any
employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be
considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall
continue while such activity exist. (Italics supplied)

For respondents to be excluded from those classified as regular employees, it is not enough that they perform work
or services that are seasonal in nature. They must have also been employed only for the duration of one season. The
evidence proves the existence of the first, but not of the second, condition. The fact that respondents -- with the
exception of Luisa Rombo, Ramona Rombo, Bobong Abriga and Boboy Silva -- repeatedly worked as sugarcane
workers for petitioners for several years is not denied by the latter. Evidently, petitioners employed respondents for
more than one season. Therefore, the general rule of regular employment is applicable.

In Abasolo v. National Labor Relations Commission,[13] the Court issued this clarification:

[T]he test of whether or not an employee is a regular employee has been laid down in De Leon v. NLRC, in which this
Court held:

The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the
particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer. The test is
whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual trade or business of the employer. The connection
can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular
business or trade in its entirety. Also if the employee has been performing the job for at least a year, even if the
performance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing need for its
performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the
employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity and while such activity exists.

xxxxxxxxx

x x x [T]he fact that [respondents] do not work continuously for one whole year but only for the duration of the x x
x season does not detract from considering them in regular employment since in a litany of cases this Court has
already settled that seasonal workers who are called to work from time to time and are temporarily laid off during
off-season are not separated from service in said period, but merely considered on leave until re-employed.[14]

The CA did not err when it ruled that Mercado v. NLRC[15] was not applicable to the case at bar. In the earlier case,
the workers were required to perform phases of agricultural work for a definite period of time, after which their
services would be available to any other farm owner. They were not hired regularly and repeatedly for the same
phase/s of agricultural work, but on and off for any single phase thereof.On the other hand, herein respondents,
having performed the same tasks for petitioners every season for several years, are considered the latters regular
employees for their respective tasks. Petitioners eventual refusal to use their services -- even if they were ready,
able and willing to perform their usual duties whenever these were available -- and hiring of other workers to
perform the tasks originally assigned to respondents amounted to illegal dismissal of the latter.

The Court finds no reason to disturb the CAs dismissal of what petitioners claim was their valid exercise of a
management prerogative. The sudden changes in work assignments reeked of bad faith.These changes were
implemented immediately after respondents had organized themselves into a union and started demanding
collective bargaining. Those who were union members were effectively deprived of their jobs. Petitioners move
actually amounted to unjustified dismissal of respondents, in violation of the Labor Code.

Where there is no showing of clear, valid and legal cause for the termination of employment, the law considers the
matter a case of illegal dismissal and the burden is on the employer to prove that the termination was for a valid
and authorized cause.[16] In the case at bar, petitioners failed to prove any such cause for the dismissal of
respondents who, as discussed above, are regular employees.

Second Issue:

Unfair Labor Practice

The NLRC also found herein petitioners guilty of unfair labor practice. It ruled as follows:

Indeed, from respondents refusal to bargain, to their acts of economic inducements resulting in the promotion of
those who withdrew from the union, the use of armed guards to prevent the organizers to come in, and the dismissal
of union officials and members, one cannot but conclude that respondents did not want a union in their haciendaa
clear interference in the right of the workers to self-organization.[17]

We uphold the CAs affirmation of the above findings. Indeed, factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to
have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdictions, are generally accorded not only respect but
even finality. Their findings are binding on the Supreme Court.[18] Verily, their conclusions are accorded great weight
upon appeal, especially when supported by substantial evidence.[19] Consequently, the Court is not duty-bound to
delve into the accuracy of their factual findings, in the absence of a clear showing that these were arbitrary and
bereft of any rational basis.[20]

The finding of unfair labor practice done in bad faith carries with it the sanction of moral and exemplary damages.[21]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
LOLITA R. LACUESTA, Petitioner, versus ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY, DR. LEOVINO MA. GARCIA and DR.
MARIJO RUIZ, Respondents.,

G.R. No. 152777, Dec 9, 2005

FACTS:

Respondent Ateneo hired, on a contractual basis, petitioner Lolita R. Lacuesta as a part-time lecturer in its
English Department for the 2nd semester of school year 1988-1989. She was re-hired, still on a contractual basis,
for the 1st and 2nd semesters of school year 1989-1990.

On July 13, 1990, the petitioner was first appointed as full-time instructor on probation, effective June 1, 1990
– March 31, 1991. Thereafter, her contract as faculty on probation was renewed effective April 1, 1991 – March 31,
1992. She was again hired for a 3rd year effective April 1, 1992 – March 31, 1993. During these 3 years she was on
probation status.

Respondents Dr. Leovino Ma. Garcia, Dean of Ateneo’s Graduate School and College of Arts and Sciences,
notified petitioner that her contract would no longer be renewed because she did not integrate well with the English
Department. Petitioner appealed to the President of the Ateneo. Then President Fr. Bernas explained to petitioner
that she was not being terminated, but her contract would simply expire. Fr. Bernas offered petitioner the job as
book editor in the University Press under terms comparable to that of a faculty member. March 26, 1993, petitioner
applied for clearance to collect her final salary as instructor. Petitioner also signed a Quitclaim, Discharge and
Release.

Petitioner worked as editor in the University Press from April 1, 1993 – March 31, 1994 including an extension
of two months after her contract expired. Upon expiry of her contract, petitioner applied for clearance to collect
her final salary as editor. Petitioner decided not to have her contract renewed due to a severe back problem. She
did not report back to work, but she submitted her clearance. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with
prayer for reinstatement, back wages, and moral and exemplary damages.

LA held that petitioner may not be terminated by mere lapse of the probationary period but only for just cause or
failure to meet the employer’s standards and that the quitclaim, discharge and release executed by petitioner was
not a bar to filing a complaint for illegal dismissal. He ordered reinstatement with payment of full back wages.

The NLRC reversed LA’s decision and ruled that petitioner was not illegally dismissed, and that her quitclaim was
valid. Petitioner sought MR but it was denied. She went to CA but it affirmed NLRC’s decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner became a regular employee of Ateneo.

RULING:

1. The “Manual of Regulations for Private Schools,” and not the Labor Code, determines whether or not a
faculty member in an educational institution has attained regular or permanent status. Under Policy
Instructions No. 11 issued by DOLE “the probationary employment of professors, instructors and teachers
shall be subject to the standards established by the Department of Education and Culture.” Said standards
are embodied in paragraph 75 (now Section 93) of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools.

Section 93 of the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools provides that full-time teachers who have
satisfactorily completed their probationary period shall be considered regular or permanent. Moreover, for those
teaching in the tertiary level, the probationary period shall not be more than 6 consecutive regular semesters of
satisfactory service. The requisites to acquire permanent employment, or security of tenure, are (1) the teacher is
a full-time teacher; (2) the teacher must have rendered three consecutive years of service; and (3) such service must
have been satisfactory.

A part-time teacher cannot acquire permanent status. Only when one has served as a full-time teacher can he
acquire permanent or regular status. The petitioner was a part-time lecturer before she was appointed as a full-
time instructor on probation. As a part-time lecturer, her employment as such had ended when her contract
expired. Thus, the three semesters she served as part-time lecturer could not be credited to her in computing the
number of years she has served to qualify her for permanent status.

Completing the probation period does not automatically qualify her to become a permanent employee of the
university. Petitioner could only qualify to become a permanent employee upon fulfilling the reasonable standards
for permanent employment as faculty member. Consistent with academic freedom and constitutional autonomy,
an institution of higher learning has the prerogative to provide standards for its teachers and determine whether
these standards have been met. At the end of the probation period, the decision to re-hire an employee on
probation, belongs to the university as the employer alone.

Probationary employees enjoy security of tenure, but only within the period of probation. Likewise, an employee on
probation can only be dismissed forjust cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with
the reasonable standards made known by the employer at the time of his hiring. Upon expiration of their contract
of employment, academic personnel on probation cannot automatically claim security of tenure and compel their
employers to renew their employment contracts. In the instant case, petitioner, did not attain permanent status and
was not illegally dismissed. As found by the NLRC, her contract merely expired.

Petitioner had already signed a valid quitclaim, discharge and release which bars the present action. This Court has
held that not all quitclaims are per se invalid or against public policy, except (1) where there is clear proof that the
waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or (2) where the terms of settlement are
unconscionable on their face. In this case, there is no showing that petitioner was coerced into signing the
quitclaim. In her sworn quitclaim, she freely declared that she received to her full satisfaction all that is due her by
reason of her employment and that she was voluntarily releasing respondent Ateneo from all claims in relation to
her employment. Nothing on the face of her quitclaim has been shown as unconscionable.

WHEREFORE, petition is DENIED for lack of merit


Casuals become regular employees after a year
Acasual employee is only casual for one year. After one year, a casual employee automatically gets his regular status.

A Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between a multinational company and its collective bargaining agent,
representing the company’s rank-and-file employees in Manila and Antipolo, expired in June 1998. The company
and unions completed renegotiations of their CBA on 26 December 1998. Both parties signed a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA), providing for salary increase as well as the “regularization of contractual, casual, and/or agency
workers who have been working with [the company]for more than one year.” The MOA was incorporated to form
part of the 1998-2001 CBA and was ratified by the employees of the company. Pursuant to the MOA, 61 casual,
contractual, or agency employees were regularized and filled up vacant positions.

The newly regularized employees proceeded to demand that their salaries and other benefits retroact to 1 December
1998 in accordance with the MOA. Unfortunately, the company refused their demands on account that the date of
effectivity of their regularization was in fact 1 May 1999. The employees then filed a complaint with the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for violations of the MOA.

The NLRC dismissed the complaint, ruling that “under the MOA dated 26 December 1998, the 61 regularized
employees are not entitled to their claims for the P60 per day salary increase, mid-year gratuity pay of P5,000 one
sack of rice, and overtime and thirteenth month differentials effective December 1, 1998 onward.” Thus, the
regularized employees were not entitled to a retroactive application of the MOA and could not receive the benefits
amounting to P35,000 The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the NLRC.

On appeal, the Supreme Court (SC) overturned the NLRC and CA. In fact, it ruled that the regularized employee’s
were entitled to all the benefits granted to the regular employees since pertinent provisions of the MOA provided
that a “non-regular employee (casual, contractual or agency worker) who has already served the company . . . for at
least one (1) year shall be given priority in filling-up the (vacant) positions by converting his non-regular employment
status to regular employment status, effective 1 December 1998.”

The Court ruled that the date 1 December 1998, and not 26 December 1998, was what was clearly referred to as the
effective date of regularization of casual employees, as properly relied on by the company. To rule otherwise would
be “logically absurd that the company will only begin to extend priority to these employees on a date that has already
passed, when in fact they have already extended priority to these employees by agreeing to the contents of the
MOA and signing said agreement.”

The SC also stressed that the 61 casual, contractual, or agency employees were all entitled to the benefits of regular
employees regardless of the stipulation in the MOA because they had all been employed by the company for over
one year. Article 280 of the Labor Code provides that “any employee who has rendered at least one year of service,
whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in
which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists.” Moreover, a casual employee
is only deemed casual for one year. After that, the employee is automatically given regular status by operation of
law (KASAMMA-CCO v. CA, G.R. No. 159828, 19 April 2006, J. Chico-Nazario)
Bernardo vs NLRC

GR 122917 07/03/99

Facts:

Petitioners numbering 43 are deaf–mutes who were hired on various periods from 1988 to 1993 by respondent Far
East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters through a uniformly worded agreement called ‘Employment
Contract for Handicapped Workers. Subsequently, they are dismissed.

Petitioners maintain that they should be considered regular employees, because their task as money sorters and
counters was necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank. They further allege that their contracts
served merely to preclude the application of Article 280 and to bar them from becoming regular employees.

Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that petitioners were hired only as “special workers and should not
in any way be considered as part of the regular complement of the Bank.”[12] Rather, they were “special” workers
under Article 80 of the Labor Code.

Issue: WON petitioners have become regular employees.

Held:

The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated that they shall be trained for a period of one month,
after which the employer shall determine whether or not they should be allowed to finish the 6-month term of the
contract. Furthermore, the employer may terminate the contract at any time for a just and reasonable
cause. Unless renewed in writing by the employer, the contract shall automatically expire at the end of the term.

Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers and renewed the
contracts of 37 of them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the renewal of the contracts of the
handicapped workers and the hiring of others lead to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary
to the bank. More important, these facts show that they were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their
positions. In other words, their disability did not render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned to them.

In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled employee should be given the
same terms and conditions of employment as a qualified able-bodied person. Section 5 of the Magna Carta
provides:

“Section 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment.—No disabled person shall be denied access to opportunities for
suitable employment. A qualified disabled employee shall be subject to the same terms and conditions of
employment and the same compensation, privileges, benefits, fringe benefits, incentives or allowances as a qualified
able bodied person.”

The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the employment contracts from
the ambit of Article 80. Since the Magna Carta accords them the rights of qualified able-bodied persons, they are
thus covered by Article 280 of the Labor Code, which provides:

“ART. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. — The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding
and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the
employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or
trade of the employer, x x x”

“The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the
particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer. The test is
whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The connection
can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular
business or trade in its entirety. Also if the employee has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the
performance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing need for its
performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence,
the employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity, and while such activity exists.”

Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers and renewed the
contracts of 37 of them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the renewal of the contracts of the
handicapped workers and the hiring of others lead to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary
to the bank. More important, these facts show that they were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their
positions. In other words, their disability did not render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned to them.

Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and desirable to the business of respondent
bank. With the exception of sixteen of them, petitioners performed these tasks for more than six months.

Petition granted

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