G.R. No.

167290 November 26, 2014

HERMANO OIL MANUFACTURING & SUGAR CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
TOLL REGULA TORY BOARD, ENGR. JAIME S. DUMLAO, JR., PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION (PNCC) and DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
HIGHWAYS (DPWH), Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The issue to be determined concerns the demand of the petitioner to have access to the North
Luzon Expressway (NLEX) by way of an easement of right of way. The demand was rebuffed by the
respondents, and upheld by both the trial and appellate courts.

The Case

On appeal by review on certiorari is the decision promulgated on October 27, 2004,1 whereby the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the dismissal of the petitioner's complaint for specific performance by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 7, through the order issued on March 6,
2002.2

Antecedents

The petitioner owned a parcel of land located at the right side of the Sta. Rita Exit of the NLEX
situated at Barangay Sta. Rita, Guiguinto, Bulacan and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-134222 in its name issued by the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan.3 The parcel of land was
bounded by an access fence along the NLEX. In its letter dated September 7, 2001,4 the petitioner
requested that respondent Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) grant an easement of right of way,
contending that it had been totally deprived of the enjoyment and possession of its property by the
access fence that had barred its entry into and exit from the NLEX. On September 26, 2001,
however, the TRB denied the petitioner's request, explaining thusly:

It is with regret that we cannot favorably consider your client's request at this point in time. Said
request is inconsistent with the provision of Section 7.0 of Republic Act No. 2000, also known as the
Limited Access Highway Act. Moreover, allowing easement of right-of-way may have
detrimental/adverse effect on the scheduled rehabilitation and improvement of the North Luzon
Expressway Interchanges, as well as on the operational problems, i.e. traffic conflicts that may arise,
if approved.5

Thereafter, the petitioner sued the TRB and Engr. Jaime S. Dumlao, the TRB's Executive Director, in
the RTC,6demanding specific performance, the grant of the easement of right of way and damages
(Civil Case No. 37-M-2002). The petitioner amended its complaint to implead the Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC) and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) as
indispensable parties.7

The petitioner alleged in its amended complaint that the access fence had totally deprived it of the
use and enjoyment of its property by preventing ingress and egress to its property; that the only
access leading to its property was the road network situated in front of its property; that it was
thereby deprived of its property without due process of law and just compensation; and that it was
also denied equal protection of the law because adjacent property owners had been given ingress
and egress access to their properties. It prayed that the RTC:

1. Immediately issue a writ of preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order enjoining the

defendants, its agents and/or representatives from depriving plaintiff to ingress and egress of
its property;

2. After due hearing:

a) Render the foregoing writ of preliminary injunction perpetual;

b) Granting plaintiff a right of way;

c) Declare the condemnation of plaintiff's property as null and void. Alternatively,

plaintiff prays that defendants be ordered to pay plaintiff a just and fair compensation
of the latter's property in the amount of not less than Four Thousand Pesos (Ps.
4,000.00) per square meter;

d) To pay plaintiff the amount of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (Ps.

300,000.00) and Ps. 5,000.00 per court appearance by way of Attorney's fees;

e) To pay plaintiff Moral and Exemplary Damages in the amount of Ps. 200,000.00;
and

f) To pay plaintiff the costs of suit.

Plaintiff further prays for such other reliefs and remedies as may be deemed just and equitable
under the premises.8

Appearing for the TRB, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Motion to Dismiss with
Opposition to the Application for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction based on the following grounds:9

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE

II.

THE PETITION ST A TES NO CAUSE OF ACTION CONSIDERING THAT: A. PLAINTIFF IS NOT

THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST B. EASEMENT WILL NOT LIE BECAUSE THE LIMITED
ACCESS TO THE NORTH LUZON EXPRESSWAY IS ALLOWED UNDER REPUBLIC ACT 2000 C.
THE STATE CANNOT BE SUED WITHOUT ITS CONSENT

III.

THE REQUISITES FOR THE ISSUANCE OF TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR

WRIT OF INJUNCTION ARE NOT PRESENT

IV.
THE COMPLAINT HAS NO LEGAL BASIS, THE PROPER REMEDY AVAILABLE IN THIS CASE IS
NOT COMPLAINT BUT A PETITION roR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF
COURT.

In its order dated March 6, 2002,10 the RTC granted the motion to dismiss, observing as follows:

The present action against the defendants Toll Regulatory Board and its Executive Director, Engr.
Jaime S. Dumlao, Jr., could be considered as a suit against the state without its consent as among
the reliefs prayed for in the complaint is to require the said defendants to pay, jointly and severally, a
just and reasonable compensation of the plaintiff's property which, if awarded in the judgment
against said defendants, would ultimately involve an appropriation by the state of the amount
needed to pay the compensation and damages so awarded. Moreover, as pointed out by the
defendants-movants, defendant Jaime S. Dumlao, Jr. is sued in his official capacity so that the
instant complaint against him is tantamount to a claim against the state which cannot be sued
without its consent.

This principle applies with equal force as regards new defendant Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH).

Defendant Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), on the other hand, was impleaded
as additional defendant being the entity that operates the North Luzon Expressway and was
primarily responsible in depriving the plaintiff of the use and enjoyment of its property by reason of
the construction of the access or right of way fence that prevents ingress to and egress from the
subject property, considering further that the other defendants had refused to grant plaintiff's request
for an casement of right of way.

The main objective and prayer of the plaintiff is for this court to issue a writ of injunction that will
restrain the defendants from depriving it of ingress and egress to its property in question or to grant
to it a right of way to its property.

Suffice it to say that the main relief sought by the plaintiff is beyond the jurisdiction of this court to
grant as provided for under Presidential Decree No. 1818 and Republic Act No. 8975 which
essentially prohibit the courts from issuing temporary restraining orders and/or writs of injunction
against government infrastructure projects, and which expressly declares any such TRO or writ of
injunction void under Section 3 of R.A. No. 8975.

In view of all the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED.

WHEREFORE, the instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.11

The petitioner sought reconsideration, but the R TC denied its motion on July 25, 2002.12

The petitioner appealed.13

Judgment of the CA

On October 27, 2004, the CA promulgated its assailed judgment, affirming the RTC's dismissal of
the complaint, to wit:
The law is clear. Plaintiff-appellant does not deny that the NLEX is a limited access facility. Neither
did it put forward any reason why it should not be covered by the said law. Plaintiff-appellant,
therefore, cannot expect any court to issue a decision in its favor in violation of an existing law. The
Court further notes that plaintiff-appellant skirted this issue in its pleadings perhaps because it
recognizes the fact that its prayers in the complaint before the trial court is in violation of the said law.

Moreover, as pointed out by defendants-appellees (Rollo, p. 19 and 127-128), when plaintiff-

appellant acquired the property on December 14, 1999 (See: Records, p. 33), the NLEX was already
in existence and as a matter of fact Entry No. 189568 in the title indicated that a portion of the
property was already sold to the Republic of the Philippines (See: Dorsal portion, Records, p. 33). It
is basic that a person cannot demand an easement of right of way if the isolation of the property was
due to owner's own act (Art. 649, NCC; Villanueva v Velasco, 346 SCRA 99[2000]). In the present
case, when the plaintiff-appellant bought the property in 1999, the NLEX was already in existence
and so was the access fence. In short, its predecessors-in-interest allowed the property to be
isolated. Plaintiff-appellant is now bound by the acts of its predecessors-in-interest.

Moreover, as admitted by plaintiff-appellant in its amended complaint, there is a road network in front
of the property which serves as its access (Records, p. 28). It is settled that to be able to demand a
compulsory right of way, the dominant estate must not have adequate access to a public highway
(Villanueva v Velasco, supra). Plaintiff appellant did not complaint about the adequacy of the existing
road works.

Also, as pointed out by defendants-appellees, the action below was one for specific performance
which is proper only in case of contractual breach. In the present case, plaintiff-appellant cannot
claim that defendants-appellees committed a breach of contract because there is precisely no
contract between them.

As to the matter of non-suability, the Court notes that while defendant-appellee PNCC is a
government owned and controlled corporation, the other defendants-appellees are either agencies
of the State (DPWH and TRB) or an employee of a government agency. Plaintiff appellant argued
that the principle of non-suability of the state does not apply when the government acted in a non-
governmental capacity. The Court, however, notes that plaintiff-appellant merely cites cases to this
effect but did not put forward any argument why the maintenance of NLEX should be considered as
a non-governmental function. It cannot be denied that the maintenance of the highways is part of the
necessary functions of the government of maintaining public infrastructures.

Coming now to PNCC although it is not strictly a government agency, its function is a necessary
incident to a government function and, hence, it should likewise enjoy immunity from suit (See:
Union Insurance Society qf Canton, Ltd. v Republic of the Philippines, 46 SCRA 120 (1972]).

As to the assertion that no expropriation proceeding was taken against the subject property, the
Court agrees with the PNCC that these arguments were not raised in the Court below and, hence, is
no longer proper at this stage. Moreover, the Court notes that the proper party to complain against
the alleged lack of proper expropriation proceeding is the previous owner, when portion of the
property was sold to the Republic of the Philippines in 1979.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Order dated March 6, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 7, in Civil Case No. 37-M-2002 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.14

Issues
The present appeal is anchored on the following grounds, namely:

FIRST

THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS REPUGNANT TO THE DUE PROCESS AND
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE ENSHRINED IN OUR CONSTITUTION AND PREY AILING
JURISPRUDENCE.

SECOND

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DECLARING

THAT ENTRY NO. 189568 IN THE TITLE OF HEREIN PETITIONER WAS ALREADY IN
EXISTENCE WHICH SHOWED THAT EVEN BEFORE THE ACQUISITION OF THE PROPERTY IN
1999, THE NLEX WAS ALREADY IN EXISTENCE AND SO WAS THE ACCESS FENCE. THUS,
ITS PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST ALLOWED THE PROPERTY TO BE ISOLATED.

THIRD

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT RESPONDENT PNCC,

ALTHOUGH NOT STRICTLY A GOVERNMENT AGENCY, SHOULD LIKEWISE ENJOY IMMUNITY
FROM SUIT.15

The foregoing grounds boil down to the issue of whether Civil Case No. 37-M-2002 was properly
dismissed.

Ruling

We concur with both lower courts.

In our view, the TRB, Dumlao and the DPWH correctly invoked the doctrine of sovereign immunity in
their favor. The TRB and the DPWH performed purely or essentially government or public functions.
As such, they were invested with the inherent power of sovereignty. Being unincorporated agencies
or entities of the National Government, they could not be sued as such. On his part, Dumlao was
acting as the agent of the TRB in respect of the matter concerned.

In Air Transportation Office v. Ramos,16 we expounded on the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the
following manner:

An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys
immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim
for damages against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is
violated. However, the need to distinguish between an unincorporated government agency
performing governmental function and one performing proprietary functions has arisen. The
immunity has been upheld in favor of the former because its function is governmental or incidental to
such function; it has not been upheld in favor of the latter whose function was not in pursuit of a
necessary function of government but was essentially a business. Nonetheless, the petitioner
properly argued that the PNCC, being a private business entity, was not immune from suit. The
PNCC was incorporated in 1966 under its original name of Construction Development Corporation of
the Philippines (CDCP) for a term of fifty years pursuant to the Corporation Code.17 In 1983, the
CDCP changed its corporate name to the PNCC to reflect the extent of the Government's equity
investment in the company, a situation that came about after the government financial institutions
converted their loans into equity following the CDCP's inability to pay the loans.18 Hence, the
Government owned 90.3% of the equity of the PNCC, and only 9.70% of the PNCC's voting equity
remained under private ownership.19 Although the majority or controlling shares of the PNCC
belonged to the Government, the PNCC was essentially a private corporation due to its having been
created in accordance with the Corporation Code, the general corporation statute.20 More specifically,
the PNCC was an acquired asset corporation under Administrative Order No. 59, and was subject to
the regulation and jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission.21 Consequently, the
doctrine of sovereign immunity had no application to the PNCC.

The foregoing conclusion as to the PNCC notwithstanding, the Court affirms the dismissal of the
complaint due to lack of jurisdiction and due to lack of cause of action.

It appears that the petitioner's complaint principally sought to restrain the respondents from
implementing an access fence on its property, and to direct them to grant it a right of way to the
NLEX. Clearly, the reliefs being sought by the petitioner were beyond the jurisdiction of the RTC
because no court except the Supreme Court could issue an injunction against an infrastructure
project of the Government. This is because Presidential Decree No. 1818, issued on January 16,
1981, prohibited judges from issuing restraining orders against government infrastructure projects,
stating in its sole provision: "No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order, preliminary injunction or preliminary order, preliminary mandatory injunction in any case,
dispute or controversy involving an infrastructure project." Presidential Decree No. 1818 was
amended by Republic Act No. 8975,22approved on November 7, 2000, whose pertinent parts provide:

Section 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restrainin;; Orders, Preliminary Injunctions and
Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions.-No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary
restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government,
or any of its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the
government's direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:

(a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or site or location of any
national government project;

(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as defined under

Section 2 hereof;

(c) Commencement, prosecution, execution, implementation, operation of any such contract

or project;

(d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and

(e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity necessary for such
contract/project.

This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies instituted by a private party,
including but not limited to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to have rights through such
bidders involving such contract/project. This prohibition shall not apply when the matter is of extreme
urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued,
grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise. The applicant shall file a bond, in an amount to be
fixed by the court, which bond shall accrue in favor of the government if the court should finally
decide that the applicant was not entitled to the relief sought.
If after due hearing the court finds that the award of the contract is null and void, the court may, if
appropriate under the circumstances, award the contract to the qualified and winning bidder or order
a rebidding of the same, without prejudice to any liability that the guilty party may incur under
existing laws.

Section 4. Nullity of Writs and Orders.-Any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or
preliminary mandatory injunction issued in violation of Section 3 hereof is void and of no force and
effect.

Section 5. Designation of Regional Trial Courts.-The Supreme Court may designate regional trial
courts to act as commissioners with the sole function of receiving facts of the case involving
acquisition, clearance and development of right-of-way for government infrastructure projects. The
designated regional trial comt shall within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of the referral,
forward its findings of facts to the Supreme Court for appropriate action. x x x

As to what was embraced by the term infrastructure project as used in Presidential Decree No. 1818,
the Court has ruled in Francisco, Jr. v. UEMMARA Philippines Corporation:23

PD 1818 proscribes the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in any case involving an
infrastructure project of the government. The aim of the prohibition, as expressed in its second
whereas clause, is to prevent delay in the implementation or execution of government infrastructure
projects (particularly through the use of provisional remedies) to the detriment of the greater good
since it disrupts the pursuit of essential government projects and frustrates the economic
development effort of the nation.

Petitioner argues that the collection of toll fees is not an infrastructure project of the government. He
cites the definition of "infrastructure projects" we used in Republic v. Silerio: The term "infrastructure
projects" means "construction, improvement and rehabilitation of roads, and bridges, railways,
airports, seaports, communication facilities, irrigation, flood control and drainage, water supply and
sewage systems, shore protection, power facilities, national buildings, school buildings, hospital
buildings, and other related construction projects that form part of the government capital
investment."

xxxx

The definition of infrastructure projects specifically includes the improvement and rehabilitation of
roads and not just its construction. Accordingly, even if the Coastal Road was merely upgraded and
not constructed from scratch, it is still covered by the definition. Moreover, PD 1818 itself states that
any person, entity or governmental official cannot be prohibited from continuing the execution or
implementation of such project or pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such execution or
implementation. Undeniably, the collection of toll fees is part of the execution or implementation of
the MCTEP as agreed upon in the TOA. The TOA is valid since it has not been nullified. Thus it is a
legitimate source of rights and obligations. It has the force and effect of law between the contracting
parties and is entitled to recognition by this Court. The MCTEP is an infrastructure project of the
government forming part of the government capital investment considering that under the TOA, the
government owns the expressways comprising the project. (Emphasis supplied.)

There can be no question that the respondents' maintenance of safety measures, including the
establishment of the access fence along the NLEX, was a component of the continuous
improvement and development of the NLEX. Consequently, the lower courts could not validly
restrain the implementation of the access fence by granting the petitioner its right of way without
exceeding its jurisdiction.
Nor did the establishment of the access fence violate the petitioner's constitutional and legal rights.

It is relevant to mention that the access fence was put up pursuant to Republic Act No. 2000 (Limited
Access Highway Act), the enforcement of which was under the authority of the DOTC. Clarifying the
DOTC's jurisdiction under this law in Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways,24 the
Court has said—

RA 2000, otherwise known as the Limited Access Highway Act, was approved on 22 June 1957.
Section 4 of RA 2000 provides that "[t]he Department of Public Works and Communications is
authorized to do so design any limited access facility and to so regulate, restrict, or prohibit access
as to best serve the traffic for which such facility is intended." The RTC construed this authorization
to regulate, restrict, or prohibit access to limited access facilities to apply to the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH).

The RTC's ruling is based on a wrong premise. The RTC assumed that the DPWH derived its
authority from its predecessor, the Department of Public Works and Communications, which is
expressly authorized to regulate, restrict, or prohibit access to limited access facilities under Section
4 of RA 2000. However, such assumption fails to consider the evolution of the Department of Public
Works and Communications.

xxxx

Upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution in February 1987, the former Ministry of Public Works
and Highways became the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and the former
Ministry of Transportation and Communications became the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC).

DPWH issued DO 74 and DO 215 declaring certain expressways as limited access facilities on 5
April 1993 and 25 June 1998, respectively. Later, the TRB, under the DPWH, issued the Revised
Rules and Regulations on Limited Access Facilities. However, on 23 July 1979, long before these
department orders and regulations were issued, the Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications was divided into two agencies - the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of
Transportation and Communications - by virtue of EO 546. The question is, which of these two
agencies is now authorized to regulate, restrict, or prohibit access to limited access facilities?

Under Section 1 of EO 546, the Ministry of Public Works (now DPWH) assumed the public works
functions of the Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communications. On the other hand,
among the functions of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications (now Department of
Transportation and Communications [DOTC]) were to (1) formulate and recommend national policies
and guidelines for the preparation and implementation of an integrated and comprehensive
transportation and communications systems at the national, regional, and local levels; and (2)
regulate, whenever necessary, activities relative to transportation and communications and prescribe
and collect fees in the exercise of such power. Clearly, under EO 546, it is the DOTC, not the DPWH,
which has authority to regulate, restrict, or prohibit access to limited access facilities.

Even under Executive Order No. 125 (EO 125) and Executive Order No. 125-A (EO 125-A), which
further reorganized the DOTC, the authority to administer and enforce all laws, rules and regulations
relative to transportation is clearly with the DOTC.

Thus, DO 74 and DO 215 arc void because the DPWH has no authority to declare certain
expressways as limited access facilities. Under the law, it is the DOTC which is authorized to
1âwphi 1
administer and enforce all laws, rules and regulations in the field of transportation and to regulate
related activities. (Emphasis supplied.)

Moreover, the putting up of the access fence on the petitioner's property was in the valid exercise of
police power, assailable only upon proof that such putting up unduly violated constitutional
limitations like due process and equal protection of the law.25 In Mirasol v. Department of Public
Works and Highways, the Court has further noted that:

A toll way is not an ordinary road. As a facility designed to promote the fastest access to certain
destinations, its use, operation, and maintenance require close regulation. Public interest and safety
require the imposition of certain restrictions on toll ways that do not apply to ordinary roads. As a
special kind of road, it is but reasonable that not all forms of transport could use it.26

Clearly, therefore, the access fence was a reasonable restriction on the petitioner's property given
the location thereof at the right side of Sta. Rita Exit of the NLEX. Although some adjacent properties
were accorded unrestricted access to the expressway, there was a valid and reasonable
classification for doing so because their owners provided ancillary services to motorists using the
NLEX, like gasoline service stations and food stores.27 A classification based on practical
convenience and common knowledge is not unconstitutional simply because it may lack purely
theoretical or scientific uniformity.28

Lastly, the limited access imposed on the petitioner's property did not partake of a compensable
taking due to the exercise of the power of eminent domain. There is no question that the property
was not taken and devoted for public use. Instead, the property was subjected to a certain restraint,
i.e. the access fence, in order to secure the general safety and welfare of the motorists using the
NLEX. There being a clear and valid exercise of police power, the petitioner was certainly not
entitled to any just compensation.29

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on October 27, 2004; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2298 February 22, 2012

ATTY. RENE O. MEDINA and ATTY. CLARITO SERVILLAS, Complainants,

vs.
JUDGE VICTOR A. CANOY, Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, Surigao City, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is an administrative complaint filed by Atty. Rene O. Medina and Atty. Clarito Servillas
(complainants) against Judge Victor A. Canoy (respondent judge), Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City, Branch 29, for Gross Ignorance of the Law and Procedure, Undue
Interference and Gross Inefficiency, relative to Civil Case No. 7077 entitled "Zenia A. Pagels v.
Spouses Reynaldo dela Cruz"; Spec. Proc. No. 7101 entitled "Noel P.E.M. Schellekens v. P/S, Supt.
David Y. Ombao, et al."; and Civil Case No. 7065 entitled "Heirs of Matilde Chato Alcaraz v. Philex-
Lascogon Mining Corporation, et al."

The Facts

The undisputed facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

In Civil Case No. 7077

On 30 June 2009, petitioner Zenia Pagels (Pagels) filed a Petition for Injunction with prayer for
issuance of Preliminary Injunction, Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), Accounting, Damages and
Attorney’s Fees against respondents Spouses Reynaldo and Racquel dela Cruz (respondent
spouses). The case was raffled to Branch 30, where respondent judge was the acting presiding
judge. After serving respondent spouses with the Summons, copy of the Petition and Notice of
hearing, respondent judge conducted the hearing and granted the TRO on 2 July 2009. On 3 July
2009, the TRO was implemented resulting in the transfer of possession of the duly-licensed primary
and elementary school and church from respondent spouses to Pagels. On 13 July 2009,
respondent spouses filed their Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim. During the 14
July 2009 hearing for preliminary injunction, the parties agreed to submit position papers. Pagels
filed her position paper but respondent spouses filed a Motion to Hear their Affirmative Defenses
instead.

On 11 August 2009, respondent judge granted the preliminary injunction without need of a bond
pending the hearing of respondent spouses’ Motion to Hear Affirmative Defenses. On 1 September
2009, respondent spouses filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which respondent judge set for
hearing on 5 October 2009. Subsequently, respondent judge reset the hearing to 16 November 2009
and then to 12 March 2010. Upon assumption as the new presiding judge of Branch 30 sometime in
February 2010, Judge Evangeline Yuipco-Bayana issued an Order revoking the preliminary
injunction earlier issued by respondent judge.

In their Complaint dated 13 September 2010, complainants contend that respondent judge should be
charged with gross ignorance of the law and procedure: (1) for disregarding the basic and
elementary principle that TRO and preliminary injunction are improper remedies to transfer
possession of one property to another whose title has not been clearly established; and (2) for failure
to decide the Motion for Reconsideration within a period of 30 days as required by the rules and
jurisprudence.

In Spec. Proc. No. 7101

Petitioner Noel P.E.M. Schellekens (petitioner Noel) filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on 19
August 2009. The next day, respondents Aris Caesar B. Servillas, P/S, Supt. David Y. Ombao,
Denelito G. Glico, Alexis E. Espojona, and Rosemarie Catelo testified during the hearing. On 21
August 2009, which was a holiday, respondent judge issued an Order for the release of petitioner
Noel upon finding that the latter was unlawfully arrested. The Order was implemented on the same
day.

Relative to this case, complainants charge respondent judge of: (1) gross ignorance of procedure
and undue interference in the administrative functions of the Bureau of Immigration by ordering the
release of the expired passport of petitioner Noel, and by preparing the said Order outside of the
court’s premises because it was not single-spaced and did not have a stamp by the Clerk of Court
as received; and (2) violating Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct due to his friendly greeting to
petitioner Noel and for acting as counsel for the latter by propounding questions on the respondents
during their testimonies.

In Civil Case No. 7065

On 3 August 2009, defendant Philex-Lascogon Mining Corporation filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Amended Complaint filed by plaintiffs Heirs of Alcaraz on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The
plaintiffs Heirs of Alcaraz submitted their Opposition dated 17 August 2009 and their 2nd Amended
Complaint dated 26 August 2009. However, it was only on 20 September 2010 that respondent
Judge issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, complainants claim that
respondent judge should be held guilty of gross inefficiency and of violating the Code of Judicial
Conduct for his undue delay in resolving a simple Motion to Dismiss.

As their final charge, complainants aver that respondent judge is guilty of tardiness and inefficiency
in trying cases before his branch. Complainants state that respondent judge usually starts the
hearing between 9:45 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. in violation of the Supreme Court Circular.

In his Comment with Counter-Charge dated 5 November 2010, respondent judge preliminarily states
that complainant Atty. Medina is neither a counsel nor a party litigant in Spec. Proc. No. 7101 and
Civil Case No. 7065; thus, he has no interest to question perceived irregularities relative to these
cases. With respect to Atty. Servillas, he is neither a counsel nor a party-in-interest in any of the
cases mentioned in the complaint.

Relative to Civil Case No. 7077, respondent judge claims that he issued the TRO and preliminary
injunction judiciously and without bad faith or irregularity. He argues that he resolved cases based
on the merits of the case and if there was indeed error, it merely constitutes an error of judgment.
Respondent judge further states that the alleged error was already aptly corrected by Judge
Bayana’s reversal. Regarding the alleged delay in the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration,
respondent judge defends himself by explaining that the Motion was not submitted for resolution.
Respondent judge argues that respondent spouses’ lawyer (complainant Atty. Medina) failed to file a
responsive pleading to the Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration and that the hearing of the
Motion was further reset to 12 March 2010.
As for Spec. Proc. No. 7101, respondent judge argues that it is already subject of an earlier
complaint filed by Cristita C. Vda. de Tolibas against him. With respect to Civil Case No. 7065,
respondent judge states that the Motion to Dismiss was already resolved.

On the charge of tardiness and inefficiency, respondent judge attached the: (1) 21 October 2010
Joint Affidavit of Prosecutor Maureen Chua and Atty. Jose Begil, Jr.; and (2) 21 October 2010
affidavit of Court Legal Researcher Peter John Tremedal explaining the reasons for the delay of the
hearing. In Tremedal’s Affidavit, he states that respondent judge instructed him to convene the
counsels first, and to ensure their attendance before respondent judge starts the hearing. In
conclusion, respondent judge asserts that the malicious filing of the baseless complaint was conduct
unbecoming officers of the court for which complainants must be held accountable.

In their Rejoinder and Answer to Counter-Charge dated 1 December 2010, complainants reiterate
their arguments in the Complaint. In the first case, they emphasize that respondent judge
deliberately failed to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration. On the second, complainants argue
that the pendency of the Tolibas administrative complaint cannot divest the Supreme Court of its
jurisdiction to review the actions of respondent judge, more so in the light of new allegations
supported by judicial records. As for respondent Judge’s alleged tardiness and inefficiency,
complainants point out that the joint affidavit of Prosecutor Chua and Atty. Bejil, Jr. merely pertained
to one particular day. As answer to respondent judge’s Counter-Charge, complainants denied the
allegation for lack of factual and legal basis.

The OCA’s Report and Recommendation

In its Report dated 18 July 2011, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found respondent judge
guilty of undue delay in rendering an order but dismissed the charges of gross ignorance of the law
and gross misconduct for being judicial in nature and for lack of merit.

In its evaluation, the OCA preliminarily states that in administrative proceedings it is immaterial
whether or not the complainant himself or herself has a cause of action against the respondent.

On the charge of gross ignorance of the law, the OCA held that respondent judge committed an
error of judgment for which he may not be administratively held liable in the absence of bad faith,
malice or corrupt purpose. As to the issue of undue delay in resolving the Motion for Reconsideration,
the OCA likewise held it unmeritorious because the motion was not submitted for resolution in view
of the resetting of its hearing.

As for the charges relating to Spec. Proc. No. 7101, the OCA found that the issues raised by
complainant may be best resolved in another pending case against respondent judge (OCA IPI No.
09-3254-TRJ) except the alleged violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct for acting as counsel for
the petitioner. The OCA also found the charges of tardiness and inefficiency bereft of merit because
Tremedal’s Affidavit explained the reason for the late hearing.

On the other hand, the OCA held that respondent judge is guilty of undue delay in resolving the
Motion to Dismiss in violation of the 1987 Constitution. Since it was respondent judge’s first
administrative offense, the OCA considered it as a mitigating circumstance. The OCA recommended
a fine of ₱5,000 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with
more severely.

This Court, in a Resolution dated 5 October 2011, re-docketed administrative complaint OCA-IPI No.
10-3514-RTJ as regular administrative matter A.M. No. RTJ-11-2298.
 The Court’s Ruling

We are partially in accord with the OCA’s findings and recommendation.

To settle the issue on complainant’s cause of action, the OCA correctly observed that complainants
may file the present administrative complaint against respondent judge. As the Court held in LBC
Bank Vigan Branch v. Guzman,1 the objective in administrative cases is the preservation of the
integrity and competence of the Judiciary by policing its ranks and enforcing discipline among its
erring employees.

However, on the charge of gross ignorance of the law, we find respondent judge guilty of the charge.

Well-settled is the rule that an injunction cannot be issued to transfer possession or control of a
property to another when the legal title is in dispute between the parties and the legal title has not
been clearly established.2 In this case, respondent judge evidently disregarded this established
doctrine applied in numerous cases when it granted the preliminary injunction in favor of Pagels
whose legal title is disputed. When the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of conversance
with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.3 Gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of basic
rules and settled jurisprudence.4

Respondent judge should have been more cautious in issuing writs of preliminary injunctions
because as consistently held these writs are strong arms of equity which must be issued with great
deliberation."5 In Fortune Life Insurance Co., Inc. v. Luczon,6 the Court held the judge guilty of gross
ignorance of the law when he failed to conduct a hearing prior to issuance of an injunction in
violation of the Rules of Court. It was further emphasized in Zuño v. Cabredo,7 where it was held that
the act of respondent in issuing the TRO to enjoin the Bureau of Customs and its officials from
detaining the subject shipment amounted to gross ignorance of the law.

A judge may also be administratively liable if shown to have been motivated by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty or corruption in ignoring, contradicting or failing to apply settled law and jurisprudence.8 In
the present case, the following compounded circumstances manifest bad faith on the part of
respondent judge: (1) in his Comment with Counter-Charge, respondent judge states that he
decided after the parties submitted their position papers, but his Order dated 11 August 2009
indicates that respondent spouses did not file their position paper and the hearing of the Affirmative
Defense was still set on 18 August 2009; (2) respondent judge’s Order patently shows facts not
entitling Pagels to the preliminary injunction but respondent judge still issued it; and (3) respondent
judge did not require petitioner Pagels to put up a bond without sufficient justification or showing of
exemption.

The error is magnified by respondent judge’s delay in resolving the Motion for Reconsideration
through the following subsequent acts: (1) he set the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration
dated 1 September 2009 on 5 October 2009 contrary to the rule providing that the "hearing x x x
must not be later than 10 days after the filing of the motion";9 (2) on 18 November 2009, respondent
judge reset the hearing from 16 November 2009 to 12 March 2010; and (3) he failed to resolve the
said Motion despite the non-filing of a responsive pleading to the Opposition on the Motion for
Reconsideration considering that it is not an indispensable pleading for resolution and the rules
provide that "a motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within thirty days from the time it is
submitted for resolution."10

Indeed, when the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law
or a principle in the discharge of his functions, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of
the position and title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately
done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority.11

Relative to Spec. Proc. No 7101, respondent judge filed a Manifestation dated 2 September 2011
annexing this Court’s Resolution dated 13 June 2011 dismissing the case against respondent judge
filed by Cristita Conjurado Vda. De Tolibas. In the Resolution, we adopted the OCA’s evaluation, to
wit: (1) respondent judge validly issued the writ of habeas corpus on a holiday, in accord with the
Section 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court; and (2) the assailed Order was not issued to assist
petitioner Noel in evading the crime of parricide. It is because the said Resolution did not address
the issues in this Complaint that we modify the findings of the OCA and rule upon the allegations of
complainants.

On the charge of violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, we find the same bereft of
merit. A judge may properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite and prevent
unnecessary waste of time and clarify obscure and incomplete details in the course of the testimony
of the witness.12 In City of Cebu v. Gako,13 the Court finds nothing irregular when respondent judge
unduly arrogated unto himself the duty of a counsel by calling a witness to the stand and conducting
the latter’s direct testimony even if the respective counsels were not interested or did not intend to
present said person as their witness. Here, the records show that respondent judge merely
propounded questions to elicit relevant facts from the witness respondents. The Transcript of
Stenographic Notes, by itself, was not sufficient to show bias or partiality. It has been held that the
Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice
before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial.14

On the charge of gross ignorance of procedure and undue interference in the administrative
functions of the Bureau of Immigration, complainants failed to prove the charge with substantial
evidence. In administrative proceedings, complainants have the burden of proving by substantial
evidence the allegations in their complaints.15 Mere accusations or surmises will not suffice.In the
absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the respondent judge has
regularly performed his duties.16

On the charge of tardiness and inefficiency, we find the same likewise without merit. Without
evidence as to their truthfulness or veracity, the allegations in the Complaint filed by complainants
remain mere allegations and do not rise to the dignity of proof.

On the charge of undue delay in resolving the Motion to Dismiss, we adopt the recommendation of
the OCA that respondent judge is guilty of the charge and should be fined ₱5,000. Respondent
judge resolved the said Motion after more than a year and only after the filing of the instant
complaint. Failure to decide cases and other matters within the reglementary period of ninety (90)
days constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction against the
erring magistrate.17 This is not only a blatant transgression of the Constitution but also of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, which enshrines the significant duty of magistrates to decide cases promptly.
Canon 6, Section 5 of the Code provides that "judges shall perform all judicial duties including the
delivery of reserved decisions efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness. "

Under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, gross ignorance of the law is a serious
charge punishable by either: (1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as
the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned and controlled corporation; or (2) suspension from office without salary
and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months; or (3) a fine of more than
₱20,000 but not exceeding ₱40,000 while undue delay in rendering a decision or order is a less
serious charge punishable by either (1) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for
not less than one nor more than three months; or (2) a fine of more than ₱10,000 but not exceeding
₱20,000. 1âwp hi1

Accordingly, we impose a fine of ₱25,000 for the charge of gross ignorance of the law, taking into
account that in a previous case respondent judge had been sanctioned.18

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Victor A. Canoy GUILTY of GROSS IGNORANCE OF

THE LAW and UNDUE DELAY in rendering a decision and accordingly fine him Thirty Thousand
Pesos (₱30,000). He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of similar or analogous infractions in
the future shall be dealt with more severely. The other charges are hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.
 CIRCULAR NO. 11-2000.
CIRCULAR NO. 11-2000

TO: THE COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN, COURT OF TAX

APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, SHARI'A DISTRICT COURTS,
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN
CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL
COURTS, SHARI'A CIRCUIT COURTS AND THE INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES.
SUBJECT: SUSPENSION OF ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS FROM THE
PRACTICE OF LAW FOR ONE (1) YEAR.
Quoted hereunder for the information and guidance of all concerned
are pertinent portions of the decision of the 2nd Division of this
Court, in Administrative Case No. 4749 entitled "Soliman M. Santos,
Jr., vs. Atty. Franciso R. Llamas" dated January 20, 2000, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"x x x
Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his
misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court
indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in
view of respondent's advanced age, his express
willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more
temperate application of the law, we believe the
penalty of one year suspension from the practice of
law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is
later, is appropriate.cralaw
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1)
YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is
later. x x x"
February 10, 2000.
G.R. No. 145328 March 23, 2006

EDUARDO F. HERNANDEZ, MA. ENCARBACION R. LEGASPI, JAIME BLANCO, JR., ENRIQUE

BELO, CARLOS VIAPLANA, CARL FURER, VIVENCIO TINIO, MICHAEL BRIGGS, ROSA
CARAM, FAUSTO PREYSLER, ROBERT KUA, GEORGE LEE, GUILLERMO LUCHANGCO,
PETER DEE, LUISA MARQUEZ, ANGELITA LILLES, JUAN CARLOS, HOMER GO, AMADEO
VALENZUELA, EMILIO CHING, ANTONIO CHAN, MURLI SABNANI, MARCOS ROCES,
RAYMUNDO FELICIANO, NORMA GAFFUD, ALF HOLST, LOURDES P. ROQUE, MANUEL DY,
RAUL FERNANDEZ, VICTORIA TENGCO, CHI MO CHENG, BARANGAY DASMARIÑAS, and
HON. FRANCISCO B. IBAY, petitioners
vs.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, respondent

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Although Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in cases involving
infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends only to the issuance of injunctions or restraining
orders against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in
technical cases. On issues clearly outside this dimension and involving questions of law, this Court
declared that courts could not be prevented from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit
administrative acts.1 In such cases, let the hammer fall and let it fall hard.

With health risks linked to exposure to electromagnetic radiation as their battle cry, petitioners, all
residents of Dasmariñas Village, are clamoring for the reversal of the decision2 dated 3 May 2000 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57849 as well as the resolution dated 27 September 2000,
denying their motion for reconsideration.

The assailed decision3 of the Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, issuing a writ of preliminary injunction against respondent National Power Corporation
(NAPOCOR) to stay the latter from energizing and transmitting high voltage electric current through
its cables erected from Sucat, Parañaque to Araneta Ave., Quezon City.

But, first, the facts:

Sometime in 1996, NAPOCOR began the construction of 29 decagon-shaped steel poles or towers
with a height of 53.4 meters to support overhead high tension cables in connection with its 230
Kilovolt Sucat-Araneta-Balintawak Power Transmission Project. Said transmission line passes
through the Sergio Osmeña, Sr. Highway (South Superhighway), the perimeter of Fort Bonifacio,
and Dasmariñas Village proximate to Tamarind Road, where petitioners’ homes are.

Said project later proved to be petitioners’ bane of existence.

Alarmed by the sight of the towering steel towers, petitioners scoured the internet on the possible
adverse effects that such a structure could cause to their health and well-being. Petitioners got hold
of published articles and studies linking the incidence of a fecund of illnesses to exposure to
electromagnetic fields. These illnesses range from cancer to leukemia.

Petitioners left no stones unturned to address their malady. They aired this growing concern to the
NAPOCOR, which conducted a series of meetings with them.
NAPOCOR received flak from Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero, who in his Privilege
Speech dated 10 May 1999, denounced the cavalier manner with which Napocor ignored safety and
consultation requirements in the questioned project.

Petitioners brought their woes to the attention of Rep. Arnulfo Fuentebella, Chairman of the House
Committee on Energy, wherein NAPOCOR was asked to shed light on the petitioners’ problem. In a
letter dated 8 November 1999, Napocor President Federico Puno stated that NAPOCOR was still in
the process of coming up with a "win-win" solution to the concerns of the Dasmariñas Village and
Forbes Park residents.4

In a letter dated 10 August 1999 addressed to Congressman Arnulfo P. Fuentebella, NAPOCOR’s

President wrote:

We have discussed the matter with the Dasmariñas and Forbes residents and we have come up
with four (4) options on how to address the problem, to wit:

Option Cost

Option 1: Transfer the line to Lawton Avenue P 111.84 million

(proposal of Dasmariñas/Forbes)

Option 2: Maintain 12 meters distance along P 77.60 million the village

Option 3: Construct an underground line P 482.00 million

Option 4: Reroute along C-5 and South Luzon P 1,018.83 million

Expressway (combination of overhead and underground)5

Negotiations between petitioners and the NAPOCOR reached an impassé, with petitioners vying for
the relocation of the transmission lines to Fort Bonifacio on one hand, and the NAPOCOR insisting
on a 12-meter easement widening, on the other.6

Thus, petitioners, on 9 March 2000 filed a Complaint7 for Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against NAPOCOR. Harping on
the hazardous effects of exposure to electromagnetic radiation to the health and safety to
themselves and their families, petitioners, through the instant case, sought what they had failed to
achieve through amicable means with NAPOCOR and prayed, inter alia, for damages and the
relocation of the transmission lines to Lawton Avenue, Fort Bonifacio.

On 13 March 2000, Judge Francisco B. Ibay issued an order8 in Civil Case No. 00-352, which
temporarily restrained the respondent from energizing and transmitting high voltage electric current
through the said project. The pertinent portion of the said order reads:

Acting on the plaintiffs’ "Urgent Omnibus Motion," it appearing that the subject area will be energized
by midnight tonight based on a report taken from Representative Joker P. Arroyo by plaintiffs’
counsel, so as not to render moot and academic the instant case, as prayed for, defendant National
Power Corporation is ordered to maintain the status quo and/or be enjoined from energizing and
transmitting high voltage electric current through its cables for forty eight (48) hours starting 4 o’clock
in the afternoon today and ending 4 o’clock in the afternoon of 15 March 2000.9
By order10 of 15 March 2000, the trial court extended the restraining order for 18 more days.

NAPOCOR filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction with the Court of Appeals assailing the above order by the trial court. Alluding
to Presidential Decree No. 1818 (1981),"Prohibiting Courts from Issuing Restraining Orders or
Preliminary Injunctions in Cases Involving Infrastructure and Natural Resource Development
Projects of, and Public Utilities Operated by, the Government," particularly Sec. 1, NAPOCOR
stalwartly sought the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack jurisdiction. Presidential Decree No.
1818 provides:

Section 1. No Court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order,
preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute, or controversy
involving an infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery, forest or other natural resource development
project of the government, or any public utility operated by the government, including among other
public utilities for transport of the goods or commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to
prohibit any person or persons, entity or government official from proceeding with or continuing the
execution or implementation of any such project, or the operation of such public utility or pursuing
any lawful activity necessary for such execution, implementation or operation.

In the interregnum, by order dated 3 April 2000, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction against NAPOCOR.11 The trial court articulated that an injunction was
necessary to stay respondent NAPOCOR’s activation of its power lines due to the possible health
risks posed to the petitioners. Asserting its jurisdiction over the case, the trial court was of the view
that Presidential Decree No. 1818 and jurisprudence proscribing injunctions against infrastructure
projects do not find application in the case at bar because of the health risks involved.

The trial court, thus, enjoined the NAPOCOR from further preparing and installing high voltage
cables to the steel pylons erected near petitioners’ homes and from energizing and transmitting high
voltage electric current through said cables while the case is pending final adjudication, upon posting
of the bond amounting to P5,000,000.00 executed to the effect that petitioners will pay all the
damages the NAPOCOR may sustain by reason of the injunction if the Court should finally decide
that the petitioners are not entitled thereto.12

In light of the foregoing order of the trial court, the petition which NAPOCOR filed with the Court of
Appeals was later amended to include the prayer for the nullification and injunction of the Order
dated 3 April 2000 of the trial court.

In the challenged decision of 3 May 2000, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order, with
the following fallo:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The
assailed orders of the respondent court, dated March 13, 2000 and April 3, 2000, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.13

In the Court of Appeals’ rationale, the proscription on injunctions against infrastructure projects of the
government is clearly mandated by the above-quoted Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1818, as
reiterated by the Supreme Court in its Circulars No. 2-91 and No. 13-93, dated 15 March 1991 and 5
March 1993, respectively.

As their motion for reconsideration was met with similar lack of success, petitioners, in a last attempt
at vindication, filed the present petition for review on the following arguments:
 I.

Temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions were purposely designed to address
matters of extreme urgency where there is probability of grave injustice and irreparable injury.14

II.

The rule on preliminary injunction merely requires that unless restrained, the act complained of will
probably work injustice to the applicant or probably violate his rights and tends to render the
judgment ineffectual.15 (Emphasis in the original.)

Fundamental to the resolution of the instant petition is the issue of whether or not the trial court may
issue a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to enjoin the construction and
operation of the 29 decagon-shaped steel poles or towers by the NAPOCOR, notwithstanding
Presidential Decree No. 1818.

Petitioners clutch on their stand that Presidential Decree No. 1818 could not be construed to apply to
cases of extreme urgency as in the present case when no less than the rights of the petitioners to
health and safety hangs on the balance.

We find the petition to be imbued with merit.

Presidential Decree No. 1818 was issued on 16 January 1981, prohibiting judges from issuing
restraining orders against government infrastructure projects. In part, the decree says, "No court in
the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction or
preliminary order, preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute or controversy involving an
infrastructure project." Realizing the importance of this decree, this Tribunal had issued different
circulars to implement this particular law.

Presidential Decree No. 181816 prohibits courts from issuing injunctions against government
infrastructure projects. In Garcia v. Burgos,17 Presidential Decree No. 1818 was held to prohibit
courts from issuing an injunction against any infrastructure project in order not to disrupt or hamper
the pursuit of essential government projects or frustrate the economic development effort of the
nation.

While its sole provision would appear to encompass all cases involving the implementation of
projects and contracts on infrastructure, natural resource development and public utilities, this rule,
however, is not absolute as there are actually instances when Presidential Decree No. 1818 should
not find application. In a spate of cases, this Court declared that although Presidential Decree No.
1818 prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects, the
prohibition extends only to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders against administrative
acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. On issues clearly
outside this dimension and involving questions of law, this Court declared that courts could not be
prevented from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.18

In the case at bar, petitioners sought the issuance of a preliminary injunction on the ground that the
NAPOCOR Project impinged on their right to health as enshrined in Article II, Section 15 of the 1987
Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
consciousness among them.
To boot, petitioners, moreover, harp on respondent’s failure to conduct prior consultation with them,
as the community affected by the project, in stark violation of Section 27 of the Local Government
Code which provides: "no project or program shall be implemented by government authorities unless
the consultations mentioned are complied with, and prior approval of the Sanggunian concerned is
observed."

From the foregoing, whether there is a violation of petitioners’ constitutionally protected right to
health and whether respondent NAPOCOR had indeed violated the Local Government Code
provision on prior consultation with the affected communities are veritable questions of law that
invested the trial court with jurisdiction to issue a TRO and subsequently, a preliminary injunction. As
such, these questions of law divest the case from the protective mantle of Presidential Decree No.
1818.

Moreover, the issuance by the trial court of a preliminary injunction finds legal support in Section 3 of
Rule 58 of the Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction may be granted
when it is established:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in
requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of
during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or

(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual. (3a) (Emphasis supplied.)

The rule on preliminary injunction merely requires that unless restrained, the act complained of will
probably violate his rights and tend to render the judgment ineffectual.

Here, there is adequate evidence on record to justify the conclusion that the project of NAPOCOR
probably imperils the health and safety of the petitioners so as to justify the issuance by the trial
court of a writ of preliminary injunction.

Petitioners adduced in evidence copies of studies linking the incidence of illnesses such as cancer
and leukemia to exposure to electromagnetic fields. The records bear out, to boot, a copy of a
brochure of NAPOCOR regarding its Quezon Power Project from which will be supplying NAPOCOR
with the power which will pass through the towers subject of the controversy. The NAPOCOR
brochure provides that because of the danger concomitant with high voltage power, Philippine laws
mandate that the power lines should be located within safe distances from residences. And the
Quezon Power Project mandates an easement of 20 meters to the right and 20 meters to the left
which falls short of the 12-meter easement that NAPOCOR was proposing to petitioners.

Likewise on record, are copies of letters of Napocor President Federico Puno to Rep. Arnulfo
Fuentebella, Chairman of the House Committee on Energy, stating updates on the negotiations
being undertaken by the NAPOCOR and the Dasmariñas Village and Forbes Park residents. Also on
file is the Privilege Speech dated 10 May 1999 of Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero, who
denounced the cavalier manner with which Napocor ignored safety and consultation requirements in
the questioned project.

With a member of Congress denouncing the subject project of NAPOCOR because of the very same
health and safety ills that petitioners now hew to in this petition, and with documents on record to
show that NAPOCOR made representations to petitioners that they are looking into the possibility of
relocating the project, added to the fact that there had been series of negotiations and meetings
between petitioners and NAPOCOR as well as related agencies, there is ample indicia to suggest to
the mind of the court that the health concerns of the petitioners are, at the very least, far from
imaginary.

Indeed, if there is no cause for concern, NAPOCOR would not have been stirred to come up with
options to address the woes of petitioners, nor would Congressman Escudero have fired away those
strong words of censure, assailing what to Congressman Escudero smacks of a "cavalier manner by
which the NAPOCOR has responded to earnest pleas for a review of its practice of installing
massive pylons supporting high tension cables in densely populated areas."19

True, the issue of whether or not the transmission lines are safe is essentially evidentiary in nature,
and pertains to the very merits of the action below. In fact, petitioners recognize that the
conclusiveness of their life, health and safety concerns still needs to be proved in the main case
below and they are prepared to do so especially in the light of some studies cited by respondent that
yield contrary results in a disputed subject. Despite the parties’ conflicting results of studies made on
the issue, the possibility that the exposure to electromagnetic radiation causes cancer and other
disorders is still, indeed, within the realm of scientific scale of probability.

Equally important, we take judicial notice that the area alluded to as location of the NAPOCOR
project is a fragile zone being proximate to local earthquake faults, particularly the Marikina fault,
among other zones. This is not to mention the risks of falling structures caused by killer tornadoes
and super typhoons, the Philippines, especially Central Luzon, being situated along the typhoon belt.

Moreover, the Local Government Code, requires conference with the affected communities of a
government project. NAPOCOR, palpably, made a shortcut to this requirement. In fact, there
appears a lack of exhaustive feasibility studies on NAPOCOR’s part before making a go with the
project on hand; otherwise, it should have anticipated the legal labyrinth it is now caught in.

These are facts, which the trial court could not ignore, and form as sufficient basis to engender the
cloud of doubt that the NAPOCOR project could, indeed, endanger the lives of the petitioners. A
preliminary injunction is likewise justified prior to a final determination of the issues of whether or not
NAPOCOR ignored safety and consultation requirements in the questioned project. Indeed, the court
could, nay should, grant the writ of preliminary injunction if the purpose of the other party is to shield
a wrongdoing. A ruling to the contrary would amount to an erosion of judicial discretion.

After all, for a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the Rules do not require that the act
complained of be in violation of the rights of the applicant. Indeed, what the Rules require is that the
act complained of be probably in violation of the rights of the applicant. Under the Rules of Court,
probability is enough basis for injunction to issue as a provisional remedy, which is different from
injunction as a main action where one needs to establish absolute certainty as basis for a final and
permanent injunction.

Pending the final determination of the trial court on the main case for damages, of whether or not the
NAPOCOR Project infringes on petitioners’ substantive right to health and pending determination of
the question of whether there was non-observance of the prior-consultation proviso under the Local
Government Code, it is prudent to preserve the status quo. In Phil. Ports Authority v. Cipres
Stevedoring & Arrastre, Inc.,20 we held:

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to judgment of final order,
requiring a party, court, agency, or person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It is a preservative
remedy to ensure the protection of a party’s substantive rights or interests pending the final
judgment in the principal action. A plea for an injunctive writ lies upon the existence of a claimed
emergency or extraordinary situation which should be avoided for otherwise, the outcome of a
litigation would be useless as far as the party applying for the writ is concerned.

At times referred to as the "Strong Arm of Equity," we have consistently ruled that there is no power
the exercise of which is more delicate and which calls for greater circumspection than the issuance
of an injunction. It should only be extended in cases of great injury where courts of law cannot afford
an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages; "in cases of extreme urgency; where the right is
very clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in complainant’s favor;
where there is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff’s right against his protest and remonstrance,
the injury being a continuing one, and where the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to
reestablish and maintain a preexisting continuing relation between the parties, recently and
arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, than to establish a new relation." (Emphasis supplied.)

What is more, contrary to respondents’ assertion, there is not a single syllable in the circulars issued
by this Court enjoining the observance of Presidential Decree No. 1818, which altogether and
absolutely, ties the hands of the courts from issuing a writ of preliminary injunction. What Circular 2-
9121 dated 15 March 1991 seeks to enjoin is the indiscriminate issuance of court injunctions. The
same holds for Circular 13-9322 dated 5 March 1993 and Circular 68-94.23 And, in Circular No. 7-99,
judges are enjoined to observe utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness in the issuance of
temporary restraining order and in the grant of writs of preliminary injunction to avoid any suspicion
that its issuance or grant was for consideration other than the strict merits of the case.24

There is not a hint from the foregoing circulars suggesting an unbridled prohibition against the
issuance of temporary restraining orders or preliminary injunctions.

In sum, what Presidential Decree No. 1818 aims to avert is the untimely frustration of government
infrastructure projects, particularly by provisional remedies, to the detriment of the greater good by
disrupting the pursuit of essential government projects or frustrate the economic development effort
of the nation. Presidential Decree No. 1818, however, was not meant to be a blanket prohibition so
as to disregard the fundamental right to health, safety and well-being of a community guaranteed by
the fundamental law of the land.25

Lest we be misconstrued, this decision does not undermine the purpose of the NAPOCOR project
which is aimed towards the common good of the people. But, is the promotion of the general welfare
at loggerheads with the preservation of the rule of law? We submit that it is not.26

In the present case, the far-reaching irreversible effects to human safety should be the primordial
concerns over presumed economic benefits per se as alleged by the NAPOCOR.

Not too long ago, the Court, in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) v. Bel-Air Village
Association, Inc.,27 upheld the validity of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of
Appeals enjoining the implementation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority’s proposed
action of opening of the Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic. We were categorical -
Not infrequently, the government is tempted to take legal shortcuts to solve urgent problems of the
people. But even when government is armed with the best of intention, we cannot allow it to run
roughshod over the rule of law. Again, we let the hammer fall and fall hard on the illegal attempt of
the MMDA to open for public use a private road in a private subdivision. While we hold that the
general welfare should be promoted, we stress that it should not be achieved at the expense of the
rule of law.28

In hindsight, if, after trial, it turns out that the health-related fears that petitioners cleave on to have
adequate confirmation in fact and in law, the questioned project of NAPOCOR then suffers from a
paucity of purpose, no matter how noble the purpose may be. For what use will modernization serve
if it proves to be a scourge on an individual’s fundamental right, not just to health and safety, but,
ostensibly, to life preservation itself, in all of its desired quality?

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision dated 3 May 2000 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 57849 is REVERSED as well as the resolution dated 27 September 2000. The
Order dated 3 April 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati in Civil Case No. 00-352 is hereby
REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167057 April 11, 2012

NERWIN INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
PNOC-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, and ESTER R. GUERZON, Chairman, Bids
and Awards Committee, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Republic Act No. 89751 expressly prohibits any court, except the Supreme Court, from issuing any
temporary restraining order (TRO), preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction to
restrain, prohibit or compel the Government, or any of its subdivisions or officials, or any person or
entity, whether public or private, acting under the Government’s direction, from: (a) acquiring,
clearing, and developing the right-of-way, site or location of any National Government project; (b)
bidding or awarding of a contract or project of the National Government; (c) commencing,
prosecuting, executing, implementing, or operating any such contract or project; (d) terminating or
rescinding any such contract or project; and (e) undertaking or authorizing any other lawful activity
necessary for such contract or project.

Accordingly, a Regional Trial Court (RTC) that ignores the statutory prohibition and issues a TRO or
a writ of preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against a government contract or
project acts contrary to law.

Antecedents

The following antecedents are culled from the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
promulgated on October 22, 2004,2 viz:

In 1999, the National Electrification Administration ("NEA") published an invitation to pre-qualify and
to bid for a contract, otherwise known as IPB No. 80, for the supply and delivery of about sixty
thousand (60,000) pieces of woodpoles and twenty thousand (20,000) pieces of crossarms needed
in the country’s Rural Electrification Project. The said contract consisted of four (4) components,
namely: PIA, PIB and PIC or woodpoles and P3 or crossarms, necessary for NEA’s projected
allocation for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. In response to the said invitation, bidders, such as
private respondent [Nerwin], were required to submit their application for eligibility together with their
technical proposals. At the same time, they were informed that only those who would pass the
standard pre-qualification would be invited to submit their financial bids.

Following a thorough review of the bidders’ qualifications and eligibility, only four (4) bidders,
including private respondent [Nerwin], qualified to participate in the bidding for the IPB-80 contract.
Thereafter, the qualified bidders submitted their financial bids where private respondent [Nerwin]
emerged as the lowest bidder for all schedules/components of the contract. NEA then conducted a
pre-award inspection of private respondent’s [Nerwin’s] manufacturing plants and facilities, including
its identified supplier in Malaysia, to determine its capability to supply and deliver NEA’s
requirements.

In the Recommendation of Award for Schedules PIA, PIB, PIC and P3 - IBP No. 80 [for the] Supply
and Delivery of Woodpoles and Crossarms dated October 4, 2000, NEA administrator Conrado M.
Estrella III recommended to NEA’s Board of Directors the approval of award to private respondent
[Nerwin] of all schedules for IBP No. 80 on account of the following:
 a. Nerwin is the lowest complying and responsive bidder;

b. The price difference for the four (4) schedules between the bid of Nerwin Industries
(lowest responsive and complying bidder) and the second lowest bidder in the amount of
$1.47 million for the poles and $0.475 million for the crossarms, is deemed substantial and
extremely advantageous to the government. The price difference is equivalent to 7,948 pcs.
of poles and 20.967 pcs. of crossarms;

c. The price difference for the three (3) schedules between the bids of Nerwin and the Tri-
State Pole and Piling, Inc. approximately in the amount of $2.36 million for the poles and
$0.475 million for the crossarms are equivalent to additional 12.872 pcs. of poles and 20.967
pcs. of crossarms; and

d. The bidder and manufacturer are capable of supplying the woodpoles and specified in the
bid documents and as based on the pre-award inspection conducted.

However, on December 19, 2000, NEA’s Board of Directors passed Resolution No. 32 reducing by
50% the material requirements for IBP No. 80 "given the time limitations for the delivery of the
materials, xxx, and with the loan closing date of October 2001 fast approaching". In turn, it resolved
to award the four (4) schedules of IBP No. 80 at a reduced number to private respondent [Nerwin].
Private respondent [Nerwin] protested the said 50% reduction, alleging that the same was a ploy to
accommodate a losing bidder.

On the other hand, the losing bidders Tri State and Pacific Synnergy appeared to have filed a
complaint, citing alleged false or falsified documents submitted during the pre-qualification stage
which led to the award of the IBP-80 project to private respondent [Nerwin].

Thus, finding a way to nullify the result of the previous bidding, NEA officials sought the opinion of
the Government Corporate Counsel who, among others, upheld the eligibility and qualification of
private respondent [Nerwin]. Dissatisfied, the said officials attempted to seek a revision of the earlier
opinion but the Government Corporate Counsel declared anew that there was no legal impediment
to prevent the award of IPB-80 contract to private respondent [Nerwin]. Notwithstanding, NEA
allegedly held negotiations with other bidders relative to the IPB-80 contract, prompting private
respondent [Nerwin] to file a complaint for specific performance with prayer for the issuance of an
injunction, which injunctive application was granted by Branch 36 of RTC-Manila in Civil Case No.
01102000.

In the interim, PNOC-Energy Development Corporation purporting to be under the Department of

Energy, issued Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 or an invitation to pre-qualify and to bid for wooden
poles needed for its Samar Rural Electrification Project ("O-ILAW project").

Upon learning of the issuance of Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 for the O-ILAW Project, Nerwin filed
a civil action in the RTC in Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 03106921 entitled Nerwin Industries
Corporation v. PNOC-Energy Development Corporation and Ester R. Guerzon, as Chairman, Bids
and Awards Committee, alleging that Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 was an attempt to subject a
portion of the items covered by IPB No. 80 to another bidding; and praying that a TRO issue to
enjoin respondents’ proposed bidding for the wooden poles.

Respondents sought the dismissal of Civil Case No. 03106921, stating that the complaint averred no
cause of action, violated the rule that government infrastructure projects were not to be subjected to
TROs, contravened the mandatory prohibition against non-forum shopping, and the corporate
president had no authority to sign and file the complaint.3
On June 27, 2003, after Nerwin had filed its rejoinder to respondents’ reply, the RTC granted a TRO
in Civil Case No. 03106921.4

On July 30, 2003, the RTC issued an order,5 as follows:

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing considerations, an order is hereby issued by this Court:

1. DENYING the motion to consolidate;

2. DENYING the urgent motion for reconsideration;

3. DISQUALIFYING Attys. Michael A. Medado, Datu Omar S. Sinsuat and Mariano H. Paps
from appearing as counsel for the defendants;

4. DECLARING defendants in default;

5. GRANTING the motion for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction.

Accordingly, let a writ of preliminary injunction issue enjoining the defendant PNOC-EDC and its
Chairman of Bids and Awards Committee Esther R. Guerzon from continuing the holding of the
subject bidding upon the plaintiffs filing of a bond in the amount of ₱200,000.00 to answer for any
damage or damages which the defendants may suffer should it be finally adjudged that petitioner is
not entitled thereto, until final determination of the issue in this case by this Court.

This order shall become effective only upon the posting of a bond by the plaintiffs in the amount of
₱200,000.00.

Let a copy of this order be immediately served on the defendants and strict compliance herein is
enjoined. Furnish the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel copy of this order.

SO ORDERED.

Respondents moved for the reconsideration of the order of July 30, 2003, and also to set aside the
order of default and to admit their answer to the complaint.

On January 13, 2004, the RTC denied respondents’ motions for reconsideration, to set aside order
of default, and to admit answer.6

Thence, respondents commenced in the Court of Appeals (CA) a special civil action for certiorari
(CA-GR SP No. 83144), alleging that the RTC had thereby committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that Nerwin had been entitled to the issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction despite the express prohibition from the law and from the Supreme
Court; in issuing the TRO in blatant violation of the Rules of Court and established jurisprudence; in
declaring respondents in default; and in disqualifying respondents’ counsel from representing them.7

On October 22, 2004, the CA promulgated its decision,8 to wit:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated July 30 and December 29,
2003 are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Case No. 03106921, private
respondent’s complaint for issuance of temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction
before Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Nerwin filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion on February 9, 2005.9

Issues

Hence, Nerwin appeals, raising the following issues:

I. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case on the basis of Rep. Act 8975
prohibiting the issuance of temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions, except if
issued by the Supreme Court, on government projects.

II. Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the entire case on the basis of
Rep. Act 8975 which prohibits the issuance only of a preliminary injunction but not injunction
as a final remedy.

III. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case considering that it is also one for
damages.

Ruling

The petition fails.

In its decision of October 22, 2004, the CA explained why it annulled and set aside the assailed
orders of the RTC issued on July 20, 2003 and December 29, 2003, and why it altogether dismissed
Civil Case No. 03106921, as follows:

It is beyond dispute that the crux of the instant case is the propriety of respondent Judge’s issuance
of a preliminary injunction, or the earlier TRO, for that matter.

Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in entertaining an application for TRO/preliminary
injunction, and worse, in issuing a preliminary injunction through the assailed order enjoining
petitioners’ sought bidding for its O-ILAW Project. The same is a palpable violation of RA 8975 which
was approved on November 7, 2000, thus, already existing at the time respondent Judge issued the
assailed Orders dated July 20 and December 29, 2003.

Section 3 of RA 8975 states in no uncertain terms, thus:

Prohibition on the Issuance of temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunctions and Preliminary
Mandatory Injunctions. – No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary restraining
order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or any of
its subdivisions, officials, or any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the
government’s direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:

xxx

(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as defined under

Section 2 hereof;

xxx
This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies instituted by a private party,
including but not limited to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to have rights through such
bidders involving such contract/project. This prohibition shall not apply when the matter is of extreme
urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued,
grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise. xxx

The said proscription is not entirely new. RA 8975 merely supersedes PD 1818 which earlier
underscored the prohibition to courts from issuing restraining orders or preliminary injunctions in
cases involving infrastructure or National Resources Development projects of, and public utilities
operated by, the government. This law was, in fact, earlier upheld to have such a mandatory nature
by the Supreme Court in an administrative case against a Judge.

Moreover, to bolster the significance of the said prohibition, the Supreme Court had the same
embodied in its Administrative Circular No. 11-2000 which reiterates the ban on issuance of TRO or
writs of Preliminary Prohibitory or Mandatory Injunction in cases involving Government Infrastructure
Projects. Pertinent is the ruling in National Housing Authority vs. Allarde "As regards the definition of
infrastructure projects, the Court stressed in Republic of the Phil. vs. Salvador Silverio and Big
Bertha Construction: The term ‘infrastructure projects’ means ‘construction, improvement and
rehabilitation of roads, and bridges, railways, airports, seaports, communication facilities, irrigation,
flood control and drainage, water supply and sewerage systems, shore protection, power facilities,
national buildings, school buildings, hospital buildings and other related construction projects that
form part of the government capital investment."

Thus, there is nothing from the law or jurisprudence, or even from the facts of the case, that would
justify respondent Judge’s blatant disregard of a "simple, comprehensible and unequivocal mandate
(of PD 1818) prohibiting the issuance of injunctive writs relative to government infrastructure
projects." Respondent Judge did not even endeavor, although expectedly, to show that the instant
case falls under the single exception where the said proscription may not apply, i.e., when the matter
is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order
is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise.

Respondent Judge could not have legally declared petitioner in default because, in the first place, he
should not have given due course to private respondent’s complaint for injunction. Indubitably, the
assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

Perforce, this Court no longer sees the need to resolve the other grounds proffered by petitioners.10

The CA’s decision was absolutely correct. The RTC gravely abused its discretion, firstly, when it
entertained the complaint of Nerwin against respondents notwithstanding that Nerwin was thereby
contravening the express provisions of Section 3 and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8975 for its
seeking to enjoin the bidding out by respondents of the O-ILAW Project; and, secondly, when it
issued the TRO and the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction.

Section 3 and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8975 provide:

Section 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary Injunctions and
Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. – No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary
restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government,
or any of its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the
government’s direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:
 (a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or site or location of any
national government project;

(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as defined under

Section 2 hereof;

(c) Commencement, prosecution, execution, implementation, operation of any such contract

or project;

(d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and

(e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity necessary for such
contract/project.

This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies instituted by a private party,
including but not limited to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to have rights through such
bidders involving such contract/project. This prohibition shall not apply when the matter is of extreme
urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued,
grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise. The applicant shall file a bond, in an amount to be
fixed by the court, which bond shall accrue in favor of the government if the court should finally
decide that the applicant was not entitled to the relief sought.

If after due hearing the court finds that the award of the contract is null and void, the court may, if
appropriate under the circumstances, award the contract to the qualified and winning bidder or order
a rebidding of the same, without prejudice to any liability that the guilty party may incur under
existing laws.

Section 4. Nullity of Writs and Orders. - Any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or
preliminary mandatory injunction issued in violation of Section 3 hereof is void and of no force and
effect.

The text and tenor of the provisions being clear and unambiguous, nothing was left for the RTC to do
except to enforce them and to exact upon Nerwin obedience to them. The RTC could not have been
unaware of the prohibition under Republic Act No. 8975 considering that the Court had itself
instructed all judges and justices of the lower courts, through Administrative Circular No. 11-2000, to
comply with and respect the prohibition against the issuance of TROs or writs of preliminary
prohibitory or mandatory injunction involving contracts and projects of the Government.

It is of great relevance to mention at this juncture that Judge Vicente A. Hidalgo, the Presiding Judge
of Branch 37 of the RTC, the branch to which Civil Case No. 03106921 had been raffled, was in fact
already found administratively liable for gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law as the
result of his issuance of the assailed TRO and writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction. The Court
could only fine him in the amount of ₱40,000.00 last August 6, 2008 in view of his intervening
retirement from the service. That sanction was meted on him in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2133 entitled
Sinsuat v. Hidalgo,11 where this Court stated:

The Court finds that, indeed, respondent is liable for gross misconduct. As the CA explained in its
above-stated Decision in the petition for certiorari, respondent failed to heed the mandatory ban
imposed by P.D. No. 1818 and R.A. No. 8975 against a government infrastructure project, which the
rural electrification project certainly was. He thereby likewise obstinately disregarded this Court’s
various circulars enjoining courts from issuing TROs and injunctions against government
infrastructure projects in line with the proscription under R.A. No. 8975. Apropos are Gov. Garcia v.
Hon. Burgos and National Housing Authority v. Hon. Allarde wherein this Court stressed that P.D.
No. 1818 expressly deprives courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctive writs against the implementation
or execution of a government infrastructure project.

Reiterating the prohibitory mandate of P.D. No. 1818, the Court in Atty. Caguioa v. Judge
Laviña faulted a judge for grave misconduct for issuing a TRO against a government infrastructure
project thus:

xxx It appears that respondent is either feigning a misunderstanding of the law or openly manifesting
a contumacious indifference thereto. In any case, his disregard of the clear mandate of PD 1818, as
well as of the Supreme Court Circulars enjoining strict compliance therewith, constitutes grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice. His claim that the said
statute is inapplicable to his January 21, 1997 Order extending the dubious TRO is but a contrived
subterfuge to evade administrative liability.

In resolving matters in litigation, judges should endeavor assiduously to ascertain the facts
and the applicable laws. Moreover, they should exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance
with statutes and procedural rules. Also, they are expected to keep abreast of and be
conversant with the rules and the circulars which the Supreme Court has adopted and which
affect the disposition of cases before them.

Although judges have in their favor the presumption of regularity and good faith in the performance
of their judicial functions, a blatant disregard of the clear and unmistakable terms of the law
obviates this presumption and renders them susceptible to administrative sanctions.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The pronouncements in Caguioa apply as well to respondent.

The questioned acts of respondent also constitute gross ignorance of the law for being patently in
disregard of simple, elementary and well-known rules which judges are expected to know and apply
properly.

IN FINE, respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law, which are
serious charges under Section 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. He having retired from the
service, a fine in the amount of ₱40,000 is imposed upon him, the maximum amount fixed under
Section 11 of Rule 140 as an alternative sanction to dismissal or suspension.12

Even as the foregoing outcome has rendered any further treatment and discussion of Nerwin’s other
submissions superfluous and unnecessary, the Court notes that the RTC did not properly appreciate
the real nature and true purpose of the injunctive remedy. This failing of the RTC presses the Court
to use this decision to reiterate the norms and parameters long standing jurisprudence has set to
control the issuance of TROs and writs of injunction, and to now insist on conformity to them by all
litigants and lower courts. Only thereby may the grave misconduct committed in Civil Case No.
03106921 be avoided. 1âwphi1

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the
judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or person, to refrain from a particular act
or acts.13 It is an ancillary or preventive remedy resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his
rights or interests during the pendency of the case. As such, it is issued only when it is established
that:
 (a) The applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in
requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually; or

(b) The commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during
the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or

(c) A party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is

procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual.14

The existence of a right to be protected by the injunctive relief is indispensable. In City Government
of Butuan v. Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS), Inc.,15 the Court elaborated on this
requirement, viz:

As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the instance of a party who
possesses sufficient interest in or title to the right or the property sought to be protected. It is proper
only when the applicant appears to be entitled to the relief demanded in the complaint, which must
aver the existence of the right and the violation of the right, or whose averments must in the
minimum constitute a prima facie showing of a right to the final relief sought. Accordingly, the
conditions for the issuance of the injunctive writ are: (a) that the right to be protected exists prima
facie; (b) that the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent
and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. An injunction will not issue to
protect a right not in esse, or a right which is merely contingent and may never arise; or to restrain
an act which does not give rise to a cause of action; or to prevent the perpetration of an act
prohibited by statute. Indeed, a right, to be protected by injunction, means a right clearly founded on
or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law.16

Conclusive proof of the existence of the right to be protected is not demanded, however, for, as the
Court has held in Saulog v. Court of Appeals,17 it is enough that:

xxx for the court to act, there must be an existing basis of facts affording a present right which
is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined. And while a clear showing of the right
claimed is necessary, its existence need not be conclusively established. In fact, the evidence
to be submitted to justify preliminary injunction at the hearing thereon need not be conclusive or
complete but need only be a "sampling" intended merely to give the court an idea of the justification
for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits. This should really be
so since our concern here involves only the propriety of the preliminary injunction and not
the merits of the case still pending with the trial court.

Thus, to be entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction, the private respondent needs only to show
that it has the ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in its complaint xxx.18

In this regard, the Rules of Court grants a broad latitude to the trial courts considering that conflicting
claims in an application for a provisional writ more often than not involve and require a factual
determination that is not the function of the appellate courts.19 Nonetheless, the exercise of such
discretion must be sound, that is, the issuance of the writ, though discretionary, should be upon the
grounds and in the manner provided by law.20 When that is done, the exercise of sound discretion by
the issuing court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with except when there is manifest
abuse.21
Moreover, judges dealing with applications for the injunctive relief ought to be wary of improvidently
or unwarrantedly issuing TROs or writs of injunction that tend to dispose of the merits without or
before trial. Granting an application for the relief in disregard of that tendency is judicially
impermissible,22 for it is never the function of a TRO or preliminary injunction to determine the merits
of a case,23 or to decide controverted facts.24 It is but a preventive remedy whose only mission is to
prevent threatened wrong,25 further injury,26 and irreparable harm27 or injustice28 until the rights of the
parties can be settled. Judges should thus look at such relief only as a means to protect the ability of
their courts to render a meaningful decision.29 Foremost in their minds should be to guard against a
change of circumstances that will hamper or prevent the granting of proper reliefs after a trial on the
merits.30 It is well worth remembering that the writ of preliminary injunction should issue only to
prevent the threatened continuous and irremediable injury to the applicant before the claim can be
justly and thoroughly studied and adjudicated.31

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals; and ORDERS petitioner to
pay the costs of suit.

The Court Administrator shall disseminate this decision to the lower courts for their guidance.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180882 February 27, 2013

THE BAGUIO REGREENING MOVEMENT, INC., represented by ATTY. ERDOLFO V.

BALAJADIA; ENVIRONMENT MANAGEMENT CITY AND PARKS OFFICE, represented by its
Officer-in Charge, Cordelia C. Lacsamana; and THE BUSOL FOREST RESERVATION TASK
FORCE, represented by its Team Leader, Victor Dictag, Petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. BRAIN MASWENG, in his capacity as Regional Hearing Officer, NCIP-CAR; ELIZABETH
MAT-AN, for herself and as representative of the heirs of Rafael; JUDITH MARANES, for
herself and as representative of the heirs of Molintas; HELEN LUBOS, for herself and as
representative of the heirs of Kalomis; MAGDALENA GUMANGAN QUE, for herself and as
representative of the heirs of Gumangan; Spouses ALEXANDER AMPAGUEY and LUCIA
AMPAGUEY; and Spouses CARMEN PANA YO and MELANIO PANAYO,Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rule on Civil Procedure
assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 78570
insofar as it affirmed the issuances of National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) Hearing
Officer Brain Masweng, and the Resolution of the same court dated December 11, 2007 denying
petitioners’ Motion for Partial Reconsideration.

Herein private respondents Elizabeth Mat-an, Judith Maranes, Helen Lubos, Magdalena Gumangan
Que, spouses Alexander and Lucia Ampaguey, and spouses Melanio and Carmen Panayo, claiming
that their parents inherited from their ancestors several parcels of land in what is now known as the
Busol Watershed Reservation, filed before the NCIP a Petition for Injunction, with an application for
a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), and thereafter a Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking to
enjoin the Baguio District Engineer’s Office, the Office of the City Architect and Parks
Superintendent, and petitioners The Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. and the Busol Task Force
from fencing the Busol Watershed Reservation.

In their Petition before the NCIP, private respondents claim that they are members of the Ibaloi and
Kankanaey tribes of Baguio City. Their ancestors’ ownership of the properties now known as the
Busol Watershed Reservation was allegedly expressly recognized in Proclamation No. 15 issued by
Governor General Leonard Wood. As owners of said properties, their ancestors paid the realty taxes
thereon. The fencing project of petitioners would allegedly impede their access to and from their
residences, farmlands and water sources, and dispossess them of their yard where tribal rituals and
ceremonies are usually held.

On October 21, 2002, NCIP Regional Hearing Officer Brain S. Masweng issued a TRO, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the petition in order and that grave injustice may result should the acts
complained of be not immediately restrained, a Temporary Restraining Order is hereby issued
pursuant to Section 69 (d) of R.A. 8371, ordering the respondents namely, the Baguio District
Engineer’s Office, represented by Engineer Nestor M. Nicolas, the Project Contractor, Mr. Pel-ey,
the Baguio Regreening Movement Inc., represented by Atty. Erdolfo V. Balajadia, the Busol Task
Force, represented by its Team Leader, Moises G. Anipew, the Baguio City Architect and Parks
Superintendent Office, represented by Arch. Ignacio Estipona, and all persons acting for and their
behalf (sic) of the respondents, their agents and/or persons whomever acting for and their behalf
(sic), to refrain, stop, cease and desist from fencing and/or constructing fences around and between
the areas and premises of petitioners, ancestral land claims, specifically identified in Proclamation
No. 15 as Lot "A" with an area of 143,190 square meters, included within the boundary lines, Lot "B"
77,855 square meters, included within the boundary lines, Lot "C" 121,115 square meters, included
within the boundary lines, Lot "D" 33,839 square meters, included within the boundary lines, Lot "E"
87,903 square meters, included within the boundary lines, Lot "F" 39,487 square meters, included
within the boundary lines, Lot "G" 11,620 square meters, included within the boundary lines, Lot "H"
17,453 square meters, included within the boundary lines, Lot "J" 40,000 square meters, included
within the boundary lines, all described and embraced under Proclamation No. 15, the land
embraced and described under the approved plan No. 12064 of the then Director of Lands,
containing an area of 186, square meters surveyed for Gumangan, the land covered by LRC PSD
52910, containing an area of 77,849 square meters as surveyed for Emily Kalomis, that land
covered by survey plan 11935 Amd, containing an area of 263153 square meters as surveyed for
Molintas, and that land covered by AP-7489, containing an area of 155084 as surveyed for the heirs
of Rafael.

This Restraining Order shall be effective for a period of twenty (20) days from receipt hereof.

Meantime, the respondents are further ordered to show cause on November 5, 2002 (Tuesday) at
2:00 o’clock in the afternoon, why petitioners’ prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction should not be granted.2

On November 6, 2002, Atty. Masweng denied petitioners’ motion to dissolve the TRO, explaining
that a TRO may be issued motu proprio where the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant
will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury. He further stated that petitioners failed to comply
with the procedure laid down in Section 6, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.

On November 12, 2002, Atty. Masweng issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, a writ of preliminary injunction is hereby issued against the respondents, their agents,
or persons acting for and in their behalves (sic), ordering them to refrain, cease and desist from
implementing their fencing project during the pendancy (sic) of the aboveentitled case in any portion
of petitioners’ ancestral land claims within the Busol Watershed Reservation. The lands being
identified under Proclamation No. 15 as lot[s] ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, ‘D’, ‘E’, ‘F’, ‘G’, ‘H’, and ‘J’, including the
lands covered by Petitioners’ approved survey plans as follows: that land identified and plotted under
Survey Plan No. B.L. FILE No. II-11836, September, 1916 surveyed for Gumangan; that land
covered by PSD-52910, May, 1921, surveyed for Emily Kalomis; that land covered by survey plan II-
11935 Amd, 1916, surveyed for Molintas; and that land covered by Survey Plan No. AP 7489, March
1916, surveyed for the heirs of Rafael.

The writ of preliminary injunction shall be effective and shall be enforced only upon petitioners’
compliance with the required injunctive bond of Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) each in
compliance with Section 3, R.A. 8975.3

Atty. Masweng ruled that the NCIP has jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of
Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) and Indigenous Peoples (IPs) and, in the exercise of its
jurisdiction, may issue injunctive writs. According to Atty. Masweng, the allegations in the verified
petition show that private respondents invoked the provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise
known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), when they sought to enjoin petitioners
from fencing their ancestral lands within the Busol Watershed Reservation. Petitioners’ fencing
project violated Section 58 of the IPRA, which requires the prior written consent of the affected
ICCs/IPs. The NCIP therefore has authority to hear the petition filed by private respondents and to
issue the injunctive writ. As regards petitioners’ contention that the issuance of the TRO violated
Presidential Decree No. 1818, Atty. Masweng applied the Decision of this Court in Malaga v.
Penachos, Jr.,4 and held that:

Respondent’s project of fencing the Busol Watershed is not in the exercise of administrative
discretion involving a very technical matter. This is so since the implementation of the fencing project
would traverse along lands occupied by people who claim that they have a legal right over their
lands. The fence would actually cut across, divide, or segregate lands occupied by people. The
effect of it would fence in and fence out property claims. In this case, petitioners invoke their
constitutional rights to be protected against deprivation of property without due process of law and of
taking private property without just compensation. Such situations involve pure question of law.5

As regards the invocation of res judicata by petitioners, Atty. Masweng held that they failed to
present copies of the Decisions supposedly rendered by the Regional Trial Court and the Supreme
Court.

On November 29, 2002, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above Order. On June
20, 2003, Atty. Masweng denied said Motion on the ground that the same was filed out of time.

Petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of Atty. Masweng in issuing the TRO and the writ of preliminary injunction.

On April 30, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing petitioners’ Petition
for Certiorari. The dispositive portion of the Decision is as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED and the assailed orders of
public respondent AFFIRMED. Nevertheless, private respondents are hereby enjoined from (i)
introducing constructions at the Busol Watershed and Forest Reservation and (ii) engaging in
activities that degrade the resources therein until viable measures or programs for the maintenance,
preservation and development of said reservation are adopted pursuant to Sec. 58 of Rep. Act No.
8371.6

The Court of Appeals ruled that since the petition before the NCIP involves the protection of private
respondents’ rights to their ancestral domains in accordance with Section 7(b), (c) and (g)7 of the
IPRA, the NCIP clearly has jurisdiction over the dispute pursuant to Section 66. The Court of
Appeals also upheld the conclusion of Atty. Masweng that the NCIP can issue injunctive writs as a
principal relief against acts adversely affecting or infringing on the rights of ICCs or IPs, because
"(t)o rule otherwise would render NCIP inutile in preventing acts committed in violation of the IPRA."8

As regards petitioners’ allegations that government reservations such as the subject Busol
Watershed cannot be the subject of ancestral domain claims, the Court of Appeals pointed out that
Section 589 of the IPRA in fact mandates the full participation of ICCs/IPs in the maintenance,
management, and development of ancestral domains or portions thereof that are necessary for
critical watersheds. The IPRA, thus, gives the ICCs/IPs responsibility to maintain, develop, protect,
and conserve such areas with the full and effective assistance of government agencies.10

Despite ruling in favor of private respondents, the Court of Appeals nevertheless found merit in
petitioners’ own application for injunction and observed that certain activities by private respondents
without regard for environmental considerations could result in irreparable damage to the watershed
and the ecosystem. Thus, the Court of Appeals enjoined private respondents from introducing
constructions at the Busol Watershed and from engaging in activities that degrade its resources,
until viable measures or programs for the maintenance, preservation and development of said
reservation are adopted pursuant to the aforementioned Section 58 of the IPRA.

Hence, the present Petition for Review wherein petitioners assert the following grounds:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY AND PATENTLY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE

NCIP’S ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION DESPITE CLEAR AND PATENT VIOLATION OF P.D. 1818,
SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR NO. 68-94 AND SUPREME COURT ADMINISTRATIVE
CIRCULAR NO. 11-2000;

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY AND PATENTLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE

ACT OF THE NCIP IN ISSUING A 20-DAYS TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER EX
PARTE SANS THE MANDATORY NOTICE AND HEARING FOR THE ISSUANCE
THEREOF;

3. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY AND PATENTLY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE

NCIP’S ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION DESPITE ABSOLUTE
ABSENCE OF CLEAR, UNMISTAKABLE AND POSITIVE LEGAL RIGHTS ON THE PART
OF THE APPLICANTS;

4. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY AND PATENTLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

THE NCIP HEARING OFFICER HAS JURISDICTION OVER A CASE OF INJUNCTION
INVOLVING A GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT;

5. THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY AND GRAVELY ERRED IN BRUSHING ASIDE

SECTION 78, A SPECIAL PROVISION OF REPUBLIC ACT 8371 WHICH EXCLUDES THE
CITY OF BAGUIO FROM THE COVERAGE OF ANCESTRAL LAND CLAIMS
APPLICATIONS;

6. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY AND PATENTLY ERRED IN UPHOLDING RULE

XIII OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES OF REPUBLIC ACT 8371, EVEN IF THE
PROVISIONS OF SAID RULE XIII CLEARLY OVERSTEPPED AND EXCEEDED SECTION
78 OF R.A. 8371.11

TRO and Preliminary Injunction against Government Infrastructure Projects

The governing law as regards the prohibition to issue restraining orders and injunctions against
government infrastructure projects is Republic Act No. 8975,12 which modified Presidential Decree
No. 1818, the law cited by the parties, upon its effectivity on November 26, 2000.13 Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 8975 provides:

Section 9. Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees, including Presidential Decree Nos. 605, 1818 and
Republic Act No. 7160, as amended, orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with
this Act are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.

Thus, in GV Diversified International, Incorporated v. Court of Appeals,14 we ruled that Presidential

Decree No. 1818 have been effectively superseded by Republic Act No. 8975. The prohibition is
thus now delineated in Section 3 of said latter law, which provides:
Section 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary Injunctions and
Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. – No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any
temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the
government, or any of its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity, whether public or private,
acting under the government’s direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:

(a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or site or location of any
national government project;

(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as defined under

Section 2 hereof;

(c) Commencement, prosecution, execution, implementation, operation of any such contract

or project;

(d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and

(e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity necessary for such
contract/project.

This prohibition shall apply to all cases, disputes or controversies instituted by a private party,
including but not limited to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to have rights through such
bidders involving such contract/project. This prohibition shall not apply when the matter is of extreme
urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued,
grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise. The applicant shall file a bond, in an amount to be
fixed by the court, which bond shall accrue in favor of the government if the court should finally
decide that the applicant was not entitled to the relief sought.

If after due hearing the court finds that the award of the contract is null and void, the court may, if
appropriate under the circumstances, award the contract to the qualified and winning bidder or order
a rebidding of the same, without prejudice to any liability that the guilty party may incur under the
existing laws. (Emphasis supplied.)

Should a judge violate the preceding section, Republic Act No. 8975 provides the following penalty:

Section 6. Penal Sanction. — In addition to any civil and criminal liabilities he or she may incur under
existing laws, any judge who shall issue a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or
preliminary mandatory injunction in violation of Section 3 hereof, shall suffer the penalty of
suspension of at least sixty (60) days without pay. (Emphasis added.)

It is clear from the foregoing provisions that the prohibition covers only judges, and does not apply to
the NCIP or its hearing officers. In this respect, Republic Act No. 8975 conforms to the coverage of
Presidential Decree No. 60515and Presidential Decree No. 1818,16 both of which enjoin only the
courts. Accordingly, we cannot nullify the assailed Orders on the ground of violation of said laws.

The Court’s Previous Decision in G.R. No. 180206

On February 4, 2009, this Court promulgated its Decision in G.R. No. 180206, a suit which involved
several of the parties in the case at bar. In G.R. No. 180206, the City Mayor of Baguio City issued
three Demolition Orders with respect to allegedly illegal structures constructed by private
respondents therein on a portion of the Busol Forest Reservation. Private respondents filed a
Petition for Injunction with the NCIP. Atty. Masweng issued two temporary restraining orders
directing the City Government of Baguio to refrain from enforcing said Demolition Orders and
subsequently granted private respondents’ application for a preliminary injunction. The Court of
Appeals, acting on petitioners’ Petition for Certiorari, affirmed the temporary restraining orders and
the writ of preliminary injunction.

This Court then upheld the jurisdiction of the NCIP on the basis of the allegations in private
respondents’ Petition for Injunction. It was similarly claimed in said Petition for Injunction that private
respondents were descendants of Molintas and Gumangan whose claims over the portions of the
Busol Watershed Reservation had been recognized by Proclamation No. 15. This Court thus ruled in
G.R. No. 180206 that the nature of the action clearly qualify it as a dispute or controversy over
ancestral lands/domains of the ICCs/IPs.17 On the basis of Section 69(d)18 of the IPRA and Section
82, Rule XV19 of NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03, the NCIP may issue temporary restraining
orders and writs of injunction without any prohibition against the issuance of the writ when the main
action is for injunction.20

On petitioners’ argument that the City of Baguio is exempt from the provisions of the IPRA and,
consequently, the jurisdiction of the NCIP, this Court ruled in G.R. No. 180206 that said exemption
cannot ipso facto be deduced from Section 7821 of the IPRA because the law concedes the validity of
prior land rights recognized or acquired through any process before its effectivity.22

Lastly, however, this Court ruled that although the NCIP has the authority to issue temporary
restraining orders and writs of injunction, it was not convinced that private respondents were entitled
to the relief granted by the Commission.23 Proclamation No. 15 does not appear to be a definitive
recognition of private respondents’ ancestral land claim, as it merely identifies the Molintas and
Gumangan families as claimants of a portion of the Busol Forest Reservation, but does not
acknowledge vested rights over the same.24 Since it is required before the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction that claimants show the existence of a right to be protected, this Court, in G.R.
No. 180206, ultimately granted the petition of the City Government of Baguio and set aside the writ
of preliminary injunction issued therein.1âwp hi1

In the case at bar, petitioners and private respondents present the very same arguments and
counter-arguments with respect to the writ of injunction against the fencing of the Busol Watershed
Reservation. The same legal issues are thus being litigated in G.R. No. 180206 and in the case at
bar, except that different writs of injunction are being assailed. In both cases, petitioners claim (1)
that Atty. Masweng is prohibited from issuing temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary
injunction against government infrastructure projects; (2) that Baguio City is beyond the ambit of the
IPRA; and (3) that private respondents have not shown a clear right to be protected. Private
respondents, on the other hand, presented the same allegations in their Petition for Injunction,
particularly the alleged recognition made under Proclamation No. 15 in favor of their ancestors.
While res judicata does not apply on account of the different subject matters of the case at bar and
G.R. No. 180206 (they assail different writs of injunction, albeit issued by the same hearing officer),
we are constrained by the principle of stare decisis to grant the instant petitiOn. The Court explained
the principle of stare decisis25in Ting v. Velez-Ting26:

The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this
Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. Basically, it is a
bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues, necessary for two simple reasons: economy and
stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code. (Citations
omitted.)
We have also previously held that "under the doctrine of stare decisis, once a court has laid down a
principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to
all future cases where the facts are substantially the same."27

However, even though the principal action in the case at bar is denominated as a petition for
injunction, the relief prayed for and granted by the NCIP partakes of the nature of a preliminary
injunction in the sense that its effectivity would cease the moment the NCIP issues its decision in an
appropriate action. The conclusions of this Court in both the case at bar and that in G.R. No. 180206
as regards private respondents' ancestral land claim should therefore be considered provisional, as
they are based merely on the allegations in the complaint or petition and not on evidence adduced in
a full-blown proceeding on the merits by the proper tribunal. Private respondents are therefore not
barred from proving their alleged ancestral domain claim in the appropriate proceeding, despite the
denial of the temporary injunctive relief prayed for.

WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78570 dated April 30, 2007 and December 11,
2007, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.