PEOPLE v.

LADONGA
G.R. No. 141066; 17 February 2005

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga seeks a review of the CA Decision (May 17, 1999) affirming her (and her
husband Adronico’s) three convictions for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as The Bouncing
Checks Law, as decided by the RTC Bohol (August 24, 1996):
 Criminal Case No. 7068 - UCPB Check No. 284743 dated July 7, 1990 for P9,075.55
 CC No. 7069 - UCPB Check No. 284744 dated July 22, 1990 for P12,730.00
 CC No. 7070 UCPB Check No. 106136 dated July 22, 1990 for P8,496.55

The three cases correspond to three loans obtained in April, May, and June 1990 respectively by the Ladonga
spouses from Alfredo Oculam, owner of the pawnshop where the spouses are regular customers. The three
checks issued by Adronico to secure the loans all bounced upon presentment due to "CLOSED ACCOUNT”.
Upon failure to redeem the checks despite demands, Oculam filed criminal complaints against them.

At the RTC, the Ladonga spouses argued that (1) the checks were issued only to guarantee the obligation,
with agreement that the checks would not be encashed upon maturity; and (2) Evangeline is not a signatory
of the checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof. The RTC still convicted both spouses,
although Adronico applied for and was granted probation.

At the CA, Evangeline argued that (1) she was not involved in issuing the checks and (2) the principle of
conspiracy does not apply to special laws like B.P. 22, especially as it would enlarge the scope of the statute
and include situations not provided for or intended by the lawmakers. The CA affirmed the RTC (and denied
MR) based on three facts:
 RPC Article 10 which makes the provisions of the penal code supplementary to special penal laws unless
otherwise provided (per People vs. Parel, U.S. vs. Ponte, and U.S. vs. Bruhez)
 BP 22, which does not prohibit the applicability of the RPC or the principle of conspiracy
 The definition of conspiracy where the fact that petitioner did not make and issue or sign the checks
does not exculpate her from criminal liability: it is not indispensable that a co-conspirator takes a direct
part in every act and knows the part which everyone performed, give that in conspiracy the act of one
conspirator could be held to be the act of the other.

ISSUES/RATIO:
(a) Whether an individual who is not the drawer or issuer of a bouncing check can be held liable
under BP 22 as a conspirator under the last sentence of RPC Article 10: YES.
 Article 10 has two important clauses which seem contradictory but can be reconciled. The entire
provision reads:”Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses which are or in the
future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This
Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.”
o The first clause should be understood to mean only that the special penal laws are
controlling with regard to offenses therein specifically punished. Special legal provisions
prevail over general ones – lex specialis derogant generali. In fact, the clause can be
considered as a superfluity, and could have been eliminated altogether.
o The second clause contains the soul (main idea and purpose) of the article. The "code shall
be supplementary" to special laws, unless the latter specifically provide the contrary.
  B.P. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the provisions of the RPC.
Therefore, the general provisions of the RPC may be applied suppletorily.
o In Yu v. People (2004) the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary
imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC to B.P. 22.
o The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case is analogous to the
application of the provision on principals under Article 17 in U.S. vs. Ponte. Once conspiracy
or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the
conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes
secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.
 The CA cited three cases which involved the suppletory application of principles under the then
Penal Code to special laws, which are all with firm basis.
o People vs. Parel is concerned with the application of Article 22 of the Code to violations of
Act 3030, the Election Law, with reference to retroactivity of penal laws favoring the
accused.
o U.S. vs. Ponte involved the application of Article 17 of the same Penal Code, with reference
to participation of principals in the commission of the crime of misappropriation of public
funds as defined and penalized by Act No. 1740.
o U.S. vs. Bruhez covered Article 45 of the same Code, with reference to the confiscation of
the instruments used in violation of Act No. 1461, the Opium Law.

(b) Whether Evangeline’s conviction was based on proof beyond reasonable doubt [1]: NO.
 The prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of the alleged
conspiracy based on the lone prosecution testimony of Oculam.
o Evangeline was merely present when her husband, Adronico, signed the first check,
o Oculam also did not describe the details of Evangeline’s participation with regard to the
second and third checks. He did not specify the nature of petitioner’s involvement in the
commission of the crime, either by a direct act, a direct inducement of her co-conspirator,
or cooperating in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not
have been accomplished.
 Evidence to prove conspiracy must be positive and convincing to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence (People v. Mandaq). Conspiracy must be established not by conjectures,
as it transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself
amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough
to constitute one as a party to conspiracy, absent active participation in the commission of the
crime with a view to furthering a common design and purpose.
 Criminal liability cannot be based on a general allegation of conspiracy. A judgment of conviction
must always be founded on moral certainty as shown by the strength of the prosecution’s
evidence, not on the weakness of the evidence for the defense (People v. Legaspi).

DISPOSITIVE: Petition granted. CA decision affirming the RTC decision is reversed and set aside, and
Evangeline Ladonga is acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

1 Article 8 of the RPC provides that a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it. To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have
performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active
participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to
execute or implement the criminal plan.