Lawyer's Oath

I, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the

Philippines,

I will support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the
duly constituted authorities therein;

I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court;

I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful
suit, or give aid nor consent to the same;

I will delay no man for money or malice,

and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion,

with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients;

and I impose upon myself these voluntary obligations

without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

So help me God.

Book:
Constitution, in the American sence, is a written instrument by which the fundamental
powers of government are, established, limited, and defined, and by which the powers are
distributed among several departments, for their more safe and useful exercise, for the
benefit of the body politic. – Justice Miller

Fundamental purpose of the Constitution is presented primarily as both as a grant and a

limitation of a Governmental Authority.

 It is the written instrument agreed upon by the people as the absolute rule of action
and decision for all departments and officers of the government and in opposition to
which any act of rule of any department of officer of the government, or even of the
people themselves, will be altogether void.
 Supreme written law of the land.

Constitutional Law – is not just the text of the constitution itself.

 It is a body of rules resulting from the interpretation by a high court of cases in which
the validity, in relation to the constitutional instrument, of some act of governmental
power has been challenged.

1935 Constitution;
By authority of Tydings-McDuffie Law, a Constitutional Conventio was called.

It MET on July 30, 1934 - held its final session on February 8, 1935.

March 3, 1935 - President of the UD approved the Draft of the Constitution.

May 14, 1935 – the Filipino electorate ratified the same by a majority vote.

Nov. 15, 1935 - the Commonwealth Gov’t established by the Constitution became operative.

July 4, 1946 – Philippine Independence came.

Philippine Republic continued to operate under the Constitution formulated in 1934-1935.

1973 Constitution;
March 16, 1967 – Phil. Congress, pursuant to the authority given to it by 1935 Constitution,
passed Resolution No. 2 (later amended by Reso. No. 4, passed on July 17, 1969) calling a
Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution.

Nov. 20, 1970 – election of Delegates to the convention were held.

June 1, 1971 – 1971 Constitutional Convention began.

Sept. 21, 972 – Martial Law was imposed on the entire Philippines.
 Before the Constitutional Convention could finish its work.
 Delegates were exiled and were placed under detention; some went hiding.

Nov. 29, 1972 – Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines.

Nov. 30, 1972 – The President issued PD 73, “submitting Filipino people for ratification or
rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Phils. Proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention” and setting the date of the plebiscite on January 15, 1973.

January 7, 1973 – The President issued General Order No. 20, directing “that the Plebiscite
scheduled to be held on January 15, 1973, to be postponed until further notice.

Jan. 17, 1973 – While the SC was hearing arguments on the petitions to enjoin the holding of
a plebiscite, the President, by Proclamation No. 1102, announced that the proposed
Constitution had been ratified by an overwhelming vote of the members of the Citizens
Assemblies.

CASE:
JAVELLANA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
1. SC ruled “that there was no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being
considered in force and in effect.

2. The Executive Department, with vigor and with all the resources as its command,
proceeded to implement it.

3. The Legislative Department was nowhere to be found to object.

4. Meanwhile, ordinary mortals lived and foind their fortunes (and misfortunes) under
the new Constitution.

Nov. 1985 – Regime of Marcos Sunk, Pres. Marcos called for a special election. Corazon
Aquino Challenged him and elections were held on February 8, 1986.
Feb. 15, 1986 - Batasan Pambansa, in the exercise of powers given by the 1973 Constitution,
proclaimed Ferdinand Marcos President.

Feb. 22, 1986 - Minister of Defense JPE, and Vice Chief of Staff FVR initiated a revolt, placed
their support to Cory.

Feb. 25 1986 – Proclaimed Cory as President in defiance of the 973 Constitution.

 At the same Time, Marcos also sworn by virtue of Batasan Proclamation but also the
same day, Marcos and family went into exile.

1987 Constitution:

Preamble
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God,

in order to build a just and humane society

and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations,

promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony,

and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of independence

and democracy under the rule of law

and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace,

do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.

Preamble - is not a source of power or right for any department of government.

But because it sets down the origin, scope and purpose of the Constitution, it is useful as a
aid in ascertaining the meaning of ambiguous provision in the body of the Constitution.

i.e. In Aglipay vs. Ruiz, Justice Laurel, in seeking the true meaning of separation of church
and state in the Philippine jurisprudence, had occasion to allude to the invocation of the “aid
of Divine Protection” found in the 1935 Preamble.

ARTICLE I. The National Territory:

The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago,

with all the islands and waters embraced therein,

and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction,

consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains,

including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other
submarine areas.

The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago,
regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the
Philippines.

Three phases of definition of national territory found in the Constitution;

 1st Phase – During the 1934 – 1935 Constitutional Convention.

 2nd Phase – Deliberations of the 1972 Constitutional Convention.

 3rd Phase – Deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.

***Between 1972 and 1986, the Philippine became party to the 1982 Convention on the Law
of the Sea.

Constitution – is a municipal law.

 Its is binding only within the territorial limits of the sovereignty promulgating the
constitution.

For actual exercise of sovereignty, it is important for the sovereign state to know the extent
of the territory over which it can legitimately exercise jurisdiction.

For settling international conflicts, a legal instrument purporting to set out the territorial limits
of the state must be supported by some recognized principle of international law.

NATIONAL TERRITORY UNDER THE 1935 CONSTITUTION

 The Article gave four points of reference for the determination of Philippine territory;
(1) The Treaty of Paris on December 10, 1899;

(2) The Treaty of Washington on Nov. 7 1900;

(3) The Treaty between Great Britain and the US on January 2, 1930;

(4) All territory over which the present Government on the Philippine Islands exercises
jurisdiction.

1973 CONSTITUTION ON NATIONAL TERRITORY

Philippine National Territory under 1973 Constitution divided into 3 groups;

1. The Philippine Archipelago;

2. Other territories belonging to the Philippines;

3. Philippine waters, air-space, and submarine areas.

Horizontal Reach – land and waters.

Upward – airspace over the land.

Downward – submarine areas.

“archipelagic principle”

A. Philippine Archipelago – 1973 Constitution.

 “All the islands and waters embraced therein”.
 Gave no exact point of reference that could delineate the exact location of these
islands.
 Therefore the article did not serve as a definition of national territory.
 To understand, we must look on the first draft to the final form.

B. All other territories belonging to the Philippines – 1973 Constitution.

 Aside from the Phil. Archipelago, Phil. Territory also includes “all other territories to
the Phils. By historic right or legal title.
 Inclusion of Batanes Island in the Phil. Territory (Historic Right); Sabbah (Legal Title)
and Marianas Island Territory (Historic Right).

C. The Territorial Sea – 1973 Constitution.

 Consist of Marginal Belt of Marine Waters adjacent to the baselines extending twelve
nautical miles outward.
 Outside territorial seas are the High Seas.

Innocent Passage – is understood as passage not prejudicial to the interests of the coastal
state.
 Nor contrary to recognized principles of international law. 12 Nautical Miles.

NOT considered innocent passages;

1. Passage of foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order
or security of the coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in any of the following
activities;
a. Any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or
political independence of the costal State, or violation of International Laws –
UN;
b. Any exercise of practice with weapons of any kind;
c. Any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defense or
security of the coastal State;
d. Any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defense or security of the coastal
State;
e. The launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft;
f. The launching, landing or taking on board of any military device;
g. The loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to the
customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal
State;
h. Any act of willful and serious pollution contrary to this Convention;
i. Any act of fishing
j. The carrying out of research or survey activities;
k. Any act aimed not having a direct bearing on passage.

Internal or Inland water consists;

1. All parts of the sea landwards from the baseline;
2. Inland rivers;
3. Lakes.

*All of them are subject to the sovereignty of the state to the same extent that the land
domain is.

*Not subject to the right of Innocent Passage by other states, unlike Territorial domain.

Insular Shelf
A. The seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coastal State but
outside the Territorial Sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where
the depth allows exploitation;
B.
C. The seabed abn subsoil of areas adjacent to islands.

*Coastal State has the right to explore and exploit its natural resources, to erect installation
needed, and to erect safety zone over its installations with a radius of 500 meters.

*The right does not affect the right of navigation of others.

*The right does not extend to non-resource material in the shelf area such as wrecked ship
and their cargos.

2 methods in fixing the starting point or BASELINE which the territorial belt is
measured;

1. The normal baseline method – the breadth of the territorial sea is measured from
the low water-line, following the indentations of the coast.

2. The straight baseline method – which instead of the baseline following the
sinuosities (curve) of the coast, it is drawn as straight lines connecting appropriate
points on the coast, without departing to any appreciable extent from the general
direction of the coast.

Archipelago – a group of islands interconnecting waters and other natural features which
are closely interrelated that such islands, waters other natural features for an intrinsic
geographical, economic and political entity, or which historically have been regarded as such.

Archipelagic State – A State constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos and may
include other islands.

National Territory in the 1987 Constitution

June 26, 1986;

Commissioner Azcuna;
1. The Sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters
and, in case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, adjacent belt of sea, described
as territorial sea.

2. The Sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and
subsoil.

3. The Sovereignty over the territorial sea is exercised subject to this Convention and to other
rules of international law.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION:

1. Like the 934-1935 Convention, the 1971 Convention did not claim that a constitutional
provision standing by itself is binding international law.

2. Only clear claimed by the 1971 Convention of the power unilaterally to delimit territorial
boundaries was with respect to inland and territorial waters.

3. Philippines is not bigger because of the new article on the national territory.
 D

4. 1973 Constitution ensured the possibility of claiming other territories on the basis of
“Historic Right or Legal Title”.

5. 1987 version, removed language possibly offensive to ASEAN neighbor and achieved a
more logical sequencing of the elements that make up the territory but prrserved everything
else founded in the 1973 Constitution.

Validity of R.A. 9255 (New Baselines Law of 2009);

Republic Act No. 9522 March 10, 2009

AN ACT TO AMEND CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3046, AS AMENDED

BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5446, TO DEFINE THE ARCHIPELAGIC BASELINE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled::

Section 1. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3046, entitled "An Act to Define the Baselines of the
Territorial Sea of the Philippines", as amended by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5446, is
hereby amended to read as follows:
 Section 1. The baselines of the Philippines archipelago are hereby defined and
described specifically as follows: (101 locations)

Section 2. The baseline in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises
sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of
the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS):

a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596; and

b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal.

Section 3. This Act affirms that the Republic of the Philippines has dominion, sovereignty and
jurisdiction over all portions of the national territory as defined in the Constitution and by
provisions of applicable laws including, without limitation, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991, as amended.

Section 4. This Act, together with the geographic coordinates and the chart and maps
indicating the aforesaid baselines, shall be deposited and registered with the Secretary
General of the United Nations.

Section 5. The National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) shall
forthwith produce and publish charts and maps of the appropriate scale clearly representing
the delineation of basepoints and baselines as set forth in this Act.

Section 6. The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be provided in
a supplemental budget or included in the General Appropriations Act of the year of its
enactment into law.

Section 7. If any portion or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid the
other portions or provisions hereof which are not affected thereby shall continue to be in full
force and effect.

Section 8. The provisions of Republic Act No. 3046, as amended by Republic Act No. 5446,
and all other laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and issuances inconsistent with this Act
are hereby amended or modified accordingly.

Section 9. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official
Gazette or in any two (2) newspaper of general circulation.

CASE:
MAGALLONA V. EXEC. SEC. ERMITA, GR 187167, AUGUST 16, 2011;
FACTS: In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baselines of the
Philippines was enacted – the law is also known as the Baselines Law. This law was meant to
comply with the terms of the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS
III), ratified by the Philippines in February 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et, al. questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among
others, that the law decreased the national territory of the Philippines hence the law is
unconstitutional.
Some of their particular arguments are as follows:
a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other ancillary
treaties – this also resulted to the exclusion of our claim over Sabah;
b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, describes the Philippine waters as “archipelagic”
waters which, in international law, opens our waters landward of the baselines to
maritime passage by all vessels (innocent passage) and aircrafts (overflight),
undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s
nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant
constitutional provisions;
c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the Scarborough
Shoal (bajo de masinloc), as a “regime of islands” pursuant to UNCLOS results in the
loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence
fishermen.

ISSUE: W/N the contentions of Magallona et. Al, are tenable?

HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not a means
to acquire, or lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law has nothing to do with the
acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of the Philippine territory.

What controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the international law principle
on occupation, accretion, cession and prescription and NOT the execution of multilateral
treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty’s
terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.

The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it. Under the
old law amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the rectangular lines enclosing the
Philippines. The area that it covered was 440,994 square nautical miles (sq. na. mi.).

But under 9522, and with the inclusion of the exclusive economic zone, the extent of our
maritime was increased to 586,210 sq. na. mi. (See image below for comparison)

If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope of the
maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights.
Anent their particular contentions:
a. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is evident on the provision of Section 2 of
RA 9522:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine
Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the
baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo,
over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.

b. UNCLOS may term our waters as “archipelagic waters” and that we may term it as our
“internal waters”, but the bottom line is that our country exercises sovereignty over these
waters and UNCLOS itself recognizes that.

However, due to our observance of international law, we allow the exercise of others of their
right of innocent passage. No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely
forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law
without risking retaliatory measures from the international community.

c. The classification of the KIG (Kalayaan Island Group) (or the Spratly’s), as well as the
Scarborough Shoal, as a regime of islands did not diminish our maritime area. Under UNCLOS
and under the baselines law, since they are regimes of islands, they generate their own
maritime zones – in short, they are not to be enclosed within the baselines of the main
archipelago (which is the Philippine Island group). This is because if we do that, then we will
be enclosing a larger area which would already depart from the provisions of UNCLOS – that
the demarcation should follow the natural contour of the archipelago.
Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal through
effective occupation.
NOTES:
Under UNCLOS and the baselines law, we have three levels of maritime zones where we
exercise treaty-based rights:
a. territorial waters – 12 nautical miles from the baselines; where we exercise sovereignty
b. contiguous zone – 24 nautical miles from the baselines; jurisdiction where we can
enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws (CFIS).
c. exclusive economic zone – 200 nautical miles from the baselines; where we have the
right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone
Note: a fourth zone may be added which is the continental shelf – this is covered by Article
77 of the UNCLOS.

PCA CASE NO. 2013-19, IN THE MATTER OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ARBITRATION,
12 JULY 2016;
PREFACE: The South China Sea has, especially in contemporary times, emerged as a region
of great interest to global players, in terms of strategic and economic interests of the
competing States. As Foreign Policy puts it, “There’s no tenser set of waters in the world than
the South China Sea. For the last few years, China and its neighbors have been bluffing,
threatening, cajoling, and suing for control of its resources.”[2]
To best understand the current situation in the South China Sea from a legal point of view, it
is imperative to refer back to the judgment passed by the Arbitral Tribunal of the Permanent
Court of Arbitration last year, in response to the claims brought by Philippines against China,
primarily regarding maritime rights, entitlements and zones in the South China Sea, as well
as for the protection of the marine life and the environment of the region, under the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982.

China has always argued for historic rights, as demarcated by the ‘Nine Dash Line’ on its
official maps of the region in question; other stakeholders, however, dispute this claim, as
shown in the arbitral proceedings. As is noted:

… While it was the Philippines which brought the case, it wasn’t the only interested party in
the Asean. Three other members have claims to parts of the South China Sea or the Spratly
Islands or the Paracels that conflict with China’s expansive nine-dash theory: Brunei,
Malaysia, and Vietnam. Indonesia, Asean’s largest economy, has continuing run-ins with
Chinese fishing vessels and occasionally with the Chinese Coast Guard in its exclusive
economic zone.[3]

Now, as the Association of South East Nations (ASEAN) heads towards working on the
enforcement of this arbitration award from last year (2016), and attempting to employ a code
of conduct for the South China Sea, it becomes even more important to look at the arbitral
ruling from an objective vantage point.

CASE BRIEF

The South China Sea Arbitration was conducted between the Republic of the Philippines and
the People’s Republic of China by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), under the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The arbitration is related to
disputes between the Parties regarding the legal basis of maritime rights and entitlements,
the status of certain geographic features, and the lawfulness of certain actions taken by China
in the South China Sea; in particular, the following four issues, as raised by Philippines:

To resolve a dispute between the parties regarding the source of maritime rights and
entitlements in the South China Sea;

To resolve a dispute between the parties concerning the entitlements to maritime zones that
would be generated under the Convention by Scarborough Shoal and certain maritime
features in the Spratly Islands that are claimed by both the parties;

To resolve a series of disputes concerning the lawfulness of China’s actions in the South China
Sea, vis-à-vis interfering with Philippine’s rights, failing to protect and preserve the marine
environment, and inflicting harm on the marine environment (through land reclamation and
construction of artificial islands);

To find that China has aggravated and extended the disputes between the Parties by
restricting access to a detachment of Philippines Marines stationed at Second Thomas Shoal.
While China and Philippines are both parties to the UNCLOS, China specifically made a
declaration in 2006 to exclude maritime boundary delimitation from its acceptance of
compulsory dispute settlement. In addition, China has shown disagreement with Philippines’
decision to take the matter to arbitration and has decided neither to agree with the decision
of the Tribunal nor to participate in the proceedings.
The Tribunal, on its end, has taken cognizance of these factors and has purported to not deal
with delimiting maritime boundaries. Furthermore, the Tribunal did not bar the proceedings,
on the basis of Article 9 of Annex VII of UNCLOS[4]. In addition, the Tribunal also noted that
despite China’s absence from the proceedings, since it is a party to the UNCLOS, the decision
of the Tribunal would, in fact, be binding upon it, pursuant to Article 296 (1)[5] and Article
11 of Annex VII[6].

China’s Foreign Ministry, further, stated its position with regard to the proceedings by
publishing a Position Paper in 2014[7]. It claimed that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction over the
matter because:

The essence of the subject-matter of the arbitration is the territorial sovereignty over the
relevant maritime features in the South China Sea;
China and the Philippines have agreed, through bilateral instruments and the Declaration on
the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, to settle their relevant disputes through
negotiations;
Philippines’ disputes would constitute an integral part of maritime delimitation between the
two countries.
The Tribunal considered China’s Position Paper as a plea on jurisdiction, and conducted a
separate hearing on the issue of jurisdiction and admissibility. Additionally, the Tribunal also
declared that it would honour China’s declaration of 2006 and the UNCLOS and would neither
delve into issues of maritime boundary delimitation or questions of sovereignty. The
Philippines also stated that it, “does not seek in this arbitration a determination of which Party
enjoys sovereignty over the islands claimed by both of them. Nor does it request a delimitation
of any maritime boundaries.”

Pursuant to this, the Tribunal issued its Award on Jurisdiction[9] in October 2015, in which it
concluded that it did indeed have jurisdiction in the case, as per Philippines’ Final
Submissions[10], and that China’s lack of participation would not prove to be a bar to its
proceedings. It, further, concluded that the treaties China was relying on were either political
in nature and not legally binding[11], or that they did were legally binding and yet did not
bar either Party from alternative means of dispute resolution[12]. In accordance with Article
283 of the UNCLOS[13], the Tribunal found that this requirement was met in the diplomatic
communications between the Parties and that Philippines’ initiation of proceedings under the
UNCLOS did not constitute an abuse of of process as claimed by China.

The Tribunal, proceeding with the first two submissions made by the Philippines, considered
the validity of China’s claim to historic rights in the maritime region of the South China Sea
and the ‘Nine-Dash Line’. Through a lengthy analysis of the text and context of the
Convention, in line with the principles set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
the Tribunal established that the Convention supersedes any treaties in force before its
coming into force. It questioned China’s claim to historical rights in the region, and established
that China’s state practice does not show that China had been enjoying any historical rights
in the South China Sea; rather, it was enjoying the freedom of the high seas and since it did
not create bar to other states’ usage of the same, it could not be understood as being a
historical right. Furthermore, since China’s publishing of the same in its Notes Verbales in
2009, many states have objected to its claim as well. “The Tribunal concludes that the
Convention superseded any historic rights or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction in excess
of the limits imposed therein.”[14] However, the Tribunal also concluded that its jurisdiction
was limited to the claims of historic rights on the maritime region and not to the land masses
in the South China Sea, i.e. if it can claim historic rights on any of the islands, then it may
also be able to claim maritime zones (as per the Convention) on the basis of these islands.
Next, the Tribunal looked at Philippines’ submissions 3 to 7, concerning the nature of the
features in the South China Sea. It differentiates between low-tide elevations[15], high-tide
features[16] and rocks[17]. In its Award on Jurisdiction, the Tribunal clarified that:

This is not a dispute concerning sovereignty over the features, notwithstanding any possible
question concerning whether low-tide elevations may be subjected to a claim of territorial
sovereignty. Nor is this a dispute concerning sea boundary delimitation: the status of a feature
as a “low-tide elevation”, “island”, or a “rock” relates to the entitlement to maritime zones
generated by that feature, not to the delimitation of such entitlements in the event that they
overlap.[18]

The Philippines put forward three categories for classifying low-tide elevations: where a low-
tide elevation is located within 12 miles of a high-tide feature[19], where the low-tide
elevation is beyond 12 miles but within the state’s exclusive economic zone or continental
shelf[20], and where the low-tide elevation is located beyond the areas of natural
jurisdiction[21].

For the purpose of identifying the nature of the features in the South China Sea, the Tribunal
relied upon satellite imagery that had been conducted on the area and direct surveys that
had been carried out, by navies or otherwise, in the area, and relied upon maps that were
sufficiently detailed. They chose a certain tidal height to maintain uniformity across the
features, and decided to rely, in cases where there had been significant man-made changes,
alterations or construction on the features, upon maps/imagery/surveys that depicted the
features as they had been in their original form.[22]

Again the Tribunal relied upon statements previously made by China to obtain their stance on
the nature of the features, since China had neither submitted any document to the Tribunal
nor had it discussed these in its Position Paper.

The Tribunal concluded that Scarborough Shoal, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Johnson
Reef, McKennan Reef and Gaven Reef (North) were all found to be high-tide features. The
Tribunal further noted that for the purposes of Article 121(3), the high-tide features at
Scarborough Shoal and the reefs were rocks that cannot sustain human human habitation or
economic life of their own and so have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. The
Tribunal found the same to be true of the Spratly Islands and so concluded that China,
therefore, has no entitlement to any maritime zone in the area of Mischief Reef or Second
Thomas Shoal; they do, however, form part of the exclusive economic zone and continental
shelf of the Philippines as they lie within 200 nautical miles of the Philippines’ coast and there
are no overlapping entitlements in the area with respect to China.

On the contrary, Hughes Reef, Gaven Reef (South), Subi Reef, Mischief Reef and Second
Thomas Shoal were all found to be low-tide elevations, of which Hughes Reef lay within 12
miles of McKennan Reef and Sin Cowe Island, Gaven Reef (South) lay within 12 miles of
Gaven Reef (North) and Namyit Island, and Subi Reef lay within 12 miles of the high-tide
feature of Sandy Cay on the reefs to the west of Thitu.

In the issue of Chinese interference with the living and non-living resources (primarily
concerned with fishing practices in the South China Sea and oil and gas exploration and
exploitation) of the Philippines, the Tribunal considered diplomatic statements from China to
the Philippines and regulations related to the matter that China had passed domestically. The
Philippines put forward four contentions related to living resources: China’s prevention of
fishing by Philippine vessels at Mischief Reef since 1995, and at Second Thomas Shoal since
1995, China’s revision of the Hainan Regulation[23] and China’s moratorium on fishing in the
South China Sea in 2012[24]. The Tribunal finds that China had breached Articles 77[25] and
56[26] of the Convention through the operation of its marine surveillance vessels (which
interfered with Philippines’ oil and gas exploration) and through its moratorium on fishing
which interfered with the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, respectively.

The Tribunal also found China in breach of Article 58 (3)[27] of the Convention, due to its
failure to prevent fishing by Chinese flagged ships in the exclusive economic zone of the
Philippines, failing to respect the sovereign rights of the Philippines over its fisheries in its
exclusive economic zone.

Submission 10 of the Philippines related to China’s interference with Philippines’ fishing

vessels and practices in the Scarborough Shoal. While both the states had conflicting views
on the situation (China believed that it was Philippines who was causing the interference) and
both claimed historic rights (Philippines distinguished this by clarifying that it only referred to
historic fishing rights) to the region, the Tribunal opined that China was, in fact, in
contravention of the Convention by interfering with the traditional fishing practice of the
Philippines in its exclusive economic zone through the deployment of its official ships in the
region. The Tribunal also noted that this decision does not depend on the question of
sovereignty, and that the Tribunal once again refrained from commenting on the matter.

Philippines’ successive contention related to China’s activities on the reefs in the South China
Sea, with regards the practices it had adopted for the purpose of large-scale construction and
reclamation at seven locations in the Spratly Islands[28], and its practices with regards to
fishing[29] in the South China Sea. Philippines claimed that China had been harming and
causing damage to the marine environment of the South China Sea through these practices
and despite objections from the surrounding states, China had not ceased its actions. It was
also noted that while some of the fishing ships were not state-appointed ships and were being
manned by non-state actors, the Chinese government had neither condemned their actions
nor made any efforts to stop them from proceeding. The Tribunal, assisted by three
independent experts on coral reef biology, expert briefs and satellite imagery, found that
China was in breach of the Convention for failing to stop the fishing vessels from engaging in
harmful harvesting practices[30] and also for its island-building activities[31]. The Tribunal
further opined that China’s construction on Mischief Reef, without authorization from
Philippines was in violation of Philippines’ sovereign rights in its exclusive economic zone and
continental shelf and a breach of the Convention[32].

The next consideration before the Tribunal was the demeanour of China’s law enforcement
vessels at Scarborough Shoal[33] and the lawfulness of these actions. The Philippines also
raised the issue under the relevant provisions of the Convention on the International
Regulations for Preventing of Collisions at Sea, 1972 (COLREGS). The Tribunal found that
China, through the actions of its law enforcement vessels, endangered Philippine vessels and
personnel and created a serious risk of collision and found China in breach of Article 94 of the
Convention[34].

The Tribunal, in response to Submission 14 of the Philippines, opined that China had, in the
course of the proceedings of this arbitration, aggravated and extended its disputes with
Philippines, through its actions of dredging, artificial island-building and construction
activities[35].
Lastly, the Tribunal did not find it necessary to make any further declaration, owing to the
fact that both the parties are already parties to the Convention and are already obliged to
comply with it.

ARTICLE II. Declaration of Principles and State Policies:

PRINCIPLES

Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them.

Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres
to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.

Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of
the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the
sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.

Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The
Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all
citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military or
civil service.

Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property,
and promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the
blessings of democracy.

Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

STATE POLICIES

Section 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other
states, the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity,
national interest, and the right to self-determination.

Section 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy
of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory.

Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the
prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies
that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living,
and an improved quality of life for all.

Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.

Section 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights.

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the
mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character
shall receive the support of the Government.

Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall
promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall
inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public
and civic affairs.

Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them.

Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

Section 17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture,
and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total
human liberation and development.

Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the
rights of workers and promote their welfare.

Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos.

Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages
private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investments.

Section 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform.

Section 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities
within the framework of national unity and development.

Section 23. The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral

organizations that promote the welfare of the nation.

Section 24. The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nation-
building.

Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.

Section 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and
prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.

Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take
positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.

Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

Preliminary issue: Legal Value of Article II:

Principles in Article 2 are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement
through the Courts.

PRINCIPLE vs. POLICIES

Principles – are binding rules which must be observed in the conduct of government

Policies – are guidelines for the orientation od the state.

KILOSBAYAN V. MORATO – 246 SCRA 540 AND MR-250 SCRA 130;

Sections 5, 12, 13 and 17 are mere guidelines which do not yet confer the rights enforceable
by the Courts but recognized Section 16 as a right conferring provision because it speaks of
“the right of the people”.

FACTS:
Facts:

1. GR 113375 (KIlosbayan vs. Guingona) held invalidity of the contract between Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the privately owned Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation (PGMC) for the operation of a nationwide on-line lottery system.
The contract violated the provision in the PCSO Charter which prohibits PCSO from holding
and conducting lotteries through a collaboration, association, or joint venture.
2. Both parties again signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) for online lottery
equipment and accessories on January 25, 1995. The agreement are as follow:
4. Rental is 4.3% of gross amount of ticket sales by PCSO at which in no case be less
than an annual rental computed at P35,000 per terminal in commercial operation.
5. Rent is computed bi-weekly.
6. Term is 8 years.
7. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities.
8. Upon expiration of term, PCSO can purchase the equipment at P25M.
3. Kilosbayan again filed a petition to declare amended ELA invalid because:
4. It is the same as the old contract of lease.
5. It is still violative of PCSO’s charter.
6. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It has not been approved by the
President and it is not most advantageous to the government.
4. PCSO and PGMC filed separate comments
0. ELA is a different lease contract with none of the vestiges in the prior contract.
1. ELA is not subject to public bidding because it fell in the exception provided in EO No.
301.
2. Power to determine if ELA is advantageous vests in the Board of Directors of PCSO.
3. Lack of funds. PCSO cannot purchase its own online lottery equipment.
4. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade.
 5. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the contract.

Issues:

1. Whether or not petitioner Kilosbayan, Incorporated has a legal standing to sue.

2. Whether or not the ELA between PCSO and PGMC in operating an online lottery is valid.

Rulings:

In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

1. Petitioners do not have a legal standing to sue.

1. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the
petitioners is a departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because
no constitutional issues were actually involved.
2. LAW OF THE CASE (opinion delivered on a former appeal) cannot also apply. Since the
present case is not the same one litigated by the parties before in Kilosbayan vs.
Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as “the law of this case”.
The parties are the same but the cases are not.
3. RULE ON “CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT” cannot still apply. An issue actually and
directly passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question
in any future action between the same parties involving a different cause of action.
But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated
claims are involved. When the second proceeding involves an instrument or
transaction identical with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with in the first
proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent
examination of the legal matters at issue.
4. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude
determination of the petitioner’s standing.
5. Standing is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is
actually involved. The more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are ‘real
parties of interest’.
6. Question of contract of law: The real parties are those who are parties to the
agreement or are bound either principally or are prejudiced in their rights with respect
to one of the contracting parties and can show the detriment which would positively
result to them from the contract.
7. Petitioners do not have such present substantial interest. Questions to the nature or
validity of public contracts maybe made before COA or before the Ombudsman.
TONDO MEDICAL V. CA – 527 SCRA 746;
FACTS: The Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA) was launched by the Department of Health
(DOH) in 1999, which provided five areas of general reform. One in particular was the
provision of fiscal autonomy to government hospitals that implements the collection of
socialized user fees and the corporate restructuring of government hospitals. The petitioners
alleged that the implementation of the aforementioned reform had resulted in making free
medicine and free medical services inaccessible to economically disadvantage Filipinos. Thus,
they alleged that the HSRA is void for violating the following constitutional provisions:
Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18 of Article II, Section 1 of Article III, Sections 11 and 14 of
Article XIII, and Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article XV.

On May 24, 1999, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102,
entitled “Redirecting the functions and Operations of the Department of Health”, which
provided for the changes in the roles, functions, and organizational processes of the DOH.
The petitioners contented that a law, such as E.O. No. 120, which effects the reorganization
of the DOH, should be enacted by Congress in the exercise of its legislative function. They
argued that E.O. No. 102 is void, as this was enacted ultra vires on the part of the President.

The Court of Appeals (CA) denied the petition due to a number of procedural defects, which
proved fatal. The CA also ruled that the HSRA cannot be declared void for violating the various
sections of Article II, III, XIII and XV of the 1987 Constitution. A motion for reconsideration
of the decision was filed by the petitioners but the same was denied in a resolution dated
March 7, 2005. Hence this petition.

ISSUES:
1. W/N the HSRA is void for violating various provisions of the Constitution?
2. W/N the issuance of Executive Order No. 102 was above the authority of the President?

HELD: Petition is DENIED. This Court AFFIRMS the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
1. No. As a general rule, the provisions of the constitution are considered self-executing, and
do not require future legislation for their enforcement. However, some provisions have already
been categorically declared by this Court as non-self-executing.

In Tañada v. Angara, the Court specifically set apart the sections found under Article II of the
1987 Constitution as non self-executing and ruled that such broad principles need legislative
enactments before they can be implemented. In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation, this Court declared that Sections 11, 12, and 13 of Article II; Section 13 of Article
XIII; and Section 2 of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution are not self-executing provisions.

2. No. Petitioners claimed that the structural and functional reorganization of the DOH is an
exercise of legislative functions, which the president usurped when he issued E.O. No. 102.
This line of argument is without basis.This Court has already ruled in a number of cases that
the President may, by executive or administrative order, direct the reorganization of
government entities under the Executive Department. This is also sanctioned under the
Constitution, as well as other statutes.

Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, clearly states: “The president shall have
control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices.” Therefore, the president is within
his authority for issuing E.O No. 102.

BCDA V. COA – 580 SCRA 295;

THE FACTS: On 13 March 1992, Congress approved Republic Act No. 7227 creating the
Bases Conversion And Development Authority (BCDA). Sec 9 of RA No. 7227 states that the
BCDA Board pf Directors shall exercise the power and functions of the BCDA under Sec 10,
the functions of the Board include the determination of the organizational structure and the
adoption of a compensation and benefit scheme at least equivalent to that of the
BangkoSentralngPilipinas (BSP). Accordingly, the Board determined the organizational
structure of the BCDA and adopted a compensation and benefit scheme for its officials and
employees.

On 20 December 1996, the Board adopted a new compensation and benefit scheme which
included a P10,000 year-end benefit granted to each contractual employee, regular
permanent employee, and Board member. In a memorandum dated 25 August 1997, Board
Chairman Victoriano A. Basco (Chairman Basco) recommended to President Fidel V. Ramos
(President Ramos) the approval of the new compensation and benefit scheme. In a
memorandum dated 9 October 1997, President Ramos approved the new compensation and
benefit scheme.

In 1999, the BSP gave a P30,000 year-end benefit to its officials and employees. In 2000, the
BSP increased the year-end benefit from P30,000 to P35,000. Pursuant to Section 10 of RA
No. 7227 which states that the compensation and benefit scheme of the BCDA shall be at
least equivalent to that of the BSP, the Board increased the year-end benefit of BCDA officials
and employees from P10,000 to P30,000. Thus in 2000 and 2001, BCDA officials and
employees received a P30,000 year-end benefit, and, on 1 October 2002, the Board passed
Resolution No. 2002-10-193approving the release of a P30,000 year-end benefit for 2002.

Aside from the contractual employees, regular permanent employees, and Board members,
the full-time consultants of the BCDA also received the year-end benefit.

ISSUES:
1. W/N members of the Board of Directors entitled to YEB?
2. W/N presumption of good faith may apply to the case at bar?

HELD: PARTIALLY GRANTED. Commission on Audit Decision No. 2007-020 dated 12 April
2007 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the Board members and full-time consultants
of the Bases Conversion and Development Authority are not required to refund the year-end
benefits they have already received.

The granting of YEB x xx is not without x xx limitation. DBM Circular Letter No. 2002-02 dated
January 2, 2002 stating, viz:

"2.0 To clarify and address issues/requests concerning the same, the following
compensation policies are hereby reiterated:

2.1 PERA, ADCOM, YEB and retirement benefits, are personnel benefits granted in
addition to salaries. As fringe benefits, these shall be paid only when the basic salary
is also paid.

2.2 Members of the Board of Directors of agencies are not salaried officials of the
government. As non-salaried officials they are not entitled to PERA, ADCOM, YEB
and retirement benefits unless expressly provided by law.

2.3 Department Secretaries, Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries who serve as

Ex-officio Members of the Board of Directors are not entitled to any remuneration in
 line with the Supreme Court ruling that their services in the Board are already paid
for and covered by the remuneration attached to their office." (underscoring ours)

Clearly, as stated above, the members and ex-officio members of the Board of
Directors are not entitled to YEB, they being not salaried officials of the
government. The same goes with full time consultants wherein no employer-employee
relationships exist between them and the BCDA. Thus, the whole amount paid to them totaling
P342,000 is properly disallowed in audit.

The Board members and full-time consultants of the BCDA are not entitled to the year-end
benefit.

The BCDA claims that the Board can grant the year-end benefit to its members and full-time
consultants because, under Section 10 of RA No. 7227, the functions of the Board include the
adoption of compensation and benefit scheme.

The Court is not impressed. The Board's power to adopt compensation and benefit scheme is
not unlimited. Section 9 of RA No. 7227 states that Board members are entitled to a per diem:
Members of the Board shall receive a per diem of not more than Five thousand pesos
(P5,000) for every board meeting: Provided, however, That the per diem collected
per month does not exceed the equivalent of four (4) meetings: Provided, further,
That the amount of per diem for every board meeting may be increased by the President but
such amount shall not be increased within two (2) years after its last increase.

ESPINA V. ZAMORA, JR. – 631 SCRA 17 (IN RELATION TO A2, SEC. 19)
Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos.

FACTS: The case at bar deals with the question of constitutionality of Retail Trade
Liberalization Act of 2000 Republic Act 8762) which was signed by President Joseph Estrada
on March 7, 2000.

Unlike its predecessor Republic Act 1180, which absolutely prohibits foreign nationals from
engaging in retail trade business in the Philippines, the questioned law allows the said foreign
trade placing them under 4 categories. The petitioners filed a case assailing the
constitutionality of R.A. 8762 as it is a clear violation of Section 9, 19 and 20 of Article II of
the Constitution. The petitioners stressed that the presence of foreign nationals would result
in alien control and monopoly of the retail trade.

On the other hand, the respondents contended that the petitioners have no legal standing to
file the petition. Aside from that, the Constitution mandates the mere regulation but not the
prohibition of foreign investments in the country.

ISSUE: W/N R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional?

HELD:
No, The Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000 is not unconstitutional.
The Court emphasized that the petitioners indeed has no legal standing to file the petition as
there is no clear showing that the implementation of R.A. 8762 prejudices the petitioners or
inflicts damage on them, either as taxpayers or as legislators. Legal standing is one of the
requisites necessary before one could validly attack the constitutionality of a certain law. Legal
standing implies that one must have personal and substantial interest in that he has suffered
or will suffer direct injury as a result of the passage of that law.

Also, Section 9, 19 and 20 of Article II are not self- executing by nature, thus, are not judicially
demandable. The said sections in Article II highlight the necessity of having a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs. However, the
objective of the provisions is to simply prohibit foreign powers or interests from maneuvering
our economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are given preference in all areas of
development. With the assailed provision, Filipinos continue to have the right to engage in
the kind of retail business which the law in question has permitted the entry of foreign
investors.

The Legislative acknowledges that indeed it is integral to primarily promote the welfare of
Filipino investors as mandated by the Constitution. Nonetheless, it is equally important that
holistic economic growth must be assured for the overall development of our country’s trade
industry. This can be done by allowing entry of foreign investors that will be allowed to engage
in businesses regulated by the provisions of R.A. 8762.

OCAMPO V. REAR ADMIRAL ENRIQUEZ, GR 225973, NOVEMBER 8, 2016 (IN

RELATION TO A2, SECS. 2, 11, 13, 23, 26, 27 & 28 ; A3, SEC. 1, A7, SEC. 17, A11,
SEC. 1, A14, SEC. 3 (2) & A18, SEC. 26)
Facts:

During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then candidate Rodrigo R.
Duterte publicly announced that he would allow the burial former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani ("LNMB"). Duterte won the May 9, 2016 elections.

On August 7, 2016, Defense Secretary Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to AFP

Chief of Staff General Ricardo R. Visaya regarding the interment of former President Ferdinand
E. Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani.

On August 9, 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued a directive to the Philippine
Army on the Funeral Honors and Service for President Marcos.

Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance, the petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition and Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with the Court.

ISSUES

1) Whether respondents Defense Secretary and AFP Rear Admiral committed grave abuse of
discretion when they issued the assailed memorandum and directive in compliance with the
verbal order of President Duterte to implement his election campaign promise to have the
remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB?

2) Whether the issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and directive
violated the Constitution, and domestic and international laws?

3) Whether historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth from the Marcoses and
their cronies, and the pronouncements of the Court on the Marcos regime have nullified his
entitlement as a soldier and former President to interment at the LNMB?

4) Whether the Marcos family is deemed to have waived the burial of the remains of former
President Marcos at the LNMB after they entered into an agreement with the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines as to the conditions and procedures by which his remains shall
be brought back to and interred in the Philippines?

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petitions.

Procedural issues

Political question

The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte's decision to have the remains of Marcos
interred at the LNMB involves a political question that is not a justiciable controversy. In the
excercise of his powers under the Constitution and the Administrative Code of 1987 to allow
the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of the public domain devoted for national
military cemetery and military shrine purposes, President Duterte decided a question of policy
based on his wisdom that it shall promote national healing and forgiveness. There being no
taint of grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion, as discussed below, President Duterte's
decision on that political question is outside the ambit of judicial review.

Locus standi
Petitioners have no legal standing to file the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
because they failed to show that they have suffered or will suffer direct and personal injury
as a result of the interment of Marcos at the LNMB.

Petitioners cannot also file as taxpayers. They merely claim illegal disbursement of public
funds, without showing that Marcos is disqualified to be interred at the LNMB by either express
or implied provision of the Constitution, the laws or jurisprudence.

Petitioners Saguisag, et al., as members of the Bar, failed to disclose the direct or potential
injury which they may suffer as a result of the act complained of. Their interest in this case
is too general and shared by other groups, such that their duty to uphold the rule of law,
without more, is inadequate to clothe them with requisite legal standing.

Petitioners also failed to prove that the case is of transcendental importance. At this point in
time, the interment of Marcos at a cemetery originally established as a national military
cemetery and declared a national shrine would have no profound effect on the political,
economic, and other aspects of our national life considering that more than twenty-seven
(27) years since his death and thirty (30) years after his ouster have already passed.
Significantly, petitioners failed to demonstrate a clear and imminent threat to their
fundamental constitutional rights.

As to petitioners Senator De Lima and Congressman Lagman, they failed to show that the
burial of Marcos encroaches on their prerogatives as legislators.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies

Petitioners violated the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Contrary to their claim of lack
of plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, petitioners should be faulted
for failing to seek reconsideration of the assailed memorandum and directive before the
Secretary ofNational Defense. The Secretary of National Defense should be given opportunity
to correct himself, if warranted, considering that AFP Regulations G 161-375 was issued upon
his order. Questions on the implementation and interpretation thereof demand the exercise
of sound administrative discretion, requiring the special knowledge, experience and services
of his office to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. If petitioners would still be
dissatisfied with the decision of the Secretary, they could elevate the matter before the Office
of the President which has control and supervision over the Department of National Defense
(DND).

Hierarchy of Courts

While direct resort to the Court through petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus are allowed under exceptional cases, which are lacking in this
case, petitioners cannot simply brush aside the doctrine of hierarchy of courts that requires
such petitions to be filed first with the proper Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC is not just
a trier of facts, but can also resolve questions of law in the exercise of its original and
concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and has the
power to issue restraining order and injunction when proven necessary.

Substantive issues

I. The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution,
the law and jurisprudence.

While the Constitution is a product of our collective history as a people, its entirety should not
be interpreted as providing guiding principles to just about anything remotely related to the
Martial Law period such as the proposed Marcos burial at the LNMB.

Section 1 of Article XI of the Constitution is not a self-executing provision considering that a

law should be passed by the Congress to clearly define and effectuate the principle embodied
therein. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted the Code of Conduct on Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, Plunder Act, and Anti-Red Tape
Act of 2007. To complement these statutes, the Executive Branch has issued various orders,
memoranda, and instructions relative to the norms of behavior/code of conduct/ethical
standards of officials and employees; workflow charts/public transactions; rules and policies
on gifts and benefits; whistle blowing and reporting; and client feedback program

Petitioners' reliance on Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV and Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII of the Constitution is
also misplaced. Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV refers to the constitutional duty of educational
institutions in teaching the values of patriotism and nationalism and respect for human rights,
while Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII is a transitory provision on sequestration or freeze orders in relation
to the recovery of Marcos' ill-gotten wealth. Clearly, with respect to these provisions, there is
no direct or indirect prohibition to Marcos' interment at the LNMB.

The second sentence of Sec. 17 of Art. VII is likewise not violated by public respondents.
Being the Chief Executive, the President represents the government as a whole and sees to
it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his or her department. Under
the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take "necessary and proper
steps" to carry into execution the law. The mandate is self-executory by virtue of its being
inherently executive in nature and is intimately related to the other executive functions. It is
best construed as an imposed obligation, not a separate grant of power. The provision simply
underscores the rule of law and, corollarily, the cardinal principle that the President is not
above the laws but is obliged to obey and execute them.

There is no violation of RA 289.

Petitioners miserably failed to provide legal and historical bases as to their supposition that
the LNMB and the National Pantheon are one and the same. This is not at all unexpected
because the LNMB is distinct and separate from the burial place envisioned in R.A. No 289. The
parcel of land subject matter of President Quirino's Proclamation No. 431, which was later on
revoked by President Magsaysay's Proclamation No. 42, is different from that covered by
Marcos' Proclamation No. 208. The National Pantheon does not exist at present. To date, the
Congress has deemed it wise not to appropriate any funds for its construction or the creation
of the Board on National Pantheon. This is indicative of the legislative will not to pursue, at
the moment, the establishment of a singular interment place for the mortal remains of all
Presidents of the Philippines, national heroes, and patriots.

Furthermore, to apply the standard that the LNMB is reserved only for the "decent and the
brave" or "hero" would be violative of public policy as it will put into question the validity of
the burial of each and every mortal remains resting therein, and infringe upon the principle
of separation of powers since the allocation of plots at the LNMB is based on the grant of
authority to the President under existing laws and regulations. Also, the Court shares the view
of the OSG that the proposed interment is not equivalent to the consecration of Marcos' mortal
remains. The act in itself does not confer upon him the status of a "hero." Despite its name,
which is actually a misnomer, the purpose of the LNMB, both from legal and historical
perspectives, has neither been to confer to the people buried there the title of "hero" nor to
require that only those interred therein should be treated as a "hero." Lastly, petitioners'
repeated reference to a "hero's burial" and "state honors," without showing proof as to what
kind of burial or honors that will be accorded to the remains of Marcos, is speculative until
the specifics of the interment have been finalized by public respondents.

No violation of RA 10639 .

The Court cannot subscribe to petitioners' logic that the beneficial provisions of R.A. No.
10368 are not exclusive as it includes the prohibition on Marcos' burial at the LNMB. It would
be undue to extend the law beyond what it actually contemplates. With its victim-oriented
perspective, our legislators could have easily inserted a provision specifically proscribing
Marcos' interment at the LNMB as a "reparation" for the Human Rights Violations Victims
(HRVVs). The law is silent and should remain to be so. This Court cannot read into the law
what is simply not there. It is irregular, if not unconstitutional, for Us to presume the
legislative will by supplying material details into the law. That would be tantamount to judicial
legislation.

The enforcement of the HRVV s' rights under R.A. No 10368 will surely not be impaired by
the interment of Marcos at the LNMB. As opined by the OSG, the assailed act has no causal
connection and legal relation to the law. The subject memorandum and directive of public
respondents do not and cannot interfere with the statutory powers and functions of the Board
and the Commission. More importantly, the HRVVs' entitlements to the benefits provided for
by R.A. No 10368 and other domestic laws are not curtailed. R.A. No. 10368 does not amend
or repeal, whether express or implied, the provisions of the Administrative Code or AFP
Regulations G 161-375.

There is no violation of International Human Rights Laws.

The nation's history will not be instantly revised by a single resolve of President Duterte,
acting through the public respondents, to bury Marcos at the LNMB. Whether petitioners admit
it or not, the lessons of Martial Law are already engraved, albeit in varying degrees, in the
hearts and minds of the present generation of Filipinos. As to the unborn, it must be said that
the preservation and popularization of our history is not the sole responsibility of the Chief
Executive; it is a joint and collective endeavor of every freedom-loving citizen of this country.

Notably, complementing the statutory powers and functions of the Human Rights Victims'
Claims Board and the HRVV Memorial Commission in the memorialization of HRVV s, the
National Historical Commission of the Philippines (NHCP), formerly known as the National
Historical Institute (NHJ), is mandated to act as the primary government agency responsible
for history and is authorized to determine all factual matters relating to official Philippine
history.

II. The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is not done whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias.

The LNMB was not expressly included in the national shrines enumerated in PD 105

P.D. No. 105 does not apply to the LNMB. Despite the fact that P.D. No. 208 predated P.D.
No. 105, the LNMB was not expressly included in the national shrines enumerated in the
latter. The proposition that the LNMB is implicitly covered in the catchall phrase "and others
which may be proclaimed in the future as National Shrines" is erroneous because: (1) As
stated, Marcos issued P.D. No. 208 prior to P.D. No. 105; (2) Following the canon of statutory
construction known as ejusdem generis, 138 the LNMB is not a site "of the birth, exile,
imprisonment, detention or death of great and eminent leaders of the nation,"; and (3) Since
its establishment, the LNMB has been a military shrine under the jurisdiction of the PVAO.

Assuming that P.D. No. 105 is applicable, the descriptive words "sacred and hallowed" refer
to the LNMB as a place and not to each and every mortal remains interred therein. Hence,
the burial of Marcos at the LNMB does not diminish said cemetery as a revered and respected
ground. Neither does it negate the presumed individual or collective "heroism" of the men
and women buried or will be buried therein. The "nation's esteem and reverence for her war
dead, " as originally contemplated by President Magsaysay in issuing Proclamation No. 86,
still stands unaffected. That being said, the interment of Marcos, therefore, does not
constitute a violation of the physical, historical, and cultural integrity of the LNMB as a national
military shrine.
The LNMB is considered as a national shrine for military memorials. The PVAO, which is
empowered to administer, develop, and maintain military shrines, is under the supervision
and control of the DND. The DND, in tum, is under the Office of the President.

The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of Government is a self-executing
provision of the Constitution and does not require statutory implementation, nor may its
exercise be limited, much less withdrawn, by the legislature. This is why President Duterte is
not bound by the alleged 1992 Agreement between former President Ramos and the Marcos
family to have the remains of Marcos interred in Batac, Ilocos Norte. As the incumbent
President, he is free to amend, revoke or rescind political agreements entered into by his
predecessors, and to determine policies which he considers, based on informed judgment and
presumed wisdom, will be most effective in carrying out his mandate.

Moreover, under the Administrative Code, the President has the power to reserve for public
use and for specific public purposes any of the lands of the public domain and that the
reserved land shall remain subject to the specific public purpose indicated until otherwise
provided by law or proclamation. At present, there is no law or executive issuance specifically
excluding the land in which the LNMB is located from the use it was originally intended by the
past Presidents. The allotment of a cemetery plot at the LNMB for Marcos as a former President
and Commander-in-Chief, a legislator, a Secretary of National Defense, a military personnel,
a veteran, and a Medal of Valor awardee, whether recognizing his contributions or simply his
status as such, satisfies the public use requirement. The disbursement of public funds to cover
the expenses incidental to the burial is granted to compensate him for valuable public services
rendered.

Likewise, President Duterte's determination to have Marcos' remains interred at the LNMB
was inspired by his desire for national healing and reconciliation. Presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty prevails over petitioners' highly disputed factual allegation
that, in the guise of exercising a presidential prerogative, the Chief Executive is actually
motivated by utang na loob (debt of gratitude) and bayad utang (payback) to the Marcoses.
As the purpose is not self-evident, petitioners have the burden of proof to establish the factual
basis of their claim. They failed. Even so, this Court cannot take cognizance of factual issues
since We are not a trier of facts.
AFP Regulations G 161-375 must be sustained.

Under AFP Regulations G 161-375, the following are eligible for interment at the LNMB: (a)
Medal of Valor Awardees; (b) Presidents or Commanders-in-Chief, AFP; ( c) Secretaries of
National Defense; ( d) Chiefs of Staff, AFP; ( e) General/Flag Officers of the AFP; (f) Active
and retired military personnel of the AFP to include active draftees and trainees who died in
line of duty, active reservists and CAFGU Active Auxiliary (CAA) who died in combat operations
or combat related activities; (g) Former members of the AFP who laterally entered or joined
the PCG and the PNP; (h) Veterans of Philippine Revolution of 1890, WWI, WWII and
recognized guerillas; (i) Government Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists and other
deceased persons whose interment or reinterment has been approved by the Commander-in-
Chief, Congress or the Secretary of National Defense; and G) Former Presidents, Secretaries
of Defense, Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists, widows of Former Presidents, Secretaries
of National Defense and Chief of Staff.

Similar to AFP Regulations G 161-374, the following are not qualified to be interred in the
LNMB: (a) Personnel who were dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the service;
and (b) Authorized personnel who were convicted by final judgment of an offense involving
moral turpitude.

In the absence of any executive issuance or law to the contrary, the AFP Regulations G 161-
375 remains to be the sole authority in determining who are entitled and disqualified to be
interred at the LNMB. Interestingly, even if they were empowered to do so, former Presidents
Corazon C. Aquino and Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, who were themselves aggrieved at the
Martial Law, did not revise the rules by expressly prohibiting the burial of Marcos at the LNMB.
The validity of AFP Regulations G 161-375 must, therefor, be sustained for having been issued
by the AFP Chief of Staff acting under the direction of the Secretary of National Defense, who
is the alter ego of the President.

AFP Regulations G 161-375 should not be stricken down in the absence of clear and
unmistakable showing that it has been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Neither could it be considered ultra vires for purportedly
providing incomplete, whimsical, and capricious standards for qualification for burial at the
LNMB.

It is not contrary to the "well-established custom," as the dissent described it, to argue that
the word "bayani" in the LNMB has become a misnomer since while a symbolism of heroism
may attach to the LNMB as a national shrine for military memorial, the same does not
automatically attach to its feature as a military cemetery and to those who were already laid
or will be laid therein. As stated, the purpose of the LNMB, both from the legal and historical
perspectives, has neither been to confer to the people buried there the title of "hero" nor to
require that only those interred therein should be treated as a "hero."

In fact, the privilege of internment at the LNMB has been loosen up through the years. Since
1986, the list of eligible includes not only those who rendered active military service or
military-related activities but also non-military personnel who were recognized for their
significant contributions to the Philippine society (such as government dignitaries, statesmen,
national artists, and other deceased persons whose interment or reinterment has been
approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Congress or Secretary of National Defense). In 1998,
the widows of former Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense and Chief of Staff were
added to the list. Whether or not the extension of burial privilege to civilians is unwarranted
and should be restricted in order to be consistent with the original purpose of the LNMB is
immaterial and irrelevant to the issue at bar since it is indubitable that Marcos had rendered
significant active military service and military-related activities.

Petitioners did not dispute that Marcos was a former President and Commander-in-Chief, a
legislator, a Secretary of National Defense, a military personnel, a veteran, and a Medal of
Valor awardee. For his alleged human rights abuses and corrupt practices, we may disregard
Marcos as a President and Commander-in-Chief, but we cannot deny him the right to be
acknowledged based on the other positions he held or the awards he received. In this sense,
We agree with the proposition that Marcos should be viewed and judged in his totality as a
person. While he was not all good, he was not pure evil either. Certainly, just a human who
erred like us.

Aside from being eligible for burial at the LNMB, Marcos possessed none of the
disqualifications stated in AFP Regulations G 161-3 7 5. He was neither convicted by final
judgment of the offense involving moral turpitude nor dishonorably
separated/reverted/discharged from active military service.

The fact remains that Marcos was not convicted by final judgment of any offense involving
moral turpitude. No less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a person shall not be held
to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

Also, the equal protection clause is not violated. Generally, there is no property right to
safeguard because even if one is eligible to be buried at the LNMB, such fact would only give
him or her the privilege to be interred therein. Unless there is a favorable recommendation
from the Commander- in-Chief, the Congress or the Secretary of National Defense, no right
can be said to have ripen. Until then, such inchoate right is not legally demandable and
enforceable.

Assuming that there is a property right to protect, the requisites of equal protection clause
are not met. 181 In this case, there is a real and substantial distinction between a military
personnel and a former President. The conditions of dishonorable discharge under the Articles
of War attach only to the members of the military. There is also no substantial distinction
between Marcos and the three Philippine Presidents buried at the LNMB (Presidents Quirino,
Garcia, and Macapagal). All of them were not convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
In addition, the classification between a military personnel and a former President is germane
to the purposes of Proclamation No. 208 and P.D. No. 1076. While the LNMB is a national
shrine for military memorials, it is also an active military cemetery that recognizes the status
or position held by the persons interred therein.

Likewise, Marcos was honorably discharged from military service. PVAO expressly recognized
him as a retired veteran pursuant to R.A. No. 6948, as amended. Petitioners have not shown
that he was dishonorably discharged from military service under APP Circular 17, Series of
1987 (Administrative Discharge Prior to Expiration of Term of Enlistment) for violating Articles
94, 95 and 97 of the Articles of War. The NHCP study is incomplete with respect to his entire
military career as it failed to cite and include the official records of the AFP.

The word "service" in AFP Regulations G 161-375 should be construed as that rendered by a
military person in the AFP, including civil service, from the time of his/her commission,
enlistment, probation, training or drafting, up to the date of his/her separation or retirement
from the AFP. Civil service after honorable separation and retirement from the AFP is outside
the context of "service" under AFP Regulations G 161-375.

Hence, it cannot be conveniently claimed that Marcos' ouster from the presidency during the
EDSA Revolution is tantamount to his dishonorable separation, reversion or discharge from
the military service. The fact that the President is the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP under
the 1987 Constitution only enshrines the principle of supremacy of civilian authority over the
military. Not being a military person who may be prosecuted before the court martial, the
President can hardly be deemed "dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the
service" as contemplated by AFP Regulations G 161-375. Dishonorable discharge through a
successful revolution is an extra-constitutional and direct sovereign act of the people which is
beyond the ambit of judicial review, let alone a mere administrative regulation.

It is undeniable that former President Marcos was forced out of office by the people through
the so-called EDSA Revolution. Said political act of the people should not be automatically
given a particular legal meaning other than its obvious consequence - that of ousting him as
president. To do otherwise would lead the Court to the treacherous and perilous path of having
to make choices from multifarious inferences or theories arising from the various acts of the
people. It is not the function of the Court, for instance, to divine the exact implications or
significance of the number of votes obtained in elections, or the message from the number of
participants in public assemblies. If the Court is not to fall into the pitfalls of getting embroiled
in political and oftentimes emotional, if not acrimonious, debates, it must remain steadfast in
abiding by its recognized guiding stars - clear constitutional and legal rules - not by the
uncertain, ambiguous and confusing messages from the actions of the people.

SEC. 1. PHILIPPINES AS A DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN STATE;

PEOPLE

TERRITORY

GOVERNMENT

FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT:
CONSTITUENT V. MINISTRANT
Constituent – functions are those which constitute the very bonds of society and are
compulsory in nature.

Ministrant – functions are those that are undertaken only by way of advancing the general
interests of society and are merely optional.

BACANI V. NACOCO – 100 PHIL. 468

FACTS: Herein petitioners are stenographers in Branch VI of the CIF Manila.
In a pending civil case where the public respondents are involved, they requested for the
services of the stenographers and thereby paid them for the said transcript at the rate of P1
per page, amounting to P714 in total.

However, upon inspecting the books of the corporation, the Auditor General disallowed the
payment of such fees and sought for the recovery of the amounts paid. Consequently, the AG
required the petitioners to reimburse the amounts invoking that the National Coconut
Corporation is a government entity within the purview of section 2 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917 which states that:

“‘The Government of the Philippine Islands’ is a term which refers to the corporate
governmental entity through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the
Philippine Islands, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms
through which political authority is made effective in said Islands, whether pertaining to the
central Government or to the provincial or municipal branches or other form of local
government.”, hence, exempted from the payment of the fees in question.

ISSUE: W/N the NCC is a government entity and is exempted from the payments in question?

HELD: Petition GRANTED.

The Court held No. Discussing, there are two-fold functions of the government namely:
constituent and ministrant. The constituent function refers to the bonds of society and are
compulsory in nature, while ministrant is more on public welfare like public works, education,
charity, health and safety. From such, we may infer that there are functions which our
government is required to exercise to promote its objectives as expressed in our Constitution
and which are exercised by it as an attribute of sovereignty, and those which it may exercise
to promote merely the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people.

The NCC has that function because the corporation promotes certain aspects of the economic
life of the people. In short, NCC belongs to what we call the government-owned and controlled
corporation which is governed by Corporation Law.

Albeit the NCC performs governmental functions for the people’s welfare, however, it was
given a corporate power separate and distinct from our government, for it was made subject
to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers
that it may exercise are concerned.

To recapitulate, we may mention that the term “Government of the Republic of the
Philippines” used in section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code refers only to that
government entity through which the functions of the government are exercised as an
attribute of sovereignty, and in this are included those arms through which political authority
is made effective whether they be provincial, municipal or other form of local government.

Therefore, NCC is not a government entity and is not exempted from the payment of fees in
question; petitioners are not subject to reimbursement.

INCORPORATED
BACANI V. NACOCO – 100 PHIL. 468
FACTS: Plaintiffs Bacani and Matto are both court stenographers assigned in Branch VI of the
Court of First Instance of Manila.

During the pendency of a civil case in the said court, Francisco Sycip vs. National Coconut
Corporation, Assistant Corporate Counsel Federico Alikpala, counsel for Defendant, requested
said stenographers for copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them during
the hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed
transcript containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills for the payment of
their fees.

The National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO) paid the amount of P564 to Leopoldo T. Bacani
and P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for said transcript at the rate of P1 per page. But the Auditor
General required the plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts by virtue of a Department of Justice
circular which stated that NACOCO, being a government entity, was exempt from the payment
of the fees in question. For reimbursement to take place, it was further ordered that the
amount of P25 per payday be deducted from the salary of Bacani and P10 from the salary of
Matoto.

Petitioners filed an action in Court countering that NACOCO is not a government entity within
the purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, the defendants
set up a defense that NACOCO is a government entity within the purview of section 2 of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917 hence, it is exempted from paying the stenographers’
fees under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: W/N National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO), which performs certain functions of
government, make them a part of the Government of the Philippines?

DISCUSSIONS:
NACOCO is not considered a government entity and is not exempted from paying the
stenographers’ fees under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Sec. 2 of the Revised Administrative Code defines the scope of the term “Government
of the Republic of the Philippines”. The term “Government” may be defined as “that
institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and
carries out those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social
state, or which are imposed upon the people forming that society by those who possess
the power or authority of prescribing them” (U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332). This
institution, when referring to the national government, has reference to what our
Constitution has established composed of three great departments, the legislative,
executive, and the judicial, through which the powers and functions of government are
exercised. These functions are twofold: constitute and ministrant. The former are those
which constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory in nature; the latter
are those that are undertaken only by way of advancing the general interests of
society, and are merely optional.

HELD:
No. NACOCO do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they do not come under
the classification of municipal or public corporation. While NACOCO was organized for the
purpose of “adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade preferences in
the United States” and of providing “Facilities for the better curing of copra products and the
proper utilization of coconut by-products”, a function which our government has chosen to
exercise to promote the coconut industry.

It was given a corporate power separate and distinct from the government, as it was made
subject to the provisions of the Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and the
powers that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518).
It may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private corporations, and in this
sense it is an entity different from our government.
UNINCORPORATED
ACCFA V. CUGCO – 30 SCRA 649 (READ WITH BACANI V. NACOCO)
Two-fold Function of the Government – Free Enterprise – Ministrant vs Constituent Functions.

In September 1961 a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) was agreed upon by labor unions
(ASA and AWA) and ACCFA (Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration).
The said CBA was supposed to be effective on July 1, 1962. Due to non-implementation of
the CBA the unions held a strike on October 25, 1962. And 5 days later CUGCO (Confederation
of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices), the mother union of ASA and AWA filed
a complaint against ACCFA due to unfair labor practices, among others, which CUGCO was
able to win in court.

In April 1963, ACCFA appealed the decision and while the appeal was pending, Republic Act
No. 3844 was passed which effectively turned ACCFA to ACA (Agricultural Credit
Administration). In March 1964, ASA and AWA then petitioned that they may have sole
bargaining rights with ACA. While this petition was not yet decided upon, in the same month
of March 1964, Executive Order No. 75 was also passed which placed ACA under the Land
Reform Project Administration (LRPA). Notwithstanding the latest legislation passed, the trial
court and the appellate court ruled in favor of ASA and AWA and ruled that they have
bargaining rights with ACA..

ISSUE: W/N ASA and AWA can be given sole bargaining rights with ACA?

HELD:
No, The Unions have no bargaining rights with ACA. EO 75 placed ACA under the LRPA and
by virtue of RA 3844 the implementation of the Land Reform Program of the government is a
governmental function NOT a proprietary function. Being such, ACA can no longer step down
to deal privately with said unions as it may have been doing when it was still ACCFA.

The Supreme Court also made a pronouncement which recognized the growing complexities
of modern society which have rendered the classification of the governmental functions
(ministrant and constituent) as unrealistic, if not obsolete.

Ministerial and governmental functions continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and are
absorbed within the activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity
if it to meet the increasing social challenges of the times and move towards a greater
socialization of economic forces. Hence, gone are the days where constituent functions are
exclusively performed by the government and not delegated to private institutions. In this
case, a constituent function is left to be performed by a private entity like ACA (formerly
ACCFA).

Separate Opinion on the Free Enterprise System

J. Fernando – This country never practiced the free enterprise system and it has abandoned
the concept of laissez faire. It is the welfare state concept which is being followed as shown
by the constitutional provision on agrarian reform, housing, protection to labor and others
that provide for the social welfare.

PVTA v. CIR – 65 SCRA 416;

FACTS: This case involves the expanded role of the government necessitated by the increased
responsibility to provide for the general welfare.
 In 1966 private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their alleged overtime services
and the petitioner’s failure to pay for said compensation in accordance with CA No. 444.
Petitioner denied the allegations for lack of a cause of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.
Judge Martinez issued an order, directing petitioner to pay. Hence, this petition for certiorari
on grounds that the corporation is exercising governmental functions and is therefore exempt
from Commonwealth Act No. 444.
PVTA contended it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is exercising
governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation of Commonwealth Act No.
444.

ISSUE: W/N PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions?

HELD:
Yes, But the distinction between the constituent and ministrant functions of the government
has become obsolete. The government has to provide for the welfare of its people. RA No.
2265 providing for a distinction between constituent and the ministrant functions is irrelevant
considering the needs of the present time: “The growing complexities of modern society have
rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government obsolete.”

The contention of petitioner that the Labor Code does not apply to them deserve scant
consideration.

There is no question based on RA 4155, that petitioner is a governmental agency. As such,

the petitioner can rightfully invoke the doctrine announced in the leading ACCFA case. The
objection of private respondents with its overtones of the distinction between constituent and
ministrant functions of governments as set forth in Bacani v. Nacoco, is futile. It does not
necessarily follow, that just because petitioner is engaged in governmental rather than
proprietary functions, that the labor controversy was beyond the jurisdiction of the now
defunct respondent Court. Nor is the objection raised that petitioner does not come within the
coverage of the Eight-Hour Labor Law persuasive.

A reference to the pertinent sections of both Republic Acts 2265 and 2155 renders clear the
differentiation that exists. If as a result of the appealed order, financial burden would have to
be borne by petitioner, it has only itself to blame. It need not have required private
respondents to render overtime service. It can hardly be surmised that one of its chief
problems is paucity of personnel. That would indeed be a cause for astonishment. It would
appear, therefore, that such an objection based on this ground certainly cannot suffice for a
reversal. To repeat, respondent Court must be sustained.
REPUBLIC V. JUDGE OF CFI OF RIZAL – 99 SCRA 660;
FACTS: Respondent Jose Sison filed a complaint against the petitioner Rice and Corn
Administration (RCA) for a sum of money with the Court of First Instance, presided by the
respondent Judge.

The RCA filed a motion to dismiss the complaint but it was denied by the respondent Judge.
After a trial, the respondent Judge ruled in favor of Sison and ordered the RCA to pay the
corn grains it purchased from Sison and the attorney's fees and the costs of the suit.
The RCA later on filed its record on appeal.

Sison filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for the RCA's failure to post an appeal bond and
the RCA, represented by the office of the Solicitor General, filed an opposition to Sison's
motion to dismiss the appeal.
The record on appeal filed by the RCA was approved by the respondent Judge but the RCA's
exemption from the payment of legal fees and from posting of the appeal bond was denied.
The respondent Judge issued an order giving the RCA 5 days within which to post an appeal
bond.

The RCA filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that they are exempt from posting an
appeal bond.

Sison filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground of petitioner's refusal to file the
appeal bond.

The respondent Judge dismissed the RCA's appeal and ruled that the RCA, being a mere
instrumentality of the Government of the Philippines, is not exempt from the payment of legal
fees and from posting of an appeal bond.

ISSUE: W/N the petitioner RCA is exempt from paying legal fees and from posting an appeal
bond?

HELD:
Yes, RCA is a governmental agency of Republic of the Philippines without a separate, distinct
and independent legal personality from the latter. And, as a governmental agency under the
Office of the President, the RCA is thus exempt from the payment of legal fees and from
posting of an appeal bond.

EXAMPLES OF GOVERNMENT EXERCISING ITS FUNCTIONS THROUGH

CORPORATIONS OR INSTRUMENTALITIES GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED
CORPORATIONS

VFP v. Reyes – 483 SCRA 526; (Separate Print)

RAMISCAL V. SANDIGANBAYAN – 499 SCRA 375
ALZAGA V. SANDIGANBAYAN – 505 SCRA 848;
FACTS: October 7, 1999, there was a case filed against the petitioners regarding alleged
irregularities which attended the purchase of four lots in Tanauan, Batangas by the AFP-RSBS.
Being vice presidents and assistant vice president of the AFP-RSBS, the petitioners claim that
they are not under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan since AFP-RSB is a private entity.

ISSUE:
(1) WON AFP-RSBS is a government entity.
(2) WON the petitioners are under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

HELD:
(1) Yes. Considering that the character and operations of the AFP-RSBS are imbued with
public interest and its fund are in the nature of public fund, it is indeed a government entity.

(2) Yes. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over “presidents, directors, trustees, or
managers of GOCCs, state universities, or educational institutions or foundations.” The
positions of the petitioners being vice president and assistant vice president are not
specifically enumerated in RA 8249 but it is clearly higher than managers. Thus, considering
them under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

INSTRUMENTALITIES
MIAA V. CA – 495 SCRA 591 (Separate Print)
BOY SCOUTS OF THE PHILIPPINES V. COA – 651 SCRA 146;
FACTS: The Commission on Audit issued COA Resolution No. 99-011 in which the said
resolution state that the BSP was created as a public corporation under Commonwealth Act
No. 111, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 460 and Republic Act No. 7278; that in Boy
Scouts of the Philippines vs. National Labor Relations Commission, the Supreme Court ruled
that the BSP, as constituted under its charter, was a “government-controlled corporation
within the meaning of Article IX (B)(2)(1) of the Constitution; and that “the BSP is
appropriately regarded as a government instrumentality under the 1987 Administrative
Code.”

The BSP sought reconsideration of the COA Resolution in a letter signed by the BSP National
President Jejomar Binay. He claimed that RA 7278 eliminated the “substantial government
participation” in the National Executive Board by removing: (i) the President of the Philippines
and executive secretaries, with the exception of the Secretary of Education, as members
thereof; and (ii) the appointment and confirmation power of the President of the Philippines,
as Chief Scout, over the members of the said Board.

The BSP further claimed that the 1987 Administrative Code itself, of which the BSP s. NLRC
relied on for some terms, defines government-owned and controlled corporations as agencies
organized as stock or non-stock corporations which the BSP, under its present charter, is not.

And finally, they claim that the Government, like in other GOCCs, does not have funds
invested in the BSP. The BSP is not an entity administering special funds. The BSP is neither
a unit of the Government; a department which refers to an executive department as created
by law; nor a bureau which refers to any principal subdivision or unit of any department.

ISSUE: Whether the BSP falls under the COA’s audit jurisdiction?

HELD: After considering the legislative history of the amended charter and the applicable
laws and the arguments of both parties, the Court found that the BSP is a public corporation
and its funds are subject to the COA’s audit jurisdiction.

The BSP Charter created the BSP as a “public corporation” to serve the following public
interest or purpose: xxx to promote through organization and cooperation with other
agencies, the ability of boys to do useful things for themselves and others, to train them in
scout craft, and to inculcate in them patriotism, civic consciousness and responsibility,
courage, self-reliance, discipline and kindred virtues, and moral values, using the method
which are in common use by boy scouts.

The purpose of the BSP as stated in its amended charter shows that it was created in order
to implement a State policy declared in Article II, Section 13 of the Constitution. Evidently,
the BSP, which was created by a special law to serve a public purpose in pursuit of a
constitutional mandate, comes within the class of “public corporations” defined by paragraph
2, Article 44 of the Civil Code and governed by the law which creates it, pursuant to Article
45 of the same Code.

The Constitution emphatically prohibits the creation of private corporations except by a

general law applicable to all citizens. The purpose of this constitutional provision is to ban
private corporations created by special charters, which historically gave certain individuals,
families or groups special privileges denied to other citizens.

The BSP is a public corporation or a government agency or instrumentality with juridical

personality, which does not fall within the constitutional prohibition in Article XII, Section 16,
notwithstanding the amendments to its charter. Not all corporations, which are not
government owned or controlled, are ipso facto to be considered private corporations as there
exist another distinct class of corporations or chartered institutions which are otherwise known
as “public corporations.” These corporations are treated by law as agencies or
instrumentalities of the government which are not subject to the test of ownership or control
and economic viability but to different criteria relating to their public purposes/interests or
constitutional policies and objectives and their administrative relationship to the government
or any of its Departments or Offices.

Since BSP, under its amended charter, continues to be a public corporation or a government
instrumentality, the Court concludes that it is subject to the exercise by the COA of its audit
jurisdiction in the manner consistent with the provisions of the BSP Charter.

FUNA V. MECO AND COA, GR 193462, FEBRUARY 4, 2014;

In the case of Funa vs MECO, the Supreme Court held that MECO is not a GOCC nor a
government instrumentality because it is not owned by the PH government. It is a sui generis
private entity - a non-governmental non-stock corporation. Although it is entrusted with a
governmental function to facilitate the country’s unofficial relations in Taiwan, it is not entirely
a government instrumentality. Thus, not all accounts of MECO are subject to the auditing
power of CoA.

Having said that, MECO should be subjected to the auditing of COA as regards its collection
of verification and consular fees. Pertinent is the provision of the Administrative Code, Section
14(1), Book V thereof, which authorizes the COA to audit accounts of non–governmental
entities “required to pay xxx or have government share” but only with respect to “funds xxx
coming from or through the government.” The said fees collected by MECO are receivables of
DOLE.

As to the verification fees: Under Section 7 of EO No. 1022, DOLE has the authority to collect
verification fees. But it entered into a series of MoA with MECO authorizing the latter to collect
such fees since the PH does not have an official post in Taiwan.

As to the consular fees: The authority behind “consular fees” is Section 2(6) of EO No. 15, s.
2001. The said section authorizes the MECO to collect “reasonable fees” for its performance
of consular functions. Evidently, and just like the peculiarity that attends the DOLE
“verification fees,” there is no consular office for the collection of the “consular fees.” Thus,
the authority for the MECO to collect the “reasonable fees,” vested unto it by the executive
order (EO No. 15, s. 2001)

CONCLUSION

The MECO is not a GOCC or government instrumentality. It is a sui generis private

entity especially entrusted by the government with the facilitation of unofficial
relations with the people in Taiwan without jeopardizing the country’s faithful
commitment to the One China policy of the PROC. However, despite its non–governmental
character, the MECO handles government funds in the form of the “verification fees” it collects
on behalf of the DOLE and the “consular fees” it collects under Section 2(6) of EO No. 15, s.
2001. Hence, under existing laws, the accounts of the MECO pertaining to its
collection of such “verification fees” and “consular fees” should be audited by the
COA.
QUASI-PUBLIC CORPORATIONS;
PHIL SOCIETY V. COA – 534 SCRA 112;
FACTS: The petitioner was incorporated as a juridical entity over one hundred years ago by
virtue of Act No. 1285, enacted on January 19, 1905, by the Philippine Commission. The
petitioner, at the time it was created, was composed of animal aficionados and animal
propagandists. The objects of the petitioner, as stated in Section 2 of its charter, shall be to
enforce laws relating to cruelty inflicted upon animals or the protection of animals in the
Philippine Islands, and generally, to do and perform all things which may tend in any way to
alleviate the suffering of animals and promote their welfare.

At the time of the enactment of Act No. 1285, the original Corporation Law, Act No. 1459,
was not yet in existence. Act No. 1285 antedated both the Corporation Law and the
constitution of the SEC.

For the purpose of enhancing its powers in promoting animal welfare and enforcing laws for
the protection of animals, the petitioner was initially imbued under its charter with the power
to apprehend violators of animal welfare laws. In addition, the petitioner was to share 1/2 of
the fines imposed and collected through its efforts for violations of the laws related thereto.

Subsequently, however, the power to make arrests as well as the privilege to retain a portion
of the fines collected for violation of animal-related laws were recalled by virtue of C.A. No.
148. Whereas, the cruel treatment of animals is now an offense against the State, penalized
under our statutes, which the Government is duty bound to enforce;

When the COA was to perform an audit on them they refuse to do so, by the reason that they
are a private entity and not under the said commission. It argued that COA covers only
government entities. On the other hand the COA decided that it is a government entity.

ISSUE: W/N the said petitioner is a private entity?

HELD:
Yes, First, the Court agrees with the petitioner that the “charter test” cannot be applied.
Essentially, the “charter test” provides that the test to determine whether a corporation is
government owned or controlled, or private in nature is simple. Is it created by its own charter
for the exercise of a public function, or by incorporation under the general corporation law?
Those with special charters are government corporations subject to its provisions, and its
employees are under the jurisdiction of the CSC, and are compulsory members of the GSIS.

And since the “charter test” had been introduced by the 1935 Constitution and not earlier, it
follows that the test cannot apply to the petitioner, which was incorporated by virtue of Act
No. 1285, enacted on January 19, 1905. Settled is the rule that laws in general have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. All statutes are to be construed as having
only a prospective operation, unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them
a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used.
In case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the retrospective effect.

Second, a reading of petitioner’s charter shows that it is not subject to control or supervision
by any agency of the State, unlike GOCCs. No government representative sits on the board
of trustees of the petitioner. Like all private corporations, the successors of its members are
determined voluntarily and solely by the petitioner in accordance with its by-laws, and may
exercise those powers generally accorded to private corporations, such as the powers to hold
property, to sue and be sued, to use a common seal, and so forth. It may adopt by-laws for
its internal operations: the petitioner shall be managed or operated by its officers “in
accordance with its by-laws in force.”

Third. The employees of the petitioner are registered and covered by the SSS at the latter’s
initiative, and not through the GSIS, which should be the case if the employees are considered
government employees. This is another indication of petitioner’s nature as a private entity.

Fourth. The respondents contend that the petitioner is a “body politic” because its primary
purpose is to secure the protection and welfare of animals which, in turn, redounds to the
public good. This argument, is not tenable. The fact that a certain juridical entity is impressed
with public interest does not, by that circumstance alone, make the entity a public corporation,
inasmuch as a corporation may be private although its charter contains provisions of a public
character, incorporated solely for the public good. This class of corporations may be
considered quasi-public corporations, which are private corporations that render public
service, supply public wants, or pursue other eleemosynary objectives. While purposely
organized for the gain or benefit of its members, they are required by law to discharge
functions for the public benefit. Examples of these corporations are utility, railroad,
warehouse, telegraph, telephone, water supply corporations and transportation companies.
It must be stressed that a quasi-public corporation is a species of private corporations, but
the qualifying factor is the type of service the former renders to the public: if it performs a
public service, then it becomes a quasi-public corporation.

Authorities are of the view that the purpose alone of the corporation cannot be taken as a
safe guide, for the fact is that almost all corporations are nowadays created to promote the
interest, good, or convenience of the public. A bank, for example, is a private corporation;
yet, it is created for a public benefit. Private schools and universities are likewise private
corporations; and yet, they are rendering public service. Private hospitals and wards are
charged with heavy social responsibilities. More so with all common carriers. On the other
hand, there may exist a public corporation even if it is endowed with gifts or donations from
private individuals.

The true criterion, therefore, to determine whether a corporation is public or private is found
in the totality of the relation of the corporation to the State. If the corporation is created by
the State as the latter’s own agency or instrumentality to help it in carrying out its
governmental functions, then that corporation is considered public; otherwise, it is private.
Applying the above test, provinces, chartered cities, and barangays can best exemplify public
corporations. They are created by the State as its own device and agency for the
accomplishment of parts of its own public works.

Fifth. The respondents argue that since the charter of the petitioner requires the latter to
render periodic reports to the Civil Governor, whose functions have been inherited by the
President, the petitioner is, therefore, a government instrumentality.

This contention is inconclusive. By virtue of the fiction that all corporations owe their very
existence and powers to the State, the reportorial requirement is applicable to all corporations
of whatever nature, whether they are public, quasi-public, or private corporations—as
creatures of the State, there is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate the activities
of a corporation to determine whether it acted within its powers. In other words, the
reportorial requirement is the principal means by which the State may see to it that its
creature acted according to the powers and functions conferred upon it.
STATE UNIVERSITIES
SERANA V. SANDIGANBAYAN – 542 SCRA 224;
FACTS: Hannah Serana was appointed by former President Estrada as a student regent of UP
Cebu, to serve a one-year term. President Estrada gave P15,000,000.00 to the Office of the
Student Regent Foundation, Inc as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The
renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. The Ombudsman filed estafa case
against her before the Sandiganbayan. She moved to quash the information. She claimed
that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her
person, in her capacity as UP student regent because the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction
over estafa; the petitioner is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; the offense charged
was not committed in relation to her office; and the funds in question personally came from
President Estrada, not from the government. As to jurisdiction over her person, she contends
that as a UP student regent, she is not a public officer who held the position in an ex officio
capacity.

The Sandiganbayan denied her motion for lack of merit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over Serana’s case.

HELD:
No, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over this case. In Geduspan v. People, the SC held that
while the first part of Sec. 4(A) covers only officials with Salary grade 27 and higher but who
are by express provisions of law placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is
placed there by express provisions of law. Sec. 4(A)(1)(g) of PD No. 1606 explicitly vested
the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors and trustees, or manager of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities, or educational foundations.
Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the Board of Regents
performs functions similar to those of a board of trustee of a non-stock corporation. By
express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by PD No.
1606. Thus, her position as a board of regent (UP student regent) is among those enumerated
and the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over her.

DE JURE AND DE FACTO GOVERNMENT:

A de jure government is the legal, legitimate government of a state and is so recognized by
other states.

In contrast, a de facto government is in actual possession of authority and control of the

state.

For example, a government that has been overthrown and has moved to another state will
attain de jure status if other nations refuse to accept the legitimacy of the revolutionary
government.

CASES:
CO KIM CHAM V. VALDEZ TAN KEH – 75 PHIL. 113;
FACTS: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with
the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American
occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a
proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial
proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law,
lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings
pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government
under the Japanese).

ISSUES:
1. W/N judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid
and remained valid even after the American occupation?

2. W/N the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that “all
laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the
said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free
of enemy occupation and control” invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings
of the courts?

3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation, those courts
could continue hearing the cases pending before them?

HELD:
Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto
government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the
Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments,
supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war.

Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or
changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for “the existence of
a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil
government or the regular administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would
not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them.

The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase “processes of
any other government” and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and
judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation.

IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto
governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated,
then it could not have been MacArthur’s intention to refer to judicial processes, which would
be in violation of international law.

A well-known rule of statutory construction is: “A statute ought never to be construed to

violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”

Another is that “where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great
mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such
construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and
unequivocal words.”

Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets
and violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean
that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase “processes of any other governments.”

In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in
use by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from him. The laws and courts
of the Philippines did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws
and courts of Japan.
It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, “law once established continues until
changed by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF
SOVEREIGNTY.” Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change.

Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and
the laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts and
laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it
follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending
therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws
creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government.

DECISION:
Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him
to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012.

SUMMARY OF RATIO:
1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue
even during occupation unless repealed.
2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on
judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations.
3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending before it.
***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets possession
and control through force or the voice of the majority and maintains itself against the will of
the rightful government) through occupation (established and maintained by military forces
who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war; denoted as a
government of paramount force) through insurrection (established as an independent
government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state)

LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PUNO – 210 SCRA 588;

FACTS: Petitioner Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, a member of the Court of Appeals,
wrote a letter dated 14 November 1990 addressed to this Court, seeking the correction of his
seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals. It appears from the records that petitioner was first
appointed Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals on 20 June 1980 but took his oath of office
for said position only on 29 November 1982, after serving as Assistant Solicitor General in the
Office of the Solicitor General since 1974.

On 17 January 1983, the Court of Appeals was reorganized and became the Intermediate
Appellate Court pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 entitled “An Act Reorganizing the
Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes”.

Petitioner was appointed Appellate Justice in the First Special Cases Division of the
Intermediate Appellate Court. On 7 November 1984, petitioner accepted an appointment to
be Deputy Minister of Justice in the Ministry of Justice; he thus ceased to be a member of the
Judiciary.

The aftermath of the EDSA Revolution in February 1986 brought about a reorganization of
the entire government, including the Judiciary. To effect the reorganization of the
Intermediate Appellate Court and other lower courts, a Screening Committee was created,
with the then Minister of Justice, now Senator Neptali Gonzales as Chairman and then Solicitor
General, now Philippine Ambassador to the United Nations Sedfrey Ordoñez as Vice Chairman.
President Corazon C. Aquino, exercising legislative powers by virtue of the revolution, issued
Executive Order No. 33 to govern the aforementioned reorganization of the Judiciary.

The Screening Committee recommended the return of petitioner as Associate Justice of the
new Court of Appeals and assigned him the rank of number eleven (11) in the roster of
appellate court justices. When the appointments were signed by President Aquino on 28 July
1986, petitioner’s seniority ranking changed, however, from number eleven (11) to number
twenty six (26).

Petitioner now alleges that the change in his seniority ranking could only be attributed to
inadvertence for, otherwise, it would run counter to the provisions of Section 2 of Executive
Order No. 33.

Petitioner elaborates that President Aquino is presumed to have intended to comply with her
own Executive Order No. 33 so much so that the correction of the inadvertent error would
only implement the intent of the President as well as the spirit of Executive Order No. 33 and
will not provoke any kind of constitutional confrontation (between the President and the
Supreme Court).

In a resolution of the Court en banc dated 29 November 1990, the Court granted Justice
Puno’s request. The Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, the Honorable Rodolfo A. Nocon,
is directed to correct the seniority rank of Justice Puno from number twelve (12) to number
five (5). However, a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Court en banc dated
29 November 1990 was later filed by Associate Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Luis A.
Javellana, two (2) of the Associate Justices affected by the ordered correction. They contend
that the present Court of Appeals is a new Court with fifty one (51) members and that
petitioner could not claim a reappointment to a prior court; neither can he claim that he was
returning to his former court, for the courts where he had previously been appointed ceased
to exist at the date of his last appointment.

Petitioner argues that, by virtue of Executive Order No. 33 read in relation to B.P. Blg. 129,
his seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals is now number five (5) for, though President
Aquino rose to power by virtue of a revolution, she had pledged at the issuance of
Proclamation No. 3 (otherwise known as the Freedom Constitution) that “no right provided
under the unratified 1973 Constitution (shall) be absent in the Freedom Constitution”.

Moreover, since the last sentence of Section 2 of Executive Order No. 33 virtually re-enacted
the last sentence of Sec. 3, Chapter 1 of B.P. Blg. 129, statutory construction rules on
simultaneous repeal and re-enactment mandate, according to positioner, the preservation
and enforcement of all rights and liabilities which had accrued under the original statute.

Furthermore, petitioner avers that, although the power of appointment is executive in

character and cannot be usurped by any other branch of the Government, such power can
still be regulated by the Constitution and by the appropriate law, in this case, by the limits
set by Executive Order No. 33 for the power of appointment cannot be wielded in violation of
law

ISSUE: W/N the present Court of Appeals is a new court such that it would negate any claim
to precedence or seniority admittedly enjoyed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals and
Intermediate Appellate Court which existing prior to Executive Order No. 33?
HELD: The Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration and the seniority rankings of
members of the Court of Appeals, including that of the petitioner, at the time the
appointments were made by the President in 1986, are recognized and upheld.

It is the holding of the Court that the present Court of Appeals is a new entity, different and
distinct from the Court of Appeals or the Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to
Executive Order No. 33, for it was created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched
by the revolutionary government of Corazon C. Aquino in the aftermath of the people power
(EDSA) revolution in 1986. A revolution has been defined as “the complete overthrow of the
established government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it”,
or as “a sudden, radical and fundamental change in the government or political system usually
effected with violence or at least some acts of violence.”

It has been said that “the locus of positive law-making power lies with the people of the state”
and from there is derived “the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing
form of government without regard to the existing constitution.”

These summarize the Aquino government’s position that its mandate is taken from “a direct
exercise of the power of the Filipino people.

A question which naturally comes to mind is whether the then existing legal order was
overthrown by the Aquino government. “A legal order is the authoritative code of a polity.
Such code consists of all the rules found in the enactments of the organs of the polity. Where
the state operates under a written constitution, its organs may be readily determined from a
reading of its provisions. Once such organs are ascertained, it becomes an easy matter to
locate their enactments. The rules in such enactments, along with those in the constitution,
comprise the legal order of that constitutional state.” It is assumed that the legal order
remains as a “culture system” of the polity as long as the latter endures and that a point may
be reached, however, where the legal system ceases to be operative as a whole for it is no
longer obeyed by the population nor enforced by the officials.

It is widely known that Mrs. Aquino’s rise to the presidency was not due to constitutional
processes; in fact, it was achieved in violation of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a
Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier declared Mr. Marcos as the winner in the 1986
presidential election. Thus it can be said that the organization of Mrs. Aquino’s Government
which was met by little resistance and her control of the state evidenced by the appointment
of the Cabinet and other key officers of the administration, the departure of the Marcos
Cabinet officials, revamp of the Judiciary and the Military signalled the point where the legal
system then in effect, had ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino.
REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN, GR 104768, JULY 21, 2003;
SOVEREIGNTY
The Sovereignty of the Philippines refers to the status of the Philippines as an independent
nation. This article covers sovereignty transitions relating to the Philippines, with particular
emphasis on the passing of sovereignty from Spain to the United States in the Treaty of Paris
(1898), signed on December 10, 1898 to end the Spanish–American War.

PEOPLE V. GOZO – 53 SCRA 476;

FACTS: Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot which was located inside the US Naval
Reservation which is within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. Upon the advice of an
assistant in the Mayor’s Office and some neighbors, she demolished the house standing
thereon without acquiring the necessary permits and then later on erected another house.
She was then charged by the City Engineer’s Office for violating a municipal order which
requires her to secure permits for any demolition and/or construction within the City. She was
convicted in violation thereof by the lower court. She appealed and countered that the City of
Olongapo has no administrative jurisdiction over the said lot because it is within a Naval Base
of a foreign country.

ISSUE: W/N Municipal Ordinance enforceable within the US Naval Base?

HELD:
Yes. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of
the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed
therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential
but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only
jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military
authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of (Military Bases Agreement). Hence,
in the exercise of its sovereignty, the State through the City of Olongapo does have
administrative jurisdiction over the lot located within the US Naval Base.

SEC. 2. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PHILIPPINE MUNICIPAL LAW:

Adoption of International Law and the doctrine of incorporation

As applied to:

Treaties and Agreements;

KURODA V. JALANDONI – 83 PHIL. 171;
FACTS: The petitioner, Shigenori Kuroda was a Lieutenant - General of the Japanese Imperial
Army who was also the Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces of the
Philippines during World War II. He was charged before the Philippine Military Tribunal by the
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines for unlawfully failed to discharge his
duties thus permitting to commit brutal and high crimes against the non-combatant civilians
and prisoners of The Imperial Japanese forces.Kuroda argued that Executive Order No. 68
which was issued by President Manuel Roxas establishing a National war crimes office
prescribing rule and regulation governing the trial of accused war criminals was illegal. It
violated the provision of the Philippine Constitution and local laws since the Philippines was
not a signatory nor an adherent to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering
Land Warfare. Therefore, he was charged of crimes not based on national and international
laws. The second argument was that American attorneys Hussey and Port should not be
allowed to practice law in the Philippines since it was a violation of the Philippine Constitution.

ISSUE: W/N Executive Order No. 68 was valid and constitutional?

HELD:
Executive Order No. 68 is valid and constitutional. In addition to the promulgation and
enforcement of Executive Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity
with the generally accepted principles of international law which are part of our constitution.
The President as Commander in chief was fully empowered in the issuance and enforcement
of Executive Order No. 68.

It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form
part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international law. In facts,
these rules and principles were accepted by the United States and Japan who were signatories
to the Conventions. The rules and principles form part of the law of our nation even if the
Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions. Our constitution has been deliberately
general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of the rule and
principle of international law as continued in treaties to which our government may have been
or shall be a signatory.

Furthermore, when the crimes was allegedly committed, the Philippines was under the
sovereignty of United States and thus we were equally bound together with the United States
and with Japan to the rights and obligations contained in the treaties signed by these two
countries. These rights and obligations give us full sovereignty. In case of emergency as a
free state this entitle us to enforce our right to punish those who committed crimes against
our people.

In addition to, there is nothing in said executive order which requires that counsel appearing
before said commission must be attorneys qualified to practice law in the Philippines in
accordance with the Rules of Court. In military tribunals counsel for the parties are usually
military personnel who are neither attorney nor even possessed of legal training. The military
Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law with jurisdiction over the crimes
charged which fall under the provision of Executive Order No. 68 and having said petition in
its custody this court will not interfere with the due process of such military Commission.

VINUYA V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ROMULO, GR 162230, APRIL 28, 2010 AND (MR)
AUGUST 12, 2014;
FACTS: This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office
of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG.

Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization
registered with the SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by
Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War.

Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through
the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials
and military officers who ordered the establishment of the “comfort women” stations in the
Philippines. But officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and
took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had
already been fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the Peace Treaty between the
Philippines and Japan.

Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to
espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against them;
and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms
of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other
international tribunals.

Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war
were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations
Agreement of 1956.

On January 15, 1997, the Asian Women’s Fund and the Philippine government signed a
Memorandum of Understanding for medical and welfare support programs for former comfort
women. Over the next five years, these were implemented by the Department of Social
Welfare and Development.

ISSUE: W/N the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing
petitioners’ claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan?

HELD: WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the
exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners’ claims against Japan.

Political questions refer “to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”

One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-
established that “the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the
Constitution to the executive and legislative–‘the political’–departments of the government,
and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to
judicial inquiry or decision.” are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy.
They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose
welfare they advance or imperil.

But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly
possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However,
the question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against
a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably
committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the
Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to
waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951.
The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.

The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which
prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential
sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other
officials.

The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would be inimical
to our country’s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby
creating serious implications for stability in this region. For the to overturn the Executive
Department’s determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a
coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally
committed.
From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle, where such an
extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treaty’s conclusion and our consideration
– the Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of
espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners
and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether
further steps are appropriate or necessary.

In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a
claim within the international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade
a government to bring a claim on the individual’s behalf. By taking up the case of one of its
subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his
behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the person of its subjects,
respect for the rules of international law.

Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection
by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State
is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their
rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can
do is resort to national law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or
obtaining redress. All these questions remain within the province of municipal law and do not
affect the position internationally.

Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this
analysis. Petitioners have not shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated
jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to
prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the
status of jus cogens.

The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a
legal term describing obligations owed by States towards the community of states as a whole.
Essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the
international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of
diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of all States. In view
of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their
protection; they are obligations erga omnes.

The term “jus cogens” (literally, “compelling law”) refers to norms that command peremptory
authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered
peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be
modified only by general international norms of equivalent authority.

MR

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration 1 and a Supplemental Motion for

Reconsideration,2 praying that the Court reverse its decision of April 28, 2010, and grant their
petition for certiorari.

In their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners argue that our constitutional and
jurisprudential histories have rejected the Court’s ruling that the foreign policy prerogatives
ofthe Executive Branch are unlimited; that under the relevant jurisprudence and constitutional
provisions, such prerogatives are proscribed by international human rights and international
conventions of which the Philippines is a party; that the Court, in holding that the Chief
Executive has the prerogative whether to bring petitioners’ claims against Japan, has read
the foreign policy powers of the Office of the President in isolation from the rest of the
constitutional protections that expressly textualize international human rights; that the
foreign policy prerogatives are subject to obligations to promote international humanitarian
law as incorporated intothe laws of the land through the Incorporation Clause; that the Court
must re-visit its decisions in Yamashita v. Styer3 and Kuroda v. Jalandoni 4 which have been
noted for their prescient articulation of the import of laws of humanity; that in said decision,
the Court ruled that the State was bound to observe the laws of war and humanity; that in
Yamashita, the Court expressly recognized rape as an international crime under international
humanitarian law, and in Jalandoni, the Court declared that even if the Philippines had not
acceded or signed the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare,
the Rules and Regulations formed part of the law of the nation by virtue of the Incorporation
Clause; that such commitment to the laws ofwar and humanity has been enshrined in Section
2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which provides "that the Philippines…adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres
to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations."

The petitioners added that the statusand applicability of the generally accepted principles of
international law within the Philippine jurisdiction would be uncertain without the
Incorporation Clause, and that the clause implied that the general international law forms
part of Philippine law only insofar as they are expressly adopted; that in its rulings in The
Holy See, v. Rosario, Jr.5 and U.S. v. Guinto6 the Court has said that international law is
deemed part of the Philippine law as a consequence of Statehood; that in Agustin v. Edu, 7 the
Court has declared that a treaty, though not yet ratified by the Philippines, was part of the
law of the land through the Incorporation Clause; that by virtue of the Incorporation Clause,
the Philippines is bound to abide by the erga omnesobligations arising from the jus
cogensnorms embodied in the laws of war and humanity that include the principle of the
imprescriptibility of war crimes; that the crimes committed against petitioners are proscribed
under international human rights law as there were undeniable violations of jus cogensnorms;
that the need to punish crimes against the laws of humanity has long become jus
cogensnorms, and that international legal obligations prevail over national legal norms; that
the Court’s invocation of the political doctrine in the instant case is misplaced; and that the
Chief Executive has the constitutional duty to afford redress and to give justice to the victims
ofthe comfort women system in the Philippines.8

Petitioners further argue that the Court has confused diplomatic protection with the broader
responsibility of states to protect the human rights of their citizens, especially where the rights
asserted are subject of erga omnesobligations and pertain to jus cogensnorms; that the claims
raised by petitioners are not simple private claims that are the usual subject of diplomatic
protection; that the crimes committed against petitioners are shocking to the conscience of
humanity; and that the atrocities committed by the Japanese soldiers against petitionersare
not subject to the statute of limitations under international law. 9

Petitioners pray that the Court reconsider its April 28, 2010 decision, and declare: (1) that
the rapes, sexual slavery, torture and other forms of sexual violence committed against the
Filipina comfort women are crimes against humanity and war crimes under customary
international law; (2) that the Philippines is not bound by the Treaty of Peace with Japan,
insofar as the waiver of the claims of the Filipina comfort women against Japan is concerned;
(3) that the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Executive Secretary committed grave abuse
of discretion in refusing to espouse the claims of Filipina comfort women; and (4) that
petitioners are entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the
respondents.
Petitioners also pray that the Court order the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Executive
Secretary to espouse the claims of Filipina comfort women for an official apology,legal
compensation and other forms of reparation from Japan.10

In their Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners stress that it was highly
improper for the April 28, 2010 decision to lift commentaries from at least three sources
without proper attribution – an article published in 2009 in the Yale Law Journal of
International Law; a book published by the Cambridge University Press in 2005; and an article
published in 2006 in the Western ReserveJournal of International Law – and make it appear
that such commentaries supported its arguments for dismissing the petition, when in truth
the plagiarized sources even made a strong case in favour of petitioners’ claims. 11

In their Comment,12 respondents disagree withpetitioners, maintaining that aside from the
statements on plagiarism, the arguments raised by petitioners merely rehashed those made
in their June 7, 2005 Memorandum; that they already refuted such arguments in their
Memorandumof June 6, 2005 that the Court resolved through itsApril 28, 2010 decision,
specifically as follows:

1. The contentions pertaining tothe alleged plagiarism were then already lodged
withthe Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards of the Court; hence, the matter of
alleged plagiarism should not be discussed or resolved herein.13

2. A writ of certioraridid not lie in the absence of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Hence, in view of the failureof petitioners to show any
arbitrary or despotic act on the part of respondents,the relief of the writ of
certiorariwas not warranted.14

3. Respondents hold that the Waiver Clause in the Treaty of Peace with Japan, being
valid, bound the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to the international law principle
of pacta sunt servanda.The validity of the Treaty of Peace was the result of the
ratification by two mutually consenting parties. Consequently, the obligations
embodied in the Treaty of Peace must be carried out in accordance with the common
and real intention of the parties at the time the treaty was concluded. 15

4. Respondents assert that individuals did not have direct international remedies
against any State that violated their human rights except where such remedies are
provided by an international agreement. Herein, neither of the Treaty of Peace and the
Reparations Agreement,the relevant agreements affecting herein petitioners, provided
for the reparation of petitioners’ claims. Respondents aver that the formal apology by
the Government of Japan and the reparation the Government of Japan has provided
through the Asian Women’s Fund (AWF) are sufficient to recompense petitioners on
their claims, specifically:

a. About 700 million yen would be paid from the national treasury over the next 10
years as welfare and medical services;

b. Instead of paying the money directly to the former comfort women, the services
would be provided through organizations delegated by governmental bodies in the
recipient countries (i.e., the Philippines, the Republic of Korea,and Taiwan); and
 c. Compensation would consist of assistance for nursing services (like home helpers),
housing, environmental development, medical expenses, and medical goods.16

Ruling

The Court DENIESthe Motion for Reconsiderationand Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
for being devoid of merit.

1. Petitioners did not show that their resort was timely under the Rules of Court.

Petitioners did not show that their bringing ofthe special civil action for certiorariwas timely,
i.e., within the 60-day period provided in Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 4. When and where position filed. – The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60)
daysfrom notice of judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new
trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be
counted from notice of the denial of said motion.

As the rule indicates, the 60-day period starts to run from the date petitioner receives the
assailed judgment, final order or resolution, or the denial of the motion for reconsideration or
new trial timely filed, whether such motion is required or not. To establish the timeliness of
the petition for certiorari, the date of receipt of the assailed judgment, final order or resolution
or the denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial must be stated in the
petition;otherwise, the petition for certiorarimust be dismissed. The importance of the dates
cannot be understated, for such dates determine the timeliness of the filing of the petition for
certiorari. As the Court has emphasized in Tambong v. R. Jorge Development Corporation: 17

There are three essential dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought under
Rule 65. First, the date when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution was received;
second, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration was filed; and third, when notice of
the denial thereof was received. Failure of petitioner to comply with this requirement shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. Substantial compliance will not suffice in a
matter involving strict observance with the Rules. (Emphasis supplied)

The Court has further said in Santos v. Court of Appeals:18

The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
is for the purpose of determining its timeliness. Such a petition is required to be filed not later
than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or Resolution sought to be assailed.
Therefore, that the petition for certiorariwas filed forty-one (41) days from receipt of the
denial of the motion for reconsideration is hardly relevant. The Court of Appeals was notin
any position to determine when this period commenced to run and whether the motion for
reconsideration itself was filed on time since the material dates were not stated. It should not
be assumed that in no event would the motion be filed later than fifteen (15) days. Technical
rules of procedure are not designed to frustrate the ends of justice. These are provided to
effect the proper and orderly disposition of cases and thus effectively prevent the clogging of
court dockets. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the
policy ofliberal construction.19

The petition for certioraricontains the following averments, viz:

 82. Since 1998, petitioners and other victims of the "comfort women system,"
approached the Executive Department through the Department of Justice in order to
request for assistance to file a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers
who ordered the establishment of the "comfort women" stations in the Philippines;

83. Officials of the Executive Department ignored their request and refused to file a
claim against the said Japanese officials and military officers;

84. Undaunted, the Petitioners in turnapproached the Department of Foreign Affairs,

Department of Justice and Office of the of the Solicitor General to file their claim
against the responsible Japanese officials and military officers, but their efforts were
similarly and carelessly disregarded;20

The petition thus mentions the year 1998 only as the time when petitioners approached the
Department ofJustice for assistance, but does not specifically state when they received the
denial of their request for assistance by the Executive Department of the Government. This
alone warranted the outright dismissal of the petition.

Even assuming that petitioners received the notice of the denial of their request for assistance
in 1998, their filing of the petition only on March 8, 2004 was still way beyond the 60-day
period. Only the most compelling reasons could justify the Court’s acts of disregarding and
lifting the strictures of the rule on the period. As we pointed out inMTM Garment Mfg. Inc. v.
Court of Appeals:21

All these do not mean, however, that procedural rules are to be ignored or disdained at will
to suit the convenience of a party. Procedural law has its own rationale in the orderly
administration of justice, namely: to ensure the effective enforcement of substantive rights
by providing for a system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or whimsicality in
the settlement of disputes. Hence, it is a mistake to suppose that substantive law and
procedural law are contradictory to each other, or as often suggested, that enforcement of
procedural rules should never be permitted if it would result in prejudice to the substantive
rights of the litigants.

As we have repeatedly stressed, the right to file a special civil action of certiorariis neither a
natural right noran essential element of due process; a writ of certiorariis a prerogative writ,
never demandable as a matter of right, and never issued except in the exercise of judicial
discretion. Hence, he who seeks a writ of certiorarimust apply for it only in the manner and
strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law and the Rules.

Herein petitioners have not shown any compelling reason for us to relax the rule and the
requirements under current jurisprudence. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

2. Petitioners did not show that the assailed act was either judicial or quasi-judicial on the
part of respondents.

Petitioners were required to show in their petition for certiorarithat the assailed act was either
judicial or quasi-judicial in character. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Courtrequires such
showing, to wit:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal,
board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order, or resolution
subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a
sworn certification of nonforum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule
46. However, petitioners did notmake such a showing.

3. Petitioners were not entitled to the injunction.

The Court cannot grant petitioners’ prayer for the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
Preliminary injunction is merely a provisional remedy that is adjunct to the main case, and is
subject to the latter’s outcome. It is not a cause of action itself. 22 It is provisional because it
constitutes a temporary measure availed of during the pendency of the action; and it is
ancillary because it is a mere incident in and is dependent upon the result of the main
action.23Following the dismissal of the petition for certiorari, there is no more legal basis to
issue the writ of injunction sought. As an auxiliary remedy, the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction cannot be issued independently of the principal action.24

In any event, a mandatory injunction requires the performance of a particular

act.1âwphi1 Hence, it is an extreme remedy,25to be granted only if the following requisites
are attendant, namely:

(a) The applicant has a clear and unmistakable right, that is, a right in esse;

(b) There is a material and substantial invasion of such right; and

(c) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant;
and no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction
of irreparable injury.26

In Marquez v. The Presiding Judge (Hon. Ismael B. Sanchez), RTC Br. 58, Lucena City, 27 we
expounded as follows:

It is basic that the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court, conditioned on the existence of a clear and positive right of the
applicant which should be protected. It is an extraordinary, peremptory remedy available only
on the grounds expressly provided by law, specifically Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, extreme caution must be observed in the exercise of such discretion. It should be
granted only when the court is fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency
demands it. The very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction rests in the
existence of a cause of action and in the probability of irreparable injury, inadequacy of
pecuniary compensation, and the prevention of multiplicity of suits. Where facts are not shown
to bring the case within these conditions, the relief of injunction should be refused. 28

Here, the Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of foreign
relations for the Philippines. Whether or not to espouse petitioners' claim against the
Government of Japan is left to the exclusive determination and judgment of the Executive
Department. The Court cannot interfere with or question the wisdom of the conduct of foreign
relations by the Executive Department. Accordingly, we cannot direct the Executive
Department, either by writ of certiorari or injunction, to conduct our foreign relations with
Japan in a certain manner.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration for their lack of merit.

TAÑADA V. ANGARA – 272 SCRA 18 [1997];

FACTS: This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents
acting in their capacities as Senators via signing the said agreement.

The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the
reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus,
provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with
exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected
in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a “free market” espoused by WTO.

Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and
impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of
the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.

ISSUE: W/N there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement?

HELD: Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the
policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the
doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of
international law, which are considered automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt
servanda – international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a mere
moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.

Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute
because it is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines
joined the United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the “concept
of sovereignty as autolimitation.” What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to
determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial
inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as
WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be the political desire of a member. Also,
it should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only
viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of
international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction.
Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free choice.
BAYAN V. ZAMORA, GR 138570, OCTOBER 10, 2000;
THE FACTS

The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an
agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty
by the Philippine government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the
concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine Senate.

The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It
provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S.
and the Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and
aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.

Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates §25, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be
allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.”

II. THE ISSUE

Was the VFA unconstitutional?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the petitioners did not
commit grave abuse of discretion, and sustained the constitutionality of the VFA.]

NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.

Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the
country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under
a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required
by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum;
and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.

There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the
VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with
the provisions of the Constitution . . . the provision in [in §25, Article XVIII] requiring
ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since
Congress has not required it.

xxx xxx xxx

This Court is of the firm view that the phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that
the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require
the other contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to
the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict
meaning to the phrase.

Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the
significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense
they have in common use.
 Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an
executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding
as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under
international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.

xxx xxx xxx

The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas
C. Hubbard, has stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to
the terms of the VFA. For as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges
the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty,
there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.

SAGUISAG V. EXEC. SECRETARY, GR 212426, JANUARY 12, 2016 AND MR, JULY 26,
2016 AFFIRMING 1ST JUDGMENT;
FACTS: The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) is an executive agreement
that gives U.S. troops, planes and ships increased rotational presence in Philippine military
bases and allows the U.S. to build facilities to store fuel and equipment there. It was signed
against the backdrop of the Philippines' maritime dispute with China over the West Philippine
Sea.

The US embassy and DFA exchanged diplomatic notes confirming all necessary requirements
for the agreement to take force. The agreement was signed on April 2014. President Benigno
Aquino III ratified the same on June 2014. It was not submitted to Congress on the
understanding that to do so was no longer necessary.

Petitions for Certiorari were filed before the Supreme Court assailing the constitutionality of
the agreement. Herein petitioners now contend that it should have been concurred by the
senate as it is not an executive agreement. The Senate issued Senate Resolution No. 105
expressing a strong sense that in order for EDCA to be valid and binding, it must first be
transmitted to the Senate for deliberation and concurrence.

ISSUE: W/N the EDCA between the Philippines and the U.S. is constitutional?

HELD: Petition is DISMISSED.

Yes, The EDCA is an executive agreement and does not need the Senate's concurrence. As
an executive agreement, it remains consistent with existing laws and treaties that it purports
to implement.

Petitioners contend that the EDCA must be in the form of a treaty duly concurred by Senate.
They hinge their argument under the following Constitutional provisions:
• Sec. 21, Art. VII: “No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective
unless concurred in by at least 2/3rds of all the Members of the Senate.”
• Section 25, Article XVIII: “ xxx Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the
Senate xxx ”

The President, however, may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities, if (a) it is not the instrument that allows the presence of foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities; or (b) it merely aims to implement an existing law or treaty
In Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading: Executive Agreements are defined as
international agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-established
national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary
nature.

Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of two-thirds of
the Senate. The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity
of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage.

The Visiting Forces Agreement – a treaty ratified by the Senate in 1999 – already allowed the
return of US troops. EDCA is consistent with the content, purpose, and framework of the
Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA. The practice of resorting to executive agreements in
adjusting the details of a law or a treaty that already deals with the presence of foreign
military forces is not at all unusual in this jurisdiction.

In order to keep the peace in its archipelago and to sustain itself at the same time against
the destructive forces of nature, the Philippines will need friends. Who they are, and what
form the friendships will take, are for the President to decide. The only restriction is what the
Constitution itself expressly prohibits. EDCA is not constitutionally infirm. As an executive
agreement, it remains consistent with existing laws and treaties that it purports to implement.

MR
BAYAN V. ROMULO, GR 159618, FEB. 1, 2011;
FACTS: Then US Ambassador Francis Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note 0470 to the DFA
proposing the terms of the Non-surrender Bilateral Agreement between the Philippines and
the US. Via Exchange of Notes BFO-028-03, the Philippines, through Sec. Ople, agreed and
accepted the US proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note and put in effect the Non-
surrender Agreement with the US government.

The Non-surrender Agreement aims to protect what it refers to and defines as persons of the
Philippines and the US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against
them in international tribunals. It provides that the persons of one party present in the
territory of the other shall not, absent the express consent of the first party be surrendered
or transferred by any means to any international tribunal for any purpose or by any means
to any other entity or third country or expelled to a third country for the purpose of surrender
to or transfer to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established by the
UN Security Council. When the US/Philippines extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers
a person of the Philippines/US to a third country, the US/Philippines will not agree to the
surrender or transfer of that person by the third country to any international tribunal, unless
such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, absent the express consent of
the Government of the US/Philippines.

Petitioners argue that the Exchange of Notes BFO-028-03 cannot be a valid medium for
concluding an agreement, that it cannot partake the nature of a treaty without being ratified
by the Senate, that the Non-surrender Agreement does not fall under any subject-categories
enumerated in a previous case, and that the Non-surrender Agreement infringes the
effectivity of the Rome Statute insofar as it unduly restricts the ICC’s jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
1) Can the Non-surrender Agreement be validly concluded through exchanges of notes? Is
the Non-surrender Agreement a violation of the obligation of the Philippines under the Rome
Statute?

HELD: The Petition is denied for lack of merit.

1) An exchange of notes falls into the category of inter-governmental agreements which is
an internationally accepted form of international agreement. It as a record of routine
agreement that has many similarities with the private law contract. The agreement
consists of 2 documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by
the representative of the other. Under the usual procedure, the accepting State repeats
the text of the offering State to record its assent. The signatories of the letters may be
government ministers, diplomats or departmental heads. The technique of exchange of
notes is frequently resorted to, either because of its speedy procedure, or sometimes to
avoid the process of legislative approval. The terms exchanges of notes and executive
agreements have been used interchangeably, the former being a form of executive
agreement that becomes binding through executive action.

The categorization of subject matters that may be covered by international agreements

mentioned in Eastern Sea Trading case is not cast in stone. There are no hard and fast
rules on the propriety of entering, on a given subject, into a treaty or executive agreement
as an instrument of international relations. The primary consideration in the choice of the
form of agreement is the parties’ intent and desire to craft an international agreement in
the form they so wish to further their respective interests.

There is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in terms of their binding
effects on the contracting parties, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained
 within their powers. The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without
the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage,
the validity of which has never been seriously questioned by the Court. The President as
head of state and government is the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the
country. The Constitution vests in the President the power to enter into international
agreements, subject to the required concurrence votes of the Senate. But agreements
may be validly entered into without such concurrence as the President wields vast powers
and influence; her conduct in the external affairs of the nation is executive altogether. The
President by ratifying through her deputies the Non-surrender agreement, did nothing
more than discharge a constitutional duty and exercise a prerogative that pertains to the
Office.

2) The Non-surrender agreement does not undermine the Rome Statute. The jurisdiction of
the ICC is to be complementary to national criminal jurisdiction of signatory states. It is
the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for
international crimes. The primary jurisdiction over the so-called international crimes rests,
at the first instance, with the State where the crime was committed; secondarily with the
ICC in appropriate situations. The Non-surrender agreement does not violate the
Philippines’ duty required by the imperatives of good faith to refrain from performing any
act tending to impair the Rome Statute.

The Philippines has not abdicated its sovereignty by bargaining away the jurisdiction of the
ICC to prosecute US national who commit serious crimes of international concerns in the
Philippines. The Non-surrender agreement is an affirmance of the Philippines’ national criminal
jurisdiction. The Philippines may decide to try persons of the US under our national criminal
jurisdiction. Or the country may opt not to exercise its criminal jurisdiction and defer to the
ICC. As to persons of the US whom the Philippines refuses to prosecute, the country would in
effect accord discretion to the US to exercise wither its national criminal jurisdiction or consent
to the referral of the matter to the ICC for trial. By their nature, international agreements
actually have a limiting effect on the otherwise encompassing nature of sovereignty. By their
voluntary act, nations may decide to surrender or waive some aspects of their state power.
In this partial surrender, greater benefits are derived from a pact or reciprocal undertaking.
Evidently, there is as yet, no overwhelming consensus, let alone prevalent practice, among
the different countries in the world that the prosecution of internationally recognized crimes
should be handled by a particular international criminal court.

Rome Statute – This establishes the International Criminal Court with the power to
exercise jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern and
shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdiction. Under the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties:
1) State Party – is legally obliged to follow all the provisions of a treaty in good faith
2) Signatory State – is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object
and purpose of a treaty.

As of writing the ponencia, the Philippines is only a signatory state to the Rome Statute
and not a State Party for lack of ratification by the Senate. Any argument obliging the
Philippines to follow any provision in the treaty would be premature.

Treaty – international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed
by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related
instruments and whatever its particular designation. International agreements may be in
the form of 1) treaties that require legislative concurrence after executive ratification or
2) executive agreements that are similar to treaties, except that they do not require
 legislative concurrence and are usually less formal and deal with a narrower range of
subject matters that treaties.

Sources of International Law

1) International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly
recognized by the contesting states
2) International custome, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law
3) General principles of law recognized by civilized nations
4) Judicial decisions and teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
nations

Doctrine of incorporation – international law is part of our law, and must be ascertained
and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions
of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. Where there is no
treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be
had to the customs and usages of civilized nations and as evidence of these, to the works
of jurists and commentators who by years of labor, research and experience have made
themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such works
are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning
what the law ought to be, but for the trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.

Customary international law – or international custom is a source of international law as

stated in the Statute of the International Court of Justice, defined as the general and
consistent practice of states recognized and followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation.

1) State practice – the objective element, generality, uniformity and consistency.

2) Opinio juris – the subjective element, requires that the state practice or norm be
carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.
Once the existence of state practice has been extablished, it becomes necessary to
determine why states behave the way they do. Do states behave the way they do
because they consider it obligatory to behave thus or do they do it only as a matter or
courtesy? Opinio juris or the belief that a certain form of behavior is obligatory, is what
makes practice international rule. Without it, practice is not law.

Jus cogens – means the compelling law. It holds the highest hierarchical position among all
other customary norms and principles. Jus cogens norms are deemed peremptory and non-
derogable. When applied to international crimes, jus cogens crimes have been deemed so
fundamental to the existence of a just international legal order that state cannot derogate
from them, even by agreement.

DEUTSCHE BANK V. CIR, GR 188550, AUGUST 28, 2013;

FACTS: Pursuant to the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, on October 21, 2003, the
petitioner remitted to the respondent the amount of Php 67,688,553.51, representing fifteen
(15) percent of the branch profit remittance tax (BPRT) on its regular banking unit (RBU) net
income remitted to the Deutsche Bank of Germany (DB Germany) for 2002 and prior taxable
years.

Believing that they made an overpayment of the BPRT, on October 4, 2005, the petitioner
filed with the BIR Large Taxpayers Assessment and Investigation Division an administrative
claim for refund or a tax credit certificate representing the alleged excess BPRT paid (amount
of Php 22,562,851.17). The petitioners also requested from the International Tax Affairs
Division (ITAD) for a confirmation of its entitlement to a preferential tax rate of 10% under
the RP-Germany Tax Treaty.

Because of the alleged inaction of the BIR on the administrative claim, on October 18, 2005,
the petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), reiterating its
claim for refund or tax credit certificate representing the alleged excess BPRT paid. The claim
was denied on the ground that application for tax treaty relief was not filed with ITAD prior
to the payment of BPRT, thereby violating the fifteen-day period mandated under Section III,
paragraph 2 of the Revenue Memorandum Order No. 1-2000. Also, the CTA Second Division
relied on an en banc decision of the CTA that before the benefits of a tax treaty may be
extended to a foreign corporation, the latter should first invoke the provisions of the tax treaty
and prove that they indeed apply to the corporation (Mirant Operations Corporation v
Commissioner of Internal Revenue).

Hence this petition.

ISSUE: W/N the failure to strictly comply with the provisions of RMO No. 1-2000 will deprive
persons or corporations the benefit of a tax treaty?

HELD:
No. The constitution provides for the adherence to the general principles of international law
as part of the law of the land (Article II, Section 2). Every treaty is binding upon the parties,
and obligations must be performed (Article 26, Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties).
There is nothing in RMO 1-2000 indicating a deprivation of entitlement to a tax treaty for
failure to comply with the fifteen-day period. The denial of availment of tax relief for the
failure to apply within the prescribed period (under the administrative issuance) would impair
the value of the tax treaty. Also, the obligation to comply with the tax treaty must take
precedence over the objective of RMO 1-2000 because the non-compliance with tax treaties
would have negative implications on international affairs and would discourage foreign
investments.

DISPOSITIVE:
The petition was granted, the CTA en banc decision was set aside and reversed. The
respondent was ordered to refund or issue a tax credit certificate (the amount of Php
22,562,851.17) in favor of the petitioner.

CBK POWER V. CIR, 746 SCRA 93;

FACTS:

In February 2001, CBK Power borrowed money from Industrial Bank of Japan, Fortis-
Netherlands, Raiffesen Bank, Fortis-Belgium, and Mizuho Bank for which it remitted interest
payments from May 2001 to May 2003. It allegedly withheld final taxes from said payments
based on the following rates, and paid the same to the Revenue District Office No. 55 of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR): (a) fifteen percent (15%) for Fortis-Belgium, Fortis-
Netherlands, and Raiffesen Bank; and (b) twenty percent (20%) for Industrial Bank of Japan
and Mizuho Bank.

However, according to CBK Power, under the relevant tax treaties between the Philippines
and the respective countries in which each of the banks is a resident, the interest income
derived by the aforementioned banks are subject only to a preferential tax rate of 10%.
Accordingly, on April 14, 2003, CBK Power filed a claim for refund of its excess final
withholding taxes allegedly erroneously withheld and collected for the years 2001 and 2002
with the BIR Revenue Region No. 9. The claim for refund of excess final withholding taxes in
2003 was subsequently filed on March 4, 2005.

The Commissioner argued that CBK Power cannot claim for refund with respect to the excess
final withholding taxes from Fortis-Netherlands because CBK Power failed to obtain an
International Tax Affairs Division (ITAD) ruling pursuant to RMO No. 1-2000 with respect to
the said transactions. Furthermore, the Commissioner assails the claim for refund on the basis
of CBK Power’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to its filing the petition before
the CTA first division.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not ITAD ruling is a condition sine qua non for the claim for refund of its
erroneous payment of final withholding taxes

2. Whether or not there was failure to exhaust administrative remedies before resorting
to judicial action

RULING:

1. No, ITAD ruling is not required in this case.

The objective of RMO No. 1-2000 in requiring the application for treaty relief with the ITAD
before a party’s availment of the preferential rate under a tax treaty is to avert the
consequences of any erroneous interpretation and/or application of treaty provisions, such as
claims for refund/credit for overpayment of taxes, or deficiency tax liabilities for
underpayment. However, as pointed out in Deutsche Bank, the underlying principle of prior
application with the BIR becomes moot in refund cases – as in the present case – where the
very basis of the claim is erroneous or there is excessive payment arising from the non-
availment of a tax treaty relief at the first instance. In parallel, CBK Power could not have
applied for a tax treaty relief 15 days prior to its payment of the final withholding tax on the
interest paid to its lenders precisely because it erroneously paid said tax on the basis of the
regular rate as prescribed by the NIRC, and not on the preferential tax rate provided under
the different treaties. As stressed by the Court, the prior application requirement under RMO
No. 1-2000 then becomes illogical.

Not only is the requirement illogical, but it is also an imposition that is not found at all
in the applicable tax treaties. In Deutsche Bank, the Court categorically held that the BIR
should not impose additional requirements that would negate the availment of the reliefs
provided for under international agreements, especially since said tax treaties do not provide
for any prerequisite at all for the availment of the benefits under said agreements.

2. NO, CBK power is justified for failing to exhaust administrative remedies, in this case,
the action or decision of the Commissioner, because otherwise, the claim for refund
would already have been prescribed.

The Court agrees with the ratiocination of the CTA En Banc in debunking the alleged failure
to exhaust administrative remedies. Had CBK Power awaited the action of the Commissioner
on its claim for refund prior to taking court action knowing fully well that the prescriptive
period was about to end, it would have lost not only its right to seek judicial recourse but its
right to recover the final withholding taxes it erroneously paid to the government thereby
suffering irreparable damage.

In the foregoing instances, attention must be drawn to the Court’s ruling in P.J. Kiener Co.,
Ltd. v. David60 (Kiener), wherein it was held that in no wise does the law, i.e., Section 306
of the old Tax Code (now, Section 229 of the NIRC), imply that the Collector of Internal
Revenue first act upon the taxpayer’s claim, and that the taxpayer shall not go to court before
he is notified of the Collector’s action. In Kiener, the Court went on to say that the claim with
the Collector of Internal Revenue was intended primarily as a notice of warning that unless
the tax or penalty alleged to have been collected erroneously or illegally is refunded, court
action will follow.

INTERNATIONAL LAW IN RELATION TO MUNICIPAL LAW:

LIM V. EXEC. SECRETARY, GR 151445, APRIL 11, 2002;
FACTS: Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) signed in 1999, personnel from the
armed forces of the United States of America started arriving in Mindanao to take partin
"Balikatan 02-1” on January 2002. The Balikatan 02-1 exercises involves the simulation of
joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense
agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951. The exercise is
rooted from the international anti-terrorism campaign declared by President George W. Bush
in reaction to the 3 commercial aircrafts hijacking that smashed into twin towers of the World
Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon building in Washington, D.C. allegedly by
the al-Qaeda headed by the Osama bin Laden that occurred on September 11, 2001. Arthur
D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise. Partylists Sanlakas and
Partido Ng Manggagawa as residents of Zamboanga and Sulu directly affected by the
operations filed a petition-in-intervention.

The Solicitor General commented the prematurity of the action as it is based only on a fear
of future violation of the Terms of Reference and impropriety of availing of certiorari to
ascertain a question of fact specifically interpretation of the VFA whether it is covers "Balikatan
02-1” and no question of constitutionality is involved. Moreover, there is lack of locus standi
since it does not involve tax spending and there is no proof of direct personal injury.

ISSUE: W/N the petition and the petition-in-intervention should prosper?

HELD:

No, Petition and the petition-in-intervention are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the
filing of a new petition sufficient in form and substance in the proper Regional Trial Court -
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.

Doctrine of Importance to the Public:

Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the
Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of
the government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws that
they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities
of procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition.

Although courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question based on the
doctrine of separation of powers, which enjoins upon the department of the government a
becoming respect for each other's act, this Court nevertheless resolves to take cognizance of
the instant petition.
Interpretation of Treaty:
The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in "activities,"
the exact meaning of which was left undefined. The expression is ambiguous, permitting a
wide scope of undertakings subject only to the approval of the Philippine government. The
sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that United States
personnel must "abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and
in particular, from any political activity." All other activities, in other words, are fair game.
To aid in this, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 31 SECTION 3 and Article
32 contains provisos governing interpretations of international agreements. It is clear from
the foregoing that the cardinal rule of interpretation must involve an examination of the text,
which is presumed to verbalize the parties' intentions. The Convention likewise dictates what
may be used as aids to deduce the meaning of terms, which it refers to as the context of the
treaty, as well as other elements may be taken into account alongside the aforesaid context.
According to Professor Briggs, writer on the Convention, the distinction between the general
rule of interpretation and the supplementary means of interpretation is intended rather to
ensure that the supplementary means do not constitute an alternative, autonomous method
of interpretation divorced from the general rule.

The meaning of the word “activities" was deliberately made that way to give both parties a
certain leeway in negotiation. Thus, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan
exercises. Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the
conclusion that combat-related activities -as opposed to combat itself -such as the one subject
of the instant petition, are indeed authorized.

The Terms of Reference are explicit enough. Paragraph 8 of section I stipulates that US
exercise participants may not engage in combat "except in self-defense." ." The indirect
violation is actually petitioners' worry, that in reality, "Balikatan 02-1" is actually a war
principally conducted by the United States government, and that the provision on self-defense
serves only as camouflage to conceal the true nature of the exercise. A clear pronouncement
on this matter thereby becomes crucial. In our considered opinion, neither the MDT nor the
VFA allow foreign troops to engage in an offensive war on Philippine territory. Under the
salutary proscription stated in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Both the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement, as in all other treaties
and international agreements to which the Philippines is a party, must be read in the context
of the 1987 Constitution especially Sec. 2, 7 and 8 of Article 2: Declaration of Principles and
State Policies in this case. The Constitution also regulates the foreign relations powers of the
Chief Executive when it provides that "[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid
and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate."
Even more pointedly Sec. 25 on Transitory Provisions which shows antipathy towards foreign
military presence in the country, or of foreign influence in general. Hence, foreign troops are
allowed entry into the Philippines only by way of direct exception.
International Law vs. Fundamental Law and Municipal Laws
Conflict arises then between the fundamental law and our obligations arising from
international agreements.

Philip Morris, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: “Withal, the fact that international law has been made
part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over
national law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most
countries, rules of international law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national
legislation.”
From the perspective of public international law, a treaty is favored over municipal law
pursuant to the principle of pacta sunt servanda. Hence, "[e]very treaty in force is binding
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith." Further, a party to a
treaty is not allowed to "invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure
to perform a treaty."

Our Constitution espouses the opposing view as stated in section 5 of Article VIII: “The
Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules
of Court may provide, final judgments and order of lower courts in:
(A) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
is in question.”

Ichong v. Hernandez: “provisions of a treaty are always subject to qualification or amendment

by a subsequent law, or that it is subject to the police power of the State”
Gonzales v. Hechanova: “our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only
when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of
Congress.”
The foregoing premises leave us no doubt that US forces are prohibited / from engaging in
an offensive war on Philippine territory.
SHANGRI-LA V. DEVELOPERS, GR 159938, MARCH 31, 2006;
PHILIP MORRIS, INC. V. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, GR 158589, JUNE 27,
2006;
ECOLE DE CUISINE V. RENAUD COINTREAU, GR 185830, JUNE 5, 2013;
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS; GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW:
MIJARES V. RANADA, GR 139325, APRIL 12, 2005;
 May 9 1991: a complaint was filed by ten Filipino citizens representing a class of 10,000
members who each alleged having suffered human rights abuses such as arbitrary
detention, torture and rape in the hands of police or military forces during the Marcos
regime with the United States District Court (US District Court), District of Hawaii, against
the Estate of former Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos Estate)
 US District Court and Affirmed by US CA: awarded them $1,964,005,859.90
 Petitioners filed Complaint with Makati RTC for the enforcement of the Final Judgment
 Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss, raising, among others, the non-payment of the
correct filing fees paying only P410
 Petitioners claimed that an action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment is not capable
of pecuniary estimation
 RTC: estimated the proper amount of filing fees was approximately P472 and dismissing
the case without prejudice
 Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65

ISSUE: W/N the enforcement of a foreign judgment is incapable of pecuniary estimation

HELD: NO. (But belongs to "other actions not involving property") petition is GRANTED.

 There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in rem and one in
personam. For an action in rem, the foreign judgment is deemed conclusive upon the title
to the thing, while in an action in personam, the foreign judgment is presumptive, and
not conclusive, of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title
 However, in both cases, the foreign judgment is susceptible to impeachment in our local
courts on the grounds of want of jurisdiction or notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact. Thus, the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled
to defend against the enforcement of such decision in the local forum. It is essential that
there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court
in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy even if such judgment has conclusive
effect as in the case of in rem actions, if only for the purpose of allowing the losing party
an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment. Consequently, the party attacking a
foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity. Absent
perhaps a statutory grant of jurisdiction to a quasi-judicial body, the claim for enforcement
of judgment must be brought before the regular courts.
 There are distinctions, nuanced but discernible, between the cause of action arising from
the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and that arising from the facts or allegations that
occasioned the foreign judgment. They may pertain to the same set of facts, but there is
an essential difference in the right-duty correlatives that are sought to be vindicated.
Extensive litigation is thus conducted on the facts, and from there the right to and amount
of damages are assessed. On the other hand, in an action to enforce a foreign judgment,
the matter left for proof is the foreign judgment itself, and not the facts from which it
prescinds.
 As stated in Section 48, Rule 39, the actionable issues are generally restricted to a review
of jurisdiction of the foreign court, the service of personal notice, collusion, fraud, or
mistake of fact or law. The limitations on review is in consonance with a strong and
pervasive policy in all legal systems to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues.
Otherwise known as the policy of preclusion, it seeks to protect party expectations
resulting from previous litigation, to safeguard against the harassment of defendants, to
insure that the task of courts not be increased by never-ending litigation of the same
disputes, and in a larger sense to promote what Lord Coke in the Ferrer's Case of 1599
 stated to be the goal of all law: "rest and quietness." If every judgment of a foreign court
were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause
of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation.
 Marcos Estate cites Singsong v. Isabela Sawmill and Raymundo v. Court of Appeals:
 In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature
of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of
money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction
is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of
the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a
sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject
of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively
by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
 An examination of Section 19(6), B.P. 129 reveals that the instant complaint for
enforcement of a foreign judgment, even if capable of pecuniary estimation, would fall
under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts
 The complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary
estimation. But at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate,
thus placing it beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule 141. It is covered by Section
7(b)(3), involving as it does, "other actions not involving property." The petitioners thus
paid the correct amount of filing fees, and it was a grave abuse of discretion for respondent
judge to have applied instead a clearly inapplicable rule and dismissed the complaint.

SOFT LAW:
Soft law refers to rules that are neither strictly binding in nature nor completely lacking legal
significance. In the context of international law, soft law refers to guidelines, policy
declarations or codes of conduct which set standards of conduct. However, they are not
directly enforceable.

PHARMACEUTICAL V. DOH, GR 173034, OCTOBER 9, 2007;

FACTS: On October 28, 1986, Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President
Corazon Aquino by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom
Constitution. The Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the
International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the
World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981.

From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding
should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and
health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. the Philippines ratified the
International Convention on the Rights of the Child.

Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to
diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents
and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. the DOH issued RIRR which
was to take effect on July 7, 2006.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify Revised
Implementing Rules and Regulations of The “Milk Code,” assailing that the RIRR was going
beyond the provisions of the Milk Code, thereby amending and expanding the coverage of
said law.
ISSUE: W/N respondents officers of the DOH acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and in violation of
the provisions of the Constitution in promulgating the RIRR?

HELD:

The Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition. Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of
Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 dated May 12, 2006 are declared NULL and VOID for
being ultra vires. The Department of Health and respondents are PROHIBITED from
implementing said provisions.

The international instruments pointed out by the respondents, UNRC, ICESR, CEDAW, are
deemed part of the law of the land and therefore the DOH may implement them through the
RIRR. Customary international law is deemed incorporated into our domestic system. Custom
or customary international law means “a general and consistent practice of states followed by
them from a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris). Under the 1987 Constitution, international
law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation.
The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic
law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation.

“Generally accepted principles of international law” refers to norms of general or customary

international law which are binding on all states. The Milk Code is a verbatim reproduction of
the (ICMBS), but it did not prohibit advertising or other forms of promotion to the general
public of products. Instead, the Milk Code expressly provides that advertising, promotion, or
other marketing materials may be allowed if such materials are duly authorized and approved
by the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC). In this regard, the WHA Resolutions adopting the
ICMBS are merely recommendatory and legally non-binding.

This may constitute “soft law” or non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence
state behavior. Respondents have not presented any evidence to prove that the WHA
Resolutions, although signed by most of the member states, were in fact enforced or practiced
by at least a majority of the member states and obligatory in nature. The provisions of the
WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented
by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature. On the other
hand, the petitioners also failed to explain and prove by competent evidence just exactly how
such protective regulation would result in the restraint of trade.

Since all the regulatory provisions under the Milk Code apply equally to both manufacturers
and distributors, the Court sees no harm in the RIRR. Except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the
rest of the provisions of the RIRR are in consonance with the objective, purpose and intent of
the Milk Code.

KNIGHTS OF RIZAL V. DMCI, GR 213948, APRIL 25, 2017;

Facts
DMCI started construction of Torre De Manila Condominium, after it was issued Building
permit by the City Of Manila Office allowing it to build a 49 Storey with Basement & 2
penthouse Level Residential Conduminium.
However the City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 121 enjoining the Office of the
Building Official to temporarily suspend the Building Permit og DMC citing among others, that
“the Torre de Manila Condominium, based on their development plans, upon completion, will
rise up high above the back of the national monument, to clearly dwarf the statue of our hero,
and with such towering heights, would certainly ruin the line of sight of the Rizal Shrine from
the frontal Roxas Boulevard vantage point.”
 Building Official Melvin Q. Balagot then sought the opinion of the City of Manila’s City Legal
Officer on whether he is bound to comply with Resolution No. 121.8 In his letter dated 12
September 2012, City Legal Officer Renato G. Dela Cruz stated that there is “no legal
justification for the temporary suspension of the Building Permit issued in favor of [DMCI-
PDI]” since the construction “lies outside the Luneta Park” and is “simply too far to be a
repulsive distraction or have an objectionable effect on the artistic and historical significance”
of the Rizal Monument.9 He also pointed out that “there is no showing that the [area of]
subject property has been officially declared as an anthropological or archeological area.
Neither has it been categorically designate.
National Historical Commission of the Philippines Dr. Maria Serena I. Diokno maintained that
the Torre de Manila project site is outside the boundaries of the Rizal Park and well to the
rear of the Rizal Monument, and thus, cannot possibly obstruct the frontal view of the National
Monument.
On 26 November 2013, following an online petition against the Torre de Manila project that
garnered about 7,800 signatures, the City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 146,
reiterating its directive in Resolution No. 121 enjoining the City of Manila’s building officials
to temporarily suspend DMCI-PDI’s Building Permit.
Manila Zoning Board of Adjustments and Appeals (MZBAA) issued Zoning Board Resolution
No. 06, Series of 2013, recommending the approval of DMCI-PDI’s application for variance,
which was later on amended.
The City Council resolution later states that “the City Council of Manila find[s] no
cogent reason to deny and/or reverse the aforesaid recommendation of the
[MZBAA] and hereby ratifies] and confirm[s] all previously issued permits, licenses
and approvals issued by the City [Council] of Manila for Torre de Manila[.]”
On 12 September 2014, the Knights Of Rizal, a “civic, patriotic, cultural, non- partisan, non-
sectarian and non-profit organization”18 created under Republic Act No. 646,19 filed a Petition
for Injunction seeking a temporary restraining order, and later a permanent
injunction, against the construction of DMCI- PDI’s Torre de Manila condominium
project. The KOR argues that the subject matter of the present suit is one of
“transcendental importance, paramount public interest, of overarching significance
to society, or with far- reaching implication” involving the desecration of the Rizal
Monument.

Issues
1. Whether or not the Court can issue a writ of mandamus against the officials of the City of
Manila to stop the construction of DMCI-PDI’s Torre de Manila Project; and
2. Whether or not Torre De Manila is a nuisance per se.
Ruling
The petition for mandamus lacks merit and must be dismissed.
Mandamus does not lie against the City of Manila.
The Constitution states that “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law x x x.”61 It is a fundamental principle that no property shall be taken away
from an individual without due process, whether substantive or procedural. The dispossession
of property, or in this case the stoppage of the construction of a building in one’s own
property, would violate substantive due process.
The Rules on Civil Procedure are clear that mandamus only issues when there is a clear legal
duty imposed upon the office or the officer sought to be compelled to perform an act, and
when the party seeking mandamus has a clear legal right to the performance of such act.
In the present case, nowhere is it found in Ordinance No. 8119 or in any law, ordinance, or
rule for that matter, that the construction of a building outside the Rizal Park is prohibited if
the building is within the background sightline or view of the Rizal Monument. Thus, there is
no legal duty on the part of the City of Manila “to consider,” in the words of the Dissenting
Opinion, “the standards set under Ordinance No. 8119” in relation to the applications of
DMCI-PDI for the Torre de Manila since under the ordinance these standards can never be
applied outside the boundaries of Rizal Park. While the Rizal Park has been declared a
National Historical Site, the area where Torre de Manila is being built is a privately-owned
property that is “not part of the Rizal Park that has been declared as a National Heritage Site
in 1995,” and the Torre de Manila area is in fact “well-beyond” the Rizal Park, according to
NHCP Chairperson Dr. Maria Serena I. Diokno.62 Neither has the area of the Torre de Manila
been designated as a “heritage zone, a cultural property, a historical landmark or even a
national treasure.”63
Also, to declare that the City of Manila failed to consider the standards under Ordinance No.
8119 would involve making a finding of fact. A finding of fact requires notice, hearing, and
the submission of evidence to ascertain compliance with the law or regulation. In such a case,
it is the Regional Trial Court which has the jurisdiction to hear the case, receive evidence,
make a proper finding of fact, and determine whether the Torre de Manila project properly
complied with the standards set by the ordinance. In Meralco v. Public Service
Commission,64 we held that it is the cardinal right of a party in trials and administrative
proceedings to be heard, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present
his own case and submit evidence in support thereof and to have such evidence presented
considered by the proper court or tribunal.
To compel the City of Manila to consider the standards under Ordinance No. 8119 to the Torre
de Manila project will be an empty exercise since these standards cannot apply outside of the
Rizal Park- and the Torre de Manila is outside the Rizal Park. Mandamus will lie only if the
officials of the City of Manila have a ministerial duty to consider these standards to
buildings outside of the Rizal Park. There can be no such ministerial duty because
these standards are not applicable to buildings outside of the Rizal Park.
The KOR also invokes this Court’s exercise of its extraordinary certiorari power of review
under Section 1, Article VIII65 of the Constitution. However, this Court can only exercise its
extraordinary certiorari power if the City of Manila, in issuing the required permits and
licenses, gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Tellingly, neither the majority nor minority opinion in this case has found that the City of
Manila committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the permits and licenses to DMCI-PDI.
Thus, there is no justification at all for this Court to exercise its extraordinary certiorari power.
Moreover, the exercise of this Court’s extraordinary certiorari power is limited to
actual cases and controversies that necessarily involve a violation of the
Constitution or the determination of the constitutionality or validity of a
governmental act or issuance. Specific violation of a statute that does not raise the issue
of constitutionality or validity of the statute cannot, as a rule, be the subject of the Court’s
direct exercise of its expanded certiorari power. Thus, the KOR’s recourse lies with other
judicial remedies or proceedings allowed under the Rules of Court.
In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical Centers
Association, Inc.,66 we held that in cases where the question of constitutionality of a
governmental action is raised, the judicial power that the courts exercise is likewise
identified as the power of judicial review– the power to review the constitutionality
of the actions of other branches of government. As a rule, as required by
the hierarchy of courts principle, these cases are filed with the lowest court with
jurisdiction over the subject matter. The judicial review that the courts undertake
requires:
1) there be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
2) the person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement;
3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
The lower court’s decision under the constitutional scheme reaches the Supreme Court
through the appeal process, through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
In the present case, the KOR elevated this case immediately to this Court in an original
petition for injunction which we later on treated as one for mandamus under Rule 65. There
is, however, no clear legal duty on the City of Manila to consider the provisions of Ordinance
No. 8119 for applications for permits to build outside the protected areas of the Rizal Park.
Even if there were such legal duty, the determination of whether the City of Manila failed to
abide by this legal duty would involve factual matters which have not been admitted or
established in this case. Establishing factual matters is not within the realm of this Court.
Findings of fact are the province of the trial courts.
There is no standard in Ordinance No. 8119 for defining or determining the background
sightline that is supposed to be protected or that is part of the “physical integrity” of the Rizal
Monument. How far should a building like the Torre de Manila be from the Rizal Monument-
one, two, three, four, or five kilometers? Even the Solicitor General, during the Oral
Arguments, conceded that the ordinance does not prescribe how sightline is determined,
neither is there any way to measure by metes and bounds whether a construction that is not
part of the historic monument itself or is outside the protected area can be said to
violate the Rizal Monument’s physical integrity, except only to say “when you stand in front
of the Rizal Monument, there can be no doubt that your view is marred and impaired.” This
kind of a standard has no parameters and can include a sightline or a construction as far as
the human eyes can see when standing in front of the Rizal Monument. Obviously, this Court
cannot apply such a subjective and non-uniform standard that adversely affects property
rights several kilometers away from a historical sight or facility.
The Dissenting Opinion claims that “the City, by reason of a mistaken or erroneous
construction of its own Ordinance, had failed to consider its duties under [Ordinance No. 8119]
when it issued permits in DMCI-PDI’s favor.” However, MZBAA Zoning Board Resolution Nos.
06 and 06-A67easily dispel this claim. According to the resolutions, the City of Manila, through
the MZBAA, acted on DMCI-PDI’s application for variance under the powers and standards set
forth in Ordinance No. 8119.
Without further proof that the MZBAA acted whimsically, capriciously, or arbitrarily in issuing
said resolution, the Court should respect MZBAA’s exercise of discretion. The Court cannot
“substitute its judgment for that of said officials who are in a better position to consider and
weigh the same in the light of the authority specifically vested in them by law.” 68 Since the
Court has “no supervisory power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative
departments of the government,” it “should not generally interfere with purely administrative
and discretionary functions.”69 The power of the Court in mandamus petitions does not extend
“to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction
or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either”70
Still, the Dissenting Opinion insists on directing the re-evaluation by the City of Manila,
through the CPDO, of the permits previously issued in favor of the Torre de Manila project to
determine compliance with the standards under Ordinance No. 8119. It also declares that the
circumstances in this case warrant the pro hac vice conversion of the proceedings in the
issuance of the permits into a “contested case” necessitating notice and hearing with all the
parties involved.
Pro hac vice means a specific decision does not constitute a precedent because the decision
is for the specific case only, not to be followed in other cases. A pro hac vice decision violates
statutory law- Article 8 of the Civil Code- which states that “judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.”
The decision of the Court in this case cannot be pro hac vice because by mandate of the
law every decision of the Court forms part of the legal system of the Philippines. If another
case comes up with the same facts as the present case, that case must be decided in the
same way as this case to comply with the constitutional mandate of equal protection of the
law. Thus, a pro hac vice decision also violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
It is the policy of the courts not to interfere with the discretionary executive acts of the
executive branch unless there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. And subject to well-settled exceptions, mandamus does not lie
against the legislative and executive branches or their members acting in the exercise of their
official ministerial functions. This emanates from the respect accorded by the judiciary to said
branches as co-equal entities under the principle of separation of powers.
In De Castro v. Salas,71 we held that no rule of law is better established than the one that
provides that mandamus will not issue to control the discretion of an officer or a court when
honestly exercised and when such power and authority is not abused.
In exceptional cases, the Court has granted a prayer for mandamus to compel action in
matters involving judgment and discretion, only “to act, but not to act one way or the
other,”72 and only in cases where there has been a clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority.73
In this case, there can be no determination by this Court that the City of Manila had been
negligent or remiss in its duty under Ordinance No. 8119 considering that this determination
will involve questions of fact. DMCI- PDI had been issued the proper permits and had secured
all approvals and licenses months before the actual construction began. Even the KOR could
not point to any law that respondent City of Manila had violated and could only point to
declarations of policies by the NHCP and the Venice Charter which do not constitute clear legal
bases for the issuance of a writ of mandamus.
The Venice Charter is merely a codification of guiding principles for the preservation and
restoration of ancient monuments, sites, and buildings. It brings together principles in the
field of historical conservation and restoration that have been developed, agreed upon, and
and laid down by experts over the years. Each country, however, remains “responsible for
applying the plan within the framework of its own culture and traditions.”74
The Venice Charter is not a treaty and therefore does not become enforceable as law. The
Philippines is not legally bound to follow its directive, as in fact, these are not directives but
mere guidelines- a set of the best practices and techniques that have been proven over the
years to be the most effective in preserving and restoring historical monuments, sites and
buildings.
The City of Manila concedes that DMCI-PDI’s Zoning Permit was granted without going
through the process under Ordinance No. 8119. However, the same was properly rectified
when, faced with mounting opposition, DMCI-PDI itself sought clarification from the City of
Manila and immediately began complying with the procedure for applying for a variance. The
MZBAA did subsequently recommend the approval of the variance and the City Council of
Manila approved the same, ratifying the licenses and permits already given to DMCI-PDI.
Such ratification was well within the right of the City Council of Manila. The City Council of
Manila could have denied the application had it seen any reason to do so. Again, the
ratification is a function of the City Council of Manila, an exercise of its discretion and well
within the authority granted it by law and the City’s own Ordinance No. 8119.
The main purpose of zoning is the protection of public safety, health, convenience,
and welfare. There is no indication that the Torre de Manila project brings any harm,
danger, or hazard to the people in the surrounding areas except that the building
allegedly poses an unsightly view on the taking of photos or the visual appreciation
of the Rizal Monument by locals and tourists. In fact, the Court must take the approval
of the MZBAA, and its subsequent ratification by the City Council of Manila, as the duly
authorized exercise of discretion by the city officials. Great care must be taken that the Court
does not unduly tread upon the local government’s performance of its duties. It is not for this
Court to dictate upon the other branches of the government how their discretion must be
exercised so long as these branches do not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
 Likewise, any violation of Ordinance No. 8119 must be determined in the proper case and
before the proper forum. It is not within the power of this Court in this case to make such
determination. Without such determination, this Court cannot simply declare that the City of
Manila had failed to consider its duties under Ordinance No. 8119 when it issued the permits
in DMCI-PDI’s favor without making a finding of fact how the City of Manila failed “to consider”
its duties with respect to areas outside the boundaries of the Rizal Park. In the first place, this
Court has no jurisdiction to make findings of fact in an original action like this before this
Court. Moreover, the City of Manila could not legally apply standards to sites outside the area
covered by the ordinance that prescribed the standards. With this, taken in light of the lack
of finding that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the City of Manila, there is
no basis to issue the writ of mandamus against the City of Manila.

3. Torre de Manila is Not a Nuisance Per Se.

In its petition, the KOR claims that the Torre de Manila is a nuisance per’ se that deserves to
be summarily abated even without judicial proceedings.87 However, during the Oral
Arguments, counsel for the KOR argued that the KOR now believes that the Torre de Manila
is a nuisance per accidens and not a nuisance per se.88
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment,
business, condition of property, or anything else which: (1) injures or endangers
the health or safety of others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies
or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage
of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or impairs the
use of property.
The Court recognizes two kinds of nuisances. The first, nuisance per se, is one “recognized as
a nuisance under any and all circumstances, because it constitutes a direct menace to public
health or safety, and, for that reason, may be abated summarily under the undefined law of
necessity.”89 The second, nuisance per accidens, is that which “depends upon certain
conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated
without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing in law
constitutes a nuisance.”90
It can easily be gleaned that the Torre de Manila is not a nuisance per se. The Torre de Manila
project cannot be considered as a “direct menace to public health or safety.” Not only is a
condominium project commonplace in the City of Manila, DMCI-PDI has, according to the
proper government agencies, complied with health and safety standards set by law. DMCI-
PDI has been granted the following permits and clearances prior to starting the project: (1)
Height Clearance Permit from the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines; 91 (2)
Development Permit from the HLURB; 92 (3) Zoning Certification from the HLURB;93 (4)
Certificate of Environmental Compliance Commitment from the Environment Management
Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources; 94 (5) Barangay
Clearance;95 (6) Zoning Permit;96 (7) Building Permit;97 (8) and Electrical and Mechanical
Permit.98
Later, DMCI-PDI also obtained the right to build under a variance recommended by the MZBAA
and granted by the City Council of Manila. Thus, there can be no doubt that the Torre de
Manila project is not a nuisance per se.
On the other hand, the KOR now claims that the Torre de Manila is a nuisance per accidens.
By definition, a nuisance per accidens is determined based on its surrounding conditions and
circumstances. These conditions and circumstances must be well established, not merely
alleged. The Court cannot simply accept these conditions and circumstances as established
facts as the KOR would have us do in this case. 99 The KOR itself concedes that the question
of whether the Torre de Manila is a nuisance per accidens is a question of fact.100
The authority to decide when a nuisance exists is an authority to find facts, to estimate their
force, and to apply rules of law to the case thus made. 101 This Court is no such authority. It
is not a trier of facts. It cannot simply take the allegations in the petition and accept these as
facts, more so in this case where these allegations are contested by the respondents.
The task to receive and evaluate evidence is lodged with the trial courts. The question, then,
of whether the Torre de Manila project is a nuisance per accidens must be settled after due
proceedings brought before the proper Regional Trial Court. The KOR cannot circumvent the
process in the guise of protecting national culture and heritage.
The TRO must be lifted.
Injunctive reliefs are meant to preserve substantive rights and prevent further
injury102 until final adjudication on the merits of the case. In the present case, since
the legal rights of the KOR are not well-defined, clear, and certain, the petition for
mandamus must be dismissed and the TRO lifted.
The general rule is that courts will not disturb the findings of administrative agencies when
they are supported by substantial evidence. In this case, DMCI-PDI already acquired vested
rights in the various permits, licenses, or even variances it had applied for in order to build a
49-storey building which is, and had been, allowed by the City of Manila’s zoning ordinance.
As we have time and again held, courts generally hesitate to review discretionary decisions
or actions of administrative agencies in the absence of proof that such decisions or actions
were arrived at with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In JRS Business Corp. v. Montesa,103 we held that mandamus is the proper remedy if it could
be shown that there was neglect on the part of a tribunal in the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty, or there was an unlawful exclusion of a party from the
use and enjoyment of a right to which he is clearly entitled. Only specific legal rights may be
enforced by mandamus if they are clear and certain. If the legal rights of the petitioner are
not well-defined, definite, clear, and certain,104 the petition must be dismissed. Stated
otherwise, the writ never issues in doubtful cases. It neither confers powers nor imposes
duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty
already imposed.105
In sum, bearing in mind the Court does not intervene in discretionary acts of the executive
department in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, 106 and considering that mandamus
may only be issued to enforce a clear and certain legal right,107 the present special civil action
for mandamus must be dismissed and the TRO issued earlier must be lifted.

There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de Manila.

In Manila Electric Company v. Public Service Commission,53 the Court held that “what is not
expressly or impliedly prohibited by law may be done, except when the act is
contrary to morals, customs and public order.” This principle is fundamental in a
democratic society, to protect the weak against the strong, the minority against the majority,
and the individual citizen against the government. In essence, this principle, which is the
foundation of a civilized society under the rule of law, prescribes that the freedom to act can
be curtailed only through law. Without this principle, the rights, freedoms, and civil liberties
of citizens can be arbitrarily and whimsically trampled upon by the shifting passions of those
who can shout the loudest, or those who can gather the biggest crowd or the most number
of Internet trolls. In other instances,54the Court has allowed or upheld actions that were not
expressly prohibited by statutes when it determined that these acts were not contrary to
morals, customs, and public order, or that upholding the same would lead to a more equitable
solution to the controversy. However, it is the law itself- Articles 130655 and 1409(1 )56 of the
Civil Code- which prescribes that acts not contrary to morals, good customs, public order, or
public policy are allowed if also not contrary to law.

In this case, there is no allegation or proof that the Torre de Manila project is “contrary to
morals, customs, and public order” or that it brings harm, danger, or hazard to the
community. On the contrary, the City of Manila has determined that DMCI-PDI complied with
 the standards set under the pertinent laws and local ordinances to construct its Torre de
Manila project.
There is one fact that is crystal clear in this case. There is no law prohibiting the construction
of the Torre de Manila due to its effect on the background “view, vista, sightline, or setting”
of the Rizal Monument.
Zoning, as well as land use, in the City of Manila is governed by Ordinance No. 8119. The
ordinance provides for standards and guidelines to regulate development projects of historic
sites and facilities within the City of Manila.
Specifically, Section 47 reads:
SEC. 47. Historical Preservation and Conservation Standards.- Historic sites and facilities shall
be conserved and preserved. These shall, to the extent possible, be made accessible for the
educational and cultural enrichment of the general public.
The following shall guide the development of historic sites and facilities:
1. Sites with historic buildings or places shall be developed to conserve and enhance their
heritage values.
2. Historic sites and facilities shall be adaptively re-used.
3. Any person who proposes to add, to alter, or partially demolish a designated heritage property
will require the approval of the City Planning and Development Office (CPDO) and shall be
required to prepare a heritage impact statement that will demonstrate to the satisfaction of
CPDO that the proposal will not adversely impact the heritage significance of the property and
shall submit plans for review by the CPDO in coordination with the National Historical Institute
(NHI).
4. Any proposed alteration and/or re-use of designated heritage properties shall be evaluated
based on criteria established by the heritage significance of the particular property or site.
5. Where an owner of a heritage property applies for approval to demolish a designated heritage
property or properties, the owner shall be required to provide evidence to satisfaction that
demonstrates that rehabilitation and re-use of the property is not viable.
6. Any designated heritage property which is to be demolished or significantly altered shall be
thoroughly documented for archival purposes with a history, photographic records, and
measured drawings, in accordance with accepted heritage recording guidelines, prior to
demolition or alteration.
7. Residential and commercial infill in heritage areas will be sensitive to the existing scale and
pattern of those areas, which maintains the existing landscape and streetscape qualities of
those areas, and which does not result in the loss of any heritage resources.
8. Development plans shall ensure that parking facilities (surface lots, residential garages,
stand-alone parking garages and parking components as parts of larger developments) are
compatibly integrated into heritage areas, and/or are compatible with adjacent heritage
resources.
9. Local utility companies (hydro, gas, telephone, cable) shall be required to place metering
equipment, transformer boxes, power lines, conduit, equipment boxes, piping, wireless
telecommunication towers and other utility equipment and devices in locations which do not
detract from the visual character of heritage resources, and which do not have a negative
impact on its architectural integrity.
10. Design review approval shall be secured from the CPDO for any alteration of the heritage
property to ensure that design guidelines and standards are met and shall promote
preservation and conservation of the heritage property. (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear that the standards laid down in Section 47 of Ordinance No. 8119 only serve as
guides, as it expressly states that “the following shall guide the development of historic sites
and facilities.” A guide simply sets a direction or gives an instruction to be followed by property
owners and developers in order to conserve and enhance a property’s heritage values.
On the other hand, Section 48 states:
SEC. 48. Site Performance Standards.- The City considers it in the public interest that all
projects are designed and developed in a safe, efficient and aesthetically pleasing manner.
 Site development shall consider the environmental character and limitations of the site and
its adjacent properties. All project elements shall be in complete harmony according to good
design principles and the subsequent development must be visually pleasing as well as
efficiently functioning especially in relation to the adjacent properties and bordering streets.
The design, construction, operation and maintenance of every facility shall be in harmony
with the existing and intended character of its neighborhood. It shall not change the essential
character of the said area but will be a substantial improvement to the value of the properties
in the neighborhood in particular and the community in general.
Furthermore, designs should consider the following:
1. Sites, buildings and facilities shall be designed and developed with regard to safety, efficiency
and high standards of design. The natural environmental character of the site and its adjacent
properties shall be considered in the site development of each building and facility.
2. The height and bulk of buildings and structures shall be so designed that it does not impair
the entry of light and ventilation, cause the loss of privacy and/or create nuisances, hazards
or inconveniences to adjacent developments.
3. Abutments to adjacent properties shall not be allowed without the neighbor’s prior written
consent which shall be required by the City Planning and Development Office (CPDO) prior to
the granting of a Zoning Permit (Locational Clearance).
4. The capacity of parking areas/ lots shall be per the minimum requirements of the National
Building Code. These shall be located, developed and landscaped in order to enhance the
aesthetic quality of the facility. In no case, shall parking areas/ lots encroach into street
rights-of- way and shall follow the Traffic Code as set by the City.
5. Developments that attract a significant volume of public modes of transportation, such as
tricycles, jeepneys, buses, etc., shall provide on-site parking for the same. These shall also
provide vehicular loading and unloading bays so as street traffic flow will not be impeded.
6. Buffers, silencers, mufflers, enclosures and other noise-absorbing materials shall be provided
to all noise and vibration-producing machinery. Noise levels shall be maintained according to
levels specified in DENR DAO No. 30- Abatement of Noise and Other Forms of Nuisance as
Defined by Law.
7. Glare and heat from any operation or activity shall not be radiated, seen or felt from any point
beyond the limits of the property.
8. No large commercial signage and/or pylon, which will be detrimental to the skyline,
shall be allowed.
9. Design guidelines, deeds of restriction, property management plans and other regulatory tools
that will ensure high quality developments shall be required from developers of commercial
subdivisions and condominiums. These shall be submitted to the City Planning and
Development Office (CPDO) for review and approval. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 47 of Ordinance No. 8119 specifically regulates the “development of historic sites
and facilities.” Section 48 regulates “large commercial signage and/or pylon.” There is
nothing in Sections 47 and 48 of Ordinance No. 8119 that disallows the construction of
a building outside the boundaries of a historic site or facility, where such building may
affect the background of a historic site. In this case, the Torre de Manila stands 870 meters
outside and to the rear of the Rizal Monument and “cannot possibly obstruct the front view of
the [Rizal] Monument.”57Likewise, the Torre de Manila is not in an area that has been declared
as an “anthropological or archeological area” or in an area designated as a heritage zone,
cultural property, historical landmark, or a national treasure by the NHCP.58
Section 15, Article XIV of the Constitution, which deals with the subject of arts and culture,
provides that “[t]he State shall conserve, promote and popularize the nation’s historical and
cultural heritage and resources x x x.” Since this provision is not self-executory, Congress
passed laws dealing with the preservation and conservation of our cultural heritage.
One such law is Republic Act No. 10066,59 or the National Cultural Heritage Act of 2009, which
empowers the National Commission for Culture and the Arts and other cultural agencies to
issue a cease and desist order “when the physical integrity of the national cultural treasures
or important cultural properties [is] found to be in danger of destruction or significant
alteration from its original state.”60 This law declares that the State should protect the
“physical integrity” of the heritage property or building if there is “danger of destruction or
significant alteration from its original state.” Physical integrity refers to the structure
itself- how strong and sound the structure is. The same law does not mention that
another project, building, or property, not itself a heritage property or building, may be the
subject of a cease and desist order when it adversely affects the background view, vista, or
sightline of a heritage property or building. Thus, Republic Act No. 10066 cannot apply to the
Torre de Manila condominium project.

A FINAL WORD
It had been Rizal’s wish to die facing the rising sun. In his Mi Ultimo Adios, the poem he left
for his family the night before he was executed, Rizal wrote:
Yo muero cuando veo que el cielo se colora Y al fin anuncia el dia tras lobrego capuz108
[Ako y mamamatay, ngayong namamalas na sa Silanganan ay namamanaag yaong
maligayang araw na sisikat sa likod ng luksang nagtabing na ulap.]109
[I die just when I see the dawn break, Through the gloom of night, to herald the day] 110
Yet at the point of his execution, he was made to stand facing West towards Manila Bay, with
his back to the firing squad, like the traitor the colonial government wished to portray him.
He asked to face his executioners, facing the East where the sun would be rising since it was
early morning, but the Spanish captain did not allow it. As he was shot and a single bullet
struck his frail body, Rizal forced himself, with his last remaining strength, to turn around to
face the East and thus he fell on his back with his face to the sky and the rising sun. Then,
the Spanish captain approached Rizal and finished him off with one pistol shot to his head.
Before his death, Rizal wrote a letter to his family. He asked for a simple tomb, marked with
a cross and a stone with only his name and the date of his birth and death; no anniversary
celebrations; and interment at Paang Bundok (now, the Manila North Cemetery). Rizal never
wanted his grave to be a burden to future generations.
The letter never made it to his family and his wishes were not carried out. The letter was
discovered many years later, in 1953. By then, his remains had been entombed at the Rizal
Monument, countless anniversaries had been celebrated, with memorials and monuments
built throughout the world.
Rizal’s wish was unmistakable: to be buried without pomp or pageantry, to the point of
reaching oblivion or obscurity in the future.111 For Rizal’s life was never about fame or
vainglory, but for the country he loved dearly and for which he gave up his life.
The Rizal Monument is expressly against Rizal’s own wishes. That Rizal’s statue now stands
facing West towards Manila Bay, with Rizal’s back to the East, adds salt to the wound. If we
continue the present orientation of Rizal’s statue, with Rizal facing West, we would be like the
Spanish captain who refused Rizal’s request to die facing the rising sun in the East. On the
other hand, if Rizal’s statue is made to face East, as Rizal had desired when he was about to
be shot, the background- the blue sky above Manila Bay- would forever be clear of
obstruction, and we would be faithful to Rizal’s dying wish.
WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Temporary
Restraining Order issued by the Court on 16 June 2015 is LIFTED effective immediately.
SO ORDERED.

ADHERENCE TO PEACE, FREEDOM, AMITY

SEC. 3. CIVILIAN SUPREMACY:

IBP v. Zamora, GR 141284, August 15, 2000;
FACTS: At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of
a temporary restraining order seeking to nullity on constitutional grounds the order of
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines (the
Marines) to join the Philippine National Police (the "PNP") in visibility patrols around the
metropolis. Formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000 1 (the "LOI") which detailed the
manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted.
2 Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila
through a sustained street patrolling to minimize or eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes
especially those perpetrated by organized crime syndicates whose members include those
that are well-trained, disciplined and well-armed active or former PNP/Military personnel.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the deployment of soldiers for law enforcement is in derogation of Article 2,
Section 3 of the Constitution;
2. Whether the deployment constitutes incursion in a civilian function of law enforcement;
3. Whether the deployment creates a dangerous tendency to rely on the military to perform
civilian functions of the government
4. Whether the deployment gives more power to the military than what it should be under
the Constitution.

The issues raised in the present petition are: (1) Whether or not petitioner has legal standing;
(2) Whether or not the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed
forces is subject to judicial review, and, (3) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to
assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian
supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP.

Held: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

Ratio: The question of deployment of the Marines is not proper for judicial scrutiny since the
same involves a political question; that the organization and conduct of police visibility patrols,
which feature the team-up of one police officer and one Philippine Marine soldier, does not
violate the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.

In view of standing
Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus
standi The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing
more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case.

National President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his alone, absent a formal board
resolution authorizing him to file the present action. Indeed, none of its members, whom the
IBP purportedly represents, has sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of
the joint visibility patrols.

Nevertheless, the Court does not automatically assume jurisdiction over actual constitutional
cases brought before it even in instances that are ripe for resolution. One class of cases
wherein the Court hesitates to rule on are ''political questions." The reason is that political
questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a
particular act or measure being assailed. Moreover, the political question being a function of
the separation of powers, the courts will not normally interfere with the workings of another
co-equal branch unless the case shows a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the
law and the Constitution.

In view of abuse of discretion

The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines.

President as stated in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, specifically, the power to call
out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Calling
the armed forces is not proper for judicial scrutiny since it involves a political question and
the resolution of factual issues which are beyond the review powers of this Court.

By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment

that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. When the
President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion,
he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom.

In view of burden of proof on factual basis

It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President's decision is totally bereft of
factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence
to support the assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the armed forces. There
is, likewise, no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because
the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on
civilian supremacy over the military.

The present petition is anchored on fear that once the armed forces are deployed, the military
will gain ascendancy, and thus place in peril our cherished liberties. Indeed, whether it is the
calling out of the armed forces alone in order to suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion or also the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the
proclamation of martial law (in case of invasion or rebellion), the exercise of the President's
powers as commander-in-chief, requires proof — not mere assertion. 4 As has been pointed
out, "Standing is not 'an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable' . . . but requires . .
. a factual showing of perceptible harm."

Because of the absence of such record evidence, we are left to guess or even speculate on
these questions. Thus, at one point, the majority opinion says that what is involved here is
not even the calling out of the armed forces but only the use of marines for law enforcement.
We need to have evidence on these questions because, under the Constitution, the President's
power to call out the armed forces in order to suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion
is subject to the limitation that the exercise of this power is required in the interest of public
safety.

Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions
must concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion or rebellion and, (2) public safety must
require it. These conditions are not required in the case of the power to call out the armed
forces. The only criterion is that "whenever it becomes necessary," the President may call the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." The implication
is that the President is given full discretion and wide latitude in the exercise of the power to
call as compared to the two other powers.

In view of the Courts concurrence

We do not doubt the veracity of the President's assessment of the situation, especially in the
light of present developments. The Court takes judicial notice of the recent bombings
perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls, public utilities, and other public places.
These are among the areas of deployment described in the LOI 2000. The deployment of the
Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the
Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement.
Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol
procedures. 38 It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines.

Considering the above circumstances, the Marines render nothing more than assistance
required in conducting the patrols. As such, there can be no "insidious incursion" of the
military in civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the
Constitution.

Political questions are defined as "those questions which under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government." 2 They
have two aspects: (1) those matters that are to be exercised by the people in their primary
political capacity and (2) matters which have been specifically delegated to some other
department or particular office of the government, with discretionary power to act. 3 The
exercise of the discretionary power of the legislative or executive branch of government was
often the area where the Court had to wrestle with the political question doctrine.

ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES;

SEC. 4. DUTY OF GOVERNMENT TO THE PEOPLE:
SEC. 5. MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND ORDER:
KILOSBAYAN V. MORATO – 246 SCRA 540 [1995] AND MR – 250 SCRA 130;
SEC. 6. SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE;
SEC. 7. INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY:
LIM V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SUPRA. SEC. 2;
FACTS: Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) signed in 1999, personnel from the
armed forces of the United States of America started arriving in Mindanao to take partin
"Balikatan 02-1” on January 2002. The Balikatan 02-1 exercises involves the simulation of
joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense
agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951. The exercise is
rooted from the international anti-terrorism campaign declared by President George W. Bush
in reaction to the 3 commercial aircrafts hijacking that smashed into twin towers of the World
Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon building in Washington, D.C. allegedly by
the al-Qaeda headed by the Osama bin Laden that occurred on September 11, 2001. Arthur
D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise. Partylists Sanlakas and
Partido Ng Manggagawa as residents of Zamboanga and Sulu directly affected by the
operations filed a petition-in-intervention.

The Solicitor General commented the prematurity of the action as it is based only on a fear
of future violation of the Terms of Reference and impropriety of availing of certiorari to
ascertain a question of fact specifically interpretation of the VFA whether it is covers "Balikatan
02-1” and no question of constitutionality is involved. Moreover, there is lack of locus standi
since it does not involve tax spending and there is no proof of direct personal injury.

ISSUE: W/N the petition and the petition-in-intervention should prosper?

HELD:
No, Petition and the petition-in-intervention are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the
filing of a new petition sufficient in form and substance in the proper Regional Trial Court -
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts

Doctrine of Importance to the Public:

Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the
Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of
the government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws that
they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities
of procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition.

Although courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question based on the
doctrine of separation of powers, which enjoins upon the department of the government a
becoming respect for each other's act, this Court nevertheless resolves to take cognizance of
the instant petition.

Interpretation of Treaty:
The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in "activities,"
the exact meaning of which was left undefined. The expression is ambiguous, permitting a
wide scope of undertakings subject only to the approval of the Philippine government. The
sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that United States
personnel must "abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and
in particular, from any political activity." All other activities, in other words, are fair game.

To aid in this, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 31 SECTION 3 and Article
32 contains provisos governing interpretations of international agreements. It is clear from
the foregoing that the cardinal rule of interpretation must involve an examination of the text,
which is presumed to verbalize the parties' intentions. The Convention likewise dictates what
may be used as aids to deduce the meaning of terms, which it refers to as the context of the
treaty, as well as other elements may be taken into account alongside the aforesaid
context. According to Professor Briggs, writer on the Convention, the distinction between the
general rule of interpretation and the supplementary means of interpretation is intended
rather to ensure that the supplementary means do not constitute an alternative, autonomous
method of interpretation divorced from the general rule.

The meaning of the word “activities" was deliberately made that way to give both parties a
certain leeway in negotiation. Thus, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan
exercises. Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the
conclusion that combat-related activities -as opposed to combat itself -such as the one subject
of the instant petition, are indeed authorized.

The Terms of Reference are explicit enough. Paragraph 8 of section I stipulates that US
exercise participants may not engage in combat "except in self-defense." ." The indirect
violation is actually petitioners' worry, that in reality, "Balikatan 02-1" is actually a war
principally conducted by the United States government, and that the provision on self-defense
serves only as camouflage to conceal the true nature of the exercise. A clear pronouncement
on this matter thereby becomes crucial. In our considered opinion, neither the MDT nor the
VFA allow foreign troops to engage in an offensive war on Philippine territory. Under the
salutary proscription stated in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Both the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement, as in all other treaties
and international agreements to which the Philippines is a party, must be read in the context
of the 1987 Constitution especially Sec. 2, 7 and 8 of Article 2: Declaration of Principles and
State Policies in this case. The Constitution also regulates the foreign relations powers of the
Chief Executive when it provides that "[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid
and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the
Senate." Even more pointedly Sec. 25 on Transitory Provisions which shows antipathy
towards foreign military presence in the country, or of foreign influence in general. Hence,
foreign troops are allowed entry into the Philippines only by way of direct exception.

International Law vs. Fundamental Law and Municipal Laws:

Conflict arises then between the fundamental law and our obligations arising from
international agreements.

Philip Morris, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: “Withal, the fact that international law has been made
part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over
national law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most
countries, rules of international law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national
legislation.”

From the perspective of public international law, a treaty is favored over municipal law
pursuant to the principle of pacta sunt servanda. Hence, "[e]very treaty in force is binding
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith." Further, a party to a
treaty is not allowed to "invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure
to perform a treaty."

Our Constitution espouses the opposing view as stated in section 5 of Article VIII: “The
Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules
of Court may provide, final judgments and order of lower courts in:
(A) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
is in question.”

Ichong v. Hernandez: “provisions of a treaty are always subject to qualification or amendment

by a subsequent law, or that it is subject to the police power of the State”
Gonzales v. Hechanova: “our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only
when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of
Congress.”
The foregoing premises leave us no doubt that US forces are prohibited / from engaging in
an offensive war on Philippine territory.

SAGUISAG V. EXEC. SECRETARY, SUPRA. SEC. 2;

SEC. 8. FREEDOM FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS:
BAYAN V. ZAMORA, SUPRA. SEC. 2
ACTS:

The Philippines and the United States entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30,
1951, To further strengthen their defense and security relationship. Under the treaty, the
parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public
vessels, and aircraft.

On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended the presence of
US military bases in the Philippines.

On July 18, 1997 RP and US exchanged notes and discussed, among other things, the possible
elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).This resulted to a series of conferences and
negotiations which culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos
approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and United States
Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.

On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign

Affairs, ratified the VFA. On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent
Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of the
Philippines,the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA, for
concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

Petitions for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners – as legislators, non-governmental

organizations, citizens and taxpayers – assail the constitutionality of the VFA and impute to
herein respondents grave abuse of discretion in ratifying the agreement.

Petitioner contends, under they provision cited, the “foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities” may be allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently
met: a) it must be a treaty,b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority
of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by congress,
and c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.

Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what
is requires for such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds
of all the members of the senate.

ISSUES AND RULING:

1. Issue 1: Do the Petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or

legislators to question the constitutionality of the VFA?

NO. Petitioners Bayan Muna, etc. have no standing. A party bringing a suit challenging the
Constitutionality of a law must show not only that the law is invalid, but that he has sustained
or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and
not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. Petitioners have failed to show
that they are in any danger of direct injury as a result of the VFA.

As taxpayers, they have failed to establish that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress of
its taxing or spending powers. A taxpayer's suit refers to a case where the act complained of
directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. Before he can
invoke the power of judicial review, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest
in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a
direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not
sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public. Clearly,
inasmuch as no public funds raised by taxation are involved in this case, and in the absence
of any allegation by petitioners that public funds are being misspent or illegally expended,
petitioners, as taxpayers, have no legal standing to assail the legality of the VFA.

Similarly, the petitioner-legislators (Tanada, Arroyo, etc.) do not possess the requisite locus
standi to sue. In the absence of a clear showing of any direct injury to their person or to the
institution to which they belong, they cannot sue. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
is also stripped of standing in these cases. The IBP lacks the legal capacity to bring this suit
in the absence of a board resolution from its Board of Governors authorizing its National
President to commence the present action.

Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the constitutional significance of

the issues raised, the Court may brush aside the procedural barrier and takes cognizance of
the petitions.

2. Issue 2: Is the VFA governed by section 21, Art. VII, or section 25, Art. XVIII of the
Constitution?

Section 25, Art XVIII, not section 21, Art. VII, applies, as the VFA involves the presence of
foreign military troops in the Philippines.

The Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on treaties
or international agreements.

Section 21, Article VII reads: “[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.”

Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:”[a]fter the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between
the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases,
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under
a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a
majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.”

Section 21, Article VII deals with treaties or international agreements in general, in which
case, the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate is required
to make the treaty valid and binding to the Philippines. This provision lays down the general
rule on treaties. All treaties, regardless of subject matter, coverage, or particular designation
or appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective. In contrast,
Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties which involve the
presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. Under this provision,
the concurrence of the Senate is only one of the requisites to render compliance with the
constitutional requirements and to consider the agreement binding on the Philippines. Sec 25
further requires that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities” may be allowed in the
Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate, ratified by a majority
of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by Congress,
and recognized as such by the other contracting state.
On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of US troops visiting the
Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and
further defines the rights of the US and RP government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction,
movement of vessel and aircraft, import and export of equipment, materials and supplies.
Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent,
however, the provisions of Section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to
determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate.

It is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is inapplicable to mere transient
agreements for the reason that there is no permanent placing of structure for the
establishment of a military base. The Constitution makes no distinction between “transient”
and “permanent”. We find nothing in Section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or
facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines. When no distinction is made
by law; the Court should not distinguish. We do not subscribe to the argument that Section
25, Article XVIII is not controlling since no foreign military bases, but merely foreign troops
and facilities, are involved in the VFA. The proscription covers “foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities.” Stated differently, this prohibition is not limited to the entry of troops and
facilities without any foreign bases being established. The clause does not refer to “foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities” collectively but treats them as separate and independent
subjects, such that three different situations are contemplated — a military treaty the subject
of which could be either (a) foreign bases, (b) foreign troops, or (c) foreign facilities — any
of the three standing alone places it under the coverage of Section 25, Article XVIII.

3. Issue 3: Was Sec 25 Art XVIII's requisites satisfied to make the VFA effective?

YES

Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country,
unless the following conditions are sufficiently met:
(a) it must be under a treaty;
(b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by Congress,
ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and
(c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.

There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The
concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the
Constitution, as there were at least 16 Senators that concurred.

As to condition (c), the Court held that the phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that the
other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the
US to submit the VFA to the US Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to
accord strict meaning to the phrase. Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in
the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should
be understood in the sense they have in common use.

The records reveal that the US Government, through Ambassador Hubbard, has stated that
the US has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the US accepts
or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its treaty
obligations, there is indeed compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.
Worth stressing too, is that the ratification by the President of the VFA, and the concurrence
of the Senate, should be taken as a clear and unequivocal expression of our nation's consent
to be bound by said treaty, with the concomitant duty to uphold the obligations and
responsibilities embodied thereunder. Ratification is generally held to be an executive act,
undertaken by the head of the state, through which the formal acceptance of the treaty is
proclaimed. A State may provide in its domestic legislation the process of ratification of a
treaty. In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly
believed, in the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its
consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.

With the ratification of the VFA it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part, under
principles of international law (pacta sunt servanda), to be bound by the terms of the
agreement. Thus, no less than Section 2, Article II declares that the Philippines adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres
to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.

SEC. 9. SOCIAL ORDER:

SEC. 10. SOCIAL JUSTICE:
SEC. 11. PERSONAL DIGNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
SEC. 12. FAMILY LIFE; MOTHER; UNBORN:

FAMILY

UNBORN

CASES:
ROE V. WADE – 410 US 113;

A pregnant single woman (Roe) brought a class action challenging the constitutionality of the
Texas criminal abortion laws, which proscribe procuring or attempting an abortion except on
medical advice for the purpose of saving the mother's life. A licensed physician (Hallford),
who had two state abortion prosecutions pending against him, was permitted to intervene. A
childless married couple (the Does), the wife not being pregnant, separately attacked the
laws, basing alleged injury on the future possibilities of contraceptive failure, pregnancy,
unpreparedness for parenthood, and impairment of the wife's health. A three-judge District
Court, which consolidated the actions, held that Roe and Hallford, and members of their
classes, had standing to sue and presented justiciable controversies. Ruling that declaratory,
though not injunctive, relief was warranted, the court declared the abortion statutes void as
vague and overbroadly infringing those plaintiffs' Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
The court ruled the Does' complaint not justiciable. Appellants directly appealed to this Court
on the injunctive rulings, and appellee cross-appealed from the District Court's grant of
declaratory relief to Roe and Hallford.

Held:

1. While 28 U.S.C. § 1253 authorizes no direct appeal to this Court from the grant or denial
of declaratory relief alone, review is not foreclosed when the case is properly before the Court
on appeal from specific denial of injunctive relief and the arguments as to both injunctive and
declaratory relief are necessarily identical. P. 123.

2. Roe has standing to sue; the Does and Hallford do not. Pp. 123-129.

(a) Contrary to appellee's contention, the natural termination of Roe's pregnancy did not moot
her suit. Litigation involving pregnancy, which is "capable of repetition, yet evading review,"
is an exception to the usual federal rule that an actual controversy

[114]

must exist at review stages, and not simply when the action is initiated. Pp. 124-125.
(b) The District Court correctly refused injunctive, but erred in granting declaratory, relief to
Hallford, who alleged no federally protected right not assertable as a defense against the good
faith state prosecutions pending against him. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U. S. 66. Pp. 125-127.

(c) The Does' complaint, based as it is on contingencies, any one or more of which may not
occur, is too speculative to present an actual case or controversy. Pp. 127-129.

3. State criminal abortion laws, like those involved here, that except from criminality only a
life-saving procedure on the mother's behalf without regard to the stage of her pregnancy
and other interests involved violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which protects against state action the right to privacy, including a woman's qualified right to
terminate her pregnancy. Though the State cannot override that right, it has legitimate
interests in protecting both the pregnant woman's health and the potentiality of human life,
each of which interests grows and reaches a "compelling" point at various stages of the
woman's approach to term. Pp. 147-164.

(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision
and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending
physician. Pp. 163, 164.

(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, the State, in
promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion
procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health. Pp. 163, 164.

(c) For the stage subsequent to viability the State, in promoting its interest in the potentiality
of human life, may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where
necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother. Pp. 163-164; 164-165.

4. The State may define the term "physician" to mean only a physician currently licensed by
the State, and may proscribe any abortion by a person who is not a physician as so defined.
P. 165.

5. It is unnecessary to decide the injunctive relief issue, since the Texas authorities will
doubtless fully recognize the Court's ruling

IMBONG V. OCHOA, GR 204819, APRIL 8, 2014;

FACTS:

Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354,
otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH
Law), challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court,
beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the
profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the
controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions-in-intervention.

The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional.
 ISSUES:

After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has
synthesized and refined them to the following principal issues:

1. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy.
1. Power of Judicial Review
2. Actual Case or Controversy
3. Facial Challenge
4. Locus Standi
5. Declaratory Relief
6. One Subject/One Title Rule

2. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:

1. Right to Life
2. Right to Health
3. Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
4. The Family
5. Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
6. Due Process
7. Equal Protection
8. Involuntary Servitude
9. Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10. Autonomy of Local Governments / ARMM

RULING:

1. Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves
the Court to resolve some procedural impediments.
1. The petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute. “The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate)
remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy
as to the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court
(as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional
mandate to decide. In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino
Feliciano, “judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the
separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of
government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and
control between them.” To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium
of participation – or instrument of intervention – of the judiciary in that
balancing operation. Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does
not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim of constitutional
violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited
by four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the
petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised
at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of
the case.
 2. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken
judicial duty.In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy
exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law
and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to
carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present
a justiciable controversy. When an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary
to settle the dispute.
3. The Court is not persuaded. In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge,
also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity
of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the
people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful
assembly are but component rights of the right to one’s freedom of expression, as they
are modes which one’s thoughts are externalized. In this jurisdiction, the application of
doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some
modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly
penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech,
but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. Verily, the
framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with
its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
4. The transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set
aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One
cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social
and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just
determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched
principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or
delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and
rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate,
rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Considering
that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the
Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.
5. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court
may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
6. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. It is well-settled that the “one
title-one subject” rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the
enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents
and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is
comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect,
and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably
adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so as not to cripple or
impede legislation.” In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law
shows that both “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated and
germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth.
2. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1. The Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at
implantation. According to him, “fertilization and conception are two distinct and
successive stages in the reproductive process. They are not identical and synonymous.”
Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that medical authorities confirm that the implantation
of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only after implantation
that pregnancy can be medically detected. This theory of implantation as the beginning of
 life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life
but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object – it
is a living human being complete with DNA and 46 chromosomes. Implantation has been
conceptualized only for convenience by those who had population control in mind. To
adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the
Constitution. It is the Court’s position that life begins at fertilization, not at
implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall, its viability
is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life.
2. A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the
Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. These
provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the
provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need for
legislation to implement these self-executing provisions. In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,
it was stated:
1. x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to
enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been,
that –… in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather
than non-self-executing. . . .

2. Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to
determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be
subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely
meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.

3. It is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives
or one’s participation in the support of modem reproductive health measures is moral from
a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong according to one’s dogma or
belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing with “faith, practice,
doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church … are
unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil
courts.” The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular
morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be
understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court
stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution,
it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of
religious freedom. Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that
the State cannot enhance its population control program through the RH Law simply
because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed,
the State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated
upon by the policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because
it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line between Church and State
demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and unto God
the things that are God’s. The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed
by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once
the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem
reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is
immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As
 Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, “at the basis of the
free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.
1. The Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether
public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector
should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be
compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of
“the principle of non-coercion” enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of
religion.
2. The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals
owned and operated by a religious group and health care service providers.
Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such institutions should they fail
or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the
Court deems that it must be struck down for being violative of the freedom of religion.
3. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24, considering
that in the dissemination of information regarding programs and services and in the
performance of reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of health care
service providers should be respected. The punishment of a healthcare service
provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to another, or who declines to
perform reproductive health procedure on a patient because incompatible religious
beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow.
4. The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the
care and custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had
a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their
parental authority.
5. Any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-
appropriate reproductive health education. One can only speculate on the content, manner
and medium of instruction that will be used to educate the adolescents and whether they
will contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their apprehensions.
Thus, considering the premature nature of this particular issue, the Court declines to rule
on its constitutionality or validity.
6. A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution
in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the
parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle. Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are
vague, words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but
also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must
be interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be construed
together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.
7. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s reproductive health
care program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to
Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to
address the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in
addressing the health development of the people. Thus: Section 11. The State shall adopt
an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor
to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at
affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly,
disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to
paupers. It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized
 couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. There is,
therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the
poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it
does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the “promotion
and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the advancement of
reproductive health.”
8. The notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation
or other similar means of coercion and compulsion. A reading of the assailed provision,
however, reveals that it only encourages private and non- government reproductive
healthcare service providers to render pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation with
PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-
government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose
which kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or
whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made
upon them to render pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of such
service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not
consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary
incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state
interest. Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be
emphasized that conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as long as their
religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render reproductive health service,
pro bona or otherwise.
9. The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power
but also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It
is the only government entity empowered to render such services and highly proficient to
do so. It should be understood that health services and methods fall under the gamut of
terms that are associated with what is ordinarily understood as “health products.” Being
the country’s premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food and
medicines available to the public, the FDA was equipped with the necessary
powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary
implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and safety by
permitting only food and medicines that are safe includes “service” and “methods.” From
the declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the public be
given only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and
effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards.
The philosophy behind the permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v.
Secretary of Justice, as follows:
1. The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing
inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its
attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and
sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to
comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the
problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the legislature may not have the
competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide the required direct and
efficacious, not to say specific solutions.

10. A reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of
health care facilities, the hiring of skilled health professionals, or the training of barangay
health workers, it will be the national government that will provide for the funding of its
implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The national government still has the
say when it comes to national priority programs which the local government is called upon
to implement like the RH Law.
RIGHTS AND DUTY OF PARENTS / AID FROM GOVERNMENT

CASES:
MEYER V. NEBRASKA – 262 US 390;
FACTS: Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child German under a Nebraska statute that
outlawed the teaching of foreign languages to students that had not yet completed the eighth
grade. The Supreme Court of Nebraska upheld the conviction.

ISSUE: W/N the statute as construed and applied unreasonably infringe on the liberty
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment?

HELD:
The statute as applied is unconstitutional because it infringes on the liberty interests of the
plaintiff and fails to reasonably relate to any end within the competency of the state.
The Fourteenth Amendment encompasses more than merely the freedom from bodily
restraint. The state argues that the purpose of the statute is to encourage the English
language to be the native tongue of all children raised in the state. Nonetheless, the protection
of the Constitution extends to those who speak other languages. Education is a fundamental
liberty interest that must be protected, and mere knowledge of the German language cannot
be reasonably regarded as harmful.

PIERCE V. SOCIETY OF SISTERS – 262 US 510;

FACTS: Appellee the Society of Sisters, a corporation with the power to establish and maintain
academies or schools and Appellee Hill Military Academy, a private organization conducting
an elementary, college preparatory, and military training school, obtained preliminary
restraining orders prohibiting appellants from enforcing Oregon’s Compulsory Education Act.
The Act required all parents and guardians to send children between 8 and 16 years to a
public school. The appellants appealed the granting of the preliminary restraining orders.

ISSUE: Does the Act unreasonably interfere with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct
the upbringing and education of children under their control?
HELD: The Act violates the 14th Amendment because it interferes with protected liberty
interests and has no reasonable relationship to any purpose within the competency of the
state.

The Appellees have standing because the result of enforcing the Act would be destruction of
the appellees’ schools. The state has the power to regulate all schools, but parents and
guardians have the right and duty to choose the appropriate preparation for their children.

WISCONSIN V. YODER – 40 LW 4476;

FACTS: Respondents Jonas Yoder, Wallace Miller, and Adin Yutzy are members of the Amish
religion. Wisconsin’s compulsory school-attendance law required them to cause their children
to attend public or private school until they reach 16. Respondents declined to send their
children to public school after completion of the eighth grade. Respondents were convicted of
violating the law and fined $5 each.

ISSUE: Did the application of the compulsory attendance law violate respondent’s rights
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution?

HELD:
The application of the law is unconstitutional as applied to the Amish.
The Amish object to the high school education because the values taught there are in marked
variance from the Amish values and way of life. It places Amish children in an environment
hostile to their beliefs and takes them away from their community during a crucial period in
their life. The Amish do not object to elementary education. Expert Dr. Hostetler testified that
the compulsory attendance could result in not only great psychological harm to Amish children
but ultimately the destruction of the Old Order Amish church community.

The State has the power to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of
basic education. Previous precedent has held that this power must yield to the right of parents
to provide an equivalent education in a privately operated system. The State’s power is
subject to a balancing test when it impinges on fundamental rights such as those protected
by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the traditional interest of parents
with respect to the religious upbringing of their children.

In order for Wisconsin to compel such attendance, it must follow that either the State does
not deny the free exercise of religious belief by its requirement or that there is a state interest
of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise
Clause. This Court determines that the Amish objection to the attendance is rooted in religious
beliefs that directly conflict with the compulsory school attendance law.

The State advances two arguments. First, it notes that some degree of education is necessary
to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system.
Second, education prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in
society. We accept these propositions. However, the evidence adduced shows that an
additional one or two years of formal high school would do little to serve those interests. Such
education may be necessary for preparation for the modern society in which we live, but is
not for the separated agrarian community of the Amish faith.

The State attacks respondents’ position as fostering ignorance from which children must be
protected by the State. However, the record shows that the Amish community has been a
highly successful social unit within our society, producing productive and law-abiding citizens.
The State also supports its position on the possibility that some children will choose to leave
the Amish community. This argument is highly speculative on the record, and the practical
agricultural training and habits of industry would support children that did choose to leave.

The requirement for compulsory high school education is a fairly recent development,
designed to not only provide educational opportunities, but also to avoid child labor or forced
idleness. In these terms, Wisconsin’s interest in compelling school attendance is less
substantial for Amish children than for children generally.

The State finally argues that exempting the Amish children fails to recognize the children’s
substantive right to a secondary education, giving due regard to the power of the State as
parens patriae. On this record there is no need to decide an issue in which the Amish parent’s
are preventing children who wish to further their education from attending school.

DISSENT: The majority assumes that the interests at stake are only those of the parents and
the State. The children also have a legitimate interest in their education. The inevitable effect
of the decision is to impose the parents’ notions of religious duty upon their children. It is the
future of the student, not the parents, that is imperiled by today’s decision. The views of the
two children in question were not canvassed, and should be on remand.

GINSBERG V. NEW YORK – 390 US 629;

ORCEO V. COMELEC – GR 190779, 26 MARCH 2010

SEC. 13. VITAL ROLE OF YOUTH

BOY SCOUTS OF THE PHILIPPINES V. COA, GR 177131, 07 JUNE 2011 (SUPRA. SEC. 1)

SEC. 14. ROLE OF WOMEN AND EQUALITY OF MEN AND WOMEN


*GARCIA V. DRILON, GR 173267, JUNE 25, 2013

SEC. 15. RIGHT TO HEALTH


IMBONG V. OCHOA, GR 204819, APRIL 8, 2014 (SUPRA. SEC. 12)

SEC. 16. RIGHT TO A BALANCED AND HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY


*OPOSA V. FACTORAN – 224 SCRA 792
LLDA V. CA – 231 SCRA 292 AND 251 SCRA 42
MMDA V. CONCERNED RESIDENT, GR 171947, DECEMBER 18, 2008
*ARIGO V. SWIFT – GR 206510, SEPTEMBER 16, 2014
*RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS V. SECRETARY REYES, GR 180771, APRIL 21, 2015.
PAJE V. CASIÑO – 749 SCRA 39
WEST TOWER V. PIC – 798 SCRA 292
INTERNATIONAL SERVICE V. GREENPEACE, GR 209271, DECEMBER 8, 2015 AND MR, JULY
ST
26, 2016 REVERSING 1 JUDGMENT.
LNL ARCHIPELAGO V. AGHAM PARTY LIST, GR 2091651, APRIL 12, 2016

SEC. 17. EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE AND SPORTS