Republic of the Philippines The fact that Obusan and Natividad lived as husband and wife was corroborated
SUPREME COURT by Linda Delfin, their housemaid in 1974; Remedios Bernal, a laundress, and
Manila
EN BANC
Adm. Case No. 1392 April 2, 1984
PRECIOSA R. OBUSAN, complainant,
vs.
GENEROSO B. OBUSAN, JR., respondent.
AQUINO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
This is a disbarment case filed in 1974 by Preciosa Razon against her husband
Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. on the ground of adultery or grossly immoral conduct. He
was admitted to the bar in 1968.
In 1967, when Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. was working in the Peoples Homesite and
Housing Corporation, he became acquainted with Natividad Estabillo who
represented to him that she was a widow. They had carnal relations. He begot with
her a son who was born on November 27, 1972. He was named John Obusan
(Exh. D). Generoso came to know that Natividad's marriage to Tony Garcia was
subsisting or undissolved.
Four days after the birth of the child or on December 1, 1972, Generoso, 33,
married Preciosa, 37, in a civil ceremony. The marriage was ratified in a religious
ceremony held on December 30,1972 (Exh. C and C-1)
The couple lived with the wife's mother at 993 Sto. Cristo Street, Tondo, Manila for
more than one year. In the evening of April 13, 1974, when his wife was out of the
house, lawyer Obusan asked permission from his mother-in-law to leave the house
and take a vacation in his hometown, Daet, Camarines Norte. Since then, he has
never returned to the conjugal abode.
Preciosa immediately started looking for her husband. After much patient
investigation and surveillance, she discovered that he was living and cohabiting
with Natividad in an apartment located at 85-A Felix Manalo Street, Cubao,
Quezon City. He had brought his car to that place.
Ernesto Bernal, a plumber, their neighbors staying at 94 Felix Manalo Street. The
three executed the affidavits, Exhibits A, B and F, which were confirmed by their
testimonies.
Romegil Q. Magana, a pook leader, testified that Obusan introduced himself as the
head of the family (25-30 tsn Nov. 26, 1976). His name is at the head of the
barangay list (Exh. E, G and H). Nieves Cacnio the owner of the apartment, came
to know Obusan as Mr. Estabillo. She Identified five photographs, Exhibits I to I-D
where respondent Obusan appeared as the man wearing eyeglasses.
Respondent's defense was that his relationship with Natividad was terminated
when he married Preciosa. He admitted that from time to time he went to 85-A
Felix Manalo Street but only for the purpose of giving financial assistance to his
son, Jun-Jun. Lawyer Rogelio Panotes, the ninong of Jun-Jun, corroborated
respondent's testimony.
He denied the testimonies of the maid, the laundress and the plumber. He claims
that they were paid witnesses. He declared that he did not live with Natividad. He
resided with his sister at Cypress Village, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City.
On the other hand, he claimed that he was constrained to leave the conjugal home
because he could not endure the nagging of his wife, their violent quarrels, her
absences from the conjugal home (she allegedly went to Baguio, Luneta and San
Andres Street) and her interference with his professional obligations.
The case was investigated by the Office of the Solicitor General. He filed a
complaint for disbarment against the respondent. Obusan did not answer the
complaint. He waived the presentation of additional evidence. His lawyer did not
file any memorandum.
After an examination of the record, we find that the complainant has sustained the
burden of proof. She has proven his abandonment of her and his adulterous
relations with a married woman separated from her own husband.
Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence of his wife that he was guilty
of grossly immoral conduct. Abandoning one's wife and resuming carnal relations
with a former paramour, a married woman, fails within "that conduct which is
willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion
of the good and respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959; Arciga vs.
Maniwang Adm. Case No. 1608, August 14, 1981, 106 SCRA 591).

Thus, a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited
with another woman who had borne him a child. He failed to maintain the highest
degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar (Toledo vs.
Toledo, 117 Phil. 768).

WHEREFORE, respondent is disbarred. His name is stricken off the Roll of

Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.
 [A.C. No. 3249. August 9, 2004]
CORDOVA vs. CORDOVA
SECOND DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court
dated AUG 9 2004.
A.C. No. 3249 (Salvacion Delizo-Cordova vs. Atty. Lawrence D. Cordova.)
In the Resolution of November 29, 1989, the Court indefinitely suspended
Atty. Lawrence D. Cordova from the practice of law after finding him guilty
of immorality. The Court likewise resolved to consider lifting the suspension
upon submission by respondent of proof satisfactory to the Commission on
Bar Discipline (CBD), Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), that he has
and continues to provide for the support of his legitimate family and that he
has given up his immoral course of conduct.
On January 15, 1992 and February 12, 1992, respondent and complainant,
respectively, filed separate petitions with this Court praying that the
suspension of respondent be lifted. In his petition, respondent explained that
the allegations of maltreatment and failure to provide support were products
of complainant's imagination and were unsubstantiated. He alleged that his
eldest daughter, Lorraine Salve, who was living with him after complainant
left their home in 1989, was enrolled in school and was provided with
material and emotional support. Respondent also submitted the affidavit of
desistance executed by complainant on December 27, 1991, attesting that
he has reformed, living in the conjugal home and provides love and paternal
affection to his family. On the other hand, complainant contended in her
petition that she and respondent have reconciled, and that respondent has
given up his immoral conduct and is supporting his legitimate family.
Appended to her petition is the affidavit of respondent which was also
executed on December 27, 1991. In the Resolutions of February 13,
1992 and March 5, 1992, these petitions were referred to the IBP for
appropriate action and recommendation.
However, on March 17, 1992, complainant wrote separate letters to Chief
Justice Andres R. Narvasa and the IBP negating her earlier petition to lift
respondent's suspension. Complainant claimed that respondent still goes
home to his live-in partner, Cita Magallanes; does not support his family,
and made it appear that he had changed his ways so she would sign an
affidavit of desistance.[1]cralaw In the months following, complainant sent
two other letters of a similar tenor.[2]cralaw At about the same time, Lorraine
Salve Cordova wrote the Court in support of her father's petition.[3]cralaw
On January 30, 1998, the CBD received a Manifestation/Motion from
respondent reiterating his plea that his suspension be lifted. Respondent
stated:
4. That on December 15, 1994, then Chapter President, Atty. MAMERTO B.
ALCISO, JR., in compliance with the directive, submitted with the Supreme
Court for its consideration Resolution No. 6, Series of 1994 of the IBP
Surigao del Sur Chapter recommending the Lifting of the Suspension of the
herein Respondent for having sufficiently proven to have regained the
fitness to be allowed to resume the practice of law as an officer of the Court
by commendably supporting and taking care of his children despite the
absence, neglect and abandonment of his wife (Complainant) who is now
living with another man, not her husband in Cebu City....
5. That on February 18, 1995, the Honorable Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) passed Resolution No. XI- 95-293 ...
resolving to adopt and direct the IBP Surigao del Sur Chapter to report on
the behavior and substantiation of Respondent's activities pending his
indefinite suspension ....
6. That upon receipt of the copy of the above-cited notice, Respondent wrote
a letter under oath to Atty. Antonia C. Buenaflor, President of the IBP
Surigao del Sur Chapter categorically explaining the details and story about
Complainant's continued clandestine extra-marital affair painfully kept
secret by the herein Respodnent in the hope of saving the shuttered [sic]
marriage....
7. In compliance with the directive of the Board of Governors of IBP, a
report of the Committee dated August 31, 1996 chaired by Atty. Teresita P.
Donasco was submitted to the Chapter President Recommending that
Respondent's Suspension from the practice of law be NOW LIFTED
...[4]cralaw
In a Report dated April 5, 2000, CBD Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo the IBP nor obliged to accept the same as a matter of course. It also
recommended that the suspension of respondent be lifted, noting that: considered the protestation of respondent that the length of his suspension
is more than sufficient punishment and his insistence that he has fully
... complainant has always informed the Supreme Court as well as this office reformed are not fully meritorious since respondent has not submitted proof
of any further acts of immorality committed by respondent. The latest letter satisfactory to the Court that he has met the standards imposed in the
from the complainant was received in June 1992. Since then up to the Resolution of November 29, 1989.
present, complainant has been silent on her husband's conduct. The silence
could only be interpreted that respondent has made amends and has On January 27, 2003, upon the recommendation of the OBC, the Court
reformed. required respondent to comment on the letter dated January 18, 2002 of
complainant and to submit satisfactory proof that he has continuously
It has been more than 10 years that respondent has suffered the effect of provided for the support of his family and that he has given up his immoral
his suspension from the practice of his legal profession. Such suspension conduct. Respondent received a copy of said resolution on March 21,
has not only affected him but it has also an adverse effect to [sic] his family 2003 but failed to comply therewith. In the Resolution of October 8, 2003,
particularly to [sic] his children. respondent was required to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily
dealt with for his non-compliance, a copy of which was received by
This office is convinced that respondent has reformed as reported by his respondent on November 12, 2003.
IBP Chapter. Furthermore, more than ten years suspension from the
practice of law appears to be sufficient penalty for the acts complained Considering that up to this late date, respondent has neither commented on
of.[5]cralaw the letter dated January 18, 2002 of complainant by way of opposition to his
motion to lift suspension nor submitted satisfactory proof that he has
On May 29, 2000, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XIV- continuously provided for the support of his legitimate family and given up
000-318,[6]cralaw adopting and approving the report and recommendation his immoral conduct, the Court Resolves to DENY the motion of respondent
of Commissioner Elamparo, lifting the suspension of respondent, copy of that his indefinite suspension from the practice of law be lifted.
which was furnished this Court.
SO ORDERED.
In view thereof, the Court directed complainant to comment
thereon.[7]cralaw In a letter dated January 18, 2002, complainant expressed
disappointment over the move of the Surigao del Sur Chapter in extending
assistance to respondent. She contended that the Surigao del Sur Chapter
is not in a position to know that respondent has already reformed, and
claimed that respondent is cohabiting with his mistress, Isabelita Cinciro,
with whom he has a seven-year old son. She also opined that all the
allegations in respondent's motion for early resolution were lies, and that in
1992, respondent tried to reconcile with her so that his suspension would be
lifted. Complainant thought that respondent had turned in a new leaf but
later discovered that this was not so. She also recounted the hardships that
she endured with respondent.

The Court referred this matter to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for
evaluation, report and recommendation. In its Report dated January 13,
2003, the OBC submitted that the Court is neither bound by the findings of
 EN BANC
[A.C. No. 4539. May 14, 1997]
ROMANA R. MALIGSA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ARSENIO FER
CABANTING, respondent.
DECISION
ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING is charged by Romana R. Maligsa
in a verified affidavit-complaint for disbarment with conduct unbecoming a
lawyer for certifying under oath a Deed of Quitclaim dated 5 May 1992[1] over
a piece of property subject of a pending civil case before the Regional Trial
Court Br. 45, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, docketed as Civil Case No. U-5434.[2]
On 11 March 1996 we required respondent to comment on the
complaint. He failed to comply despite service upon him of our Resolution
together with copy of the complaint.
On 22 October 1996 we considered the failure of respondent Atty.
Arsenio Fer Cabanting to file his comment as waiver of his right to do so and
directed the case submitted for decision.
On the basis of the complaint and the supporting documents, this Court
finds sufficient legal basis for disciplinary action against respondent for
making it appear in the Acknowledgment of the Deed of Quitclaim in
question that the affiant therein signed the document and acknowledged the
contents thereof before him as Notary Public on 5 May 1992 when in truth
and in fact the affiant did not and could not have done so.
The evidence clearly discloses that on 5 May 1992 a Deed of Quitclaim
was purportedly executed by one Irene Maligsa in favor of Juanito V.
Abaoag over a parcel of land located in Cablong, Pozorrubio,
Pangasinan.[3] The subject document was notarized by respondent on the
same date. The document was apparently used as evidence against
complainant in a pending civil case for annulment of OCT No. P-31297,
quieting of title with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order plus damages.
The complainant alleges that the Deed of Quitclaim could not have
been executed and notarized on 5 May 1992 because the affiant Irene
Maligsa died on 21 April 1992 or sixteen (16) days earlier.[4] Moreover, Irene
Maligsa could not have signed the document because she "never knew how
to write as she uses the thumb mark in every transaction she entered." [5]
Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 [6] provides
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer
duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of
instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary
public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person
acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is
the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his
free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under the official seal, if
he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.
Furthermore, the Acknowledgment contained in the questioned
document specifically provides "BEFORE ME personally appeared
IRENE MALIGSA x x x x" [7] Clearly, the party acknowledging must
personally appear before the Notary Public or any other person authorized
to take such acknowledgment of instruments or documents.
In the case before us, it would have been physically and legally
impossible for the affiant Irene Maligsa to have executed the alleged Deed
of Quitclaim on 5 May 1992 and to have personally subscribed to its
authenticity and validity before respondent notary public on the same date,
affiant having died on 21 April 1992. Also, it behooves respondent as a
notary public to require the personal appearance of the person executing a
document to enable the former to verify the genuineness of the signature of
the affiant.
Quite importantly, this is not the first time that respondent has been
involved in an act of malpractice in violation of his oath as a lawyer and the
Canons of Professional Ethics.
In the consolidated administrative cases of Valencia v.
Cabanting,[8] the Court suspended respondent Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting
for six (6) months from the practice of law. In those cases respondent
purchased his client's property which was still the subject of a
pending certiorari proceeding contrary to the prohibition stated in Art. 1491
of the New Civil Code and Art. II of the Canons of Professional Ethics. Under
the circumstances, a recollection of the basic principles of professional
ethics in the practice of law is apropos.
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession. The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as
well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal
profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the
courts and to his clients. To this end a member of the legal fraternity should
refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence
and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the
legal profession. [9]
Notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public
interest in a substantial degree and protection of the interest requires
preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public
from imposing upon the public and the courts and the administrative offices
generally.[10] Notarization of a private document converts the document into
a public one making it admissible in court without further proof of its
authenticity.
As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated
to subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being
dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. Faithful
observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of an oath in an
acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. Simply put, such responsibility is
incumbent upon respondent and failing therein, he must now accept the
commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion. By his
effrontery of notarizing a fictitious or spurious document, he has made a
mockery of the legal solemnity of the oath in an Acknowledgment.
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether
in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in
moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court. [11] Considering the serious nature of the
instant offense and in light of his prior misconduct hereinbefore mentioned
for which he was penalized with a six (6) month suspension from the practice
of law, with a warning that repetition of the same or similar act would be
dealt with more severely, the contumacious behavior of respondent in the
instant case which grossly degrades the legal profession indeed warrants
the imposition of a much graver penalty.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent ATTY. ARSENIO FER
CABANTING guilty of grave misconduct rendering him unworthy of his
continued membership in the legal profession; consequently, he is
ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken off the
Roll of Attorneys effective immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all the courts of the land as
well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant
and recorded in the personal files of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 1512 January 29, 1993
VICTORIA BARRIENTOS, complainant,
vs.
TRANSFIGURACION DAAROL, respondent.
RESOLUTION
In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on August 20, 1975, complainant
Victoria C. Barrientos seeks the disbarment of respondent Transfiguracion
Daarol, ** a member of the Philippine Bar, on grounds of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct.
After respondent filed his answer (Rollo, p. 12), the Court Resolved to refer
the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation (Rollo, p. 18).
As per recommendation of the Solicitor General and for the convenience of
the parties and their witnesses who were residing in the province of
Zamboanga del Norte, the Provincial Fiscal of said province was authorized
to conduct the investigation and to submit a report, together with transcripts
of stenographic notes and exhibits submitted by the parties, if any (Rollo, p.
20).
On November 9, 1987, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its
Report and Recommendation, viz.:
Evidence of the complainant:
. . . complainant Victoria Barrientos was single and a resident of
Bonifacio St., Dipolog City; that when she was still a teenager and
first year in college she came to know respondent Transfiguracion
Daarol in 1969 as he used to go to their house being a friend of her
sister Norma; that they also became friends, and she knew the
respondent as being single and living alone in Galas, Dipolog City;
that he was the General Manager of Zamboanga del Norte Electric
Cooperative, Inc. (ZANECO) and subsequently transferred his
residence to the ZANECO compound at Laguna Blvd. at Del Pilar
St., Dipolog City (pp. 109-111, tsn, September 30, 1976).
That on June 27, 1973, respondent came to their house and asked
her to be one of the usherettes in the Mason's convention in
Sicayab, Dipolog City, from June 28 to 30, 1973 and, she told
respondent to ask the permission of her parents, which respondent
did, and her father consented; that for three whole days she served
as usherette in the convention and respondent picked her up from
her residence every morning and took her home from the
convention site at the end of each day (pp. 112-114, tsn, id.).
That in the afternoon of July 1, 1973, respondent came to
complainant's house and invited her for a joy ride with the
permission of her mother who was a former classmate of
respondent; that respondent took her to Sicayab in his jeep and
then they strolled along the beach, and in the course of which
respondent proposed his love to her; that respondent told her that
if she would accept him, he would marry her within six (6) months
from her acceptance; complainant told respondent that she would
think it over first; that from then on respondent used to visit her in
their house almost every night, and he kept on courting her and
pressed her to make her decision on respondent's proposal; that
on July 7, 1973, she finally accepted respondent's offer of love and
respondent continued his usual visitations almost every night
thereafter; they agreed to get married in December 1973 (pp. 115-
119, tsn, id.).
That in the morning of August 20, 1973, respondent invited her,
with the consent of her father, to a party at the Lopez Skyroom; that
at 7:00 p.m. of that day respondent fetched her from her house and
went to the Lopez Skyroom (pp. 119-121, tsn, id); that at about
10:00 p.m. of that evening they left the party at the Lopez Skyroom,
but before taking her home respondent invited her for a joy ride and
took her to the airport at Sicayab, Dipolog City; respondent parked
the jeep by the beach where there were no houses around; that in
the course of their conversation inside the jeep, respondent
reiterated his promise to marry her and then started caressing her
downward and his hand kept on moving to her panty and down to
her private parts (pp. 121-122, tsn. id.); that she then said: "What
is this Trans?", but he answered: "Day, do not be afraid of me. I will
marry you" and reminded her also that "anyway, December is very
near, the month we have been waiting for" ([p], 122, tsn, id.), then
he pleaded, "Day, just give this to me, do not be afraid" (ibid), and
again reiterated his promise and assurances, at the same time
pulling down her panty; that she told him that she was afraid
because they were not yet married, but because she loved him she
finally agreed to have sexual intercourse with him at the back seat
of the jeep; that after the intercourse she wept and respondent
again reiterated his promises and assurances not to worry because
anyway he would marry her; and at about 12:00 midnight they went
home (pp.122-124, tsn, id.).
After August 20, 1973, respondent continued to invite her to eat
outside usually at the Honeycomb Restaurant in Dipolog City about
twice or three times a week, after which he would take her to the
airport where they would have sexual intercourse; that they had
this sexual intercourse from August to October 1973 at the
frequency of two or three times a week, and she consented to all
these things because she loved him and believed in all his
promises (pp. 125-127, tsn, id.).
Sometime in the middle part of September, 1973 complainant
noticed that her menstruation which usually occurred during the
second week of each month did not come; she waited until the end
of the month and still there was no menstruation; she submitted to
a pregnancy test and the result was positive; she informed
respondent and respondent suggested to have the fetus aborted
but she objected and respondent did not insist; respondent then
told her not to worry because they would get married within one
month and he would talk to her parents about their marriage (pp.
129-132, tsn, id.).
On October 20, 1973, respondent came to complainant's house
and talked to her parents about their marriage; it was agreed that
the marriage would be celebrated in Manila so as not to create a
scandal as complainant was already pregnant; complainant and
her mother left for Manila by boat on October 22, 1973 while
respondent would follow by plane; and they agreed to meet in
Singalong, Manila, in the house of complainant's sister Delia who
is married to Ernesto Serrano (pp. 132-135, tsn, id.).
On October 26, 1973, when respondent came to see complainant
and her mother at Singalong, Manila, respondent told them that he
could not marry complainant because he was already married (p.
137, tsn, id.); complainant's mother got mad and said: "Trans, so
you fooled my daughter and why did you let us come here in
Manila?" (p. 138, tsn, id.). Later on, however, respondent
reassured complainant not to worry because respondent had been
separated from his wife for 16 years and he would work for the
annulment of his marriage and, subsequently marry complainant
(p. 139, tsn, id.); respondent told complainant to deliver their child
in Manila and assured her of a monthly support of P250.00 (p. 140,
tsn, id.); respondent returned to Dipolog City and actually sent the
promised support; he came back to Manila in January 1974 and
went to see complainant; when asked about the annulment of his
previous marriage, he told complainant that it would soon be
approved (pp. 141-142, tsn, id.); he came back in February and in
March 1974 and told complainant the same thing (p. 142, tsn, id.);
complainant wrote her mother to come to Manila when she delivers
the child, but her mother answered her that she cannot come as
nobody would be left in their house in Dipolog and instead
suggested that complainant go to Cebu City which is nearer;
complainant went to Cebu City in April 1974 and, her sister Norma
took her to the Good Shepherd Convent at Banawa Hill; she
delivered a baby girl on June 14, 1974 at the Perpetual Succor
Hospital in Cebu City; and the child was registered as "Dureza
Barrientos" (pp. 143-148, tsn, id.).
In the last week of June 1974 complainant came to Dipolog City
and tried to contact respondent by phone and, thru her brother, but
to no avail; as she was ashamed she just stayed in their house;
she got sick and her father sent her to Zamboanga City for medical
treatment; she came back after two weeks but still respondent did
not come to see her (tsn. 48-150, tsn, id.); she consulted a lawyer
and filed an administrative case against respondent with the
National Electrification Administration; the case was referred to the
Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative (ZANECO) and it was
dismissed and thus she filed the present administrative case (pp.
150-151, tsn, id.).
Evidence for the Respondent
The evidence of the respondent consists of his sole testimony and
one exhibit, the birth certificate of the child (Exh. 1). Respondent
declared substantially as follows: that he was born on August 6,
1932 in Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte; that he married Romualda
Sumaylo in Liloy in 1955; that he had a son who is now 20 years
old; that because of incompatibility he had been estranged from his
wife for 16 years; that in 1953 he was baptized as a moslem and
thereby embraced the Islam Religion (pp.
173-180 tsn, Jan. 13, 1977); that he came to know complainant's
father since 1952 because he was his teacher; likewise he knew
complainant's mother because they were former classmates in
high school; that he became acquainted with complainant when he
used to visit her sister, Norma, in their house; they gradually
became friends and often talked with each other, and even talked
about their personal problems; that he mentioned to her his being
estranged from his wife; that with the consent of her parents he
invited her to be one of the usherettes in the Masonic Convention
in Sicayab, Dipolog City held on June 28-30, 1973 (pp. 185-192,
tsn, id.); that the arrangement was for him to fetch her from her
residence and take her home from the convention site; that it was
during this occasion that they became close to each other and after
the convention, he proposed his love to her on July 7, 1973; that
(sic) a week of courtship, she accepted his proposal and since then
he used to invite her (pp. 193-194, tsn, id.).
That in the evening of August 20, 1973, respondent invited
complainant to be his partner during the Chamber of Commerce
affair at the Lopez Skyroom; that at about 10:00 p.m. of that
evening after the affair, complainant complained to him of a
headache, so he decided to take her home but once inside the
jeep, she wanted to have a joy ride, so he drove around the city
and proceeded to the airport; that when they were at the airport,
only two of them, they started the usual kisses and they were
carried by their passion; they forgot themselves and they made
love; that before midnight he took her home; that thereafter they
indulged in sexual intercourse many times whenever they went on
joy riding in the evening and ended up in the airport which was the
only place they could be alone
(p. 195, tsn, id.).
That it was sometime in the later part of October 1973 that
complainant told him of her pregnancy; that they agreed that the
child be delivered in Manila to avoid scandal and respondent would
take care of expenses; that during respondent's talk with the
parents of complainant regarding the latter's pregnancy, he told
him he was married but estranged from his wife; that when
complainant was already in Manila, she asked him if he was willing
to marry her, he answered he could not marry again, otherwise, he
would be charged with bigamy but he promised to file an annulment
of his marriage as he had been separated from his wife for 16
years; that complainant consented to have sexual intercourse with
him because of her love to him and he did not resort to force,
trickery, deceit or cajolery; and that the present case was filed
against him by complainant because of his failure to give the
money to support complainant while in Cebu waiting for the
delivery of the child and, also to meet complainant's medical
expenses when she went to Zamboanga City for medical check-up
(pp. 198-207, tsn, id.).
FINDING OF FACTS
From the evidence adduced by the parties, the following facts are
not disputed:
1. That the complainant, Victoria Barrientos, is single, a college
student, and was about 20 years and 7 months old during the time
(July-October 1975) of her relationship with respondent, having
been born on December 23, 1952; while respondent
Transfiguracion Daarol is married, General Manager of
Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative, and 41 years old at the
time of the said relationship, having been born on August 6, 1932;
2. That respondent is married to Romualda A. Sumaylo with whom
be has a son; that the marriage ceremony was solemnized on
September 24, 1955 at Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte by a catholic
priest, Rev. Fr. Anacleto Pellamo, Parish Priest thereat; and that
said respondent had been separated from his wife for about 16
years at the time of his relationship with complainant;
3. That respondent had been known by the Barrientos family for
quite sometime, having been a former student of complainant's
 father in 1952 and, a former classmate of complainant's mother at
the Andres Bonifacio College in Dipolog City; that he became
acquainted with complainant's sister, Norma in 1963 and
eventually with her other sisters, Baby and Delia and, her brother,
Boy, as he used to visit Norma at her residence; that he also
befriended complainant and who became a close friend when he
invited her, with her parents' consent, to be one of the usherettes
during the Masonic Convention in Sicayab, Dipolog City from June
28 to 30, 1973, and he used to fetch her at her residence in the
morning and took her home from the convention site after each
day's activities;
4. That respondent courted complainant, and after a week of
courtship, complainant accepted respondent's love on July 7,
1973; that in the evening of August 20, 1973, complainant with her
parents' permission was respondent's partner during the Chamber
of Commerce affair at the Lopez Skyroom in the Dipolog City, and
at about 10:00 o'clock that evening, they left the place but before
going home, they went to the airport at Sicayab, Dipolog City and
parked the jeep at the beach, where there were no houses around;
that after the usual preliminaries, they consummated the sexual act
and at about midnight they went home; that after the first sexual
act, respondent used to have joy ride with complainant which
usually ended at the airport where they used to make love twice or
three times a week; that as a result of her intimate relations,
complainant became pregnant;
5. That after a conference among respondent, complainant and
complainant's parents, it was agreed that complainant would deliver her
child in Manila, where she went with her mother on October 22, 1973 by
boat, arriving in Manila on the 25th and, stayed with her brother-in-law
Ernesto Serrano in Singalong, Manila; that respondent visited her there on
the 26th, 27th and 28th of October 1973, and again in February and March
1974; that later on complainant decided to deliver the child in Cebu City in
order to be nearer to Dipolog City, and she went there in April 1974 and her
sister took her to the Good Shepherd Convent at Banawa Hill, Cebu City;
that on June 14, 1974, she delivered a baby girl at the Perpetual Succor
Hospital in Cebu City and, named her "Dureza Barrientos"; that about the
last week of June 1974 she went home to Dipolog City; that during her stay
here in Manila and later in Cebu City, the respondent defrayed some of her
expenses; that she filed an administrative case against respondent with the
National Electrification Administration; which complaint, however, was
dismissed; and then she instituted the present disbarment proceedings
against respondent.
xxx xxx xxx
In view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully
recommend that after hearing, respondent
Transfiguracion Daarol be disbarred as a lawyer. (Rollo,
pp. 28-51).
After a thorough review of the case, the Court finds itself in full accord with
the findings and recommendation of the Solicitor General.
From the records, it appears indubitable that complainant was never
informed by respondent attorney of his real status as a married individual.
The fact of his previous marriage was disclosed by respondent only after the
complainant became pregnant. Even then, respondent misrepresented
himself as being eligible to re-marry for having been estranged from his wife
for 16 years and dangled a marriage proposal on the assurance that he
would work for the annulment of his first marriage. It was a deception after
all as it turned out that respondent never bothered to annul said marriage.
More importantly, respondent knew all along that the mere fact of separation
alone is not a ground for annulment of marriage and does not vest him legal
capacity to contract another marriage.
Interestingly enough. respondent lived alone in Dipolog City though his son,
who was also studying in Dipolog City, lived separately from him. He never
introduced his son and went around with friends as though he was never
married much less had a child in the same locality. This circumstance alone
belies respondent's claim that complainant and her family were aware of his
previous marriage at the very start of his courtship. The Court is therefore
inclined to believe that respondent resorted to deceit in the satisfaction of
his sexual desires at the expense of the gullible complainant. It is not in
accordance with the nature of the educated, cultured and respectable, which
complainant's family is, her father being the Assistant Principal of the local
public high school, to allow a daughter to have an affair with a married man.
But what surprises this Court even more is the perverted sense of
respondent's moral values when he said that: "I see nothing wrong with this
relationship despite my being married." (TSN, p. 209, January 13,
1977; Rollo, p. 47) Worse, he even suggested abortion. Truly, respondent's
moral sense is so seriously impaired that we cannot maintain his
membership in the Bar. In Pangan v. Ramos (107 SCRA 1 [1981]), we held
that:
(E)ven his act in making love to another woman while his first wife
is still alive and their marriage still valid and existing is contrary to
honesty, justice, decency and morality. Respondent made a
mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding
respect and dignity.
Finally, respondent even had the temerity to allege that he is a Moslem
convert and as such, could enter into multiple marriages and has inquired
into the possibility of marrying complainant (Rollo, p. 15). As records
indicate, however, his claim of having embraced the Islam religion is not
supported by any evidence save that of his self-serving testimony. In this
regard, we need only to quote the finding of the Office of the Solicitor
General, to wit:
When respondent was asked to marry complainant he said he
could not because he was already married and would open him to
a charge of bigamy (p. 200, tsn, January 13, 1977). If he were a
moslem convert entitled to four (4) wives, as he is now claiming,
why did he not marry complainant? The answer is supplied by
respondent himself. He said while he was a moslem, but, having
been married in a civil ceremony, he could no longer validly enter
into another civil ceremony without committing bigamy because the
complainant is a christian (p. 242, tsn, January 13, 1977).
Consequently, if respondent knew, that notwithstanding his being
a moslem convert, he cannot marry complainant, then it was
grossly immoral for him to have sexual intercourse with
complainant because he knew the existence of a legal impediment.
Respondent may not, therefore, escape responsibility thru his
dubious claim that he has embraced the Islam religion. (Rollo,
p. 49).
By his acts of deceit and immoral tendencies to appease his sexual desires,
respondent Daarol has amply demonstrated his moral delinquency. Hence,
his removal for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar on the grounds of
deceit and grossly immoral conduct (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court) is
in order. Good moral character is a condition which precedes admission to
the Bar (Sec. 2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and is not dispensed with upon
admission thereto. It is a continuing qualification which all lawyers must
possess (People v. Tuanda, 181 SCRA 682 [1990]; Delos Reyes v. Aznar,
179 SCRA 653 [1989]), otherwise, a lawyer may either be suspended or
disbarred.
As we have held in Piatt v. Abordo (58 Phil. 350 [1933], cited in Leda v.
Tabang, 206 SCRA 395 [1992]):
It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good
character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the
practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law (People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No.
3360, 30 January 1990, 181 SCRA 692). As aptly put by Mr.
Justice George A. Malcolm: "As good character is an essential
qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, when the
attorney's character is bad in such respects as to show that he is
unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the
court retains the power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil.
350 [1933]).
Only recently, another disbarment proceeding was resolved by this Court
against a lawyer who convinced a woman that her prior marriage to another
man was null and void ab initio and she was still legally single and free to
marry him (the lawyer), married her, was supported by her in his studies,
begot a child with her, abandoned her and the child, and married another
woman (Terre vs. Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, July 3, 1992).
Here, respondent, already a married man and about 41 years old, proposed
love and marriage to complainant, then still a 20-year-old minor, knowing
that he did not have the required legal capacity. Respondent then
succeeded in having carnal relations with complainant by deception, made
her pregnant, suggested abortion, breached his promise to marry her, and
then deserted her and the child. Respondent is therefore guilty of deceit and
grossly immoral conduct.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to
the exacting standards of mental and moral fitness. Respondent having
exhibited debased morality, the Court is constrained to impose upon him the
most severe disciplinary action — disbarment.
The ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its members the
highest standard of morality. The members are, in fact, enjoined to aid in
guarding the Bar against the admission of candidates unfit or unqualified
because deficient either moral character or education (In re Puno, 19 SCRA
439, [1967]; Pangan vs. Ramos, 107 SCRA 1 [1981]).

As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral
character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and must
lead a life in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community.
More specifically, a member of the Bar and an officer of the Court is not only
required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses
but must also behave himself in such a manner as to avoid scandalizing the
public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards (Tolosa
vs. Cargo, 171 SCRA 21, 26 [1989], citing Toledo vs. Toledo, 7 SCRA 757
[1963] and Royong vs. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859 [1963]).

In brief, We find respondent Daarol morally delinquent and as such, should

not be allowed continued membership in the ancient and learned profession
of law (Quingwa v. Puno, 19 SCRA 439 [1967]).

ACCORDINGLY, We find respondent Transfiguracion Daarol guilty of

grossly immoral conduct unworthy of being a member of the Bar and is
hereby ordered DISBARRED and his name stricken off from the Roll of
Attorneys. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all courts of the land,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and
spread on the personal record of respondent Daarol.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 97239 May 12, 1993
INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION) AND
NESTOR B. MICOSA, respondents.
NOCON, J.:
Posed for determination in this petition for certiorari is the question of
whether a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for
dismissal from employment and corollarily, whether a conviction of a crime
of homicide involves moral turpitude.
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) is an international organization
recognized by the Philippine government and accorded privileges, rights
and immunities normally granted to organizations of universal character. In
1977, it hired private respondent Nestor B. Micosa as laborer, who thereby
became bound by IRRI Employment Policy and Regulations, the
Miscellaneous Provisions of which states viz:
C. Conviction and Previous Separation
l. . . .
2. An employer who has been convicted of a (sic) criminal
offense involving moral turpitude may be dismissed from
the service.1
On February 6, 1967, Micosa stabbed to death one Reynaldo Ortega inside
a beer house in Los Baños, Laguna.
On September 15, 1987, Micosa was accused of the crime of homicide.
During the pendency of the criminal case, Micosa voluntarily applied for
inclusion in IRRI's Special Separation Program. However, on January 9,
1990, IRRI's Director General, Klaus L. Lampe expressed deep regret that
he had to disapprove Micosa's application for separation because of IRRI's
desire to retain the skills and talents that persons like him possess.2
On January 23, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision fending Micosa
guilty of homicide, but appreciating, however, in his favor the presence of
the mitigating circumstances of (a) incomplete self-defense and (b)
voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating
circumstance.
Subsequently, Micosa applied for suspension of his sentence under the
Probation Law.
On February 8, 1990, IRRI's Director General personally wrote Micosa that
his appointment as laborer was confirmed, making him a regular core
employee whose appointment was for an indefinite period and who "may not
be terminated except for justifiable causes as defined by the pertinent
provisions of the Philippine Labor Code.3
On March 30, 1990, IRRI's Human Resource Development Head, J.K.
Pascual wrote Micosa urging him to resign from employment in view of his
conviction in the case for homicide.
On April 4, 1990, the Laguna Parole and Probation Office No. II wrote IRRI
informing the latter that said office found Micosa's application for probation
meritorious as he was evaluated "to possess desirable social antecedents
in his life."4
On April 6, 1990, Micosa informed J.K. Pascual that he had no intention of
resigning from his job at IRRI.
On April 22, 1990, J. K. Pascual replied to Micosa's letter insisting that the
crime for which he was convicted involves moral turpitude and informing him
that he is thereby charged of violating Section I-AA, Par VII, C-2 of the
Institute's Personnel Manual.
On April 27, 1990, Micosa explained to J.K. Pascual that the slaying of
Reynaldo Ortega on February 6, 1987 arose out of his act of defending
himself from unlawful aggression; that his conviction did not involve moral
turpitude and that he opted not to appeal his conviction so that he could avail
of the benefits of probation, which the trial court granted to him.
On May 7, 1990, Micosa sought the assistance of IRRI's Grievance
Committee who recommended to the Director General, his continued
employment. However, on May 21, 1990, J.K. Pascual issued a notice to
Micosa that the latter's employment was to terminate effective May 25, 1990.
On May 29, 1990, Micosa filed a case for illegal dismissal.
On August 21, 1990, Labor Arbiter Numeriano D. Villena rendered judgment
finding the termination of Micosa illegal and ordering his reinstatement with
full backwages from the date of his dismissal up to actual reinstatement. The
dispositive portion of the same is hereunder quoted:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the following orders
are hereby entered:
1. Finding the termination of complainant's services
illegal;
2. Ordering respondent International Rice Research
Institute to reinstate complainant Nestor B. Micosa to his
former position without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges appurtenant, thereto immediately upon receipt
hereof;
3. Ordering respondent International Rice Research
Institute to pay complainant Nestor B. Micosa his full
backwages computed from the date of his dismissal on
May 25, 1990 up to actual reinstatement based on his
latest salary rate of P41,068.00 per month.
4. Ordering respondent International Rice Research
Institute, to pay complainant's counsel the amount of Five
Thousand Pesos P5,000.00, representing his attorney's
fees; and.
5. Dismissing the claim for damages for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.5
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission was basically in
agreement with the findings and conclusions of the Labor Arbiter. Hence, in
a resolution dated January 31, 1991, it affirmed the appealed decision, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with
modification deleting the award of attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.6
Accordingly, petitioner filed this instant petition raising the following issues:
1. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
HAS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
FINDING THAT IRRI HAD NO RIGHT NOR AUTHORITY
TO PRESCRIBE ANY OTHER CAUSE/S FOR
DISMISSAL IF THE SAME IS NOT AMONG THOSE
ENUMERATED IN ARTICLE OF THE LABOR CODE.
2. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
HOLDING THAT "THERE IS NO BASIS TO APPLY
PETITIONER'S INSTITUTE PERSONNEL MANUAL IN
DISMISSING THE COMPLAINANT ON THE SOLE
GROUND THAT HIS CONVICTION OF HOMICIDE
CONSTITUTE MORAL TURPITUDE.7
The basic premise of petitioner is that Micosa's conviction of the crime of
homicide, which is a crime involving moral turpitude, is a valid ground for his
dismissal under the Miscellaneous Provisions of IRRI's Employment Policy
Regulations.
In addition to its claim that it has the prerogative to issue rules and
regulations including those concerning employee discipline and that its
employees are bound by the aforesaid personnel manual, petitioner justifies
its action as a legitimate act of self-defense. It admits that Micosa's interests
— in his employment and means of livelihood — are adversely affected; that
a convict should not be discriminated against in society and that he should
be given the same opportunities as those granted to other fellow citizens but
claims that at times, one's right is deemed superior than that of another. In
this case, petitioner believes that it has a superior right to maintain a very
high degree or standard not only to forestall any internal problem hampering
operations but also to prevent even the smallest possibility that said
problems could occur considering that it is an international organization with
concomitant obligation to the host country to avoid creating disturbance or
give occasion for such disturbance.
It should be recalled, however, that Micosa was issued an appointment with
an assurance from the IRRI's Director General that as regular core
employee he "may not be terminated except for justifiable causes as defined
by the pertinent provisions of the Philippine Labor Code."8 Thus, IRRI could
not remove him from his job if there existed no justifiable cause as defined
by the Labor Code.
Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes wherein an
employer may terminate an employment. Verily, conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude is not one of these justifiable causes. Neither may
said ground be justified under Article 282 (c) nor under 282 (d) by analogy.
Fraud or willful breach by the employees of the trust reposed in him by his
employer or duly authorized representative under Article 282 (c) refers to
any fault or culpability on the part of the employee in the discharge of his
duty rendering him absolutely unworthy of the trust and confidence
demanded by his position. It cannot be gainsaid that the breach of trust must
be related to the performance of the employee's function.9 On the other
hand, the commission of a crime by the employee under Article 282 (d) refer
to an offense against the person of his employer or any immediate member
of his family or his duly authorized representative. Analogous causes must
have an element similar to those found in the specific just cause enumerated
under Article 282. Clearly lacking in the ground invoked by petitioner is its
relation to his work or to his employer.
In the case at bar, the commission of the crime of homicide was outside the
perimeter of the IRRI complex, having been committed in a restaurant after
office hours and against a non-IRRI employee. Thus, the conviction of
Micosa for homicide was not work-related, his misdeed having no relation
to his position as laborer and was not directed or committed against IRRI or
its authorized agent.
Besides, IRRI failed to show how the dismissal of Micosa would be in
consideration of the safety and welfare of its employees, its reputation and
standing in the community and its special obligations to its host country. It
did not present evidence to show that Micosa possessed a tendency to kill
without provocation or that he posed a clear and present danger to the
company and its personnel. On the contrary, the records reveal that
Micosa's service record is unblemished. There is no record whatsoever that
he was involved in any incident similar to that which transpired on that fateful
night of February 6, 1987. In fact, even after his conviction, the IRRI's
Director General expressed his confidence in him when he disapproved his
application for special separation in a letter dated January 8, 1990 and when
he conveyed to him IRRI's decision to promote him to the status of a regular
core employee, with the commensurate increases in benefits in a letter
dated February 1990. Respondent IRRI derogates the letters' significance
saying that they were mere pro-forma communications which it had given to
numerous other workers. But whether or not such letters were "form letters,
they expressed the message that were meant to be conveyed,i.e., that
Micosa is fit for continued employment. In addition, the employees at IRRI's
Grievance Committee interceded favorably in behalf of Micosa when they
recommended his retention despite his conviction showing that the very
employees which IRRI sought to protect did not believe that they were
placing their very own lives in danger with Micosa's retention.
Likewise, noteworthy is the fact that Micosa, although found guilty as
charged, was also found worthy of probation. This means that all the
information regarding his character, antecedents, environment, as well as
his mental and physical condition were evaluated as required under Section
8 of the Probation Law and it was found that there existed no undue risk that
Micosa will commit another crime during his period of probation and that his
being placed on probation would be to the benefit of society as a whole.
In the face of all these, IRRI remained adamant and insisted on Micosa's
termination. Certainly, said termination cannot be upheld for it lacked not
only a legal basis but factual basis as well.
Even under IRRI's Employment Policy and Regulations, the dismissal of
Micosa's on the ground of his conviction for homicide cannot be sustained.
The miscellaneous provisions of said personnel manual mentions of
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude as a ground for dismissal.
IRRI simply assumed that conviction of the crime of homicide is conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude. We do not subscribe to this view.
Moral turpitude has been defined in Can v. Galing 10 citing In Re
Basa11 and Tak Ng v. Republic12 as everything which is done contrary to
justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity
in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to
society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals.
As to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to
determine.13 Thus, the precipitate conclusion of IRRI that conviction of the
crime of homicide involves moral turpitude is unwarranted considering that
the said crime which resulted from an act of incomplete self-defense from
an unlawful aggression by the victim has not been so classified as involving
moral turpitude.
IRRI argues that the crime of homicide committed by Micosa involves moral
turpitude as the killing of a man is conclusively an act against justice and is
immoral in itself not merely prohibited by law. It added that Micosa stabbed
the victim more than what was necessary to repel the attack.
seor as malum prohibitum, since there are crimes which are mala in se and
yet but rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve
moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only.16 It follows therefore, that moral
turpitude is somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which
must be left to the process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are
reached.
In fine, there is nothing in this case to show any abuse of discretion by the
National Labor Relations Commission in affirming the decision of the Labor
Arbiter finding that Micosa was illegally dismissed. For certiorari to lie, there
must be capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very
antithesis of the judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil
and common traditions.17 The abuse of discretion must be grave and patent,
and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or
despotically.18
WHEREFORE, the petition, is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

IRRI failed to comprehend the significance of the facts in their totality. The SO ORDERED.
facts on record show that Micosa was then urinating and had his back turned
when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly
rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim
to stop the attack but was ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that
position that he drew a fan knife from the left pocket of his shirt and
desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold on Micosa only after
the latter had stabbed him several times. These facts show that Micosa's
intention was not to slay the victim but only to defend his person. The
appreciation in his favor of the mitigating circumstances of self- defense and
voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating circumstance
demonstrate that Micosa's character and intentions were not inherently vile,
immoral or unjust.

This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve
moral turpitude. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending
on the degree of the crime.14 Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal
act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but
whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question
of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances.15While
. . . generally but not always, crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while
crimes mala prohibita do not, it, cannot always be ascertained whether
moral turpitude does or does not exist by classifying a crime as malum in
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 180363 April 28, 2009
EDGAR Y. TEVES, Petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HERMINIO G.
TEVES, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution is whether the crime of which petitioner Edgar Y.
Teves was convicted in Teves v. Sandiganbayan1 involved moral turpitude.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd
legislative district of Negros Oriental during the May 14, 2007 elections. On
March 30, 2007, respondent Herminio G. Teves filed a petition to
disqualify2petitioner on the ground that in Teves v. Sandiganbayan,3 he
was convicted of violating Section 3(h), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for possessing pecuniary or
financial interest in a cockpit, which is prohibited under Section 89(2) of the
Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, and was sentenced to pay a fine
of P10,000.00. Respondent alleged that petitioner is disqualified from
running for public office because he was convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification from public office.4 The case was docketed as SPA No. 07-
242 and assigned to the COMELEC’s First Division.
On May 11, 2007, the COMELEC First Division disqualified petitioner from
running for the position of member of House of Representatives and
ordered the cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy.5
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc
which was denied in its assailed October 9, 2007 Resolution for being
moot, thus:
It appears, however, that [petitioner] lost in the last 14 May 2007
congressional elections for the position of member of the House of
Representatives of the Third district of Negros Oriental thereby rendering
the instant Motion for Reconsideration moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration
dated 28 May 2007 filed by respondent Edgar Y. Teves challenging the
Resolution of this Commission (First Division) promulgated on 11 May
2007 is hereby DENIED for having been rendered moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.6
Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:
I.
THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN THE COMELEC EN BANC
DEMURRED IN RESOLVING THE MAIN ISSUE RAISED IN
PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, WHETHER
PETITIONER IS DISQUALIFIED TO RUN FOR PUBLIC OFFICE TAKING
INTO CONSIDERATION THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN
G.R. NO. 154182.
II.
THE MAIN ISSUE IS NOT RENDERED MOOT AND ACADEMIC AS THE
RESOLUTION THEREOF WILL DETERMINE PETITIONER’S
QUALIFICATION TO RUN FOR OTHER PUBLIC POSITIONS IN FUTURE
ELECTIONS.
III.
THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN THE COMELEC EN BANC IN
EFFECT AFFIRMED THE FINDINGS OF THE FIRST DIVISION WHICH
RULED THAT PETITIONER’S CONVICTION FOR VIOLATION OF
SECTION 3(H) OF R.A. 3019 AND THE IMPOSITION OF FINE IS A
CONVICTION FOR A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE.
A.
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED OF A
CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE SHOULD BE RESOLVED
TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE FINDINGS OF THE SUPREME
COURT IN G.R. NO. 154182.
B.
THERE IS NOTHING IN THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT
THAT SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF THE FIRST DIVISION OF THE
COMELEC, THAT BASED ON THE "TOTALITY OF FACTS" DOCTRINE,
PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL
TURPITUDE.7
The petition is impressed with merit.
The fact that petitioner lost in the congressional race in the May 14, 2007
elections did not effectively moot the issue of whether he was disqualified
from running for public office on the ground that the crime he was
convicted of involved moral turpitude. It is still a justiciable issue which the
COMELEC should have resolved instead of merely declaring that the
disqualification case has become moot in view of petitioner’s defeat.
Further, there is no basis in the COMELEC’s findings that petitioner is
eligible to run again in the 2010 elections because his disqualification shall
be deemed removed after the expiration of a period of five years from
service of the sentence. Assuming that the elections would be held on May
14, 2010, the records show that it was only on May 24, 2005 when
petitioner paid the fine of P10,000.00 he was sentenced to pay in Teves v.
Sandignbayan.8 Such being the reckoning point, thus, the five-year
disqualification period will end only on May 25, 2010. Therefore he would
still be ineligible to run for public office during the May 14, 2010 elections.
Hence, it behooves the Court to resolve the issue of whether or not
petitioner’s violation of Section 3(h), R.A. No. 3019 involves moral
turpitude.1avvphi1
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code reads:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by
competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final
judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for
which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months,
or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a
candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon
or granted amnesty.lawphil.net
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed
removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or
incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five
years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again
becomes disqualified. (Emphasis supplied)
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to
justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity
in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to
society in general.9
Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019 of which petitioner was convicted, reads:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any
business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or
takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the
Constitution or by any law from having any interest.
The essential elements of the violation of said provision are as follows: 1)
The accused is a public officer; 2) he has a direct or indirect financial or
pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction; 3) he either: a)
intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such
interest, or b) is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or
by law.10
Thus, there are two modes by which a public officer who has a direct or
indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or
transaction may violate Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019. The first mode is when
the public officer intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in
connection with his financial or pecuniary interest in any business,
contract, or transaction. The second mode is when he is prohibited from
having such an interest by the Constitution or by law.11
In Teves v. Sandiganbayan,12 petitioner was convicted under the second
mode for having pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit which is
prohibited under Sec. 89(2) of the Local Government Code of 1991. The
Court held therein:
However, the evidence for the prosecution has established that petitioner
Edgar Teves, then mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, owned the cockpit
in question. In his sworn application for registration of cockpit filed on 26
September 1983 with the Philippine Gamefowl Commission, Cubao,
Quezon City, as well as in his renewal application dated 6 January 1989
he stated that he is the owner and manager of the said cockpit. Absent any
evidence that he divested himself of his ownership over the cockpit, his
ownership thereof is rightly to be presumed because a thing once proved
to exist continues as long as is usual with things of that nature. His affidavit
dated 27 September 1990 declaring that effective January 1990 he "turned
over the management of the cockpit to Mrs. Teresita Z. Teves for the
reason that [he] could no longer devote a full time as manager of the said
entity due to other work pressure" is not sufficient proof that he divested
himself of his ownership over the cockpit. Only the management of the
cockpit was transferred to Teresita Teves effective January 1990. Being
the owner of the cockpit, his interest over it was direct.
Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves over the cockpit were
transferred to his wife, still he would have a direct interest thereon
because, as correctly held by respondent Sandiganbayan, they remained
married to each other from 1983 up to 1992, and as such their property
relation can be presumed to be that of conjugal partnership of gains in the
absence of evidence to the contrary. Article 160 of the Civil Code provides
that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife. And Section 143 of the Civil Code declares all the property
of the conjugal partnership of gains to be owned in common by the
husband and wife. Hence, his interest in the Valencia Cockpit is direct and
is, therefore, prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991, which
reads:
Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest. – (a) It shall be
unlawful for any local government official or employee, directly or
indirectly, to:
xxxx
(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a local
government unit…. [Emphasis supplied].
The offense proved, therefore, is the second mode of violation of Section
3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, which is possession of a prohibited interest.13
However, conviction under the second mode does not automatically mean
that the same involved moral turpitude. A determination of all surrounding
circumstances of the violation of the statute must be considered. Besides,
moral turpitude does not include such acts as are not of themselves
immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited, as in
the instant case.
Thus, in Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections,14 the Court clarified that:
Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this
reason that "as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme
Court to determine." In resolving the foregoing question, the Court is
guided by one of the general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral
turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not, the rationale of which was
set forth in "Zari v. Flores," to wit:
"It (moral turpitude) implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the
fact that it is punishable by law or not. It must not be merely mala prohibita,
but the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself,
and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude. Moral turpitude
does not, however, include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but
whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited."
This guideline nonetheless proved short of providing a clear-cut solution,
for in "International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC, the Court admitted
that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does
not exist by merely classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum
prohibitum. There are crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely
involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude
and are mala prohibita only. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime
involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently
depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute.
(Emphasis supplied)1awphi1
Applying the foregoing guidelines, we examined all the circumstances
surrounding petitioner’s conviction and found that the same does not
involve moral turpitude.
First, there is neither merit nor factual basis in COMELEC’s finding that
petitioner used his official capacity in connection with his interest in the
cockpit and that he hid the same by transferring the management to his
wife, in violation of the trust reposed on him by the people.
The COMELEC, in justifying its conclusion that petitioner’s conviction
involved moral turpitude, misunderstood or misapplied our ruling in Teves
v. Sandiganbayan. According to the COMELEC:
In the present case, while the crime for which [petitioner] was convicted
may per se not involve moral turpitude, still the totality of facts evinces [his]
moral turpitude. The prohibition was intended to avoid any conflict of
interest or any instance wherein the public official would favor his own
interest at the expense of the public interest. The [petitioner] knew of the
prohibition but he attempted to circumvent the same by holding out that the
Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center is to be owned by a certain Daniel
Teves. Later on, he would aver that he already divested himself of any
interest of the cockpit in favor of his wife. But the Supreme Court saw
through the ruse and declared that what he divested was only the
management of the cockpit but not the ownership. And even if the
ownership is transferred to his wife, the respondent would nevertheless
have an interest thereon because it would still belong to the conjugal
partnership of gains, of which the [petitioner] is the other half.
[Petitioner] therefore maintained ownership of the cockpit by deceit. He
has the duty to divest himself but he did not and instead employed means
to hide his interests. He knew that it was prohibited he nevertheless
concealed his interest thereon. The facts that he hid his interest denotes
his malicious intent to favor self-interest at the expense of the public. Only
a man with a malevolent, decadent, corrupt and selfish motive would cling
on and conceal his interest, the acquisition of which is prohibited. This
plainly shows his moral depravity and proclivity to put primacy on his self
interest over that of his fellowmen. Being a public official, his act is also a
betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the people. Clearly, the totality of
his acts is contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, honesty and
good morals. The crime, as committed by the [petitioner], plainly involves
moral turpitude.15
On the contrary, the Court’s ruling states:
The Sandiganbayan found that the charge against Mayor Teves for
causing the issuance of the business permit or license to operate the
Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center is "not well-founded." This it
based, and rightly so, on the additional finding that only the Sangguniang
Bayan could have issued a permit to operate the Valencia Cockpit in the
year 1992. Indeed, under Section 447(3) of the LGC of 1991, which took
effect on 1 January 1992, it is the Sangguniang Bayan that has the
authority to issue a license for the establishment, operation, and
maintenance of cockpits. Unlike in the old LGC, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337,
wherein the municipal mayor was the presiding officer of the Sangguniang
Bayan, under the LGC of 1991, the mayor is not so anymore and is not
even a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. Hence, Mayor Teves could not
have intervened or taken part in his official capacity in the issuance of a
cockpit license during the material time, as alleged in the information,
because he was not a member of the Sangguniang Bayan.16
Thus, petitioner, as then Mayor of Valencia, did not use his influence,
authority or power to gain such pecuniary or financial interest in the
cockpit. Neither did he intentionally hide his interest in the subject cockpit
by transferring the management thereof to his wife considering that the
said transfer occurred before the effectivity of the present LGC prohibiting
possession of such interest.
As aptly observed in Teves v. Sandiganbayan:
As early as 1983, Edgar Teves was already the owner of the Valencia
Cockpit. Since then until 31 December 1991, possession by a local official
of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not yet prohibited. It was before the
effectivity of the LGC of 1991, or on January 1990, that he transferred the
management of the cockpit to his wife Teresita. In accordance therewith it
was Teresita who thereafter applied for the renewal of the cockpit
registration. Thus, in her sworn applications for renewal of the registration
of the cockpit in question dated 28 January 1990 and 18 February 1991,
she stated that she is the Owner/Licensee and Operator/Manager of the
said cockpit. In her renewal application dated 6 January 1992, she referred
to herself as the Owner/Licensee of the cockpit. Likewise in the separate
Lists of Duly Licensed Personnel for Calendar Years 1991 and 1992,
which she submitted on 22 February 1991 and 17 February 1992,
respectively, in compliance with the requirement of the Philippine
Gamefowl Commission for the renewal of the cockpit registration, she
signed her name as Operator/Licensee.17 (Emphasis supplied)
Second, while possession of business and pecuniary interest in a cockpit
licensed by the local government unit is expressly prohibited by the
present LGC, however, its illegality does not mean that violation thereof
necessarily involves moral turpitude or makes such possession of interest
inherently immoral. Under the old LGC, mere possession by a public
officer of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not among the prohibitions.
Thus, in Teves v. Sandiganbayan, the Court took judicial notice of the fact
that:
x x x under the old LGC, mere possession of pecuniary interest in a
cockpit was not among the prohibitions enumerated in Section 41 thereof.
Such possession became unlawful or prohibited only upon the advent of
the LGC of 1991, which took effect on 1 January 1992. Petitioner Edgar
Teves stands charged with an offense in connection with his prohibited
interest committed on or about 4 February 1992, shortly after the maiden
appearance of the prohibition. Presumably, he was not yet very much
aware of the prohibition. Although ignorance thereof would not excuse him
from criminal liability, such would justify the imposition of the lighter penalty
of a fine of P10,000 under Section 514 of the LGC of 1991.18 (Italics
supplied)
The downgrading of the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of nine
years and twenty-one days as minimum to twelve years as maximum to a
lighter penalty of a fine of P10,000.00 is a recognition that petitioner’s
violation was not intentionally done contrary to justice, modesty, or good
morals but due to his lack of awareness or ignorance of the prohibition.
Lastly, it may be argued that having an interest in a cockpit is detrimental
to public morality as it tends to bring forth idlers and gamblers, hence,
violation of Section 89(2) of the LGC involves moral turpitude.
Suffice it to state that cockfighting, or sabong in the local parlance, has a
long and storied tradition in our culture and was prevalent even during the
Spanish occupation.19 While it is a form of gambling, the morality thereof or
the wisdom in legalizing it is not a justiciable issue. In Magtajas v. Pryce
Properties Corporation, Inc., it was held that:
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal
per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the
people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or
penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to
Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own
discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it
without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow
others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has
prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-
racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom,
which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it
been said that courts do no sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories.
That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that
questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicability of statutes are
not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative
and executive departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of
government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches
decide, they are answerable only to their own conscience and the
constituents who will ultimately judge their acts, and not to the courts of
justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections dated May 11, 2007 and October 9, 2007
disqualifying petitioner Edgar Y. Teves from running for the position of
Representative of the 3rd District of Negros Oriental, are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and a new one is entered declaring that the crime committed
by petitioner (violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019) did not involve moral
turpitude.

SO ORDERED.