OROLA VS. ATTY. RAMOS Three tests were provided in the Hornilla v.

Salunat ruling in
A.C. No. 9860 | Sept. 11, 2013 | PERLAS-BERNABE, J determining whether or not there is conflict of interests: “whether or not
in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or
JOSEPHINE L. OROLA, MYRNA L. OROLA, MANUEL L. OROLA, MARY claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he
ANGELYN OROLA-BELARGA, MARJORIE MELBA OROLA-CALIP, AND KAREN
argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he
OROLA, Complainants, v. ATTY. JOSEPH ADOR RAMOS, Respondent.
argues for the other client.”
Second, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously
affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also
FACTS:
whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first
The respondent acted as a collaborating counsel with Atty. Ely
client any knowledge acquired through their connection.
Azarraga, J.r. in representing Maricar, Karen, and the other heirs of late
Lastly, whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an
Antonio L. Orola (Heirs of Antonio) in the settlement of the estate of
attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and
Trinidad Laserna-Orola. The Heirs of Antonio, together with the Heirs of
loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing
Trinidad, who were the complainants in the disbarment case, moved for
in the performance thereof.
the removal of Emilio Orola, the adverse party, as the administrator of
In the instant case, records reveal that respondent was the
Trinidad’s estate. Subsequently, respondent appeared as a
collaborating counsel not only for Maricar as claimed by him, but for all
collaborating counsel for Emilio, the opposing party, in the same case.
the Heirs of Antonio. The Heirs of Trinidad and the
Due to this, complainants filed a disbarment complaint before the
Heirs of Antonio succeeded in removing Emilio as administrator for
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on the ground that the
having committed acts prejudicial to their interests. However, the
respondent violated the prohibition against representing conflicting
respondent clearly violated the prohibition against representing
interests under Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
conflicting interests when he proceeded to represent Emilio for the
Respondent contended that he never appeared as counsel for
purpose of seeking his reinstatement as administrator in the same case.
the complainants. He merely represented Maricar temporarily at the
latter’s request due to the unavailability of Atty. Azarraga and his service
Attorney; Attorney-Client Relationship. A disbarment complaint was filed
was free of charge. He also contended that he consulted Maricar before
against respondent Atty. Ramos for representing conflicting interests in
he undertook to represent Emilio in the same case and that no
the same case. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Ramos violated Rule
information was disclosed to him by Maricar or Atty. Azarraga at any
15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Under
instance.
the afore-cited rule, it is explicit that a lawyer is prohibited from
representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former
ISSUE:
client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action
Whether or not respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests
or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the
in violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code
principles of public policy and good taste. It behooves lawyers not only
to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the
HELD:
appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants
The Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of
provides that:
paramount interest in the administration of justice. Atty. Ramos’
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except
justification that no confidential information was relayed to him is not an
by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of
excuse since the rule on conflict of interests provides an absolute
the facts.
prohibition from representation with respect to opposing parties in the
The above-cited rule is clear and unequivocal that a lawyer is
same case. Thus, a lawyer cannot change his representation from one
prohibited from representing new clients whose interests oppose that of
party to the latter’s opponent in the same case. Joseph L. Orola, et al.
a former client in any manner, whether they are parties in the same
v. Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos, A.C. No. 9860, September 11, 2013.
action or on totally unrelated cases.
MABINI COLLEGES VS. ATTY. PAJARILLO,
A.C. No. 10687 | July 22, 2015 | VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
MABINI COLLEGES, INC. REPRESENTED BY MARCEL N. LUKBAN,
ALBERTO I. GARCIA, JR., AND MA. PAMELA ROSSANA A.
APUYA, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSE D. PAJARILLO, Respondent.
CONFLICT OF INTEREST – What A Lawyer Owes His Former Client Is
To Maintain Inviolate The Client’s Confidence Or To Refrain From Doing
Anything Which Will Injuriously Affect Him In Any Matter In Which He
Previously Represented Him…
FACTS:
Mabini Colleges, Inc was composed of two opposing factions in 1995,
the Adeva Group, and the Lukban Group. Respondent Atty. Jose
Pajarillo was appointed as counsel by the complainant in 1996. In
March, 1999, the Adeva Group issued a Board Resolution which
authorised Pilar Andrade to apply for a loan with the Rural Bank of
Paracale (RBP) Daet Branch, which the Lukban Group opposed thru a
letter because the Adeva Group appointed Librado Guerra and Cesar
Echano who were not registered as stockholders in the Stock and
Transfer Book of the complainant, and that the complainant was having
financial difficulties. The Adeva Group assured the bank that it had
sufficient capacity to pay the loan, hence the RBP approved the loan for
P200,000.00 On September 27, 1999, the Securities and Exchange
Commission issued an Order nullifying the appointment of Guerra and
Echano by the Adeva Group as stockholders; thus the complainant
informed RBP of this development. RBP in turn wrote the complainant
a letter acknowledging its receipt of the SEC Order and informing it that
the SEC order was referred to its (RBP) legal counsel, which turned out
to be respondent Atty. Pajarillo. Complainant and RBP increased the
loan to P400,000.00, but the RBP subsequently foreclosed the
mortgage. The complainant filed a complaint for annulment of
mortgage with prayer for preliminary injunction, where the respondent
entered his appearance as counsel for RBP. The complainant then
filed a disbarment case against the respondent for allegedly
representing conflicting interests, and failure to exhibit candour, fairness
and loyalty. In his defense, he alleges that the Marcel Lukban, et al
cannot represent the company in this complaint because they were not
duly authorised by the Board of Directors to file the complaint. Second,
he is not covered by the prohibition on conflict of interest as this applies
only to the legal counsel of the complainant; he merely served as a
corporate secretary and did not serve as its counsel. Third, all the
documents on the loan agreement between RBP and the complainant
were all public records, thus he could not have taken advantage of his
position as the mere corporate secretary of the complainant.
The Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of
representing conflicting interests, as shown by the cash vouchers from
1994 to 2001 showing that he was paid by complainant for his services.
The personality of the complainant to file the complaint is immaterial
since proceedings for disbarment may be taken by the Supreme Court
moto propio or by the IBP upon verified complaint. His
recommendation to suspend respondent from the practice of law for
one year was affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is guilty of representing conflicting
interests
RULING:
We rule in the affirmative. We thus affirm the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and Resolution
Nos. XX-2013-770 and XXI-2014-290 of the IBP Board of Governors.
Indeed, respondent represented conflicting interests in violation of
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that “[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except
by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts.”
This rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients whose
interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not
they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated
cases.1 Based on the principles of public policy and good taste, this
prohibition on representing conflicting interests enjoins lawyers not only
to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants
be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice. In Maturan v.
Gonzales we further explained the rationale for the prohibition:
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and
client, which is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. A
lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client’s
case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as
the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and
guarded with care. No opportunity must be given him to take advantage
of the client’s secrets. A lawyer must have the fullest confidence of his
client. For if the confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the
loss thereof.
Meanwhile, in Hornilla v. Salunat, we explained the test to determine
the existence of conflict of interest:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent
interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is “whether or not in
behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim,
but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for
one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the
other client.” This rule covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of
interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney
to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter
in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in
his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired
through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is
whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from
the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client
or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance thereof.
The rule prohibiting conflict of interest applies to situations wherein a
lawyer would be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse
to any of his present or former clients. It also applies when the lawyer
represents a client against a former client in a controversy that is
related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous
litigation in which he appeared for the former client.6 This rule applies
regardless of the degree of adverse interests.7 What a lawyer owes his
former client is to maintain inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain
from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in
which he previously represented him.8 A lawyer may only be allowed to
represent a client involving the same or a substantially related matter
that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former client
consents to it after consultation.
Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, we find that respondent
represented conflicting interests when he served as counsel for RBP in
the case for annulment of mortgage filed by the complainant,
respondent’s former client, against RBP.
The finding of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent was
compensated by complainant for his retained legal services is
supported by the evidence on record, the cash vouchers from 1994 to
2001. Clearly, complainant was respondent’s former client. And
respondent appeared as counsel of RBP in a case filed by his former
client against RBP. This makes respondent guilty of representing
conflicting interests since respondent failed to show any written consent
of all concerned (particularly the complainant) given after a full
disclosure of the facts representing conflicting interests.10
We also note that the respondent acted for the complainant’s interest on
the loan transaction between RBP and the complainant when he sent a
letter dated May 14, 1999 to RBP to assure the latter of the financial
capacity of the complainant to pay the loan. But as counsel for RBP in
the case for annulment of mortgage, he clearly acted against the
interest of the complainant, his former client.
Contrary to the respondent’s claim, it is of no moment that all the
documents and information in connection with the loan transaction
between RBP and the complainant were public records. In Hilado v.
David,11 we laid down the following doctrinal pronouncements:
The principle which forbids an attorney who has been engaged to
represent a client from thereafter appearing on behalf of the client’s
opponent applies equally even though during the continuance of the
employment nothing of a confidential nature was revealed to the
attorney by the client. (Christian vs. Waialua Agricultural Co., 30 Hawaii,
553, Footnote 7, C. J. S., 828.)
Where it appeared that an attorney, representing one party in litigation,
had formerly represented the adverse party with respect to the same
matter involved in the litigation, the court need not inquire as to how
much knowledge the attorney acquired from his former client during that
relationship, before refusing to permit the attorney to represent the
adverse party. (Brown vs. Miller, 52 App. D. C. 330; 286, F. 994.)
In order that a court may prevent an attorney from appearing against a
former client, it is unnecessary that the court ascertain in detail the
extent to which the former client’s affairs might have a bearing on the
matters involved in the subsequent litigation on the attorney’s
knowledge thereof. (Boyd vs. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 274 P., 7; 51
Nev., 264.)
This rule has been so strictly enforced that it has been held that an
attorney, on terminating his employment, cannot thereafter act as
counsel against his client in the same general matter, even though,
while acting for his former client, he acquired no knowledge which could
operate to his client’s disadvantage in the subsequent adverse
employment. (Pierce vs. Palmer [1910], 31 R. I., 432; 77 Atl., 201, Ann.
Cas., 1912S, 181.)
Thus, the nature and extent of the information received by the lawyer
from his client is irrelevant in determining the existence of conflict of
interest.

Finally, we agree with the Investigating Commissioner that a complaint

for disbarment is imbued with public interest which allows for a liberal
rule on legal standing. Under Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court, “[proceedings for the disbarment, suspension or discipline of
attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of
any person.” Thus, in the present case, we find that Marcel N. Lukban,
Alberto I. Garcia Jr., and Ma. Pamela Rossana A. Apuya can institute
the complaint for disbarment even without authority from the Board of
Directors of the complainant.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Resolution No. XX-2013-770 and

Resolution No. XXI-2014-290 of the IBP Board of Governors imposing a
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one year against
respondent Atty. Jose D. Pajarillo are hereby AFFIRMED.
REGALA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 105938 | 262 SCRA 125 | KAPUNAN, J.
[G.R. No. 105938. September 20, 1996]
TEODORO R. REGALA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, AVELINO V. CRUZ,
JOSE C. CONCEPCION, ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, VICTOR P. LAZATIN,
and EDUARDO U. ESCUETA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
ACTING THROUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT, and RAUL S. ROCO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 108113. September 20, 1996]
PARAJA G. HAYUDINI, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION / INFORMATION
FACTS :
Clients consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding
the financial and corporate structure, framework and set-up of the
corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their professional
advice in the form of, among others, the deeds of assignment covering
their client's shareholdings.
Petitioners fear that identifying their clients would implicate them in the
very activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the aforementioned corporations.
1. July 31, 1987 – complaint before the Sandiganbayan of PCGG vs.
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., (principal defendant) et al. for recovery of
alleged ill-gotten wealth, i. e., shares of stocks in named corporations in
PCGG Case No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033), entitled "R. P. v. Cojuangco,
et al."
2. Defendants named in the case are herein petitioners (plus private
respondent Raul S. Roco) - then partners of the law firm Angara, Abello,
Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA Law Firm).
3. ACCRA Law Firm – acquired info on assets of clients, personal and
business circumstances; assisted in organization and acquisition of
business associations and/or organizations (companies listed in Civil
Case 0033), where its members acted as incorporators, or simply, as
stockholders etc; delivered documents which substantiate the client's
equity holdings, i.e., (1) stock certificates endorsed in blank
representing the shares registered in the client's name, and (2) a blank
deed of trust or assignment covering said shares; acted as nominees-
stockholders of the said corporations involved in sequestration
proceedings (as office practice)
4. August 20, 1991 - respondent PCGG’s "Motion to Admit Third
Amended Complaint" and "Third Amended Complaint" excluded private
respondent Raul Roco from complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 because
of his undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for
Created by: Ma. Angela Leonor C. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010
Page 24 of 147 whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the
companies involved in PCGG Case No. 33.
5. Third Amended Complaint – said defendants conspired in helping set
up, through the use of the coconut levy funds, UCPB, UNICOM,
COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, and more than 20 other coconut levy
funded corporations, including the acquisition of San Miguel
Corporation shares
6. ACCRA Investments Corporation - became the holder of
approximately 15 million shares (roughly 3.3%) of total outstanding
capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987; 44 among the top 100
biggest stockholders of UCPB (about 1,400,000 shareholders); a
wholly-owned investment arm
7. Edgardo J. Angara - holding approximately 3,744 shares as of
February, 1984 of UCPB 8. Expanded Amended Complaint of ACCRA –
said that is only in legitimate lawyering; became holders of shares of
stock in the corporations listed but do not claim any proprietary interest
in the said shares of stock; said Avelino V. Cruz an incorporator in 1976
of Mermaid Marketing Corporation but for legitimate business purposes
and already transferred shares
9. Petitioner Paraja Hayudini - denied being onvolved in the alleged ill-
gotten wealth
10. "COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" dated October 8, 1991 with
Counter-Motion of ACCRA – moving that respondent PCGG similarly
grant the same treatment to them (exclusion as parties-defendants) as
accorded Roco.
11. Conditions precedent for the exclusion of petitioners, namely
(PCGG’s Comment): (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b)
documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) deeds
of assignments petitioners executed for clients covering shares
12. PCGG’s supposed proof to substantiate compliance by Roco: (a)
Letter to respondent PCGG of his the counsel reiterating previous
request for reinvestigation; (b) Affidavit as Attachment; (c) Letter of the
Roco, Bunag, and Kapunan Law Offices originally requesting the
Created by: Ma. Angela Leonor C. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010
Page 25 of 147 reinvestigation and/or re-examination of evidence of
PCGG against Roco
13. Roco did not refute petitioners' contention that he did actually not
reveal identity of the client, nor undertook to reveal the identity of the
client for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder.
14. March 18, 1992 - respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated
Resolution herein questioned, denying the exclusion of petitioners for
their refusal to comply with the conditions by PCGG
15. Hence, petition for certiorari, grounds: strict application of the law of
agency; absolutely no evidence that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had
undertaken to reveal, disclosure not constitute a substantial distinction
for equal protection clause, favoritism and undue preference; not
holding that, under the facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege
prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their
client(s) and the other information requested by the PCGG;
unreasonable or unjust
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lawyer’s fiduciary duty (uberrimei fidei) may be
asserted in refusing to disclose the identity of clients [name of
petitioners' client(s)] under the facts and circumstances obtaining in the
instant case
HELD:
The High Court upheld that petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of
their clients under pain of the breach of fiduciary duty owing to their
clients, because the facts of the instant case clearly fall within
recognized exceptions to the rule that the client's name is not privileged
information. Sandiganbayan resolution annulled and set aside.
Petitioners excluded from complaint.
1. A lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the
name or identity of this client.
Reasons:
a) Court has a right to know that the client whose
privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh
and blood.
b) Privilege begins to exist only after the attorneyclient
relationship has been established. The attorney-client
privilege does not attach until there is a client.
c) Privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the
relationship.
d) Due process considerations Created by: Ma. Angela
Leonor C. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 26 of
147 require that the opposing party should, as a general
rule, know his adversary.
2. BUT (Exceptions/Racio Decidendi): When the client's name
itself has an independent significance, such that disclosure
would then reveal client confidences
a. A strong probability exists that revealing the client's
name would implicate that client in the very activity for
which he sought the lawyer's advice. (Baird exception
for freedom of consultation)
b. Disclosure would open the client to civil liability. (case at
bar)
c. Government's lawyers have no case against an
attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name,
the said name would furnish the only link that would
form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an
individual of a crime. (case at bar – BAIRD
EXCEPTION)
d. Relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on
which the client seeks legal assistance (case at bar)
e. Nature of the attorney-client relationship has been
previously disclosed and it is the identity which is
intended to be confidential
3. Petitioners were impleaded by PCGG as co-defendants to force
them to disclose the identity of their clients, after the "bigger
fish" as they say in street parlance — the names of their clients
in exchange for exclusion from the complaint. (Primavera
Farms, Inc., et al. vs. PCGG Mario Ongkiko) - "so called client is
Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco" (leverage to nail clients)
4. No valid cause of action. It would seem that petitioners are
merely standing in for their clients as defendants in the
complaint. Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the basis
of activities and services performed in the course of their duties
as lawyers.
5. The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the
Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio operarum (contract of
lease of services) where one person lets his services and
another hires them without reference to the object of which the
services are to be performed. Their services may be
compensated by honorarium or for hire, and mandato (contract
of agency) wherein a friend on whom reliance could be placed
makes a contract in his name, but gives up all that he gained by
the contract to the person who requested him. Created by: Ma.
Angela Leonor C. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 27 of
147
6. OTHERS: Privileged Communication Laws Applicable
a. Old Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the Philippine
Commission on August 7, 1901. Section 383 "forbids
counsel, without authority of his client to reveal any
communication made by the client to him or his advice
given thereon in the course of professional
employment."
b. Rules of Court Sec. 24: “Disqualification by reason of
privileged communication. — The following persons
cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the
following cases: “An attorney cannot, without the
consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or his advice
given thereon in the course of…”
c. Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states, Sec. 20: “duty of
an attorney:
(e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every
peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and
to accept no compensation in connection with his
client's business except from him or with his knowledge
and approval.”
d. Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
“A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he
shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him.”
e. Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: The
lawyers owes "entire devotion to the interest of the
client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability,"
7. Equal protection clause - a guarantee which provides a wall of
protection against uneven application of status and regulations.
In the broader sense, the guarantee operates against uneven
application of legal norms so that all persons under similar
circumstances would be accorded the same treatment.
8. Violates the equal protection guarantee and the right against
self-incrimination and subverts the lawyer-client confidentiality
privilege.
FACTS:
 Petitioners in this case and private respondent Roco were all
then partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion,
Regala and Cruz Law Offices (commonly known as ACCRA)
 ACCRA performed services for clients which included acquiring
and/or organizing business associations and/or organizations
where it acted as incorporators or simply as stockholders
 As members of the law firm, petitioners and Roco admit that
they assisted in the organization and acquisition of companies
included in Civil Case No. 0033. In keeping with the office
practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders.
Anong kalokohan yan?
o Civil Case No. 0033 – “RP v. Eduardo Cojuangco et.
al.”, for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, which includes
shares of stock in certain corporations
 PCGG later on filed a motion to admit 3rd amended complaint,
which excluded Roco in Civil Case 33 as party defendant.
PCGG was removing Roco because Roco was going to make
choochoo and reveal the identity of the principals.
 The ACCRA lawyers then filed a comment and/or opposition
saying that they should also be removed the way that Roco
was.
 PCGG then said that it will ask for their exclusion only if they will
also disclose the identity of their clients
 During the proceedings, Roco did not actually reveal the identity
of the client for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder
 The ACCRA lawyer’s motion for exclusion was denied (they
refused to comply with the PCGG’s offer) by the PCGG and the
court. Hence, this motion for certiorari
ISSUE #1:
W/N the ACCRA lawyers should be excluded from the case

HELD #1:
 Yes. It is apparent that the ACCRA lawyers were only impleaded
to force them to disclose the identity of their clients.
 PCGG has no valid cause of action

ISSUE #2:
W/N the attorney-client privilege prohibits the ACCRA lawyers from
revealing the identity of their clients

HELD #2:
 General rule: a client’s identity should not be shrouded in
mystery
o Exceptions: where a strong probability exists that
revealing the client’s name would implicate that client in
the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice
o Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability
o Where revealing the identity would furnish the only link
that would be necessary to convict an individual of a
crime
 The prosecution should rely on the strength of their evidence
and not on the weakness of the defense
 Roco merely stated that he was acting as nominee-stockholder
for the client and is part of legitimate lawyering. The ACCRA
lawyers also made such statement and should also be dropped.

IN RE: CANON 14
 the relation of attorney and client is strictly personal and highly
confidential and fiduciary
 the lawyer is more than a mere agent or servant because he
possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on
him by his client
PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an
G.R. Nos. 115439-41 | 275 SCRA 505 | July 16, 1997 unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE

SANDIGANBAYAN, MANSUETO V. HONRADA, CEFERINO S.
PAREDES, JR. and GENEROSO S. SANSAET, respondents.

LIMITATION OF PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION

FACTS:
Paredes, was the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then Governor
of the same province and is at present a Congressman. Atty. Sansaet is
a practicing attorney who served as counsel for Paredes in several
instances. In 1976, Paredes applied for a free patent over a piece of
land and it was granted to him. But later, the Director of Lands found out
that Paredes obtained the same through fraudulent misrepresentations
in his application. A civil case was filed and Sansaet served as counsel
of Paredes. A criminal case for perjury was subsequently filed against
Paredes and Sansaet also served as counsel.

Later, Teofilo Gelacio, a taxpayer, initiated perjury and graft charges

against Paredes and Sansaet, claiming that they acted in conspiracy, by
not filing an arraignment in the criminal case. To evade responsibility for
his own participation, he claimed that he did so upon the instigation and
inducement of Paredes, and to discharge himself as a government
witness. The Sandiganbayan claimed that there was an attorney-client
privilege and resolved to deny the discharge.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the testimony of Atty. Sansaet is barred by the attorney-
client privilege

HELD :
Statements and communications regarding the commission of a crime
already committed, made by a party who committed it, to an attorney,
consulted as such, are privileged communications. However, the
communication between an attorney and client having to do with the
client's contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are
not covered by the cloak of privilege ordinarily existing in reference to
communications between an attorney and a client. The falsification not
having been committed yet, these communications are outside the pale
of the attorney client privilege.
Moreover, Sansaet himself was a conspirator in the commission of the
falsification. For the communication to be privileged, it must be for a