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SELF-EVIDENCE
RobertAudi
University of Nebraska
Let us begin with the idea that a self-evident propositionis one whose truth
is in some way evident "in itself." This is what one would expect from the mean-
ings of the parts of the compound, and it accords with standarduses of the term.
Now if a proposition,p, is evident in itself, simply "looking at it" in the right way
should reveal some positive status-at least its truth. Looking at it in a way
appropriateto seeing its truth(or to appreciatingits being evident) requiresun-
derstandingit. It will not do, for instance,just to considerit undera non-identifying
Thebasickindof self-evidence
Given these and other points about the notion of the self-evident, I construe
the basic kind of self-evident proposition as (roughly) a truthsuch that any ade-
quate understandingof it meets two conditions: (a) in virtue of having that un-
derstanding,one is justified in believing the proposition(i.e., has justification for
believing it, whether one in fact believes it or not); and (b) if one believes the
proposition on the basis of that understandingof it, then one knows it.2 More
briefly (but not quite equivalently), p is self-evident provided an adequateun-
derstandingof it is sufficient for being justified in believing it and for knowing it
if one believes it on the basis of that understanding.Three elements in this ac-
count need clarificationshere. The first concerns the relationbetween the under-
standingin questionandbelievingp, the second the notion of the adequacyof that
understanding,and the thirdthe need for the second, knowledge condition in the
account.
First, as (a) indicates, it does not follow from the self-evidence of a propo-
sition thatif one understands(and considers) it, then one believes it. This is not to
deny that rational persons tend to believe self-evident propositions they ade-
quately understand,more or less upon comprehendinglyconsidering them. This
tendencyindeed seems partlyconstitutiveof what it is to be a rationalperson.But
Leaving furthersubtleties aside, the crucial point is that in the above char-
acterizationof self-evidence, understandingin clause (a) may be of any of the
three kinds indicated so long as justification is understoodaccordingly.If S oc-
currentlyunderstandsa self-evident proposition,p, S has occurrentjustification
for it, roughly,justification groundedlargely in elements in S's consciousness,
such as awareness of a relation between concepts. If S has strong dispositional
understandingof p, S has dispositionaljustification, roughly in the sense that S
can bringjustifying elements into consciousness in an appropriateway by suit-
able reflection (but does not at the time have them in consciousness). If S has
weak dispositionalunderstandingof p, S has structural justification for it: roughly,
S does not have occurrentor strongdispositionaljustification for it, butthereis an
appropriatepath leading fromjustificatory materialsaccessible to S to an occur-
rent justification for p.3 (I shall assume that when knowledge of a self-evident
propositionis based on understandingit, the understandingmust be occurrentor
strongly dispositional, but there may be, and one could certainly devise, a con-
ception of knowledge with a looser connection to understanding.4)
Something should also be said about the need for the second, knowledge
condition in the proposed account of self-evidence. It is not obvious that it is not
entailed by the first condition, hence in some logical sense redundant.For at least
two reasons, I am inclined to doubt this.
First, there may be contingent,non-self-evident truthssuch that an adequate
understandingof them can groundthe relevantdegree of justification for believ-
ing them, yet the understandingin question is not such that believing the propo-
sition on the basis of it implies knowing thatproposition.Considerthe proposition
that (normal) people who are insulted tend to feel offended. This sounds like a
truism;but on analysis, it seems testable (given an independentspecification of
normality,which is surely available), and presumablyit can be established only
on the basis of experience. We apparently tend, however, to believe it non-
inferentiallyupon understandingit. Certainly feeling offended is highly appro-
priateto being insulted;thatmuch seems to be some kind of conceptualtruth,and
the normalityassumption also makes the proposition seem truistic. Adequately
understandingit, then, seems to provide significantjustification for it. But apart
from knowledge of how people actually take insults, believing, on the basis of
adequatelyunderstandingit, that (normal) people who are insulted tend to feel
offended, does not guaranteeknowing it.
Second, perhapstheremay be, at least in the domainof mathematicsor logic,
a non-self-evidentthoughprovablepropositionthatcan be justifiably believed on
the basis of an adequate understandingof it. One might see what it says with
sufficientclarityto explain thatand to indicate why it is not equivalentto various
close cousins. One might be able to draw a wide range of (valid) inferences from
it and to reject many invalid ones. But one could still be unable to distinguish it
fromone self-evident close cousin, q, such thatit takes great sophisticationto see
the difference between the two, and one's justification for believing p might de-
pend on thinkingof it-in a certain way-as equivalent to q. This way of think-
ing of it as equivalentto q must not imply inferringit from q, since one then need
not have justification for p on the basis of understandingp. We might also sup-
pose that S does not have the false belief thatp is equivalent to q, though, to be
sure, S is disposed to believe this on reflection since it is so difficult to see any
difference.
Even if S does believep is equivalentto q, however,it does not follow thatS's
belief thatp is inferential(indeed, thatmight be quite unlikely whereS takes them
to be equivalent), nor that S's understandingof p, though imperfect and incom-
plete, is not as good overall as we commonly have for self-evident propositions.
Suppose, however, that it is not as good. S might still have a high degree of
justification for believing p. It would not be "complete"or, certainly, maximal
justification;but those levels of justification arenot requiredfor believing p to be
appropriatefor a rationalpersonin the circumstances,nor do we achieve them for
all self-evident propositions we justifiedly believe, such as some that are rather
complex (a topic to which I returnbelow). There is some reason to think, then,
thatthereis a kind of understandingof truepropositionswhich is good enough to
provide a high degree of justification for believing them, yet does not suffice for
knowing them on the basis of that understanding.5
There is still anotherpossibility we should consider. Suppose I entertainthe
proposition that (ordinary,full) first cousins have at least two grandparentsin
common. I may have the thoughtthatfirst cousins arechildrenof siblings (broth-
ers or sisters or a brother and a sister) and that siblings have their parents in
common. These two parentsare of course grandparentsof the first cousins, who
thus have two grandparentsin common. I have adequatelyunderstoodthe orig-
inal propositionandI surelyhave ajustificationfor it, since, fromcousins' having
two grandparentsin common it self-evidently follows that they have at least two
in common. Notice, however, that the propositionthat first cousins have at least
two grandparentsin common cannot in this way be non-inferentially known just
on the basis of my understandingit; it is here known only throughthe self-evident
entailmentjust cited (thoughto be sure one would not have to drawthe inference
explicitly to form a belief of the proposition). This is a case, then, where the
knowledge condition is apparentlynot entailed by the justification condition.
Indeed, without that condition one would mistakenlyconsider the propositionin
question self-evident. It is a priori in the broad sense that it is entailed by a self-
evident proposition(andhas anotherepistemic propertyto be describedshortly).
But this is a differentpoint.
Granted,someone thinking about the proposition that first cousins have at
least two grandparentsin common mighthave the thoughtthat the formercould
be "double cousins," children of siblings on both sides, say two brothersmar-
ried to two sisters. Here one could see the truth of the proposition other than
simply on the basis of understandinghow, as just noted, first cousins must
share two grandparents.But realizing that there can be double cousins is not
necessary for adequately understanding the original proposition. Thus, al-
though there is an understandingof it that is a basis of non-inferentialknowl-
edge of it, adequatelyunderstandingit is not in general sufficient for this. Some
Self-evidence,apriority,andnecessity
groundfor justification, nor even the point thatbelief on the basis of such under-
standingconstitutesknowledge, immediatelyentails necessity. In denying an im-
mediateentailmenthereI meanroughlythatthe claim thatself-evidentpropositions
arenecessaryis neitherself-evident (in any preanalytic,intuitive sense), nor self-
evidently entailed (in any such sense) by any philosophically uncontroversial
accountof self-evidence. Self-evidence, as I conceive it, is a matterof how a truth
can be seen, not a matterof seeing what kind of truthit is.
This absence of an immediateentailmentfrom the self-evident to the neces-
sary is a desirable result of my characterization.Not only is there dispute about
whetherevery a prioripropositionis necessary;9it also seems possible to see the
truth of a self-evident proposition without either seeing that it is necessary or
even having the concept of necessity.l° These are among the reasons I consider it
desirablefor an account of the self-evident to leave room for a theoreticallyin-
teresting account of why the self-evident is necessary-and for debate about
whetherit is.
I cannotdevelop such an accounthere, but a promisingbeginning is made by
reflection on how there could be the requisite kind of a priorijustification of a
contingentproposition.Supposep is only a contingenttruth,hence false in some
worlds. It is at least not clear how adequatelyunderstandingp might suffice to
justify believing it; but it is at best mysterious how such understandingwould
suffice for knowing it. How, for instance, would the relevantunderstandingrule
out one's being in a world wherep is false? By contrast,if at least part of what is
understoodwhen a self-evident truth is adequately understoodis relations be-
tween concepts, andif concepts areabstractentities existing in all possible worlds,
then (on certain additionalassumptions, above all that the relevant relations of
abstractentities are unchanging across worlds)ll two importantpoints follow:
that the truthin question holds (and may in some cases be seen to hold) in all
possible worlds, and that understandingthe relevant conceptual relations can
ground knowledge of it. The concept of categorial exclusion, for instance, is
(intrinsicallyand self-evidently) symmetrical;hence (adequately)understanding
it to obtain between the concept of a dog and that of a cat is sufficient to ground
knowing the necessary truththat if no dogs are cats, no cats are dogs.
As this suggests, my accountis compatiblewith the existence of a de re grasp
of necessity, for instance of the necessary connection between being squareand
being rectangular.It is also compatible with some such grasp being a necessary
non-inferentialbasis of a priorijustification,ratheras seeing the rectangularityof
somethingmay be an essential basis of one's justification for believing the prop-
osition that it is rectangular.12
The cogito raises interestingproblems.My understandingof the (contingent)
propositionthatI exist is special: unlike my understandingof contingenttruthsin
general,it rules out my being in a world in which this propositionis false. But this
is because I must exist in orderto understandany proposition.It is not because of
my understandingof this propositionin particular.Such understandingis, more-
over, apparentlynot the kind that grounds a priorijustification for believing a
Given what I have said about the natureand varieties of the understanding
thatgroundsjustification for self-evident propositions,we may distinguishthose
self-evident propositionsthatarereadilyunderstoodby normaladults(or by peo-
ple of some relevant description,e.g. maturemoral agents) and those (adequate-
ly) understoodby them only throughreflection on them, say on concreteinstances
thathelp to bring out their content. Call the first immediately
self-evidentand the
second mediatelyself-evident,since, for the relevantcategory of persons which
I shall assume is normal adults-their truth can be grasped only through the
mediation of reflection.l8 The reflection may involve drawing inferences, but
their role here is limited largely to clarifying the content of the proposition in
question: as self-evidence is normally understood,a self-evident proposition is
knowable without inferentialgrounds. One may requiretime to achieve an ade-
quate understandingof it, but one needs no premise for it in order to acquire
justification for believing it.
Self-evidence,obviousness,andperspicuity
Immediatelyself-evidentpropositionsareobvious,in the most common sense;
roughly,theirtruthis apparentas soon as one considers them with understanding.
This is usually as soon as one encounters them in a natural formulation in a
language in which one is competent. But obviousness, which is a property of
propositions, is sometimes confused with perspicuity,which is a property of
expressions.An obvious truthmay be expressed in an unperspicuousformulation
and may then not initially seemobvious or even true.
The obvious, however, even when perspicuouslyexpressed,need not be self-
evident. It is obvious that there exists at least one person, but this is not self-
evident: the proposition is not evident in itself; but if we consider a natural
formulation of it in a language we understand,we have ample ground in that
situationfor seeing its truth(at least if we know we arepersons). Moreover,there
are degrees(as well as kinds) of obviousness, but there are kindsratherthan
degrees of self-evidence. We could define a comparativenotion of self-evidence
using, for example, the concept of ease of comprehension, a factor in which
self-evident propositions vary. But the notion of self-evidence as normally un-
derstooddoes not admitdegrees, nor does my characterizationinduce differences
of degree in the overall conception of self-evidence as opposed to its dimensions.
Granted,some self-evident propositionsaremore readily seen to be truethan
others, but this is a different point. Even immediately self-evident propositions
can differ in obviousness, whether for everyone or for some people or for one
person at differenttimes. Considerthe propositionthat if A is longer than B and
B is longer than C, then A is longer than C. This is "very intuitive" and very
obviously true. It is also, for many people, more readily seen to be true, even if
perhapsnot in the end more intuitivethan,the propositionthatif therenever have
been any siblings then there never have been any first cousins.
Thecompelling,thewithholdable,andthedisbelievable
Theself-evident,the intuitive,andtheaxiomatic
one believes p. This has been taken to be a priori, but also denied. It has not in
generalbeen claimed to be self-evident, in partbecause it does not seem obvious
and is indeed not even intuitive to many people initially approachingthe subject.
It must be arguedfor (in part) by marshallingintuitions about individual cases.
On my account, it can be self-evident, and hence a priori, even if it is compre-
hendingly denied. There is no need for it to be obvious; and contraryto the com-
mon view thatit should need no argumentif it is self-evident, my account allows
thatit may, for any of several reasons, need argument,and thatone may arguefor
it either from instances that enhance understandingor even from premises. The
latterpossibility has been denied and needs explanation.
Once again, Ross is a fruitful source of common views about the self-
evident. Like the other major contributorsto the study of the self-evident, he
neglected the distinctionbetween the immediatelyandthe mediately self-evident.
By likening his candidate basic moral truthsto the (elementary)truths of logic
andmathematics,he wrongly implied thatthe formerareof the first kind. Indeed,
when he went on to say thatprovingthemis impossible, he createdthe impression
that he would place them in a yet narrowercategory,that of the stronglyaxiom-
atic:p is strongly axiomatic provided it is not only (a) immediately self-evident
(which is often takento be roughly equivalentto simple axiomatic status),but (b)
also unprovablefromanythingepistemicallyprior.Suchunprovabilityis, roughly,
the impossibility of being proved from one or more premises that can be known
orjustifiedly believed without alreadyknowing orjustifiedly believing the prop-
osition in question.2lBut this statusis not entailedby self-evidence: from a propo-
sition's being knowable on the basis of understandingit, it does not follow that it
cannot be known on the basis of premises.
One might think, as Ross may have, that provabilityentails appropriateness
of demandinga proof as a condition for the acceptability,or at least for knowl-
edge, of the propositionin question. This is surely a dialectical mistake, though
one that is easily made underthe influence of skeptical objections.
One might also think that if there is a deeper foundationfor p, thenp episte-
mically depends on it; thus, since a self-evident proposition does not epistemi-
cally depend on premises, it cannot be proved. This view is surely a mistake. A
belief (or its propositionalobject), like an architecturalstructure,can have two or
more independentsets of foundations,and it might be firmly upheld even if only
one set bears weight. Moreover, a building may rest on two adequate sets of
pillarsthatareanchoredin differentmasses of bedrock,one deeperthanthe other.
We can also add or replace foundations even after they are laid, and a single
structure-or belief-can receive supportfrom two very differentkinds of foun-
dational materials.Just as a building that rests directly on bedrock can be addi-
tionally supportedby stays attachedto its sides or by pillars beneathit anchored
in yet deeper rock, a belief may epistemically rest on the non-inferentialground
of adequateunderstandingbut admit of epistemic supportfrom "below."
Anotherway to express the difference between self-evidence and strong ax-
iomaticity is this. A self-evident proposition can function as an epistemic un-
moved mover: it can be known, and can provide supportfor other propositions,
withoutitself being seen to have (andperhapswithoutthereeven existing) a basis
in something constitutingevidence for it. But, unlike a strongly axiomatic prop-
osition, it need not be an unmovablemover. This would be one such that there
cannotbe furtherevidence for it, since the existence of thatevidence would move
it upwardsfrom the lowest possible foundationallevel.22Philosophershave long
wanted unmovable movers, and the concept has a certain appeal:these proposi-
tions would be good candidatesfor foundationsthatareobvious, compelling, and
unshakable.But such foundations are not requiredin philosophical theorizing.
Good foundationsmay not be visibly good, if readily visible at all; they can in
many cases be rationallydenied; and they can be strengthenedfrom below.
such inferences here is limited largely to clarifying what the propositionin ques-
tion says: as self-evidence is normally understood,a self-evident proposition is
knowable without relying on inferentialgroundsfor it. One may requiretime to
get it in clear focus, but need not reach it by an inferentialpath.
To see one kind of role inference can have in yielding understandingof the
self-evident, consider the propositionthat if p entails q, and q entails r, and yet r
is false, thenp is false. One may instantlysee the truthof this; but even if one must
first infer thatp entails r, this propositionis not a groundfor believing the whole
conditionalproposition.It is an implicate of a partof it thathelps one to see how
the whole conditional is true. Call the inference here an internalinference.Even
if such an inferenceis requiredto know the truthof a proposition,thatproposition
may still be mediately self-evident. Internalinferences may also be purely clar-
ificatory,say semantically.We might say, then, that knowledge of a self-evident
proposition(andjustification for believing it) can dependinternallyon inference,
above all where inference is needed for understandingthe proposition,but cannot
dependexternallyon inference, where this is a matterof epistemic dependenceon
one or more premises. The former kind is a comprehensionaldependence, the
latter a premise-dependence.The basic kind of knowledge of the self-evident
rules out only the latterkind of dependence.
There are different sorts of internal inferences. Recall the proposition that
the existence of great grandchildrenentails that of four generations of people.
One might see the truthof this by noting thatby definition greatgrandchildrenare
three generationalremoves from their great grandparentsand that this requires
the existence of one additional generation, hence four. Here the partly defini-
tional propositionnoted is a potentialgroundfor believing the self-evident prop-
osition, but the inference can still be considered internalbecause this ground is
accessible by simple conceptualunderstandingof the original proposition.Even
if one were so constitutedthat one had to see the original truththrough such an
inference, the propositionremains independently justifiable. It has, then, the im-
portantpropertyof epistemic self-sufficiency, which may belong to an a priorias
well as to an empiricalproposition and to a necessary as well as to a contingent
one. But unlike some epistemically self-sufficient propositions, any inferential
dependencea self-evidentpropositionhas is comprehensional:the inferenceserves
to bring out the content of the original proposition, a content that, to someone
who comprehendinglyconsidersthe proposition,is directlybefore the mind with-
out any need to draw inferences.
Given how much reflection, with or without inference, can be requiredto
understanda self-evident proposition, it should be no surprise that I do not
think a belief based on such understandingmust be psychologically certain,
even when it constitutes knowledge.24Perhaps, however, self-evident proposi-
tions by their very nature are epistemicallycertain: perhaps where p is self-
evident, it is certainthat p. This certainty is an objective status not easily
analyzed, but I take it to imply above all both thatp is true and that there is an
accessible way of ascertaining that p, where reflection on the content of p is a
paradigmof an accessible way.
Conclusion
not only sociologically but also in a strong sense implying a distinctive a priori
method.This does not, however, license dogmatismor free us fromdefending our
substantiveclaims, nor does it renderscientific findings or theories irrelevantto
philosophy. Self-evidence need not wear its name on its sleeve; it is liable to
counterfeit;andourjustification for believing self-evident propositionsis subject
to defeat from empirical as well as from a priori sources. There are, however,
ways to identify the genuine article.The notion of the self-evident turnsout, then,
to be importantin understandingknowledge and justification, central for one
kind of plausible account of the a priori,andhighly useful in building philosoph-
ical theories.35
Notes
28. Not in Roderick's Chisholm's sense of 'axiom', in which "h is an axiom =Df h is
necessarily such that (1) it is true and (2) for every S, if S accepts h, then h is certain
for S,"but thatis a technical one yielding a strongnotion with limited uses outside his
epistemology. See Theory of Knowledge, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall,
1989), p. 28.
29. In EpistemologyI used 'ultimatelyself-evident' to emphasizethe connection, by self-
evident steps, with self-evident propositions, but I now think it better to avoid the
possible suggestion thatin one understooda propositionof this thirdkind well enough,
understandingit would suffice for justification and knowledge in the way it does for
the self-evident.
30. In a broaderusage, a falsehood can be called an a prioripropositionprovided it is an
a priori truththat it is false. This less common usage raises no special problems but
presents a terminological complication I ignore in the text.
31. An interestingquestion that arises here is whetherthe notions of an a prioriproposi-
tion and of a priorijustification apply to cases in which computerproof is essential.
For valuable discussion of this issue and an associated conception of the a priori
different from (and perhapsmore permissive than) the one indicated here, see Tyler
Burge, "ComputerProof, AprioriKnowledge, and OtherMinds,"Philosophical Per-
spectives 12 (1998), 1-37.
32. There is much difference in judgment about how to classify the analytic. It might be
considereda semanticconcept by those who think of it as truthby virtue of the mean-
ings of the relevantterms.It mightbe regardedas conceptualby those who take it to be
groundedin relations of concepts. It might be conceived as ontological by those who
think such trutharebasic to the structureof reality.For epistemology, the notion of the
a prioriis the more importantof the two. For W. V. Quine's case that neithernotion is
clear,see his "TwoDogmas of Empiricism,"in his Froma Logical Point of View(Cam-
bridge, Mass: HarvardUniversity Press,1953). Among the widely noted replies is H.
P.GriceandP.F. Strawson,"InDefenseofaDogma,"PhilosophicalReview55 (1956).
For a contrastbetween the "old"and"new"Quineanpositions anda criticaldiscussion
of Quine's commitmentsconcerning analyticity,see Van Cleve, op. cit.
33. I arguefor this in some detail in ch. 4 of Epistemology.
34. Suppose, however, that an analytic propositioncould be so "long"that although one
can adequatelyunderstandit throughoutone's readingof a formulation,one musttrust
one's memory if one forms a belief of it. Perhapshere one has a justification for the
belief, yetjustifiedly believing it or knowing it requiresa cognitive state whose object
can be presentedonly throughthe use of memory.Arguably,if one can understandit
one must be able to hold it before one's mind at once, as opposed to rememberingthe
first part well enough to have the requisite understandingas one reads the last. If so,
the problemis solved; if not (and I suspect not, given the ordinarynotion of sentence
understanding),then not only are some propositionsanalyticby the containmentstan-
dardnot self-evident; we also have a case in which it seems clear that the knowledge
condition of my account of self-evidence is not redundant.
35. An earlier statement of my concept of self-evidence is given in my "Intuitionism,
Pluralism, and the Foundations of Ethics," in Walter Sinnott-Armstrongand Mark
Timmons,Moral Knowledge(OxfordandNew York:OxfordUniversity Press,1996),
and ch.4 of my Epistemology (1998) is the source of my classification of the a priori
in terms of self-evidence as the base. For helpful discussion of this paper I thank
Albert Casullo, Elizabeth Fricker,Kenneth Lucey, Joseph Mendola, Thomas Nagel,
Lex Newman, Markvan Roojen, and, especially, Bruce Russell.