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DISCUSSION
107
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108 PHILOSOPHYANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH
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ON JOHNSTONE'S
'PHENOMENOLOGY
OFDEATH' 109
AND'PHILOSOPHY
OFSLEEP'
The phenomenologyof death is not a simple description of it, which would
hardly be worth the trouble, since the description is completed in a word:
nothing. It is instead an exploration of what death means to life, from the
point of view of the living.7
This involveswhat Husserlwould call a reductionto meaningor
significance. The questionsbecomewhatis themeaningofdeathand
how am I consciousof death. Now clearly,to be conscious of my
death is simplyto recognizethat my life has a terminalpoint.The
phenomenology of deathis nothingbut the clarificationof the sense
whichthis termination has for me as one who is not yet dead but
alive.Andof coursethe significance of my death,forme, cannotbe
overestimated:it is of ultimatesignificance.And this pointis ab-
solutelyessential.As both Earle and Heideggerpoint out, nobody
else's deathhas thesame significance forme thatmyown deathhas.
For Heideggerit is onlythrougha reflection on my own death that
authenticexistencebecomespossibleforme; and,forEarle,it is our
owncertainty ofourindividualmortality thatconferson our livesthe
sense and meaning,howevervariable,thattheyhave foreach of us.
Now, in contrastto what is assertedabove neitherof thesepheno-
menologists is concernedwiththemeaningof thedeathof the other.
Both insistemphaticallythat the death whichcarries this ultimate
significance forme is myowndeathand notthedeathof anyoneelse.
Furthermore, neitherof thesephenomenologies of deathhas anything
essentialto do withthe"experienceof dying."Theyare not"deathbed
phenomenologies." Ratherbothare fullyentrenched in theexperience
of livingand the phenomenonof death as it appears fromthisper-
spective.Andthis,I think,is theonlylegitimatesense in whichthere
can be a "phenomenology of death."Unfortunately, this conception
seems to have eludedJohnstone completely.
Let us now turnto thereflections on thephenomenon of sleep.In
the article,"TowardsA Philosophyof Sleep," it is argued 1) that a
personwho had neverbeen asleep (or "experienced" unconsciousness
of some sortsuch as thatwhichresultsfromanaesthesiaor a blow
to thehead,etc.) could notpossiblybe aware thathe is consciousor
be self-conscious; 2) thatnot onlyis sleep a necessaryconditionof
thisconsciousnessof consciousnessor self-consciousness, but further
thatsleep is a necessaryconditionof simplybeingconsciousat all;
3) thatany philosophy, and especiallyphenomenology, whichclaims
7 William Earle, The AutobiographicalConsciousness. Chicago:
Quadrangle Books,
1972.P. 215.
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110 PHILOSOPHYANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH
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'PHENOMENOLOGY
ON JOHNSTONE'S OF DEATH' 111
AND'PHILOSOPHYOF SLEEP'
sions" are non-Humean; they arise from the mental activity of interpreting
gaps.11
Now since the "requisiteimpressions"for formingthe ideas of
"consciousness"and "unconsciousness"arise only on the occasion
ofa gap in theformer,it allegedlyfollowsthatone could notcomeby
suchnotions,or evenhave anyawarenessof thephenomenato which
theyrefer,in theabsenceof such a gap. Thus,accordingto thisargu-
ment,I cannotbe aware of my consciousnessunless I have been
asleep,drugged,or clubbed6verthehead.
Now thisargument, WhichI assume is taken to be sufficientto
establishthe priorityof sleep, is howeverbased on the assumption
thata personwhohad neversleptcouldnevertheless be conscious.At
the endof thisarticle,however,Johnstone goes on to show thatthis
assumptionis untenable.He challengeshis own assumptionby ap-
peal, curiouslyenough,to one of the centralslogansof phenomenol-
ogy.He affirmsas a prioritrueof consciousness,not onlythat "all
consciousnessis consciousnessof something"but in additionthat
"all consciousness is somebody's consciousness."12 But to recognize
any act of consciousnessas "mine"I must,by necessity,be aware
thatI am consciousin thefirstplace. But if this"principleof owner-
ship" is an essentialfeatureof consciousness,then it followsthat
self-consciousnessis equally essential.However,if to be conscious
impliesthatone is also self-conscious, and if self-consciousness
re-
quires"sleep"as a necessarycondition,thenone mustconcludethat
sleepis a necessaryconditionof consciousnessas well.Indeed thisis
theconclusionthatis drawn:
Hence the initial assumption is false; no one who has never slept can possibly
be conscious. Sleep, therefore,is a necessary condition for consciousness as
well as self-consciousness.13
Now,to be sure,this is an extraordinary conclusion.It is, how-
ever,completely withoutfoundation. I will show1) thattheconsider-
ationstakenas evidencein his firstargumentactuallysupporta con-
clusionwhichis the exact oppositeof the one at which Johnstone
arrives,and 2) thatthesecondargumentis so utterlyincoherent that
it defeatsitself,as well as the firstargument.
Let mebeginwiththesecondargument. Accordingto Johnstone's
ownusage,sleep is to be understoodas a gap or interruption in con-
11Ibid., p. 75.
12Ibid., p. 79.
13Ibid., p. 79.
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112 ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
PHILOSOPHY RESEARCH
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ON JOHNSTONE'S
'PHENOMENOLOGYOF DEATH' 113
AND'PHILOSOPHYOF SLEEP'
which I can agree with Johnstone,namely the "ownership principle."
As Sartre argues, every act of consciousness is also a consciousness
of consciousness. But it is preciselythis self-consciousnessthat makes
sleep an intelligiblephenomenon,and not the other way around. Thus
the phenomenon of sleep should strengthenone's commitmentto a
philosophy,indeed a phenomenology,of consciousness, not because it
is a "philosophyof sleep," but rather because it is a philosophy which
can make some sense of sleep. And this is somethingwhich Mr. John-
stone has completelyfailed to do.
JOSEPH W. GALLOWAY.
DARTMOUTH COLLEGE.
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