G.R. No.

181250 July 18, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
EMMALYN DELA CERNA y QUINDAO, alias "INDAY" and REGIE MEDENCELES y ISTIL, Accused,
REGIE MEDENCELES y ISTIL, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This appeal seeks to reserve and set aside the September 5, 2007 decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00953, which affirmed the conviction of Regie Medenceles y Istil for illegal sale of
methylenedioxmethamphetamine, popularly known as ecstasy, a dangerous drug, as penalized under Section
5, Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002).
That on or about the 28th day of August 2002, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not having been lawfully authorized to sell,
trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, or distribute any dangerous drug, conspiring and
confederating with one another, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sell, trade, deliver or
distribute to National Bureau of Investigation Senior Agent GREGORIO S. ZUNIGA, JR., a poseur buyer, two
hundred (200) pieces of light blue color tablets which were found positive to test for
Methylenedioxymethamphetamine, commonly known as "Ecstacy", a dangerous drug, for the amount of
P80,000.00, Philippine Currency, in violation of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Both accused pleaded not guilty to the foregoing information at their arraignment on September 25, 2005. 3
The Court of Appeals (CA) summarized the evidence of the parties in its assailed decision, as follows:
P100 bills which were placed on top of the two (2) sets of boodle money to be used for the buy bust. She also
wrote down the serial numbers of the P100 bills, V059146 and FU239560.
Around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, the group proceeded to Mcdonald’s at Vargas St., Mandaluyong City and
parked their vehicle 15 to 20 meters away from their target. Winmar U. De Ramos acted as a perimeter guard
while Federico O. Criste and SI Divinagracia were designated as arresting officers. Zuniga, Jr., the poseur
buyer met the informant who informed him that the deal was made. They then proceeded to the second floor
of Mcdonald’s and when they got there, a woman, three (3) meters away from them, waved them. The
informant with Zuniga approached the woman, and when they got near her, the woman handed a box similar
to that of a cough syrup paper box to the man seated beside her. The man then handed to Zuniga the white
box which was 3 inches tall by 1 ½ to 2 inches in diameter, while Zuniga handed to the man two stacks of
boodle money. Thereafter, Zuniga introduced himself as an NBI agent, and after apprising the two of their
constitutional rights, arrested the woman and the man, who turned out to be a appellants Emmalyn Dela
Cerna y Quidao a.k.a. "Inday" and Regie Mendenceles, respectively.
For their part, appellants vehemently denied the charges leveled against them. According to the appellant DE
LA CERNA, while they were eating at McDonald’s at St. Francis Branch, they were approached by about ten
(10) persons who frisked and brought them to the NBI office. One of the agents showed her medicine tablets
from the table and placed fluorescent powder on her two palms, then she was placed in such a way that her
feet were near on electrical wire, for five (5) minutes, during which, she was hurt.
Further, appellant Medenceles stated that these agents placed a plastic bag on his head, and despite the fact
that no items was recovered from him, the present case was filed against him. He did not file a case against
the agents who hurt him as they threatened him.4
On April 20, 2005, the RTC found the two accused guilty as charged, disposing:
WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, both accused, EMMALYN DELA CERNA y QUINDAO @ Inday
and REGIE MENDENCELES y ISTIL, are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of
Section 5, Article 2, of Republic Act No. 9165 and both are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH
and pay the fine of ONE MILLION and FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P1,500,000.00).

At the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Forensic Chemist Juliet Gelacio-Mahinhim; SI
Federico O. Criste; Winmar Lovie U. De Ramos, SA Gregorio Zuniga, Jr.; SA Rosauro Bautista; Forensic
Chemist Emilia S. Rosaldez; and Senior Inspector Divinagracia. Their testimonies, woven together, disclosed
the following facts:
On 28 August 2002, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agents Federico Criste, Gregorio Zuniga, Jr.,
Winmar Louie de Ramos received a briefing from their team leader, Rosauro Bautista about a buy bust
operation that would be conducted that afternoon in Mandaluyong City. They were to proceed to McDonald’s
at Vargas St., Mandaluyong City, at the back of Shoemart (SM) Megamall. SA Gregorio S. Zuñiga was to act
as poseur buyer who would buy more or less 200 pieces of ecstacy pills worth P80,000.00 from a certain
Inday. Early that morning, Forensic Chemist Emilia A. Rosaldez dusted with fluorescent powder the two (2)
The transparent plastic bag containing 37.4007 grams of Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) or
commonly known as "Ecstacy" is hereby deemed forfeited in favor of the government to be disposed of in
accordance with existing rules.
Finally, the OIC, Branch Clerk of Court, is directed to submit the two hundred tablets of
Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA), also known as ECSTACY, to the proper government agency
provided by law, immediately.
SO ORDERED.5

1
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of both accused but reduced the death penalty to life
imprisonment,6 viz:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the assailed judgment dated 20 April 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213, is AFFIRMED with modifications, that the penalty of death be
reduced to life imprisonment.
SO ORDERED.
Only Medenceles appealed.7 Thereby, the conviction of Dela Cerna became final.
Issues
Medenceles contends that the CA erred in convicting him of the charge because he was implicated only
because he was in the company of Dela Cerna during the buy-bust; and insists that a real drug pusher would
not approach just anyone in order to sell drugs. 8
Ruling
We affirm the conviction of Medenceles.
To obtain a conviction for the illegal sale of a dangerous drug, like ecstacy, the State must prove the following,
namely: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and the consideration; and (b) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof. What is decisive is the proof that the sale actually took
place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. 9
The State convincingly and competently established the foregoing elements of the offense charged.
Poseur-buyer NBI Agent Zuniga, Jr. testified that the two accused sold ecstacy to him for P80,000.00 during a
legitimate buy-bust operation;10 and that he recovered the buy-bust money in Dela Cerna’s hand right after the
sale.11 Based on the certification issued by Forensic Chemist Juliet Gelacio-Mahilum, who had subjected the
confiscated tablets to physical, chemical and chromatographic examinations as well as to instrumental
analysis, the 200 ecstacy tablets with a total weight of 37.4007 grams were found to be positive for the
presence of methylenedioxymethamphetamine, a dangerous drug. 12 Also presented in court as evidence were
the 200 ecstacy tablets, the marked buy-bust money, and the certification from Forensic Chemist Emilia S.
Rosaldes confirming that Dela Cerna’s left and right hands tested positive for yellow fluorescent powder, the
powder dusted on the buy-bust money prior to the buy-bust operation. 13
NBI Agent Bautista, the buy-bust team leader, corroborated Agent Zuniga, Jr.’s recollections, attesting that he
witnessed Agent Zuniga, Jr.’s act of handing over the buy-bust money to Dela Cerna who was then
accompanied by Mecendeles;14 and that Agent Zuniga, Jr. thereafter signaled to the rest of the buy-bust team
in order for them to arrest both accused. 15
Both the RTC and the CA regarded as credible the testimonies of poseur buyer Agent Zuniga, Jr. and Agent
Bautista on what transpired during the buy-bust operation. We concur with both lower courts, and hold that,
indeed, the testimonies of the NBI agents as entrapping and arresting officers inspire belief and credence
considering that the accused did not impute any ill-motive to them for testifying against them as they did. The
RTC judge’s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is accorded the highest respect
because she had the unique opportunity to directly observe the demeanor of the witnesses and had been
thereby enabled to determine whether the witnesses were speaking the truth or prevaricating. 16 That
evaluation, which the CA affirmed, is now binding on the Court because the appellant has not called attention
to facts or circumstances of weight that might have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted that,
if considered, would materially affect the disposition of the case. 17
Medenceles’ insistence that he was implicated only because he had happened to be in the company of Dela
Cerna during the buy-bust operation was unworthy of consideration because the established facts
contradicted it. The records show that he acted in conspiracy with Dela Cerna. This conclusion of conspiracy
between them was based on the firm testimony of poseur buyer Agent Zuniga, Jr. to the effect that both
accused were of one mind in selling ecstacy to him. It appears, indeed, that prior to the buy-bust operation,
both of the accused sat together inside the McDonald’s Restaurant; that in transacting with the poseur buyer,
Dela Cerna handed a white paper box containing the 200 ecstacy tablets to Medenceles, her boyfriend, who,
in turn, handed the tablets to Agent Zuniga, Jr. in exchange for the marked buy-bust money that Agent Zuniga,
Jr. handed over to Dela Cerna; and that the buy-bust money was later recovered from Dela Cerna upon the
arrest of the two accused.18 No other logical conclusion can be drawn from the accused’s acts in unison
except that they did have a common purpose and community of interest during the transaction with the poseur
buyer. There is no question that conspiracy may be deduced from the mode, method, and manner in which
the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused when such acts point to a joint purpose
and design, concerted action, and community of interests.19 Conspiracy between them having been
competently established, Dela Cerna and Medenceles were liable as co-principals irrespective of what each of
them actually did.20
Medenceles’ claim of undue incrimination for a very serious crime could not at all be true.1âwphi1 If it was, he
should have vindicated himself by filing an administrative or criminal complaint against the buy-bust team
members. That step would have been expected of him had he been truly innocent. But he did not. 21 His
inaction betrayed the unworthiness of his claim.
Nor should we give substance to Medenceles’ argument that a real drug pusher would not have casually
approached just anyone in order to sell drugs. The records indicate that Agent Zuniga, Jr. was not just anyone
because the informant, whom both accused were familiar with, accompanied the poseur buyer. Prior to the
actual transaction, the informant and the accused had agreed to meet at the venue of the arrest so that the
accused could sell the ecstacy to the poseur buyer. Under the circumstances, the poseur buyer was not a
stranger to the accused. At any rate, such a defense has been discredited by the Court several times. In
People v. Requiz, 22 for instance, the Court observed:
If pushers peddle drugs only to persons known to them, then drug abuse would certainly not be as rampant as
it is today and would not pose a serious threat to society. We have found in many cases that drug pushers sell
their prohibited articles to any prospective customer, be he a stranger or not, in private as well as in public
places, even in the daytime. Indeed, drug pushers have become increasingly daring, dangerous and, worse,
2
openly defiant of the law. Hence, what matters is not the existing familiarity between the buyer and the seller The accused prays for the review and reversal of the decision promulgated on June 29, 2006, 1 whereby the
or the time and venue of the sale, but the fact of agreement and the acts constituting sale and delivery of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction for murder handed down by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
prohibited drugs. Branch 34, in Balaoan, La Union.

Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 provides: Antecedents

Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous
Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. – The penalty of life imprisonment to death and
a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall
be imposed upon any person, who, unless, authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, delivery,
give away to another, distribute, dispatch, in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all
species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any such
transactions.
Although the law punishes the unauthorized sale of dangerous drugs, such as ecstacy, regardless of quantity
and purity, with life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P 1 0,000,000.00, the CA
properly corrected the penalty prescribed by the RTC in view of the intervening effectivity of Republic Act No.
934623prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty in the Philippines. The retroactive application of Republic
Act No. 9346 is already settled. 24
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on September 5, 2007; and DIRECT appellant to pay
the costs of suit.
At around 9:30 p.m. on October 29, 1996, Jose Olais was walking along the provincial road in Butubut Oeste,
Balaoan, La Union when Alfonso Fontanilla suddenly struck him in the head with a piece of wood called
bellang.2Olais fell facedown to the ground, but Fontanilla hit him again in the head with a piece of stone.
Fontanilla desisted from hitting Olais a third time only because Joel Marquez and Tirso Abunan, the sons-in-
law of Olais, shouted at him, causing him to run away. Marquez and Abunan rushed their father-in-law to a
medical clinic, where Olais was pronounced dead on arrival.3
On April 25, 1997, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of La Union filed an information for murder against
Fontanilla in the RTC, viz:
That on or about the 29th day of October 1996, along the Provincial Road at Barangay Butubut Oeste,
Municipality of Balaoan, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and strike with a long coconut night stick and thereafter hit
with a stone the head of Jose Olais, thereby inflicting on the latter head wounds which caused the death of the
latter, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said victim.

SO ORDERED. CONTRARY TO LAW.4

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN The accused pleaded not guilty.

Associate justice
The State presented Marquez and Abunan as its witnesses. They claimed that they were only several meters
G.R. No. 177743 January 25, 2012 away from Olais when Fontanilla struck him; that they shouted at Fontanilla, who fled because of them; and
that they were able to see and to identify Fontanilla as the attacker of their father-in-law because the area was
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, then well-lighted.5
vs.
ALFONSO FONTANILLA y OBALDO, Accused-Appellant. Dr. Felicidad Leda, the physician who conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of Olais, attested that her post-
mortem examination showed that Olais had suffered a fracture on the left temporal area of the skull, causing
DECISION his death. She opined that a hard object or a severe force had hit the skull of the victim more than once,
considering that the skull had been already fragmented and the fractures on the skull had been radiating. 6

BERSAMIN, J.:
An indispensable requisite of self-defense is that the victim must have mounted an unlawful aggression
against the accused. Without such unlawful aggression, the accused cannot invoke self-defense as a
justifying circumstance.
SPO1 Abraham Valdez, who investigated the slaying and apprehended Fontanilla, declared that he had gone
looking for Fontanilla in his house along with other policemen; that Fontanilla’s father had denied that he was
around; that their search of the house had led to the arrest of Fontanilla inside; and that they had then brought
him to the police station.7 Valdez further declared that Fontanilla asserted that he would only speak in court. 8

3
At the trial, Fontanilla claimed self-defense. He said that on the night of the incident, he had been standing on
the road near his house when Olais, wielding a nightstick and appearing to be drunk, had boxed him in the
stomach; that although he had then talked to Olais nicely, the latter had continued hitting him with his fists,
striking him with straight blows; that Olais, a karate expert, had also kicked him with both his legs; that he had
thus been forced to defend himself by picking up a stone with which he had hit the right side of the victim’s
head, causing the latter to fall face down to the ground; and that he had then left the scene for his house upon
seeing that Olais was no longer moving.9
10
Fontanilla’s daughter Marilou corroborated her father’s version.
On June 21, 2001, the RTC declared Fontanilla guilty as charged, and disposed thusly:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment declaring he accused
ALFONSO FONTANILLA Y OBALDO @ ‘Carlos’ guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER as
defined and penalized in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Sec. 6,
and thereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA TO DEATH and to indemnify the
heirs of the victim in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos ( P50,000.00).
SO ORDERED.11
The RTC rejected Fontanilla’s plea of self-defense by observing that he had "no necessity to employ a big
stone, inflicting upon the victim a mortal wound causing his death" 12 due to the victim attacking him only with
bare hands. It noted that Fontanilla did not suffer any injury despite his claim that the victim had mauled him;
that Fontanilla did not receive any treatment, and no medical certificate attested to any injury he might have
suffered, having been immediately released from the hospital; 13 that Fontanilla’s failure to give any statement
at the time he surrendered to the police was inconsistent with his plea of self-defense; 14 and that the manner
of attack against Olais established the attendance of treachery. 15
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC, holding that Fontanilla did not establish the indispensable element of
unlawful aggression; that his failure to report the incident to the police at the earliest opportunity, or even after
he was taken into custody, negated the plea of self-defense; and that the nature of the victim’s injury was a
significant physical proof to show a determined effort on the part of Fontanilla to kill him, and not just to defend
himself.16
The CA ruled that treachery was attendant, because Olais had no inkling that a fatal blow was looming upon
him, and because Fontanilla was inconspicuously hidden from view when he struck Olais from behind,
rendering Olais unable to retaliate.17
Nonetheless, the CA rectified the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death to only reclusion perpetua upon
noting the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, and disposed as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Balaoan, La Union,
Branch 34, in Criminal Case No. 2561 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that appellant Fontanilla is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. No cost.
SO ORDERED.18
The accused is now appealing, insisting that the CA erred because:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IGNORING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S CLAIM OF
SELF-DEFENSE.
II.
EVEN GRANTING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT KILLED THE VICTIM, THE TRIAL COURT
GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER
WHEN THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
III.
FURTHERMORE, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE SPECIAL
PRIVILEGE[D] MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE AND THE
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.
Ruling
We affirm the conviction.
Fontanilla pleaded self-defense. In order for self-defense to be appreciated, he had to prove by clear and
convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.19 Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element of self-defense, for if no
unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is unavailing, for there is nothing to
repel.20 The character of the element of unlawful aggression is aptly explained as follows:
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying circumstance of self-
defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no justified killing in defense of oneself. The test for the
presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put in real
peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary
threat. Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression,
4
namely: (a) there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or,
at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful.
Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful
aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a weapon, an
offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful
aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere
threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a
revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent
unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to
his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot. 21
By invoking self-defense, however, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that caused the death of
Olais. It is basic that once an accused in a prosecution for murder or homicide admitted his infliction of the
fatal injuries on the deceased, he assumed the burden to prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence
the justifying circumstance that would avoid his criminal liability. 22 Having thus admitted being the author of the
death of the victim, Fontanilla came to bear the burden of proving the justifying circumstance to the
satisfaction of the court,23and he would be held criminally liable unless he established self-defense by
sufficient and satisfactory proof. 24 He should discharge the burden by relying on the strength of his own
evidence, because the Prosecution’s evidence, even if weak, would not be disbelieved in view of his
admission of the killing.25 Nonetheless, the burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt remained with the
State until the end of the proceedings.
Fontanilla did not discharge his burden. A review of the records reveals that, one, Olais did not commit
unlawful aggression against Fontanilla, and, two, Fontanilla’s act of hitting the victim’s head with a stone,
causing the mortal injury, was not proportional to, and constituted an unreasonable response to the victim’s
fistic attack and kicks.
Indeed, had Olais really attacked Fontanilla, the latter would have sustained some injury from the aggression.
It remains, however, that no injury of any kind or gravity was found on the person of Fontanilla when he
presented himself to the hospital; hence, the attending physician of the hospital did not issue any medical
certificate to him. Nor was any medication applied to him. 26 In contrast, the physician who examined the
cadaver of Olais testified that Olais had been hit on the head more than once. The plea of self-defense was
thus belied, for the weapons used by Fontanilla and the location and number of wounds he inflicted on Olais
revealed his intent to kill, not merely an effort to prevent or repel an attack from Olais. We consider to be
significant that the gravity of the wounds manifested the determined effort of the accused to kill his victim, not
just to defend himself.27
The CA and the RTC found that treachery was attendant. We concur. Fontanilla had appeared out of nowhere
to strike Olais on the head, first with the wooden stick, and then with a big stone, causing Olais to fall to the
ground facedown. The suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack effectively denied to Olais the ability to
defend himself or to retaliate against Fontanilla.
The imposition of reclusion perpetua by the CA was warranted under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code,28which prescribes reclusion perpetua to death as the penalty for murder. Under the rules on the
application of indivisible penalties in Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, 29 the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua is imposed if there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances. Yet, the Court points out
that the RTC erroneously imposed "RECLUSION PERPETUA TO DEATH" as the penalty. Such imposition
was bereft of legal justification, for reclusion perpetua and death, being indivisible, should not be imposed as a
compound, alternative or successive penalty for a single felony. In short, the imposition of one precluded the
imposition of the other.
The Court also modifies the limiting of civil damages by the CA and the RTC to only the death indemnity
of P50,000.00. When death occurs due to a crime, the damages to be awarded may include: (a) civil
indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (b) actual or compensatory damages; (c) moral damages; (d)
exemplary damages; and (e) temperate damages.30
Accordingly, the CA and the RTC should also have granted moral damages in addition to the death indemnity,
which were of different kinds.31 The death indemnity compensated the loss of life due to crime, but appropriate
and reasonable moral damages would justly assuage the mental anguish and emotional sufferings of the
surviving family of Olais.32 Although mental anguish and emotional sufferings of the surviving family were not
quantifiable with mathematical precision, the Court must nonetheless strive to set an amount that would
restore the heirs of the deceased to their moral status quo ante. Given the circumstances, P50,000.00 should
be reasonable as moral damages, which, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, 33 we are bound to award
despite the absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs’ mental anguish and emotional suffering. The
rationale for doing so rested on human nature and experience having shown that:
xxx a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the
victim’s family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes the
victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not only steals from the family of the
deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love, affection and support, but often leaves them with
the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them.341âwphi1
Another omission of the CA and the RTC was their non-recognition of the right of the heirs of the victim to
temperate damages. The victim’s wife testified about her family’s incurring funeral expenses of P36,000.00,
but only P18,000.00 was backed by receipts. It is already settled that when actual damages substantiated by
receipts sum up to lower than P25,000.00, temperate damages of at least P25,000.00 become justified, in lieu
of actual damages in the lesser amount actually proved by receipts. It would obviously be unfair to the heirs of
the victim to deny them compensation by way of actual damages despite their honest attempt to prove their
actual expenses by receipts (but succeeding only in showing expenses lower than P25,000.00 in
amount).35 Indeed, the heirs should not be left in a worse situation than the heirs of another victim who might
be nonetheless allowed temperate damages of P25,000.00 despite not having presented any receipts at all.
With the victim’s wife having proved P18,000.00 worth of expenses, granting his heirs temperate damages
of P25,000.00, not only P18,000.00, is just and proper. Not to do so would foster a travesty of basic fairness.
5
The Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed in criminal cases as part of the civil liability
"when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances." 36 The Civil Code permits such
damages to be awarded "by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages."37 In light of such legal provisions, the CA and the RTC
should have recognized the entitlement of the heirs of the victim to exemplary damages on account of the
attendance of treachery. It was of no moment that treachery was an attendant circumstance in murder, and,
as such, inseparable and absorbed in murder. As well explained in People v. Catubig: 38
The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to be
understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the
public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings,
each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an
award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony
underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether
ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the
award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It
would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the
aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying
nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal,
rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary
damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
For the purpose, P30,000.00 is reasonable and proper as exemplary damages,39 for a lesser amount would
not serve result in genuine exemplarity.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on June 29, 2006 by the Court of Appeals, subject to
the MODIFICATION of the civil damages, by ordering accused Alfonso Fontanilla y Obaldo to pay to the heirs
of Jose Olais P25,000.00 as temperate damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in addition to
the P50,000.00 as death indemnity and the P50,000.00 as moral damages, plus interest of 6% per annum on
such amounts from the finality of the judgment.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 169871 February 2, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JOSE N. MEDIADO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J:
An accused who asserts self-defense admits his infliction of the fatal blows and bears the burden of
satisfactorily establishing all the elements of self-defense. Otherwise, his conviction for the felony of murder or
homicide will be affirmed.
In this appeal, Jose N. Mediado (Jose) appeals the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder for the killing of Jimmy Llorin (Jimmy), 1 thereby affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, in Iriga City (RTC) convicting him of that felony and imposing
on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the payment of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as
moral damages, and P24,000.00 as actual damages.2
Antecedents
At around 9:00 a.m. on March 20, 1997, Jimmy was having a conversation with Rodolfo Mediado (Rodolfo) at
the dancing hall located in Pulang Daga, Balatan, Camarines Sur. He was around 35 meters away from Lilia,
his wife, who was at a meeting of the Mr. and Mrs. Club in the barangay hall. At that moment, Lilia witnessed
Jose emerge from behind Jimmy and hack Jimmy twice on the head with a bolo. She next saw Jose move to
Jimmy’s left side and continue hacking him although he had already fallen to the ground. Jose fled, but Juan
Clorado (Clorado), a former barangay kagawad, ran after him. Upon catching up, Clorado seized and took the
bolo from Jose, and brought Jose to the PNP station in Balatan, Camarines Sur. Lilia believed that Jose fatally
assaulted Jimmy for fear that he would report to the police authorities that Jose had attacked one Vicente
Parañal during the town fiesta two days earlier. 3
Jose confessed to killing Jimmy but claimed that he did so only to defend himself and his father (Rodolfo).
Jose related that he had passed by the barangay hall on his way to work, and had observed Jimmy punch
Rodolfo and hit him with a stone; that Jimmy then picked up a stone and threw it at him (Jose); that to fend off
the attack, he (Jose) unsheathed his bolo and hacked Jimmy until he fell to the ground; and that he remained
in the place for ten minutes and later yielded to Clorado who accompanied him to the police station where he
surrendered to Police Officer Ramon Maumay. 4
As stated, both the RTC and the CA rejected Jose’s claim of self-defense and defense of a relative, and found
that treachery was employed by Jose when he attacked Jimmy from behind.
Hence, this appeal.
We affirm the CA decision.
We reiterate that findings of the CA upon factual matters are conclusive and ought not to be disturbed unless
they are shown to be contrary to the evidence on record. 5 Here, Jose has not demonstrated to our satisfaction
that the CA committed any reversible error in making its findings of fact against Jose.
6
Specifically, the RTC and the CA correctly rejected Jose’s claim of self-defense and defense of a relative
because he did not substantiate it with clear and convincing proof.
The Revised Penal Code delineates the standards for self-defense and defense of a relative in Article 11, viz:
Article 11. Justifying circumstances. The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances
concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself."
2. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or
legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or his relatives by affinity in the same degrees and
those by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and second requisites
prescribed in the next preceding circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in case the
provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making defense had no part therein.
xxx
Indeed, upon invoking the justifying circumstance of self-defense, Jose assumed the burden of proving the
justification of his act with clear and convincing evidence. This is because his having admitted the killing
required him to rely on the strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the Prosecution’s evidence,
which, even if it were weak, could not be disbelieved in view of his admission. 6
It is also notable that unlawful aggression is the condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstances of self-
defense and defense of a relative. There can be no self-defense unless the victim committed unlawful
aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense.7 As the CA pointed out, however, Jose did not
support his claim that Jimmy had committed aggression by punching Rodolfo and by throwing stones at him
and his father.8 In fact, he and his father were not able to identify any weapon used by Jimmy aside from the
stone that he supposedly picked up from the ground. Even that testimony was contrary, for Jose testified that
he had unsheathed his bolo and hacked Jimmy after dodging the stone thrown at him. Plainly, he did not
establish with clear and convincing proof that Jimmy had assaulted him or his father as to pose to either of
them an imminent threat of great harm before he mounted his own attack on Jimmy.1avvphi1
Moreover, the post-mortem examination disclosed that Jimmy had sustained a total of seven wounds: two
incised wounds and five hack wounds.9 Three of the hack wounds were inflicted on Jimmy’s neck, one of
which fatally extended to and cut the trachea, esophagus, and the carotid and jugular vessels that supplied
blood to the heart and brain of Jimmy.10 Dr. Moll Lee, the medico-legal expert, opined at the trial that the
injuries were possibly sustained by Jimmy from the assailant who was behind him and while he was already
down.11 This opinion was consistent with Lilia’s testimony to the effect that Jose had attacked Jimmy from
behind as well as when Jimmy was already lying on the ground. 12 The nature, number, and gravity of Jimmy’s
wounds spoke not of defense on the part of Jose but of a criminal intent to kill Jimmy. 13 They indicated beyond
doubt the treacherous manner of the assault, that is, that Jose thereby ensured that the killing would be
without risk and would deny to Jimmy any opportunity to defend himself. 14
Lastly, the testimonies of Jose and Rodolfo were infected with inconsistencies. For one, Rodolfo did not
mention that his son had carried a bolo during the incident; instead, Rodolfo recalled that Jose and Jimmy had
engaged in a fistfight. 15 Also, Rodolfo’s claim that he chose to return home after being badly hurt from
Jimmy’s attack was unnatural, for, if that were true, he was thereby unnaturally leaving his son to engage the
attacker alone.
We modify the award of damages to make their amounts consistent with the law and jurisprudence relating to
an accused adjudged guilty of a crime covered by Republic Act No. 7659, 16 regardless of aggravating or
mitigating circumstances.17 The correct amounts are P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral
damages; and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, all to be granted without proof or pleading. In addition, the
Court notes that actual damages awarded to the heirs was only P24,000.00. In furtherance of justice and
consistent with our ruling in People v. Villanueva18 that when actual damages proven by receipts is lower
than P25,000.00, the award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages is justified in lieu of actual damages of a
lesser amount.19
WHEREFORE, the Court affirms the Decision promulgated on May 19, 2005 in C.A.-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00589
entitled People of the Philippines v. Jose Mediado, subject to the modification that Jose N. Mediado is ordered
to indemnify the heirs of Jimmy Llorin in the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral
damages; P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 179709 July 6, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
FILOMENO MAYINGQUE, GREGORIO MAYINGQUE, and TORIBIO MAYINGQUE y SANICO, Defendants-
Appellants.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
7
Appellants Toribio Mayingque alias Loloy (Toribio), Gregorio Mayingque alias Gorio (Gregorio), and Filomeno
Mayingque alias Boy Roti (Filomeno) appeal the decision promulgated on June 15, 2007 by the Court of
Appeals (CA)1 affirming their conviction for murder that the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 275, in Las
Piñas City handed down, penalizing each with reclusion perpetua, and ordering them to pay P50,000.00 to the
heirs of deceased Edgardo Sumalde Tusi (Edgardo), and P20,000.00 as burial expenses to the wife of Tusi. 2
The appellants and one Edwin Macas (Edwin) were indicted for the murder of Edgardo under the amended
information dated June 28, 1999,3 charging them thus:
That on or about the 30th day of May, 1999, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and all of them
mutually helping and aiding one another, without justifiable motive with intent to kill and by means of treachery
and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault,
attack and stab one EDGARDO SUMALDE TUSI, with deadly weapons (knife and bolo), hitting the victim on
the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple mortal stab wounds, which directly
caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
At arraignment, the appellants pleaded not guilty to the information, as amended. Edwin remained at large to
this date.4
Evidence of the Prosecution
The Prosecution presented Salvacion Tusi (Salvacion), wife of Edgardo, the victim, who testified that she
knew the appellants because they usually had their drinking sessions on Sundays at Edwin’s place, which
was beside her residence at Pedro Sabido Street, BF Resort Village, Las Piñas City; that in one such drinking
session, Edgardo, annoyed by the noise made by the appellants and Edwin, was prompted to admonish them
to tone down their voices; that the appellants and Edwin resented Edgardo’s admonition; 5 that while she and
Edgardo were resting in front of their house at around 5 pm on May 30, 1999, Toribio arrived and without
saying anything stabbed Edgardo twice on his side; that she shouted for help, but her cousin Ruben Bernal
could not do anything because Edwin, Filomeno and Gregorio had meanwhile joined Teofilo in assaulting
Edgardo.6
Ruben Bernal and Jaime Bernal corroborated Salvacion’s recollection of the assault on Edgardo. According to
them, the appellants ganged up on Edgardo, with Teofilo wielding a kitchen knife with which he stabbed
Edgardo twice and Gregorio hacking Edgardo on the head with a bolo while Filomeno and Edwin restrained
Edgardo. They heard Edwin tell the appellants to ensure that Edgardo was lifeless before leaving him. 7
Dr. Romeo T. Salen, Medico Legal Officer of the Western Police District (now Manila Police District) Crime
Laboratory, appeared in court in representation of Dr. Emmanuel L. Aranas, and brought the following
documents: (a) Request for Examination on the Cadaver of the deceased transmitted by the Las Piñas Police
and received by Dr. Aranas; (b) Certification of Identification and Consent for Autopsy signed by the brother of
Edgardo; (c) Post Mortem Examination or Anatomical Sketch; (d) Medico Legal Report; and (e) Death
Certificate of Edgardo prepared by Dr. Aranas.8
Dr. Salen explained that based on Dr. Aranas’ written findings, Edgardo had sustained 12 wounds in the head,
neck and chest, eight of which had been fatal.9
Evidence of the Defense
For the Defense, the three appellants and one Agustin Tano (Tano) were presented as witnesses.
Tano was on his way home in late afternoon of May 30, 1999 when he saw Edgardo punch and then hit
Toribio with a lead pipe. He next saw Toribio retaliate by successively stabbing Edgardo with a knife. Tano
added that the other accused were not present during the incident.10
Filomeno narrated that on the day of the incident, he left his house at 9:00 am to attend the birthday party of
his nephew in Golden Gate, Moonwalk, Las Piñas City; that at 6:30 pm, his wife arrived at Golden Gate, and
begged him not to go home yet because Toribio had been involved in a fight with Edgardo and in turn the
family of Edgardo had threatened to retaliate against Toribio’s relatives to avenge Edgardo’s death; that he
and his wife thus remained in Golden Gate from May 30, 1999 to July 28, 1999 out of fear that Edgardo’s
relatives might retaliate against him although he had nothing to do with Edgardo’s death; 11 that it was when he
visited Toribio in detention when a police officer invited him for questioning regarding his supposed
involvement in the May 30, 1999 incident; and that he (Filomeno) was then immediately detained in the police
station, but was later transferred to the Las Piñas City Jail without any investigation being conducted. 12
Gregorio attested that on the date of the incident, he was taking care of his two-month old grandson, when his
neighbor advised him to leave his house at once, because his son Toribio had been involved in a fight; that he
entrusted his grandson to the care of his neighbor to go to Antipolo City, where his other son, Gregorio, Jr.,
was residing; that he stayed in Antipolo City for two months because of fear of Toribio’s enemies in Las Piñas
City; that when he returned to Las Piñas City on July 28, 1999 to fetch his wife and daughter, 13 policemen
invited him for questioning; and that he was then detained for his alleged involvement in the killing of
Edgardo.14
Toribio stated that he was proceeding on foot towards Edwin’s place at around 5:00 pm on May 30, 1999,
when he saw Edgardo, Ruben and Jaime drinking together; that the three hailed him and invited him to drink
with them; that although he declined the offer initially, he relented after Edgardo got mad at him; that Edgardo
then invited him to join them, but he declined the invitation and told them that he was going somewhere else;
that his refusal irked Edgardo, who warned him not be a toughie; that Edgardo stood up and attacked him with
a lead pipe, hitting him in the left arm; that his injury left a scar of an inch on his left arm; 15 that he ran towards
Edwin’s place and stayed there for about 20 minutes; that leaving Edwin’s house later on, he passed by the
three, who were still drinking; that Edgardo spotted him, held him by the collar, and punched him; that Ruben
and Jaime also hit him with a lead pipe and a wooden club (dos por dos), injuring his left chest; that he parried
their blows until they reached the street, where he fell on a small table used for selling Indian mangoes; that
he was able to pick up a small knife used for peeling the mangoes, and while he was about to stand up from a
prostrate position, he stabbed Edgardo on the head, neck and chest with the knife; that he did not report the
8
incident to the police, and, instead, went home; that he did not anymore submit himself for medical attention,
because his wounds were only slight; that he surrendered to the Antipolo City police authorities eight days
later, upon learning that the other appellants had been implicated in Eduardo’s death and were being hunted
down by the police.16
Ruling of the RTC
In its January 30, 2006 decision,17 the RTC found the appellants guilty of murder, and sentenced each to
suffer reclusion perpetua, and to pay to the heirs of the deceased P50,000.00 and to the wife of the
deceased P20,000.00 for the burial expenses.
The RTC supported the verdict with the following findings:
The self defense version of accused Toribio Mayingque is against the eye witness account of prosecution
witnesses who told the Court that about 5:00 in the afternoon of 30th day of May, 1999 Salvacion Tusi and her
husband, the victim herein, were resting in front of their house located at Pedro Sabido St. BF Resort Village,
Las Piñas City, together with a cousin, Ruben Bernal.
Accused Toribio "Loloy" Mayingque arrived and without saying anything stabbed the victim two times.
Salvacion shouted for help while her cousin Ruben Bernal was about to help her husband but Roly, Edwin
Macas and Gregorio arrived and helped in the killing of the victim (TSN, p. 5, Sept. 6, 1999).
The four (4) continuously stabbed the victim with a bladed weapons (Ibid, p. 6). Three were positively
identified in court as the perpetrators, to wit: accused Toribio, Gregorio and Filomeno, all surnamed
Mayingque. Salvacion incurred expenses in the amount of P20,000.00 as a result of the death of the victim.
The reason why they stabbed and killed the victim was because they resented the admonition by the victim to
them. Toribio, Filomeno and Gregorio always had a drinking spree in the place of Edwin Macas every Sunday
and were very noisy. The victim asked them not to be noisy (Ibid, p. 9).
The multiple wounds suffered by the victim even belies a any pretension of self defense. The victim suffered
10 stab wounds and 2 incised wounds. In all, the victim suffered 12 wounds, to wit:
No. 1 Stab Wound, parietal region, measuring 4 by 0.5 cm right of the mid-sagittal line which is on
the right part of the head measuring 4 x .5 cm which is a superficial wound because there was no
other organ damaged and it is not a fatal injury. This is caused by a sharp bladed weapon and that
he pointed injury No. 1 in the Anatomical Sketch;
No. 2 Stab Wound, parietal region, measuring 2.5 by 0.2 cm, 10 cm right of mid-sagittal line, he
described that this wound is a superficial wound which is almost the same size of injury No. 1 which
was likewise caused by a sharp bladed weapon;
No. 3, stab wound, right orbital region, measuring 4 by 0.4 cm. 4 from the anterior midline, 6 cm
deep, directed posterior wards and downwards, piercing the optic nerve and the adjacent soft
tissues and muscles which means from front to back and it pierced the optic nerve which is
responsible for the movement and for the eyes to see. Wound No. 3 is very damaging because it will
cause blindness to the right eye and if the bleeding is profuse and if no medication is done, the
patient could die. This is a fatal injury and is indicated in the Anatomical Sketch;
No. 4, Incised wound, right temporal region, measuring 5 by 0.7 cm, 8 cm anterior midline. This is an
incised wound also a superficial injury caused by a sharp bladed instrument;
No. 5, Incised Wound, submental region, measuring 3 by 0.5 cm, 4 cm left of the anterior midline.
This wound is located on the chin a superficial and non fatal injury and this injury is indicated in
Exhibit "L" as injury No. 5;
No. 6, Stab wound, neck, measuring 1.5 by 1.5 cm, along the anterior midline, 7 cm deep, directed
posterior wards, downwards, and lateral wards, piercing the upper lobe of the left lungs. This injury
is located on the left side of the neck directed posterior ward or front to back and the upper lobe of
the left lung was destroyed. This wound is fatal and caused the death of the victim. This injury is
indicated in the Anatomical Sketch as Wound No. 6 and the injury was caused by sharp bladed
instrument;
No. 7, Stab Wound, neck, measuring 3.5 by 1.5 cm, along the anterior midline, 7 cm deep, directed
posterior wards, downwards and lateral wards, piercing the upper lobe of the left lung. This injury is
located on the middle part of the neck and injured a major organ which is the lung and fatal, this is
indicated in the Anatomical Sketch as Injury No. 7 and caused by a sharp bladed instrument;
No. 8, Stab Wound, left supraclavicular region, measuring 2.5 by 1.5 cm, 12 cm from the anterior
midline, 5 cm deep, directed posterior wards, downwards and medial wards, piercing the upper lobe
of the left lung. This wound is located at the clavicular which is the bone of the chest and directly
behind the clavicular is the lungs and this injury is fatal and could cause the death of the victim and
said injury is indicated in the Anatomical Sketch and the injury was caused by a sharp bladed
instrument;
No. 9, Stab wound, left clavicular region, measuring 2 by 0.5 cm. 9 cm. From the anterior midline, 6
cm deep, directed poster wards, down wards and medial wards, passing thru the 1st left intercostals
space, piercing the upper lobe of the left lung. This injury is located at the clavicular region and
destroys the upper lobe of the left lung and this is a fatal wound caused by a bladed weapon. This
injury is indicated in the Anatomical Sketch as Wound No. 9;
No. 10, Stab wound, left infraclavicular region, measuring 2 by 1 cm. 12 cm from the anterior
midline, 10 cm deep, directed posterior wards, downwards and medialwards passing thru the 2nd
left intercostals space, piercing the upper lobe of the left lung. This injury is located at the clavicular
region directly behind is the lung and this injury is fatal caused by a bladed instrument and the same
is indicated in the Anatomical Sketch as Wound No. 10.
9
 No. 11. Stab wound, sternal region, measuring 3 by 0.6 cm. Along the anterior midline, 10 cm. Deep,
directed posteriorwards, downwards and lateralwards, piercing the upper lobe of the right lung. This
injury is on the external region so from the center to the outside it hits the upper lobe of the right lung
and this is a fatal wound and also indicated as Injury No. 11 in the anatomical sketch.
No. 12, Stab wound, right mammary region, measuring 3 by 2.5, 4 cm from the anterior midline,
directed posteriorwards, downwards and to the right, fracturing the 3rd right thoracic rib, piercing the
pericardium and the right ventricle of the heart. This injury is located on the right chest directed
posteriorwards, downwards and fractured the third right thoracic rib and hit the pericardium and the
right ventricle of the heart on the middle and this wound was very fatal and caused by a sharp
bladed instrument and this injury is likewise indicated in the Anatomical Sketch
According to Dr. Talen, the relative position of the assailant in inflicting wounds No. 7 to 10 most probably was
facing the victim and the trajectory is directed downwards and the infliction came from above. Injury Nos. 1, 2,
4 and 5 were inflicted in any position. Wound No. 3 was inflicted from up to down. Multiple stab wounds, head,
neck and chest caused of death of the victim.
The foregoing 12 injuries of the victim belie the self defense of accused Toribio Mayingque. The multiple
injuries of the victim support the claim of conspiracy by the prosecution. Dr. Salen told the Court that the
different sizes of the wounds show that indeed more than one assailant inflicted the wounds and more than
one instrument used (TSN, pp. 32-33, Feb. 14, 2001). Moreover, all three have been positively identified in
court as the perpetrators. Thus, the Court can not accept the denial and alibi by the other two co-accused,
namely: Gregorio Mayingque and Filomeno Mayingque.
It is clear from the testimonies of prosecution witnesses that the accused treacherously attacked the victim.
They suddenly assaulted the victim. As held: "it is necessary to show that the aggressors cooperated in such
a way as to secure advantage from their superiority in strength. (People v. Casey, see note 63, supra at 34
[1981] citing People v. Elizaga, 86 Phil. 365.) There must be proof of the relative physical strength of the
aggressors and the assaulted party or proof that the accused simultaneously assaulted the deceased."
(People v. Casey, see note 63, supra at 34 [1981] citing People v. Bustos, et al., 51 Phil. 385; People vs.
Rubia, et al., 52 Phil. 172, 176 [1928].)" (G.R. Nos. 120394-97, January 16, 2001, People vs. Danilo Pablo, Et
Al.)18
Ruling of the CA
Through its decision dated June 15, 2007,19 the CA affirmed the RTC, giving the following ratiocination:
The appeal is bereft of merit.
The testimonies of Salvacion, Ruben, and Jaime positively pointing to accused-appellant Loloy as the one
who stabbed Tusi twice with a kitchen knife along with accused-appellants Gorio as the one who hacked Tusi
on the head with a bolo and Boy Roti, as the one who held Tusi while the latter was being hacked, which are
bolstered by the medico legal findings that eight (8) out of twelve (12) stabs and incise wounds sustained by
Tusi are fatal wounds, belie accused-appellant Loloy’s assertion of self defense.
Another factor which militates against accused-appellant Loloy’s claim of self defense are the facts that he
confessed his guilt in the course of his testimony before the lower court when he stated that he surrendered to
the Antipolo City Police authorities because he was conscience stricken by the fact that he allegedly violated
the penal and the divine laws when he stabbed Tusi successively to get even with the latter, Ruben, and
Jaime who were allegedly hitting him with a lead pipe and wooden club, which is tantamount to retaliation
rather than self defense; that he did not submit the injuries on his left arm and chest to medical examination to
at least clearly and convincingly substantiate the alleged unlawful aggression on his person by Tusi, and that
he pleaded not guilty during the arraignment because his counsel advised him to do so, but deep inside his
conscience, he felt guilty as charged.
xxx when the accused invokes self-defense, it becomes incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that he indeed acted in defense of himself. xxx
xxx
Moreover, the nature, number and location of the wounds sustained by the victim belie the assertion of self-
defense since the gravity of the said wounds is indicative of a determined effort to kill and not just defend. The
number of wounds was established by the physical evidence, which is a mute manifestation of truth and ranks
high in the hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. xxx
The distance between accused-appellant Boy Roti’s alleged whereabouts on May 30, 1999 and the crime
scene could be negotiated in thirty (30) minutes by a tricycle ride so much so that it was physically possible for
him to be present at the scene of the incident at that precise time. Aside from his wife Lolita who started giving
her direct testimony, but subsequently died, accused-appellant Boy Roti could have presented his sister, Lina
Mayingque, a certain Roberto Entosa, and his sister-in-law (hipag) as witnesses to prove that he was in
Golden Gate, Moonwalk, Las Piñas City all the time, and to disprove the prosecution’s claim of his presence
in BF Resort Village where Tusi was stabbed to death on May 30, 1999. However, he did not do so. If
accused-appellant Boy Roti’s fear that the family of Tusi would retaliate for being a brother of accused-
appellant Loloy to avenge Tusi’s death, even though he had nothing to do with it, is true, he should have
reported the matter to the police authorities rather than hide at his sister’s house in Moonwalk until his
apprehension on July 28, 1999.
Accused-appellant Gorio’s alleged act of fleeing for safety from Las Piñas City to Antipolo City in order to
allegedly avoid involvement in a neighborhood fight involving his son accused-appellant Loloy, entrusting his
two (2)-month old grandchild to the care of a neighbor who was not that familiar to him, leaving his wife and
daughter behind in Las Piñas City exposed to the purported wrath of the family of Tusi, and leaving his son,
accused-appellant Loloy, to fight his alleged aggressors without doing anything to protect his son, are
incredible, and contrary to human nature and experience. His conduct could no less than be construed as an
implied admission of guilt.
For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for accused-appellants Loloy and Gorio to prove that they were
somewhere else when the crime was committed. They must likewise prove that they could not have been
physically present at the scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. Positive
10
identification where categorical and consistent and not attended by any showing of ill motive on the part of
eyewitnesses on the matter prevails over alibi and denial.
On the other hand, Tano’s testimony was incongruent with the testimonies of the other defense witnesses as
regards the actual date of the occurrence of the offense, and the identity of Tusi. Said testimony cast doubt on
his credibility as an eyewitness and it fails to overcome the evidence for the prosecution clearly and
convincingly.
The testimony of Dr. Salen as regards the Anatomical Sketch, and Medico Legal Report, among other things,
prepared by Dr. Aranas falls under the exception to the hearsay rule because the said sketch and report are
entries in official records made by Dr. Aranas in the performance of his duty as a Medico Legal Officer of the
WPD Crime Laboratory. Dr. Aranas had personal knowledge of the facts stated by him the said sketch and
report relative to the nature and number of wounds sustained by Tusi because he was the one who performed
the autopsy on the cadaver of Tusi. Dr. Salen acquired such facts from the sketch and report made by his
predecessor, Dr. Aranas, who had a legal duty to turn over the same to him as his successor. Such entries
were duly entered in a regular manner in the official records, hence, the entries in said sketch and report are
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated and are admissible under Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.
As an officer having legal custody of the said sketch and report, Dr. Salen attested that the copies presented
in the lower court were the original ones prepared by Dr. Aranas.
The findings on the wounds sustained by Tusi as found on the medico legal report was written in a technical
language which is not well understood by the lower court, and said matter required the special knowledge,
skill, experience or training possessed by Dr. Salen as a Medico Legal Officer of the WPD Crime Laboratory
to give to the lower court the meaning of the technical language used, particularly, whether or not the wounds
described therein were fatal. Hence, the lower court could receive in evidence Dr. Salen’s interpretation of Dr.
Aranas’ findings.
The testimony of an expert witness is not indispensable to a successful prosecution for murder. While the
autopsy report of a medico legal expert in cases of murder, or homicide, is preferably accepted to show the
extent of the injuries suffered by the victim, it is not the only competent evidence to prove the injuries and the
fact of death. The testimonies of credible witnesses are equally admissible regarding such injuries and the
surrounding circumstances thereof.
On the non-offer of evidence, notwithstanding the fact that the medical legal report and the anatomical sketch
were not formally offered, they are nonetheless, admissible because –
x x x Evidence not formally offered can be considered by the court as long as they have been properly
identified by testimony duly recorded and they have themselves been incorporated in the records of the case.
All the documentary and object evidence in this case were properly identified, presented and marked as
exhibits in court x x x. Even without their formal offer, therefore, the prosecution can still establish the case
because witnesses properly identified those exhibits, and their testimonies are record. Furthermore,
appellant’s counsel had cross-examined the prosecution witnesses who testified on the exhibits.
In this case, the counsel of accused-appellants Loloy, Gorio, and Boy Roti had the opportunity to cross-
examine Dr. Salen, but did not do so, insisting that the latter is not qualified as a medico legal expert, and that
his testimony is hearsay.
Records show that Edgardo Tusi was not in a position to put up any kind of defense considering the fact that
he was seated and resting underneath a tree infront of his house immediately before accused-appellant Loloy
suddenly appeared and stabbed him twice with a kitchen knife.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means and
method or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution, without
risk to the offender, arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery
is the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked.
The participation of accused-appellants Gorio and Boy Roti in killing Tusi was shown when accused-appellant
Gorio subsequently hacked Tusi on the head with a bolo, while accused-appellant Boy Roti assisted by
holding Tusi right after the stabbing by accused-appellant Loloy to especially ensure the stabbing and hacking
without risk to themselves.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. In the absence of direct proof of conspiracy, it may be deduced from the mode,
method and manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused
themselves when such point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.
Hence, the lower court correctly held that treachery and conspiracy attended the killing of Tusi.
Even if the voluntary surrender of accused-appellant Loloy to the Antipolo City Police would be appreciated,
he would still be punished by reclusion perpetua, which is an indivisible penalty with a fixed duration, under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code because the pertinent portion of Article 63 of the said Code provides
that:
In all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless
of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.
Hence, the lower court correctly sentenced accused-appellants Loloy, Gorio, and Boy Roti to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.20
Hence, this appeal, in which the appellants urge that the CA committed the following errors, namely:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO ACCUSED-APPELLANT TORIBIO
MAYINGQUE’S THEORY OF SELF-DEFENSE.
11
 II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS CONSPIRED TO
COMMIT THE CRIME OF MURDER
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO HEARSAY EVIDENCE WHICH
BECAME THE BASIS FOR THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
IV
ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY, THE COURT A QUO, GRAVELY
ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER,
INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE AND IN FINDING THAT THE CRIME WAS ATTENDED BY TREACHERY.
On June 25, 2008, Gregorio manifested in writing that he was withdrawing his appeal upon the advice and
assistance of his counsel, because he intended to apply for executive clemency by reason of his advanced
age of 78 years.21
On July 16, 2008, the Court allowed Gregorio’s withdrawal of appeal, and considered the judgment final and
executory as to him.22
Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
I Toribio did not convincingly establish, first of all, that there was unlawful aggression against him. His claim that
The appellants would have the Court review the CA’s affirmance of their conviction by attacking the appellate
court’s supposed failure to accord credence to Toribio’s plea of self-defense, and by assailing the appellate
court’s appreciation of the evidence.
The Court cannot accept the appellants’ urging.
To begin with, it is fundamental that the determination by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses, when
affirmed by the appellate court, is accorded full weight and credit as well as great respect, if not conclusive
effect.23 Such determination made by the trial court proceeds from its first-hand opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses, their conduct and attitude under grilling examination, 24 thereby placing the trial
court in the unique position to assess the witnesses’ credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty
and candor.25
In view of the foregoing, we sustain the CA’s affirmance of the conviction. We have not been shown any fact
or circumstance of weight and influence that the CA and the RTC overlooked that, if considered, should affect
the outcome of the case.
Secondly, the essential elements of self-defense are: (a) unlawful aggression; (b) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.26 By invoking self-defense, the accused must prove by clear and convincing evidence the
elements of self-defense.27 The rule consistently adhered to in this jurisdiction is that when the accused
admitted that he was the author of the death of the victim and his defense was anchored on self-defense, it
becomes incumbent upon him to prove the
justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court. 28 The rationale for this requirement is that the accused,
having admitted the felonious wounding or killing of his adversary, is to be held criminally liable for the crime
unless he establishes to the satisfaction of the court the fact of self-defense. Thereby, however, the burden to
prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt is not lifted from the shoulders of the State, which carries it until the end
of the proceedings. In other words, only the onus probandi has shifted to him, because self-defense is an
affirmative allegation that must be established with certainty by sufficient and satisfactory proof. 29 He must
now discharge the burden by relying on the strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of that of the
Prosecution, for, even if the Prosecution’s evidence is weak, it cannot be disbelieved in view of the accused’s
admission of the killing.30
Both the trial court and the CA rejected Teofilo’s plea of self-defense. We hold that they did so correctly.
Teofilos’s evidence on self-defense was not persuasive enough, and lacked credibility. Simply stated, such
evidence did not prevail over the clear showing by Salvacion and the Bernals that Teofilo and his co-
conspirators had ganged up on Edgardo with a knife (Teofilo) and bolo (Gregorio) while the other two had held
Edgardo to render him defenseless. Indeed, we agree with the conclusion of both lower courts that the plea of
self-defense was belied by the number (12) and the different sizes of the wounds inflicted on Edgardo. The
presence of a large number of wounds on the victim’s body negated self-defense, and indicated, instead, a
determined effort to kill the victim.31
Edgardo and the Bernals had attacked him with a lead pipe and wooden club, which impelled him to stab
Edgardo, became implausible to the lower courts, and to us, too, because Toribio did not even submit himself
to any medical attention. He should have done so, if, truly, he had sustained injuries at the hands of the victim
and his group. At any rate, the question as to who between the accused and the victim was the unlawful
aggressor was a question of fact best addressed to and left with the trial court for determination based on the
evidence on record.32
Thirdly, the CA did not err in affirming the conviction of Filomeno, whose main plea consisted of alibi.
Filomeno’s alibi would place him in Golden Gate, Moonwalk, Las Piñas City, at the time of the commission of
the crime. The CA rejected such alibi by indicating that the distance between Golden Gate, Moonwalk, Las
Piñas City and Pedro Sabido Street, BF Resort Village, Las Piñas City where the crime was committed could
be negotiated through a 30-minute tricycle ride, which did not render impossible for Filomeno to be in the
place of the crime when it was committed. The CA also cited the abject failure of Filomeno, or other witnesses
to credibly establish his being in Golden Gate, Moonwalk, Las Piñas City in the entire time from the morning of
12
May 30, 1999 till after the commission of the crime, as well as to disprove the State’s positive showing that he
was present in the place of the crime when it was committed.
Alibi is an inherently weak and unreliable defense, because it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove. 33 To
establish alibi, the accused must prove: (a) that he was actually in another place at the time of the
perpetration of the crime; and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime when
the crime was perpetrated.34 Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the
accused was when the crime transpired and the place where the crime was committed, as well as to the
facility of access between the two places.35
II
Penalties and Damages
As the consequence of the foregoing conclusion, the appellants are found guilty of murder, and accordingly
punished with reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. 36
There is a need to correct the award of damages.
The CA did not state whether the amount of P50,000.00 was for death indemnity or moral damages.
Nonetheless, the CA should have awarded both damages, considering that they were of different kinds. 37 For
death indemnity, the amount of P50,000.00 is fixed pursuant to the current judicial policy on the
matter,38 without the need of any evidence or proof of
damages.39 Likewise, the mental anguish of the surviving family should be assuaged by the award of
appropriate and reasonable moral damages.40 Although the surviving family’s mental anguish is not ever
quantifiable with mathematical precision, the Court must nonetheless determine the amount to which the heirs
of the deceased are entitled. In this case, the Court holds that the amount of P50,000.00 is reasonable, which,
pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence,41 is awarded even in the absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs’
emotional suffering, simply because human nature and experience have shown that:
xxx a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the
victim’s family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes the
victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not only steals from the family of the
deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love, affection and support, but often leaves them with
the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them.421awph!1
The Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed in criminal cases as part of the civil liability
"when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances." 43 The Civil Code allows such
damages to be awarded "by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages."44 In this regard, the CA and the RTC committed the plain
error of failing to recognize the right of the heirs of the victim to exemplary damages by virtue of the
attendance of treachery. The plain error, even if not assigned in this appeal, demands immediate rectification
as a matter of law due to the killing being attended by treachery.
That treachery, being an attendant circumstance, was inseparable from murder did not matter. As well
explained in People v. Catubig:45
The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to be
understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the
public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings,
each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an
award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony
underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether
ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the
award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It
would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the
aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying
nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal,
rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary
damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
Accordingly, P30,000.00 is awarded as exemplary damages. We hold that true exemplarity will not be served
by a lesser amount.
Lastly, the Court retains the award of P20,000.00 for burial expenses, as the CA and RTC fixed, considering
that the appellants have not assailed such amount. There can be no question that burial expenses were the
reasonable consequence of the criminal act of the accused.
WHEREFORE, appellants TORIBIO MAYINGQUE and FILOMENO MAYINGQUE are found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, and each is sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua.
The appellants are ordered to pay to the heirs of Edgardo Tusi P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as
moral damages, P30,000.00 as actual damages, and P20,000.00 as burial expenses.
Costs of suit to be paid by the appellants.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 172606 November 23, 2011
13
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MELANIO NUGAS y MAPAIT, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Self-defense is often readily claimed by an accused even if false. It is time, then, to remind the Defense about
the requisites of the justifying circumstance and about the duty of the Defense to establish the requisites by
credible, clear and convincing evidence.
Melanio Nugas y Mapait appeals the decision promulgated on March 8, 2006, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed his conviction for murder under the decision rendered on August 17, 2000 by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 73, in Antipolo City (RTC).
Antecedents
On June 25, 1997, the Office of Provincial Prosecutor in Antipolo City charged Jonie Araneta y Nugas
(Araneta) with murder committed as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of March 1997, in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, armed with a
bladed weapon, conspiring and confederating with an unidentified male person, whose true identity and
present whereabout is still unknown, with treachery and taking advantage of their superior strength, did, then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said bladed weapon one Glen
Remigio y Santos hitting the latter on the left neck, thereby inflicting upon him mortal stab wound which
directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
On April 7, 1998, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, learning of the identity of the unidentified male co-
conspirator of Araneta as Melanio Nugas y Mapait (Nugas), amended the information to include Nugas as a
co-principal, to wit:
That on or about the 26th day of March, 1997, in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping and aiding one another, armed with a bladed weapon, with intent to kill, evident
premeditation, treachery, and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said bladed weapon one Glen Remegio y Santos hitting the latter
on the left neck, thereby inflicting upon him mortal stab wound which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Upon arraignment on June 9, 1998, Araneta and Nugas, both assisted by counsel de officio, voluntarily and
spontaneously pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. 4
In the course of the presentation of evidence for the Defense, Araneta manifested his willingness to change
his plea, and to enter a plea of guilty as an accomplice in homicide. On July 19, 1999, the RTC approved his
offer to change plea. The plea bargaining was with the conformity of the State Prosecutor and the heirs of the
victim. Thus, after ensuring that Araneta had understood the consequences of his new plea of guilty, the RTC
allowed him to enter a new plea. He was subsequently duly convicted as an accomplice in homicide and
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two years, four months, and one day of prision correccional,
as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. 5
The trial proceeded against Nugas.
Evidence of the Prosecution
On March 26, 1997, at about 9:00 in the evening, Glen Remigio (Glen), his wife, Nila Remigio (Nila), and their
two children, Raymond and Genevieve, then 11- and 6-years old, respectively, were traveling on board their
family vehicle, a Tamaraw FX, along Marcos Highway in COGEO, Antipolo, Rizal. Glen was driving, while Nila
sat to his extreme right because their children sat between them. While they were passing along Carolina
Village, two men waved at them signalling their request to hitch a ride. Glen accommodated the two men, one
of whom was carrying a maroon plastic bag, allowing them to board the vehicle at the rear. When the vehicle
neared Masinag Market, the two men suddenly brandished knives that each pointed at Glen’s and Nila’s
necks, warning them not to make any wrong move if they did not want to be harmed. Considering that the two
men demanded to be brought to Sta. Lucia Mall, Glen continued driving the vehicle. Upon the vehicle
reaching Kingsville Village, the man behind Glen suddenly stabbed Glen on the neck. Thereafter, the two men
alighted and fled. Glen pulled the knife from his neck and handed it to Nila. He drove to the nearest hospital,
but he collapsed on the way and lost control of the vehicle, causing it to run over two pedestrians, one of
whom died and the other suffered a broken arm. Once the vehicle hit the railings of a gas station, Nila cried
for help. Concerned citizens immediately rushed Glen to the nearest hospital, which was about 50 to 60
meters away. Nila stayed behind to look after their children. When she checked the vehicle, she found the
knife, its scabbard, and the maroon plastic bag left by the assailants at the rear of the vehicle. She gathered
the articles and later turned them over to the police officer in charge of the investigation. The maroon plastic
bag was found to contain the following items: a National Bureau of Investigation clearance, 6 a police
clearance,7 Social Security System papers,8 and official receipts,9 all issued in the name of Araneta, a
stainless fork knuckle, and a bunch of keys.
Despite undergoing treatment, Glen succumbed,10 and his body was brought for autopsy to the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory. The autopsy revealed that Glen had sustained a fatal stab wound on the left
side of his neck originating from the front and going towards the back and downwards towards the center of
his body, piercing the apex of the left lung and transecting the left common carotid artery; that the stab wound
had been inflicted by a single bladed weapon; and that the immediate cause of his death was the hemorrhage
resulting from the stab wound.11 It was opined that the position of the stab wound would suggest that had the
14
assailant used his left hand, he was probably directly behind the victim; but had he used his right hand, he
had to be somewhere to the extreme left of the victim.
During trial, Nila identified Nugas as the person who had sat behind her husband and who had stabbed her
husband in the neck, and Araneta as the person who had sat behind her and who had carried the maroon
plastic bag that she had later recovered from the backseat.
Other witnesses presented were the investigating police officer, the medico-legal officer who had performed
the autopsy, and Atty. Jose S. Diloy, the lawyer who had assisted Araneta in executing a sworn statement
pointing to Nugas, his own uncle, as the person who had stabbed the driver of the vehicle they were riding on
March 26, 1997.
The State adduced object and documentary evidence, including the knife, the maroon plastic bag and all its
contents, Medico Legal Report No. M-0406-97,12 and the sworn statement of Araneta.13
Evidence of Nugas
Albeit admitting having stabbed Glen, Nugas maintained that he did so in self-defense. He claimed that the
Tamaraw FX driven by Glen was a passenger taxi, not a family vehicle; that when he and Araneta boarded the
vehicle at Gate 1 in COGEO, Antipolo, about four other passengers were already on board; that he argued
with Glen about the fare, because Glen was overcharging; that when he was about to alight in front of
Rempson Supermarket, Glen punched him and leaned forward as if to get something from his clutch bag that
was on the dashboard; that thinking that Glen was reaching for a gun inside the clutch bag, he stabbed Glen
with his left hand from where he was seated in order to protect himself (Inunahan ko na sya); and that when
asked why he carried a knife, he replied that he needed the knife for protection because he was living in a
squatter’s area.
Ruling of the RTC
On August 17, 2000, the RTC convicted Nugas of murder, ruling that his guilt had been established beyond
reasonable doubt.
The RTC accorded greater credence to the testimony of Nila because she had consistently narrated the
incident. It observed that although Nila had initially made a mistake in identifying who, as between Nugas and
Araneta, had stabbed her husband, she had rectified her error upon seeing the two accused together in
person; that despite the resemblance of Nugas and Araneta to each other, she had firmly pointed to Nugas as
the person who had stabbed Glen; that even granting to be true Nugas’ version that Glen had pushed and
punched him, his stabbing of Glen could not be a reasonable and necessary means to repel the attack, for, by
all standards, fists were no match to knives; that treachery had been duly proved beyond reasonable doubt,
because Nugas’ position inside the vehicle in relation to Glen, who had sat on the driver’s seat, and Nugas’
manner of inflicting the fatal blow from behind warranted the inference that Nugas had taken advantage of his
position to specially ensure the execution of the felony, without risk to himself arising from any defense that
Glen might make.
The RTC disposed thusly:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused MELANIO NUGAS is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
Nugas is hereby further ordered to pay to heirs of Glen Remigio the amount of P80,000.00 for actual
damages, P50,000.00 for funeral expenses and P50,000 as death indemnity.
SO ORDERED.14
Ruling of the CA
Upon review,15 the CA affirmed the factual and legal conclusions of the RTC, and declared that Nugas’
invoking of self-defense shifted the burden to him to prove the attendance of the elements of self-defense, but
he failed to discharge such burden.
Issue
Nugas has now come to the Court to reverse his conviction, and begs us to delve into whether the affirmance
by the CA was proper, and whether the attendant circumstance of treachery was duly proven.
Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
By pleading self-defense, an accused admits the killing,16 and thereby assumes the burden to establish his
plea of self-defense by credible, clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, his conviction will follow from his
admission of killing the victim. Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when it is uncorroborated by
independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, the accused must
discharge the burden of proof by relying on the strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the
State’s evidence,17 because the existence of self-defense is a separate issue from the existence of the crime,
and establishing self-defense does not require or involve the negation of any of the elements of the offense
itself.18
To escape liability, the accused must show by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence that: (a) the
victim committed unlawful aggression amounting to an actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the
accused claiming self-defense; (b) there was reasonable necessity in the means employed to prevent or repel
the unlawful aggression; and (c) there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused claiming
self-defense or at least any provocation executed by the accused claiming self-defense was not the proximate
and immediate cause of the victim’s aggression. 19
The RTC found that Nugas did not establish the requisites of self-defense. The CA concurred.
15
The Court upholds both lower courts.
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying circumstance of self-
defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no justified killing in defense of oneself. 20 The test for the
presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put in real
peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary
threat.21Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression,
namely: (a) there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or,
at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful. 22
Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful
aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a weapon, an
offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful
aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere
threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a
revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent
unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to
his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot. 23
Nugas did not credibly establish that Glen had first punched him and then reached for his clutch bag on the
dashboard, making Nugas believe that he had a gun there. For one, as the CA pointed out, Nugas admitted
not actually seeing if Glen had a gun in his clutch bag.24 And, secondly, the CA correctly found and declared
Nugas’ testimony about Glen punching him to be improbable, viz:25
It is also highly improbable that the victim, in relation to accused-appellant Nugas position, can launch an
attack against the latter. First, the victim was at the driver’s seat and seated between him were his wife and
two children. Second, the victim was driving the FX vehicle.1âwphi1 Third, accused-appellant Nugas was
seated directly behind the victim. All things considered, it is highly improbable, nay risky for the victim’s family,
for him to launch an attack.
Consequently, Nugas had absolutely no basis for pleading self-defense because he had not been subjected to
either actual or imminent threat to his life. He had nothing to prevent or to repel considering that Glen
committed no unlawful aggression towards him.
With unlawful aggression, the indispensable foundation of self-defense, not having been established by
Nugas, it is superfluous to still determine whether the remaining requisites of self-defense were attendant. As
the Court made clear in People v. Carrero:26
Unlawful aggression is the main and most essential element to support the theory of self-defense and the
complete or incomplete exemption from criminal liability; without such primal requisite it is not possible to
maintain that a person acted in self-defense within the terms under which unlawful aggression is subordinate
to the other two conditions named in article 8, No. 4, of the Penal Code. 27 When an act of aggression is in
response to an insult, affront, or threat, it cannot be considered as a defense but as the punishment which the
injured party inflicts on the author of the provocation, and in such a case the courts can at most consider it as
a mitigating circumstance, but never as a reason for exemption, except in violation of the provisions of the
Penal Code. (emphasis supplied)
Treachery is present when two conditions concur, namely: (a) that the means, methods and forms of
execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) that
such means, methods and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused
without danger to his person.28
The essence of treachery lies in the attack that comes without warning, and the attack is swift, deliberate and
unexpected, and affords the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape,
thereby ensuring its accomplishment without the risk to the aggressor, without the slightest provocation on the
part of the victim. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to
defend himself or to retaliate. Treachery may also be appreciated when the victim, although warned of the
danger to his life, is defenseless and unable to flee at the time of the infliction of the coup de grace. 29
The CA exhaustively discussed and rightly determined the presence of treachery as a circumstance attendant
in the killing of Glen and the improbability of Glen launching an attack against or defending himself from
Nugas by reason of their relative positions. We affirm the CA, because there was nothing adduced by Nugas
that refuted how the relative positions of Glen and Nugas had left the former defenseless and unable to parry
or to avoid the fatal blow of the latter. Verily, Nugas stabbed Glen from behind with suddenness, thereby
deliberately ensuring the execution of the killing without any risk to himself from any defense that Glen might
make.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on March 8, 2006 finding MELANIO NUGAS y MAPAIT
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 175939 April 3, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CHAD MANANSALA y LAGMAN, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
16
The due recognition of the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation through the criminal complaint or information is decisive of whether his prosecution for a crime
stands or not. The right is not transgressed if the information sufficiently alleges facts and omissions
constituting an offense that includes the offense established to have been committed by the accused.
The Case
Chad Manansala y Lagman seeks to reverse the decision promulgated on July 26, 2006, whereby the Court
of Appeals (CA)1 affirmed .with modification his conviction for the illegal possession and control of 750 grams
of dried marijuana leaves in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972)
that the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 74, Olongapo City had handed down through its decision dated
February 1, 2000,2sentencing him to suffer the penalties of "reclusion perpetua maximum or imprisonment
from thirty (30) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years and to pay the fine of Seven Hundred Fifty
(P750,000.00) Thousand Pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment."
Antecedents
The information filed on October 20, 1994 alleged:
That on or about the nineteenth (19th) day of October, 1994, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being lawfully authorized did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly engage in selling, delivering, giving away to another and
distributing more or less 750 grams or 3/4 kilo of marijuana dried leaves placed in a small wooden box inside
the cabinet, which are prohibited drugs, found in his possession and control.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
To substantiate the charge, the Prosecution showed the following.
On October 18, 1994 the Philippine National Police in Olongapo City (PNP) conducted a test-buy operation
against Manansala, a suspected dealer of marijuana. On the same date, following the test-buy, the PNP
applied for and obtained a search warrant from the RTC, Branch 72, Olongapo City (Search Warrant No. 8-
94) to authorize the search for and seizure of prohibited drugs in Manansala’s residence located at No. 55
Johnson Extension, Barangay East Bajac Bajac, Olongapo City.4 SPO4 Felipe P. Bolina and other elements of
the PNP, accompanied by Barangay Chairman Reynaldo Manalang of Barangay East Bajac Bajac, conducted
the search of Manansala’s house at around 5:30 a.m. on October 19, 1994. The search yielded the 750 grams
of dried marijuana leaves subject of the information, which the search team recovered from a wooden box
placed inside a cabinet. Also seized was the amount of P655.00 that included the two marked P50.00 bills
bearing serial numbers SNKJ812018 and SNMN426747 used during the test buy. 5
All the seized articles were inventoried, and Manansala himself signed the certification to that effect, along
with his father, Jose Manansala, and Barangay Captain Manalang. 6 The certification listed the following seized
articles, to wit: (a) one kilo, more or less, of suspected dried marijuana leaves; (b) rolling paper; and (c) money
amounting to P655.00.
SPO4 Bolina and his team brought Manansala to Camp Cabal in Olongapo City, where they turned over the
seized articles to the evidence custodian, SPO2 Marcelino R. Sapad. At around 8:20 a.m. of October 20,
1994, the seized articles were submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Olivas, San Fernando,
Pampanga for qualitative examination.
The PNP Crime Laboratory later issued Technical Report No. D-396-94,7 to wit:
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
Spmn "A" – One (1) big transparent plastic bag containing two (2) rectangular bricks of dried
suspected MARIJUANA fruiting tops having a total weight of seven hundred fifty five (755) grams.
Spmn "B" – One (1) medium size plastic bag containing dried suspected MARIJUANA fruiting tops
weighing 9.045 grams. x x x.
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of any prohibited and/or regulated drug in the above-stated specimen. x
x x.
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE result for
MARIJUANA, a prohibited drug. x x x.
CONCLUSION:
Spmns "A" and "B" – contain MARIJUANA, a prohibited drug. 8
Manansala pleaded not guilty on November 22, 1994.9
On January 4, 1995, First Asst. City Prosecutor Mario F. Manalansan filed a motion for the admission of an
amended information, ostensibly to modify the offense charged from illegal sale of prohibited drugs under
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425 to illegal possession of prohibited drugs under Section 8 of the same
law.10 But the RTC did not act on the motion.
Nonetheless, the trial proceeded, with the Prosecution establishing the matters earlier summarized.
17
In his turn, Manansala denied the charge, alleging that he had been the victim of a frame-up. His version
follows.
On October 19, 1994, military men clad in civilian attire arrived at his house and arrested him without any
warrant, and brought him to an office he referred to simply as S2, then to a club located on Magsaysay Street
in Olongapo City known as Dorris 2. His captors mugged and then detained him when he refused to admit the
sale and possession of marijuana. They turned down his request to be brought to a hospital for the treatment
of the injuries he thereby sustained. As of the time of his testimony, he conceded that he could not identify his
captors and whoever had maltreated him, except SPO4 Bolina whom he recognized in court when the latter
testified at the trial.11
Decision of the RTC
As stated, the RTC convicted Manansala for illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 6425, holding thus:
The Information to which accused pleaded "not guilty" charges that accused willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
x x x engage in selling, delivering, giving away to another and distributing x x x falling under the more
embracing term known as "drug pushing". The alleged act of allegedly knowingly selling or pushing prohibited
drugs by the accused was however, not sufficiently proven. The member of the team who is alleged to have
acted as a poseur-buyer of the illegal stuff from the accused was not presented as a witness, hence, the
testimony of SPO4 Felipe Bolina, to the effect that during the surveillance conducted prior to the application of
the search warrant, a member of the team acting as poseur buyer was able to buy marijuana from the
accused, cannot be given weight, being hearsay.
However, the fact that the enforcing team where witness Bolina is a member, was able to find marijuana
leaves in the custody, possession and control of the accused, in the course of the enforcement of the search
warrant and has been established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, without controversion but the
denial of the accused, which like alibi, is the weakest defense, this Court is convinced that accused is guilty
instead of violating Section 8, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act as amended, a crime that is necessarily
included in the crime of drug pushing or dealing, for which the accused have been charged with. In light of
these circumstances, this Court has no option that to find accused guilty and liable for the crime proved. Since
the date of the commission of the crime as proved is October 19, 1994, the provisions of Republic Act No.
7659, in so far as the imposable penalty is concerned, will find application.
WHEREFORE, finding accused Chad Manansala y Lagman, GUILTY of Violation of Section 8, Article II of
Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua maximum or imprisonment from thirty (30) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years and to
pay the fine of Seven Hundred Fifty (P750,000.00) Thousand Pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.12
Ruling of the CA
On intermediate appeal, the CA reviewed the conviction upon the following issues, namely:
1. That the conviction, being anchored on evidence procured by virtue of an invalid warrant, was
erroneous;
2. That the RTC erred in convicting the accused for illegal possession of prohibited drug on the
misplaced and inaccurate theory that the offense in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425
was necessarily included in the offense in violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425; and
3. That the RTC overlooked, misinterpreted, misapplied and misrepresented facts and evidences of
substance and importance that, if weighed, assayed and considered were enough to acquit the
accused.13
On July 26, 2006, the CA promulgated its assailed decision, affirming the conviction subject to modification,
viz:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Decision
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of seven hundred fifty thousand pesos (P750,000.00) with subsidiary
imprisonment.
Accordingly, the prohibited drugs confiscated from the appellant are hereby ordered transmitted to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) through the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposition.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.14
Hence, this appeal, in which Manansala reiterates the errors he already assigned before the CA.
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The information alleged that "on or about the nineteenth (19th) day of October, 1994, in the City of Olongapo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being
lawfully authorized did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly engage in selling, delivering, giving
away to another and distributing more or less 750 grams or 3/4 kilo of marijuana dried leaves placed in a
small wooden box inside the cabinet, which are prohibited drugs, found in his possession and control."
18
The crime thereby charged was a violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659,15 which provides:
Section 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any such transactions.
Arraigned under such information, Manansala pleaded not guilty to it. But instead of finding him guilty of the
crime charged after trial, the RTC convicted him for a violation of Section 8, of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, which states:
Section 8. Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall possess or use any prohibited drug subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
On appeal, Manansala assigned as one of the reversible errors committed by the RTC that the trial court had
erred in convicting him for illegal possession of prohibited drugs on the misplaced and inaccurate theory that
the offense of illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8 was necessarily included in the offense
of illegal sale of marijuana in violation of Section 4.
The CA disagreed with Manansala, however, and held that his conviction for the illegal possession of
marijuana in violation of Section 8 under the information that had alleged the illegal sale of marijuana under
Section 4 was proper, giving its reasons as follows:
xxxx
Indispensable in every prosecution for the illegal sale of marijuana, a prohibited drug, is the submission of
proof that the sale of the illicit drug took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof, coupled with
the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. The element of sale must be unequivocally
established in order to sustain a conviction. In the case before Us, the trial court correctly held that the
prosecution failed to establish, much less adduce proof, that accused-appellant was indeed guilty of the
offense of illegal sale of marijuana. But it is beyond doubt that he was found in possession of the same.
While no conviction for the unlawful sale of prohibited drugs may be had under the present
circumstances, the established principle is that possession of marijuana is absorbed in the sale
thereof, except where the seller is further apprehended in possession of another quantity of the
prohibited drugs not covered by or included in the sale and which are probably intended for some
future dealings or use by the seller. In the case before Us, it has been satisfactorily ascertained that
the bricks of marijuana confiscated from accused-appellant were the same prohibited drugs subject of
the original Information. In this light, We find that the court a quo committed no reversible error in
convicting the accused-appellant of illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 8, Article II
of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.
Again, it should be stressed that the crime of unlawful sale of marijuana penalized under Section 4 of
RA 6425 necessarily includes the crime of unlawful possession thereof. As borne by the records, it has
been sufficiently proven beyond any doubt that the lawful search conducted at the house of the accused
yielded a total of 764.045 grams marijuana dried leaves as verified by the PNP Forensic Chemist. Thus, on
the face of the positive testimony of the prosecution witness and the presentation of the corpus delicti, it is
indubitable that a crime had in fact been committed and that accused-appellant was the author of the same. 16
xxxx
To properly resolve the appeal, therefore, it is necessary to determine whether the conviction of Manansala for
a violation of Section 8, which the information did not allege, instead of for a violation of Section 4, which the
information alleged, was not in violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation brought against him.
For sure, there have been many occasions in which the Court has found an accused charged with the illegal
sale of marijuana in violation of Section 4 guilty instead of the illegal possession of marijuana in violation of
Section 8. In the oft-cited case of People v. Lacerna,17 the Court held as prevailing the doctrine that the illegal
sale of marijuana absorbs the illegal possession of marijuana, except if the seller was also apprehended in the
illegal possession of another quantity of marijuana not covered by or not included in the illegal sale, and the
other quantity of marijuana was probably intended for some future dealings or use by the accused. The
premise used in Lacerna was that the illegal possession, being an element of the illegal sale, was necessarily
included in the illegal sale. The Court observed thusly:
In People vs. Manzano, the Court identified the elements of illegal sale of prohibited drugs, as follows: (1) the
accused sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another, and (2) he knew that what he had sold and delivered
was a dangerous drug. Although it did not expressly state it, the Court stressed delivery, which implies prior
possession of the prohibited drugs. Sale of a prohibited drug can never be proven without seizure and
identification of the prohibited drug, affirming that possession is a condition sine qua non.
It being established that illegal possession is an element of and is necessarily included in the illegal sale of
prohibited drugs, the Court will thus determine appellant’s culpability under Section 8.
From the penal provision under consideration and from the cases adjudicated, the elements of illegal
possession of prohibited drugs are as follows: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is
identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the prohibited drug.18
In all the convictions premised on the situation described in Lacerna, however, the involvement of a single
object in both the illegal sale as the crime charged and the illegal possession as the crime proved is
indispensable, such that only the prohibited drugs alleged in the information to be the subject of the illegal
sale is considered competent evidence to support the conviction of the accused for the illegal possession. As
such, the illegal possession is either deemed absorbed by or is considered a necessary element of the illegal
sale. On the other hand, any other illegal substance found in the possession of the accused that is not part of
the subject of the illegal sale should be prosecuted under a distinct and separate information charging illegal
19
possession; otherwise, the fundamental right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him would be flagrantly violated.
It is true that there was an error in the information’s statement of the facts essential to properly describe the
offense being charged against Manansala as that of illegal possession of marijuana; and that the error
became known to the Prosecution, leading Prosecutor Manalansan to himself file the motion for the admission
of the amended information dated January 3, 1995.19 In the motion, Prosecutor Manalansan manifested that
the information as filed charged a violation of Section 4; and that during the preliminary investigation, he had
concluded that Manansala should have been charged with a violation of Section 8 instead of a violation of
Section 4 as far as the 750 grams of dried marijuana leaves seized from his possession during the
implementation of Search Warrant No. 8-94 was concerned. The distinct and separate nature of the 750
grams of marijuana leaves from the quantity of marijuana worth P100.00 that was the object of the test buy
became all the more evident in Prosecutor Manalansan’s letter dated December 28, 1994 addressed to City
Prosecutor Prudencio B. Jalandoni.20
There, Prosecutor Manalansan stated that the 750 grams of marijuana dried leaves had been seized from the
possession Manansala on October 19, 1994 by virtue of the search warrant, while the attributed illegal sale of
marijuana had happened on October 18, 1994 during the test buy conducted to support the application of the
search warrant. The letter specifically stated:
xxxx
3. The two incidents, the sale on 18 October 1994 and the seizure on 19 October 1994 are separate
incidents giving rise to two distinct offenses;
4. We cannot assume that the accused was engaged in the "sale of prohibited drugs" on 19 October
1994 because he was engaged in it before.1âwphi1 There is no evidence to show that the accused
was engaged in the sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of drugs as
provided under Section 4;
5. The two (2) P50.00 bills are not enough to prove that the accused was engaged in selling the 750
grams of marijuana leaves. They can prove the sale on 18 October 1994 but cannot qualify his
possession of the 750 grams of the drugs.
xxxx
Nonetheless, the conviction of Manansala stands.
The CA correctly declared that the illegal possession of marijuana was "a crime that is necessarily included in
the crime of drug pushing or dealing, for which the accused have been charged with." The right of Manansala
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him enunciated in Section 14(2), Article III of
the 1987 Constitution21 was not violated simply because the information had precisely charged him with
selling, delivering, giving away and distributing more or less 750 grams of dried marijuana leaves. Thereby, he
was being sufficiently given notice that he was also to be held to account for possessing more or less 750
grams of dried marijuana leaves. As Lacerna and similar rulings have explained, the crime of illegal sale of
marijuana defined and punished under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, implied the prior
possession of the marijuana. As such, the crime of illegal sale included or absorbed the crime of illegal
possession. The rule is that when there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or
information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged necessarily includes
the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is
charged.22 According to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Court (1985), the rule then applicable, an offense
charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the
former, as this is alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on July 26, 2006;
and ORDERS accused CHAD MANANSALA y LAGMAN to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 176631 February 2, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
AVELINO FELAN, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
His own daughter commenced the prosecution of Avelino Felan for qualified rape through her complaint dated
May 30, 1996.1 The information subsequently filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Ormoc City alleged:
That on or about the 12th day of February 1995, at around 10:00 o’clock in the evening, at Brgy. Tambulilid,
Ormoc City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused AVELINO FELAN,
by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with his very own daughter, AAA,2 a fourteen (14) years old lass, against her will.3
The Prosecution showed that at about 10:00 p.m. on February 12, 1995, the accused roused his daughter
AAA, the complainant, then 14 years old, from sleep inside their house; that he told her not to be afraid; that
he removed her panty, spread her legs, and went on top of her; that she resisted but he overpowered her; that
he inserted his penis into her vagina and made pumping movements until he satisfied himself; that she cried
due to vaginal pain; that she left the house and stayed with her friends, who advised her to report the rape to
Mrs. Charito Aris, a social worker of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) in Ormoc
20
City; that Mrs. Aris later brought her first to the police station for reporting of the rape, and then to Dr. Gloria
Esmero Pastor, City Health Officer of Ormoc City, for medical examination; that Dr. Pastor found that AAA’s
hymen was torn; and that Dr. Pastor concluded that the hymenal laceration could be caused by sexual
intercourse.
The accused denied the accusation, branding it as the fabrication of AAA out of anger at him for not giving her
basic needs and for admonishing her to stop using illegal drugs.
After trial, on November 26, 1997, the RTC convicted the accused of qualified rape and imposed the death
penalty. He was also ordered to pay AAA P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.4
On July 14, 2006, the Court of Appeals (CA) modified the criminal and civil liabilities of the accused after
finding him guilty of simple rape on account of AAA’s minority not being established beyond reasonable doubt.
The CA lowered the penalty to reclusion perpetua and sentenced him to pay an amount of P50,000.00 as
moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages in addition to the civil indemnity of P50,000.00.5
In his appeal to this Court, the accused contends that the RTC and the CA erred in relying mainly on AAA’s
testimony, despite her not being a credible witness and although her testimony was doubtful by reason of her
having used illegal drugs and having engaged in prostitution, aside from possessing a poor memory. He
insists that he could control his sexual urge. 6
The appeal lacks merit and persuasion. We affirm the conviction.
The law applicable is Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No.
7659,7which provides:
Article 335. When and how rape is committed. – Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The State competently and sufficiently established these elements beyond reasonable doubt. AAA rendered a
complete and credible narration of her ordeal at the hands of the accused, whom she positively identified. In a
prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is
credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things, as in this
case.8 Here, the victim’s testimony was even corroborated on material points by the testimonies of Mrs. Aris
and Dr. Pastor as well as by the documentary evidences adduced.
It is notable that the RTC and the CA both found and considered AAA as a credible witness whose testimony
should be believed. We accord great weight to the trial judge’s assessment of the credibility of AAA and of her
testimony because the trial judge, having personally observed AAA’s conduct and demeanor as a witness,
was thereby enabled to discern if she was telling or inventing the truth. 9 The trial judge’s evaluation, when
affirmed by the CA, is binding on the Court, and it becomes the burden of the accused to project to us facts or
circumstances of weight that were overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted which, when duly
considered, would materially affect the disposition of the case differently. 10 We do not vary from this rule now,
however, considering that the accused did not make any showing that the RTC, in the first instance, and the
CA, on review, ignored, misapprehended, or misinterpreted facts or circumstances supportive of or crucial to
his defense.
The denial of the accused, being worthless, was properly disregarded. It was both self-serving and
uncorroborated.1avvphi1It could not, therefore, overcome the positive declarations against the accused and
the positive identification of the accused by AAA,11 whose good motive to impute such a heinous act to her
own father was not disproved or refuted. We do consider to be highly inconceivable for a daughter like AAA to
impute against her own father a crime as serious and despicable as incest rape, unless the imputation was
the plain truth. In fact, as we observed before, it takes "a certain amount of psychological depravity for a
young woman to concoct a story which would put her own father to jail for the rest of his remaining life and
drag the rest of the family including herself to a lifetime of shame." 12
The attempt to discredit AAA on the ground of her being a user of illegal drugs and of her having engaged in
prostitution deserved no consideration. First of all, AAA’s use of illegal drugs and engaging in prostitution,
even if true, did not destroy her credibility as a witness or negate the rape. Indeed, the Court has ruled that
the victim’s moral character was immaterial in the prosecution and conviction of an accused for rape, there
being absolutely no nexus between it and the odious deed committed. 13 Moreover, even a prostitute or a
woman of loose morals could fall victim of rape, for she could still refuse a man’s lustful advances. 14
The CA correctly pronounced the accused liable for simple rape and properly punished him with reclusion
perpetua. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659,
supra, rape is qualified and punished by death if it is alleged and proved that the victim was a minor during the
commission of the crime and that the offender was her parent. 15 Although the information alleged that the
victim was only 14 years of age at the time of the rape, the State did not duly establish such circumstance
because no birth certificate, or baptismal certificate, or other competent document showing her age was
presented. Her testimony regarding her age without any independent proof is not sufficient. 16 As a result, the
penalty for simple rape was properly reclusion perpetua.
Prevailing jurisprudence leads us to affirm the CA’s ruling that AAA was entitled to P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity,17and P50,000.00 as moral damages,18 without need of any pleading and proof. Similarly correct
was the CA’s grant of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. 19 In People v. Mira,20 we observed that "when
either one of the qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority is omitted or lacking, that which is
pleaded in the information and proved by the evidence may be considered as an aggravating circumstance."
In this case, the relationship between the victim and the accused is an aggravating circumstance because it
was alleged in the information and duly proved during the trial. Thus, conformably with Article 2230 of the Civil
Code, which provides that "in criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be
21
imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstance," we ratify the award of Criminal Case No. 98-2305-MK
exemplary damages.
That on or about the 22nd day of January, 1998 in the City of Marikina, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
WHEREFORE, the Court affirms the decision promulgated on July 14, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR. H.C. No. 00158. of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation and with
lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously try and attempt to have carnal knowledge
SO ORDERED. of herein complainant one AAA, thus commencing the commission of the crime of rape directly by overt acts
but did not perform all the acts of execution that could have produced the crime of rape by reason of cause or
causes other than his own spontaneous desistance.4
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Evidence of the Prosecution

G.R. No. 172321 February 9, 2011

In the evening of January 15, 1998, AAA, then sleeping in the bedroom that she and her five younger siblings
shared with their father, was roused from sleep by someone undressing her. 5 It was her father. AAA resisted,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, but the accused, wielding a bladed weapon, 6 threatened to kill her if she shouted.7 The accused then forcibly
vs. kissed her on the lips, mashed her breasts, touched her private parts, and had carnal knowledge of her. After
RENATO DADULLA y CAPANAS, Defendant-Appellant. her ordeal, she put on her garments and just cried.8 She recalled that her father had first sexually abused her
on February 14, 1992.9
DECISION
On January 22, 1998, AAA was again roused from sleep by her father touching her body. Noticing that her
BERSAMIN, J.: shorts were already unzipped and unbuttoned, she zipped and buttoned them up and covered herself with a
blanket. But her father pulled the blanket away and tried to unzip her shorts. However, she was able to go
under the wooden bed to evade him. She resisted his attempts to pull her out from under the bed by firmly
A rapacious father who vented his lust on his own daughter without any qualms is allowed to suffer the lesser holding on to the bed. She told him that she would not get out from under the bed because what he was doing
penalty because of the failure of the criminal information to aver his relationship with the victim. Even so, the to her was bad.10 Upon hearing her, he stopped and withdrew, telling her to leave the house. He then went to
Court condemns his most despicable crime. sleep.11 In the meanwhile, BBB, AAA’s younger sister, was awakened by what she thought was an argument
between her father and AAA. She heard him tell AAA: Tumigil ka na nang kaiiyak, wala ka nang pakinabang.
The father is now before the Court to assail the decision promulgated on January 20, 2006 in C.A.-G.R. CR.- AAA just cried under the bed and did not say anything. BBB soon fell asleep, 12 but AAA could not sleep and
H.C. No. 01021, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) pronounced him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of remained under the bed until morning when the accused left to ply his jeepney route. 13
simple rape in Criminal Case No. 98-2304, imposing reclusion perpetua, and of acts of lasciviousness in
Criminal Case No. 98-2305, thereby modifying the sentences handed down by the Regional Trial Court, Upon waking up, BBB saw her father as he was about to leave the house. She heard him telling AAA to leave
Branch 272 (RTC), in Marikina City.1 the house.14 As soon as he had left, BBB approached the crying AAA and asked what had happened to her.
AAA related her ordeal and pleaded with BBB to help her. 15 Together, they went to their uncle, CCC, to report
The Charges the incident. CCC queried AAA whether she wanted her father to be thrown in jail, and she replied in the
affirmative. Thus, CCC requested his wife to accompany AAA to the barangay to file a complaint. Later, AAA
and CCC’s wife went to Camp Crame for the physical and genital examinations, which established that AAA
On January 28, 1998, the accused was charged in the RTC with rape and attempted rape through separate had a deep healed hymenal laceration at 5:00 o’clock position. 16
informations, as follows:

Evidence of the Defense

Criminal Case No. 98-2304-MK

That on or about the 15th day of January, 1998 in the City of Marikina, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of threats, force and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with AAA, 2 against her will and consent.3
The accused denied molesting AAA. He narrated that on January 15, 1998, AAA and BBB left the house at
around 6:30 p.m. to watch television elsewhere and returned only at around 11:00 p.m.; that on January 22,
1998, he scolded AAA for her failure to cook on time; that at around 4:00 a.m. of January 23, 1998, he struck
AAA’s face with his fist (dinunggol sa mukha) and told her to leave the house because he was slighted by
AAA’s laughing instead of answering his query of whether she had understood why he had scolded her the

22
previous night; and that AAA was no longer a virgin due to her having been raped by Joel Cloma in 1992, and
by another man in 1993.17
The RTC Decision
On March 24, 1999, the RTC found the accused guilty of rape in Criminal Case No. 98-2304-MK, and
imposed the death penalty, ordering him to pay to AAA P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P20,000.00 as
moral damages; and of attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 98-2305-MK, and imposed the indeterminate
penalty of four years, nine months, and eleven days of prision correccional, as minimum, to five years, four
months, and twenty days, as maximum, ordering him to pay to AAA P20,000.00 as moral damages.
The CA Decision
On appeal, the accused assigned the following errors, to wit:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 98-
2304 DESPITE THAT ACCUSED WAS NOT PROPERLY INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND
CAUSE OF ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM WHICH IS IN VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF ATTEMPTED RAPE
DOCKETED AS CRIMINAL CASE NO. 98-2305.
Nonetheless, the CA disposed in its decision promulgated on January 20, 2006:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATION:
In Criminal Case No. 98-2304-MK, accused-appellant Renato Dadulla y Capanas is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of simple rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-
appellant is also ordered to pay AAA moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, in addition to civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00.
In Criminal Case No. 98-2305-MK, accused-appellant Renato Dadulla y Capanas, is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of acts of lasciviousness and is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum, and to pay AAA the amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
The CA held that the correct penalty in Criminal Case No. 98-2304-MK was reclusion perpetua because the
accused was liable only for simple rape by virtue of the information not alleging any qualifying circumstances;
and that in Criminal Case No. 98-2305-MK the accused was guilty only of acts of lasciviousness, not
attempted rape, because his act of opening the zipper and buttons of AAA’s shorts, touching her, and pulling
her from under the bed constituted only acts of lasciviousness.
Ruling of the Court
We sustain the conviction but correct the award of civil liability.
I
Criminal Liabilities
The CA correctly determined the criminal liabilities in both cases.
To begin with, the finding and conclusion of the RTC that the totality of the evidence presented by the State
painted a convincing tale of AAA’s harrowing experience at the hands of the accused are well founded and
supported by the records. Her unwavering testimonial account of the bestiality of her own father towards her
reflected her singular reliability. The CA’s holding that a woman would think twice before concocting a story of
rape unless she was motivated by a desire to seek justice for the wrong committed against her 18 was apt and
valid. Indeed, her revelation of being sexually assaulted by her own father several times could only proceed
from innate sincerity, and was entitled to credence in the absence of strong showing by the accused of
grounds to disbelieve her. Also, her immediate willingness to report to and face the police investigation and to
undergo the trouble and humiliation of a public trial was a badge of trustworthiness.
Secondly, the failure to allege the qualifying circumstance of relationship in the information in Criminal Case
No. 98-2304-MK precluded a finding of qualified rape against the accused. Section 8, 19 Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court has expressly required that qualifying and aggravating circumstances be specifically alleged in the
information. Due to such requirement being pro reo, the Court has authorized its retroactive application in
favor of even those charged with felonies committed prior to December 1, 2000 (i.e., the date of the effectivity
of the 2000 revision of the Rules of Criminal Procedure that embodied the requirement). 20
The term "aggravating circumstance" is strictly construed when the appreciation of the modifying
circumstance can lead to the imposition of the maximum penalty of death. 21 Consequently, the qualifying
circumstance of relationship, even if established during trial, could not affect the criminal penalty of the
accused by virtue of its non-allegation in the information. The accused could not be convicted of the graver
offense of qualified rape, although proven, because relationship was neither alleged nor necessarily included
in the information.22 Accordingly, the accused was properly convicted by the CA for simple rape and justly
punished with reclusion perpetua.
23
Thirdly, it is notable that the RTC outrightly concluded that the crime committed on January 22, 1998 Q: Like on January 15, 1998, you slept, on January 22, 1998, you slept side by side with your brothers and
constituted attempted rape, after quoting the testimony of AAA and BBB. It offered no analysis or discussion of sisters and your father?
why the accused was criminally liable for attempted rape. The omission contravened Section 14, 23 Article VIII
of the Constitution, as reiterated in Section 1,24 Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, which enjoined that decisions A: Yes, sir.
should state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based. 25

Q: Did you notice the presence of your father when you said you were awakened on that night?
Nonetheless, the omission did not invalidate or render ineffectual the conviction, for the CA in due course
reformed the RTC’s error. In its disquisition on why the accused should be held liable for acts of
lasciviousness, instead of attempted rape, the CA explained the true nature of the crime of the accused thus: A: Yes, sir.

We likewise agree with accused-appellant that the court a quo erred in convicting him of attempted rape in Q: What was he doing?
Criminal Case No. 98-2305-MK. In connection with the incident that transpired on January 22, 1998, Liza
testified as follows: A: He was sitting and touching me, sir.

Pros. Dela Peña: Q: How far was he from you?

Q: While you were sleeping in the evening on January 22, 1998, do you recall of any instance (sic) or incident A: He was near me.
which awakened you?
Q: And upon seeing your father near you and the button and zipper of your short[s] was open, what
Witness: did you do?

A: Yes, sir. A: I zipped and unbuttoned my short[s] and covered myself with blanket.

Q: Again Miss Witness, tell us this incident that you are referring to? Q: Why did you cover yourself with blanket?

A: While I was sleeping, I was awakened that my zipper was already opened and my buttons were already A: Because I do not want to see him beside me.
loosened.
Q: Did you not ask your father to leave because you do not want to see him?
Q: And upon noticing that the zipper and the buttons of your short[s] are already loosened or opened, what did
you do?
A: I told him.
A: I zipped it again and unbuttoned it.
Q: Did your father leave?
Q: Was your father there on that night?
A: No, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why don’t you like your father beside you?
Q: What about your brother and sisters?
A: Because of these things he was doing to me.
A: They were already asleep.
Q: And after covering yourself with blanket, what transpired next?

24
A: He removed the blanket from me, sir.
Q: And after that, what happened?
A: He was forcibly opening my short[s].
Q: What did you do when your father was forcibly opening your short[s]?
A: I covered myself under the wooden bed.
Q: How wide is this wooden bed?
A: From that wall up to the rostrum.
Pros. Dela Peña:
About a distance of two meters in width. Why did you hide yourself under the wooden bed?
A: In order not to repeat what he was doing to me.
Q: After you hi[d] yourself under the wooden bed, what did your father did [sic] to you?
A: He held me on my hands and tried to pull me out under the wooden bed.
Q: And was your father able to pull you out under the wooden bed?
A: No sir.
The act of accused-appellant in opening the zipper and buttons of the shorts of Liza, touching her and
pulling her when she hid under the bed showed that he employed force on Liza and was motivated by
lewd designs. The word "lewd" is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, and lecherous. It signifies that
form of immorality which has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried in a wanton
manner. Thus, the crime committed by accused-appellant is merely acts of lasciviousness, which is
included in rape. The elements of the crime of acts of lasciviousness are: (1) that the offender commits any
act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done: (a) by using force and intimidation, or (b) when the
offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the offended party is under 12
years of age; and (3) that the offended party is another person of either sex. 26
According to People v. Collado,27 the difference between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness lies in the
intent of the perpetrator as deduced from his external acts. The intent referred to is the intent to lie with a
woman.28Attempted rape is committed when the "touching" of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the
intent to penetrate; otherwise, there can only be acts of lasciviousness. 29 Thus, the accused’s act of opening
the zipper and buttons of AAA’s shorts, touching her, and trying to pull her from under the bed manifested lewd
designs, not intent to lie with her. The evidence to prove that a definite intent to lie with AAA motivated the
accused was plainly wanting, therefore, rendering him guilty only of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case
No. 98-2305-MK.
And, fourthly, the indeterminate penalty imposed by the RTC was erroneous for not being in accord with the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. This impelled the CA to revise the indeterminate penalty, rationalizing:
Under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for acts of lasciviousness is prision correccional. We
impose the penalty in its medium period, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance alleged and
proved. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper penalty imposable is from six months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four years and two months of prision correccional, as maximum. 30
We uphold the revision by the CA. The RTC fixed the minimum of the indeterminate penalty from within
prision correccional, when Section 131 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law expressly required that the
minimum "shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense."
The penalty next lower is arresto mayor.
II
Civil liability must be modified
Under Article 2230 of the Civil Code,32 the attendance of any aggravating circumstance (generic, qualifying, or
attendant) entitles the offended party to recover exemplary damages. Here, relationship was the aggravating
circumstance attendant in both cases. We need to award P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in rape and
of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages in acts of lasciviousness.
Although, as earlier mentioned, an aggravating circumstance not specifically alleged in the information (albeit
established at trial) cannot be appreciated to increase the criminal liability of the accused, the established
presence of one or two aggravating circumstances of any kind or nature
entitles the offended party to exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the Civil Code because the
requirement of specificity in the information affected only the criminal liability of the accused, not his civil
liability. The Court has well explained this in People v. Catubig:33
The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to be
understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the
public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings,
each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an
award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony
underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether
ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the
25
award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It
would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the
aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying
nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal,
rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary
damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.lavvphil
That People v. Catubig was subsequent to the dates of the commission of the crimes charged did not matter.
Like any other judicial interpretation of an existing law, the ruling in People v. Catubig settled the
circumstances when Article 2230 of the Civil Code applied, thereby reflecting the meaning and state of that
legal provision. The retroactivity of the ruling vis-à-vis the accused could not be challenged or be barred by
virtue of its being civil, not penal, in effect.
WHEREFORE, the Decision promulgated on January 20, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01021 is affirmed in
all respects, subject to the modification that the civil liabilities include P30,000.00 as exemplary damages for
the rape (Criminal Case No. 98-2034-MK), and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages for the acts of
lasciviousness (Criminal Case No. 98-2035-MK).
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 169084 January 18, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MELANIO DEL CASTILLO y VARGAS, HERMOGENES DEL CASTILLO y VARGAS, ARNOLD AVENGOZA
y DOGOS, FELIX AVENGOZA y DOGOS, RICO DEL CASTILLO y RAMOS, and JOVEN DEL
CASTILLO yABESOLA, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This case illustrates yet again why denial and alibi are not the best defenses when there is positive
identification of the accused for their complicity in the commission of a crime.
Antecedents
All the accused are related to one another either by consanguinity or by affinity. Melanio del Castillo and
Hermogenes del Castillo are brothers. Rico del Castillo and Joven del Castillo are, respectively, Melanio’s son
and nephew. Felix Avengoza is the son-in-law of Melanio and the brother of Arnold Avengoza. Both Felix and
Arnold lived in the house of Melanio.
On March 28, 2000, the City Prosecutor’s Office of Batangas City charged all the accused in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, Batangas City with three counts of murder, alleging as follows:
Criminal Case No. 10839
That on or about March 21, 2000, at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening at Sitio Bulihan, Brgy. Balete,
Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating with one another, while armed with bolos, kitchen knife and pointed instrument,
all deadly weapons, with intent to kill and with the qualifying circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior
strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack and stab with said deadly
weapons one Sabino Guinhawa y Delgado @ "Benny," thereby hitting him on the different parts of his body,
which directly caused the victim’s death.1
Criminal Case No. 10840
That on or about March 21, 2000, at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening at Sitio Bulihan, Brgy. Balete,
Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating with one another, while armed with bolos, kitchen knife and pointed instrument,
all deadly weapons, with intent to kill and with the qualifying circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior
strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack and stab with said deadly
weapons one Graciano Delgado y Aguda @ "Nonoy," thereby hitting him on the different parts of his body,
which directly caused the victim’s death.2
Criminal Case No. 10841
That on or about March 21, 2000, at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening at Sitio Bulihan, Brgy. Balete,
Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating with one another, while armed with bolos, kitchen knife and pointed instrument,
all deadly weapons, with intent to kill and with the qualifying circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior
strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack and stab with said deadly
weapons one Victor Noriega y Blanco, thereby hitting him on the different parts of his body, which directly
caused the victim’s death.(emphases and italics supplied).3
The cases were consolidated for arraignment and trial. On April 7, 2000, the accused pleaded not guilty to the
informations.4
Version of the Prosecution
26
The witnesses for the State were Froilan R. Perfinian, PO3 Pablo Aguda Jr., Dr. Luz M. Tiuseco, Rosalia
Delgado, Domingo Guinhawa, Abella Perez Noriega, SPO3 Felizardo Panaligan, Sr. Insp. Marcos Barte and
SPO3 Danilo Magtibay.
The eyewitness version of Perfinian follows. On March 20, 2000, at about 9:00 pm, he had just left the house
of one Lemuel located in Sitio Bulihan, Barangay Balete, Batangas City (Bulihan) to walk to his own home
located also in Bulihan when he heard someone pleading: Huwag po, huwag po! He followed the direction of
the voice, and saw the assault by all the accused against Sabino D. Guinhawa (Sabino), Graciano A. Delgado
(Graciano), and Victor B. Noriega (Victor). He recognized each of the accused because he saw them from
only six meters away and the moon was very bright. Besides, he was a godfather of Hermogenes’ son, and
the other accused usually passed by his house.
Perfinian recalled that the accused surrounded their victims during the assault; that Arnold stabbed Graciano
on the stomach with a bolo, causing Graciano to fall to the ground; that Rico hacked Graciano with a bolo; that
when Victor tried to escape by running away, Hermogenes and Felix pursued and caught up with him; that
Felix hacked Victor; and that when Sabino ran away, Melanio and Joven pursued him.
Perfinian rushed home as soon as all the accused had left. He narrated to his wife everything he had just
witnessed. On the following day, he learned that the police authorities found the dead bodies of Sabino,
Graciano and Victor. Afraid of being implicated and fearing for his own safety, he left for his father’s house in
Marinduque. He did not return to Bulihan until after he learned from the TV newscast that all the accused had
been arrested. Once returning home, he relayed to the victims’ families everything he knew about the killings.
Also, he gave a statement to the Batangas City Police.5
PO3 Aguda was on duty as the desk officer of the Batangas City Police Station in the morning of March 22,
2000 when he received the report about the dead bodies found in Bulihan. He and other police officers went
to Bulihan, and found the dead bodies of Sabino, Graciano, and Victor sprawled on the road about 20 meters
from each other. The bodies were all bloodied and full of hack wounds. During his investigation, he came
upon one Rene Imbig (Rene) who mentioned seeing the six accused wielding bolos and running on the night
of March 21, 2000. From the site of the crime, he and his fellow officers went to the houses of Melanio and
Rico, which were about 20 meters from where the bodies were found. The houses were abandoned, but he
recovered a blood-stained knife with a curved end in Melanio’s house. Returning to the station, he saw
Hermogenes there, who informed him that the other suspects had fled to Sitio Tangisan, Barangay Mayamot,
Antipolo, Rizal (Sitio Tangisan), where Melanio’s mother-in-law resided. Accompanied by Rene and other
police officers, he travelled to Sitio Tangisan that afternoon. Upon arriving in Sitio Tangisan, Rene pointed to
Melanio who was just stepping out of his mother-in-law’s house. Melanio ran upon seeing their approach, but
they caught up with him and subdued him. They recovered a bolo from Melanio. They found and arrested the
other suspects in the house of Melanio’s mother-in-law, and brought all the arrested suspects back to
Batangas City for investigation. There, the suspects admitted disposing some of their clothes by throwing
them into the Pasig River, and said that their other clothes were in the house of Melanio. They mentioned that
the bolo used by Hermogenes was still in his house.
On the morning of March 23, 2000, PO3 Aguda and his fellow officers recovered two shorts, a shirt, and a
knife - all blood-stained from Melanio’s house in Bulihan. Going next to the house of Hermogenes, Winifreda
del Castillo, the latter’s wife, turned over the bolo of Hermogenes. They learned that prior to the killings,
Melanio had been fuming at being cheated in a cockfight, and had uttered threats to kill at least three persons
in Bulihan.6
Sr. Insp. Barte, SPO3 Panaligan and SPO3 Magtibay corroborated PO3 Aguda’s recollections. 7
Dr. Luz M. Tiuseco (Dr. Tiuseco), a Medical Officer of Batangas City Health Office, conducted the post-mortem
examinations on the remains of Sabino, Graciano, and Victor on March 22, 2001. She found that Sabino
sustained 11 hack wounds and 12 stab wounds; that Graciano suffered four stab wounds and a hack wound;
and that Victor had three hack wounds. She certified that the victims had died from hypovolemic shock
secondary to multiple stab and hack wounds. 8
Domingo Guinhawa, the elder brother of Sabino, declared that his family spent P50,000.00 for Sabino’s
funeral and burial expenses.9 Rosalia Delgado, a sister of Graciano, attested that the expenses incurred for
Graciano’s burial amounted to P51,510.00.10 Abella Perez Noriega, the wife of Victor, claimed that her family
spent P53,395.00 for Victor’s wake and interment.11
Version of the Accused
The Defense offered the testimonies of the accused and Winifreda. The accused admitted being in Bulihan at
the time of the incident, but denied liability. Arnold and Joven invoked self-defense and defense of strangers,
while Melanio, Hermogenes, Rico and Felix interposed denial. Winifreda corroborated the testimonies of
Arnold and Joven.
The evidence of the accused was rehashed in the appellee’s brief submitted by the Public Attorney’s Office,
as follows:
Arnold Avengoza testified that on March 21, 2001, he had a drinking spree with Rico del Castillo in their
house. After about an hour, he was requested by Winifreda del Castillo, wife of Hermogenes del Castillo, to
accompany them to their house. Together with Joven del Castillo, they brought Winifreda and her son to their
house. Before they were able to reach Winifreda’s house, three (3) men appeared. One of them held
Winifreda and when he tried to help her, the other persons attempted to draw something from their waists
prompting him to hacked one of them. He told the man to stop, but the latter refused. When the other man got
mad, he hacked him twice. Then, they brought Winnie and her son to the house of Melanio del Castillo. He did
not inform Melanio del Castillo about what transpired, but told him to take his family away, because he saw
dead persons near his place. He threw his bolo into the Pasig River.
Joven del Castillo, corroborated Rico’s testimony and admitted that he was the one who stabbed the other
man, who attempted to draw something from his waist while Arnold hacked the other man. He was no longer
aware how many times he stabbed the said man. Victor Noriega was one of the three (3) men who blocked
their way. They left Sitio Bulihan at about 11:00 o’clock in the evening, together with Felix Avengoza, Arnold
Avengoza, Rico del Castillo, Melanio del Castillo and his family. They went to Antipolo, Rizal, where they were
arrested by the police authorities.
27
Hermogenes del Castillo slept the whole night of March 21, 2000 and came to know that the three (3) persons
were killed during the night near the house of his brother Melanio only from his wife Winifreda. Fearing
retaliation from the relatives of the persons who were killed, because the bodies were found near his brother’s
house, he went to the house of Barangay Captain Aloria, who in turn told him to go to the police station. He
came to know that he was being implicated in the killing when he was incarcerated.
Rico del Castillo testified that on the night of March 21, 2001 at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening, he fetched
Winifreda del Castillo to treat the sprain of his daughter. At about 9:00 o’clock in the evening, since his
daughter was still crying, he requested Joven and Arnold to accompany Winifreda and her son in going home.
Arnold and Joven returned at around 10:00’clock in the evening. He was told that they saw dead people and
was asked to leave the place together with his family.
Felix Avengoza said that on the night of March 21, 2001, he was informed by Joven and Arnold that they saw
two (2) dead persons near their house. For fear of becoming a suspect, he was told to leave his house
together with his family.
Melanio del Castillo affirmed the testimony of Felix and added that he was at first hesitant to leave his house
because of his personal belongings and animals, but due to insistence of Arnold and Joven, he also left with
them for Manila.
Winifreda del Castillo confirmed that she was fetched by Rico del Castillo to treat his daughter. When Rico
was unable to bring her back home, Joven and Arnold accompanied her. While they were on their way, three
(3) persons suddenly blocked them. One of them held her hand and tried to drag her away. When Arnold tried
to pacify them, they got angry and attempted to pull something from their waists so Arnold hacked him. 12
Decision of the RTC
On October 23, 2001, the RTC convicted the accused of murder, but appreciated voluntary surrender as a
mitigating circumstance in favor of Hermogenes, viz:
In the light of all the foregoing considerations, accused Arnold Avengoza, Felix Avengoza, alias Alex, Rico del
Castillo, Joven del Castillo, Hermogenes del Castillo, alias Menes and Melanio del Castillo are all hereby
found Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as defined and punished under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 charged in these three cases namely: Criminal
Case No. 10839, Criminal Case No. 10840 and Criminal Case No. 10841.
Wherefore, accused Arnold Avengoza, Felix Avengoza, Rico del Castillo, Joven del Castillo and Melanio del
Castillo are sentenced in each of the above mentioned criminal cases to suffer the imprisonment of reclusion
perpetuatogether with all the accessory penalties inherent therewith and to pay the costs. With respect to
accused Hermogenes del Castillo, considering the presence of mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
in his favor and further applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, in each of the aforesaid
criminal cases, he is hereby sentenced to imprisonment of Fourteen (14) Years, Eight (8) Months and One (1)
Day as minimum to Twenty (20) Years of reclusion temporal as maximum together with its inherent accessory
penalties.
As to the civil aspects of these cases, in Criminal Case No. 10839, all the herein accused are directed to
jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of Sabino Guinhawa the amount of P58,510,00 as actual funeral
expenses and the sum of P75,000.00 as moral damages. In Criminal Case No. 10840, all the herein accused
are directed to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of Graciano Delgado with the sum of P51,510.00 as
actual funeral expenses and P75,000.00 as moral damages. And in Criminal Case No. 10841, all the above-
named accused are further directed to indemnify the heirs of Victor Noriega with the sum of P53,395.00 as
actual funeral expenses and the amount of P75,000.00 as moral damages.
Finally, let accused Hermogenes del Castillo be credited with his preventive imprisonment if he is entitled to
any.
SO ORDERED.13
Decision of the CA
The accused appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) upon the following assigned errors, to wit:
I.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ALL THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER DESPITE THE FACT THAT TWO
OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS HAVE ALREADY ADMITTED KILLING THE THREE VICTIMS IN
DEFENSE OF WINIFREDA DEL CASTILLO.
II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE JUSTIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF SELF-DEFENSE AND DEFENSE OF STRANGERS IN FAVOR OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ARNOLD AVENGOZA AND JOVEN DEL CASTILLO.
III.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING ACTUAL AND MORAL DAMAGES
DESPITE THE LACK OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE SAME.
On April 28, 2005, the CA affirmed the convictions, correcting only the awards of damages and the penalty
imposed on Hermogenes,14 to wit:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that appellant Hermogenes
Del Castillo is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and all the accused are ordered to pay
jointly and severally the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages to
the heirs of each victim; the sum of P15,000.00 and P8,000.00 as actual damages to the heirs of Sabino
28
Guinhawa and Graciano Delgado, respectively, and P10,000.00 as nominal damages to the heirs of Victor
Noriega.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
Hence, the accused have come to us in a final appeal, submitting that because Arnold and Joven had already
admitted killing the victims, the rest of them should be exculpated; that Arnold and Joven should be absolved
of criminal liability because they acted in self-defense and defense of strangers; and that conspiracy among
them was not proven.15
Ruling
The conviction of appellants is affirmed, but the damages awarded and their corresponding amounts are
modified in conformity with prevailing jurisprudence.
I.
Factual findings of the RTC
and CA are accorded respect
Both the RTC and the CA considered Perfinian’s eyewitness testimony credible.
We concur with both lower courts.
We reiterate that the trial judge’s evaluation of the credibility of a witness and of his testimony is accorded the
highest respect because of the trial judge’s unique opportunity to directly observe the demeanor of the witness
that enables him to determine whether the witness is telling the truth or not. 16 Such evaluation, when affirmed
by the CA, is binding on the Court unless the appellant reveals facts or circumstances of weight that were
overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted that, if considered, would materially affect the disposition of
the case.17
The accused did not present any fact or circumstance of weight that the RTC or the CA overlooked,
misapprehended, or misinterpreted that, if considered, would alter the result herein. Accordingly, we have no
reason to disregard their having accorded total credence to Perfinian’s eyewitness account of the killings. In
contrast, we have the bare denials of Melanio, Hermogenes, Felix, and Rico, but such denials were weak for
being self-serving and unnatural. Their own actuations and conduct following the attack even confirmed their
guilt, for had Melanio, Felix, and Rico been innocent, it was puzzling that they had to suddenly abandon their
homes to go to Antipolo City in Rizal. Their explanation for the hasty departure - that Arnold and Joven warned
them to leave because dead bodies had been found near Melanio’s house, and they might be implicated -
was unnatural and contrary to human nature. The normal reaction of innocent persons was not to run away, or
instead to report to the police whatever they knew about the dead bodies. In any case, they did not need to be
apprehensive about being implicated if they had no participation in the crimes.
The lower courts correctly evaluated the evidence. To us, Perfinian’s identification of all the accused as the
perpetrators was positive and reliable for being based on his recognition of each of them during the incident.
His being familiar with each of them eliminated any possibility of mistaken identification. He spotted them from
a distance of only six meters away under a good condition of visibility (i.e., the moon then being "very bright").
Consequently, their denials and alibi were properly rejected.
Likewise, Perfinian detailed the distinct acts done by each of the accused during their assault. Such
recollection of the fatal events was categorical and strong, and there was no better indicator of the reliability
and accuracy of his recollection than its congruence with the physical evidence adduced at the trial. For one,
the results of the post-mortem examinations showing that the victims had sustained multiple stab and hack
wounds (i.e., Sabino sustained 11 hack wounds and 12 stab wounds; Graciano suffered four stab wounds and
a hack wound; and Victor had three hack wounds) confirmed his testimonial declarations about the victims
having been repeatedly stabbed and hacked.18 Also, the blood-stained bolos and blood-stained clothing
recovered from the possession of the accused confirmed his declarations that the accused had used bolos in
inflicting deadly blows on their victims.
It is notable, on the other hand, that the Defense did not challenge the sincerity of Perfinian’s eyewitness
identification. The accused did not show if Perfinian had harbored any ill-feeling towards any or all of them
that he was moved to testify falsely against them. Any such ill-feeling was even improbable in light of the
revelation that he and Hermogenes had spiritual bonds as compadres. Without such showing by the Defense,
therefore, Perfinian was presumed not to have been improperly actuated, entitling his incriminating testimony
to full faith and credence.19
II.
Arnold and Joven did not act
in self-defense and in defense of strangers
In order for self-defense to be appreciated, the accused must prove by clear and convincing evidence the
following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.20 On the other hand, the requisites of defense of strangers are, namely: (a) unlawful aggression by
the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means to prevent or repel it; and (c) the person defending be not
induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive. 21
In self-defense and defense of strangers, unlawful aggression is a primordial element, a condition sine qua
non. If no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense and defense of strangers
are unavailing, because there would be nothing to repel. 22 The character of the element of unlawful
aggression has been aptly described in People v. Nugas,23 as follows:
29
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying circumstance of self-
defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no justified killing in defense of oneself. The test for the
presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put in real
peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary
threat. Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression,
namely: (a) there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or,
at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful.
Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful
aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a weapon, an
offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful
aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere
threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a
revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent
unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to
his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.
By invoking self-defense and defense of strangers, Arnold and Joven in effect admitted their parts in killing the
victims. The rule consistently adhered to in this jurisdiction is that when the accused’s defense is self-defense
he thereby admits being the author of the death of the victim, that it becomes incumbent upon him to prove
the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court. 24 The rationale for the shifting of the burden of
evidence is that the accused, by his admission, is to be held criminally liable unless he satisfactorily
establishes the fact of self-defense. But the burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt is not thereby
lifted from the shoulders of the State, which carries it until the end of the proceedings. In other words, only
the onus probandi shifts to the accused, for self-defense is an affirmative allegation that must be established
with certainty by sufficient and satisfactory proof.25He must now discharge the burden by relying on the
strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of that of the Prosecution, considering that the
Prosecution’s evidence, even if weak, cannot be disbelieved in view of his admission of the killing. 26
Arnold and Joven did not discharge their burden.
Arnold and Joven did not adequately prove unlawful aggression; hence, neither self-defense nor defense of
stranger was a viable defense for them. We note that in addition to the eyewitness account of Perfinian
directly incriminating them, their own actuations immediately after the incident confirmed their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. As the CA cogently noted,27 their flight from the neighborhood where the crimes were
committed, their concealing of the weapons used in the commission of the crimes, their non-reporting of the
crimes to the police, and their failure to surrender themselves to the police authorities fully warranted the
RTC’s rejection of their claim of self-defense and defense of stranger.
Winifreda’s testimonial claim that the victims were the aggressors deserves no consideration. Her story was
that one of the victims had tried to attack her with a balisong.28 Yet, her story would not stand scrutiny because
of the fact that no such weapon had been recovered from the crime scene; and because of the fact that none
of the accused had substantiated her thereon. Neither Arnold nor Joven attested in court seeing any of the
victims holding any weapon.29
Nonetheless, even if we were to believe Arnold and Joven’s version of the incident, the element of unlawful
aggression by the victims would still be lacking. The allegation that one of the victims had held Winifreda’s
hand did not indicate that the act had gravely endangered Winifreda’s life. Similarly, the victims’ supposed
motion to draw something from their waists did not put Arnold and Joven’s lives in any actual or imminent
danger. What the records inform us is that Arnold and Joven did not actually see if the victims had any
weapons to draw from their waists. That no weapons belonging to the victims were recovered from the crime
scene confirmed their being unarmed. Lastly, had they been only defending themselves, Arnold and Joven did
not tell the trial court why they had repeatedly hacked their victims with their bolos; or why they did not
themselves even sustain any physical injury. Thus, the CA and the RTC rightly rejected their plea of self-
defense and defense of stranger, for the nature and the number of wounds sustained by the victims were
important indicia to disprove self-defense.30
III.
The State duly established
conspiracy and abuse of superior strength
The CA upheld the RTC’s finding that conspiracy and abuse of superior strength were duly established.
We affirm the CA.
The accused, armed with bolos, surrounded and attacked the victims, and pursued whoever of the latter
attempted to escape from their assault. Thereafter, the accused, except Hermogenes, fled their homes and
together hastily proceeded to Antipolo, Rizal. Their individual and collective acts prior to, during and following
the attack on the victims reflected a common objective of killing the latter. Thereby, all the accused, without
exception, were co-conspirators.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it.31 Conspiracy is either express or implied. Thus, the State does not always have to
prove the actual agreement to commit the crime in order to establish conspiracy, for it is enough to show that
the accused acted in concert to achieve a common purpose. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and
manner of the commission of the offense, or from the acts of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime indubitably pointing to a joint purpose, a concert of action and a community of
interest.32 Where the acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a common
design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident, and all the
perpetrators will be liable as principals.33 Once a conspiracy is established, each co-conspirator is as
criminally liable as the others, for the act of one is the act of all. A co-conspirator does not have to participate
in every detail of the execution; neither does he have to know the exact part performed by the co-conspirator
in the execution of the criminal act.34
In view of the foregoing, the Court rejects the pleas for exculpation of the other accused grounded on their
respective alibis considering that Arnold and Joven’s admission of sole responsibility for the killings did not
eliminate their liability as co-conspirators.
30
Abuse of superior strength is an aggravating circumstance that qualifies the killing of a person to murder. 35 It is
present if the accused purposely uses excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to
the person attacked, or if there is notorious inequality of forces between the victim and aggressor, and the
latter takes advantage of superior strength. Superiority in strength may refer to the number of aggressors and
weapons used.36
A gross disparity of forces existed between the accused and the victims. Not only did the six accused
outnumber the three victims but the former were armed with bolos while the latter were unarmed. The
accused clearly used their superiority in number and arms to ensure the killing of the victims. Abuse of
superior strength is attendant if the accused took advantage of their superiority in number and their being
armed with bolos.37 Accordingly, the crimes committed were three counts of murder.
The CA concluded that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should not be appreciated in favor
of Hermogenes.
In order that voluntary surrender is appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the following requisites must
concur: (a) the accused has not been actually arrested; (b) the accused surrenders himself to a person in
authority or the latter’s agent; and (c) surrender is voluntary.38 The third requisite requires the surrender to be
spontaneous, indicating the intent of the accused to unconditionally submit himself to the authorities, either
because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save them the trouble and expenses necessary for his
search and capture.39
Although Hermogenes went to Barangay Chairman Aloria of Bulihan after the killings, he did so to seek
protection against the retaliation of the victims’ relatives, not to admit his participation in the killing of the
victims.40 Even then, Hermogenes denied any involvement in the killings when the police went to take him
from Chairman Aloria’s house.41 As such, Hermogenes did not unconditionally submit himself to the authorities
in order to acknowledge his participation in the killings or in order to save the authorities the trouble and
expense for his arrest.42
Nonetheless, any determination of whether or not Hermogenes was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender was vain in light of the penalty for murder being reclusion perpetua to death under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. Due to both such penalties being
indivisible, the attendance of mitigating or aggravating circumstances would not affect the penalties except to
aid the trial court in pegging the penalty to reclusion perpetua if the only modifying circumstance was
mitigating, or the mitigating circumstances outnumbered the aggravating circumstances; or to prescribe the
death penalty (prior to its prohibition under Republic Act No. 934643 ) should there be at least one aggravating
circumstance and there was no mitigating circumstance, or the aggravating circumstances outnumbered the
mitigating circumstances. This effect would conform to Article 63, (2), of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. — In all cases in which the law prescribes a single
indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances
that may have attended the commission of the deed.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following
rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
xxx
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed,
the lesser penalty shall be applied.
xxx
IV.
Civil liability
The awards of civil indemnity and moral damages are also proper, but their corresponding amounts should be
increased to P75,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.44 The actual damages of P15,000.00
and P8,000.00 granted to the heirs of Sabino and Graciano, respectively, were also warranted due to their
being proven by receipts.45 However, the Court has held that when actual damages proven by receipts
amount to less than P25,000.00, as in the case of Sabino and Graciano, the award of temperate damages
amounting to P25,000.00 is justified in lieu of actual damages for a lesser amount. 46 This is based on the
sound reasoning that it would be anomalous and unfair that the heirs of the victim who tried and succeeded in
proving actual damages of less than P25,000.00 only would be put in a worse situation than others who might
have presented no receipts at all but would be entitled to P25,000.00 temperate damages.47 Hence, instead of
only P15,000.00 and P8,000.00, the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages should be awarded each
to the heirs of Sabino and Graciano.1awphil
The heirs of Victor did not present receipts proving the expenses they incurred by virtue of Victor’s death.
Nonetheless, it was naturally expected that the heirs had spent for the wake and burial of Victor. Article 2224
of the Civil Code provides that temperate damages may be recovered when some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty. Hence, in lieu of nominal damages of P10,000.00
awarded by the CA, temperate damages of P25,000.00 are awarded to the heirs of Victor.
Exemplary damages of P30,000.00 should be further awarded to the heirs of the victims because of the
attendant circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary
damages may be granted when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstance. It was
immaterial that such aggravating circumstance was necessary to qualify the killing of each victim as murder. 48
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on April 28, 2005, with the
following MODIFICATIONS, to wit: (a) the civil indemnity and moral damages are each increased
to P75,000.00; (b) temperate damages of P25,000.00 is granted, respectively, to the heirs of Sabino and
Graciano in lieu of actual damages; (c) instead of nominal damages, temperate damages of P25,000.00 is
awarded to the heirs of Victor; and (d) P30,000.00 as exemplary damages is given, respectively, to the heirs
of Sabino, Graciano and Victor.
31
The accused shall pay the costs of suit. CONTRARY to and in VIOLATION of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. 7659,
otherwise known as the "Heinous Crimes Law".6
SO ORDERED.
At his arraignment on November 12, 1997,7 Caliso pleaded not guilty to the charge.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice The records show that AAA died on June 5, 1997 at around 11:00 am in the river located in Barangay
Tiacongan, Kapatagan, Lanao Del Norte; that the immediate cause of her death was asphyxia, secondary to
G.R. No. 183830 October 19, 2011 drowning due to smothering; that the lone eyewitness, 34-year old Soledad Amegable (Amegable), had been
clearing her farm when she heard the anguished cries of a girl pleading for mercy: Please stop noy, it is
painful noy!;8 that the cries came from an area with lush bamboo growth that made it difficult for Amegable to
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, see what was going on; that Amegable subsequently heard sounds of beating and mauling that soon ended
vs. the girl’s cries; that Amegable then proceeded to get a better glimpse of what was happening, hiding behind a
DELFIN CALISO, Accused-Appellant. cluster of banana trees in order not to be seen, and from there she saw a man wearing gray short pants
bearing the number "11" mark, who dragged a girl’s limp body into the river, where he submerged the girl into
DECISION the knee-high muddy water and stood over her body; that he later lifted the limp body and tossed it to deeper
water; that he next jumped into the other side of the river; that in that whole time, Amegable could not have a
look at his face because he always had his back turned towards her; 9 that she nonetheless insisted that the
BERSAMIN, J.: man was Caliso, whose physical features she was familiar with due to having seen him pass by their
barangay several times prior to the incident;10 that after the man fled the crime scene, Amegable went straight
The decisive question that seeks an answer is whether the identification of the perpetrator of the crime by an to her house and told her husband what she had witnessed; and that her husband instantly reported the
eyewitness who did not get a look at the face of the perpetrator was reliable and positive enough to support incident to the barangay chairman.
the conviction of appellant Delfin Caliso (Caliso).
It appears that one SPO3 Romulo R. Pancipanci declared in an affidavit 11 that upon his station receiving the
Caliso was arraigned and tried for rape with homicide, but the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 21, in incident report on AAA’s death at about 12:45 pm of June 5, 1997, he and two other officers proceeded to the
Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte found him guilty of murder for the killing of AAA, 1 a mentally-retarded 16-year old crime scene to investigate; that he interviewed Amegable who identified the killer by his physical features and
girl, and sentenced him to death in its decision dated August 19, 2002. 2 The appeal of the conviction was clothing (short pants); that based on such information, he traced Caliso as AAA’s killer; and that Caliso gave
brought automatically to the Court. On June 28, 2005, 3 the Court transferred the records to the Court of an extrajudicial admission of the killing of AAA. However, the declarations in the affidavit remained worthless
Appeals (CA) for intermediate review pursuant to the ruling in People v. Mateo. 4 On October 26, 2007,5 the because the Prosecution did not present SPO3 Pancipanci as its witness.
CA, although affirming the conviction, reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua and modified the civil awards.
Now, Caliso is before us in a final bid to overturn his conviction. Leo Bering, the barangay chairman of San Vicente, Kapatagan, Lanao Del Norte, attested that on the
occasion of Caliso’s arrest and his custodial interrogation, he heard Caliso admit to the investigating police
Antecedents officer the ownership of the short pants recovered from the crime scene; that the admission was the reason
why SPO3 Pancipanci arrested Caliso from among the curious onlookers that had gathered in the area; that
Amegable, who saw SPO3 Pancipanci’s arrest of Caliso at the crime scene, surmised that Caliso had gone
The information dated August 5, 1997 charged Caliso with rape with homicide perpetrated in the following home and returned to the crime scene thereafter.12
manner:

Municipal Health Officer Dr. Joseph G.B. Fuentecilla conducted the post-mortem examination on the body of
That on or about the 5th day of June, 1997, at Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, Philippines and within the AAA on June 6, 1997, and found the following injuries, to wit:
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge upon one AAA, who is a minor of
16 years old and a mentally retarded girl, against her will and consent; that on the occasion of said rape and EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
in furtherance of the accused’s criminal designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent to kill, and taking advantage of superior strength, attack, assault and use personal violence upon said 1. The dead body was generally pale wearing a heavily soiled old sleeveless shirt and garter skirts.
AAA by mauling her, pulling her towards a muddy water and submerging her underneath, which caused the
death of said AAA soon thereafter.
2. The body was wet and heavily soiled with mud both nostrils and mouth was filled with mud.
32
 3. The skin of hands and feet is bleached and corrugated in appearance.
4. 2 cm. linear lacerated wound on the left cheek (sic).
5. Multiple small (sic) reddish contusions on anterior neck area.
6. Circular hematoma formation 3 inches in diameter epigastric area of abdomen.
7. Four erythematus linear abrasion of the left cheek (sic).
8. Presence of a 6x8 inches bulge on the back just below the inferior angle of both scapula
extending downwards.
9. The body was wearing an improperly placed underwear with the garter vertically oriented to the
right stained with moderate amount of yellowish fecal material.
10. Minimal amount of pubic hair in the lower pubis with labia majora contracted and retracted.
11. There’s no swelling abrasion, laceration, blood hematoma formation in the vulva. There were old
healed hymenal lacerations at 5 and 9 o’clock position.
12. Vaginal canal admits one finger with no foreign body recovered (sic).
13. Oval shaped contusion/hematoma 6 cm at its greatest diameter anterior surface middle 3rd left
thigh.
14. Presence of 2 contusion laceration 1x0.5 cm in size medial aspect left knee. 13
Dr. Fuentecilla also conducted a physical examination on the body of Caliso and summed up his findings
thusly:
P.E. FINDINGS:
1. Presence of a 7x0.1 cm. horizontally averted linear erythematus contusion left side of neck (Post
▲).
2. 8x0.2 cm. reddish linear abrasion (probably a scratch mark) from the left midclavicular line
extending to the left anterioraxillary line.
3. Presence of 2 erythematus abrasion 3 cmx0.1 cm in average size dorsal surface (probably a
scratch mark) middle 3rd left arm.
4. 2.5 cm. abrasion dorsal surface middle and right forearm.
5. Presence of a linear erythematus contusion (probably a scratch mark) 2x7 cm. in average size
lateral boarder of scapula extending to left posterior axillary line.
6. Presence of 2 oblique oriented erythematus contusion (probably a scratch mark) 14x022 cm. and
5x0.2 cm. in size respectively at the upper left flank of the lower back extending downward to the
midline.
7. Presence of 5 linear reddish pressure contusion parallel to each other with an average 5 cm left
flank area.14
In his defense, Caliso denied the accusation and interposed an alibi, insisting that on the day of the killing, he
plowed the rice field of Alac Yangyang from 7:00 am until 4:00 pm.
Yangyang corroborated Caliso’s alibi, recalling that Caliso had plowed his rice field from 8 am to 4 pm of June
5, 1997. He further recalled that Caliso was in his farm around 12:00 noon because he brought lunch to
Caliso. He conceded, however, that he was not aware where Caliso was at the time of the killing.
Ruling of the RTC
After trial, the RTC rendered its judgment on August 19, 2002, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, accused DELFIN CALISO is hereby sentenced to
death and to indemnify the heirs of AAA in the amount of P50,000.00. The accused is also hereby ordered to
pay the said heirs the amount of P50, 000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.15
The RTC found that rape could not be complexed with the killing of AAA because the old-healed hymenal
lacerations of AAA and the fact that the victim’s underwear had been irregularly placed could not establish the
commission of carnal knowledge; that the examining physician also found no physical signs of rape on the
body of AAA; and that as to the killing of AAA, the identification by Amegable that the man she had seen
submerging AAA in the murky river was no other than Caliso himself was reliable.
Nevertheless, the RTC did not take into consideration the testimony of Bering on Caliso’s extrajudicial
admission of the ownership of the short pants because the pants were not presented as evidence and
because the police officers involved did not testify about the pants in court. 16 The RTC cited the qualifying
33
circumstance of abuse of superior strength to raise the crime from homicide to murder, regarding the word
homicide in the information to be used in its generic sense as to include all types of killing.
Ruling of the CA
On intermediate review, the following errors were raised in the brief for the accused-appellant, 17 namely:
i. The court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of murder despite
the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt;
ii. The court a quo gravely erred in giving weight and credence to the incredible and inconsistent
testimony of the prosecution witnesses.
iii. The court a quo gravely erred in appreciating the qualifying aggravating circumstance of taking
advantage of superior strength and the generic aggravating circumstance of disregard of sex[; and]
iv. The court a quo gravely erred in imposing the death penalty.
As stated, the CA affirmed Caliso’s conviction for murder based on the same ratiocinations the RTC had
rendered. The CA also relied on the identification by Amegable of Caliso, despite his back being turned
towards her during the commission of the crime. The CA ruled that she made a positive identification of Caliso
as the perpetrator of the killing, observing that the incident happened at noon when the sun had been at its
brightest, coupled with the fact that Amegable’s view had not been obstructed by any object at the time that
AAA’s body had been submerged in the water; that the RTC expressly found her testimony as clear and
straightforward and worthy of credence; that no reason existed why Amegable would falsely testify against
Caliso; that Caliso did not prove the physical impossibility for him to be at the crime scene or at its immediate
vicinity at the time of the incident, for both Barangay San Vicente, where AAA’s body was found, and
Barangay Tiacongan, where the rice field of Yangyang was located, were contiguous; that the attendant
circumstance of abuse of superior strength qualified the killing of AAA to murder; that disregard of sex should
not have been appreciated as an aggravating circumstance due to its not being alleged in the information and
its not being proven during trial; and that the death penalty could not be imposed because of the passage of
Republic Act No. 9346, prohibiting its imposition in the Philippines.
The CA decreed in its judgment, viz:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated August 19, 2002, finding appellant guilty of
Murder, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant Delfin Caliso is sentenced to reclusion
perpetua, and is directed to pay the victim’s heirs the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, as well as the
amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, in addition to the civil indemnity of P50,000.00 he had been
adjudged to pay by the trial court.
SO ORDERED.18
Issue
The primordial issue is whether Amegable’s identification of Caliso as the man who killed AAA at noon of July
5, 1997 was positive and reliable.
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty of the Prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the
identity of the criminal, for even if the commission of the crime can be established, there can be no conviction
without proof of identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt. 19
The CA rejected the challenge Caliso mounted against the reliability of his identification as the culprit by
Amegable in the following manner:20
As to the first two errors raised, appellant contends that the testimony of Soledad Amegable was replete with
discrepancies. Appellant avers, for instance, that Soledad failed to see the assailant’s face. Moreover,
considering the distance between where Soledad was supposedly hiding and where the incident transpired,
appellant states that it was inconceivable for her to have heard and seen the incident. According to appellant,
witness Soledad could not even remember if at that time, she hid behind a banana plant, or a coconut tree.
At bench, the incident happened at noon, when the sun was at its brightest. Soledad could very well recognize
appellant. Furthermore, notwithstanding the fact that it was his back that was facing her, she asserted being
familiar with the physical features of appellant, considering that he frequented their barangay. Even during her
cross-examination by the defense counsel, Soledad remained steadfast in categorically stating that she
recognized appellant:
Q: Mrs. Amegable, you said during your direct examination that you saw Delfin Caliso, the accused
in this case, several times passed by your barangay, am I correct?
A: Several times.
Q: By any chance prior to the incident, did you talk to him?
A: No, sir.
Q: Are you acquainted with him?
A: Yes, sir.
34
 Q: Even if he is in his back position?
A: Yes, sir. (Emphasis Supplied)
Given the circumstances as stated above, it was even probable that Soledad caught glimpses of the profile of
the appellant at the time of the incident. She related, in addition, that when the victim was being submerged in
the water, there was no object obstructing her view.
The inconsistencies as alleged by appellant, between Soledad Amegable’s declaration in court and her
affidavit, such as the tree or plant from where she was hiding behind at the time of the incident, are
insignificant and cannot negate appellant’s criminal liability. Her whole attention was riveted to the incident that
was unfolding before her. Besides, any such inconsistencies are minor. Slight contradictions are indicative of
an unrehearsed testimony and could even serve to strengthen the witness’ credibility. A witness who is telling
the truth is not always expected to give a perfectly concise testimony, considering the lapse of time and the
treachery of human memory.
In fact, the testimony of a single eye-witness is sufficient to support a conviction, so long as such testimony is
found to be clear and straightforward and worthy of credence by the trial court. Furthermore, over here,
witness Soledad had no reason to testify falsely against appellant.
Besides, the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court,
because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and
attitude.lawphi1 Findings of the trial court on such matters are binding and conclusive on the appellate court.
Contrary to the CA’s holding that the identification of Caliso based on Amegable’s recognition of him was
reliable, the Court considers the identification not reliable and beyond doubt as to meet the requirement of
moral certainty.
When is identification of the perpetrator of a crime positive and reliable enough for establishing his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt?
The identification of a malefactor, to be positive and sufficient for conviction, does not always require direct
evidence from an eyewitness; otherwise, no conviction will be possible in crimes where there are no
eyewitnesses. Indeed, trustworthy circumstantial evidence can equally confirm the identification and
overcome the constitutionally presumed innocence of the accused. Thus, the Court has distinguished two
types of positive identification in People v. Gallarde,21 to wit: (a) that by direct evidence, through an eyewitness
to the very commission of the act; and (b) that by circumstantial evidence, such as where the accused is last
seen with the victim immediately before or after the crime. The Court said:
xxx Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an
eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of positive identification. A
witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness
to the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be
instances where, although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime,
he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for
instance when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately
before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification, which
forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting
an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the author of the
crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual eyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to possibly positively
identify a suspect or accused to the exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an
eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary that there can be no conviction until and unless an accused is
positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is settled that direct evidence of the
commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of
guilt. If resort to circumstantial evidence would not be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the absence
of direct evidence, then felons would go free and the community would be denied proper protection. 22
Amegable asserted that she was familiar with Caliso because she had seen him pass by in her barangay
several times prior to the killing. Such assertion indicates that she was obviously assuming that the killer was
no other than Caliso. As matters stand, therefore, Caliso’s conviction hangs by a single thread of evidence,
the direct evidence of Amegable’s identification of him as the perpetrator of the killing. But that single thread
was thin, and cannot stand sincere scrutiny. In every criminal prosecution, no less than moral certainty is
required in establishing the identity of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. Her identification of Caliso
as the perpetrator did not have unassailable reliability, the only means by which it might be said to be positive
and sufficient. The test to determine the moral certainty of an identification is its imperviousness to skepticism
on account of its distinctiveness. To achieve such distinctiveness, the identification evidence should
encompass unique physical features or characteristics, like the face, the voice, the dentures, the
distinguishing marks or tattoos on the body, fingerprints, DNA, or any other physical facts that set the
individual apart from the rest of humanity.
A witness’ familiarity with the accused, although accepted as basis for a positive identification, does not
always pass the test of moral certainty due to the possibility of mistake.
No matter how honest Amegable’s testimony might have been, her identification of Caliso by a sheer look at
his back for a few minutes could not be regarded as positive enough to generate that moral certainty about
Caliso being the perpetrator of the killing, absent other reliable circumstances showing him to be AAA’s killer.
Her identification of him in that manner lacked the qualities of exclusivity and uniqueness, even as it did not
rule out her being mistaken. Indeed, there could be so many other individuals in the community where the
crime was committed whose backs might have looked like Caliso’s back. Moreover, many factors could have
influenced her perception, including her lack of keenness of observation, her emotional stress of the moment,
her proneness to suggestion from others, her excitement, and her tendency to assume. The extent of such
factors are not part of the records; hence, the trial court and the CA could not have taken them into
consideration. But the influence of such varied factors could not simply be ignored or taken for granted, for it is
even a well-known phenomenon that the members of the same family, whose familiarity with one another
could be easily granted, often inaccurately identify one another through a sheer view of another’s back.
Certainly, an identification that does not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake cannot be accorded any
evidentiary force.23
35
Amegable’s recollection of the perpetrator wearing short pants bearing the number "11" did not enhance the
reliability of her identification of Caliso. For one, such pants were not one-of-a-kind apparel, but generic. Also,
they were not offered in evidence. Yet, even if they had been admitted in evidence, it remained doubtful that
they could have been linked to Caliso without proof of his ownership or possession of them in the moments
before the crime was perpetrated.
Nor did the lack of bad faith or ill motive on the part of Amegable to impute the killing to Caliso guarantee the
reliability and accuracy of her identification of him. The dearth of competent additional evidence that
eliminated the possibility of any human error in Amegable’s identification of Caliso rendered her lack of bad
faith or ill motive irrelevant and immaterial, for even the most sincere person could easily be mistaken about
her impressions of persons involved in startling occurrences such as the crime committed against AAA. It is
neither fair nor judicious, therefore, to have the lack of bad faith or ill motive on the part of Amegable raise her
identification to the level of moral certainty.
The injuries found on the person of Caliso by Dr. Fuentecilla, as borne out by the medical certificate dated
June 9, 1997,24 did not support the culpability of Caliso. The injuries, which were mostly mere scratch
marks,25 were not even linked by the examining physician to the crime charged. Inasmuch as the injuries of
Caliso might also have been due to other causes, including one related to his doing menial labor most of the
time, their significance as evidence of guilt is nil.
In the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt as to the identity of the culprit, the accused’s constitutional
right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved is not overcome, and he is entitled to an
acquittal,26 though his innocence may be doubted.27 The constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed
to every individual is of primary importance, and the conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness
of the defense he put up but on the strength of the evidence for the Prosecution. 28
WHEREFORE, the decision promulgated on October 26, 2007 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE for
insufficiency of evidence, and accused-appellant Delfin Caliso is ACQUITTED of the crime of murder.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City is directed to forthwith release Delfin Caliso from
confinement, unless there is another lawful cause warranting his further detention.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 168932 October 19, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CHARLIE BUTIONG, Defendant-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This case involves a man who had sexual intercourse with a woman who, although 29 years of age, was a
mental retardate with the mentality of a six- to seven-year old.
The man, Charlie Butiong, seeks the review and reversal of the judgment promulgated on May 18,
2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction for rape handed down by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 258, in Parañaque City, for which he was imposed reclusion perpetua. He insists that the
State did not duly establish that the woman had been a mental retardate.
The records show that Butiong had been arraigned and tried under an information that alleged:
xxxx
That on or about the 7th day of October 1998, in the City of Parañaque, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of the complainant [AAA], a mental retardate, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Antecedents
In the evening of October 7, 1998, AAA,3 then a 29-year-old mental retardate, was invited by Butiong, her
long-time neighbor, to go over to his house because he would give her something. AAA obliged. He locked the
door as soon as she had stepped inside his house, and then took off his shorts and the shorts of AAA. He led
her to the sofa, where he had carnal knowledge of her. AAA remembered that she then felt pain in her
abdomen and became angry at him for what he had done.4
Upon reaching home, AAA forthwith told her older sister what had happened. Her sister brought AAA to the
police station,5 and later on to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), where AAA underwent a medico-
legal examination by Dr. Armie M. Soreta-Umil. The medico-legal examination revealed that AAA’s hymen was
intact but "distensible and its orifice wide (2.5 cms. in diameter) as to allow complete penetration by an
average-sized adult Filipino male organ in full erection without producing any genital injury." 6 Noticing AAA’s
disorientation and incoherence, Dr. Soreta-Umil endorsed her to the NBI Psychiatric Section for
evaluation.7 AAA also underwent a series of psychological tests at the National Mental Hospital. The tests
included the Raven’s Progressive Matrices Test, Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test, and Draw a Person Test. A
36
Rorschach Psycho-Diagnostic Test was not used because AAA was not able to answer. 8 Another test, the
Sack’s Sentence Completion Test, was not used because of AAA’s inability to comply with the
instructions.9 The results of the psychological tests showed that she had a mild level of mental retardation,
and that her mental age was that of a child aged from six to seven years; she was unaware of what went on
around her and was interested only in gratifying her own needs.10
The Defense presented only one witness in the person of Dr. Natividad Dayan, whom it offered as an expert
psychologist. She concluded that the Raven’s Progressive Matrices Test and the Bender Visual Motor Gestalt
Test administered on AAA were unreliable for determining the existence of mental retardation. She based her
conclusion on James Morizon’s DSM-4 Made Easy: The Clinician’s Guide for Diagnosis, and Jay Siskin’s
Coping With Psychiatric and Psychological Testimony.11 According to her, an individually administered
intelligence test, like the Stamp Intelligence Scale or the Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale, as well as
projective techniques, like the Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test and the Thematic Perception Test, should
have been instead administered to appropriately determine AAA’s mental age. 12
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC rendered judgment finding Butiong guilty of rape, viz:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having been able to prove the guilt of the accused CHARLIE BUTIONG
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple RAPE defined and punishable under Art. 266-A par. 1 in
relation to Art. 266-B par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 8353, accused CHARLIE
BUTIONG is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
Pursuant to the existing jurisprudence, accused CHARLIE BUTIONG is further ordered to indemnify the
private complainant, AAA, the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages
and P25,000.00 as and by way of exemplary damages.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.13
The RTC noted that nothing in Dr. Dayan’s testimony on the unreliability of the tests administered on AAA
would invalidate the findings of psychologist Nimia de Guzman and Dr. Diana de Castro, both of the National
Center for Mental Health, to the effect that AAA had mild level retardation with a mental age of a six- to seven-
year old person; and that such findings were admissible and had more than sufficiently complied with the
required historical and physical examination for determining AAA’s mental condition. The trial judge himself
held,14 based on his personal observation of AAA as a witness in court, that she was a retardate who could
narrate what had transpired albeit with some difficulty about how she had been sexually abused. He
considered AAA as a competent witness whose behavior and appearance manifested no possibility for her to
concoct a story of her defloration at the hands of the accused.
Ruling of the CA
Butiong appealed, but the CA affirmed the conviction on May 18, 2005, 15 to wit:
In sum, the Court sees no cogent reason to depart from the well-entrenched doctrine that the trial court’s
assessment of the credibility of witnesses is accorded great respect because of its opportunity to hear their
testimonies and observe their demeanor and manner of testifying. Absent any showing that the trial court
overlooked or misappreciated some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which would affect the
result of the case, the Court sees no reason to alter the findings of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated February 24, 2003 is affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.
The CA considered the State’s evidence sufficient to support the conclusion that AAA was mentally retarded. It
concluded that the State’s expert witness psychologist de Guzman had not only interviewed AAA and a
relative of AAA but had also administered a series of tests on AAA upon which to base her findings about
AAA’s mental condition; that the results of the psychiatric examination done by Dr. de Castro, as well as the
trial judge’s personal observation that AAA was a mental retardate supported the findings of psychologist de
Guzman; and that AAA could not legally give her consent to the sexual act, as held in People v.
Asturias,16 because the clinical findings showed her mentality to be at par with that of a six- or seven-year-old.
The CA rejected Butiong’s argument that rape was not established because no semen had been taken from
AAA, stressing that the fact of rape depended not on the presence of spermatozoa but on the fact of unlawful
penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ, which the State amply proved.
Issues
In this appeal, Butiong submits that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PROOF OF THE DATE OF THE COMMISSION OF
THE OFFENSE IS NOT NECESSARY IN ORDER TO CONVICT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE OFFENDED PARTY IS A MENTAL
RETARDATE.
III
37
 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT A MENTAL RETARDATE IS IN THE SAME CLASS
AS A WOMAN DEPRIVED OF REASON OR OTHERWISE UNCONSCIOUS.
Anent the first assigned error, Butiong contends that the State did not establish rape because there was no
evidence showing the exact date when the rape occurred. Under the second assigned error, he disputes the
RTC’s conclusion that AAA was a mental retardate by focusing on the inconclusiveness of the findings of
psychologist de Guzman brought about by her failure to ascertain AAA’s personal history and by her
computing AAA’s mental age upon inaccurate and unverified information. He notes that two other physicians
who had examined AAA, one from the NBI and the other from the National Center for Mental Health, were not
presented as witnesses. He insists on his innocence, and emphasizes the testimony of Dr. Dayan on the
unreliability of the tests administered on AAA. He maintains that the unreliability of the tests administered on
AAA for determining the presence of mental retardation should be appreciated in his favor in accordance with
People v. Cartuano, Jr.,17 which required that a diagnosis of mental retardation should be made after a
thorough evaluation based on history, and physical and laboratory examinations by a clinician. Lastly, he
posits that the State did not establish the elements of rape, considering that a mental retardate qualified
neither as a "woman deprived of reason" nor as "a woman under twelve years of age" as provided under
Article 266-A par. 1(b) nor of par. 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling
We affirm the conviction.
I sufficient proof of the consummation of rape. We have ruled that rape can be established by the sole
Exact date of rape and absence of spermatozoa
from victim’s genitalia are not elements of rape
Butiong argues that the State did not duly establish the fact of rape because the exact date of the incident was
indeterminate, and because no spermatozoa was found in AAA’s genital organ.
The argument deserves no consideration.
The CA fully debunked the argument on the exact date of the rape not being established by simply quoting
from AAA’s testimony that the rape had occurred on October 7, 1998. 18 We need to emphasize, however, that
the date of the rape need not be precisely proved considering that date is not an element of rape. 19
Nor did the absence of spermatozoa from the genitalia of AAA negate or disprove the rape. 20 The basic
element of rape is carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse, not ejaculation. 21 Carnal knowledge is defined as
"the act of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman." 22 This explains why the slightest
penetration of the female genitalia consummates the rape. As such, a mere touching of the external genitalia
by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act already constitutes consummated rape. 23 People v.
Campuhan24 has aimed to remove any confusion as to the extent of "touching" in rape:
[T]ouching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of
organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim’s vagina, or the mons pubis,
as in this case. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid
into the female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of
consummated rape. As the labias, which are required to be "touched" by the penis, are by their natural situs or
location beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch them with the penis is to attain some degree
of penetration beneath the surface, hence, the conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of
the pudendum constitutes consummated rape.
The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the perineal area,
e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubis is
the rounded eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible within the surface. The next
layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of the female organ composed of the outer convex surface and the
inner surface. The skin of the outer convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented, while the
inner surface is a thin skin which does not have any hair but has many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath
the labia majora is the labia minora. Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape to
be consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of
the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute
consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of
either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be
attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness. 25 [emphasis supplied]
That AAA’s recollection on the rape was corroborated by the results of the medico-legal examination was
testimony of the victim that is credible and untainted with serious uncertainty. 26 With more reason is this true
when the medical findings supported the testimony of the victim, 27 like herein.
II
Rape was committed because AAA
was a mental retardate
One of Butiong’s contentions is that having sexual intercourse with AAA, a mental retardate, did not amount to
a rape, because it could not be considered as carnal knowledge of a woman deprived of reason or of a female
under twelve years of age as provided under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
The contention cannot be sustained.
Rape is essentially a crime committed through force or intimidation, that is, against the will of the female. It is
also committed without force or intimidation when carnal knowledge of a female is alleged and shown to be
without her consent. This understanding of the commission of rape has been prevalent in both the common
law and the statutory law systems. As Corpus Juris Secundum has summed up: 28
38
At common law rape could be committed only where the unlawful carnal knowledge of a female was had
without her consent or against her will; lack of consent was an essential element of the offense; and there can
be no rape in the common-law sense without the element of lack of consent. Under the statutes punishing the
offense, an essential element of the crime of rape is that the act was committed without the consent of the
female, or, as it is otherwise expressed, against her will. The act of sexual intercourse is against the female’s
will or without her consent when, for any cause, she is not in a position to exercise any judgment about the
matter.
Carnal knowledge of the female with her consent is not rape, provided she is above the age of consent or is
capable in the eyes of the law of giving consent. Thus, mere copulation, with the woman passively
acquiescent, does not constitute rape. The female must not at any time consent; her consent, given at any
time prior to penetration, however reluctantly given, or if accompanied with mere verbal protests and refusals,
prevents the act from being rape, provided the consent is willing and free of initial coercion. Thus, where a
man takes hold of a woman against her will and she afterward consents to intercourse before the act is
committed, his act is not rape. However, where the female consents, but then withdraws her consent before
penetration, and the act is accomplished by force, it is rape; and where a woman offers to allow a man to have
intercourse with her on certain conditions and he refuses to comply with the conditions, but accomplishes the
act without her consent, he is guilty of rape. [emphasis supplied]
In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, 29 Justice Aquino discusses the concept of committing rape
against the female’s will or without her consent, to wit:
In rape committed by means of duress, the victim’s will is nullified or destroyed. Hence, the necessity of
proving real and constant resistance on the part of the woman to establish that the act was committed against
her will. On the other hand, in the rape of a woman deprived of reason or unconscious, the victim has no will.
The absence of will determines the existence of the rape. Such lack of will may exist not only when the victim
is unconscious or totally deprived of reason, but also when she is suffering some mental deficiency impairing
her reason or free will. In that case, it is not necessary that she should offer real opposition or constant
resistance to the sexual intercourse. Carnal knowledge of a woman so weak in intellect as to be incapable of
legal consent constitutes rape. Where the offended woman was feeble-minded, sickly and almost an idiot,
sexual intercourse with her is rape. Her failure to offer resistance to the act did not mean consent for she was
incapable of giving any rational consent.
The deprivation of reason need not be complete. Mental abnormality or deficiency is enough. Cohabitation
with a feebleminded, idiotic woman is rape. Sexual intercourse with an insane woman was considered rape.
But a deafmute is not necessarily deprived of reason. This circumstances must be proven. Intercourse with a
deafmute is not rape of a woman deprived of reason, in the absence of proof that she is an imbecile. Viada
says that the rape under par. 2 may be committed when the offended woman is deprived of reason due to any
cause such as when she is asleep, or due to lethargy produced by sickness or narcotics administered to her
by the accused. xxx [emphasis supplied]
Butiong was arraigned, tried and convicted of the crime of rape as defined and penalized under paragraph 1,
Article 266-A, in relation to paragraph 1, Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, under an
amended information that plainly averred that AAA was a "mental retardate." The insertion of the phrase in the
amended information was significant, because the phrase put him on sufficient notice that the victim "was not
in full possession of her normal reasoning faculty."30 The phrase further specifically indicated which of the four
modes of committing the crime of rape as provided in paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, applied in his case, namely:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under 12 years of age, or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances first mentioned is present.
Yet, Butiong’s contention is that his case did not come under any of the four modes due to carnal knowledge
of a mental retardate not being either carnal knowledge of a female deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, or of a female under 12 years of age or demented.
The contention is unwarranted.
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, provides:
Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed. ̶ Rape is committed –
1) By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of
the circumstances mentioned above be present.
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act
of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object
into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Carnal knowledge of a mental retardate is rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 because a mental retardate is not capable of giving her consent
to a sexual act. Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary, it being sufficient for the State to establish, one,
39
the sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and, two, the mental retardation of the victim. 31 It
should no longer be debatable that rape of a mental retardate falls under paragraph 1, b), of Article 266-A,
supra, because the provision refers to a rape of a female "deprived of reason," a phrase that refers to mental
abnormality, deficiency or retardation. 32
Who, then, is a mental retardate within the context of the phrase "deprived of reason" used in the Revised
Penal Code?
In People v. Dalandas,33 the Court renders the following exposition on mental retardation and its various
levels, viz:
Mental retardation is a chronic condition present from birth or early childhood and characterized by impaired
intellectual functioning measured by standardized tests. It manifests itself in impaired adaptation to the daily
demands of the individual’s own social environment. Commonly, a mental retardate exhibits a slow rate of
maturation, physical and/or psychological, as well as impaired learning capacity.
Although "mental retardation" is often used interchangeably with "mental deficiency," the latter term is usually
reserved for those without recognizable brain pathology. The degrees of mental retardation according to their
level of intellectual function are illustrated, thus:
Mental Retardation
LEVEL DESCRIPTION TERM INTELLIGENCE QUOTIENT
(IQ RANGE)
I Profound Below 20
II Severe 20-35
III Moderate 36-52
IV Mild 53-68
xxxx
The traditional but now obsolescent terms applied to those degrees of mental retardation were (a) idiot,
having an IQ of 0 to 19, and a maximum intellectual factor in adult life equivalent to that of the average two-
year old child; (b) imbecile by an IQ of 20 to 49 and a maximum intellectual function in adult life equivalent to
that of the average seven-year old child; moron or feebleminded, having an IQ of 50 to 69 and a maximum
intellectual function in adult life equivalent to that of the average twelve-year old child. Psychiatrists and
psychologists apply the term "borderline" intelligence to those with IQ between 70 to 89. In People vs. Palma,
we ruled that a person is guilty of rape when he had sexual intercourse with a female who was suffering from
a "borderline mental deficiency." [emphasis supplied]
Considering the findings of psychologist de Guzman to the effect that AAA had the mental age of a six- to
seven-year old, an age equated with imbecility under the previous classification, her mental age was even
lower than that of a borderline mental deficiency within the context of that term as characterized in People v.
Dalandas, supra.34 As such, Butiong’s carnal knowledge of AAA amounted to rape of a person deprived of
reason.
The ability of the female to given rational consent to carnal intercourse determines if carnal knowledge of a
mental retardate like AAA is rape. Indeed, the Court has consistently considered carnal knowledge of a female
mental retardate with the mental age below 12 years of age as rape of a woman deprived of reason. 35 As the
Court aptly stated in People v. Manlapaz,36 where the victim was a 13-year old girl with the mentality of a five-
year-old, that ability to give rational consent was not present, viz:
Sexual intercourse with a woman who is deprived of reason or with a girl who is below twelve years of age is
rape because she is incapable of giving rational consent to the carnal intercourse. "Las mujeres privadas de
razon, enajenadas, idiotas, imbeciles, son incapaces por su estado mental de apreciar la ofensa que el
culpable infiere a su honestidad y, por tanto, incapaces de consentir. Pero no es condicion precisa que la
carencia de razon sea completa, basta la abnormalidad o deficiencia mental que solo la disminuye, sin
embargo, la jurisprudence es discordante" (II Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, 14th Ed., 1975, pp. 538-9).
"Comete violacion el que yace mujer que no tiene normalmente desarrolladas sus facultades mentales (19
nov. 1930); aqui esta comprendido el yacimiento con debiles o retrasados mentales (11 mayo 1932, 25 feb.
1948, 27 sept. 1951); constituye este delito el coito con una niña de 15 años enferma de epilepsia genuina
que carece de capacidad para conocer el valor de sus actos (2 marzo 1953); el yacimiento con oligofrenicas
(mentally deficient persons) 28 abril, 24 octubre, 1956, 19 feb. 1958); xxx" (ibid., note 3).
The same rule prevails in American jurisprudence. "There can be no question but that a copulation with a
woman known to be mentally incapable of giving even an imperfect consent is rape" (State vs. Jewett, 192 At.
7).
"An accused is guilty of the crime of rape when it is established that he had sexual intercourse with a female
who was mentally incapable of validly consenting to or opposing the carnal act" (65 Am Jur 2nd 766 citing
State vs. Prokosch, 152 Minn. 86, 187 NW 971; Cokeley vs. State, 87 Tex. Crim. 256, 220 SW 1099; 31 ALR
3rd 1227, sec. 3).
"In this species of rape neither force upon the part of a man nor resistance upon the part of a woman forms an
element of the crime. If, by reason of any mental weakness, she is incapable of legally consenting, resistance
is not expected any more than it is in the case of one who has been drugged to unconsciousness, or robbed
of judgment by intoxicants. Nor will an apparent consent in such a case avail any more than in the case of a
child who may actually consent, but who by law is conclusively held incapable of legal consent. Whether the
woman possessed mental capacity sufficient to give legal consent must, saving in exceptional cases, remain
a question of fact xxx. It need but be said that legal consent presupposes an intelligence capable of
40
understanding the act, its nature, and possible consequences. This degree of intelligence may exist with an
impaired and weakened intellect, or it may not" (People vs. Boggs, 290 Pac. 618 citing People vs. Griffin, 49
Pac. 711 and People vs. Peery, 146 Pac. 44). [emphasis supplied]
III
People v. Cartuano was not applicable
To boost his challenge to the finding that AAA was a mental retardate, Butiong cites People v. Cartuano, 37 a
case where the Court ruled that a diagnosis of mental retardation required a thorough evaluation of the history
of the victim, and held that a physical and laboratory examination by a clinician was necessary. He insists that
the findings of the psychologist and the physicians who had examined AAA fell short of the requirements set in
People v. Cartuano, considering that psychologist de Guzman did not try to locate the biological parents of
AAA for the purpose of ascertaining her personal history, and did not base her findings on reliable data.
Butiong’s reliance on People v. Cartuano does not advance his cause.
People v. Cartuano applies only to cases where there is a dearth of medical records to sustain a finding of
mental retardation. Indeed, the Court has clarified so in People v. Delos Santos, 38 declaring that the records in
People v. Cartuano were wanting in clinical, laboratory, and psychometric support to sustain a finding that the
victim had been suffering from mental retardation. It is noted that in People v. Delos Santos, the Court upheld
the finding that the victim had been mentally retarded by an examining psychiatrist who had been able to
identify the tests administered to the victim and to sufficiently explain the results of the tests to the trial court. 39
In direct contrast to People v. Cartuano, this case did not lack clinical findings on the mentality of the
victim.1awphi1
40
Moreover, as clarified in People v. Dalandas, People v. Cartuano does not preclude the presentation by the
State of proof other than clinical evidence to establish the mental retardation of the victim. For sure, the courts
are not entirely dependent on the results of clinical examinations in establishing mental retardation. In People
v. Almacin,41for instance, the Court took into consideration the fact that the victim was illiterate and unschooled
in concluding that she was mentally incapable of assenting to or dissenting from the sexual
intercourse.42 Also, in People v. Dumanon,43 the Court concurred in the trial court’s observation and conclusion
that the victim was a mental retardate based on her physical appearance and on her difficulty to understand
and answer the questions during her testimony.44
Here, the State’s witnesses sufficiently explained the psychological tests conducted to establish AAA’s mental
retardation with the mentality of a six- or seven-year-old. The trial judge himself reached a conclusion on
AAA’s mentality from his close personal observation of her as a witness in court, noting that she manifested a
difficulty in responding to the questions, especially those bearing on her being sexually abused. 45 The trial
judge’s observation to the effect that she had no notion of the wrong that had been done to her was validated
by the clinical findings. As such, the totality of the evidence presented by the State established beyond
reasonable doubt AAA’s deficient mental condition.
IV
Presumption of innocence was overcome
by sufficient evidence of guilt
Notable is that Butiong did not testify. He offered neither alibi nor denial despite the strong charge of rape
brought against him. His defense was purposely limited to his submission, through Dr. Dayan, that AAA had
not been established to be a mental retardate. Thereby, he did not refute that he had carnal knowledge of
AAA. Having earlier demonstrated the futility of Dr. Dayan’s discounting of the State’s evidence of AAA’s
mental retardation, we can justifiably consider the presumption of innocence in favor of Butiong as overcome.
Still, even if he had asserted alibi and denial, his guilt for the rape of AAA would not be reversed in the face of
AAA’s unwavering testimony and of her very positive and firm identification of him as the man who had
undressed her and sexually gratified himself off her. 46 He could no longer hide behind the protective shield of
his presumed innocence, but should have come forward with credible and strong evidence of his lack of
authorship of the crime. Considering that the burden of the evidence had shifted to him but he did not
discharge his burden at all, there is no other outcome except to affirm his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on May 18, 2005 in CA-GR CR HC No. 00862.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
G.R. No 191726 February 06, 2013
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
NOEL BARTOLOME y BAJO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A buy-bust operation has been recognized in this jurisdiction as a legitimate form of entrapment of the culprit.
It is distinct from instigation, in that the accused who is otherwise not predisposed to commit the crime is
enticed or lured or talked into committing the crime. While entrapment is legal, instigation is not.
41
This final appeal is taken by the accused from the decision promulgated on January 29, 20 I 0, 1 whereby the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction for illegal sale of methampethamine hydrochloride or shabu in
violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002) handed down by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 120, in Caloocan City (RTC) through its decision
dated July 12, 20062
Antecedents
On August 13, 2003, the City Prosecutor’s Office of Caloocan City charged the accused with illegally selling
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu in violation of Section 5, Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165 through
the information reading thus:
That on or about the 10th day of August 2003 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any authority of law, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to PO1 Borban Paras, who posed as poseur buyer,
one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.06 gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride
(shabu), knowing the same to be dangerous drug.
Contrary to Law.3
After the accused pleaded not guilty, trial ensued.
The evidence for the State was as follows.
On August 10, 2003, at around 1:00 a.m., an informant went to the Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Unit
(ADSOU) in Caloocan City to report the illicit drug dealings of the accused on Reparo Street, Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City. Acting on the report, Police Inspector Cesar Cruz of ADSOU immediately instructed some of
his men to conduct a buy-bust operation against the accused. During the pre-operation briefing, the buy-bust
team designated PO1 Borban Paras as the poseur-buyer. Paras was given a P100.00 bill that he marked with
his initials BP. It was agreed that the informant would drop a cigarette butt in front of the suspect to identify
him to Paras; and that Paras would scratch his head to signal to the buy-bust team that the transaction with
the suspect had been consummated. The operation was coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency.
Upon arriving at the target area at around 2:00 a.m. of August 10, 2003, the team members positioned
themselves in the vicinity of a store. The informant then approached a person who was standing in front of the
store and dropped a cigarette butt in front of the person. Paras, then only two meters away from the informant,
saw the dropping of the cigarette butt. Paras went towards the suspect and said to him: Pre pa-iskor nga. The
suspect responded: Pre, piso na lang tong hawak magkano ba kukunin mo? Paras replied: Ayos na yan, piso
lang naman talaga ang kukunin ko, after which he handed the marked ₱100.00 bill to the suspect, who in turn
drew out a plastic sachet containing white substances from his pocket and gave the sachet to Paras. With
that, Paras scratched his head to signal the consummation of the sale. As the other members of the team
were approaching, Paras grabbed the suspect. PO3 Rodrigo Antonio, another member of the team,
confiscated the marked ₱100.00 bill from the suspect, who was identified as Noel Bartolome y Bajo. Paras
immediately marked the sachet at the crime scene with Bartolome’s initials NBB.4
Insp. Cruz later requested in writing the PNP Crime Laboratory in Caloocan City to conduct a laboratory
examination of the contents of the plastic sachet seized from Bartolome. 5 PO2 Rolando De Ocampo, another
member of the buy-bust team, brought the request and the sachet and its contents to the laboratory. In due
course, Forensic Chemical Officer Jesse Abadilla Dela Rosa of the PNP Crime Laboratory confirmed in
Physical Science Report No. D-1038-03 that the plastic sachet contained 0.06 gram of methamphetamine
hydrocholoride or shabu, a dangerous drug.6
On his part, the accused claimed that the arresting officers had framed him up because they wanted to extort
a substantial amount from him in exchange for his release. The version of the accused tended to show the
following.
On August 9, 2003, at about 12:00 in the afternoon, the accused went to his brother’s house located on
Zapote Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, to take a rest from his work as a construction worker. While he
and his brother were watching the television show Eat Bulaga inside the house, two policemen suddenly
entered the house. One of the policemen, whom the accused later identified as PO3 Antonio, frisked the
accused but spared his brother because the latter was asthmatic. The policemen then brought the accused to
the police station and detained him. At the police station, PO3 Antonio inquired from the accused if he was
selling shabu, but the accused denied doing so. It was then that PO3 Antonio demanded ₱20,000.00 from the
accused in exchange for his freedom. The accused refused to pay because he did not have the money. 7
Ruling of the RTC
As stated, the RTC convicted Bartolome of the crime charged, 8 to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds and so holds that accused NOEL BARTOLOME Y BAJO
is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 5, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165 and imposes
upon him the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php500,000.00).
The one (1) piece of heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.06 gram of Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government to be turned over to the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the accused assailed his conviction, stating:
I
42
 ASSUMING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT PARTICIPATED IN THE SELLING OF ILLEGAL The concurrence of the foregoing elements was conclusively established herein.
DRUGS, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING HIM OF THE CRIME CHARGED
SINCE HE WAS MERELY INSTIGATED BY THE POLICE INTO DOING IT. To start with, Paras, as the poseur-buyer, testified that the accused sold to him shabu during the buy-bust
operation, to wit:
II
Q – So when the informant proceeded to the place of Noel Bartolome, what did the informant do?
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE POLICE’S FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH THE PROCEDURE IN THE CUSTODY OF SEIZED PROHIBITED AND A – After he threw cigarette in front of Noel Bartolome, I approached him.
REGULATED DRUGS PRESCRIBED UNDER THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATION
OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 WHICH CASTS SERIOUS DOUBT ON THE IDENTITY OF THE
SEIZED DRUG CONSTITUTING THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE OFFENSE. xxxx

The accused argued that the operation mounted against him was not an entrapment but an instigation, Q – What happened next?
contending that without the proposal and instigation made by poseur buyer Paras no transaction would have
transpired between them; that the police team did not show that its members had conducted any prior A – When I approached the accused, I told him.
surveillance of him; and that the Prosecution should have presented the informant as a witness against him.
"Pre-paiskor nga" and he said
On January 29, 2010, the CA promulgated its assailed decision,9 rejecting the assigned errors of the accused,
and affirmed his conviction. It held that the operation against him was not an instigation but an entrapment,
considering that the criminal intent to sell dangerous drugs had originated from him, as borne out by "Pre, piso na lang tong hawak ko
the shabu being inside his pocket prior to the transaction with Paras; that the accused did not show that Paras
had any ill motive to falsely testify against him; that the conduct of a prior surveillance and the presentation of Magkano ba ang kukunin mo" and he said
the informant as a witness were not necessary to establish the validity of the entrapment; and that the non-
compliance by the buy-bust team with the requirements under Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations for Republic Act No. 9165 (IRR) was not fatal because there was a justifiable ground for it, and "ayos nay an, piso lang naman talaga ang kukunin ko."
because the apprehending team properly preserved the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated
drugs. Q – Who handed first you or the accused?

Hence, the accused is now before the Court in a final bid for acquittal. A – I was the one who handed the buy bust money.

Ruling Q – After giving him the P100.00 pesos to Noel Bartolome where did he place it?

The appeal lacks merit. A – Then after that he placed it on his front pocket and then after that he got one (1) plastic sachet from his
left front pocket.
To establish the crime of illegal sale of shabu, the Prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt (a) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the identity of the object and the consideration of the sale; and (b) the Q – And then after giving you the plastic sachet containing illegal drug, what did you do?
delivery of the thing sold and of the payment for the thing. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, like shabu, requires simply the consummation of the selling transaction, which happens at A – I scratched my head, sir.
the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. In short, what is material is the proof showing that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the thing sold as evidence of
the corpus delicti. If a police officer goes through the operation as a buyer, the crime is consummated when Q – After scratching your head, what transpired if any?
the police officer makes an offer to buy that is accepted by the accused, and there is an ensuing exchange
between them involving the delivery of the dangerous drugs to the police officer. 10 A – When I saw my companions approaching me, I grabbed Noel Bartolome, sir. 11

43
Secondly, the transmission of the plastic sachet and its contents from the time of their seizure until they were
delivered to the PNP Crime Laboratory for chemical examination was properly documented, starting with the
marking of the plastic sachet at the crime scene by Paras. This was followed by the preparation of the written
request by Insp. Cruz at the ADSOU. PO2 De Ocampo then personally brought the plastic sachet and its
contents, together with the written request, to the PNP Crime Laboratory, where the delivery of the request
and of the sachet and its contents was recorded by SPO1 Bugabuga of that office. In Physical Sciences
Report No. D-1038-03, Chemist Dela Rosa of the PNP Crime Laboratory ultimately certified that the contents
of the plastic sachet were examined and found to be 0.06 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu, a dangerous drug.12
And, thirdly, the Prosecution presented the shabu, the marked P100.00 bill, and Chemist Dela Rosa’s Physical
Sciences Report No. D-1038-03 at the trial.13
On the other hand, the accused’s claim of being the victim of a vicious frame-up and extortion is unworthy of
serious consideration. The fact that frame-up and extortion could be easily concocted renders such defenses
hard to believe. Thus, although drug-related violators have commonly tendered such defenses to fend off or
refute valid prosecutions of their drug-related violations, the Court has required that such defenses, to be
credited at all, must be established with clear and convincing evidence. 14 But the accused did not adduce
such evidence here, for all he put up were self-serving denials. Had the version of the Defense been what
really transpired, there was no reason for the accused and his brother not to have formally charged the police
officers with the severely penalized offense of planting of evidence under Section 2915 of Republic Act No.
9165 and extortion. Thereby, the allegations of frame-up and extortion were rendered implausible.
Yet, the accused discredits the validity of his arrest by contending that the arrest resulted from an instigation,
not from a legitimate entrapment. He insists that the evidence of the Prosecution did not show him to be then
looking for buyers of shabu when Paras and the informant approached him; that it was Paras who proposed to
buy shabu from him; and that consequently Paras instigated him to sell shabu. He submits that the transaction
would not have transpired without the proposal and instigation by Paras; that Paras initiated the commission
of the crime by offering to him P100.00 for the purchase of the shabu; and that he should be acquitted due to
the absolutory cause of instigation.16
The Court is not persuaded to side with the accused.
The trial judge and the CA agreed in their findings on the arrest of the accused being the result of a legitimate
entrapment procedure. Such findings were based on the credible testimonies of the poseur buyer and other
competent witnesses of the Prosecution. We concur with their findings. Indeed, the trial judge’s assessment of
the credibility of the witnesses is entitled to respect. This is because of the trial judge’s unique opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they testified before him. 17 The rule applies even more if, like here,
the trial judge’s assessment was affirmed by the CA upon review. 18 This rule should be obeyed here.
Moreover, we find no glaring errors or misapprehension of facts committed by the RTC in not according
credence to the version of the accused and his brother. In this regard, it is significant that the accused did not
ascribe any ill motive to Paras that could have made the officer testify falsely against him. Considering that the
records were patently bereft of any indicium of ill motive or of any distorted sense of duty on the part of the
apprehending team, particularly Paras as the poseur buyer, full credence was properly accorded to the
Prosecution’s evidence incriminating the accused. Without the clear and convincing indication of the lawmen’s
ill motive and irregular performance of duty, it is always good law to presume them to have performed their
official duties in a regular manner.19 That presumption became conclusive for lack of contravention.
To be clear, then, the insistence by the accused that he was entitled to the benefit of an absolutory cause as
the result of an instigation is unwarranted.
There is a definite distinction between instigation and entrapment. The Court highlighted the distinction
in People v. Bayani, 20 viz:
Instigation is the means by which the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to
prosecute him. On the other hand, entrapment is the employment of such ways and means for the purpose of
trapping or capturing a lawbreaker. Thus, in instigation, officers of the law or their agents incite, induce,
instigate or lure an accused into committing an offense which he or she would otherwise not commit and has
no intention of committing. But in entrapment, the criminal intent or design to commit the offense charged
originates in the mind of the accused, and law enforcement officials merely facilitate the apprehension of the
criminal by employing ruses and schemes; thus, the accused cannot justify his or her conduct. In instigation,
where law enforcers act as co-principals, the accused will have to be acquitted. But entrapment cannot bar
prosecution and conviction. As has been said, instigation is a "trap for the unwary innocent," while entrapment
is a "trap for the unwary criminal."
As a general rule, a buy-bust operation, considered as a form of entrapment, is a valid means of arresting
violators of Republic Act No. 9165. It is an effective way of apprehending law offenders in the act of
committing a crime. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender, without
anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense.
A police officer’s act of soliciting drugs from the accused during a buy-bust operation, or what is known as a
"decoy solicitation," is not prohibited by law and does not render invalid the buy-bust operations. The sale of
contraband is a kind of offense habitually committed, and the solicitation simply furnishes evidence of the
criminal’s course of conduct. In People v. Sta. Maria, the Court clarified that a "decoy solicitation" is not
tantamount to inducement or instigation:
It is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his way,
or that the criminal act was done at the "decoy solicitation" of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that
detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting its commission. Especially is
this true in that class of cases where the office is one habitually committed, and the solicitation merely
furnishes evidence of a course of conduct.
As here, the solicitation of drugs from appellant by the informant utilized by the police merely furnishes
evidence of a course of conduct. The police received an intelligence report that appellant has been habitually
dealing in illegal drugs. They duly acted on it by utilizing an informant to effect a drug transaction with
appellant. There was no showing that the informant induced the appellant to sell illegal drugs to him.
44
Conversely, the law deplores instigation or inducement, which occurs when the police or its agent devises the
idea of committing the crime and lures the accused into executing the offense. Instigation absolves the
accused of any guilt, given the spontaneous moral revulsion from using the powers of government to beguile
innocent but ductile persons into lapses that they might otherwise resist.
People v. Doria enumerated the instances when this Court recognized instigation as a valid defense, and an
instance when it was not applicable:
In United States v. Phelps, we acquitted the accused from the offense of smoking opium after finding that the
government employee, a BIR personnel, actually induced him to commit the crime in order to persecute him.
Smith, the BIR agent, testified that Phelps’ apprehension came after he overheard Phelps in a saloon say that
he like smoking opium on some occasions. Smith’s testimony was disregarded. We accorded significance to
the fact that it was Smith who went to the accused three times to convince him to look for an opium den where
both of them could smoke this drug. The conduct of the BIR agent was condemned as "most reprehensible."
In People v. Abella, we acquitted the accused of the crime of selling explosives after examining the testimony
of the apprehending police officer who pretended to be a merchant. The police officer offered "a tempting
price, xxx a very high one" causing the accused to sell the explosives. We found there was inducement,
"direct, persistent and effective" by the police officer and that outside of his testimony, there was no evidence
sufficient to convict the accused. In People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng, [W]e convicted the accused after
finding that there was no inducement on the part of the law enforcement officer. We stated that the Customs
secret serviceman smoothed the way for the introduction of opium from Hong Kong to Cebu after the accused
had already planned its importation and ordered said drug. We ruled that the apprehending officer did not
induce the accused to import opium but merely entrapped him by pretending to have an understanding with
the Collector of Customs of Cebu to better assure the seizure of the prohibited drug and the arrest of the
surreptitious importers.
In recent years, it has become common practice for law enforcement officers and agents to engage in buy-
bust operations and other entrapment procedures in apprehending drug offenders, which is made difficult by
the secrecy with which drug-related offenses are conducted and the many devices and subterfuges employed
by offenders to avoid detection. On the other hand, the Court has taken judicial notice of the ugly reality that in
cases involving illegal drugs, corrupt law enforcers have been known to prey upon weak, hapless and
innocent persons. The distinction between entrapment and instigation has proven to be crucial. The balance
needs to be struck between the individual rights and the presumption of innocence on one hand, and ensuring
the arrest of those engaged in the illegal traffic of narcotics on the other.
Applying the foregoing, we declare that the accused was not arrested following an instigation for him to
commit the crime. Instead, he was caught in flagrante delicto during an entrapment through buy-bust. In a
buy-bust operation, the pusher sells the contraband to another posing as a buyer; once the transaction is
consummated, the pusher is validly arrested because he is committing or has just committed a crime in the
presence of the buyer. Here, Paras asked the accused if he could buy shabu, and the latter, in turn, quickly
transacted with the former, receiving the marked bill from Paras and turning over the sachet of shabu he took
from his pocket. The accused was shown to have been ready to sell the shabu without much prodding from
Paras. There is no question that the idea to commit the crime originated from the mind of the accused.
The accused argues that the absence of a prior surveillance cast doubt on the veracity of the buy-bust
operation; and that the failure to present the informant as a witness against him, as well as the buy-bust
team’s failure to comply with the requirements under Section 21, Article II, of Republic Act No.9165, were fatal
to the cause of the Prosecution.21
The argument of the accused lacks merit. We have held that prior surveillance is not necessary to render a
buy-bust operation legitimate, especially when the buy-bust team is accompanied to the target area by the
informant.22 That was what precisely happened here.
Similarly, the presentation of an informant as a witness is not regarded as indispensable to the success of a
prosecution of a drug-dealing accused. As a rule, the informant is not presented in court for security reasons,
in view of the need to protect the informant from the retaliation of the culprit arrested through his efforts.
Thereby, the confidentiality of the informant’s identity is protected in deference to his invaluable services to
law enforcement.23Only when the testimony of the informant is considered absolutely essential in obtaining the
conviction of the culprit should the need to protect his security be disregarded. Here, however, the informant’s
testimony as a witness against the accused would only be corroborative of the sufficient testimony of Paras as
the poseur-buyer; hence, such testimony was unnecessary. 24
We consider as unwarranted the contention of the accused about the non-compliance by the buy-bust team
with the requirements of the law for the proper seizure and custody of dangerous drugs.
The requirements are imposed by Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, whose
pertinent portion reads as follows:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
xxxx
To implement the requirements of Republic Act No. 9165, Section 21 (a), Article II of the IRR relevantly states:
xxxx
45
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items;
xxxx
It is notable that pursuant to the IRR, supra, the non-observance of the requirements may be excused if there
is a justification, provided the integrity of the seized items as evidence is "properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team."
Although it appears that the buy-bust team did not literally observe all the requirements, like photographing
the confiscated drugs in the presence of the accused, of a representative from the media and from the
Department of Justice, and of any elected public official who should be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy of it, whatever justification the members of the buy-bust team had to render in
order to explain their non-observance of all the requirements would remain unrevealed because the accused
did not assail such non-compliance during the trial. He raised the matter for the first time only in the CA. As
such, the Court cannot now dwell on the matter because to do so would be against the tenets of fair play and
equity. That is what the Court said in People v. Sta. Maria, 25 to wit:
The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds.1âwphi1 However, whatever justifiable grounds
may excuse the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation in this case from complying with Section 21
will remain unknown, because appellant did not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from
him. Indeed, the police officers’ alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not
raised before the trial court but were instead raised for the first time on appeal. In no instance did appellant
least intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their
integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a
party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such
objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.
We point out that the non-adherence to Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 was not a serious flaw
that would make the arrest of the accused illegal or that would render the shabu subject of the sale by him
inadmissible as evidence against him. What was crucial was the proper preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized shabu, inasmuch as that would be significant in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.26
The State showed here that the chain of custody of the shabu was firm and unbroken. The buy-bust team
properly preserved the integrity of the shabu as evidence from the time of its seizure to the time of its
presentation in court. Immediately upon the arrest of the accused, Paras marked the plastic sachet containing
the shabu with the accused’s initials of NBB. Thereafter, Paras brought the sachet and the contents to the
ADSOU,27 where his superior officer, Insp. Cruz, prepared and signed the request for the laboratory
examination of the contents of the marked sachet.28 P02 De Ocampo handcarried the request and the
evidence to the PNP Crime Laboratory.29 SPO 1 Bugabuga of that office recorded the delivery of the request
and the marked sachet, which were all received by Chemist Dela Rosa.30 In turn, Chemist Dela Rosa
examined the contents of the marked sachet, and executed Physical Sciences Report No. D-1 03 8-03
confirming that the marked sachet contained 0.06 gram of shabu.31 In this regard, the accused did not deny
that Paras and Chemist Dela Rosa affirmed the sequence of custody of the shabu during the trial.32
The CA and the RTC correctly imposed life imprisonment and fine of P500,000.00. Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 states that the penalty for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, regardless of
the quantity and purity, shall be life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P
10,000,000.00.33
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on January 29, 2010; and
ORDER the accused to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 181491 July 30, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
HENRY ARCILLAS, Accused-Appellant,
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The rape of a female over 12 years but under 18 years of age by the common-law spouse of her mother is
qualified rape. Yet, the crime is only simple rape, although the State successfully proves the common-law
relationship, where the information does not properly allege the qualifying circumstance of relationship
between the accused and the female. This is because the right of the accused to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him is inviolable.
Henry Arcillas had been convicted of qualified rape by the Regional Trial Court in Masbate City (RTC) and
meted the death penalty, which the law in force at the time prescribed. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
finding of guilt, but found him guilty only of simple rape due to his common-law relationship with the victim's
46
mother not having been properly alleged in the information and accordingly imposed reclusion perpetua. He is
now before the Court to make his final plea for exoneration.
Antecedents
AAA,1 allegedly Arcillas’ step-daughter, brought a complaint dated May 22, 2000 for qualified rape against
him.2After due proceedings, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate ultimately filed on August 29,
2000 an information charging him with qualified rape in the RTC, averring:
That on or about May 12, 2000 at more or less 11:00 o’clock in the evening thereof, at Brgy. Magsaysay,
Municipality of Uson, Province of Masbate, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, being then the step-father of AAA, with deliberate intent, with lewd design and by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
with his own step-daughter, AAA, a 13-year-old girl, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The summary of the parties’ evidence is rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in its decision promulgated
June 26, 2007,4 follows:
The prosecution presented in evidence the testimonies of five (5) witnesses, namely: CCC, BBB, Dr. Allen
Ching, AAA and SPO4 Aurora Moran. The trial court summarized their testimonies as follows:
AAA had just graduated from the Emilio S. Boro Elementary School in Cataingan, Masbate, sometime in
March 2000. She was then living with her grandmother, DDD, in Alimango, Cataingan, Masbate. Immediately
after her graduation, her mother, BBB, fetched her and brought her to Magsaysay, Uson, Masbate, where they
lived together along with AAA’s siblings and her mother’s live-in partner, accused Henry Arcillas.
In the evening of May 12, 2000, AAA, then barely thirteen (13) years old, as evidenced by her certificate of live
birth, went to sleep in a room shanty located in Magsaysay, Uson, Masbate, together with her two sisters,
CCC and EEE, her mother and the latter’s live-in partner, accused Henry Arcillas. The shanty consisted of a
single room measuring more or less four (4) square meters. At around 11:00 o’clock in the evening, AAA was
awakened when she felt that somebody was lying on top of her. She found out that accused Henry Arcillas
was on top of her. She noticed that she had no more short pants and panties and that she felt pain in her
vagina. She also noticed that something had been inserted into her vagina and that the accused was making
a push and pull movement on top of her. She then pushed away the accused and awakened her mother
Josie, who was just asleep near her. BBB then stood up and immediately lighted the gas lamp. She saw the
accused beside AAA still naked. AAA told her mother that she was sexually abused by Henry Arcillas. BBB
then grabbed an ax and struck the accused with it but the latter was not hit. Before BBB was awakened, CCC,
who was at the right side of AAA, was awakened first because she heard the latter crying. She then saw
Henry Arcillas already at the post of their hut.
AAA then went out of their shanty and thought of going back to her grandmother in Alimango, Cataingan,
Masbate. BBB prevented her from traveling to Cataingan because it was almost midnight, and told her instead
that they would have to go to the said place together some other time. Meanwhile, BBB drove Henry Arcillas
away. AAA was able to go to her grandmother in Alimango, Cataingan, Masbate only about two weeks after
the incident because her mother would not give her money for her fare. BBB explained that she was suffering
from fever at that time and no one could tend to her.
Thereafter, BBB complained to Jimmy Lorena, the Barangay Kagawad of Magsaysay, Uson, Masbate. Jimmy
Lorena then summoned Henry Arcillas and during the confrontation where AAA was also present, Henry
Arcillas was made to sign a statement and was made to promise that he would not do the same act again.
Despite the confrontation, however, the victim, with the help of her cousin, Evelyn Daligdig, still lodged a
complaint for rape against Henry Arcillas before the Uson Police Station. She was investigated by SPO4
Aurora Moran, who prepared the complaint as well as the victim’s statement ("Deklarasyon").
The victim was physically examined at the Cataingan District Hospital on May 23, 2000 by Dr. Nerissa A.
Deparine, who issued a medical certificate reflecting the following findings:
"External: Incomplete healed laceration at 5, 7 and 9 o’clock position; Internal: Admits 2 fingers without
resistance."
It was Dr. Allen Ching, however, who testified on, and interpreted, the findings of Dr. Nerissa Deparine. Dr.
Ching claimed that he and Dr. Nerissa Deparine knew each other as both were employed in Cataingan,
Masbate, and that he was familiar with the signature of Dr. Nerissa Deparine since the latter usually referred
to him some of her patients.
The defense, on the other hand, presented two witnesses, namely: the accused, Henry Arcilla, and Jimmy
Lorena, a Barangay Kagawad of Magsaysay, Uson, Masbate. The trial court summarized their testimonies as
follows:
Henry Arcillas testified that he was a widower since 1996 although he had a live-in partner, BBB. He admitted
that AAA was his step-daughter. In the afternoon of May 12, 2000, Henry Arcillas had a drinking spree in the
house of the owner of the thresher where he worked. They started drinking hard liquor (Tanduay) at 4:00 in
the afternoon until 6:00, after which he went home very drunk. He then went to sleep together with his live-in
partner, BBB, and the latter’s three daughters, CCC, EEE and AAA. The house where they slept was a one-
room shanty. BBB was on his left side while AAA was on his right. At around 11:00 o’clock in the evening,
Henry Arcillas was awakened when AAA complained to her mother that he held her shorts. At that juncture,
his live-in partner tried to strike him with an ax. Henry claimed that he was able to touch the body of AAA but
he did not know what part of her body he had touched nor which part of his body had touched AAA. He,
however, denied having sexually molested the latter.
During the incident, the complainant’s mother got so mad at Henry Arcillas that she drove him away. After
almost two weeks, AAA went to the place of her grandmother in Alimango, Cataingan, Masbate. AAA and her
relatives then returned to Magsaysay, Uson, Masbate and lodged a complaint before Jimmy Lorena, the
Barangay Kagawad of Magsaysay, Uson, Masbate. During the confrontation, a certain Belen complained that
47
Henry Arcillas committed acts of lasciviousness upon her niece AAA, who was also present. When confronted
about the incident on May 12, 2000, AAA alleged that the accused touched her short pants prompting her to
kick him. Thus, the intention of Henry Arcillas did not materialize.
Jimmy Lorena claimed that he was able to settle the case amicably in his house.1âwphi1 In fact, Henry
Arcillas executed an affidavit promising that he would not commit the same offense anymore. A certain
Francisco Oliva was the one who prepared said affidavit but Jimmy had lost the copy of the same. The
defense claimed that what the complainant AAA alleged in that confrontation was that the accused only
touched her short pants but she was not raped. Finally, the accused Henry Arcillas claimed that the motive of
AAA in filing the case for rape against him was due to the fact that the complainant was against his
relationship with her mother and that she wanted to take her mother from him.
Ruling of the RTC
On March 8, 2004, the RTC convicted Arcillas of qualified rape based on the foregoing evidence and meted
the death penalty on him,5 disposing:
WHEREFORE, being convicted of such heinous crime of Qualified Rape, accused Henry Arcillas is hereby
sentenced to suffer the capital penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the said victim the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND
(PhP50,000.00) PESOS; to pay the latter the sum of FIFTY
THOUSAND (PhP50,000.00) PESOS as for moral damages; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ruling of the CA
In his appeal in the CA, Arcillas assigned to the RTC the following errors, namely:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE MOTIVE BEHIND THE FILING OF
THE INSTANT CASE AGAINST THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH DESPITE THE
DEFECTIVE ALLEGATION OF RELATIONSHIP IN THE INFORMATION.
On June 26, 2007, the CA affirmed the finding of guilt against Arcillas but downgraded the crime to simple
rape on the ground that the information did not allege that he was her mother’s common-law husband, instead
of the victim’s step-father, the qualifying circumstance the information alleged. 6 It decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the March 8, 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate City,
Masbate, Branch 48, is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Simple Rape and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In all other respects, the
assailed Decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
The CA supported its affirmance in this wise:
xxx We agree with the accused-appellant that the trial court erred in convicting him of Qualified Rape and in
imposing the death penalty in view of the defective allegation in the information. Indeed, even the Solicitor
General agrees with the accused-appellant on this point.
It must be noted that the Information alleged that accused-appellant was the step-father of the rape victim.
The evidence shows, however, that he was merely the common-law husband or live-in partner of the latter’s
mother. In order that the accused may be convicted of qualified rape, the circumstances of relationship and
minority must be jointly alleged in the Information and proved during trial. Thus, the accused can only be
convicted of simple rape where the information alleges that the accused is the step-father of the victim but the
evidence shows that he is merely the common-law husband of the natural mother of the victim.
In People vs. Escultor, the Supreme Court held:
Nevertheless, the death penalty is not the correct penalty for the two counts of rape committed by appellant
because the two informations in Criminal Case No. CEB-BRL-478 and CEB-BRL-479 failed to correctly state
appellant’s relationship with Jenelyn. To justify the death penalty, the prosecution must specifically allege in
the information and prove during the trial the qualifying circumstances of the minority of the victim and her
relationship to the offender. The information must jointly allege these qualifying circumstances to afford the
accused his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Sections 8 and 9 of
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly mandate that the qualifying circumstance
should be alleged in the information.
Although the prosecution proved that appellant was the common-law spouse of (AAA’s) mother, what appears
in the informations is that the victim is the stepdaughter of appellant. A stepdaughter is the daughter of one’s
spouse by a previous marriage. For appellant to be the stepfather of (AAA), he must be legally married to
(AAA’s) mother. However, appellant and the victim’s mother were not legally married but merely lived in
common-law relation. The two informations failed to allege specifically that appellant was the common-law
spouse of the victim’s mother. Instead, the two informations erroneously alleged the qualifying circumstance
that appellant was the stepfather of the victim. Hence, appellant is liable only for two counts of simple
statutory rape punishable with reclusion perpetua for each count. (Emphasis Ours)
48
Thus, accused-appellant should have been convicted of simple rape only, punishable by reclusion perpetua.
For this reason, We need not disturb anymore the trial court’s award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. The rule
is that, if the rape was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances that require the imposition of the death
penalty, the civil indemnity shall be P75,000.00. But since accused-appellant should only be convicted of
simple rape, the civil indemnity should only be P50,000.00 as awarded by the lower court. The award of moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 is also in order, being in consonance with prevailing jurisprudence.
In any event, the imposition of the death penalty is no longer allowed in view of the passage of R.A. No. 9346
which prohibits its imposition and instead mandates, in lieu of the capital punishment, the imposition of the
penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Thus, even if the lower court was correct in convicting the
accused-appellant of qualified rape, the penalty should still be reclusion perpetua. 7
Issues
Arcillas thus assails the CA’s decision as contrary to the facts, the law and jurisprudence.
Ruling
The CA correctly affirmed the conviction of Arcillas for simple rape.
The statutory provisions relevant to this review are Article 266-A and Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code,
which provide:
Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
xxxx
Article 266-B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the
parent of the victim. x x x
xxxx
The elements of the offense charged are that: (a) the victim is a female over 12 years but under 18 years of
age; (b) the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within
the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim; and (c) the offender has carnal
knowledge of the victim either through force, threat or intimidation; or when she is deprived of reason or is
otherwise unconscious; or by means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority.
AAA rendered a complete and credible narration of her ordeal at the hands of the accused, whom she
positively identified in court. Her testimony was corroborated on material points by BBB and her own sister as
well as by the medico-legal evidence adduced. With both the RTC and the CA considering AAA as a credible
witness whose testimony should be believed, we accord great weight to their assessment. The trial judge was
placed in the unique position to discern whether she was telling the truth or inventing it after having personally
observed AAA’s conduct and demeanor as a witness.8 The trial judge’s evaluation, affirmed by the CA, is
binding on the Court, and cannot be disturbed, least of all rejected in its entirety, unless Arcillas successfully
showed facts or circumstances of weight that the RTC and the CA might have overlooked, misapprehended,
or misinterpreted that, if duly considered, would materially affect the disposition of the case differently. 9 Alas,
he did not make that showing here.
In his defense, Arcillas denied committing rape against AAA. He insisted that he merely touched her body
during a moment of intoxication. The RTC and the CA rejected the denial and explanation. The Court holds
that both lower courts rightly did so, considering that AAA’s positive declarations of what he had done to her in
order to have carnal knowledge of her against her will were far more credible that his denial and explanation
that were negative evidence by nature. His explanation lacked weight because it was too convenient and too
easy to utter. Worse, the explanation did not stand well in the face of the circumstances that transpired. Of
great significance was that AAA roused her mother who was slumbering close by in order to forthwith
denounce Arcillas. AAA’s spontaneity in doing so entirely belied the explanation. The roused BBB then got up
and quickly lighted a lamp, and in that illumination she saw him naked by the side of the victim. Indignant,
BBB quickly grabbed an axe and struck him with it, but he was lucky to avoid the blow and to grab the ax
away from BBB. Yet, the dispossession of the axe did not deter BBB from angrily banishing him from her
home thereafter. To us, BBB’s indignant reaction was that of a mother vindicating her young child against his
rapacity. Such circumstances reflected the gravity of the crime just perpetrated against her daughter.
49
The CA disagreed with the RTC’s pronouncing Arcillas guilty of qualified rape and imposing the death penalty,
and ruled instead that he was liable only for simple rape because the information failed to allege his being the
common-law husband of the victim’s mother. As to the penalty, the CA punished him with reclusion perpetua.
We concur with the CA on both actions.
Rape is qualified and punished with death when committed by the victim’s parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, or relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or by the common-law spouse of
the victim’s parent.10 However, an accused cannot be found guilty of qualified rape unless the information
alleges the circumstances of the victim’s over 12 years but under 18 years of age and her relationship with
him. The reason is that such circumstances alter the nature of the crime of rape and increase the penalty;
hence, they are special qualifying circumstances.11 As such, both the age of the victim and her relationship
with the offender must be specifically alleged in the information and proven beyond reasonable doubt during
the trial; otherwise, the death penalty cannot be imposed.12
The minority of AAA was sufficiently alleged in the information that stated that she was "a 13-year-old girl."
The Prosecution established that her age when the rape was committed on May 12, 2000 was thirteen years
and two months by presenting her birth certificate revealing her date of birth as March 15, 1987. 13 As to her
relationship with Arcillas, the information averred that he was "then the step-father of AAA." It turned out,
however, that he was not her stepfather, being only the common-law husband of BBB. The RTC itself found
that he and BBB were only "live-in partners." In addition, AAA’s birth certificate disclosed that her father was
CCC, who had been married to BBB,14who was widowed upon the death of CCC in 1996. No evidence was
adduced to establish that BBB and Arcilla legally married after CCC’s death. 15
Arcillas’ being the common-law husband of BBB at the time of the commission of the rape, even if established
during the trial, could not be appreciated because the information did not specifically allege it as a qualifying
circumstance. Otherwise, he would be deprived of his right to be informed of the charge lodged against him. 16
As to the civil liability, both lower courts united in ordering Arcillas to pay to AAA P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
and another P50,000.00 as moral damages. They were correct. Civil indemnity is mandatory upon the finding
of the fact of rape, while moral damages are proper without need of proof other than the fact of rape by virtue
of the undeniable moral suffering of AAA due to the rapes.
In addition, Arcillas was liable for exemplary damages. According to the Civil Code, exemplary damages may
be imposed in criminal cases as part of the civil liability "when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances."17 The law permits such damages to be awarded "by way of example or correction
for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages." 18 Accordingly,
the CA and the RTC should have recognized the entitlement of AAA to exemplary damages on account of the
attendance of her minority and the common-law relationship between him and her mother. It did not matter
that such qualifying circumstances were not taken into consideration in fixing his criminal liability, because the
term aggravating circumstances as basis for awarding exemplary damages under the Civil Code was
understood in its generic sense. As the Court well explained in People v. Catubig: 19
The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to be
understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the
public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings,
each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an
award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony
underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether
ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the
award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It
would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the
aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying
nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal,
rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary
damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
For exemplary damages, therefore, the Court holds that the amount of P25,000.00 is reasonable and proper.
Lastly, the Court deems it appropriate to impose interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the monetary awards
reckoned from the finality of this decision to complete the quest for justice and vindication on the part of AAA.
This is upon the authority of Article 2211 of the Civil Code, which states that in crimes and quasi-delicts
interest as a part of the damages may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the discretion of the court.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on June 26, 2007 in all
respects, subject to the modifications that HENRY ARCILLAS shall pay to AAA the further sum of P25,000.00
as exemplary damages; and that he shall be liable for interest of 6% per annum on the monetary awards
reckoned from the finality of this decision.
Costs of suit to be paid by the accused.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate justice
G.R. No. 196390 September 28, 2011
PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA), Petitioner,
vs.
RICHARD BRODETT AND JORGE JOSEPH, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
50
Objects of lawful commerce confiscated in the course of an enforcement of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002 (Republic Act No. 9165)that are the property of a third person are subject to be returned to
the lawful ownerwho is not liable for the unlawful act. But the trial court may not release such objects pending
trial and before judgment.
Antecedents
On April 13, 2009, the State, through the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City,charged
RichardBrodett (Brodett) and Jorge Joseph (Joseph) with a violation of Section 5, in relation to Section 26(b),
of Republic Act No. 91651 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in MuntinlupaCity,docketed as Criminal Case No.
09-208,the accusatory portion of the information for which reads as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of September 2008, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping and aiding each other, they not being authorized by law, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously sell, trade, deliver and give away to another, sixty (60) pieces of blue-colored
tablets with Motorala (M) logos, contained in six (6) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets with recorded total
net weight of 9.8388 grams, which when subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive results for
presence of METHAMPHETAMINE, a dangerous drug. 2
Also on April 16, 2009, the State, also through the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City, filed
another information charging only Brodett with a violation of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 09-209, with the information alleging:
That on or about the 19th day of September 2008, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control the following:
a. Four (4) yellow tablets with Playboy logos and ten (10) transparent capsules containing white
powdery substance contained in one self-sealing transparent plastic sachet having a net weight of
4.9007 grams, which when subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive results for presence
of METHYLENE DIOXYMETHAMPHETAMINE (MDMA), commonly known as "Ecstasy", a
dangerous drug;
b. Five (5) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing white powdery substance with total
recorded net weight of 1.2235 grams, which when subjected to laboratory examination yielded
positive results for presence of COCCAINE, a dangerous drug;
c. Five (5) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing white powdery substance, placed in a
light-yellow folded paper, with total recorded net weight of 2.7355 grams, which when subjected to
laboratory examination yielded positive results for presence of COCCAINE, a dangerous drug;
d. Three (3) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing dried leaves with total recorded net
weight of 54.5331 grams, which when subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive results
for presence of TETRAHYDROCANNABINOL, a dangerous drug. 3
In the course of the proceedings in the RTC, on July 30, 2009, Brodett filed a MotionToReturn Non-Drug
Evidence. He averred that during his arrest, Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) had seized several
personal non-drug effects from him,including a 2004 Honda Accord car with license plate no. XPF-551;and
that PDEArefused to return his personal effects despite repeated demands for their return. He prayed that his
personal effects be tendered to the trial court to be returned to himupon verification. 4
On August 27, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor submitted its Comment and
Objection,5 proposingthereby that the delivery to the RTC of the listedpersonal effects for safekeeping, to be
held there throughout the duration of the trial, would be to enable the Prosecution and the Defense to exhaust
their possible evidentiary value. The Office of the City Prosecutor objected to the return of the car because it
appeared to be the instrument in the commission of the violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 due to its being
the vehicle used in the transaction of the sale of dangerous drugs.
On November 4, 2009, the RTC directedthe release of the car, viz:
WHEREFORE, the Director of PDEA or any of its authorized officer or custodian is hereby directed to: (1)
photograph the abovementioned Honda Accord, before returning the same to its rightful owner Myra S.
Brodett and the return should be fully documented, and (2) bring the personal properties as listed in this Order
of both accused, Richard S. Brodett and Jorge J. Joseph to this court for safekeeping, to be held as needed.
SO ORDERED.6
PDEA moved to reconsider the order of the RTC, but its motion was denied on February 17, 2010 for lack of
merit, to wit:
WHEREFORE,premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The
Order of the Court dated November 4, 2009 is upheld.
SO ORDERED.7
Thence, PDEA assailed the order of the RTC in the Court of Appeals (CA) by petition for certiorari, claiming
that the orders of the RTC were issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
On March 31, 2011, the CA promulgated its Decision,8 dismissing the petition for certiorari thusly:
xxxx
51
Here it is beyond dispute that the Honda Accord subject of this petition is owned by and registered in the
name of Myra S. Brodett, not accused Richard Brodett. Also, it does not appear from the records of the case
that said Myra S. Brodett has been charged of any crime, more particularly, in the subject cases of possession
and sale of dangerous drugs. Applying Section 20 of the law to the dispute at bar, We therefore see no cogent
reason why the subject Honda Accord may not be exempted from confiscation and forfeiture.
xxxx
We thus cannot sustain petitioner’s submission that the subject car, being an instrument of the offense, may
not be released to Ms. Brodett and should remain in custodia legis. The letters of the law are plain and
unambiguous. Being so, there is no room for a contrary construction, especially so that the only purpose of
judicial construction is to remove doubt and uncertainty, matters that are not obtaining here. More so that the
required literal interpretation is consistent with the Constitutional guarantee that a person may not be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and consequently DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.9
Hence, PDEA appeals.
Issues
Essentially,PDEA asserts that the decision of the CAwas not in accord with applicable laws and the primordial
intent of the framers of R. A. No. 9165.10 It contends that the CA gravely erred in its ruling; that the Honda
Accord car, registered under the name of Myra S. Brodett (Ms.Brodett), had been seized from accused
Brodettduring a legitimate anti-illegal operation and should not be released from the custody of the law;that
the Motion to Return Non-Drug Evidencedid not intimate or allege that the car had belonged to a third person;
and that even if the car had belonged to Ms. Brodett, a third person, her ownership did not ipso facto
authorize its release, because she was under the obligation to prove to the RTC that she had no knowledge of
the commission of the crime.
In hisComment,11 Brodettcounters that the petitioner failed to present any question of law that warranted a
review by the Court;that Section 20 of R. A. No. 9165 clearly and unequivocally states that confiscation and
forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the supposed unlawful act in favor of the Government may be
done by PDEA, unless such proceeds or instruments are the property of a third person not liable for the
unlawful act; that PDEA is gravely mistaken in its reading that the third person must still prove in the trial court
that he has no knowledge of the commission of the crime; and that PDEA failed to exhaust all remedies before
filing the petition for review.
The decisive issue is whether or not the CA erred in affirming the orderfor the release of the car to Ms.Brodett.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
I
Applicable laws and jurisprudence on releasing
property confiscated in criminal proceedings
It is not open to question thatin a criminal proceeding, the court having jurisdiction over the offense has the
power to order upon conviction of an accusedthe seizure of (a) the instruments to commit the crime, including
documents, papers, and other effects that are the necessary means to commit the crime; and (b) contraband,
the ownership or possession of which is not permitted for being illegal. As justification for the first, the accused
must not profit from his crime, or must not acquire property or the right to possession of property through his
unlawful act.12 As justification for thesecond, to return to the convict from whom thecontraband was taken, in
one way or another,is not prudent or proper, because doing so will give rise to a violation of the law for
possessing the contraband again.13 Indeed, the court having jurisdiction over the offense has theright to
dispose of property used in the commission of the crime, such disposition being an accessory penalty to be
imposed on the accused, unless the property belongs to a third person not liable for the offense that it was
used as the instrument to commit.14
In case of forfeiture of property for crime, title and ownership of the convict are absolutely divested and shall
pass to the Government.15 But it is required that the property to be forfeited must be before the court in such
manner that it can be said to be within its jurisdiction. 16
According to the Rules of Court, personal property may be seized in connection with a criminal offense either
by authority of a search warrant or as the product of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. If the search is by
virtue of a search warrant, the personal property that may be seized may be that which is the subject of the
offense; or that which has been stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; orthat which
has been used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. 17 If the search is an incident of
a lawful arrest, seizure may be made of dangerous weapons or anything that may have been used or may
constitute proof in the commission of an offense.18 Should there be no ensuing criminal prosecution in which
the personal property seized is used as evidence, its return to the person from whom it was taken, or to the
person who is entitled to its possession is but a matter of course, 19 except if it is contraband or illegal per se. A
proper court may order the return of property held solely as evidence should the Government be
unreasonably delayed in bringing a criminal prosecution.20 The order for the disposition of such property can
be made only when the case is finally terminated. 21
Generally, the trial court is vested with considerable legal discretion in the matter of disposing of property
claimed as evidence,22 and this discretion extends even to the manner of proceeding in the event the accused
claims the property was wrongfully taken from him.23 In particular, the trial court has the power to return
property held as evidence to its rightful owners, whether the property was legally or illegally seized by the
Government.24 Property used as evidence must be returned once the criminal proceedings to which it relates
have terminated, unless it is then subject to forfeiture or other proceedings. 25
II
52
 Order of release was premature and made
in contravention of Section 20, R.A. No. 9165
It is undisputed that the ownership of the confiscated car belonged to Ms. Brodett, who was not charged either
in connection with the illegal possession and sale of illegal drugs involving Brodett and Joseph that were the
subject of the criminal proceedings in the RTC, or even in any other criminal proceedings.
In its decision under review, the CA held as follows:
A careful reading of the above provision shows that confiscation and forfeiture in drug-related cases pertains
to "all the proceeds and properties derived from the unlawful act, including but not limited to, money and other
assets obtained thereby, and the instruments or tools with which the particular unlawful act was committed
unless they are the property of a third person not liable for the unlawful act." Simply put, the law exempts from
the effects of confiscation and forfeiture any property that is owned by a third person who is not liable for the
unlawful act.
Here, it is beyond dispute that the Honda Accord subject of this petition is owned by and registered in the
name of Myra S. Brodett, not accused Richard Brodett. Also, it does not appear from the records of the case
that said Myra S. Brodett has been charged of any crime, more particularly, in the subject cases of possession
and sale of dangerous drugs. Applying Section 20 of the law to the dispute at bar, We therefore see no cogent
reason why the subject Honda Accord may not be exempted from confiscation and forfeiture.
Basic is the rule in statutory construction that when the law is clear and unambiguous, the court has no
alternative but to apply the same according to its clear language. The Supreme Court had steadfastly adhered
to the doctrine that the first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law according to its express terms,
interpretation being called only when such literal application is impossible. No process of interpretation or
construction need be resorted to where a provision of law peremptorily calls for application.
We thus cannot sustain petitioner’s submission that the subject car, being an instrument of the offense, may
not be released to Ms. Brodett and should remain in custodia legis. The letters of the law are plain and
unambiguous. Being so, there is no room for a contrary construction, especially so that the only purpose of
judicial construction is to remove doubt and uncertainty, matters that are not obtaining here. More so that the
required literal interpretation is not consistent with the Constitutional guarantee that a person may not be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. 26 (emphases are in the original text)
The legal provision applicable to the confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the unlawful
act, including the properties or proceeds derived from illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs and precursors
and essential chemicals,is Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, which pertinently providesas follows:
Section 20.Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Unlawful Act, Including the
Properties or Proceeds Derived from the Illegal Trafficking of Dangerous Drugs and/or Precursors and
Essential Chemicals. – Every penalty imposed for the unlawful importation, sale, trading, administration,
dispensation, delivery, distribution, transportation or manufacture of any dangerous drug and/or controlled
precursor and essential chemical, the cultivation or culture of plants which are sources of dangerous drugs,
and the possession of any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs
including other laboratory equipment, shall carry with it the confiscation and forfeiture, in favor of the
government, of all the proceeds derived from unlawful act, including, but not limited to, money and other
assets obtained thereby, and the instruments or tools with which the particular unlawful act was committed,
unless they are the property of a third person not liable for the unlawful act, but those which are not of lawful
commerce shall be ordered destroyed without delay pursuant to the provisions of Section 21 of this Act.
After conviction in the Regional Trial Court in the appropriate criminal case filed, the Court shall immediately
schedule a hearing for the confiscation and forfeiture of all the proceeds of the offense and all the assets and
properties of the accused either owned or held by him or in the name of some other persons if the same shall
be found to be manifestly out of proportion to his/her lawful income: Provided, however, That if the forfeited
property is a vehicle, the same shall be auctioned off not later than five (5) days upon order of confiscation or
forfeiture.
During the pendency of the case in the Regional Trial Court, no property, or income derived therefrom, which
may be confiscated and forfeited, shall be disposed, alienated or transferred and the same shall be in
custodialegis and no bond shall be admitted for the release of the same.
The proceeds of any sale or disposition of any property confiscated or forfeited under this Section shall be
used to pay all proper expenses incurred in the proceedings for the confiscation, forfeiture, custody and
maintenance of the property pending disposition, as well as expenses for publication and court costs. The
proceeds in excess of the above expenses shall accrue to the Board to be used in its campaign against illegal
drugs.27
There is no question, for even PDEA has itself pointed out, that the text of Section 20 of R. A. No.
9165relevant to the confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the unlawful act is similar to
that ofArticle 45 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:
Article 45.Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of theCrime. – Every penalty imposed
for the commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments
or tools with which it was committed.
Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government, unless
they be the property of a third person not liable for the offense, but those articles which are not subject of
lawful commerce shall be destroyed.
The Court has interpreted and applied Article 45of the Revised Penal Codein People v. Jose, 28 concerning the
confiscation and forfeiture of the car used by the four accused when they committed theforcible abduction with
rape, although the car did not belong to any of them, holding:
xxx Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code bars the confiscation and forfeiture of an instrument or tool used in
the commission of the crime if such "be the property of a third person not liable for the offense," it is the sense
of this Court that the order of the court below for the confiscation of the car in question should be set aside
53
and that the said car should be ordered delivered to the intervenor for foreclosure as decreed in the judgment
of the Court of First Instance of Manila in replevin case. xxx29
Such interpretation is extended by analogy to Section 20, supra. To bar the forfeiture of the tools and
instruments belonging to a third person,therefore, there must be an indictment charging such third person
either as a principal, accessory, or accomplice. Less than that will not suffice to prevent the return of the tools
and instruments to the third person, for a mere suspicion of that person’s participation is not sufficient ground
for the court to order the forfeiture of the goods seized.30
However, the Office of the City Prosecutorproposed throughits Comment and Objection submitted on August
27, 2009 in the RTC31 that the delivery to the RTC of the listed personal effects for safekeeping, to be held
there throughout the duration of the trial, would be to enable the Prosecution and the Defenseto exhaust their
possible evidentiary value. The Office of the City Prosecutor further objected to the return of the car because it
appeared to bethe vehicle used in the transaction of the sale of dangerous drugs, and, as such, was the
instrument in the commission of the violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165.
On its part, PDEA regards the decision of the CA to be not in accord with applicable laws and the primordial
intent of the framers of R. A. No. 9165, 32 and contends that the car should not be released from the custody of
the law because it had been seized from accused Brodett during a legitimate anti-illegal operation. It argues
that the Motion to Return Non-Drug Evidencedid not intimate or allege that the car had belonged to a third
person; and that even if the car had belonged to Ms. Brodett, a third person, her ownership did not ipso facto
authorize its release, because she was under the obligation to prove to the RTC that she had no knowledge of
the commission of the crime. It insists that the car is a property in custodialegis and may not be released
during the pendency of the trial.
We agree with PDEA and the Office of the City Prosecutor.
We note that the RTC granted accusedBrodett’sMotion To Return Non-Drug Evidence on November 4, 2009
when the criminal proceedings were still going on, and the trial was yet to be completed. Ordering the release
of the car at that pointof the proceedings was premature, considering that the third paragraph of Section 20,
supra, expressly forbids the disposition, alienation, or transfer of any property, or income derived therefrom,
that has been confiscated from the accused charged under R.A. No. 9165 during the pendency of the
proceedings in the Regional Trial Court.Section 20 further expressly requires that such property or income
derived therefrom should remain in custodialegis in all that time and that no bond shall be admitted for the
release of it.
Indeed, forfeiture, if warrantedpursuant to either Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 20 of R.A.
No. 9165, would be a part of the penalty to be prescribed. The determination of whetheror not the car (or any
other article confiscated in relation to the unlawful act) would be subject of forfeiture could be made only when
the judgment was to be rendered in the proceedings. Section 20 is also clear as to this.
The status of the car (or any other article confiscated in relation to the unlawful act) for the duration of the trial
in the RTCas being in custodialegisisprimarily intended to preserve it as evidence and to ensure its availability
as such. To release it before the judgment is rendered is to deprive the trial court and the parties access to it
as evidence. Consequently, that photographs were ordered to be taken of the car was not enough, for mere
photographs might not fill in fully the evidentiary need of the Prosecution. As such, the RTC’s assailed orders
were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for being in
contravention with the express language of Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165.
Nonetheless, the Court need not annul the assailed orders of the RTC, or reverse the decision of the CA. It
appears thaton August 26, 2011 the RTC promulgated its decision on the merits in Criminal Case No. 09-208
and Criminal Case No. 09-209, acquitting both Brodettand Joseph and further ordering the return to the
accused of all non-drug evidence except the buy-bust money and the genuine money,because:
The failure of the prosecution therefore to establish all the links in the chain of custody is fatal to the case at
bar. The Court cannot merely rely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official function in
view of the glaring blunder in the handling of the corpus delicti of these cases. The presumption of regularity
should bow down to the presumption of innocence of the accused. Hence, the two (2) accused BRODETT
and JOSEPH should be as it is hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes herein charged for Illegal Selling and Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, RICHARD BRODETT y SANTOS and JORGE JOSEPH y JORDANA are ACQUITTED of
the crimes charged in Criminal Case Nos. 09-208 and 09-209.
The subject drug evidence are all ordered transmitted to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for
proper disposition. All the non-drug evidence except the buy bust money and the genuine money are ordered
returned to the accused.
The genuine money used in the buy bust operation as well as the genuine money confiscated from both
accused are ordered escheated in favor of the government and accordingly transmitted to the National
Treasury for proper disposition. (emphasis supplied)33
The directive to return the non-drug evidence hasovertaken the petition for review as to render further action
upon it superfluous. Yet, the Court seizes the opportunity to perform its duty to formulate guidelines on the
matter of confiscation and forfeiture of non-drug articles, including those belonging to third persons not liable
for the offense, in order to clarify the extent of the power of the trial court under Section 20 of R.A. No.
9165.34 This the Court must now do in view of the question about the confiscation and forfeiture of non-drug
objects being susceptible of repetition in the future.35 1âwphi1
We rule that henceforth the Regional Trial Courts shall comply strictly with the provisions of Section 20 of R.A.
No. 9165, and should not release articles, whether drugs or non-drugs, for the duration of the trial and before
the rendition of the judgment, even if owned by a third person who is not liable for the unlawful act.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for review isDENIED.
54
The Office of the Court Administrator is directed to disseminate this decision to all trial courts for their
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 154083 February 27, 2013
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner,
vs.
SAMSON DE LEON, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A public official is guilty of grave misconduct when he neglects to act upon a complaint about a violation of the
law he is enforcing. He may be suspended or dismissed from office for his first offense.
The Office of the Ombudsman seeks the review and reversal of the decision promulgated on January 30,
2002, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reduced to suspension for three months without pay for simple
neglect of duty the penalty of suspension for one yt:!ar without pay the Office of the Ombudsman had imposed
on respondent Samson De Leon (De Leon) upon finding him guilty of neglect of duty. 1
Antecedents
Acting on a report of illegal quarrying being committed in the Municipality of Baras, Rizal, Graft Investigation
Officer Dante D. Tomilla of the Fact Finding Investigation Bureau (FFIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman
conducted an investigation pursuant to a mission order dated April 17, 1998.
On June 8, 1998, Tornilla filed his report to Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, through Assistant Ombudsman
Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr. and Director Agapito B. Rosales,2 confirming the illegal quarrying, to wit:
From the Municipal Hall, we proceeded to the quarrying area. Along our way, we have noticed a dump truck
loaded with quarrying materials coming from the quarrying site. At this juncture, we signaled the truck driver to
stop and then checked the driver’s license, the truck registration while my other companions took pictures of
the truck.
Verification of the above hauler truck with Plate No. TKU-121 (Isuzu) is owned and operated by Mayor Lito
Tanjuatco of Tanay, Rizal. The truck driver, a certain Alfredo Casamayor Payot informed this Investigator that
he is paying One hundred (P100.00) Pesos per truckload of quarrying materials to the quarry operator, a
certain Mr. Javier.
xxxx
Jonathan Llagas, Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator denied knowing Mr. Javier nor any
quarrying activities going on in Baras, Rizal. When we informed him of our findings, he insisted that the
quarrying operations is within the jurisdictional area of Tanay, Rizal. To cut short our discussion, we requested
him to look and see the quarrying operations to determine the territorial boundaries, whether it is a part of
Baras or Tanay and to submit his findings and action taken on our request. However, up to this writing,
Jonathan Llagas failed to comply.
Per report received by the Office of the Assistant Ombudsman, EIO, stated that the quarrying activities in
Baras, Rizal is still going on the following day, Saturday, April 18, 1998, after our visit on Friday, April 17, 1998,
(p. 21, Records). With this information, this investigator proceeded back to the Baras, Rizal and conducted
ocular inspection on May 8, 1998, before proceeding to the Laguna Lake Development Authority in Calauan,
Laguna, in compliance with a Mission Order.
True enough, we were able to see for ourselves the continuing quarry operations and the quarried stones, soil
and materials were dumped to a portion of the Laguna de Bay thereby reclaiming said portion allegedly to be
developed as Resort and restaurant establishments.3
Tornilla recommended that a preliminary investigation be conducted against Baras Municipal Mayor Roberto
Ferrera, Baras Municipal Planning and Coordinator Jonathan Llagas, and property owner Venancio Javier for
the probable violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act); and that
administrative proceedings for violations of the Civil Service Rules be also undertaken.
In his report and recommendation dated July 13, 1998, 4 DILG Resident Ombudsman Rudiger G. Falcis II
sought the inclusion in the investigation of De Leon as the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Officer (PENRO) and as concurrently the Chairman of the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) of
Rizal.
After the preliminary investigation, Graft Investigation Officer II Edgardo V. Geraldez of the FFIB, Office of the
Ombudsman, issued a decision dated April 29, 1999, 5 dismissing the complaint against all the respondents for
lack of substantial evidence. However, Assistant Ombudsman Aportadera, Jr. recommended the disapproval
of the said decision. Ombudsman Desierto approved the recommendation of Assistant Ombudsman
Aportadera, Jr.
The case was then referred to Atty. Sabino M. Cruz, Resident Ombudsman for the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), who ultimately submitted a memorandum on October 20, 1999 6,
duly approved by the Ombudsman, finding De Leon liable for gross neglect of duty, as follows:
55
WHEREFORE , it is respectfully recommended that:
xxxx
3) Respondent SAMSON G. DE LEON, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer, be penalized
with one (1) year suspension without pay, for Gross Neglect of Duty. 7
xxxx
On December 2, 1999, De Leon moved for Reconsideration,8 praying that the memorandum dated October
20, 1999 be set aside.
On January 31, 2000, the Ombudsman denied De Leon’s motion for reconsideration. 9
On November 17, 1999, the DENR directed the Regional Executive Director of Region IV to effect De Leon’s
suspension. 10
Ruling of the CA
Aggrieved, De Leon appealed to the CA via a petition for review,11 seeking the reversal of the memorandum
dated October 20, 1999 and the order dated January 31, 2000 of the Ombudsman. He averred as grounds of
his appeal the following, namely:
I. PUBLIC RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, IN DISREGARDING THE
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS EMBODIED IN THE DECISION DATED 29 APRIL 1999.
II. PUBLIC RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, IN FINDING THE
PETITIONER LIABLE FOR GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY.
III. PUBLIC RESPONDENTS ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION,
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, IN EFFECTING THE IMMEDIATE EXECUTION OF
THE PENALTY OF SUSPENSION FOR A PERIOD OF ONE YEAR, ON THE PETITIONER. 12
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the Office of the Ombudsman, submitted its comment
on July 14, 2000,13 praying that De Leon’s petition for review be dismissed for its lack of merit.
On January 30, 2002, the CA promulgated its assailed decision, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Memorandum dated October 20, 1999 issued by the Office of the
Ombudsman in OMB-ADM-0-98-0414 is hereby MODIFIED in that petitioner SAMSON DE LEON is hereby
penalized with THREE (3) MONTHS SUSPENSION without pay for SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY.
Furthermore, it appearing that he has already served such penalty, petitioner is hereby
ordered REINSTATED to his former position.
SO ORDERED.14
The Office of the Ombudsman sought reconsideration, 15 but the CA denied its motion on June 21, 2002.
Issues
Dissatisfied, the Office of the Ombudsman appeals, contending that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD
WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT CONSIDERING
THAT:
I.
IT DECREED PRIVATE RESPONDENT LIABLE FOR SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY
NOTWITHSTANDING THE UNDENIABLE FACT THAT HE FAILED TO PERFORM A TASK WHICH
IS CLEARLY REPOSED ON HIM ON A REGULAR BASIS AND WHICH BREACH OF DUTY
APPEARS FLAGRANT AND PALPABLE.
II.
IT SUBSTITUTED ITS FINDING TO THAT OF THE OMBUDSMAN WHEN NO COGENT REASON
EXISTS THEREFOR.
III.
IT HELD THAT THE DECISION OF THE OMBUDSMAN IS NOT IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY. 16
The pivotal issue is whether or not the CA committed reversible error in modifying the findings and reducing
the penalty imposed by the Office of the Ombudsman.
Ruling
The petition for review on certiorari is meritorious.
56
In its assailed decision, the CA justified its modification of the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in the
following manner, to wit:
In the case at bench, petitioner, although guilty of neglect in the performance of his official duties, may only be
held liable for Simple Neglect of Duty. Petitioner’s offense is not of such nature to be considered brazen,
flagrant and palpable as would amount to a Gross Neglect of Duty. As pointed out by petitioner, as early as
May 1997, upon the complaint of one Teresita G. Fabian, he ordered the inspection of the subject property
located in Baras, Rizal. Relying on the report of Forrester Ferrer and Engineer Aide Velasquez, petitioner
indorsed to the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board the former’s findings that there were "extraction" in the
area. The same findings were likewise forwarded to the Regional Executive Director of the DENR. A
reinvestigation of the area was again conducted in July 1997 upon petitioner’s instruction with the findings that
there were no illegal quarrying activities being undertaken in the premises although a payloader and a back
hoe can be seen in the area. Nonetheless, petitioner should not have merely relied on the reports and instead
confirmed such findings by personally proceeding to the premises and verifying the findings, specially since
the report cited the presence of large machineries, and that there was visible extraction in the area. While the
Court is not inclined to conclude that there were indeed illegal quarrying activities in the area, nevertheless,
prudence dictates that petitioner should have brought it upon himself to confirm the findings of the
investigation. Moreover, in this day and age where environmental concerns are not to be trifled with, it
devolves upon petitioner, as the Provincial Environment and Natural Resource Officer, to oversee the
protection and preservation of the environment within his province. The Court cannot accept petitioner’s
passing the buck, so to speak, to the Regional Director of the DENR for to do so would be tolerating
bureaucracy and inefficiency in government service.
Be that as it may, as the Court previously stated, petitioner’s negligence does not amount to a gross neglect of
duty. Given that his neglect is not that odious, petitioner should only be liable for Simple Neglect of Duty and
should accordingly be meted out the penalty of three (3) months suspension without pay. 17
We disagree with the CA that De Leon was liable only for simple misconduct. An examination of the records
persuasively shows that the Office of the Ombudsman correctly held De Leon guilty of gross neglect of duty, a
grave offense punishable by dismissal even for the first offense.18
A PENRO, who is appointed by the Secretary of the DENR, has the responsibility to implement DENR
policies, programs and projects in the province of his assignment. De Leon was appointed as the PENRO of
Rizal and concurrently the Chairman of the PMRB of Rizal. As such, his duties and responsibilities included
the following:
1. Plans, organizes, directs and coordinates the overall office and field activities and operation of the
province concerning environmental and natural resources programs/projects;
2. Supervises and enforces discipline to personnel pertaining to norm and conduct in the effective
performance of tasks pursuant to manual operation guidelines and establish[ed] practices;
3. Makes final review and correction of administrative and technical report submitted by
subordinates;
4. Coordinates with local government units, national office officials and other concern (sic) parties
related to the conduct and operation of the office;
5. Execute[s] and implement[s] policy, rules and regulations work programs and plans laid down by
the Regional Office;
6. Approves routine and non-policy determining papers and renders administrative and technical
decision(s) within the limit(s) of delegated authorities;
7. Occasionally conduct[s] field inspection to obtain on the spot information about the needs and
problems of the provincial office; and
8. Perform[s] such other duties as maybe (sic) assigned. 19
Based on the Civil Service Position Description Form,20 De Leon as the PENRO of Rizal was the highest
executive officer of the DENR at the provincial level. He had the authority to coordinate all the DENR agencies
within his jurisdiction, including the PMRB. In his concurrent positions as the PENRO and Chairman of the
PMRB, therefore, his paramount function was to ensure that the laws enforced by the DENR as well as the
rules and regulations promulgated by the DENR in implementation of such laws were complied with and
effectively implemented and enforced. Verily, he was the primary implementor and enforcer within his area of
responsibility of all the laws and administrative orders concerning the environment, and because of such
character of his concurrent offices should have made sure that he efficiently and effectively discharged his
functions and responsibilities.
In the matter that is now before us, De Leon evidently neglected to efficiently and effectively discharge his
functions and responsibilities. Except for issuing the investigation order and for denying having granted any
permit to quarry, he did nothing affirmative to put a stop to the illegal quarrying complained of, or to do any
other action that was entirely within his power to do as the PENRO that the complaint demanded to be done.
Relevantly, the CA itself also observed in its decision under review that De Leon had not done enough as the
circumstances obtaining in the case properly called for, to wit:
x x x Nonetheless, petitioner should not have merely relied on the reports and instead confirmed such findings
by personally proceeding to the premises and verifying the findings, specially since the report cited the
presence of large machineries, and that there was visible extraction in the area. While the court is not inclined
to conclude that there were indeed illegal quarrying activities in the area, nevertheless, prudence dictates that
petitioner should have brought it upon himself to confirm the findings of the investigation. Moreover, in this day
and age where environmental concerns are not to be trifled with, it devolves upon petitioner, as the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resource Officer to oversee the protection and preservation of the environment with
his province. The Court cannot accept petitioner’s passing the buck so to speak. x x x. 21
Its foregoing observations notwithstanding, the CA still held De Leon guilty only of simple neglect of duty.
57
The CA thereby erred.
Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence "refers to negligence characterized by the want of even slight care,
or by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and
intentionally, with a conscious indifference to the consequences, insofar as other persons may be affected. It
is the omission of that care that even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to give to their own
property."22 It denotes a flagrant and culpable refusal or unwillingness of a person to perform a duty. 23 In cases
involving public officials, gross negligence occurs when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable. 24
In contrast, simple neglect of duty means the failure of an employee or official to give proper attention to a
task expected of him or her, signifying a "disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference." 25
Conformably with these concepts, De Leon, given his rank and level of responsibility, was guilty of gross
neglect in not performing the act expected of him as the PENRO under the circumstances obtaining. He was
precisely assigned to perform tasks that imposed on him the obligation to do everything reasonably
necessarily and permissible under the law in order to achieve the objectives of environmental protection. He
could not feign ignorance of the Government’s current efforts to control or prevent environmental deterioration
from all hazards, including uncontrolled mining and unregulated illegal quarrying, but he chose to be passive
despite clear indications of the illegal quarrying activities that had been first brought to his official attention as
early as in 1997 by Teresita Fabian of the Provincial Tourism Office of Rizal. The most that he did on the
complaint was to dispatch two of his subordinates to verify the report of quarrying. After the subordinates
returned with the information that there were no quarrying activities at the site, he was apparently content with
their report. He was not even spurred into further action by the subordinates’ simultaneous report on having
observed at the site the presence of earthmoving equipment (specifically, a backhoe and a payloader). Had
he been conscientious, the presence of the earthmoving equipment would have quickly alerted him to the high
probability of their being used in quarrying activities at the site. We presume that he was not too obtuse to
sense such high probability. The seriousness of the matter should have prodded him to take further actions,
including personally inspecting the site himself either to confirm the findings of the subordinates or to satisfy
himself that the earthmoving equipment was not being used for quarrying. By merely denying having granted
any permit or unwarranted benefit to any quarry operator, he seemingly considered the report of his
subordinates satisfactory.
Curiously, De Leon contended that the responsibility to monitor any reported mining and quarrying activities
belonged to the Regional Director of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau. His contention was insincere, if not
also ridiculous, however, considering that he was then the concurrent Chairman of the Provincial Mining
Regulatory Board, the office directly tasked with the implementation of all environmental laws, rules and
regulations.
The flagrant and culpable refusal or unwillingness of De Leon to perform his official duties denoted gross
neglect of duty also because the illegal quarrying had been going for a period of time. The actions he took
were inadequate, and could even be probably seen as a conscious way to mask a deliberate and intentional
refusal to perform the duties that his position required. He had no justification for accepting the reports of his
subordinates at face value despite indications to the contrary. Making it worse for him was that the place
where the quarrying was then taking place was a mere stone’s throw away from the main road, being only
about 400 meters away from the main road.
In this connection, the Court observes that gross neglect of duty includes want of even slight care. De Leon’s
omission and indifference were definitely more than want of slight care, but were tantamount to a wilful intent
to violate the law or to disregard the established rules, which only strengthened and confirmed his guilt of
gross negligence.
The remaining question is whether or not the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman was immediately
executory. The question crops up from the insistence by De Leon that his penalty of suspension for one year
was not immediately executory.
The CA held that the one-year suspension meted on De Leon was not immediately executory, viz:
x x x. Book 5, Title 1, Chapter 6 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cited by the OSG is not applicable as said
rule governs administrative cases decided by the Civil Service Commission. In this case, petitioner was
adjudged liable by the Office of the Ombudsman, hence RA 6670 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 shall
govern. In this regard, Section 27 of RA 6670 provides that ‘(A)ny order, directive, or decision, imposing the
penalty of public censure or reprimand, a suspension of not more than a month’s salary shall be final and
unappealable." Logically, therefore, suspension of more than one (1) month is not deemed final and
executory. (Underscoring in the original)
There is no issue about the disciplinary authority of the Office of the Ombudsman over all elective and
appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members
of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. The
only officials not under its disciplinary authority are those who may be removed only by impeachment, the
Members of Congress, and the Justices and Judges of the Judiciary. As to this, Republic Act No. 6770 (The
Ombudsman Act of 1989) clearly provides, viz:
Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by
impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
De Leon was subject to the disciplinary authority of the Office of the Ombudsman because he was an
appointive public official.26 Indeed, the power of the Office of the Ombudsman to investigate extends to all
kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been committed during his tenure of office
by any officer or employee of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations. 27 The Office of the Ombudsman also has the power to
act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions that (1) are contrary to law or regulation; (2)
are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory; (3) are inconsistent with the general course of an
agency’s functions, though in accordance with law; (4) proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary
ascertainment of facts; (5) are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or (6) are
otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification. 28 At the same time, the Office of the Ombudsman, in the
exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority, can impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion,
58
fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault. The exercise of all such
powers is well founded on the Constitution and on Republic Act No. 6770.
In Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing, and related cases,29 the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Puno,
has definitively recognized the full administrative disciplinary authority of the Office of the Ombudsman,
declaring that its authority does not end with a recommendation to punish, but goes farther as to directly
impose the appropriate sanctions on the erring public officials and employees, like removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or criminal prosecution; and characterizing such imposition of sanctions to be not
merely advisory or recommendatory but actually mandatory, to wit:
In fine, the manifest intent of the lawmakers was to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative
disciplinary authority in accord with the constitutional deliberations. Unlike the Ombudsman-like agencies of
the past the powers of which extend to no more than making findings of fact and recommendations, and the
Ombudsman or Tanodbayan under the 1973 Constitution who may file and prosecute criminal, civil or
administrative cases against public officials and employees only in cases of failure of justice, the Ombudsman
under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 is intended to play a more active role in the enforcement of
laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and other offenses committed by public officers and employees. The
Ombudsman is to be an "activist watchman," not merely a passive one. He is vested with broad powers to
enable him to implement his own actions.30
To resolve whether or not the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman was immediately executory, we hereby
hold that the decision is immediately executory, and that an appeal does not stop the decision from being
executory. This was clearly pronounced by the Court in Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals,31 to wit:
The Court of Appeals held that the order of the Ombudsman imposing the penalty of dismissal is not
immediately executory. The Court of Appeals applied the ruling in Lapid v. Court of Appeals, that all other
decisions of the Ombudsman which impose penalties that are not enumerated in Section 27 of RA 6770 are
neither final nor immediately executory.
In Lapid v. Court of Appeals, the Court anchored its ruling mainly on Section 27 of RA 6770 , as supported by
Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. The pertinent provisions read:
Section 27 of RA 6770
SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. – (1) All provisionary orders at the Office of the Ombudsman are
immediately effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed
within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on any of the following grounds:
(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or decision;
(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the movant. The
motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days from filing: Provided, That only one
motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any
order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not
more than one month’s salary shall be final and unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10)
days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for
reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the interest of
justice may require. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (AO 07):
Sec. 7. Finality of decision. – Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction
where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month,
or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final and unappealable. In all other
cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the
respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari, shall have been filed by him
as prescribed in Section 27 of RA 6770. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court held in Lapid v. Court of Appeals that the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
"mandate that decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman where the penalty imposed is other than public
censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month salary are still appealable and hence, not final
and executory."
Subsequently, on 17 August 2000, the Ombudsman issued Administrative Order No. 14-A (AO 14-A),
amending Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. The amendment
aims to provide uniformity with other disciplining authorities in the execution or implementation of judgments
and penalties in administrative disciplinary cases involving public officials and employees. Section 7, Rule III
of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by AO 14-A, reads:
Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. – Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case
of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one
month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final and unappealable. In all other
cases, the decision may be appealed within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the decision or
order denying the motion for reconsideration.
59
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory.1âwphi1 In case the penalty is suspension or SO ORDERED.
removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive
suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
suspension or removal.(Emphasis supplied) Associate Justice

On 15 September 2003, AO 17 was issued, amending Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the G.R. No. 162489 June 17, 2015
Ombudsman. Thus, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman was further
amended and now reads:
BERNARDO U. MESINA, Petitioner,
vs.
Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. – Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one
month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all
other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review under the DECISION
requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt
of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration. BERSAMIN, J.:

An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or Under review is the decision promulgated on July 24, 2003, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with
removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under modification the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 120, in Caloocan City
preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive convicting the petitioner of malversation as defined and penalized under Article 217, paragraph 4 of the
by reason of the suspension or removal. Revised Penal Code.2

A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of
course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced and properly
implemented. The refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Office of
the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure shall be ground for disciplinary action against
said officer. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, in the case of In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong,
Secretary of DPWH, the Court noted that Section 7 of AO 17 provides for execution of the decisions
pending appeal, which provision is similar to Section 47 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service.
More recently, in the 2007 case of Buencamino v. Court of Appeals, the primary issue was whether the
decision of the Ombudsman suspending petitioner therein from office for six months without pay was
immediately executory even pending appeal in the Court of Appeals. The Court held that the pertinent ruling
in Lapid v. Court of Appeals has already been superseded by the case of In the Matter to Declare in Contempt
of Court Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH, which clearly held that decisions of the
Ombudsman are immediately executory even pending appea1." 32 (Emphasis supplied)
Antecedents
On July 9, 1998, an information was filed in the RTC charging the petitioner with qualified theft. Upon his
motion, he was granted a reinvestigation. On September 17, 1998, after the reinvestigation, an amended
information was filed charging him instead with malversation of public funds, the amended information alleging
thusly:
That on or about the 6th day of July 1998, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said above-named accused, being then an employee of [the] City Treasurer's Office,
Caloocan City, and acting as Cashier of said office, and as such was accountable for the public funds
collected and received by him (sic) reason of his position, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and embezzled and convert to his 0~11personal use and benefit said
funds in the sum of P167,876.90, to the damage and prejudice of the City Government of Caloocan in the
aforementioned amount of P167,876.90.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on January 30, 2002;
HOLDS respondent SAMSON DE LEON guilty of GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY, and IMPOSES on him the
penalty of SUSPENSION FROM OFFICE FOR ONE YEAR WITHOUT PAY; and DIRECTS him to pay the
costs of suit.
The CA adopted the RTC's summary of the facts, as follows:
x x x that in the afternoon of July 6, 1998 between 1 :00 and 2:00 o'clock, herein accused Bernardo Mesina
then Local Treasurer Officer I of the Local Government of Caloocan City went to the so called Mini City Hall
located at Carnarin Road, District I, Caloocan City for purposes of collection. While thereat, Ms. Rosalinda
60
Baclit, Officer-In-Charge of collection at said onice, turned over/remitted to Mesina the weeks' collection for
the period covering the month of June 1998 representing, among others, the Market Fees' collection,
Miscellaneous fees, real property taxes, Community Tax Receipts (cedula) and the 'Patubig' (local water
system) collection all amounting to P468,394.46 (Exhs. 'K' and 'K-2', 'L' - 'L-2', 'M', 'M-2', 'N' - 'N-2', 'O' - '0-2',
'P' - 'P-2', 'Q' - 'Q-2', 'R', 'R-2', 'S' -· 'S-2', 'T' - 'T0-2', 'U' - 'U-2', 'V' - 'V-2', 'W', 'W-2', 'X' -- 'X-2', and 'Y' - 'Y-2').
After counting the cash money, the (sic) were bundled and placed inside separate envelopes together with
their respective liquidation statements numbering about thirteen (13) pieces signed by both Ms. Irene
Manalang, OIC of the Cash Receipt Division, and herein accused Mesina acknowledging receipt and
collection thereof (Exhs, 'K-1 ', 'M-3', 'N-3', 'P-3', 'Q-3', 'R-3', T-3', 'U-3', 'V-3', 'W-3 ', 'X-3 ', and 'Y-3 ').
Thereafter, Bernardo Mesina together with his driver left the Mini City I-Jail and proceeded to City Hall Main.
Later that same afternoon, Ms. Baclit received several phone calls coming from the Main City Hall. At around
3:00 o'clock, Mrs. Josie Sanilla, secretary of City Treasurer Carolo V. Santos, called up the Mini City Hall
confirming the collection of the 'Patubig' by Mr. Bernardo Mesina. Thirty (30) minutes thereafter, Mrs. Elvira
Coleto, Local Treasurer Operation Officer II of the Main City Hall called up to inform Ms. Baclit that the
supposed 'Patubig' collection amounting to P.167,870.90 (Exh. 'K-2') was not remitted. Also, Bernardo Mesina
phoned Ms. Baclit telling the latter that he did not receive the 'Patubig' collection. Alarmed by these telephone
calls she just received, Ms. Baclit then immediately consulted the documents/liquidation statements
supposedly signed by Mesina acknowledging receipt and collection thereof, however, all efforts to locate and
retrieved (sic) these records proved futile at that moment.
Meanwhile, City Treasurer Carolo V. Santos, after having been informed by Mrs. Irene Manalang of the
discrepancy in the collection, summoned both Ms. Baclit and Bernardo Mesina to his office at the Main City
Hall for an inquiry relative to the missing P167,870.90 'Patubig' collection. And as the two (2), Baclit and
Mesina, insisted on their respective versions during said confrontation, City Treasurer Santos, in the presence
of the Chief of the Cash Disbursement Division, Administrative Officers and Local Treasurer's Operation
Officer II Mrs. Coleto, then ordered Mesina's vault scaled pending further investigation.
The following morning July 7, 1998, Caloocan City Mayor Reynaldo O. Malonzo called for an immediate probe
of the matter. Present during the investigation at the Mayor's Office were Ms. Baclit, accused Bernardo
Mesina, City Auditor Chito Ramirez, City Treasurer Santos as well as the representative from the different
offices concerned. Again, when asked by Mayor Malonzo as to whether or not [t]he 'Patubig' collection was
collected and/or remitted, Mesina stood fast in his denial of having received the same; Ms. Baclit on the other
hand positively asserted the remittance and collection thereof by Bernardo Mesina.
Thereafter, they all proceeded to the cashier's room where Mesina had his safe and thereat, in the presence
of COA State Auditor III Panchito Fadera, Cashier IV-CTO Fe. F. Sanchez, Administrative Officer IV Lourdes
Jose, LTOO II Elvira M. Coleto, accused Bernardo Mesina and LTOO II Rosalinda Baclit, Mesina's vault was
opened and a cash count and/or physical count of the contents thereof was conducted. Found inside were the
following, to wit: I) coins amounting to P107.15; 2) coins amounting to P50.47; 3) coins amounting to P127.00;
4) coins amounting to P64.1 O; 5) cash with tape amounting to P770.00; 6) spoiled bills amounting
to P440.00; 7) bundled bills amounting to P20,500.00. Also found inside were the Report of Collection by the
Liquidating Officer (RCLO) in the amount of P123,885.55 as well as the original and duplicate copies of the
daily sum of collections of accountable form under the name of one Racquel Ona dated March 31, 1998
amounting to P123,885.55 (six (6) copies of vales/chits) Exhs. 'Z', 'Z-1' and 'Z-2'). In addition thereto, the cash
amount of P67,900.00 then withheld by the City Cashier pending this investigation, was turned over to the
said auditing team, thus, the total cash money audited against accused Mesina amounted to P89,965.72 (sic)
(Exhs. 'BB' and 'BB-1').
In the afternoon of July 7, 1998, at about 5:00 o'clock, Mses. Rosalinda Baclit and Maria Luisa Canas all went
to the SID Caloocan City Police Station to have their separate sworn statements taken (Exhs. 'E', 'E-1 ', 'D',
'D-1 ', 'F', and 'F-1 '). Mmes. Lorna Palomo-Cabal, Divina Dimacali-Sarile and Victoria Salita Vda. De Puyat
likewise executed a joint sworn affidavit (Exhs. 'G', 'G-1', 'G-2', and 'G-3') in preparation for the filing of
appropriate criminal charge against Bernardo Mesina.
The following day, July 8, 1998, Mamerto M. Manahan, Panchito Fadera and Carolo V. Santos also executed
their respective affidavits in relation to the incidents at bar (Exhs. 'A', 'A-1 ', 'A-2'; Exhs. 'B', and 'B-1'; Exhs. 'C',
and 'C-1'). Meanwhile, the statement of collection supposedly signed by accused Mesina was finally
recovered at Rosalinda Baclit's desk hidden under a pile of other documents. (Rollo, pp. 74-75) 4
The Defense presented the oral testimony of the petitioner and documentary evidence. 5 He admitted
collecting the total amount of P468,394.46 from Baclit, including the subject patubig collection totaling
to P167,976.90, but adamantly denied misappropriating, misapplying, and embezzling the patubig collection,
maintaining that the patubig collection was found complete in his vault during the inspection. He explained
that he deliberately kept the collection in his vault upon learning that his wife had suffered a heart attack and
had been rushed to the hospital for immediate medical treatment. He believed that he did not yet need to
remit the amount to the OIC of the Cash Receipt Division because it was still to be re-counted. He claimed
that when he returned to the Main City Hall that same day his vault was already sealed. 6 He said that the
accusation was politically motivated. In support of his claim of innocence, he cited his numerous awards and
citations for honesty and dedicated public service.7
On November 8, 2001, the RTC found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
malversation, disposing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused BERNARDO MESINA Y UMALI guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Malversation as defined and penalized under Article 217 paragraph 4
of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
The Court further imposes a penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office and a fine
of P167,876.90 upon the accused.
SO ORDERED.8
On July 24, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC's decision, with modification as to the amount of fine
imposed,9decreeing:
61
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision dated November 8, 2001 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 120, Caloocan City in Criminal Case No. C-54217 is affirmed with modification in the sense that
the fine is reduced from 1!167,876.98 to P37,876.98. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
In his appeal, the petitioner submits for consideration the following:
I. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING WITH MODIFICATION THE CONVICTION
OF PETITIONER ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF MAL VERSA TION NOTWITHSTANDING
THAT:
a. it had admitted in evidence the testimony of prosecution witness ELVIRA COLITO that she saw,
when accused-appellant 's vault was opened, to have seen (sic) the bundles of the missing Patubig
collections of more than Ps130,000.00 (sic), and thus, in effect, there was no misappropriation, as
one of the elements of the crime of malversation;
b. that it erred and completely misapprehended and failed to appreciate the true meaning of the
testimony of the said witness of seeing inside the vault more than Ps130, 000. 00 in bundles by
treating/and/or (sic) appreciating the same as exactly Ps130, 000. 00 flat without appreciating the
words more than, thus guilty of erroneous inference surmises and conjectures; c. that it overlooked
and completely disregarded that inside the vault was the sum of Ps20,500.00 in bundles also [Exh.
"BB and B-1 "j regarding contents of the vault or the total sum of Ps22, 065. 72 testified to by
Panchito Madera (sic), Head of the Audit Team;
d. the Court of Appeals gravely erred to surmise and at least look on the lack from the lists of
inventories of the vault the more than Ps130,000.00 in bundles and why it was not listed among the
moneys found inside the accused-appellant 's vault;
e. doubts and inconsistencies existing therefrom shall remained (sic) favorable to the accused-
appellant pursuant to applicable jurisprudence;
II. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A (SIC) QUESTIONS OF LAW, THAT THE INVESTIGATION
CONDUCTED BY THE GROUP OF MAYOR MALONZO, THE TREASURER, THE ADMINISTRATOR, THE
CITY AUDITOR, CHIEF OF DIVISIONS AND THE AUDIT PROCEEDINGS ARE NULL AND VOID DUE:
A. Accused-appellant was not informed of his constitutional right to assistance of counsel as
mandated by the Constitution;
B. The audit proceedings did not comply strictly with the Manual of Instructions to Treasurers and
Auditors and other Guidelines, thus null and void,'
C. Thus, the presumption of juris tantum in Art. 127 of the Revised Penal Code is overcome firmly
supported by the discovery of the missing money and further the conclusions of the Court of Appeals
was against established jurisprudence enunciated in the case of TINGA vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, No. L-57650, [160 SCRA 483};
III. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS FATALLY WRONG IN NOT APPL YING EVIDENCE OF
GOOD MORAL CHARACTER TO ACQUIT AND EXONERATE PETITIONER ACCUSED-APPELLANT IN
VIOLATION OF RULE 130, SEC. 46, OF THE RULES OF COURT. A. Notwithstanding, not only are the
evidence weak, but its findings or discovery of "more than Ps130,000.00 inside the vault is subject to double
interpretations, and/or double alternative or probabilities, thus the presumption of innocence will be adopted. 10
Ruling of the Court
The appeal has no merit.
The crime of malversation of public funds charged herein is defined and penalized under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, as follows:
Article 217. Malversation of public funds or property. - Presumption of malversation. - Any public officer who,
by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or
shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other
person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the
misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property shall suffer:
xxxx
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is more than
twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the
penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification
and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such
missing funds or property to personal use. (As amended by R.A. No. 1060)
62
The crime of malversation of public funds has the following elements, to wit: (a) that the offender is a public
officer; (b) that he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (c) that
the funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable; and (d) that he
appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another
person to take them.11
The elements of the crime charged were duly established against the petitioner.
The Prosecution proved, firstly, that the petitioner was a public officer with the position of Local Treasurer
Officer I of Caloocan City; secondly, that by reason of his position, he was tasked to collect fees and taxes
regularly levied by the Mini City Hall, including market fees, miscellaneous fees, real property taxes, and the
subject patubig collection; and, thirdly, that all of the fees and taxes collected were unquestionably public
funds for which he was accountable.
As to the fourth element of misappropriation, the petitioner did not rebut the presumption that he had
misappropriated the patubig collection to his personal use. He had earlier feigned ignorance of having
received the patubig collection when he phoned Ms. Baclit to tell her that he did not receive the collection. He
still insisted that he had not received the sum from Ms. Baclit when the City Treasurer summoned them both.
His denial continued until the next day when City Mayor Malonzo himself asked them both about the matter.
Only after the petitioner's vault was finally opened did he declare that the collection was intact inside his vault.
Even then, the actual amount found therein was short by 1!37,876.98. Conformably with Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code, supra, the failure of the petitioner to have the patubig collection duly forthcoming upon
demand by the duly authorized officer was prima facie evidence that he had put such missing fund to personal
use. Although the showing was merely prima facie, and, therefore, rebuttable, he did not rebut it, considering
that he not only did not account for the collection upon demand but even steadfastly denied having received it
up to the time of the inspection of the sealed vault. Under the circumstances, he was guilty of the
misappropriation of the collection.
Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the culpa is only a modality in the
perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs from the mode proved, the same offense of
malversation is still committed; hence, a conviction is proper. 12 All that is necessary for a conviction is
sufficient proof that the accused accountable officer had received public funds or property, and did not have
them in his possession when demand therefor was made without any satisfactory explanation of his failure to
have them upon demand. For this purpose, direct evidence of the personal misappropriation by the accused is
unnecessary as long as he cannot satisfactorily explain the inability to produce or any shortage in his
accounts.13 Accordingly, with the evidence adduced by the State being entirely incompatible with the
petitioner's claim of innocence, we uphold the CA's affirmance of the conviction, for, indeed, the proof of his
guilt was beyond reasonable doubt.
The petitioner bewails the deprivation of his constitutionally guaranteed rights during the investigation. He
posits that a custodial investigation was what really transpired, and insists that the failure to inform him of his
Miranda rights rendered the whole investigation null and void. We disagree with the petitioner's position.
According to People v. Marra,14 custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement
authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
manner. The safeguards during custodial investigation begin to operate as soon as the investigation ceases to
be a general inquiry into a still unsolved crime, and the interrogation is then focused on a particular suspect
who has been taken into custody and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory questions that tend to
elicit incriminating statements. The situation contemplated is more precisely described as one where -After a
person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a confrontation arises which at best may be termed
unequal. The detainee is brought to an army camp or police headquarters and there questioned and cross-
examined not only by one but as many investigators as may be necessary to break down his morale. He finds
himself in a strange and unfamiliar surrounding, and every person he meets he considers hostile to him. The
investigators are well-trained and seasoned in their work. They employ all the methods and means that
experience and study has taught them to extract the truth, or what may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most
detainees are unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional rights.
And even if they were, the intimidating and coercive presence of the officers of the law in such an atmosphere
overwhelms them into silence x x x.15
Contrary to the petitioner's claim, the fact that he was one of those being investigated did not by itself define
the nature of the investigation as custodial. For him, the investigation was still a general inquiry to ascertain
the whereabouts of the missing patubig collection. By its nature, the inquiry had to involve persons who had
direct supervision over the issue, including the City Treasurer, the City Auditor, the representative from
different concerned offices, and even the City Mayor. What was conducted was not an investigation that
already focused on the petitioner as the culprit but an administrative inquiry into the missing city funds.
Besides, he was not as of then in the custody of the police or other law enforcement office.
Even as we affirm the CA, we have to clarify the penalty imposed in terms of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law.1âwphi1
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law states that an indeterminate sentence is imposed on the
offender consisting of a maximum term and a minimum term. 16 The maximum term is the penalty properly
imposed under the Revised Penal Code after considering any attending circumstance; while the minimum
term is within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the
offense committed. Conformably with the instructions on the proper application of the Indeterminate Sentence
law in malversation reiterated in Zafra v. People:17 (a) the penalties provided under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code constitute degrees; and ( b) considering that the penalties provided under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code arc not composed of three periods, the time included in the prescribed penalty should be
divided into three equal portions, each portion forming a period, pursuant to Article 65 of the Revised Penal
Code.18 With the amount of P37,876.98 ultimately found and declared by the CA to have been
misappropriated exceeding the P22,000.00 threshold, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua (that is, 17 years, four months and one day to reclusion perpetua), the
minimum period of which is 17 years, four months and one to 18 years and eight months, the medium period
of which is 18 years, eight months and one day to 20 years, and the maximum period is reclusion perpetua.
Accordingly, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence of the petitioner is the medium period in view of the
absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, while the minimum of the indeterminate sentence
63
shall be taken from the penalty next lower, which is reclusion temporal in its minimum and medium periods
(i.e., from 12 years and one day to 17 years and four months). Hence, the indeterminate sentence for the
petitioner is modified to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 18 years, eight months
and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
In addition, the Court notes that both lower courts did not require the petitioner to pay the amount
of P37,876.98 subject of the malversation. That omission was plain error that we should now likewise correct
as a matter of course, for there is no denying that pursuant to Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. The omission, if unchecked and unrevised, would
permanently deprive the City of Caloocan of the misappropriated amount. Such prejudice to the public coffers
should be avoided.
The Court has justifiably bewailed the omissions by the lower courts in this respect, and has seen fit to point
out in Zafra v. People:
One more omission by the CA and the R TC concerned a matter of law. This refers to their failure to decree in
favor of the Government the return of the amounts criminally misappropriated by the accused. That he was
already sentenced to pay the fine in each count was an element of the penalties imposed under the Revised
Penal Code, and was not the same thing as finding him civilly liable for restitution, which the RTC and the CA
should have included in the judgment. Indeed, as the Court emphasized in Bacolod v. People, it was
"imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the accused, and determine the civil
liability to be imposed on the accused, unless there has been a reservation of the action to recover civil
liability or a waiver of its recovery," explaining the reason for doing so in the following manner:
It is not amiss to stress that both the R TC and the CA disregarded their express mandate under Section 2,
Rule 120 of the Rules of Court to have the judgment, if it was of conviction, state: "(1) the legal qualification of
the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances
which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal,
accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or
damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if
there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or
waived." Their disregard compels us to act as we now do lest the Court be unreasonably seen as tolerant of
their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves seek the correction of the omission by an appeal
is no hindrance to this action because the Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but
also the duty to correct at any time a matter of law and justice.
We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs that the parties are properly
entitled to by law or in equity under the established facts. Their judgments will not be worthy of the name
unless they thereby fully determine the rights and obligations of the litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for only
by a full determination of such rights and obligations would they be true to the judicial office of administering
justice and equity for all. Courts should then be alert and cautious in their rendition of judgments of conviction
in criminal cases. They should prescribe the legal penalties, which is what the Constitution and the law require
and expect them to do. Their prescription of the wrong penalties will be invalid and ineffectual for being done
without jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They should also
determine and set the civil liability ex delicto of the accused, in order to do justice to the complaining victims
who are always entitled to them. The Rules of Court mandates them to do so unless the enforcement of the
civil liability by separate actions has been reserved or waived. 19
Under the law, the civil liability of the petitioner may involve restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and
indemnification for consequential damages.20 Given that his obligation requires the payment of the amount
misappropriated to the City of Caloocan, the indemnification for damages is through legal interest of 6% per
annum on the amount malversed, reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment. 21
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on July 24, 2003 finding petitioner BERNARDO
U. MESINA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malversation of public funds subject to the MODIFICATIONS
that: (a) he shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal, as minimum,
to 18 years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and pay a fine of P37,876.98; and
(b) he shall further pay to the City of Caloocan the amount of P37,876.98, plus interest thereon at the rate of
6% per annum, reckoned from the finality of this decision until the amount is fully paid.
The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 180219 November 23, 2011
VIRGILIO TALAMPAS y MATIC, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
By petition for review on certiorari, Virgilio Talampas y Matic (Talampas) seeks the review of the affirmance of
his conviction for homicide (for the killing of the late Ernesto Matic y Masinloc) by the Court of Appeals (CA)
through its decision promulgated on August 16, 2007. 1
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, in Biñan, Laguna (RTC) had rejected his pleas of self-defense and
accident and had declared him guilty of the felony under the judgment rendered on June 22, 2004. 2
Antecedents
64
The information filed on November 17, 1995, to which Talampas pleaded not guilty, averred as follows: 3
That on or about July 5, 1995, in the Municipality of Biñan, Province of Laguna, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused VIRGILIO TALAMPAS, with intent to kill, while conveniently
armed with a short firearm and without any justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot one Ernesto Matic y Masinloc with the said firearm, thereby inflicting
upon him gunshot wound at the back of his body which directly caused his instantaneous death, to the
damage and prejudice of his surviving heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The State presented as witnesses Jose Sevillo, Francisco Matic, Jerico Matic, Dr. Valentin Bernales, and
Josephine Matic. The CA summarized their testimonies thuswise: 4
Prosecution witness Jose Sevillo (Jose) who allegedly witnessed the incident in question, testified that on July
5, 1995 at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening, he together with Eduardo Matic (Eduardo) and Ernesto Matic
(Ernesto) were infront of his house, along the road in Zona Siete (7), Wawa, Malaban, Biñan, Laguna,
repairing his tricycle when he noticed the appellant who was riding on a bicycle passed by and stopped. The
latter alighted at about three (3) meters away from him, walked a few steps and brought out a short gun, a
revolver, and poked the same to Eduardo and fired it hitting Eduardo who took refuge behind Ernesto. The
appellant again fired his gun three (3) times, one shot hitting Ernesto at the right portion of his back causing
him (Ernesto) to fall on the ground with his face down. Another shot hit Eduardo on his nape and fell down on
his back (patihaya). Thereafter, the appellant ran away, while he (Jose) and his neighbors brought the victims
to the hospital. On June 6, 1995, Jose executed a Sworn Statement at the Biñan Police Station.
Another witness, Francisco Matic, testified that prior to the death of his brother Ernesto who was then 44
years old, he (Ernesto) was driving a tricycle on a boundary system and earned P100.00 daily, although not
on a regular basis because sometimes Ernesto played in a band for P100.00 per night.
Jerico Matic, eldest son of Ernesto, alleged that he loves his father and his death was so painful to him that he
could not quantify his feelings in terms of money. The death of his father was a great loss to them as they
would not be able to pursue their studies and that nobody would support them financially considering that the
money being sent by their mother in the amount of P2,000.00 to P2,500.00 every three (3) months, would not
be enough.
Dr. Valentin Bernales likewise, testified that he was the one who conducted the autopsy on the body of
Ernesto and found one gunshot in the body located at the back of the costal area, right side, sixteen (16)
centimeters from the spinal column. This shot was fatal as it involved the major organs such as the lungs, liver
and the spinal column which caused Ernesto’s death.
The last witness, Josephine Matic, wife of Ernesto, testified that her husband was laid to rest on July 18, 1995
and that his untimely death was so painful and that she could not provide her children with sustenance. She
asked for the amount of P200,000.00 for her to be able to send her children to school.
On his part, Talampas interposed self-defense and accident. He insisted that his enemy had been Eduardo
Matic (Eduardo), not victim Ernesto Matic (Ernesto); that Eduardo, who was then with Ernesto at the time of
the incident, had had hit him with a monkey wrench, but he had parried the blow; that he and Eduardo had
then grappled for the monkey wrench; that while they had grappled, he had notice that Eduardo had held a
revolver; that he had thus struggled with Eduardo for control of the revolver, which had accidentally fired and
hit Ernesto during their struggling with each other; that the revolver had again fired, hitting Eduardo in the
thigh; that he had then seized the revolver and shot Eduardo in the head; and that he had then fled the scene
when people had started swarming around.
Ruling of the RTC
On June 22, 2004, the RTC, giving credence to the testimony of eyewitness Jose Sevilla, found Talampas
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide,5 and disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Homicide, with one mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and hereby sentences him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of IMPRISONMENT ranging from TEN (10) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) years and EIGHT (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is likewise
ordered to pay the heirs of Ernesto Matic y Masinloc the following sums, to wit:
1. P50,000.00 – as and for death indemnity;
2. P50,000.00 – as and for moral damages;
3. P25,000.00 – as and for actual damages; and
4. P30,000.00 – as and for temperate damages.
Furnish Public Prosecutor Nofuente, Atty. Navarroza, the private complainant and accused with a copy of this
decision.
SO ORDERED.6
Ruling of the CA
Talampas appealed to the CA, contending that:
I
65
 THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DEATH OF ERNESTO
MATIC WAS MERELY ACCIDENTAL.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
ACTED IN DEFENSE OF HIMSELF WHEN HE GRAPPLED WITH EDUARDO MATIC.
Still, the CA affirmed the conviction based on the RTC’s factual and legal conclusions, and ruled that
Talampas, having invoked self-defense, had in effect admitted killing Ernesto and had thereby assumed the
burden of proving the elements of self-defense by credible, clear and convincing evidence, but had miserably
failed to discharge his burden.7
The CA deleted the award of temperate damages in view of the awarding of actual damages, pointing out that
the two kinds of damages were mutually exclusive.8
Issue
Hence, Talampas is now before the Court, continuing to insist that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt, and that the lower courts both erred in rejecting his claim of self-defense and accidental death.
Ruling
The petition for review is denied for lack of merit.
Firstly, the elements of the plea of self-defense are: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (c) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the accused in defending himself. 9
In the nature of self-defense, the protagonists should be the accused and the victim. The established
circumstances indicated that such did not happen here, for it was Talampas who had initiated the attack only
against Eduardo; and that Ernesto had not been at any time a target of Talampas’ attack, he having only
happened to be present at the scene of the attack. In reality, neither Eduardo nor Ernesto had committed any
unlawful aggression against Talampas. Thus, Talampas was not repelling any unlawful aggression from the
victim (Ernesto), thereby rendering his plea of self-defense unwarranted.
Secondly, Talampas could not relieve himself of criminal liability by invoking accident as a defense. Article
12(4) of the Revised Penal Code,10 the legal provision pertinent to accident, contemplates a situation where a
person is in fact in the act of doing something legal, exercising due care, diligence and prudence, but in the
process produces harm or injury to someone or to something not in the least in the mind of the actor – an
accidental result flowing out of a legal act.11 Indeed, accident is an event that happens outside the sway of our
will, and although it comes about through some act of our will, it lies beyond the bounds of humanly
foreseeable consequences.12 In short, accident presupposes the lack of intention to commit the wrong done.
The records eliminate the intervention of accident. Talampas brandished and poked his revolver at Eduardo
and fired it, hitting Eduardo, who quickly rushed to seek refuge behind Ernesto. At that point, Talampas fired
his revolver thrice. One shot hit Ernesto at the right portion of his back and caused Ernesto to fall face down to
the ground. Another shot hit Eduardo on the nape, causing Eduardo to fall on his back. Certainly, Talampas’
acts were by no means lawful, being a criminal assault with his revolver against both Eduardo and Ernesto.
And, thirdly, the fact that the target of Talampas’ assault was Eduardo, not Ernesto, did not excuse his hitting
and killing of Ernesto. The fatal hitting of Ernesto was the natural and direct consequence of Talampas’
felonious deadly assault against Eduardo. Talampas’ poor aim amounted to aberratio ictus, or mistake in the
blow, a circumstance that neither exempted him from criminal responsibility nor mitigated his criminal liability.
Lo que es causa de la causa, es causa del mal causado (what is the cause of the cause is the cause of the
evil caused).13 Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code,14 criminal liability is incurred by any person
committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
Nonetheless, the Court finds the indeterminate sentence of 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to 14 years and eight months, as maximum, legally erroneous.
The penalty for homicide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal.1avvphi1 Under
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 15 the court, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense
punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, is mandated to prescribe an indeterminate
sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum term shall be within the range
of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense. With the absence of
aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period, or
14 years, eight months, and one day to 17 years and four months. This is pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised
Penal Code.16 It is such period that the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence should be reckoned
from. Hence, limiting the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence at only 14 years and eight months
contravened the express provision of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, for such penalty was within the
minimum period of reclusion temporal. Accordingly, the Court must add one day to the maximum term fixed by
the lower courts.
The Court finds to be unnecessary the increment of one day as part of the minimum term of the indeterminate
sentence. It may be true that the increment did not constitute an error, because the minimum term thus fixed
was entirely within the parameters of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Yet, the addition of one day to the 10
years as the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence of Talampas may occasion a degree of
inconvenience when it will be time for the penal administrators concerned to consider and determine whether
Talampas is already qualified to enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Hence, in order to
66
simplify the computation of the minimum penalty of the indeterminate sentence, the Court deletes the one-day
increment from the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on August 16, 2007 finding VIRGILIO
TALAMPAS y MATIC guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, and IMPOSES the
indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, eight months, and one day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum.
The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
That on or about the 11th day of May 2000, in the City of Legazpi Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit on
the person of JAYSON DELA CRUZ, a twelve year-old,
Grade VI pupil of MABA Institute, Legazpi City, acts of physical abuse and/or maltreatment by striking said
JAYSON DELA CRUZ with his palm hitting the latter at his back and by slapping said minor hitting his left
cheek and uttering derogatory remarks to the latter’s family to wit: "Mga hayop kamo, para dayo kamo digdi,
Iharap mo dito ama mo" (You all animals, you are all strangers here. Bring your father here), which acts of the
accused are prejudicial to the child’s development and which demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the
said child as a human being.

SO ORDERED.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice The Prosecution showed that on May 11, 2002, Jayson Dela Cruz (Jayson) and Roldan, his older brother,
both minors, joined the evening procession for the Santo Niño at Oro Site in Legazpi City; that when the
procession passed in front of the petitioner’s house, the latter’s daughter Mary Ann Rose, also a minor, threw
G.R. No. 169533 March 20, 2013 stones at Jayson and called him "sissy"; that the petitioner confronted Jayson and Roldan and called them
names like "strangers" and "animals"; that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand, and slapped
GEORGE BONGALON, Petitioner, Jayson on the face;4 that the petitioner then went to the brothers’ house and challenged Rolando dela Cruz,
vs. their father, to a fight, but Rolando did not come out of the house to take on the petitioner; that Rolando later
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. brought Jayson to the Legazpi City Police Station and reported the incident; that Jayson also underwent
medical treatment at the Bicol Regional Training and Teaching Hospital;5 that the doctors who examined
Jayson issued two medical certificates attesting that Jayson suffered the following contusions, to wit: (1)
DECISION contusion .5 x 2.5 scapular area, left; and (2) +1x1 cm. contusion left zygomatic area and contusion .5 x 2.33
cm. scapular area, left.6
BERSAMIN, J.:
On his part, the petitioner denied having physically abused or maltreated Jayson. He explained that he only
Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse under Section 10 (a) talked with Jayson and Roldan after Mary Ann Rose and Cherrylyn, his minor daughters, had told him about
of Republic Act No. 7610.1 Only when the laying of hands is shown beyond reasonable doubt to be intended Jayson and Roldan’s throwing stones at them and about Jayson’s burning Cherrylyn’s hair. He denied
by the accused to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being shouting invectives at and challenging Rolando to a fight, insisting that he only told Rolando to restrain his
should it be punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under the Revised Penal Code. sons from harming his daughters.7

The Case To corroborate the petitioner’s testimony, Mary Ann Rose testified that her father did not hit or slap but only
confronted Jayson, asking why Jayson had called her daughters "Kimi" and why he had burned Cherrlyn’s
hair. Mary Ann Rose denied throwing stones at Jayson and calling him a "sissy." She insisted that it was
On June 22, 2005,2 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction of the petitioner for the crime of child instead Jayson who had pelted her with stones during the procession. She described the petitioner as a loving
abuse under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610. and protective father.8

Antecedents Ruling of the RTC

On June 26, 2000, the Prosecutor’s Office of Legazpi City charged the petitioner in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Legazpi City with child abuse, an act in violation of Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610, alleging
as follows:
After trial, the RTC found and declared the petitioner guilty of child abuse as charged, to wit: 9
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused
GEORGE BONGALON @ "GI" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Republic Act No. 7610, and
67
is hereby ordered to undergo imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years of prision mayor
in its minimum period.
SO ORDERED.
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the petitioner assailed the credibility of the Prosecution witnesses by citing their inconsistencies.
He contended that the RTC overlooked or disregarded material facts and circumstances in the records that
would have led to a favorable judgment for him. He attacked the lack of credibility of the witnesses presented
against him, citing the failure of the complaining brothers to react to the incident, which was unnatural and
contrary to human experience.
The CA affirmed the conviction, but modified the penalty,10 viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated October 20, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
9 of Legazpi City is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-appellant George Bongalon is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum term, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and 1 day of prision mayor as the maximum
term.
Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim, Jayson de la Cruz the additional amount of P5,000 as
moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
The petitioner has come to the Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 11
The petitioner asserts that he was not guilty of the crime charged; and that even assuming that he was guilty,
his liability should be mitigated because he had merely acted to protect her two minor daughters.
Ruling of the Court
At the outset, we should observe that the petitioner has adopted the wrong remedy in assailing the CA’s
affirmance of his conviction. His proper recourse from the affirmance of his conviction was an appeal taken in
due course. Hence, he should have filed a petition for review on certiorari. Instead, he wrongly brought a
petition for certiorari. We explained why in People v. Court of Appeals: 12
The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep the inferior court
within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As observed in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et
al. "the special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not
errors of judgment. The raison d’etre for the rule is when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed
while so engaged does not deprived it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did,
every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a
void judgment. In such a scenario, the administration of justice would not survive. Hence, where the issue or
question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision–not the jurisdiction of the court to
render said decision–the same is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari. The proper
recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
It is of no consequence that the petitioner alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in his
petition. The allegation of grave abuse of discretion no more warrants the granting of due course to the
petition as one for certiorari if appeal was available as a proper and adequate remedy. At any rate, a reading
of his presentation of the issues in his petition indicates that he thereby imputes to the CA errors of judgment,
not errors of jurisdiction. He mentions instances attendant during the commission of the crime that he claims
were really constitutive of justifying and mitigating circumstances; and specifies reasons why he believes
Republic Act No. 7610 favors his innocence rather than his guilt for the crime charged. 13 The errors he thereby
underscores in the petition concerned only the CA’s appreciation and assessment of the evidence on record,
which really are errors of judgment, not of jurisdiction.
Even if we were to treat the petition as one brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, it would still be
defective due to its being filed beyond the period provided by law. Section 2 of Rule 45 requires the filing of
the petition within 15 days from the notice of judgment to be appealed. However, the petitioner received a
copy of the CA’s decision on July 15, 2005,14 but filed the petition only on September 12, 2005, 15 or well
beyond the period prescribed by the Rules of Court.
The procedural transgressions of the petitioner notwithstanding, we opt to forego quickly dismissing the
petition, and instead set ourselves upon the task of resolving the issues posed by the petition on their merits.
We cannot fairly and justly ignore his plea about the sentence imposed on him not being commensurate to the
wrong he committed. His plea is worthy of another long and hard look. If, on the other hand, we were to
outrightly dismiss his plea because of the procedural lapses he has committed, the Court may be seen as an
unfeeling tribunal of last resort willing to sacrifice justice in order to give premium to the rigidity of its rules of
procedure. But the Rules of Court has not been intended to be rigidly enforced at all times. Rather, it has been
instituted first and foremost to ensure justice to every litigant. Indeed, its announced objective has been to
secure a "just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding." 16 This objective will be
beyond realization here unless the Rules of Court be given liberal construction and application as the noble
ends of justice demand. Thereby, we give primacy to substance over form, which, to a temple of justice and
equity like the Court, now becomes the ideal ingredient in the dispensation of justice in the case now awaiting
our consideration.
68
The petitioner’s right to liberty is in jeopardy. He may be entirely deprived of such birthright without due
process of law unless we shunt aside the rigidity of the rules of procedure and review his case. Hence, we
treat this recourse as an appeal timely brought to the Court. Consonant with the basic rule in criminal
procedure that an appeal opens the whole case for review, we should deem it our duty to correct errors in the
appealed judgment, whether assigned or not.17
The law under which the petitioner was charged, tried and found guilty of violating is Section 10 (a), Article VI
of Republic Act No. 7610, which relevantly states:
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and other Conditions Prejudicial to the
Child’s Development. –
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for
other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential
Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
xxxx
Child abuse, the crime charged, is defined by Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, as follows:
Section 3. Definition of terms. –
xxxx
(b) "Child Abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the
following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity
of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment
of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
xxxx
Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the CA to the effect that the petitioner struck
Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped Jayson on the face, we disagree with their holding that his acts
constituted child abuse within the purview of the above-quoted provisions. The records did not establish
beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson had been intended to debase the "intrinsic worth
and dignity" of Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson.
The records showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have been done at the spur of the moment and in
anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own
minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his self-
control, he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child
as a human being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse.
It is not trite to remind that under the well-recognized doctrine of pro reo every doubt is resolved in favor of the
petitioner as the accused. Thus, the Court should consider all possible circumstances in his favor. 18
What crime, then, did the petitioner commit?
Considering that Jayson’s physical injury required five to seven days of medical attention, 19 the petitioner was
liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Article 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. — The crime of slight physical injuries shall be
punished:
1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the offended
party for labor from one to nine days, or shall require medical attendance during the same period.
xxxx
The penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor, which ranges from one day to 30 days of
imprisonment.20 In imposing the correct penalty, however, we have to consider the mitigating circumstance of
passion or obfuscation under Article 13 (6) of the Revised Penal Code, 21 because the petitioner lost his reason
and self-control, thereby diminishing the exercise of his will power. 22 Passion or obfuscation may lawfully arise
from causes existing only in the honest belief of the accused. 23 It is relevant to mention, too, that in passion or
obfuscation, the offender suffers a diminution of intelligence and intent. With his having acted under the belief
that Jayson and Roldan had thrown stones at his two minor daughters, and that Jayson had burned Cherrlyn’s
hair, the petitioner was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion. Arresto menor is prescribed in its
minimum period (i.e., one day to 10 days) in the absence of any aggravating circumstance that offset the
mitigating circumstance of passion. Accordingly, with the Indeterminate Sentence Law being inapplicable due
to the penalty imposed not exceeding one year,24 the petitioner shall suffer a straight penalty of 10 days of
arresto menor.
The award of moral damages to Jayson is appropriate. Such damages are granted in criminal cases resulting
in physical injuries.25 The amount of P5,000.00 fixed by the lower courts as moral damages is consistent with
the current jurisprudence.26
69
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals; and ENTER a new judgment: (a) finding
petitioner George Bongalon GUlLTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES
under paragraph 1, Article 266, of the Revised Penal Code; (b) sentencing him to suffer the penalty of 10 days
of arresto menor; and (c) ordering him to pay Jayson Dela Cruz the amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages,
plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 173822 October 13, 2010
SALVADOR ATIZADO and SALVADOR MONREAL, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
On May 4, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 52, Sorsogon, convicted the petitioners of
murder.1 On December 13, 2005, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed their conviction in C.A.-G.R. CR-HC No.
01450, but modified the awarded damages.2
The petitioners contest the CA’s affirmance of their conviction in this appeal via petition for review on
certiorari.
We affirm their conviction, but we reduce the penalty imposed on Salvador Monreal because the RTC and the
CA did not duly appreciate his minority at the time of the commission of the crime. We order his immediate
release from prison because he already served his sentence, as hereby modified. Also, we add to the
damages to which the heirs of the victim were entitled in order to accord with the prevailing law and
jurisprudence.
Antecedents
On June 20, 1994, the Office of the Sorsogon Provincial Prosecutor formally charged the petitioners and a
certain Danilo Atizado (Danilo) with murder through the following information, to wit:
That on or about the 18th day of April 1994, at Barangay Bogña, Municipality of Castilla, Province of
Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with treachery and evident premeditation, and without any justifiable cause or motive, with intent
to kill, armed with handguns, attack, assault and shot one Rogelio Llona y Llave, a Sangguniang Bayan
member of Castilla, Sorsogon, thereby inflicting upon him mortal and serious wounds which directly caused
his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
After the petitioners and Danilo pleaded not guilty to the information on November 7, 1994, 4 the trial ensued.
The witnesses for the State were Simeona Mirandilla (Mirandilla), Major Saadra Gani (Major Gani), Dr.
Wilhelmo Abrantes (Dr. Abrantes), Lawrence Llona (Lawrence), and Herminia Llona (Herminia).
Mirandilla narrated that on April 18, 1994 she and the late Rogelio Llona (Llona), her common-law husband,
had attended the fiesta of Barangay Bonga in Castilla, Sorsogon; that at about 8 pm of that date, they had
gone to the house of Manuel Desder (Desder) in the same barangay; that as they and Jose Jesalva (Jesalva),
a barangay kagawad of the place, were seated in the sala of Desder’s house, she heard "thundering steps" as
if people were running and then two successive gunshots; that she then saw Atizado pointing a gun at the
prostrate body of Llona; that seeing Atizado about to shoot Llona again, she shouted: Stop, that’s enough!;
that while aiding Llona, she heard three clicking sounds, and, turning towards the direction of the clicking
sounds, saw Monreal point his gun at her while he was moving backwards and simultaneously adjusting the
cylinder of his gun; that the petitioners then fled the scene of the shooting; that she rushed to the house of
barangay captain Juanito Lagonsing (Lagonsing) to report the shooting; and that she and Lagonsing brought
Llona to a hospital where Llona was pronounced dead. 5
Major Gani testified that the petitioners and Danilo were arrested on May 18, 1994, 6 based on the warrant of
arrest issued by Judge Teodisio R. Dino, Jr. of the Municipal Trial Court in Castilla, Sorsogon.
Dr. Abrantes confirmed that Llona died due to two gunshot wounds in the back that penetrated his spinal
column, liver, and abdomen.7
Lawrence and Herminia stated that the Llona family spent P30,000.00 for the funeral expenses of Llona. 8
Denying the accusation, the petitioners interposed alibi. The witnesses for the Defense were Monreal, Roger
Villafe (Villafe), Merlinda Lolos, Joseph Lorenzana (Lorenzana), Jesalva, and Lagonsing.
The Defense showed that at the time of the commission of the crime, Atizado had been in his family residence
in Barangay Tomalaytay, Castilla,
Sorsogon, because he had been sick of influenza, while Monreal and Danilo had been in the house of a
certain Ariel also in Barangay Tomalaytay, Castilla, Sorsogon drinking gin; that the petitioners and Danilo had
not been recognized to be at the crime scene during the shooting of Llona; and that the petitioners had been
implicated only because of their being employed by their uncle Lorenzana, the alleged mastermind in the
killing of Llona.
70
As stated, on May 4, 2000, the RTC convicted the petitioners but acquitted Danilo, viz: Ruling

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Salvador Atizado and Salvador Monreal guilty The conviction of the petitioners is affirmed, subject to modifications in the penalty imposed on Monreal and in
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised the amounts and kinds of damages as civil liability.
Penal Code, with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the Court hereby sentences each of the accused to
an imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the heirs of Rogelio Llona the sum of Fifty Thousand I.
(P50,000.00) Pesos, Philippines currency, in solidum, as civil indemnity, without subsidiary imprisonment in Factual findings of the RTC and CAare accorded respect
case of insolvency; to reimburse the heirs of the victim the amount of P30,000.00 as actual expenses and to
pay the cost.
The RTC and CA’s conclusions were based on Mirandilla’s positive identification of the petitioners as the
malefactors and on her description of the acts of each of them made during her court testimony on March 6,
Accused Danilo Atizado on reasonable doubt is hereby acquitted of the crime charged and he being a 1995,13viz:
detention prisoner, his immediate release from the provincial jail is hereby ordered, unless he is charged of
other lawful cause or causes.
q Who were you saying ‘we sat together’?
Accused Salvador Atizado and Salvador Monreal being detained, shall be credited in full in the service of their
sentence. a Kdg. Llona, Mr. Jose Jesalva and I was letting my 5 years old child to sleep.

SO ORDERED.9 q Can you demonstrate or described before this Honorable Court the size of the sala and the house
you wherein (sic)?
The Court referred the petitioners’ direct appeal to the CA pursuant to People v. Mateo.10
a The size of the sale (sic) is about 3 x 3 meters.
On December 13, 2005, the CA affirmed the conviction, disposing:
q Now, please show to this Honorable Court the relative position, the sitting arrangement of yours,
Kgd. Llona and Kgd. Jesalva.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED. Accused-appellants Salvador Atizado and Salvador
Monreal are hereby ordered to suffer the imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua. Likewise, they are ordered to
pay the heirs of Rogelio Llona the amount of: (a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P30,000.00 as actual a I was sitting on a long bench then my child was on my lap, then Kdg. Llona was infront of me, I
damages; and (c) P50,000.00 as moral damages. was at the right side of Kdg. Llona

SO ORDERED.11 q How about Kdg. Jesalva?

After the CA denied their motion for reconsideration, 12 the petitioners now appeal. a This Kgd. Jesalva was facing Kgd. Llona and Kgd. Llona was facing the door in otherwords, the
door was at his back.
Issue
q Was the door open?
The petitioners submit that the RTC and the CA erred in finding them guilty of murder beyond reasonable
doubt based on the eyewitness testimony of Mirandilla despite her not being a credible witness; that some a Yes, sir.
circumstances rendered Mirandilla’s testimony unreliable, namely: (a) she had failed to identify them as the
assailants of Llona, because she had not actually witnessed them shooting at Llona; (b) she had merely q Was the door immediately found… Rather was this the main door of the house?
assumed that they had been the assailants from the fact that they had worked for Lorenzana, the supposed
mastermind; (c) the autopsy report stated that Llona had been shot from a distance, not at close range,
contrary to Mirandilla’s claim; (d) Mirandilla’s testimony was contrary to human experience; and (e) a That was the main door leading to the porch of the house.
Mirandilla’s account was inconsistent with that of Jesalva’s.

71
q And from the porch is the main stairs already? q Then after that what happened?

a Yes, sir. a My intention was to let Kgd. Llona push-up but I heard three (3) clicks of the trigger of the gun.

q Now, what were you doing there after dinner as you said you have finished assisting the persons q Then what did you do when you heard that?
in Bongga about the program, ... after that, what were you doing then?
a After which I turned my head suddenly then I saw this Salvador Monreal but at that time I do not
a I was letting my child to sleep and Kgd. Llona was fanning my child. know his name.

q How about Kgd. Jesalva? q Then what did you see of him?

a His head was stopping (sic) because of his drunkenness. a I saw this Salvador Monreal stepping backward and he was adjusting the cylinder of the gun.

q Can you tell this Honorable Court, while you were on that situation, if there was any incident that q Now, when you saw and heard Atizado three (3) clicks of the gun, can you see where the gun was
happened? pointed at?

a There was a sudden thundering steps as if they were running and there were successive shots. a It was pointed towards me.

q Simultaneously with these two (2) successive shots can you see the origin or who was responsible q So, there were three (3) shots that did not actually fired towards you?
for the shots?
a Yes, sir.
a Upon hearing the shots, I turned my head and saw Salvador Atizado.
q So when you said that you saw this man Monreal, can you still recognize this man?
q Who is this Salvador Atizado?
a Yes, sir.
a He was the one who shot Kgd. Llona.
q Could you be able to point at him, if he is in Court?
q Can you be able to identify him?
a Yes, sir.
a (Witness identifying the person, and when asked of his name answered Salvador Atizado.)
q Kindly please go down and tap his shoulder?
q So when you heard the shots, who was actually shot?
a (witness going down and proceeded to the first bench and tap the shoulder of the person, the
a Kgd. Llona, because after looking at the (3) persons I saw Kgd. Llona sliding downward. person tapped by the witness answered to the name Salvador Monreal.)

q Then after that what happened? q You said, when you stood up and face with him while he was adjusting his revolver and he was
moving backward, did you see other persons as his companion, if any?
a Then I stood immediately and I told the persons responsible ‘stop that’s enough’, and I gave
assistance to Kgd. Llona. a At the first time when I turned my head back, I saw this Atizado he was already on the process of
leaving the place.
72
 q Who is the first name of this Atizado?
a Danilo Atizado
q And did they actually leave the place at that moment?
a Salvador Monreal was the one left.
Our own review persuades us to concur with the RTC and the CA. Indeed, Mirandilla’s positive identification of
the petitioners as the killers, and her declarations on what each of the petitioners did when they mounted their
sudden deadly assault against Llona left no doubt whatsoever that they had conspired to kill and had done so
with treachery.
It is a basic rule of appellate adjudication in this jurisdiction that the trial judge’s evaluation of the credibility of
a witness and of the witness’ testimony is accorded the highest respect because the trial judge’s unique
opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of the witness enables him to determine whether the witness is
telling the truth or not.14 Such evaluation, when affirmed by the CA, is binding on the Court unless facts or
circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted that, if considered, would
materially affect the disposition of the case.15 We thus apply the rule, considering that the petitioners have not
called attention to and proved any overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted circumstance. Fortifying
the application of the rule is that Mirandilla’s positive declarations on the identities of the assailants prevailed
over the petitioners’ denials and alibi.16
Under the law, a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.17 Yet, the State did not have to prove the petitioners’ previous
agreement to commit the murder, 18 because their conspiracy was deduced from the mode and manner in
which they had perpetrated their criminal act.19 They had acted in concert in assaulting Llona, with their
individual acts manifesting a community of purpose and design to achieve their evil end. As it is, all the
conspirators in a crime are liable as co-principals.20 Thus, they cannot now successfully assail their conviction
as co-principals in murder.
Murder is defined and punished by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659, which provides:
Article 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall
be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death, if committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing
means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or
assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other
means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an
earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or
scoffing at his person or corpse.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk
to himself arising from the defense which offended party might make. 21 For treachery to be attendant, the
means, method, or form of execution must be deliberated upon or consciously adopted by the
offenders.22 Moreover, treachery must be present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack. 23
The CA held that Mirandilla’s testimonial narrative "sufficiently established that treachery attended the attack
o[n] the victim" because Atizado’s shooting the victim at the latter’s back had been intended to ensure the
execution of the crime; and that Atizado and Monreal’s conspiracy to kill the victim was proved by their
presence at the scene of the crime each armed with a handgun that they had fired except that Monreal’s
handgun did not fire.24
We concur with the CA on the attendance of treachery. The petitioners mounted their deadly assault with
suddenness and without the victim being aware of its imminence. Neither an altercation between the victim
and the assailants had preceded the assault, nor had the victim provoked the assault in the slightest. The
assailants had designed their assault to be swift and unexpected, in order to deprive their victim of the
opportunity to defend himself.25 Such manner constituted a deliberate adoption of a method of attack that
ensured their unhampered execution of the crime.
II.
Modification of the Penalty on Monreal and of the Civil Damages
Under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty for murder is reclusion
perpetuato death. There being no modifying circumstances, the CA correctly imposed the lesser penalty
of reclusion perpetua on Atizado, which was conformable with Article 63 (2) of the RPC.26 But reclusion
perpetua was not the correct penalty for Monreal due to his being a minor over 15 but under 18 years of age.
The RTC and the CA did not appreciate Monreal’s minority at the time of the commission of the murder
probably because his birth certificate was not presented at the trial.
Yet, it cannot be doubted that Monreal was a minor below 18 years of age when the crime was committed on
April 18, 1994. Firstly, his counter-affidavit executed on June 30 1994 stated that he was 17 years of
73
age.27 Secondly, the police blotter recording his arrest mentioned that he was 17 years old at the time of his
arrest on May 18, 1994.28Thirdly, Villafe’s affidavit dated June 29, 1994 averred that Monreal was a minor on
the date of the incident.29Fourthly, as RTC’s minutes of hearing dated March 9, 1999 showed, 30 Monreal was
22 years old when he testified on direct examination on March 9, 1999, 31 which meant that he was not over 18
years of age when he committed the crime. And, fifthly, Mirandilla described Monreal as a teenager and young
looking at the time of the incident.32
The foregoing showing of Monreal’s minority was legally sufficient, for it conformed with the norms
subsequently set under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9344, also known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Act of 2006,33 viz:
Section 7. Determination of Age. - The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption of minority.
He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18)
years old or older. The age of a child may be determined from the child’s birth certificate, baptismal certificate
or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be based on information from
the child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant
evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor.
Any person contesting the age of the child in conflict with the law prior to the filing of the information in any
appropriate court may file a case in a summary proceeding for the determination of age before the Family
Court which shall decide the case within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the appropriate pleadings of all
interested parties.
If a case has been filed against the child in conflict with the law and is pending in the appropriate court, the
person shall file a motion to determine the age of the child in the same court where the case is pending.
Pending hearing on the said motion, proceedings on the main case shall be suspended.
In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and other government officials concerned
shall exert all efforts at determining the age of the child in conflict with the law.
Pursuant to Article 68 (2) of the RPC,34 when the offender is over 15 and under 18 years of age, the penalty
next lower than that prescribed by law is imposed. Based on Article 61 (2) of the RPC, reclusion temporal is
the penalty next lower than reclusion perpetua to death. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and Article
64 of the RPC, therefore, the range of the penalty of imprisonment imposable on Monreal was prision
mayor in any of its periods, as the minimum period, to reclusion temporal in its medium period, as the
maximum period. Accordingly, his proper indeterminate penalty is from six years and one day of prision
mayor, as the minimum period, to 14 years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum
period.
Monreal has been detained for over 16 years, that is, from the time of his arrest on May 18, 1994 until the
present. Given that the entire period of Monreal’s detention should be credited in the service of his sentence,
pursuant to Section 41 of Republic Act No. 9344, 35 the revision of the penalty now warrants his immediate
release from the penitentiary.
In this regard, the benefits in favor of children in conflict with the law as granted under Republic Act No. 9344,
which aims to promote the welfare of minor offenders through programs and services, such as delinquency
prevention, intervention, diversion, rehabilitation and re-integration, geared towards their development, are
retroactively applied to Monreal as a convict serving his sentence. Its Section 68 expressly so provides:
Section 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentences. – Persons who have been
convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of
eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are
serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. They shall be entitled to
appropriate dispositions provided under this Act and their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall
be immediately released if they are so qualified under this Act or other applicable laws.
Both petitioners were adjudged solidarily liable to pay damages to the surviving heirs of Llona.1avvp++il Their
solidary civil liability arising from the commission of the crime stands, 36 despite the reduction of Monreal’s
penalty. But we must reform the awards of damages in order to conform to prevailing jurisprudence. The CA
granted only P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as actual damages, and P50,000.00 as moral
damages. We hold that the amounts for death indemnity and moral damages should each be raised
to P75,000.00 to accord with prevailing case law;37 and that exemplary damages of P30,000.00 due to the
attendance of treachery should be further awarded, 38 to accord with the pronouncement in People v.
Catubig,39 to wit:
The commission of an offense has two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and
other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which, is addressed by, respectively, the
prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim. The
increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the
attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the
criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however is likewise, if not primarily,
intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary
damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be
withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a
distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil liability of the offender. In
fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying,
should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article
2230 of the Civil Code.
The award of actual damages of P30,000.00 is upheld for being supported by the record.
WHEREFORE, the Court affirms the decision dated December 13, 2005 promulgated in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
01450, subject to the following modifications:
(a) Salvador Monreal is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty from six years and one day
of prision mayor, as the minimum period, to 14 years, eight months, and one day of reclusion
temporal, as the maximum period;
74
 (b) The Court orders the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City to immediately release Salvador
Monreal due to his having fully served the penalty imposed on him, unless he is being held for other
lawful causes; and
(c) The Court directs the petitioners to pay jointly and solidarily to the heirs of Roger L.
Llona P75,000.00 as death indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and P30,000.00 as actual damages.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished for immediate implementation to the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections in Muntinlupa City by personal service. The Director of Bureau of Corrections shall report to this
Court the action he has taken on this decision within five days from service.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 188056 January 8, 2013
SPOUSES AUGUSTO G. DACUDAO AND OFELIA R. DACUDAO, Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAUL M. GONZALES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Petitioners - residents of Bacaca Road, Davao City - were among the investors whom Celso G. Delos
Angeles, Jr. and his associates in the Legacy Group of Companies (Legacy Group) allegedly defrauded
through the Legacy Group's "buy back agreement" that earned them check payments that were dishonored.
After their written demands for the return of their investments went unheeded, they initiated a number of
charges for syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao
City on February 6, 2009. Three of the cases were docketed as NPS Docket No. XI-02-INV.-09-A-00356,
Docket No. XI-02-INV.-09-C-00752, and Docket No. XI-02-INV.-09-C-00753. 1
On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department of Justice (DOJ) Order No. 182 (DO No.
182), directing all Regional State Prosecutors, Provincial Prosecutors, and City Prosecutors to forward all
cases already filed against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. to the Secretariat of the DOJ Special Panel in Manila for
appropriate action.
DO No. 182 reads:2
All cases against Celso G. delos Angeles, Jr., et al. under Legacy Group of Companies, may be filed with the
docket section of the National Prosecution Service, Department of Justice, Padre Faura, Manila and shall be
forwarded to the Secretariat of the Special Panel for assignment and distribution to panel members, per
Department Order No. 84 dated February 13, 2009.
However, cases already filed against Celso G. delos Angeles, Jr. et al. of Legacy group of Companies in your
respective offices with the exemption of the cases filed in Cagayan de Oro City which is covered by
Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, should be forwarded to the Secretariat of the Special Panel at Room 149,
Department of Justice, Padre Faura, Manila, for proper disposition.
For information and guidance.
Pursuant to DO No. 182, the complaints of petitioners were forwarded by the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Davao City to the Secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ. 3
Aggrieved by such turn of events, petitioners have directly come to the Court via petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, ascribing to respondent Secretary of Justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing
DO No. 182. They claim that DO No. 182 violated their right to due process, their right to the equal protection
of the laws, and their right to the speedy disposition of cases. They insist that DO No. 182 was an obstruction
of justice and a violation of the rule against enactment of laws with retroactive effect.
Petitioners also challenge as unconstitutional the issuance of DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009
exempting from the coverage of DO No. No. 182 all the cases for syndicated estafa already filed and pending
in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City. They aver that DOJ Memorandum dated March 2,
2009 violated their right to equal protection under the Constitution.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent Secretary of Justice, maintains the validity
of DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, and prays that the petition be dismissed for its
utter lack of merit.
Issues
The following issues are now to be resolved, to wit:
1. Did petitioners properly bring their petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus directly to the
Court?
2. Did respondent Secretary of Justice commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing DO No. 182?
3. Did DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 violate petitioners’ constitutionally
guaranteed rights?
75
 Ruling
The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, being bereft of substance and merit, is dismissed.
Firstly, petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of courts by coming directly to the Court with their
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus without tendering therein any special, important or compelling
reason to justify the direct filing of the petition.
We emphasize that the concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the
Regional Trial Courts to issue the writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction did not give petitioners the unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. 4 An undue disregard of
this policy against direct resort to the Court will cause the dismissal of the recourse. In Bañez, Jr. v.
Concepcion,5 we explained why, to wit:
The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that the policy
is not to be ignored without serious consequences. The strictness of the policy is designed to shield the Court
from having to deal with causes that are also well within the competence of the lower courts, and thus leave
time to the Court to deal with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has
assigned to it. The Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus only when absolutely necessary or when serious and important reasons exist to justify an
exception to the policy. This was why the Court stressed in Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto:
x x x. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be
burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called
extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and important
reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings
before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for
some reason or another are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary
writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these
courts that the specific action for the writ’s procurement must be presented. This is and should continue to be
the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe. (Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Cuaresma, the Court has also amplified the need for strict adherence to the policy of hierarchy of
courts. There, noting "a growing tendency on the part of litigants and lawyers to have their applications for the
so-called extraordinary writs, and sometimes even their appeals, passed upon and adjudicated directly and
immediately by the highest tribunal of the land," the Court has cautioned lawyers and litigants against taking a
direct resort to the highest tribunal, viz:
x x x. This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts x
x x, which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also shared by this
Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals x x x, although prior to the effectivity of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's competence to issue the extraordinary writs was
restricted to those "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be
taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court
to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate
forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly
indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be
filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of
the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special
and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a
policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better
devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's
docket. Indeed, the removal of the restriction on the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this regard, supra—
resulting from the deletion of the qualifying phrase, "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" — was evidently
intended precisely to relieve this Court pro tanto of the burden of dealing with applications for the
extraordinary writs which, but for the expansion of the Appellate Court corresponding jurisdiction, would have
had to be filed with it.1âwphi1
xxxx
The Court therefore closes this decision with the declaration for the information and evidence of all concerned,
that it will not only continue to enforce the policy, but will require a more strict observance thereof. (Emphasis
supplied)
Accordingly, every litigant must remember that the Court is not the only judicial forum from which to seek and
obtain effective redress of their grievances. As a rule, the Court is a court of last resort, not a court of the first
instance. Hence, every litigant who brings the petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus should ever be mindful of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, the observance of which is
explicitly defined and enjoined in Section 4 of Rule 65, Rules of Court, viz:
Section 4. When and where petition filed. - The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice
of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether
such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of the said
motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a
corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area
as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in
the aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it
involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the
petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be
filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. 6
76
Secondly, even assuming arguendo that petitioners’ direct resort to the Court was permissible, the petition
must still be dismissed.
The writ of certiorari is available only when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.7"The sole office of the writ of certiorari," according to Delos Santos v. Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Company:8
x x x is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the
issuance of the writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial or quasi-
judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or
that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty
enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
For a special civil action for certiorari to prosper, therefore, the following requisites must concur, namely: (a) it
must be directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) the
tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (c) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.9 The burden of proof lies on petitioners to demonstrate that the assailed
order was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
Yet, petitioners have not shown a compliance with the requisites. To start with, they merely alleged that the
Secretary of Justice had acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction. Also, the petition did not show that the
Secretary of Justice was an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Instead, the Secretary of
Justice would appear to be not exercising any judicial or quasi-judicial functions because his questioned
issuances were ostensibly intended to ensure his subordinates’ efficiency and economy in the conduct of the
preliminary investigation of all the cases involving the Legacy Group. The function involved was purely
executive or administrative.
The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the Government does not make it a quasi-judicial
office or agency. Its preliminary investigation of cases is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. Nor does the DOJ
exercise a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor on the finding of probable
cause in any case. Indeed, in Bautista v. Court of Appeals,10 the Supreme Court has held that a preliminary
investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, stating:
x x x the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.
He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial,
and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to
enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no
purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause
to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be
acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal. 11
There may be some decisions of the Court that have characterized the public prosecutor’s power to conduct a
preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature. Still, this characterization is true only to the extent that the
public prosecutor, like a quasi-judicial body, is an officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to
those of a court of law.
But the limited similarity between the public prosecutor and a quasi-judicial body quickly endsthere. For sure,
a quasi-judicial body is an organ of government other than a court of law or a legislative office that affects the
rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making; it performs adjudicatory functions, and its
awards and adjudications determine the rights of the parties coming before it; its decisions have the same
effect as the judgments of a court of law. In contrast, that is not the effect whenever a public prosecutor
conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause in order to file a criminal information against
a person properly charged with the offense, or whenever the Secretary of Justice reviews the public
prosecutor’s orders or resolutions.
Petitioners have self-styled their petition to be also for prohibition. However, we do not see how that can be.
They have not shown in their petition in what manner and at what point the Secretary of Justice, in handing
out the assailed issuances, acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. On the other hand, we already indicated why the issuances were
not infirmed by any defect of jurisdiction. Hence, the blatant omissions of the petition transgressed Section 2,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 2. Petition for prohibition. — When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter
specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject
thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-
forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (2a) Similarly, the petition could not
be one for mandamus, which is a remedy available only when "any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office
to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court." 12 The main
objective of mandamus is to compel the performance of a ministerial duty on the part of the respondent.
Plainly enough, the writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion or to
compel a course of conduct,13 which, it quickly seems to us, was what petitioners would have the Secretary of
Justice do in their favor. Consequently, their petition has not indicated how and where the Secretary of
77
Justice’s assailed issuances excluded them from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which they were
unquestionably entitled.
Thirdly, there is no question that DO No. 182 enjoyed a strong presumption of its validity. In ABAKADA Guro
Party List v. Purisima,14 the Court has extended the presumption of validity to legislative issuances as well as
to rules and regulations issued by administrative agencies, saying:
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law which they
are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect. Such rules and regulations partake
of the nature of a statute and are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. As such, they
have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set
aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court. 15
DO No. 182 was issued pursuant to Department Order No. 84 that the Secretary of Justice had promulgated
to govern the performance of the mandate of the DOJ to "administer the criminal justice system in accordance
with the accepted processes thereof"16 as expressed in Republic Act No. 10071 (Prosecution Service Act of
2010) and Section 3, Chapter I, Title III and Section 1, Chapter I, Title III of Book IV of Executive Order 292
(Administrative Code of 1987).
To overcome this strong presumption of validity of the questioned issuances, it became incumbent upon
petitioners to prove their unconstitutionality and invalidity, either by showing that the Administrative Code of
1987 did not authorize the Secretary of Justice to issue DO No. 182, or by demonstrating that DO No. 182
exceeded the bounds of the Administrative Code of 1987 and other pertinent laws. They did not do so. They
must further show that the performance of the DOJ’s functions under the Administrative Code of 1987 and
other pertinent laws did not call for the impositions laid down by the assailed issuances. That was not true
here, for DO No 182 did not deprive petitioners in any degree of their right to seek redress for the alleged
wrong done against them by the Legacy Group. Instead, the issuances were designed to assist petitioners
and others like them expedite the prosecution, if warranted under the law, of all those responsible for the
wrong through the creation of the special panel of state prosecutors and prosecution attorneys in order to
conduct a nationwide and comprehensive preliminary investigation and prosecution of the cases. Thereby, the
Secretary of Justice did not act arbitrarily or oppressively against petitioners.
Fourthly, petitioners attack the exemption from the consolidation decreed in DO No. 182 of the cases filed or
pending in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City, claiming that the exemption traversed the
constitutional guaranty in their favor of the equal protection of law. 17
The exemption is covered by the assailed DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, to wit:
It has come to the attention of the undersigned that cases for syndicated estafa were filed with your office
against officers of the Legacy Group of Companies. Considering the distance of the place of complainants
therein to Manila, your Office is hereby exempted from the directive previously issued by the undersigned
requiring prosecution offices to forward the records of all cases involving Legacy Group of Companies to the
Task Force.
Anent the foregoing, you are hereby directed to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases involving the
Legacy Group of Companies filed in your office with dispatch and to file the corresponding informations if
evidence warrants and to prosecute the same in court.
Petitioners’ attack deserves no consideration. The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not require
the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction; what it requires is simply
equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. 18 Hence, the Court has affirmed that if
a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the classification stands as long as it
bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government end. 19
That is the situation here. In issuing the assailed DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, the Secretary of
Justice took into account the relative distance between Cagayan de Oro, where many complainants against
the Legacy Group resided, and Manila, where the preliminary investigations would be conducted by the
special panel. He also took into account that the cases had already been filed in the City Prosecutor’s Office
of Cagayan de Oro at the time he issued DO No. 182. Given the considerable number of complainants
residing in Cagayan de Oro City, the Secretary of Justice was fully justified in excluding the cases
commenced in Cagayan de Oro from the ambit of DO No. 182. The classification taken into consideration by
the Secretary of Justice was really valid. Resultantly, petitioners could not inquire into the wisdom behind the
exemption upon the ground that the non-application of the exemption to them would cause them some
inconvenience.
Fifthly, petitioners contend that DO No. 182 violated their right to the speedy disposition of cases guaranteed
by the Constitution. They posit that there would be considerable delay in the resolution of their cases that
would definitely be "a flagrant transgression of petitioners’ constitutional rights to speedy disposition of their
cases."20
We cannot favor their contention.
In The Ombudsman v. Jurado,21 the Court has clarified that although the Constitution guarantees the right to
the speedy disposition of cases, such speedy disposition is a flexible concept. To properly define that concept,
the facts and circumstances surrounding each case must be evaluated and taken into account. There occurs
a violation of the right to a speedy disposition of a case only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements of the trial are sought and secured, or
when, without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having
his case tried.22 It is cogent to mention that a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not
determinant of the concept.23
The consolidation of the cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. was ordered obviously to obtain expeditious
justice for the parties with the least cost and vexation to them. Inasmuch as the cases filed involved similar or
related questions to be dealt with during the preliminary investigation, the Secretary of Justice rightly found
the consolidation of the cases to be the most feasible means of promoting the efficient use of public resources
and of having a comprehensive investigation of the cases.
78
On the other hand, we do not ignore the possibility that there would be more cases reaching the DOJ in LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
addition to those already brought by petitioners and other parties. Yet, any delays in petitioners’ cases Associate Justice
occasioned by such other and subsequent cases should not warrant the invalidation of DO No. 182. The
Constitution prohibits only the delays that are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive, and tend to render G.R. No. 159823 February 18, 2013
rights nugatory.24 In fine, we see neither undue delays, nor any violation of the right of petitioners to the
speedy disposition of their cases.
TEODORO A. REYES, Petitioner,
vs.
Sixthly, petitioners assert that the assailed issuances should cover only future cases against Delos Angeles, ETTORE ROSSI, Respondent.
Jr., et al., not those already being investigated. They maintain that DO No. 182 was issued in violation of the
prohibition against passing laws with retroactive effect.
DECISION
Petitioners’ assertion is baseless.
BERSAMIN, J.:
As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However, exceptions exist, and one such exception
concerns a law that is procedural in nature. The reason is that a remedial statute or a statute relating to The rescission of a contract of sale is not a prejudicial question that will warrant the suspension of the criminal
remedies or modes of procedure does not create new rights or take away vested rights but only operates in proceedings commenced to prosecute the buyer for violations of the Bouncing Checks Law (Batas Pambansa
furtherance of the remedy or the confirmation of already existing rights. 25 A statute or rule regulating the Blg. 22) arising from the dishonor of the checks the buyer issued in connection with the sale.
procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of its
passage. All procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The retroactive application is not Antecedents
violative of any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, for, verily, no vested right generally attaches
to or arises from procedural laws.
On October 31, 1997, petitioner Teodoro A. Reyes (Reyes) and Advanced Foundation Construction Systems
Corporation (Advanced Foundation), represented by its Executive Project Director, respondent Ettore Rossi
Finally, petitioners have averred but failed to establish that DO No. 182 constituted obstruction of justice. This (Rossi), executed a deed of conditional sale involving the purchase by Reyes of equipment consisting of a
ground of the petition, being unsubstantiated, was unfounded. Warman Dredging Pump HY 300A worth P10,000,000.00. The parties agreed therein that Reyes would pay
the sum of P3,000,000.00 as downpayment, and the balance of P7,000,000.00 through four post-dated
Nonetheless, it is not amiss to reiterate that the authority of the Secretary of Justice to assume jurisdiction checks. Reyes complied, but in January 1998, he requested the restructuring of his obligation under the deed
over matters involving the investigation of crimes and the prosecution of offenders is fully sanctioned by law. of conditional sale by replacing the four post-dated checks with nine post-dated checks that would include
Towards that end, the Secretary of Justice exercises control and supervision over all the regional, provincial, interest at the rate of P25,000.00/month accruing on the unpaid portion of the obligation on April 30, 1998,
and city prosecutors of the country; has broad discretion in the discharge of the DOJ’s functions; and June 30, 1998, July 31, 1998, September 30, 1998 and October 31, 1998. 1
administers the DOJ and its adjunct offices and agencies by promulgating rules and regulations to carry out
their objectives, policies and functions. Advanced Foundation assented to Reyes’ request, and returned the four checks. In turn, Reyes issued and
delivered the following nine postdated checks in the aggregate sum of P7,125,000.00 drawn against the
Consequently, unless and until the Secretary of Justice acts beyond the bounds of his authority, or arbitrarily, United Coconut Planters Bank,2 to wit:
or whimsically, or oppressively, any person or entity who may feel to be thereby aggrieved or adversely
affected should have no right to call for the invalidation or nullification of the rules and regulations issued by,
as well as other actions taken by the Secretary of Justice. Check No. Date Amount
72807 April 30, 1998 P 25,000.00
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the omnibus petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus for lack 79125 May 1, 1998 1,000,000.00
of merit.
72802 May 30, 1998 2,000,000.00
Petitioners shall pay the costs of suit. 72808 June 30, 1998 25,000.00
72809 July 31, 1998 25,000.00
SO ORDERED.

79
 72801 August 31, 1998 2,000,000.00
72810 September 30, 1998 25,000.00
72811 October 31, 1998 25,000.00
72903 November 30, 1998 2,000,000.00
Rossi deposited three of the post-dated checks (i.e., No. 72807, No. 79125 and No. 72808) on their maturity
dates in Advanced Foundation’s bank account at the PCI Bank in Makati. Two of the checks were denied
payment ostensibly upon Reyes’ instructions to stop their payment, while the third (i.e., No. 72802) was
dishonored for insufficiency of funds.3
Rossi likewise deposited two more checks (i.e., No. 72809 and No. 72801) in Advanced Foundation’s account
at the PCI Bank in Makati, but the checks were returned with the notation Account Closed stamped on them.
He did not anymore deposit the three remaining checks on the assumption that they would be similarly
dishonored.4
In the meanwhile, on July 29, 1998, Reyes commenced an action for rescission of contract and damages in
the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City (RTC). His complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. Q98-35109 and
entitled Teodoro A. Reyes v. Advanced Foundation Construction Systems Corporation, sought judgment
declaring the deed of conditional sale "rescinded and of no further force and effect," and ordering Advanced
Foundation to return the P3,000,000.00 downpayment with legal interest from June 4, 1998 until fully paid;
and to pay to him attorney’s fees, and various kinds and amounts of damages. 5
On September 8, 1998, Rossi charged Reyes with five counts of estafa and five counts of violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati for the dishonor of Checks No. 72807, No.
72808, No. 72801, No. 72809 and No. 79125. Another criminal charge for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 was lodged against Reyes in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City for the dishonor of Check
No. 72802.6
On September 29, 1998, Reyes submitted his counter-affidavit in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Makati,7claiming that the checks had not been issued for any valuable consideration; that he had discovered
from the start of using the dredging pump involved in the conditional sale that the Caterpillar diesel engine
powering the pump had been rated at only 560 horsepower instead of the 1200 horsepower Advanced
Foundation had represented to him; that welding works on the pump had neatly concealed several cracks;
that on May 6, 1998 he had written to Advanced Foundation complaining about the misrepresentations on the
specifications of the pump and demanding documentary proof of Advanced Foundation’s ownership of the
pump; that he had caused the order to stop the payment of three checks (i.e., No. 72806, No. 72807 and No.
79125); that Advanced Foundation had replied to his letter on May 8, 1998 by saying that the pump had been
sold to him on an as is, where is basis; that he had then sent another letter to Advanced Foundation on May
18, 1998 to reiterate his complaints and the request for proper documentation of ownership; that he had
subsequently discovered other hidden defects, prompting him to write another letter; and that instead of
attending to his complaints and request, Advanced Foundation’s lawyers had threatened him with legal action.
At the same time, Reyes assailed the jurisdiction of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati over the
criminal charges against him on the ground that he had issued the checks in Quezon City; as well as argued
that the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati should suspend the proceedings because of the pendency in
the RTC of the civil action for rescission of contract that posed a prejudicial question as to the criminal
proceedings.8
On November 20, 1998, the Assistant City Prosecutor handling the preliminary investigation recommended
the dismissal of the charges of estafa and the suspension of the proceedings relating to the violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 based on a prejudicial question.9
On January 5, 1999, the City Prosecutor of Makati approved the recommendation of the handling Assistant
City Prosecutor,10 stating:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint for Estafa is respectfully recommended to be dismissed,
as upon approval, it is hereby dismissed.
Further, it is respectfully recommended that the proceedings in the charge for Violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 against the respondent be suspended until the prejudicial question raised in Civil Case Q-98-35109
for Rescission of Contract and Damages which is now pending with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 224, has
been duly resolved.
Rossi appealed the resolution of the City Prosecutor to the Department of Justice, but the Secretary of
Justice, by resolution of July 24, 2001, denied Rossi’s petition for review.
After the denial of his motion for reconsideration on April 29, 2002, Rossi challenged the resolutions of the
Secretary of Justice by petition for certiorari in the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In the petition for certiorari, Rossi insisted that the Secretary of Justice had committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in upholding the suspension of the criminal proceedings
by the City Prosecutor of Makati on account of the existence of a prejudicial question, and in sustaining the
dismissal of the complaints for estafa.
On May 30, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed decision,11 to wit:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the assailed resolution is hereby MODIFIED and the instant petition
is GRANTED in so far as the issue of the existence of prejudicial question is concerned. Accordingly, the
order suspending the preliminary investigation in I.S. No. 98-40024-29 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
the dismissal of the complaint for estafa is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
80
 Issues
Hence, this appeal by Reyes.
Reyes asserts that the CA erred in ruling that there was no prejudicial question that warranted the suspension
of the criminal proceedings against him; that the petition suffered fatal defects that merited its immediate
dismissal; that the CA was wrong in relying on the pronouncements in Balgos, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan12 and Umali v. Intermediate Appellate Court13 because the factual backgrounds thereat were
not similar to that obtaining here; and that the Secretary of Justice did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In his comment,14 Rossi counters that the petition for review should be outrightly dismissed because of its fatal
defect; that the CA did not err in ruling that the action for rescission of contract did not pose a prejudicial
question that would suspend the criminal proceedings.
Reyes submitted a reply,15 declaring that the defect in the affidavit of service attached to his petition for review
had been due to oversight; that he had substantially complied with the rules; that there existed a prejudicial
question that could affect the extent of his liability in light of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-
2000; and that the CA erred in finding that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion.
To be resolved is whether or not the civil action for rescission of the contract of sale raised a prejudicial
question that required the suspension of the criminal prosecution for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
Ruling
The petition for review is without merit.
A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are
both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must first be determined before the latter may
proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de
jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. 16 The rationale for the suspension on the
ground of a prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions. 17
Two elements that must concur in order for a civil case to be considered a prejudicial question are expressly
stated in Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. – The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
In Sabandal v. Tongco,18 the concept of prejudicial question is explained in this wise:
For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal
proceedings until the final resolution of the civil, the following requisites must be present: (1) the civil case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.
If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues raised
in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other element or characteristic is
satisfied. It must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would be
necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil
action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same
facts, or there is no necessity "that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case,"
therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. Neither is there a prejudicial question if the
civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.
Contending that the rescission of the contract of sale constitutes a prejudicial question, Reyes posits that the
resolution of the civil action will be determinative of whether or not he was criminally liable for the violations
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. He states that if the contract would be rescinded, his obligation to pay under the
conditional deed of sale would be extinguished, and such outcome would necessarily result in the dismissal of
the criminal proceedings for the violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
The action for the rescission of the deed of sale on the ground that Advanced Foundation did not comply with
its obligation actually seeks one of the alternative remedies available to a contracting party under Article 1191
of the Civil Code, to wit:
Article 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should
not comply with what is incumbent upon him.
The injured party may choose between the fulfilment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of
damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfilment, if the latter should
become impossible.
The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of a period.
This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have acquired the thing, in
accordance with Articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law.
Article 1191 of the Civil Code recognizes an implied or tacit resolutory condition in reciprocal obligations. The
condition is imposed by law, and applies even if there is no corresponding agreement thereon between the
parties. The explanation for this is that in reciprocal obligations a party incurs in delay once the other party has
performed his part of the contract; hence, the party who has performed or is ready and willing to perform may
rescind the obligation if the other does not perform, or is not ready and willing to perform. 19
81
It is true that the rescission of a contract results in the extinguishment of the obligatory relation as if it was
never created, the extinguishment having a retroactive effect. The rescission is equivalent to invalidating and
unmaking the juridical tie, leaving things in their status before the celebration of the contract. 20 However, until
the contract is rescinded, the juridical tie and the concomitant obligations subsist.
To properly appreciate if there is a prejudicial question to warrant the suspension of the criminal actions,
reference is made to the elements of the crimes charged. The violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 requires
the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to
apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.21 The issue in the criminal actions upon the violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 is, therefore,
whether or not Reyes issued the dishonoured checks knowing them to be without funds upon presentment.
On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for rescission is whether or not the breach in the fulfilment of
Advanced Foundation’s obligation warranted the rescission of the conditional sale. If, after trial on the merits
in the civil action, Advanced Foundation would be found to have committed material breach as to warrant the
rescission of the contract, such result would not necessarily mean that Reyes would be absolved of the
criminal responsibility for issuing the dishonored checks because, as the aforementioned elements show, he
already committed the violations upon the dishonor of the checks that he had issued at a time when the
conditional sale was still fully binding upon the parties. His obligation to fund the checks or to make
arrangements for them with the drawee bank should not be tied up to the future event of extinguishment of the
obligation under the contract of sale through rescission. Indeed, under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the mere
issuance of a worthless check was already the offense in itself. Under such circumstances, the criminal
proceedings for the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 could proceed despite the pendency of the civil
action for rescission of the conditional sale.
Accordingly, we agree with the holding of the CA that the civil action for the rescission of contract was not
determinative of the guilt or innocence of Reyes. We consider the exposition by the CA of its reasons to be
appropriate enough, to wit:
xxxx
We find merit in the petition.
A careful perusal of the complaint for rescission of contract and damages reveals that the causes of action
advanced by respondent Reyes are the alleged misrepresentation committed by the petitioner and AFCSC
and their alleged failure to comply with his demand for proofs of ownership. On one hand, he posits that his
consent to the contract was vitiated by the fraudulent act of the company in misrepresenting the condition and
quality of the dredging pump. Alternatively, he claims that the company committed a breach of contract which
is a ground for the rescission thereof. Either way, he in effect admits the validity and the binding effect of the
deed pending any adjudication which nullifies the same.
Indeed, under the Jaw on contracts, vitiated consent does not make a contract unenforceable but merely
voidable, the remedy of which would be to annul the contract since voidable contracts produce legal effects
until they are annulled. On the other hand, rescission of contracts in case of breach pursuant to Article 1191 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines also presupposes a valid contract unless rescinded or annulled.
As defined, a prejudicial question is one that arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of
the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question
must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be
lodged in another court or tribunal.
It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not
only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined. It comes into play generally in a situation where a civil action and a
criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved
before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
In this light, it is clear that the pendency of the civil case does not bar the continuation of the proceedings in
the preliminary investigation on the ground that it poses a prejudicial question. Considering that the contracts
are deemed to be valid until rescinded, the consideration and obligatory effect thereof are also deemed to
have been validly made, thus demandable. Consequently, there was no failure of consideration at the time
when the subject checks were dishonored. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review; AFFIRMS the decision the Court of Appeals
promulgated on May 30, 2003; and DIRECTS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
G.R. Nos. 177105-06 August 12, 2010
JOSE REYES y VACIO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
82
BERSAMIN, J.:
The petitioner appeals by petition for review on certiorari the decision dated January 15, 2007 rendered by the
Sandiganbayan, finding him guilty in Criminal Case No. 24655 of a violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act
No. 3019,1 and in Criminal Case No. 24656 of usurpation of judicial functions as defined and penalized under
Article 241, Revised Penal Code. 2
Antecedents
Belen Lopez Vda. de Guia (Belen) was the registered absolute owner of two parcels of agricultural land with
an area of 197,594 square meters located in Santa Barbara, Baliwag, Bulacan and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 209298 of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. On March 19, 1975, Belen’s son,
Carlos de Guia (Carlos), forged a deed of sale, in which he made it appear that his mother had sold the land
to him. Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan cancelled TCT No. 209298 by virtue of the forged
deed of sale and issued TCT No. 210108 in Carlos’ name.
On March 20, 1975, Carlos sold the land to Ricardo San Juan (Ricardo). On the same date, Ricardo
registered the deed of sale in the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, which cancelled TCT No. 210108 and issued
TCT No. 210338 in Ricardo’s name. Subsequently, Ricardo mortgaged the land to Simeon Yangco (Simeon).
Upon learning of the transfers of her land, Belen filed on December 20, 1975 an adverse claim in the Register
of Deeds of Bulacan. Her adverse claim was annotated on TCT No. 210338. She also filed in the then Court
of First Instance (CFI) of Baliwag, Bulacan a civil action for cancellation of sale, reconveyance, and damages
against Carlos, Ricardo and Simeon, docketed as Civil Case No. 655-B.
On January 20, 1981, the CFI decided Civil Case No. 655-B, dismissing Belen’s complaint and affirming the
validity of the deeds of sale between Belen and Carlos and between Carlos and Ricardo. Belen filed a motion
for reconsideration but her motion was denied.
Belen appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC), docketed as AC-G.R. CV No. 5524-UDK.
On April 19, 1983, the IAC dismissed Belen’s appeal due to non-payment of docket fees. The dismissal
became final on May 17, 1983, and entry of judgment was issued on June 21, 1983. The records were
remanded to the CFI on July 6, 1983.3
Thereafter, the tenants of the land, namely, Paulino Sacdalan, Leonardo Sacdalan, Santiago Sacdalan,
Numeriano Bautista and Romeo Garcia (tenants), invoked their right to redeem pursuant to Section 12 of
Republic Act No. 3844, as amended.4 Acting thereon, Ricardo executed a deed of reconveyance in favor of
the tenants on October 24, 1983.5
Upon registration of the deed of reconveyance, TCT No. 210338 was cancelled, and TCT No. 301375 was
issued in the names of the tenants. The land was subdivided into several lots, and individual TCTs were
issued in the names of the tenants.
In the meanwhile, Belen discovered for the first time through a letter-inquiry to the IAC Clerk of Court that her
appeal in AC-G.R. CIV No. 5524-UDK had been dismissed for non-payment of docket fees. She thus filed in
the IAC a motion to reinstate her appeal. The IAC granted her motion. 6 The reinstated appeal was re-docketed
as AC-G.R. CV No. 02883.
On February 20, 1986, the IAC promulgated its decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883, granting Belen’s
appeal,7 thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one entered:
(1) declaring as null and void and without any effect whatsoever the deed of sale executed by and
between appellant Belen Lopez vda. De Guia and defendant Carlos de Guia, Exhibit "A;"
(2) declaring defendant-appellant Ricardo San Juan as a purchaser in bad faith and ordering him to
reconvey to appellant the two (2) parcels of land described in the complaint;
(3) ordering the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel and/or annul TCT No. 210338 in the name
of defendant-appellee Ricardo San Juan as well as TCT No. 210108 in the name of defendant-
appellee Carlos de Guia for being null and void and to reinstate TCT No. 209298 in the name of
appellant as the true and valid title over the lands described therein; and
(4) ordering the defendants-appellees to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
The IAC decision became final on March 15, 1986, and entry of judgment was made on November 7,
1986.8 The records were remanded to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baliwag, Bulacan (RTC).
On December 18, 1986, Belen filed in the RTC a motion for execution vis-à-vis the decision in AC-G.R. CV
No. 02883. The RTC granted her motion. However, when the writ of execution was about to be executed,
Belen learned that Ricardo had sold the land to the tenants through a deed of reconveyance. Thus, Belen filed
in the RTC a motion to declare Ricardo and the tenants in contempt of court for circumventing the final and
executory judgment in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883.
On October 12, 1987, the RTC held Ricardo and the tenants in contempt of court and ordered each of them to
pay a fine of P200.00. It directed Ricardo and the tenants to reconvey the land to Belen and to deliver to her
the share in the harvest.
Ricardo and the tenants appealed the RTC order to the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
14783 entitled Mariano Bautista, et al vs. Hon. Felipe N. Villajuan, Jr. as Judge RTC of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch XIV and Belen Lopez Vda. De Guia.
83
On November 8, 1988, Belen, through her daughter and attorney-in-fact, Melba G. Valenzuela (Melba), filed in
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a complaint for ejectment and collection of
rents against the tenants, entitled Belen Lopez Vda. De Guia thru her Attorney-in-Fact, Melba G. Valenzuela
vs. Paulino Sacdalan, Romeo Garcia, Numeriano Bautista, Leonardo Sacdalan and Santiago Sacdalan and
docketed as DARAB Case No. 034-BUL’88.9
On July 6, 1989, the CA rendered its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 14783, 10 affirming the RTC order dated
October 12, 1987 with modification. It ruled that the RTC correctly ordered Ricardo and the tenants to
reconvey the land to Belen, but held that the RTC erred in finding Ricardo and the tenants in contempt of
court. This decision became final and executory on July 31, 1989.
On March 16, 1993, the petitioner, as Provincial Adjudicator, rendered a decision in DARAB Case No. 034-
BUL’88 entitled Belen Lopez vda. De Guia thru her Attorney-in-Fact, Melba G. Valenzuela v. Paulino
Sacdalan, Romeo Garcia, Numeriano Bautista, Leonardo Sacdalan and Santiago Sacdalan, 11 dismissing
Belen’s complaint for ejectment and collection of rents and affirming the respective TCTs of the tenants, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Board finds the instant case wanting of merit, the same is hereby
dismissed. Consequently, the Transfer Certificate of titles Nos. T-307845, T-307846, T-307856, T-307857, T-
307869, T-307870, T-307871, T-307873 and T-307874 issued in the name of Numeriano Bautista, Romeo
Garcia, Leonardo Sacdalan, Paulino Sacdalan and Santiago Sacdalan respectively are hereby AFFIRMED.
The plaintiff and all other persons acting in their behalf are hereby ordered to permanently cease and desist
from committing any acts tending to oust or eject the defendants or their heirs or assigns from the landholding
in question.
12
SO ORDERED.
Belen filed a notice of appeal in the DARAB on March 26, 1993.
On March 31, 1993, the petitioner granted the tenants’ motion for execution in DARAB Case No. 034-
BUL’88.13
Aggrieved, Belen, through Melba, filed an urgent motion to set aside the writ of execution in DARAB Case No.
034-BUL’88,14 but her motion was denied.
On October 24, 1994, the DARAB Central Office affirmed the petitioner’s ruling. 15
After her motion for reconsideration was denied, Belen lodged an appeal to the CA (CA-G.R. SP No. 39315).
In due course, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the DARAB Central Office, 16 and ordered the
tenants: (a) to vacate the land; (b) to deliver its possession to Belen; and (c) to pay to Belen the rents on the
land corresponding to the period from 1981 until they would have vacated.
The tenants filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied their motion.
Thus, the tenants appealed to this Court (G.R. No. 128967), which affirmed the CA’s decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 39315.17
On May 13, 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations in the Sandiganbayan, one charging
the petitioner with a violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, and the other with usurpation of judicial functions
under Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code, 18 as follows:
Criminal Case No. 24655
(for violation of section 3 (e) of RA 3019)
That on or about 16 March 1993, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Malolos, Bulacan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Jose V. Reyes, a public officer
being then employed as Provincial Adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) in Malolos, Bulacan, while in the performance of his official function as such and acting with evident
bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally render his decision in
DARAB Case No. 034-Bul-88 favorable to the tenants who were respondents in said agrarian case, thereby
ignoring and disregarding the final and executory decision of the Court of Appeals in AC-GR CV-02883 which
declared complainant Belen de Guia as the true owner of the lands subject of the litigation in both cases, thus
causing undue injury and damage to the said Belen de Guia and to the public interest. 19
Criminal Case No. 24656
(for usurpation of judicial functions under
Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code)
That on or about 16 March 1993, or immediately prior or subsequent thereto, in Malolos, Bulacan, Philippines,
above-named accused Jose V. Reyes, a public officer being then employed as Provincial Adjudicator of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in Malolos, Bulacan, while in the performance of
his official function as such and taking advantage thereof, with full knowledge of a Decision in AC-GR CV-
02883 of the Court of Appeals, which declared Belen de Guia as the true owner of the lands litigated in said
case, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously disregard, obstruct and ignore the said final and
executory decision of the Court of Appeals, by rendering a decision in DARAB Case No. 034-Bul-88 thereby
favoring and emboldening the tenants-respondents in said DARAB case to unlawfully continue occupying the
lands of Belen de Guia, the complainant, to her damage and prejudice, as well as to the public interest. 20
Arraigned on August 8, 2000, the petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to each
information.21
After trial, on January 15, 2007, the Sandiganbayan rendered its assailed decision, 22 finding the petitioner
guilty of both charges; and sentencing him to suffer: (a) in Criminal Case No. 24655 (for violation of Section 3
(e) of RA 3019), an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment from six years and one month, as minimum, to 10
years as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from holding public office; and (b) in Criminal Case No.
84
24656 (for usurpation of judicial functions under Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code), imprisonment of four
months of arresto mayor.
The Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on March 15, 2007. 23
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
Issues
The issues raised herein are:
a) Whether the petitioner was guilty of violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 in rendering his decision in
DARAB CASE NO. 034 BUL’88; and
b) Whether the petitioner was guilty of usurpation of judicial functions under Article 241 of the
Revised Penal Code.24
Anent the first issue, the petitioner maintains that there was no evident bad faith, manifest partiality, and gross
inexcusable negligence on his part when he decided DARAB Case No. 034-BUL’88; that his decision therein
had been solely based on what he had perceived to be in keeping with the letter and spirit of the pertinent
laws; and that his decision had been rendered upon a thorough appreciation of the facts and the law. 25
As to the second issue, the petitioner insists that his rendition of the decision did not amount to the felony of
usurpation of judicial functions.
Ruling
The petitioner was correctly held guilty of and liable for violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 in rendering his
decision in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL’88, but his conviction for usurpation of judicial functions under Article
241 of the Revised Penal Code is reversed and set aside.
A.
Elements of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, established herein
RA 3019 was enacted to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike that constitute graft or
corrupt practices or may lead thereto. 26 The law enumerates the punishable acts or omissions and provides
their corresponding penalties.
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, under which petitioner was charged and found guilty, relevantly provides:
Section. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
xxx
The essential elements of the offense under Section 3 (e) are the following:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence;
and
3. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any private
party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions. 27
The first element was established. The petitioner was a public officer when he rendered his decision in
DARAB Case No. 034 BUL’88, being then a Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB discharging the duty of
adjudicating the conflicting claims of parties.
The second element includes the different and distinct modes by which the offense is committed, that is,
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. Proof of the existence of any of
the modes suffices to warrant conviction under Section 3 (e). 28
Manifest partiality exists when the accused has a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor
one side or one person rather than another. 29 It is synonymous with bias, which excites a disposition to see
and report matters as they are wished for rather than as they are. 30
Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or to cause
damage.31 It contemplates a breach of sworn duty through some perverse motive or ill will. 32
Gross inexcusable negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting
or omitting to act in a situation where there is duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with
conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. 33
85
The decision rendered on February 20, 1986 in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883 – nullifying the forged deed of sale
between Belen and Carlos; declaring Ricardo a purchaser in bad faith; ordering Ricardo to reconvey the land
to Belen; directing the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel the respective TCTs of Ricardo and Carlos; and
reinstating Belen’s TCT – became final on March 15, 1986. After the entry of judgment was made on
November 7, 1986, the records were remanded to the RTC in Baliwag, Bulacan, which eventually granted
Belen’s motion for execution.
Due to its finality, the decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883 became immutable, and could no longer be modified
in any respect, whether the modification was to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law, whether made by
the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. 34 The reason for such immutability is that a
litigation must end sometime, and an effective and efficient administration of justice requires that the winning
party be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict once a judgment becomes final. 35
The petitioner was fully aware of the finality of the decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883 prior to his promulgation
of the decision in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL’88. Indeed, he actually admitted having read and examined the
following documents (adduced by the Prosecution) prior to his rendition of the decision, 36 namely:
(1) Belen’s position paper dated August 7, 1992 submitted to him in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL’88,
in which Belen stated that the decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883 had become final and executory; 37
(2) The entry of judgment issued in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883; 38
(3) Belen’s TCT No. 209298, reflecting the entry of judgment issued in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883 and
the cancellation of the TCTs of the tenants-lessees by virtue of the decision in AC-G.R. CV No.
02883;39 and
(4) Addendum to Belen’s position paper, mentioning the decree in the decision in AC-G.R. CV No.
02883.40
Yet, the petitioner still rendered his decision in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL’88 that completely contradicted and
disregarded the decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883 by invalidating Belen’s title on the land and upholding the
TCTs of the tenants. He thereby exhibited manifest partiality, for such decision of his was a total and willful
disregard of the final decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883. His granting the tenants’ motion for execution made
his partiality towards the tenants and bias against Belen that much more apparent.
Similarly, the petitioner’s evident bad faith displayed itself by his arrogant refusal to recognize and obey the
decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883, despite his unqualified obligation as Provincial Adjudicator to abide by the
CA’s ruling that was binding on him as Provincial Adjudicator and on all the parties in DARAB Case No. 034-
BUL’88.
Worthy of note is that the CA, in CA-G.R. SP No. 39315, and this Court, in G.R. No. 128967, had
characterized the petitioner’s aforementioned conduct as "an utter disrespect to the judiciary," as vested with
a "dishonest purpose," and as constituting "a contumacious attitude which should not be tolerated." 41 These
acute characterizations fortify the holding that he harbored a deliberate intent to do wrong to Belen.
Correctly did the Sandiganbayan find that the petitioner had displayed manifest partiality and evident bad faith
in rendering his decision in DARAB Case No. 034-BUL’88.
The third element of the offense – when the act of the accused caused undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or, gave any private party unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge of the
functions of the accused – was also established. In this regard, proof of the extent or quantum of damage was
not essential, it being sufficient that the injury suffered or the benefit received could be perceived to be
substantial enough and was not merely negligible.421avvphi1
Belen was constrained to engage the services of a lawyer and to incur other expenses in order to protect and
prosecute her interest in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL’88. In all, her expenses were in the substantial sum
of P990,000.00.43 Moreover, the petitioner’s stubborn refusal to recognize and obey the decision in AC-G.R.
CV No. 02883 forced a further but needless prejudicial delay in the prompt termination of the cases. The delay
proved very costly to Belen, for, in that length of time (that is, from March 16, 1993 up to the present), Belen
has been unduly deprived of her exclusive ownership and undisturbed possession of the land, and the fruits
thereof. The injury and prejudice surely equated to undue injury for Belen.
Likewise, the petitioner’s ruling in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL’88 gave unwarranted benefit, advantage, or
preference to the tenants by allowing them to remain in possession of the land and to enjoy the fruits.
Given the foregoing considerations, the Sandiganbayan correctly convicted the petitioner in Criminal Case No.
24655 for violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.
B.
Usurpation of judicial functions
Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code states:
xxx The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correcional in its minimum period shall be
imposed upon any officer of the executive branch of the government who shall assume judicial powers or shall
obstruct the execution of any order or decision rendered by any judge within his jurisdiction.
In usurpation of judicial function, the accused, who is not a judge, attempts to perform an act the authority for
which the law has vested only in a judge.44 However, the petitioner’s task as Provincial Adjudicator when he
rendered judgment in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL’88 was to adjudicate the claims of the opposing parties. As
such, he performed a quasi-judicial function, closely akin to the function of a judge of a court of law. He could
not be held liable under Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code, therefore, considering that the acts
constitutive of usurpation of judicial function were lacking herein.
86
 C.
Penalties
The Sandiganbayan appreciated the mitigating circumstance of old age in favor of the petitioner by virtue of
his being already over 70 years old.
The Sandiganbayan thereby erred. The mitigating circumstance of old age under Article 13 (2) of the Revised
Penal Code applied only when the offender was over 70 years at the time of the commission of the
offense.45 The petitioner, being only 63 years old when he committed the offenses charged, 46 was not entitled
to such mitigating circumstance.
Under Section 9 of RA 3019, the penalty for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 is imprisonment for not less
than six years and one month nor more than 15 years, and perpetual disqualification from public office.
Pursuant to Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is punished by a special law, the
accused is punished with an indeterminate sentence the maximum of which does not exceed the maximum
fixed by the law violated, and the minimum is not less than the minimum term prescribed by the law violated.
Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. 24655, the Sandiganbayan correctly imposed on the petitioner the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from six years and one month, as minimum, to 10 years as
maximum. The penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office was also correctly imposed.
WHEREFORE, the Court affirms the conviction of the petitioner in Criminal Case No. 24655 (for violation of
section 3 (e) of RA 3019), but reverses and sets aside his conviction in Criminal Case No. 24656 (for
usurpation of judicial functions as defined and penalized under Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code).
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 157943 September 4, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
vs.
GILBERT REYES WAGAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of an accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. In
order to overcome the presumption of innocence, the Prosecution is required to adduce against him nothing
less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. Such proof is not only in relation to the elements of the offense, but
also in relation to the identity of the offender. If the Prosecution fails to discharge its heavy burden, then it is
not only the right of the accused to be freed, it becomes the Court’s constitutional duty to acquit him.
The Case
Gilbert R. Wagas appeals his conviction for estafa under the decision rendered on July 11, 2002 by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, in Cebu City (RTC), meting on him the indeterminate penalty of 12 years of
prision mayor, as minimum, to 30 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum.
Antecedents
Wagas was charged with estafa under the information that reads:
That on or about the 30th day of April, 1997, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in the City of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent,
with intent to gain and by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with
the commission of the fraud, to wit: knowing that he did not have sufficient funds deposited with the Bank of
Philippine Islands, and without informing Alberto Ligaray of that circumstance, with intent to defraud the latter,
did then and there issue Bank of the Philippine Islands Check No. 0011003, dated May 08, 1997 in the
amount of P200,000.00, which check was issued in payment of an obligation, but which check when
presented for encashment with the bank, was dishonored for the reason "drawn against insufficient funds" and
inspite of notice and several demands made upon said accused to make good said check or replace the same
with cash, he had failed and refused and up to the present time still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage
and prejudice of Alberto Ligaray in the amount aforestated.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
After Wagas entered a plea of not guilty,2 the pre-trial was held, during which the Defense admitted that the
check alleged in the information had been dishonored due to insufficient funds. 3 On its part, the Prosecution
made no admission.4
At the trial, the Prosecution presented complainant Alberto Ligaray as its lone witness. Ligaray testified that on
April 30, 1997, Wagas placed an order for 200 bags of rice over the telephone; that he and his wife would not
agree at first to the proposed payment of the order by postdated check, but because of Wagas’ assurance that
he would not disappoint them and that he had the means to pay them because he had a lending business and
money in the bank, they relented and accepted the order; that he released the goods to Wagas on April 30,
1997 and at the same time received Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) Check No. 0011003 for P200,000.00
payable to cash and postdated May 8, 1997; that he later deposited the check with Solid Bank, his depository
87
bank, but the check was dishonored due to insufficiency of funds;5 that he called Wagas about the matter, and
the latter told him that he would pay upon his return to Cebu; and that despite repeated demands, Wagas did
not pay him.6
On cross-examination, Ligaray admitted that he did not personally meet Wagas because they transacted
through telephone only; that he released the 200 bags of rice directly to Robert Cañada, the brother-in-law of
Wagas, who signed the delivery receipt upon receiving the rice.7
After Ligaray testified, the Prosecution formally offered the following: (a) BPI Check No. 0011003 in the
amount of P200,000.00 payable to "cash;" (b) the return slip dated May 13, 1997 issued by Solid Bank; (c)
Ligaray’s affidavit; and (d) the delivery receipt signed by Cañada. After the RTC admitted the exhibits, the
Prosecution then rested its case.8
In his defense, Wagas himself testified. He admitted having issued BPI Check No. 0011003 to Cañada, his
brother-in-law, not to Ligaray. He denied having any telephone conversation or any dealings with Ligaray. He
explained that the check was intended as payment for a portion of Cañada’s property that he wanted to buy,
but when the sale did not push through, he did not anymore fund the check. 9
On cross-examination, the Prosecution confronted Wagas with a letter dated July 3, 1997 apparently signed
by him and addressed to Ligaray’s counsel, wherein he admitted owing Ligaray P200,000.00 for goods
received, to wit:
This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated June 23, 1997 which is self-explanatory. It is worthy also to
discuss with you the environmental facts of the case for your consideration, to wit:
It is true that I obtained goods from your client worth P200,000.00 and I promised to settle the same last May
10, 1997, but to no avail. On this point, let me inform you that I sold my real property to a buyer in Manila, and
promised to pay the consideration on the same date as I promised with your client. Unfortunately, said buyer
likewise failed to make good with such obligation. Hence, I failed to fulfill my promise resultant thereof. (sic)
Again, I made another promise to settle said obligation on or before June 15, 1997, but still to no avail
attributable to the same reason as aforementioned. (sic)
To arrest this problem, we decided to source some funds using the subject property as collateral. This other
means is resorted to for the purpose of settling the herein obligation. And as to its status, said funds will be
rele[a]sed within thirty (30) days from today.
In view of the foregoing, it is my sincere request and promise to settle said obligation on or before August 15,
1997.
Lastly, I would like to manifest that it is not my intention to shy away from any financial obligation.
xxxx
Respectfully yours,
(SGD.)
GILBERT R. WAGAS10
Wagas admitted the letter, but insisted that it was Cañada who had transacted with Ligaray, and that he had
signed the letter only because his sister and her husband (Cañada) had begged him to assume the
responsibility.11 On redirect examination, Wagas declared that Cañada, a seafarer, was then out of the
country; that he signed the letter only to accommodate the pleas of his sister and Cañada, and to avoid
jeopardizing Cañada’s application for overseas employment.12 The Prosecution subsequently offered and the
RTC admitted the letter as rebuttal evidence.13
Decision of the RTC
As stated, the RTC convicted Wagas of estafa on July 11, 2002, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
charged and he is hereby sentenced as follows:
To suffer an indeterminate penalty of from twelve (12) years of pris[i]on mayor, as minimum, to thirty (30)
years of reclusion perpetua as maximum;
To indemnify the complainant, Albert[o] Ligaray in the sum of P200,000.00;
To pay said complainant the sum of P30,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees; and the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.14
The RTC held that the Prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt all the elements constituting the
crime of estafa, namely: (a) that Wagas issued the postdated check as payment for an obligation contracted at
the time the check was issued; (b) that he failed to deposit an amount sufficient to cover the check despite
having been informed that the check had been dishonored; and (c) that Ligaray released the goods upon
receipt of the postdated check and upon Wagas’ assurance that the check would be funded on its date.
Wagas filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, 15 arguing that the Prosecution did not establish that
it was he who had transacted with Ligaray and who had negotiated the check to the latter; that the records
showed that Ligaray did not meet him at any time; and that Ligaray’s testimony on their alleged telephone
conversation was not reliable because it was not shown that Ligaray had been familiar with his voice. Wagas
also sought the reopening of the case based on newly discovered evidence, specifically: (a) the testimony of
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Cañada who could not testify during the trial because he was then out of the country, and (b) Ligaray’s
testimony given against Wagas in another criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
On October 21, 2002, the RTC denied the motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, opining that the
evidence Wagas desired to present at a new trial did not qualify as newly discovered, and that there was no
compelling ground to reverse its decision.16
Wagas appealed directly to this Court by notice of appeal. 17
Prior to the elevation of the records to the Court, Wagas filed a petition for admission to bail pending appeal.
The RTC granted the petition and fixed Wagas’ bond at P40,000.00.18 Wagas then posted bail for his
provisional liberty pending appeal.19
The resolution of this appeal was delayed by incidents bearing on the grant of Wagas’ application for bail. On
November 17, 2003, the Court required the RTC Judge to explain why Wagas was out on bail. 20 On January
15, 2004, the RTC Judge submitted to the Court a so-called manifestation and compliance which the Court
referred to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report, and recommendation. 21 On July
5, 2005, the Court, upon the OCA’s recommendation, directed the filing of an administrative complaint for
simple ignorance of the law against the RTC Judge. 22 On September 12, 2006, the Court directed the OCA to
comply with its July 5, 2005 directive, and to cause the filing of the administrative complaint against the RTC
Judge. The Court also directed Wagas to explain why his bail should not be cancelled for having been
erroneously granted.23 Finally, in its memorandum dated September 27, 2006, the OCA manifested to the
Court that it had meanwhile filed the administrative complaint against the RTC Judge. 24
Issues
In this appeal, Wagas insists that he and Ligaray were neither friends nor personally known to one other; that
it was highly incredible that Ligaray, a businessman, would have entered into a transaction with him involving
a huge amount of money only over the telephone; that on the contrary, the evidence pointed to Cañada as the
person with whom Ligaray had transacted, considering that the delivery receipt, which had been signed by
Cañada, indicated that the goods had been "Ordered by ROBERT CAÑADA," that the goods had been
received by Cañada in good order and condition, and that there was no showing that Cañada had been acting
on behalf of Wagas; that he had issued the check to Cañada upon a different transaction; that Cañada had
negotiated the check to Ligaray; and that the element of deceit had not been established because it had not
been proved with certainty that it was him who had transacted with Ligaray over the telephone.
The circumstances beg the question: did the Prosecution establish beyond reasonable doubt the existence of
all the elements of the crime of estafa as charged, as well as the identity of the perpetrator of the crime?
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:
xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with
the commission of the fraud:
xxxx
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in
the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the
drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of
notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency
of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
In order to constitute estafa under this statutory provision, the act of postdating or issuing a check in payment
of an obligation must be the efficient cause of the defraudation. This means that the offender must be able to
obtain money or property from the offended party by reason of the issuance of the check, whether dated or
postdated. In other words, the Prosecution must show that the person to whom the check was delivered would
not have parted with his money or property were it not for the issuance of the check by the offender. 25
The essential elements of the crime charged are that: (a) a check is postdated or issued in payment of an
obligation contracted at the time the check is issued; (b) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and
(c) damage to the payee thereof.26 It is the criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check that is
punishable, not the non-payment of a debt.27 Prima facie evidence of deceit exists by law upon proof that the
drawer of the check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three days from receipt
of the notice of dishonor.
The Prosecution established that Ligaray had released the goods to Cañada because of the postdated check
the latter had given to him; and that the check was dishonored when presented for payment because of the
insufficiency of funds.
In every criminal prosecution, however, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by
proof beyond reasonable doubt.28 In that regard, the Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt
that it was Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check.
Firstly, Ligaray expressly admitted that he did not personally meet the person with whom he was transacting
over the telephone, thus:
89
Q: Who is that "him" that you are referring to?

On April 30, 1997, do you remember having a transaction with the accused in this case? A:

A: Gilbert Wagas.30

Yes, sir. He purchased two hundred bags of rice from me.
Q:
How did this purchase of rice transaction started? (sic)
Secondly, the check delivered to Ligaray was made payable to cash. Under the Negotiable Instruments Law,
this type of check was payable to the bearer and could be negotiated by mere delivery without the need of an
indorsement.31 This rendered it highly probable that Wagas had issued the check not to Ligaray, but to
somebody else like Cañada, his brother-in-law, who then negotiated it to Ligaray.1âwphi1 Relevantly, Ligaray
confirmed that he did not himself see or meet Wagas at the time of the transaction and thereafter, and
expressly stated that the person who signed for and received the stocks of rice was Cañada.

A: It bears stressing that the accused, to be guilty of estafa as charged, must have used the check in order to
defraud the complainant. What the law punishes is the fraud or deceit, not the mere issuance of the worthless
He talked with me over the phone and told me that he would like to purchase two hundred bags of rice and he check. Wagas could not be held guilty of estafa simply because he had issued the check used to defraud
will just issue a check.29 Ligaray. The proof of guilt must still clearly show that it had been Wagas as the drawer who had defrauded
Ligaray by means of the check.
Even after the dishonor of the check, Ligaray did not personally see and meet whoever he had dealt with and
to whom he had made the demand for payment, and that he had talked with him only over the telephone, to Thirdly, Ligaray admitted that it was Cañada who received the rice from him and who delivered the check to
wit: him. Considering that the records are bereft of any showing that Cañada was then acting on behalf of Wagas,
the RTC had no factual and legal bases to conclude and find that Cañada had been acting for Wagas. This
lack of factual and legal bases for the RTC to infer so obtained despite Wagas being Cañada’s brother-in-law.
Q:
Finally, Ligaray’s declaration that it was Wagas who had transacted with him over the telephone was not
After the check was (sic) bounced, what did you do next? reliable because he did not explain how he determined that the person with whom he had the telephone
conversation was really Wagas whom he had not yet met or known before then. We deem it essential for
A: purposes of reliability and trustworthiness that a telephone conversation like that one Ligaray supposedly had
with the buyer of rice to be first authenticated before it could be received in evidence. Among others, the
person with whom the witness conversed by telephone should be first satisfactorily identified by voice
I made a demand on them. recognition or any other means.32 Without the authentication, incriminating another person just by adverting to
the telephone conversation with him would be all too easy. In this respect, an identification based on familiarity
Q: with the voice of the caller, or because of clearly recognizable peculiarities of the caller would have
sufficed.33 The identity of the caller could also be established by the caller’s self-identification, coupled with
How did you make a demand? additional evidence, like the context and timing of the telephone call, the contents of the statement
challenged, internal patterns, and other distinctive characteristics, and disclosure of knowledge of facts known
peculiarly to the caller.34
A:
Verily, it is only fair that the caller be reliably identified first before a telephone communication is accorded
I called him over the phone. probative weight. The identity of the caller may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence. According
to one ruling of the Kansas Supreme Court:
Q:
Communications by telephone are admissible in evidence where they are relevant to the fact or facts in issue,
and admissibility is governed by the same rules of evidence concerning face-to-face conversations except the
90
party against whom the conversations are sought to be used must ordinarily be identified. It is not necessary Q:
that the witness be able, at the time of the conversation, to identify the person with whom the conversation
was had, provided subsequent identification is proved by direct or circumstantial evidence somewhere in the Mr. Witness, you mentioned that you and the accused entered into [a] transaction of rice selling, particularly
development of the case. The mere statement of his identity by the party calling is not in itself sufficient proof with these 200 sacks of rice subject of this case, through telephone conversation?
of such identity, in the absence of corroborating circumstances so as to render the conversation admissible.
However, circumstances preceding or following the conversation may serve to sufficiently identify the caller.
The completeness of the identification goes to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility, and the A:
responsibility lies in the first instance with the district court to determine within its sound discretion whether the
threshold of admissibility has been met.35 (Bold emphasis supplied) Yes, sir.

Yet, the Prosecution did not tender any plausible explanation or offer any proof to definitely establish that it Q:
had been Wagas whom Ligaray had conversed with on the telephone. The Prosecution did not show through
Ligaray during the trial as to how he had determined that his caller was Wagas. All that the Prosecution sought
to elicit from him was whether he had known and why he had known Wagas, and he answered as follows: But you cannot really ascertain that it was the accused whom you are talking with?

Q: A:

Do you know the accused in this case? I know it was him because I know him.

A: Q:

Yes, sir. Am I right to say [that] that was the first time that you had a transaction with the accused through telephone
conversation, and as a consequence of that alleged conversation with the accused through telephone he
issued a check in your favor?
Q:
A:
If he is present inside the courtroom […]
No. Before that call I had a talk[ ] with the accused.
A:
Q:
No, sir. He is not around.
But still through the telephone?
Q:
A:
Why do you know him?
Yes, sir.
A:
Q:
I know him as a resident of Compostela because he is an ex-mayor of Compostela. 36
There was no instant (sic) that the accused went to see you personally regarding the 200 bags rice
During cross-examination, Ligaray was allowed another opportunity to show how he had determined that his transaction?
caller was Wagas, but he still failed to provide a satisfactory showing, to wit:

91
A: the commission of the offense with the participation of the accused. All these facts must be proved by the
State beyond reasonable doubt on the strength of its evidence and without solace from the weakness of the
No. It was through telephone only. defense. That the defense the accused puts up may be weak is inconsequential if, in the first place, the State
has failed to discharge the onus of his identity and culpability. The presumption of innocence dictates that it is
for the Prosecution to demonstrate the guilt and not for the accused to establish innocence. 41 Indeed, the
Q: accused, being presumed innocent, carries no burden of proof on his or her shoulders. For this reason, the
first duty of the Prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal. For even if the
In fact[,] you did not cause the delivery of these 200 bags of rice through the accused himself? commission of the crime can be established, without competent proof of the identity of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, there can be no conviction.42
A:
There is no question that an identification that does not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake cannot be
accorded any evidentiary force.43 Thus, considering that the circumstances of the identification of Wagas as
Yes. It was through Robert. the person who transacted on the rice did not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake, the proof of guilt
did not measure up to the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt demanded in criminal cases. Perforce,
Q: the accused’s constitutional right of presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved is not overcome,
and he is entitled to an acquittal,44 even though his innocence may be doubted.45
So, after that phone call[,] you deliver[ed] th[ose] 200 sacks of rice through somebody other than the
accused? Nevertheless, an accused, though acquitted of estafa, may still be held civilly liable where the preponderance
of the established facts so warrants.46 Wagas as the admitted drawer of the check was legally liable to pay the
amount of it to Ligaray, a holder in due course.47 Consequently, we pronounce and hold him fully liable to pay
A: the amount of the dishonored check, plus legal interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision.

Yes, sir.37 WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision rendered on July 11, 2002 by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, in Cebu City; and ACQUITS Gilbert R. Wagas of the crime of estafa on the
Ligaray’s statement that he could tell that it was Wagas who had ordered the rice because he "know[s]" him ground of reasonable doubt, but ORDERS him to pay Alberto Ligaray the amount of P200,000.00 as actual
was still vague and unreliable for not assuring the certainty of the identification, and should not support a damages, plus interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision.
finding of Ligaray’s familiarity with Wagas as the caller by his voice. It was evident from Ligaray’s answers that
Wagas was not even an acquaintance of Ligaray’s prior to the transaction. Thus, the RTC’s conclusion that No pronouncement on costs of suit.
Ligaray had transacted with Wagas had no factual basis. Without that factual basis, the RTC was speculating
on a matter as decisive as the identification of the buyer to be Wagas.
SO ORDERED.
The letter of Wagas did not competently establish that he was the person who had conversed with Ligaray by
telephone to place the order for the rice. The letter was admitted exclusively as the State’s rebuttal evidence LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
to controvert or impeach the denial of Wagas of entering into any transaction with Ligaray on the rice; hence, it Associate Justice
could be considered and appreciated only for that purpose. Under the law of evidence, the court shall
consider evidence solely for the purpose for which it is offered, 38 not for any other purpose.39 Fairness to the G.R. No. 158362 April 4, 2011
adverse party demands such exclusivity. Moreover, the high plausibility of the explanation of Wagas that he
had signed the letter only because his sister and her husband had pleaded with him to do so could not be
taken for granted. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
GILBERTO VILLARICO, SR. @ "BERTING", GILBERTO VILLARICO, JR., JERRY RAMENTOS, and
It is a fundamental rule in criminal procedure that the State carries the onus probandi in establishing the guilt RICKY VILLARICO, Accused-Appellants.
of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, as a consequence of the tenet ei incumbit probation, qui dicit, non
qui negat, which means that he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove, 40 and as a means of respecting
the presumption of innocence in favor of the man or woman on the dock for a crime. Accordingly, the State DECISION
has the burden of proof to show: (1) the correct identification of the author of a crime, and (2) the actuality of
92
BERSAMIN, J:
The identification of the accused as the person responsible for the imputed crime is the primary duty of the
State in every criminal prosecution. Such identification, to be positive, need not always be by direct evidence
from an eyewitness, for reliable circumstantial evidence can equally confirm it as to overcome the
constitutionally presumed innocence of the accused.
On appeal by the accused is the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on June 6, 2003, 1 finding
Gilberto Villarico, Sr., Gilberto Villarico, Jr., Jerry Ramentos, 2 and Ricky Villarico guilty of murder for the killing
of Haide Cagatan, and imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua on each of them, thereby modifying the
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 16, in Tangub City that had pronounced them guilty of
homicide aggravated by dwelling.3
With treachery having attended the killing, we affirm the CA but correct the civil liability to accord with pertinent
law and jurisprudence.
Antecedents
On October 7, 1999, an information for murder was filed in the Regional Trial Court in Misamis Occidental
(RTC) against all the accused,4 the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about August 8, 1999, at about 7:50 o’clock in the morning at Barangay Bolinsong, Municipality of
Bonifacio, Province of Misamis Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, armed
with a short firearms (sic), did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously suddenly and treacherously shoot
HAIDE CAGATAN at the back penetrating through the neck which cause(d) the instant death of said victim
and that he had no chance to avoid or defend himself from the attack.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
All the accused pleaded not guilty at their December 15, 1999 arraignment.
Version of the Prosecution
At around 7:50 p.m. on August 8, 1999, Haide was busy preparing dinner in the kitchen of his family’s
residence in Bolinsong, Bonifacio, Misamis Occidental. The kitchen, located at the rear of the residence, had
a wall whose upper portion was made of three-feet high bamboo slats (sa-sa) and whose lower portion was
also made of bamboo slats arranged like a chessboard with four-inch gaps in between. At that time, Haide’s
sister-in-law Remedios Cagatan was attending to her child who was answering the call of nature near the
toilet. From where she was, Remedios saw all the accused as they stood at the rear of the kitchen aiming
their firearms at the door – Ricky Villarico was at the left side, and Gilberto, Jr. stood behind him, while
Gilberto, Sr. was at the right side, with Ramentos behind him. When Gilberto, Jr. noticed Remedios, he
pointed his gun at her, prompting Remedios to drop to the ground and to shout to Lolita Cagatan, her mother-
in-law and Haide’s mother: Nay, Nay tawo Nay (Mother, mother, there are people outside, mother). At that
instant, Remedios heard three gunshots.5
Francisco Cagatan, the father of Haide, also heard the gunshots just as he was coming out of the toilet,
making him instinctively jump into a hole, from where he was able to see and recognize Gilberto, Sr., Gilberto,
Jr. and Ricky who were then standing by the kitchen door. They were aiming their guns upward, and soon
after left together with Ramentos.6
Lolita also heard the gunshots while she was in the sala. She recalled that Haide then came towards her from
the kitchen, asking for help and saying: Tabang kay gipusil ko ni Berting (I was shot by Berting).7 At that, she
and Remedios brought the wounded Haide to Clinica Ozarraga, where he was treated for gunshot wounds on
his left scapular region (back of left shoulder) and right elbow. He succumbed shortly thereafter due to
hypovolemic shock or massive loss of blood.8
Version of the Defense
The accused denied the accusations and each proffered an alibi.
Gilberto, Sr. claimed that he was sleeping in his home with a fever when he heard a gunshot. He insisted that
he learned that Haide had been shot only in the next morning.9 His denial and alibi were corroborated by his
wife Carmelita10 and his daughter Jersel.11
Gilberto, Jr. testified that on the day of the incident, he went to Liloan, Bonifacio, Misamis Occidental at
around 5:00 p.m. to visit his girlfriend together with Charlie Bacus and Randy Hernan. They stayed there until
9:00 p.m. Thereafter, they proceeded to Tiaman to attend the wake for one Helen Oligario Cuizon, and were
there for an hour. They then returned to Bolinsong and spent the night in the house of Randy. It was only in
the morning that Randy’s father informed them that Haide had been shot. 12
Ricky declared that he stayed throughout the whole evening of August 8, 1999 in the house of his aunt
Flordeliza.13Myrna Hernan, a neighbor of Flordeliza, corroborated his testimony. 14
Ramentos alleged that he was drinking tuba with others at the store owned by Cinderella Bacus at the time of
the shooting; and that he went home at around 9:00 p.m. after his group was done drinking. He did not recall
hearing any gunshots while drinking and came to know of the shooting only from a certain Anecito Duyag on
the following morning.1avvphi1
To discredit the testimony about Haide being able to identify his assailants, the Defense presented Peter
Ponggos, who narrated that he had been on board a motorcycle (habal-habal) when Lolita and Remedios
asked for his help; and that he then aided Lolita and Remedios in bringing Haide to the hospital. According to
Peter, he asked Haide who had shot him, but Haide replied that there had been only one assailant whom he
did not recognize.15
Ruling of the RTC
93
After trial, the RTC convicted the four accused of homicide aggravated by dwelling, disposing: 16
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Homicide, with one aggravating circumstance of dwelling, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, hereby sentences each one of them to a penalty of imprisonment ranging from 6 years and 1 day, as its
minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day, as its maximum, to suffer the accessory penalties provided for by
law, to pay jointly and solidarily, the heirs of the victim P50,000.00, as civil liability and to pay the costs.
Let all the accused be credited of the time that they were placed in jail under preventive imprisonment,
applying the provisions of Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
SO ORDERED.
The RTC accorded faith to the positive identification of the accused by the Prosecution’s witnesses, and
disbelieved their denial and alibis due to their failure to show the physical improbability for them to be at the
crime scene, for the distances between the crime scene and the places where the accused allegedly were at
the time of the commission of the crime were shown to range from only 100 to 700 meters. 17 The RTC found,
however, that the Prosecution was not able to prove treachery because:
xxx The medical report of "gunshot wound left scapular region" which the doctor interpreted to be at the back
of the left shoulder is not sufficient to prove treachery, it being susceptible to 2 different interpretations: one:
that victim had his back towards his assailants, and two: that he was actually facing them but he turned
around for cover upon seeing the armed "group of Berting". The Court is inclined to believe the second
interpretation because the victim was able to see and identify his assailants. Two prosecution witnesses
testified that the victim identified to them who shot him. 18
Ruling of the CA
On intermediate review, the CA modified the RTC’s decision, holding instead that murder was established
beyond reasonable doubt because the killing was attended by treachery, viz: 19
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby MODIFIED. Pursuant to Section 13, paragraph 2 of Rule 124
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, We render JUDGMENT without entering it, as follows:
1. We find all accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER. Each accused is hereby
SENTENCED TO SUFFER the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
2. The Division Clerk of Court is hereby directed to CERTIFY and ELEVATE the entire records of this
case to the Supreme Court for review.
SO ORDERED.20
Citing People v. Valdez,21 the CA explained that the attendance of treachery did not depend on the position of
the victim at the time of the attack, for the essence of treachery was in the element of surprise the assailants
purposely adopted to ensure that the victim would not be able to defend himself. Considering that the accused
had purposely positioned themselves at night outside the door to the kitchen from where they could see
Haide, who was then busy preparing dinner, through the holes of the kitchen wall, the CA concluded that
Haide was thus left unaware of the impending assault against him.
Issues
In this recourse, the accused raise the following errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF
MURDER DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE IDENTITY OF THE
ASSAILANT AS WELL AS ACCUSED-APPELLANTS’ GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY, ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT INDEED ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY.
The accused contend that the Prosecution witnesses failed to positively identify them as the persons who had
actually shot Haide; that treachery was not attendant because there was no proof showing that they had
consciously and deliberately adopted the mode of attacking the victim; and that assuming that they committed
the killing, they could only be convicted of homicide.
The decisive queries are, therefore, the following:
(a) Should an identification, to be positive, have to be made by a witness who actually saw the
assailants?
(b) Was treachery attendant in the killing of Haide as to qualify the crime as murder?
Ruling
We affirm the finding of guilt for the crime of murder, but modify the civil liability.
1.
94
 Positive identification refers to Atty. Fernandez:
proof of identity of the assailant
Q. And where were you at that time when he was shot?
The first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, for, even if
the commission of the crime can be established, there can be no conviction without proof of the identity of the A. In the sala.
criminal beyond reasonable doubt.22 In that regard, an identification that does not preclude a reasonable
possibility of mistake cannot be accorded any evidentiary force. 23 The intervention of any mistake or the
appearance of any weakness in the identification simply means that the accused’s constitutional right of Q. Could you possibly tell the Honorable Court what actually took place when your son was shot?
presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved is not overcome, thereby warranting an acquittal, 24 even
if doubt may cloud his innocence.25Indeed, the presumption of innocence constitutionally guaranteed to every A. He came from the kitchen at that time when I heard gunreports, he said "Nay" help me because I was shot
individual is forever of primary importance, and every conviction for crime must rest on the strength of the by Berting.29
evidence of the State, not on the weakness of the defense. 26
xxx
The accused contend that the Prosecution witnesses did not actually see who had shot Haide; hence, their
identification as the malefactors was not positively and credibly made.
Atty. Anonat:
We cannot uphold the contention of the accused.
Q. And that affidavit was executed by you at the Bonifacio Police Station?
The established circumstances unerringly show that the four accused were the perpetrators of the fatal
shooting of Haide. Their identification as his assailants by Remedios and Francisco was definitely positive and A. Yes.
beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, Remedios saw all the four accused near the door to the kitchen
immediately beforethe shots were fired and recognized who they were. She even supplied the detail that xxx
Gilberto, Jr. had trained his firearm towards her once he had noticed her presence at the crime scene. On his
part, Francisco attested to seeing the accused near the door to the kitchen holding their firearms right after he
heard the gunshots, and also recognized them. Q. And you affirm to the truth of what you have stated in this affidavit?

The collective recollections of both Remedios and Francisco about seeing the four accused standing near the
door to the kitchen immediately before and after the shooting of Haide inside the kitchen were categorical
enough, and warranted no other logical inference than that the four accused were the persons who had just
shot Haide. Indeed, neither Remedios nor Francisco needed to have actually seen who of the accused had
fired at Haide, for it was enough that they testified that the four armed accused: (a) had strategically
positioned themselves by the kitchen door prior to the shooting of Haide; (b) had still been in the same
positions after the gunshots were fired; and (c) had continuously aimed their firearms at the kitchen door even
as they were leaving the crime scene.
The close relationship of Remedios and Francisco with the victim as well as their familiarity with the accused
who were their neighbors assured the certainty of their identification as Haide’s assailants. In Marturillas v.
People,27 the Court observed that the familiarity of the witness with the assailant erased any doubt that the
witness could have erred; and noted that a witness related to the victim had a natural tendency to remember
the faces of the person involved in the attack on the victim, because relatives, more than anybody else, would
be concerned with seeking justice for the victim and bringing the malefactor before the law. 28
Moreover, the following portions of Lolita’s testimony show that Haide himself recognized and identified his
assailants, to wit:
A. Yes.
Q. On question No. 7 you were asked in this manner – "Giunsa man nimo pagkasayod nga sila maoy
responsible sa kamatayon sa imong anak? How do you know that they were responsible (for) the death of
your son? And your answer is this "Tungod kay ang biktima nakasulti pa man sa wala pa siya namatay ug ang
iyang pulong mao nga TABANG NAY KAY GIPUSIL KO NILA NI BERTING ug nasayod ako nga sila gumikan
sa akong mga testigos." which translated into English – Because the victim was able to talk before he died
and the words which he told me help me Nay I am shot by the group of Berting and I know this because of my
witnesses. 30
xxx
The statement of Haide to his mother that he had just been shot by the group of Berting – uttered in the
immediate aftermath of the shooting where he was the victim – was a true part of the res gestae. The
statement was admissible against the accused as an exception to the hearsay rule under Section 42, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

95
Section 42. Part of the res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place
or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in
evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue,
and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae. (36 a)
The term res gestae refers to "those circumstances which are the undesigned incidents of a particular litigated
act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act."31 In a general way, res gestae includes the
circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and
which are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and
fabrication.32 The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission
of the crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or
utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.33
The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is whether the act, declaration, or exclamation
is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded
a part of the principal fact or event itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to
manufacture testimony.34 A declaration or an utterance is thus deemed as part of the res gestae that is
admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (a) the
principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the declarant had
time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.35
We find that the requisites concurred herein. Firstly, the principal act – the shooting of Haide – was a startling
occurrence. Secondly, his statement to his mother about being shot by the group of Berting was made before
Haide had time to contrive or to devise considering that it was uttered immediately after the shooting. And,
thirdly, the statement directly concerned the startling occurrence itself and its attending circumstance (that is,
the identities of the assailants). Verily, the statement was reliable as part of the res gestae for being uttered in
spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence.
In the face of the positive identification of all the four accused, it did not matter whether only one or two of
them had actually fired the fatal shots. Their actions indicated that a conspiracy existed among them. Indeed,
a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it.36 Direct proof of a previous agreement among the accused to commit the crime is not
necessary,37 for conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct of the accused at the time of their commission of
the crime that evinces a common understanding among them on perpetrating the crime. 38 Thus, the concerted
acts of the four manifested their agreement to kill Haide, resulting in each of them being guilty of the crime
regardless of whether he actually fired at the victim or not. It is axiomatic that once conspiracy is established,
the act of one is the act of all;39and that all the conspirators are then liable as co-principals. 40
But did not the fact that the name Berting without any surname being too generic open the identification of the
accused as the assailants to disquieting doubt about their complicity?
We hold that there was no need for a surname to be attached to the nickname Berting in order to insulate the
identification by Haide from challenge. The victim’s res gestae statement was only one of the competent and
reliable pieces of identification evidence. As already shown, the accused were competently incriminated also
by Remedios and Francisco in a manner that warranted the logical inference that they, and no others, were
the assailants. Also, that Berting was the natural nickname for a person whose given name was Gilberto, like
herein accused Gilberto, Sr. and Gilberto, Jr., was a matter of common knowledge in the Philippines. In fine,
the pieces of identification evidence, including Haide’s res gestae statement, collaborated to render their
identification unassailable.
Relevantly, the Court has distinguished two types of positive identification in People v. Gallarde,41 namely: (a)
that by direct evidence, through an eyewitness to the very commission of the act; and (b) that by
circumstantial evidence, such as where the accused is last seen with the victim immediately before or after
the crime. The Court said:
xxx Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an
eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of positive identification. A
witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness
to the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be
instances where, although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime,
he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for
instance when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately
before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification, which
forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting
an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the author of the
crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual eyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to possibly positively
identify a suspect or accused to the exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an
eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary that there can be no conviction until and unless an accused is
positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is settled that direct evidence of the
commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of
guilt. If resort to circumstantial evidence would not be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the absence
of direct evidence, then felons would go free and the community would be denied proper protection. 42
To conclude, the identification of a malefactor, to be positive and sufficient for conviction, does not always
require direct evidence from an eyewitness; otherwise, no conviction will be possible in crimes where there
are no eyewitnesses. Indeed, trustworthy circumstantial evidence can equally confirm the identification and
overcome the constitutionally presumed innocence of the accused.
Faced with their positive identification, the four accused had to establish convincing defenses. They opted to
rely on denial and their respective alibis, however, but both the RTC and the CA rightly rejected such
defenses.
The rejection was warranted. Long judicial experience instructs that their denial and alibis, being too easy to
invent, could not overcome their positive identification by credible Prosecution witnesses whose motives for
the identification were not shown to be ill or vile. Truly, a positive identification that is categorical, consistent,
and devoid of any showing of ill or vile motive on the part of the Prosecution witnesses always prevails over
96
alibi and denial that are in the nature of negative and self-serving evidence. 43 To be accepted, the denial and Q. Were you present when the late Haide Cagatan was shot?
alibi must be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence establishing not only that the accused did not
take part in the commission of the imputed criminal act but also that it was physically impossible for the A. Yes, I was present.
accused to be at or near the place of the commission of the act at or about the time of its commission. In
addition, their proffered alibis were really unworthy of credit because only the accused themselves and their
relatives and other intimates substantiated them.44 Q. Could you possibly tell the Court in what particular place you were when the alleged incident took place?

2. A. I was in the ground floor.

The essence of treachery is in the mode of attack,
not in the relative position of the victim and the assailant
The RTC ruled out the attendance of treachery due to its persuasion that the victim must have been facing his
assailants at the time of the assault and was thus not taken by surprise. The CA differed from the RTC,
however, and stressed that regardless of the position of the victim, the essence of treachery was the element
of surprise that the assailants purposely adopted to ensure that the victim was not able to defend himself. 45
We uphold the ruling of the CA.
Q. What were you doing there?
A. I attended my child (to) answer(ing) the call of his (sic) nature.
Q. Now, could you possibly describe before this Honorable Court, Mrs. Cagatan, the exact event that took
place when the alleged shooting incident took place in your presence?
A. At that time, I attended my child (to) answer(ing) the call of (his) nature and after doing that when I was
about to stand up to go up I saw the Villarico’s was (sic) at the back of the kitchen.

There is treachery when: (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and Q. At the time you saw them was (sic) any one of them saw you likewise?
(b) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack
employed by him.46 The essence of treachery lies in the suddenness of the attack that leaves the victim
unable to defend himself, thereby ensuring the commission of the offense. 47 It is the suddenness of the attack A. There was.
coupled with the inability of the victim to defend himself or to retaliate that brings about treachery;
consequently, treachery may still be appreciated even if the victim was facing the assailant. 48 Q. Who was he?

Here, the elements of treachery were present. His assailants gunned Haide down while he was preoccupied A. Gilberto Villarico, Jr.
in the kitchen of his own abode with getting dinner ready for the household. He was absolutely unaware of the
imminent deadly assault from outside the kitchen, and was for that reason in no position to defend himself or
to repel his assailants. Q. At that precise time when you saw them and one of them saw you, what did Villarico, Jr. do?

The argument of the accused that the Prosecution did not show that they had consciously and deliberately A. He aimed his gun to me.
adopted the manner of killing Haide had no substance, for the testimonies of Remedios and Francisco
disclose the contrary. Q. Could you possibly demonstrate that to the Court?

Remedios’ testimony about seeing the four accused taking positions near the door to the kitchen immediately A. (Witness demonstrated by squatting position)
preceding the shooting of Haide was as follows:
Q. Now at that precise moment when you saw Villarico, Jr. on a squatting position pointing his gun at you,
Atty. Fernandez: what was the exact action that you did?

xxx A. When he aimed his gun to me I immediately dropped to the ground.

97
 xxx Q. Now you said that you saw all of the accused at the time when your late son Haide Cagatan was murdered
in the evening of August 8. Could you possibly explain to this Honorable Court at the very first time what did
Q. Since you were personally present could you still remember Mrs. Cagatan how many gun burst you head you see?
at that precise moment when you dropped to the ground because Villarico Jr. was aiming his gun at you. How
many gun burst did you hear? A. After I came from the toilet I was proceeding to the kitchen because Haide was preparing food and he was
calling for dinner. When Haide Cagatan was calling for dinner and at the time I was proceeding to the door of
A. Three gunbursts. the kitchen, when I was near the door I heard the gun shots.

Q. Let us go back to the time when Villarico, Jr. pointed his gun to you. Do you still remember what were the Q. At the time when you heard gunshots, what did you do?
other accused doing or where were they at that time?
A. I laid down flat on the ground while my head is (sic) looking up and there I saw the 3 Villaricos bringing a
A. I can remember. revolver. They came from aiming their guns towards upstairs and they are about to withdraw from that place
together with Jerry Ramientos.

Q. Please tell the Honorable Court.

xxx

A. Gilberto Villarico, Sr. was on the right side; Ricky Villarico was on the left side and behind Gilberto Villarico,
Sr. was Jerry Ramientos and behind Ricky Villarico is (sic) Gilberto Villarico Jr. Q. Now, since you said that you saw the accused Villaricos, could you possibly tell the Court, what were their
responsible position(s) in relation to the door of the kitchen?

Q. What were Ricky and Gilberto Villarico, Jr. doing at the time?
A. They were in shooting position as they aimed upward and they were bringing revolver aiming upstairs.

A. They were also dropping themselves on the ground and aimed their guns.
Q. To what particular object that they were aiming their guns?
A. To the door of our kitchen.
Q. In relation to the door of the kitchen, could you possibly tell the Court what were their responsible position
at that time when you saw them?
A. The four of them were situated in front of the kitchen door. Villarico Jr. and Villarico Sr. were facing each
other while Ricky Villarico and Jerry Ramientos were also facing each other. 50

Q. How about Ramientos, where was he at that time when you saw the accused pointing their guns towards The testimonies of Remedios and Francisco on how and where the four accused had deliberately and
the door of your kitchen? strategically positioned themselves could not but reveal their deliberate design to thereby ensure the
accomplishment of their design to kill Haide without any possibility of his escape or of any retaliation from him.
A. Ramientos was standing behind Gilberto Villarico Sr.49 Aptly did the CA observe:

Likewise, Francisco saw the four accused in the same positions that Remedios had seen them moments prior A perusal of the information shows that treachery was properly alleged to qualify the killing of Heide [sic]
to the shooting. He claimed that they were aiming their firearms at the kitchen and continued aiming their Cagatan to murder. The prosecution was likewise able to prove treachery through the element of surprise
firearms even as they were leaving the crime scene, viz: rendering the victim unable to defend himself. In this case, the evidence shows that the victim, who was in the
kitchen preparing dinner, could be seen from the outside through the holes of the wall. The witnesses
consistently described the kitchen’s wall as three feet high bamboo splits (sa-sa), accented with bamboo splits
Atty. Fernandez: woven to look like a chessboard with 4-inch holes in between. The accused-appellants, likewise, positioned
themselves outside the kitchen door at night where the victim could not see them. When the accused-
xxx appellants shot him, he was caught unaware.51

98
 3.
Penalty and Damages
There is no question that the CA justly pronounced all the four accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder, and punished them with reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 24852 of the Revised Penal Code, in
relation to Article 63, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code, considering the absence of any generic
aggravating circumstance.
However, the CA did not explain why it did not review and revise the grant by the RTC of civil liability in the
amount of only P50,000.00. Thereby, the CA committed a plainly reversible error for ignoring existing laws,
like Article 2206 of the Civil Code,53 which prescribes a death indemnity separately from moral damages, and
Article 2230 of the Civil Code, 54 which requires exemplary damages in case of death due to crime when there
is at least one aggravating circumstance; and applicable jurisprudence, specifically, People v.
Gutierrez,55 where we held that moral damages should be awarded to the heirs without need of proof or
pleading in view of the violent death of the victim, and People v.Catubig, 56 where we ruled that exemplary
damages were warranted whenever the crime was attended by an aggravating circumstance, whether
qualifying or ordinary. Here, the aggravating circumstance of treachery, albeit attendant or qualifying in its
effect, justified the grant of exemplary damages.
Plain oversight might have caused both the RTC and the CA to lapse into the serious
omissions.1avvphil Nonetheless, a rectification should now be made, for, indeed, gross omissions, intended or
not, should be eschewed. It is timely, therefore, to remind and to exhort all the trial and appellate courts to be
always mindful of and to apply the pertinent laws and jurisprudence on the kinds and amounts of indemnities
and damages appropriate in criminal cases lest oversight and omission will unduly add to the sufferings of the
victims or their heirs. Nor should the absence of specific assignment of error thereon inhibit the sua sponte
rectification of the omissions, for the grant of all the proper kinds and amounts of civil liability to the victim or
his heirs is a matter of law and judicial policy not dependent upon or controlled by an assignment of error. An
appellate tribunal has a broad discretionary power to waive the lack of proper assignment of errors and to
consider errors not assigned,57 for technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and
completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties. Indeed, the trend in modern day procedure is to
accord broad discretionary power such that the appellate court may consider matters bearing on the issues
submitted for resolution that the parties failed to raise or that the lower court ignored. 58
Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, we grant to the heirs of Haide P75,000.00 as death
indemnity;59P75,000.00 as moral damages;60 and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.61 As clarified in People
v. Arbalate,62damages in such amounts are to be granted whenever the accused are adjudged guilty of a
crime covered by Republic Act No. 7659, like the murder charged and proved herein. Indeed, the Court,
observing in People v. Sarcia,63 citing People v. Salome64 and People v. Quiachon,65 that the "principal
consideration for the award of damages xxx is the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense
because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender," announced that:
The litmus test[,] therefore, in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the crime
committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty, regardless of whether the penalty
actually imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, we affirm the decision promulgated on June 6, 2003 in CA-G.R. CR No. 24711, finding
GILBERTO VILLARICO, SR., GILBERTO VILLARICO, JR., JERRY RAMENTOS, and RICKY VILLARICO
guilty of murder and sentencing each of them to suffer reclusion perpetua, subject to the modification that they
are held jointly and solidarily liable to pay to the heirs of the late Haide Cagatan death indemnity
of P75,000.00, moral damages of P75,000.00, and exemplary damages of P30,000.00.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 179476 February 9, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RUEL TUY, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Together with Ramon Salcedo, Jr. and Raul Salcedo, who have remained at large, appellant Ruel Tuy was
charged with murder in the Regional Trial Court in Calabanga, Camarines Sur (RTC) for the killing of Orlando
Barrameda in the afternoon of October 11, 2001 in Brgy.Bani, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, under the following
information:
That on or about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon of October 11, 2001 at Bani, Tinambac, Camarines Sur,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused with intent to kill and while
armed with firearms and a bolo and with conspiracy between and among themselves, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and harm one Orlando Barrameda thereby inflicting mortal
wounds on the different part of his body which caused his instantaneous death, to the damage of his heirs in
such amount as maybe duly proven in court.
Attendant during the commission of the crime is treachery because the accused took advantage of their
superior strength, with arms and employed means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.
Further, the offended party was at the time of the crime the incumbent barangay captain of the place where
the incident happened.
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ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.1
Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge of murder. Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued.
For the Prosecution, Severino Barrameda (Severino), the son of the victim, declared that he had witnessed
the Salcedos shooting and Tuy hacking his father. The medico-legal evidence presented through Dr. Salvador
Betito, Jr. (Betito), who had conducted the autopsy, established that the victim had sustained five hack
wounds and two gunshot wounds. Betito concluded that the cause of death was rapid external and internal
hemorrhage secondary to multiple gunshot wounds and hack wounds.
In his defense, Tuy denied his participation in the crime and claimed that he was processing copra at the time
of the killing in Sitio Olango, Brgy. Bani Tinambac, Camarines Sur. His brother Ramil Tuy corroborated him.
On February 22, 2006, the RTC rendered its decision convicting Tuy of murder, and archiving the case as
against the Salcedos. The RTC based its judgment on the eyewitness testimony of Severino and on the
testimony of Dr. Betito. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused Ruel Tuy
beyond reasonable doubt, he is hereby found guilty of the crime of Murder as charged. He is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the heirs of Orlando Barrameda the
amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity; P50,000 as moral damages; P38,000 as actual damages and to pay the
costs. He is likewise meted the accessory penalty as provided for under the Revised Penal Code.
xxx
SO ORDERED. 2
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction,3 rejecting Tuy’s defenses of denial and alibi. It
ruled that it was still physically possible for him to come from Brgy. Olango and be at the seashore of Brgy.
Bani, Tinambac, Camarines Sur where the killing happened. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Calabanga, Camarines Sur in
Criminal Case No. 02-697 dated 22 February 2006 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.4
Tuy now insists to us that the CA committed reversible error in affirming his conviction.
We affirm the decision of the CA.
Firstly, the findings of the RTC are accorded the highest degree of respect, especially if adopted and
confirmed by the CA, because of the first-hand opportunity of the trial judge to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses when they testified at trial; such findings are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on
appeal unless there is clear misapprehension of facts.5 Here, there was no showing that the RTC and the CA
erred in appreciating the worth of Severino’s eyewitness testimony.
Secondly, the CA and the RTC rejected the alibi of Tuy. We agree with their rejection. To begin with, his
absence from the scene of the murder was not firmly established considering that he admitted that he could
navigate the distance between Brgy. Olango (where he was supposed to be) and Brgy. Bani (where the crime
was committed) in an hour by paddle boat and in less than that time by motorized banca. Also, eyewitness
Severino positively identified him as having hacked his father. 6 The failure of Tuy to prove the physical
impossibility of his presence at the crime scene negated his alibi. 7
And, thirdly, the medico-legal evidence indicating that the victim sustained several hack wounds entirely
corroborated Severino’s recollection on the hacking.
On the civil liability, we increase the civil indemnity and the moral damages from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00,
and add exemplary damages of P30,000.00 in order to accord with current jurisprudence to the effect that
damages in such amounts are granted whenever the accused is adjudged guilty of a crime covered by
Republic Act No. 7659 like murder.8
WHEREFORE, the Court affirms the decision promulgated on April 25, 2007 finding RUEL TUY guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder, subject to the modification that the civil indemnity is P75,000.00; the moral
damages is P75,000.00; and the exemplary damages is P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 181544 April 11, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JULIUS TAGUILID y BACOLOD, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
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For resolution is the final appeal of Julius Taguilid y Bacolod from his conviction for rape by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 106, in Quezon City on April 21, 2006, 1 which the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed through
its decision promulgated on August 16, 2007.2
Antecedents
Taguilid was charged in the RTC with rape in relation to Republic Act No. 7610 (Special Protection of Children
against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act) under the following information, to wit:
That on or about the 29th day of May, 2002, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of force and intimidation suddenly entered the
bedroom of private complainant,3 a minor, 12 yrs of age, located at xxx Brgy. Talayan, this City, and once
inside, pushed said complainant to lie down, forcibly inserted his finger to her private part, removed her panty
and thereafter had sexual intercourse with said offended party, all against her will, and without her consent,
which acts further debase, degrade and demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of said private complainant as
a human being, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
The evidence of the Prosecution shows that at about 4:00 pm on May 29, 2002 Taguilid suddenly entered
AAA’s room while she was resting; that the room was in the third floor of the house owned by her parents and
located in Barangay Talayan, Quezon City; that he was a cousin of her mother who had been living with her
family in that house since 2000; that upon entering her room, he pushed her down on her back, then inserted
his finger in her vagina and later on inserted his penis in her vagina; that she cried and pushed him away, but
to no avail; that he next turned her over and penetrated her anus with his penis while in that position; and that
she did not shout for help because he threatened to kill her if she did. 5
At the time of the rape, AAA was 12 years and ten months old, having been born on July 28, 1989.
The Prosecution further established that BBB, AAA’s father, was at the time tending to the family store at the
ground floor when he decided to go up to the third floor to look for and talk to AAA; that upon reaching her
room, he found Taguilid standing by her bed in the act of raising the zipper of his pants, and AAA was on her
bed, crying and uttering inaudible words; that BBB saw that her skirt was raised up to her waist, and her
panties, though still on her, were disheveled (wala sa ayos); and that it seemed to BBB that his sudden
appearance in the room had taken Taguilid by surprise, causing the latter to hurriedly leave the room even
before BBB could say anything to him.
BBB later on brought his daughter to the United Doctors Medical Center (UDMC) in Quezon City for a medico-
legal examination before reporting the matter to the barangay office. He lodged a complaint for rape with the
police authorities in order to seek their assistance in the arrest of Taguilid. 6
The RTC summarized the medico-legal findings on AAA thuswise:
Dr. Jerico Angelito Q. Cordero, 28 years old, physician and a medico-legal officer assigned as Deputy Chief of
DNA Analysis Center conducted medical and physical examination upon the victim on May 29, 2002 at 7:50 in
the evening. His findings, marked as Exhibit "E" show that under genital category, the hymen is annular with
deep healed laceration at 4 and 9 o’clock positions. Under labia minora, it is light brown slightly hypertrophied
(increased in size) labia minora; that the fourchette (part of the sex organ located just below the hymen), was
abraded, meaning "nagasgas or nalagusan" (TSN, September 20, 2002, p. 6). He found out that AAA is in a
non-virgin state physically and there are no signs of application of any form of physical trauma. He said that
deep-healed laceration means that the injury has healed 5 to 10 days from the time of the injury. 7
Taguilid denied the accusation. He testified that AAA’s mother was his third cousin; that he lived with AAA’s
family because his means of livelihood was playing their drums at birthday parties and fiestas; that on May 28,
2002, he and AAA had an argument after she refused to follow his instruction to wash the dishes; that he
whipped her with two sticks of walis tingting, but she retaliated by stabbing his shorts, causing his shorts to fall
off; that it was while he was pulling up his shorts and zipping them when BBB suddently appeared and found
him inside her room in that pose; and that he immediately rushed down the stairs, with BBB saying to him:
Hintayin mo ako sa ibaba. Pinakain na, pinatulog pa, ahas sa bahay na ito. 8
Ruling of the RTC
As stated, the RTC pronounced Taguilid guilty of rape, holding:
The Court finds that AAA was actually violated in her own room. The act was already consummated when her
father entered her room, looking for her. The accused was putting and zipping up his pant inside the room of
the victim who was crying on her bed, hair and dress disheveled, shaken and visibly afraid of the accused.
Her panty was on, but "wala sa ayos," as explained by her father who was shocked to see his daughter on
bed with the accused in the act of zipping up his pants. Whipping up a young girl with two sticks of walis
tingting would perhaps make her cry but would not certainly make her lie on bed, shaking in fear and uttering
words inaudibly. This condition of AAA is a manifestation that she was threatened and forced sexually. Her
testimony was firm – she was abused and raped. The accused even used his finger on her vagina before he
slipped his penis inside her vagina. The accused also "pinataob" her and did anal sex (TSN, Feb. 7, 2003,
pp. 4-7). When asked how many times the accused raped her, she said outrightly, "Ten (10) times" (Ibid).
The testimony of AAA was honest, straightforward and clear. She answered all questions of her ordeal in
clearcut language. She mentioned the word "pinataob" to describe the next position the accused assumed to
penetrate her anus. Young as she is, her purpose was to unearth the truth – that she was raped by the
accused not only on that fateful day of May 29, 2002, but several times before.
xxx
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, accused JULIUS TAGUILID Y BACOLOD is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA.
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The accused is further ordered to pay the private complainant the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000) as civil indemnity in consonance with prevailing jurisprudence (People v. Obejaso, 299 SCRA 549;
People v. Ibay, 233 SCRA 15); the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000) as moral damages; and
the amount of TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000) as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.9
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the CA affirmed Taguilid’s conviction, decreeing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated April 21, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
106 of Quezon City in Criminal Case No. 02-109810 finding accused-appellant Julius Taguilid y Bacolod
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.10
The CA explained its affirmance in the following manner, viz:
In the instant case, we agree with the trial court that the testimony of private complainant should be accorded
full faith and credit as it amply supports a finding of guilt on the part of accused-appellant for the commission
of the said offense. Indeed, the narration of her ordeal was ‘honest, straightforward and clear’ and all through
her entire testimony she remained firm and steadfast in identifying accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the
offense.
On the other hand, accused-appellant can only set up the defense of denial. Denial, although a legitimate
defense, is an inherently weak defense that crumbles in the face of positive and categorical identification of
the private complainant. Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evident, is a self-serving assertion
that deserves no weight in law. As between the positive declaration of the prosecution witness and the
negative statement of the accused, the former deserves more credence.
Incidentally, we cannot also help but observe that the weakness of accused-appellant’s defense becomes all
the more apparent in this appeal considering as to how he is now trying to change his theory as to what had
transpired on May 29, 2002. For instance, during the trial of the case, accused-appellant contended that there
was no rape but a serious case of misunderstanding between him and the father of the private complainant as
his shorts fell as a result of private complainant’s retaliation for beating her with walis tingting. On appeal
however, a reading of the arguments of the accused-appellant shows that while he still maintains that there
was no rape, he avers that the sexual congress was consensual as there was absence of physical struggle or
resistance on the part of the private complainant.
Lastly, the absence of ‘fresh’ lacerations on private complainant’s genitalia is not a factor that is conclusively
relied upon to establish the non-existence of rape. Indeed, the absence of external signs of physical injuries
does not cancel out the commission of rape, since proof of injuries is not an essential element of the crime. In
fact, even the absence of fresh lacerations does not preclude the finding of rape.
This holds true in the instant case considering that coupled with the testimony of private complainant on the
rape and her identification of the accused-appellant as the culprit therein, the medico-legal report and the
medico-legal, Dr. Cordero testified that private complainant is ‘in a non-virgin state’. To repeat, proof of injuries
is not essential to the crime itself.
Significantly, let it also be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense is [sexual intercourse without
consent].
That having been said, we find no reversible error committed by the trial court in convicting accused-appellant
of the offense of rape. The records of the case show that the prosecution had satisfactorily proven his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt and that he had carnal knowledge of the private complainant against her will
through the use of force and intimidation. Such being the case, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of
reclusion perpetua for absent any circumstance that would qualify the rape under the instances enumerated
under Sec. 11 of R.A. 7659, the proper imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. 11
Issues
Taguilid reiterates his assignment of errors in the CA, namely:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE HIGHLY
INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AND IN NOT CONSIDERING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S DEFENSE.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF RAPE DESPITE THE
PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III.
THE FINDINGS/PHYSICAL EVIDENCE AS CONTAINED IN THE MEDICO-LEGAL REPORT DOES NOT
SHOW AND/OR IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE OFFENSE OF RAPE.12
Taguilid argues that AAA’s testimony on how the rape had happened and how easily he had undressed her
indicated that he did not use force and intimidation against her; that her fear of him had been only the product
of her imagination; and that her silence during the entire event, and her failure to escape from him or to report
his allegedly previous sexual assaults had revealed her having voluntarily consented to the sexual act. 13
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Taguilid submits that the State did not prove that he had any moral ascendancy over AAA; that the age gap
between them did not suffice to establish his moral ascendancy over her; 14 and that the medico-legal findings
of the hymenal lacerations found on her on the same date of the rape being already healed, not fresh, were
inconsistent with rape.15
Ruling
The Court affirms the conviction.
First of all, it is basic that findings of the CA affirming those of the RTC as the trial court are generally
conclusive on the Court which is not a trier of facts.16 Such conclusiveness derives from the trial court’s having
the first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor and manner of the victim when she testified at the trial. 17 It
also looks to the Court that both the RTC and the CA carefully sifted and considered all the attendant
circumstances. With Taguilid not showing that the RTC and the CA overlooked any fact or material of
consequence that could have altered the outcome if they had taken it into due consideration, the Court must
fully accept the findings of the CA.
Secondly, the medico-legal finding made on May 29, 2002 showing AAA’s hymenal laceration as "deep-
healed" and as having healed "5 to 10 days from the time of (infliction of) the injury" did not detract from the
commission of the rape on May 29, 2002. For one, hymenal injury has never been an element of rape, for a
female might still be raped without such injury resulting. The essence of rape is carnal knowledge of a female
either against her will (through force or intimidation) or without her consent (where the female is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious, or is under 12 years of age, or is demented). 18 It is relevant to know that
carnal knowledge is simply the act of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman. 19 Thus, although
AAA testified on her sexual penetration by Taguilid, the fact that her hymenal injury was not fresh but already
deep-healed was not incompatible with the evidence of rape by him. In this regard, her claim that he had
previously subjected her to similar sexual assaults several times before May 29, 2002, albeit not the subject of
this prosecution, rendered the absence of fresh hymenal injury not improbable even as it showed how the
deep-healed laceration might have been caused.
Thirdly, AAA’s failure to shout for help although she knew that her father was tending to the family store just
downstairs was not a factor to discredit her or to diminish the credibility of her evidence on the rape. She
explained her failure by stating that Taguilid had threatened to harm her should she shout. She thereby
commanded credence, considering that she was not expected to easily overcome her fear of him due to her
being then a minor just under 13 years of age at the time of the rape. Nor would it be reasonable to impose on
her any standard form of reaction when faced with a shocking and horrifying experience like her rape at the
hands of Taguilid. The Court has recognized that different people react differently to a given situation involving
a startling occurrence.20 Indeed, the workings of the human mind placed under emotional stress are
unpredictable, and people react differently - some may shout, others may faint, and still others may be
shocked into insensibility even if there may be a few who may openly welcome the intrusion. 21
There can be no question that the testimony of a child who has been a victim in rape is normally given full
weight and credence. Judicial experience has enabled the courts to accept the verity that when a minor says
that she was raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed against
her.22 The credibility of such a rape victim is surely augmented where there is absolutely no evidence that
suggests the possibility of her being actuated by ill-motive to falsely testify against the accused. 23 Truly, a rape
victim’s testimony that is unshaken by rigid cross-examination and unflawed by inconsistencies or
contradictions in its material points is entitled to full faith and credit. 24
And, fourthly, Taguilid’s defense at the trial was plain denial of the positive assertions made against
him.1âwphi1 He then declared that the charge of rape against him resulted from BBB’s misunderstanding of
what had really occurred in AAA’s bedroom just before BBB had appeared unannounced. Yet, such denial was
devoid of persuasion due to its being easily and conveniently resorted to, and due to denial being generally
weaker than and not prevailing over the positive assertions of both AAA and BBB. Also, Taguilid’s explanation
of why he was then zipping his pants when BBB found him in AAA’s bedroom, that AAA’s stabbing had caused
his pants to fall off, was implausible without him demonstrating how the pants had been unzipped from AAA’s
stabbing of him as to cause the pants to fall off. Besides, Taguilid’s act of quickly leaving the room of AAA
without at least attempting to tell BBB the reason for his presence in her room and near the bed of the sobbing
AAA if he had been as innocent as he claimed exposed the shamness and insincerity of his denial.
In this connection, the Court is not surprised that Taguilid changed his defense theory on appeal, from one of
denial based on the charge having resulted from a misunderstanding of the situation in AAA’s bedroom on the
part of BBB to one admitting the sexual congress with AAA but insisting that it was consensual between them.
Such shift, which the CA unfailingly noted, revealed the unreliability of his denial, if not also its inanity.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on August 16, 2007 by the Court of Appeals.
The appellant shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 177320 February 22, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CESAR BAUTISTA y SANTOS, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Under review is the conviction of the accused for illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu respectively
punished under Section 5 and Section 11 (3) of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
103
of 2002). He had been tried for and found guilty of the offenses by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
127, Caloocan City, and the Court of Appeals (CA) had affirmed the convictions through the decision
promulgated on February 15, 2007.1
Antecedents
On April 28, 2003, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City filed in the RTC two separate
informations charging Cesar Bautista y Santos with a violation of Section 5 and a violation of Section 11 (3) of
RA 9165, alleging thus:
Criminal Case No. C-67993
That on or about the 25th day of April 2003 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control six (6) pieces of plastic sachets
containing METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu) weighing 0.05 gram, 0.09 gram, 0.05 gram,
0.09 gram, 0.07 gram & 0.06 gram knowing the same to be dangerous drug under the provisions of the
above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Criminal Case No. C-67994
That on or about the 25th day of April 2003 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously sell and deliver to PO2 AMADEO TAYAG who posed, as buyer METHAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE (SHABU) weighing 0.05 gram, a dangerous drug, without the corresponding license or
prescription therefore, knowing the same to be such.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Evidence of the Prosecution
In the afternoon of April 25, 2003, an informant went to the Station Drug Enforcement Unit of the Caloocan
Police Station to report the peddling of illegal drugs by Bautista on Kasama Street, Barangay 28, Caloocan
City. Forthwith, Police Insp. Cesar Cruz formed a team consisting of SPO1 Rommel Ybañez, PO3 Rizalino
Rangel, PO2 Jessie Caragdag, PO2 Juanito Rivera, and PO2 Amadeo L. Tayag to conduct a buy-bust
operation against Bautista. PO2 Tayag, designated as the poseur-buyer, was given a P100.00 bill as buy-bust
money, on which he placed his initials ALT. The rest of the buy-bust team would serve as back up for PO2
Tayag. The team proceeded to the target area with the informant.4
Upon arriving at the target area, the informant pointed out Bautista to the team. Bautista was then standing in
front of a house. PO2 Tayag and the informant then approached Bautista even as the rest of the team took up
positions nearby. The informant introduced PO2 Tayag to Bautista as biyahero ng shabu, after which the
informant left PO2 Tayag and Bautista alone to themselves. PO2 Tayag told Bautista: Cesar, pakuha ng piso.
Bautista drew a plastic sachet from his pocket and handed it to PO2 Tayag, who in turn handed the P100.00
bill buy-bust money to Bautista. PO2 Tayag then turned his cap backwards as the pre-arranged signal to the
back-up members. The latter rushed forward and arrested Bautista. Upon informing Bautista of his
constitutional rights, SPO1 Ybañez frisked him and found in his pocket six other plastic sachets, while PO2
Caragdag seized the buy-bust money from Bautista’s hand. The team brought Bautista and the seized plastic
sachets back to the police station.5
In the police station, the team recorded the buy-bust bill in the police blotter and turned over the plastic
sachets to PO2 Hector Castillo, the investigator on duty.6 PO2 Castillo marked the sachet handed by Bautista
to PO2 Tayag as "CBS (Bautista’s initials) Buy-bust," and the other six sachets recovered by SPO1 Ybañez
from appellant’s possession as "CBS-1," "CBS-2," "CBS-3," "CBS-4," "CBS-5," and "CBS-6." 7
Based on the written request of Insp. Cruz, Forensic Chemist Albert S. Arturo conducted a laboratory
examination on the contents of the marked sachets, 8 and stated in his Physical Science Report that the
marked sachets contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous substance. The Physical
Science Report enumerated the marked sachets examined and gave the weight of the shabu in each as
follows: "CBS (Bautista’s initials) Buy-bust" – 0.05 gram; "CBS-1" – 0.05 gram; "CBS-2" – 0.09 gram; "CBS-3"
– 0.05 gram; "CBS-4" – 0.09 gram; "CBS-5" – 0.07 gram; and "CBS-6" – 0.06 gram. 9
Evidence of the Accused
Bautista denied the charge. He claimed that on April 25, 2003, at around 6:00 p.m., he and his wife, Rosario,
were in their house cutting cloth to be made into door mats when PO2 Tayag and two others barged in; that
when he asked what they wanted, they told him that it was none of his business; that the three introduced
themselves as policemen and ordered him to go with them; that they forced him to go with them, with PO2
Tayag hitting him on the nape; that as they were walking on the road, they demanded money from him, but he
told them that he had none; and that he was brought to and detained at the Caloocan City Jail. 10
Decision of the RTC
After trial, the RTC found Bautista guilty as charged through its joint decision dated September 5,
2005,11 disposing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and the prosecution having established to a moral certainty the guilt of
Accused CESAR BAUTISTA y SANTOS @ CESAR TAGILID, this Court hereby renders judgment as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. C-67993 for Violation of Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165, this Court in the absence
of any aggravating circumstance hereby sentences same Accused to a prison term of twelve (12)
years, eight (8) months and one day to seventeen (17) years and eight (8) months and to pay the
104
 fine of Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency; and
2. In Crim. Case No. C-67994 for Violation of Section 5, Art. II of R.A. 9165, this Court in the
absence of any aggravating circumstance hereby sentences said Accused to LIFE
IMPRISONMENT, and to pay the fine of Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Subject drug in both cases are declared confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government to be dealt with
in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
Decision of the CA
On February 15, 2007, the CA affirmed the RTC judgment, pertinently holding: 12
In sum, the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of herein appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The
actual sale of prohibited or regulated drugs coupled with their presentation in court has been sufficiently
proven by the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Their recount of the incident complement each other,
giving a complete picture on how the illegal sale of shabu transpired and how the sale led to the apprehension
of appellant in flagrante delicto. Their testimonies likewise established beyond doubt that appellant was found
in actual possession of six (6) additional pieces of heat-sealed sachets containing white crystalline substance
(shabu) when he was arrested.
Appellant’s claim, therefore, that in convicting him, the trial court merely relied on the presumption that official
duty has been regularly performed is without merit. Appellant’s conviction was based on established facts and
evidence on record.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City,
Branch 127 in Criminal Cases Nos. C-67993 and C-67994 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
Hence, this appeal, in which Bautista contends that the CA erred in affirming his conviction because: (a) there
were inconsistencies in the testimonies of Prosecution witnesses as to who of them had actually received the
tip from the informant; (b) PO2 Tayag’s testimony that Bautista had handed him a sachet of shabu without
inquiring about the former’s identity ran counter to human experience; (c) the back-up members of the buy-
bust team did not actually witness the transaction between PO2 Tayag and Bautista; and (d) the plastic
sachets were not immediately marked after their seizure from Bautista. 13
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
I
Illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu
were established beyond reasonable doubt
Section 5 and Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 pertinently provide as follows:
Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous
Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. – The penalty of life imprisonment to death and
a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall
be imposed upon any person, who, unless, authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver,
give away to another, distribute, dispatch, in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all
species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any such
transactions.
xxx
Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. – The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging
from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed
upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the following
quantities, regardless of the degree of purity thereof:
xxx
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be graduated as
follows:
xxx
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three
hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities of
dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine, or cocaine hydrochloride
marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," or other dangerous drugs
such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstacy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly
introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far
beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than three hundred (300) grams of marijuana.
To secure a conviction for illegal sale of shabu, the following essential elements must be established: (a) the
identities of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the
105
thing sold and the payment for the thing. What is material in prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu is the proof
that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as
evidence.14
The requisites for illegal sale of shabu were competently and convincingly proven by the Prosecution. PO2
Tayag, as the poseur-buyer, attested that Bautista sold shabu to him during a legitimate buy-bust
operation.15 According to Forensic Chemist Arturo, the substance subject of the transaction, which weighed
0.05 gram, was examined and found to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous
drug.16 PO2 Caragdag declared that he recovered the buy-bust money from Bautista’s hand right after the
sale.17 Further, the Prosecution later presented as evidence both the sachet of shabu subject of the sale and
the buy-bust money used in the buy-bust operation. 18Thereby, the Prosecution directly incriminated Bautista.
For illegal possession of a dangerous drug, like shabu, the elements are: (a) the accused is in possession of
an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited or dangerous drug; (b) such possession is not authorized
by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug. 19
The elements of illegal possession of a dangerous drug were similarly competently and convincingly
established by the Prosecution. SPO1 Ybañez stated that upon seeing the pre-arranged signal given by PO2
Tayag, he and the other members of the team proceeded to arrest Bautista; and that he frisked Bautista and
then recovered six other plastic sachets from Bautista’s pocket. 20 Undoubtedly, the frisking was legally
authorized as a search incidental to the lawful arrest of Bautista for evidence in the commission of illegal drug
pushing.21 Forensic Chemist Arturo certified that each of the sachets contained different shabu of different
weights.22
The lower courts justifiably accorded credence to the eyewitness testimonies of PO2 Tayag, PO2 Caragdag,
and SPO1 Ybañez. Their testimonial accounts were consistent with the documentary and object evidence of
the Prosecution. It was significant that no ill motive was imputed to them to falsely testify against Bautista, with
Bautista himself admitting not being aware of any reason why they would wrongly incriminate him. 23
In drug-related prosecutions, the State bears the burden not only of proving the elements of the offenses of
sale and possession of shabu under Republic Act No. 9165, but also of proving the corpus delicti, the body of
the crime. "Corpus delicti has been defined as the body or substance of the crime and, in its primary sense,
refers to the fact that a crime has been actually committed. As applied to a particular offense, it means the
actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged. The corpus delicti is a compound fact made
up of two (2) things, viz: the existence of a certain act or result forming the basis of the criminal charge, and
the existence of a criminal agency as the cause of this act or result." 24 The dangerous drug is itself the very
corpus delicti of the violation of the law prohibiting the possession of the dangerous drug. 25 Consequently, the
State does not comply with the indispensable requirement of proving corpus delicti when the drug is missing,
and when substantial gaps occur in the chain of custody of the seized drugs as to raise doubts on the
authenticity of the evidence presented in court.26
To ensure that the chain of custody is established, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 relevantly provides:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment.
xxx
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physical inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
xxx
The complementary Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9165 instructs the
apprehending officer or team on the custody and control of the confiscated drugs in the following manner:
xxx
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items;
xxx
The rule on chain of custody under the foregoing enactments expressly demands the identification of the
persons who handle the confiscated items for the purpose of duly monitoring the authorized movements of the
illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia from the time they are seized from the accused until the time they are
presented in court. In this regard, Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002
defines the chain of custody rule as follows:
b. "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the
time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in
court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and
106
signature of the person who held temporary custody [was] of the seized item, the date and time when such
transfer of custody made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition[.]
Here, the buy-bust team did not mark the sachets until after reaching the police station. Even so, the omission
did not destroy the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated items. We are satisfied that PO2
Tayag and SPO1 Ybañez brought the confiscated sachets of shabu to the police station immediately after the
buy-bust operation, and turned them over to the duty investigator, PO2 Castillo, for marking; 27 that in their
presence, PO2 Castillo marked the sachet of shabu sold by Bautista to PO2 Tayag as "CBS (Bautista’s
initials) Buy-bust," and the six sachets of shabu recovered by SPO1 Ybañez from Bautista’s possession as
"CBS-1," "CBS-2," "CBS-3," "CBS-4," "CBS-5," and "CBS-6";28 that PO2 Castillo then delivered the marked
sachets to Insp. Cruz who in turn caused their transmittal to the Crime Laboratory Office, Northern Police
District (NPD), in Caloocan City, for appropriate laboratory examination; 29 that upon the instruction of Insp.
Cruz, SPO1 Ybañez handcarried the written request and the marked sachets to the NPD Crime Laboratory
Office for laboratory examination, where one PO2 Bonifacio received them; 30 and that thereafter, Forensic
Chemist Arturo certified in the Physical Science Report prepared following his qualitative examination that the
contents of the marked sachets were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, and enumerated
the marked sachets examined and rendered the weights of the shabu they contained, as follows: "CBS
(Bautista’s initials) Buy-bust" – 0.05 gram; "CBS-1" - 0.05 gram; "CBS-2" - 0.09 gram; "CBS-3" – 0.05 gram;
"CBS-4" – 0.09 gram; "CBS-5" – 0.07 gram; and "CBS-6" – 0.06 gram. 31
We have held that a non-compliance with the regulations is not necessarily fatal as to render an accused’s
arrest illegal or the items confiscated from him inadmissible as evidence of his guilt, for what is of the utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated items that will be
utilized in the determination of his guilt or innocence.32
That was done herein. PO2 Tayag firmly identified the sachet of shabu marked as "CBS(Bautista’s initials)
Buy bust" as the one he had bought from Bautista in the buy-bust operation. 33 In the same manner, SPO1
Ybañez identified the sachets of shabu marked "CBS-1," "CBS-2," "CBS-3," "CBS-4," "CBS-5," and "CBS-6"
presented in court as those he had recovered from Bautista’s possession right after the buy-bust
operation.34 Finally, Forensic Chemist Arturo properly stated that the same exhibits were the very specimens
he had subjected to chemical analysis upon the formal request of Insp. Cruz. 35 Without question, then, the
quantities of shabu recovered from Bautista were duly preserved within the context of the rule on chain of
custody.
As if confirming the arresting officers’ observance of the rule on chain of custody, Bautista did not assail the
integrity of the confiscated shabu except by insisting on being framed up by the policemen. His insistence did
not deflect guilt from him, however, considering that his failure to charge the policemen with frame-up and
extortion could only be regarded as his tacit admission that such evidence had not been tampered or meddled
with but preserved and intact.36
II
Denial and frame-up not established
Bautista’s denial and defense of frame-up were given no consideration due to their being self-serving and
uncorroborated. We declare such treatment warranted. He did not present Rosario, his wife, to corroborate his
claim of being framed up although she was supposed to have been around at the time of his arrest. He did not
also adduce evidence to substantiate his story of being falsely incriminated in a frame-up by competent
evidence. His claim thereon did not prevail over the positive identification of him by PO2 Tayag as the drug
pusher he had transacted with. As the Court sees it, he was not even sincere in claiming frame-up, for he did
not formally charge the policemen for the supposed frame-up and extortion committed against him. Verily,
defenses of frame-up and extortion are not looked upon with favor due to their being conveniently concocted
and usually asserted by culprits arrested for violations of Republic Act No. 9165. 37
III
Inconsistencies in testimony
are inconsequential
Bautista argues that the arresting policemen incurred inconsistencies because they could not be sure on who
of them had actually received the report of the informant on the illegal drug pushing of Bautista.
The argument has no merit. There is no dispute that the matter of who among the policemen actually received
the report from the informant did not relate to the essential elements of the crimes charged. Nor did such
matter refer to the actual buy-bust itself – that crucial moment when Bautista was caught red-handed selling
and possessing shabu in question. As such, it was insignificant in this adjudication. We deem to be basic
enough that an inconsistency that had nothing to do with the elements of the crime could not be a basis for
acquittal.38
Bautista’s insistence that it was impossible for him to sell shabu to PO2 Tayag due to the latter being unknown
to him merits no attention. Based on our collective experience as judges, we know that drug pushing has been
committed with so much casualness even between total strangers. It was credible enough, then, that PO2
Tayag categorically declared that the informant had first introduced him to Bautista as biyahero ng shabu
before PO2 Tayag and Bautista started transacting with each other. 39
Bautista posits that the back-up members did not visually see the sale between him and PO2 Tayag. That
position is unfounded for three reasons. The first is that PO2 Tayag testified that Bautista had sold shabu to
him during the buy-bust operation. The second is that the back-up members themselves did actually witness
the transaction between Bautista and PO2 Tayag, with PO2 Caragdag specifically saying that he had seen
their transaction from seven meters away from them; 40 and with SPO1 Ybañez, despite admitting not actually
seeing the exchange between Bautista and PO2 Tayag, still seeing PO2 Tayag giving the pre-arranged signal
to communicate the consummation of the sale of shabu. 41 And, thirdly, the giving of the pre-arranged signal
rendered a full ocular view of the exchange between Bautista and PO2 Tayag superfluous. Worthy of noting is
that the giving of the pre-arranged signal in a buy-bust operation has been an accepted form of
communicating the consummation of the exchange between the drug pusher and the poseur buyer.
IV
Penalties
107
Section 11 (3) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides that the illegal possession of less than five grams of shabu is
penalized with imprisonment of 12 years and one day to 20 years, and a fine ranging from P300,000.00
to P400,000.00. Bautista was guilty of illegal possession of shabu weighing 0.41 gram. The RTC and the CA
imposed on him an indeterminate sentence of 12 years, eight months and one day, as minimum, to 17 years
and eight months, as maximum, and a fine of P300,000.00.1âwphi1
Although the penalty thus imposed is within the range of the penalty imposable under Republic Act No. 9165,
the increment of one day as part of the minimum of the indeterminate sentence is deleted despite its being
within the parameters of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The one-day increment to the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence was surplusage that may occasion a slight degree of inconvenience when it will be
time for the penal administrators concerned to pass upon and determine whether or not Bautista is already
qualified to enjoy the benefits under the Indeterminate Sentence Law and other relevant legal
provisions.42 Accordingly, the penalty should be an indeterminate sentence of 12 years and eight months, as
minimum, to 17 years and eight months, as maximum, and a fine of P300,000.00.
Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, the unauthorized sale of shabu, regardless of its quantity and
purity, carries with it the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00
to P10,000,000.00. The RTC and the CA were correct in prescribing life imprisonment and fine of P500,000.00
due to the absence of any aggravating circumstance. It is relevant to observe that the higher penalty of death
might no longer be possibly prescribed in view of the intervening enactment of Republic Act No. 9346, 43 a law
that prohibits the imposition of the death penalty.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on February 15, 2007 by the Court of Appeals, subject
to the SOLE MODIFICATION that the indeterminate sentence prescribed on the illegal possession of shabu
as defined and punished under Section 11 (3) of Republic Act No. 9165 is 12 years and eight months, as
minimum, to 17 years and eight months, as maximum, and a fine of P300,000.00.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 175924 March 14, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ERLAND SABADLAB y BAYQUEL, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
On October 28, 2003, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 140, in Makati City pronounced Erland
Sabadlab y Bayquel guilty of forcible abduction with rape committed against AAA,1 a 16-year old domestic
helper, and penalized him with reclusion perpetua. 2 On April 26, 2006, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
conviction and the penalty, but modified the civil damages.3 Hence, Sabadlab appeals.
Antecedents
Both the RTC and the CA agreed on the factual antecedents.
AAA was then walking at around noon of March 12, 2002 on Dapitan Street in Makati City, proceeding
towards MA Montessori to fetch her employer’s son who was studying there. Suddenly, a man (later identified
as Sabadlab) grabbed her by the shoulder and ordered her to go with him. She recognized him to be the man
who had persistently greeted her every time she had bought pandesal at 5 o’clock am near her employer’s
house in the past two weeks. Alarmed, she refused to do his bidding, but Sabadlab poked a gun at her throat.
Two other men whom she did not recognize joined Sabadlab at that point. They forced her into the backseat
of a parked car, and one of Sabadlab’s cohorts blindfolded her with a handkerchief. The car moved forward,
and stopped after twenty minutes of travel. Still blindfolded, she was brought out of the car. Sabadlab said that
he would remove her clothes. Sabadlab then undressed her, leaving only the blindfold on her. One of them
tied her hands behind her back. Sabadlab began kissing her body from the neck downwards. Although
blindfolded, she knew that it was Sabadlab because his cohorts were calling out his name as he was kissing
her body. Then they made her lie flat on the ground with her hands still tied behind her back. Sabadlab raped
her in that position. The others took their turns in raping her after Sabadlab. To prevent her from shouting for
help, Sabadlab stuffed her mouth with crumpled newspapers. The three ravished her again and again, that
she could not remember the number of times they did so.
At around 3:00 o’clock pm, Sabadlab and his cohorts returned a blindfolded AAA by car back to Dapitan
Street, but let her go only after sternly warning that they would surely kill her if she told anyone about the
rapes. Once they left, she proceeded to MA Montessori to fetch her ward. She waited there until 5:30 pm.
Upon her arrival at the house, AAA’s employer noticed the kiss marks on her neck. AAA at first lied about the
kiss marks, but she ultimately disclosed the rapes because her irritated employer slapped and boxed her on
the stomach to force her to disclose.
On March 13, 2002, her employer brought AAA to the Makati Police Station to report the rapes. AAA
underwent medico-legal examination later that day at the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame Quezon City.
The results of the medico-legal examination were embodied in Medico-Legal Report No. M-797-02 issued by
medico-legal officer Dr. Mary Ann P. Gajardo, viz:
PHYSICAL INJURIES:
1. Ecchymosis, right mandibular region, measuring 2.5 x 2.5 cm, 8 cms from the anterior
midline.
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 2. Ecchymosis, neck, measuring 3 x 2.5 cms, 6 cms right of the anterior midline.
3. Ecchymosis, neck, measuring 3 x 2.5 cms, 4.5 cms left of the anterior midline.
4. Ecchymosis, nape, measuring 3.5 x 2.5 cms, 4 cms right of the posterior midline.
5. Ecchymosis, nape, measuring 4.5 x 3 cms, 4 cms left of the posterior midline.
6. Ecchymosis, right breast, measuring 4 x 3.5 cms. 10 cms from the anterior midline.
7. Ecchymosis, sternal region, measuring 9 x 3 cms, bissecting the anterior midline.
8. Ecchymosis, left breast, measuring 3.5 x 2.5 cms, 9 cms from the anterior midline.
9. Ecchymosis, left breast, measuring 3.5 x 3 cms, 11 cms from the anterior midline.
10. Abrasion, left scapular region, measuring 3.5 x 0.5 cms. 14 cms from the posterior
midline
GENITAL:
PUBIC HAIR: Moderate
LABIA MAJORA: Full, convex and slightly gaping.
LABIA MINORA: Pinkish brown slightly hypertrophied labia minora in between.
HYMEN: Presence of shallow fresh lacerations at 7 o’clock position and deep fresh lacerations at 6
and 9 o’clock position. Congested.
POSTERIOIR FOURCHETTE: Abraded/Congested
EXTERNAL VAGINAL ORIFICE: Offers strong resistance upon introduction of the examiner’s index
finger.
VAGINAL CANAL: Narrow with prominent rugosities.
CERVIX: Soft and close
PERIURETHRAL AND VAGINAL SMEARS: Negative for spermatozoa and negative for gram (-)
diploxocci.
CONCLUSION: Findings are compatible with recent loss of virginity. Barring unforeseen
complications, it is estimated that the above injuries will heal within 3-5 days. 4
Afterwards, AAA and the policemen went to the vicinity where she had usually bought pandesal to look for the
suspects. She spotted Sabadlab in one of the nearby restaurants and pointed to him. The policemen
apprehended Sabadlab and brought him to the station, where he gave his name as Erland Sabadlab y
Bayquel. That was her first time to know the name of Sabadlab.
These antecedents impelled the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati to immediately charge Sabadlab and
two John Does with forcible abduction with rape via the information dated March 13, 2002, alleging:
That on or about the 12th day of March of 2002, in the City of Makati, Philippines a place within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused together with two (2) John Does whose names and
whereabouts are still unknown, with lewd designs and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away AAA, 16 years of age, against her will from
Dapitan St., Barangay Guadalupe, Makati City and brought her to an undisclosed place, where accused by
means of force, violence and intimidation had carnal knowledge of complainant against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
In his defense, Sabadlab denied the charge and asserted alibi, claiming that on March 12, 2002, he was at
Billiard M where he worked as a spotter; that he stayed there until noon, leaving the place only to have lunch;
and that he returned to Billiard M at 12:30 pm and stayed there until he was arrested at 7:00 pm of March 12,
2002. Frederick Dionisio and Nathaniel Salvacion corroborated Sabadlab’s alibi.
As stated, the RTC convicted Sabadlab for forcible abduction with rape as charged based on AAA’s positive
identification of him as one of the rapists, observing that her physical injuries and fresh hymenal lacerations
were consistent with her account of the rapes, decreeing:
WHEREFORE, finding accused ERLAND SABADLAB y BAYQUEL GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
as principal of the crime of forcible abduction with rape charged in this case, he is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the costs.
On the civil aspect, the accused is ordered to pay AAA the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00)
as EXEMPLARY DAMAGES and ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) as MORAL
DAMAGES.
SO ORDERED.6
109
On appeal in the CA, Sabadlab assigned the following errors, 7 to wit:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE HIGHLY
INCREDIBLE AND INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME
CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
Nonetheless, the CA sustained his conviction and the penalty of reclusion perpetua, holding that the supposed
inconsistencies referred to trivial matters or innocent lapses that did not affect the credibility of AAA as a
witness but were instead badges of veracity or manifestations of truthfulness of the material points of her
testimony. The CA thus disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the RTC dated October
28, 2003 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as follows:
1. The award of moral damages is REDUCED to P50,000.00;
2. The award of exemplary damages is DELETED;
3. Appellant is ordered to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
Pursuant to Section 13 (C), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, appellant may appeal this
case to the Supreme Court via a Notice of Appeal filed before this Court.
SO ORDERED.8
Upon the denial of his motion for reconsideration on August 2, 2006, Sabadlab is now before the Court to
seek the final review.
In addition to the arguments and submissions made in his appellant’s brief in the CA, Sabadlab indicates in
his supplemental brief9 that AAA’s version was ambiguous and implausible, and conflicted with human
experience as borne by the following, namely: (a) the State did not present any torn apparel; (b) no bodily
injuries were shown to prove that AAA had resisted the sexual intercourse; (c) AAA did not cry for help; and (d)
AAA did not escape despite several opportunities to do so. He contends, moreover, that the State’s evidence
established only simple seduction.10
Ruling
We affirm the conviction.
First of all, Sabadlab continues to assail the credibility of AAA’s recollections. We understand why he does so,
because the credibility of the victim’s testimony is a primordial consideration in rape. 11 Yet, because both the
RTC and the CA unanimously regarded AAA as a credible and spontaneous witness, he has now to present
clear and persuasive reasons to convince us to reverse both lower courts’ determination of credibility and to
resolve the appeal his way.
Our review reveals, however, that Sabadlab has not tendered any clear and persuasive reasons that may
warrant the reversal or modification of the findings of both lower courts on the credibility of AAA and his
criminal liability. The supposed inconsistencies dwelled on minor details or collateral matters that the CA
precisely held to be badges of veracity and manifestations of truthfulness due to their tendency of
demonstrating that the testimony had not been rehearsed or concocted. It is also basic that inconsistencies
bearing on minor details or collateral matters should not adversely affect the substance of the witness’
declaration, veracity, or weight of testimony. 12 The only inconsistencies that might have discredited the victim’s
credible testimony were those that affected or related to the elements of the crime. Alas, that was not true
herein.
The supposed inconsistencies were inconsequential to the issue of guilt. For one, the matter of who of the
three rapists had blindfolded and undressed AAA was trifling, because her confusion did not alter the fact that
she had been really blindfolded and rendered naked. Nor did the failure to produce any torn apparel of AAA
disprove the crime charged, it being without dispute that the tearing of the victim’s apparel was not necessary
in the commission of the crime charged. In fact, she did not even state that her clothes had been torn when
Sabadlab had forcibly undressed her. Verily, details and matters that did not detract from the commission of
the crime did not diminish her credibility.
We hardly need to remind that the task of assigning values to the testimonies of witnesses and of weighing
their credibility is best left to the trial judge by virtue of the first-hand impressions he derives while the
witnesses testify before him.13 The demeanor on the witness chair of persons sworn to tell the truth in judicial
proceedings is a significant element of judicial adjudication because it can draw the line between fact and
fancy. Their forthright answers or hesitant pauses, their quivering voices or angry tones, their flustered looks
or sincere gazes, their modest blushes or guilty blanches - all these can reveal if the witnesses are telling the
truth or lying in their teeth.14As the final appellate reviewer in this case, then, we bow to the age-old norm to
accord the utmost respect to the findings and conclusions on the credibility of witnesses reached by the trial
judge on account of his unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and on account of his personal
access to the various indicia available but not reflected in the record. 15
Secondly, AAA’s recollection of the principal occurrence and her positive identification of the rapists,
particularly Sabadlab, were firm. It is reassuring, too, that her trustworthiness in identifying Sabadlab as one of
the rapists rested on her recognition of him as the man who had frequently flirted with her at the store where
she had usually bought pandesal for her employer’s table. As such, the identification of him as one of the
rapists became impervious to doubt.
110
Thirdly, AAA’s failure to shout for help and her failure to escape were not factors that should diminish
credibility due to their being plausibly explained, the first by the fact that her mouth had been stuffed by
Sabadlab with crumpled newspaper, preventing her from making any outcry, and the second by the fact that
the culprits had blindfolded her and had also tied her hands behind her back.
And, lastly, Sabadlab’s allegation that AAA did not sustain any bodily injuries was actually contrary to the
medical certification showing her several physical injuries and the penetration of her female organ. 16 This
should debunk without difficulty his submission that she did not offer any resistance to the sexual assaults she
suffered. Her resistance to Sabadlab’s order for her to go with him was immediately stifled by his poking of the
gun at her throat and by appearance of his two cohorts.1âwphi1 At any rate, it is notable that among the
amendments of the law on rape introduced under Republic Act No. 8353 (The Anti-Rape Act of 1997) is
Section 266-D, which adverts to the degree of resistance that the victim may put up against the rapist, viz:
Article 266-D. Presumptions. - Any physical overt act manifesting resistance against the act of rape in any
degree from the offended party, or where the offended party is so situated as to render her/him incapable of
giving valid consent, may be accepted as evidence in the prosecution of the acts punished under Article 266-
A.
We next deal with the characterization of the crime as forcible abduction with rape. The principal objective of
Sabadlab and his two cohorts in abducting AAA from Dapitan Street and in bringing her to another place was
to rape and ravish her. This objective became evident from the successive acts of Sabadlab immediately after
she had alighted from the car in completely undressing her as to expose her whole body (except the eyes due
to the blindfold), in kissing her body from the neck down, and in having carnal knowledge of her (in that order).
Although forcible abduction was seemingly committed, 17 we cannot hold him guilty of the complex crime of
forcible abduction with rape when the objective of the abduction was to commit the rape. Under the
circumstances, the rape absorbed the forcible abduction.18
The penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly prescribed. Article 266-A and Article 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353,19 respectively define and punish simple rape as follows:
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of
the circumstances mentioned above be present.
Article 266-B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua.
xxx
Although the CA deleted the RTC’s award of exemplary damages because of the "absence of aggravating
circumstance (sic),"20 we reinstate the award in view of the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of use
of a deadly weapon in the commission of the crime. The Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be
imposed in a criminal case as part of the civil liability "when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances."21 The Civil Code allows such damages to be awarded "by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages."22 Present here was the need for exemplarity. Thus, the CA should have recognized the entitlement
to exemplary damages of AAA on account of the attendance of use of a deadly weapon. It was of no moment
that the use of a deadly weapon was not specifically alleged in the information. As fittingly explained in People
v. Catubig:23
The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to be
understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the
public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings,
each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an
award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony
underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether
ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the
award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It
would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the
aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying
nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal,
rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary
damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
Accordingly, the Court grants the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in addition to the civil
indemnity of P50,000.00 and the moral damages of P50,000.00 the CA awarded to AAA. Sabadlab is further
liable for interest of 6% per annum on all the civil damages.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on April 26, 2006, with the
MODIFICATION that ERLAND SABADLAB y BAYQUEL is: (a) DECLARED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT of SIMPLE RAPE as defined under Article 266-A and as penalized with reclusion perpetua pursuant
to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353; and (b) ORDERED TO
PAY to the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, plus interest of 6% per annum on each of the amounts reckoned from the finality of this decision.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
111
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 177145 February 9, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JOEY TORIAGA, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Joey Toriaga appeals the decision promulgated on November 17, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
01617,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction for raping AAA2 under the decision dated
February 26, 2002 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 128 in Caloocan City. 3
Toriaga was no trivial stranger to AAA and her family. Her father was Toriaga’s close friend and "drinking
buddy," and CCC, AAA’s aunt, regarded Toriaga as a trusted employee in her balut selling business. CCC
even furnished Toriaga a sleeping area inside her house. At the time material to this case, AAA was a 13-year
old lass.4 She happened to be alone in keeping watch of the house of CCC in the early evening of November
26, 1995 while CCC and her family went to church for mass. At around then, Toriaga and AAA’s father were
drinking at the latter’s house, which was only about 20 meters away from CCC’s house. Then, feeling already
drunk, Toriaga returned to CCC’s house. Hearing him knocking at around 7o’clock p.m. AAA opened the door
and let him in. She then casually went up to the second floor to watch television. Later, AAA went downstairs,
and saw Toriaga opening his folding bed and switching off the lights. Thinking that Toriaga was going to bed,
she sat on the stairs. But she was not prepared for what happened next, because Toriaga grabbed and poked
an icepick at her neck and dragged her downstairs. Holding the icepick to her neck, he ordered her to strip
naked and to lie on the folding bed. Out of fear she complied. He undressed himself and mounted her. He
inserted his penis into her vagina. She felt the penetration. He was on top for about 10 minutes, stopping only
because she pretended losing consciousness. He lifted her and brought her upstairs, covering her mouth with
a pillow. When she felt the icepick being pressed into her stomach, she fought and parried the blow, thereby
preventing the icepick from penetrating her flesh. To protect herself, she turned face down, but he stabbed her
back with the icepick. Although she was in pain, she kept silent and still, which made him stop stabbing her,
probably believing that she was already dead. She soon heard him washing his hands downstairs. But just
when she tried to rise, she heard him coming back. She thus laid down again and pretended to be asleep.
Satisfied that she had not moved, he went out of the house and closed the door. She then crawled to the
window and shouted for help. Several neighbors responded and rushed her to the hospital for medical
treatment.
The medico-legal findings disclosed her injuries, to wit:
Wound, sutured, roughly elliptical, with contused edges, 0.5 cm. nape.
Wounds, sutured, roughly elliptical with contused edges, posterior chest, right side; 0.7 cm., infrascapular
area, 5.5 cms. from the posterior median line; 0.6 cm. infrascapular area, 4.5 cms. from the posterior median
line; 0.7 cm., infrascpular area, along paravertebral line, 4.0 cms. from the posterior median line; 0.6 cm.
infrascapular area, along midscapular line, 6.5 cms., from the posterior median line; 0.7 cm., infrascapular
area, 4.3 cms., from the posterior median line; 0.6 cm., area just above the right buttocks, along posterior
axillary line, 9.5 cms., from the posterior median line.
Wounds, roughly elliptical with contused edges: 0.3 cm., right hypochondrium, abdomen with a curvilinear
reddish abrasion measuring 6.5 cms.; 0.5 cm., intergluteal area, along posterior median line; 0.5 cm., outer
upper quadrant, right buttocks, 10.0 cms. from the posterior median line.
GENITAL EXAMINATIONS:
Pubic hair, fine, scanty. Labia majora, coaptated. Labia minora, coaptated. Fourchette, with a superficial
laceration, edges still bleeding. Vestibule, congested with a contusion at the left lateral portion. Hymen, short,
thick, intact. Hymenal orifice, admits a tube measuring 2.0 cms. in diameter with moderate resistance. Vaginal
walls, tight. Rugosities, prominent. 5
On November 28, 1995, the following information for rape was filed in the RTC, viz:
That on or about the 26th day of November, 1995 at Kalookan City, Metro-Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design and by means of threat and
intimidation by using a bladed weapon (knife) employed upon the person of 13-year old AAA, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and have sexual intercourse with said AAA, against her will and
without her consent.
Contrary to law.6
A separate information for frustrated homicide was also filed.
Initially, the RTC consolidated the two cases, and Toriaga pleaded not guilty to both charges on January 17,
1996. In view of his intervening conviction for frustrated homicide, however, only the charge for rape
remained. During the presentation of evidence for the accused, he moved to be allowed to change his plea to
guilty. Thus, upon re-arraignment, he pleaded guilty to the information for rape. But he withdrew his plea on
November 20, 2000 upon being apprised of the imposable penalty and the consequences of the plea.
Toriaga denied raping AAA, claiming that he returned to CCC’s house and slept. He insisted that BBB had
instigated AAA to charge him with rape and to testify against him due to a previous misunderstanding between
them.
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On February 26, 2002, the RTC convicted Toriaga, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the accused Joey Toriaga guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape and hereby sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of Reclusion
perpetua and all the accessory penalties attached thereto. He is further adjudged to pay the victim the sum
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and the amount of P75,000.00 as for moral damages with no subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Considering that the accused is already serving sentence at the New Bilibid Prisons for having been convicted
for the crime of Frustrated Homicide in another case, furnish the Director of the New Bilibid Prisons copy of
this Decision, for the proper imposition of his sentence in this case.
SO ORDERED.7
Thus, Toriaga appealed to this Court, which, on September 6, 2004, transferred the records to the CA for
intermediate review, conformably with People v. Mateo.8
In the CA, Toriaga changed his defense of denial and alibi for the first time to the affirmative defense of
consensual sexual intercourse with AAA, whom he insisted had undressed herself freely and did not shout
when the incident was taking place. He contended that he was liable only for qualified seduction because he
was a domestic within the contemplation of the law.
In its decision, the CA rejected his contentions, because, firstly, he was found not to have been charged with
the custody or authority over the minor victim; secondly, AAA was not a member of the household of CCC, nor
was he a member of the victim’s household; and thirdly, the complaint for rape neither averred nor embodied
the elements of seduction. Consequently, the CA affirmed the conviction for rape.
In his appeal, Toriaga’s main argument of consensual sexual intercourse rested on the failure of AAA to shout
during the rape and on her failure to escape when he momentarily left her and while he was busy undressing
himself. He insisted that the proximity of the houses in the neighborhood should have emboldened her to put
up some resistance had the sexual encounter been forced. Her demeanor was inconsistent with that of an
ordinary Filipina whose instincts dictated that she summoned every ounce of her strength and courage to
thwart any attempt to defile her virtue.
The appeal fails.
Firstly, the defense of consensual sexual intercourse, like the sweetheart defense, demands corroboration.
Yet, Toriaga offered no corroboration, thereby exposing his belatedly offered defense as a self-serving after-
thought resorted to after his original defenses of denial and alibi had failed to ensure his acquittal by the CA.
Thus, his new defense deserved scant consideration.
Secondly, the physical evidence spoke more vividly than the testimony of the victim, whose multiple injuries
confirmed the use of brutal force and violence in her rape. Also, the multiple stab wounds she sustained
negated his claim of consensual sexual intercourse.1avvphi1
Third, the CA’s rejection of Toriaga’s contention of being liable only for qualified seduction was correct. Indeed,
the information did not allege the presence of the elements of qualified seduction, to wit: (a) that AAA was a
virgin; (b) that she was over 12 and under 18 years of age; (c) that he had sexual intercourse with her; and (d)
that there was abuse of authority, or of confidence, or of relationship.
Fourthly, the RTC and the CA correctly determined the penalty of reclusion perpetua as imposable. The
information alleged the use of a bladed weapon in the commission of the rape. Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that whenever the crime of rape is committed with use of a deadly weapon the
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. The Prosecution established that the accused wielded an
icepick to intimidate her into submission and later to assault AAA with intent to kill her to seal her mouth
forever. Under Article 63, 2, Revised Penal Code, where the prescribed penalties of reclusion perpetua and
death, and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances present or attendant, like herein, the
lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposable.
And, fifthly, we will not disturb the awards of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P75,000.00 as moral damages,
but we add the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages by reason of the established presence of the
qualifying circumstance of use of a deadly weapon. Under Art. 2230 of the Civil Code, AAA was entitled to
recover exemplary damages.9
WHEREFORE, we affirm the decision promulgated on November 17, 2006 in C.A.-G.R. CR-HC No. 01617 in
all respects, with the modification that JOEY TORIAGA is ordered to pay the victim the further sum
of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 173307 July 17, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
VICTORINO REYES, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
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Slightest penetration of the labia of the female victim's genitalia consummates the crime of rape.
The Case
Victorino Reyes appeals his .conviction for the rape of his 13-year-old neighbor AAA, 1 for which the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 53, in Rosales, Pangasinan had imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua under its
decision of April 23, 2001,2 and which conviction the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed on appeal by its assailed
decision promulgated on April 20, 2006.3
Antecedents
As the RTC and the CA both found, Reyes raped AAA at around 9:00 p.m. on December 26, 1996 in
Barangay San Aurelio, Balungao, Pangasinan. Earlier, at around 7:00 p.m., AAA and her 9-year-old sister,
BBB, had watched television at his house just across the street from their house.1âwphi1 Only Reyes and his
two sons, aged seven and five, were the other persons in the house, for his wife had gone to another
barangay to sell refreshments. By 9:00 p.m., AAA and BBB rose to go home, but as they were leaving, Reyes
suddenly pulled AAA into the store attached to the sala of his house. He told her in the dialect: Umaykan ta
agiyyot ta. (Come here and let us have sex).4 Alarmed by what his words denoted, AAA struggled to free
herself from him. BBB went to her succor by pulling her away from him, but his superior strength prevailed.
BBB could only cry as he dragged AAA into the store. BBB was left outside the store crying.
Inside the store, Reyes kissed AAA and mashed her breasts. He threatened her: If you will shout, I will kill
you.5 He pulled down her long pants and panties below her knees, took out his penis, grabbed her by the
waist, and used his body to anchor her back to a nearby table. She fought back by boxing and pushing him
away, but her efforts were futile. He twice tried to pry open her legs, but she strained hard to close them. On
the second attempt, however, her effort was not enough to prevent him from pulling her legs apart, and he
then thrust his penis into her vagina and made push and pull movements. 6 Although his penis achieved only a
slight penetration of her vagina,7 he succeeded in satisfying his lust, as confirmed later on when CCC, the
mother of the victim, found semen on AAA’s panties.8
After he had satisfied his lust, Reyes threatened to kill both AAA and BBB should they tell anyone else about
what had happened. Then they hurriedly left for home.9 Upon their arrival in their house, CCC called out to her
daughters to go to bed. Only BBB immediately complied because AAA tarried outside, only to have her mother
again call her inside. AAA entered the house this time, but went to where the aparador was and took out fresh
panties. CCC saw her doing so and became suspicious. She also saw fear in the face of her daughter. When
she inspected the soiled underwear of AAA, CCC discovered that her panties were wet with semen. 10 Upon
being interrogated, AAA admitted that Reyes had raped her. 11
At around 6:00 a.m. of the next day, December 27, 1996, CCC reported the rape of her daughter by Reyes to
the Barangay Chairman of San Aurelio, who accompanied AAA and her father to the Balungao Police Station
to bring the criminal complaint for rape. At the request of the Balungao Police, Dr. Ingrid Irena B. Gancinia, the
Municipal Health Officer of Rosales, Pangasinan, conducted a medical examination on AAA at around 3:30
p.m. of that day.
The findings reflected in Dr. Gancinia’s medico-legal report showed the following:
IE: Contusion, labia majora, Right and Left;
No hymenal lacerations noted with one examining finger difficult to penetrate the vaginal canal. 12
Subsequently, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan filed the information dated February 3,
1997 charging Reyes with rape committed as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of December, 1996, in the evening, in Brgy. San Aurelio 1st, Municipality of
Balungao, Province of Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with lewd designs, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal knowledge
with AAA, a minor of about thirteen (13) years old, against her will and to her damage and prejudice.
Contrary to Article 335, Revised Penal Code.13
Upon his arraignment on February 23, 1998,14 Reyes pleaded not guilty to the information.
Although admitting that AAA and BBB had watched television in his house at the time of the rape, Reyes
insisted that he had been sleeping on the sofa in front of the television set in the sala of his house from 7:30
p.m. of December 26, 1996 until 2:30 a.m. of the next day. He denied the accusation, and called attention to
the medical findings showing that AAA’s hymen was intact; hence, she was still a virgin.
On April 23, 2001, after the trial on the merits, the RTC convicted Reyes as charged. It regarded AAA’s
narration of the circumstances of her rape as clear, convincing and consistent on all material points. It
concluded that the contusion (pamamaga) on AAA’s labia majora found by Dra. Gancinia proved that penile
penetration had been achieved; that AAA’s fragile personality manifested during the trial explained why she
had cried and refused to answer in the face of the often browbeating questions during her cross-examination;
that Reyes had also made intimidating glares towards her while she testified; and that she had remained
consistent in her claim of rape and insistent that she was telling the truth.
The RTC disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Victorino Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape as charged and hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to
indemnify the private complainant AAA in the amount of Seventy Five Thousand (P75,000.00) Pesos. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.15
On intermediate review, Reyes argued 16 that AAA and her mother had concocted the charge as their way of
escaping their debts at his store. 17 He denied having carnal knowledge of AAA, and stated that he had merely
114
kissed her, citing the lack of medical findings of any hymenal lacerations in the medico-legal report. 18 He
posited that even assuming that there had been carnal knowledge, the act could only be consensual
considering that AAA’s hand had landed on his shoulders during the supposed sexual encounter.
Nonetheless, the CA affirmed Reyes’ conviction.19
Hence, this appeal, wherein Reyes reiterates his submissions.
Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
To start with, both the CA and the RTC unanimously found that the testimonies of AAA and BBB were credible
and reliable. It consequently behooved Reyes to come forward with a good reason or cause to have us depart
from the age-old rule of according conclusiveness to the findings of the RTC that the CA affirmed. The Court is
not a trier of facts, and has to depend on the findings of fact of the trial court by virtue of its direct access to
the witnesses as they testified in court. Only when the appellant convincingly demonstrates that such findings
of fact were either erroneous, or biased, or unfounded, or incomplete, or unreliable, or conflicted with the
findings of fact of the CA would the Court assume the rare role of a trier of facts. But that convincing
demonstration was not done here by Reyes.
Secondly, the decisive question is whether the evidence adduced by the State competently proved that the
crime reached the consummated stage. Reyes insists that the fact that AAA’s hymen had remained intact, per
the medico-legal report, revealed that no rape had been committed.
His insistence is not persuasive.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, 20 the law
applicable at the time of the rape of AAA, defined and punished rape thusly:
Article 335. When and how rape is committed. – Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. 21
As the text of the law itself shows, the breaking of the hymen of the victim is not among the means of
consummating rape. All that the law required is that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman under the
circumstances described in the law. By definition, carnal knowledge was "the act of a man having sexual
bodily connections with a woman."22 This understanding of rape explains why the slightest penetration of the
female genitalia consummates the crime.
During her examination of AAA, Dra. Gancinia found pamamaga (swelling) on the victim’s labia majora. Dra.
Gancinia opined that such swelling was possibly caused by the insertion of a hard object, like a hard penis, or
by friction with hard objects even without removing the panties or pants of AAA. 23 Although such medical
finding, left alone, was susceptible of different probable interpretations, AAA’s testimonial narration about how
Reyes had sexually assaulted her, including how his penis had only slightly penetrated her vagina, confirmed
that he had carnal knowledge of her.
More specifically, the presence of the swelling in AAA’s labia majora was an indication of the penetration by
the erect penis of the labia majora of the accused. As such, there was sufficient factual foundation for finding
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape,24 for, as the Court explains in People v. Teodoro: 25
In objective terms, carnal knowledge, the other essential element in consummated statutory rape, does not
require full penile penetration of the female. The Court has clarified in People v. Campuhan 26 that the mere
touching of the external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute
carnal knowledge. All that is necessary to reach the consummated stage of rape is for the penis of the
accused capable of consummating the sexual act to come into contact with the lips of the pudendum of the
victim. This means that the rape is consummated once the penis of the accused capable of consummating the
sexual act touches either labia of the pudendum. As the Court has explained in People v. Bali-balita, 27 the
touching that constitutes rape does not mean mere epidermal contact, or stroking or grazing of organs, or a
slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim’s vagina, or the mons pubis, but rather
the erect penis touching the labias or sliding into the female genitalia. Accordingly, the conclusion that
touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape proceeds from
the physical fact that the labias are physically situated beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, such
that for the penis to touch either of them is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface of the
female genitalia. It is required, however, that this manner of touching of the labias must be sufficiently and
convincingly established. (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, although the RTC and the CA correctly imposed reclusion perpetua because the crime was simple
rape, we need to revise the civil liability fixed and allowed by the RTC in order to have it accord with pertinent
jurisprudence to the effect that civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and moral damages of P50,000.00 should be
awarded to the victim of simple rape without need of proof other than the fact of rape. 28 This is because the
victim unquestionably suffered actual loss and moral injuries from her experience. In addition, the attendance
of AAA’s minority as an aggravating circumstance, which, although not a proper basis to raise the penal
sanction on account of the failure to allege it in the information, should still justify the grant of exemplary
damages in order to set a public example and to establish a deterrent against elders who abuse and corrupt
the youth.29 According to People v. Catubig,30 exemplary damages are justified regardless of whether or not
the generic or qualifying aggravating circumstances are alleged in the information, considering that the grant
of such damages pursuant to Article 2230 of the Civil Code is intended for the sole benefit of the victim and
115
does not affect the criminal liability, the exclusive concern of the State. The grant in this regard should be in
the sum of P30,000.00.31
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on April 20, 2006 by the Court of Appeals, with the
MODIFICATION that Victorino Reyes shall pay to AAA P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this
decision.
Costs of suit to be paid by the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 173794 January 18, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DARWIN RELATO y AJERO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Statutory rules on preserving the chain of custody of confiscated prohibited drugs and related items are
designed to ensure the integrity and reliability of the evidence to be presented against the accused. Their
observance is the key to the successful prosecution of illegal possession or illegal sale of prohibited drugs.
Darwin Relato y Ajero is now before the Court in a final plea for exoneration from his conviction for violating
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002). Policemen had arrested
him on August 29, 2002 during a buy-bust operation and the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Sorsogon
had forthwith charged him with the offense on August 30, 2002 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 65,
in Bulan, Sorsogon as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of August, 2002 at about 11:00 o’clock in the evening, in Barangay Aquino,
Municipality of Bulan, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, sell, dispense and deliver to a PNP
asset disguised as poseur-buyer, two (2) plastic sachets of methamphetamine hydrochloride "shabu" weighing
0.0991 gram, for and in consideration of the sum of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00), the serial number of
which was previously noted, without having been previously authorized by law to sell or deliver the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
Upon pleading not guilty to the information on November 19, 2002,2 Relato was tried.
Version of the Prosecution
At 6:00 pm of August 29, 2002, PO3 Sonny Evasco of the Bulan Police Station received a tip from his asset to
the effect that Relato would be peddling illegal drugs around midnight in Barangay Aquino, Zone 7, Bulan,
Sorsogon. PO3 Evasco immediately reported the tip to SPO1 Elmer Masujer, the chief of the Intelligence
Department of the police station. In turn, SPO1 Masujer formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation
against Relato consisting of himself, PO3 Evasco, PO1 Wilfredo Lobrin and SPO2 Adolfo Villaroza. SPO1
Masujer prepared a P500.00 bill to be the buy-bust money by marking the bill with his initials. 3
The team waited for the informant to call again. At 10:00 pm, PO3 Evasco finally received the call from his
asset, who confirmed that the proposed transaction would take place beside the lamp post near the ice plant
in Barangay Aquino. With that, the team hastened to the site. PO3 Evasco and SPO2 Villaroya concealed
themselves about seven to 10 meters from the lamp post, while SPO1 Masujer and PO1 Lobrin provided area
security from about 10 to 15 meters away from where PO3 Evasco and SPO2 Villaroya were.
A few minutes later, Relato and a companion (later identified as Pido Paredes) arrived together on board a
motorcycle. Relato alighted to confer with the asset who was the poseur buyer. After the transaction was
completed, PO3 Evasco signaled to the rest of the team, who drew near and apprehended Relato. Seized
from Relato was the marked P500.00 buy-bust bill. The poseur buyer turned over to PO3 Evasco the two
transparent sachets containing crystalline substances that Relato sold to the poseur buyer. Paredes escaped. 4
SPO1 Masujer marked the two transparent sachets with his own initials "EM" upon returning to the police
station.5
Forensic Chemical Officer Josephine Clemen of the PNP Crime Laboratory in Region V conducted the
laboratory examination on the contents of the two transparent sachets and found the contents to have a total
weight of 0.991 gram. She certified that the contents were positive for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride.6
Version of the Accused
Relato denied the accusation, and claimed that he had been framed up. His version follows.
At about 11:00 pm of August 29, 2002, Relato and Paredes were proceeding to his grandfather’s wake in
Magallanes, Sorsogon on board his motorcycle, with Paredes driving. They stopped upon reaching Barangay
Aquino to allow Relato to adjust the fuel cock of the motorcycle. SPO1 Masujer suddenly appeared and put
handcuffs on Relato, who resisted. The three other officers came to SPO1 Masujer’s assistance and subdued
Relato.1awphil SPO1 Masujer then seized Relato’s 3310 Nokia cellphone, its charger, and his personal
116
money of P3,500.00 in P500.00 bills. Relato claimed that the cellphone belonged to Paredes while the cash
was a gift from an in-law. The officers boarded Relato in their jeep and haled him to the police station of Bulan.
In the station, SPO1 Masujer and PO2 Villaroya required him to remove his pants. He complied. They then
searched his person but did not find anything on him. He then saw SPO1 Masujer take two sachets from his
own wallet and placed them on top of a table. SPO1 Masujer then told Relato to point to the sachets, and a
picture was then taken of him in that pose. In the meanwhile, Paredes notified his family about his arrest. 7
Ruling of the RTC
On August 9, 2004, the RTC convicted Relato, 8 viz:
Prosecution having established by the required quantum of proof and with moral certainty the CULPABALITY
of the herein accused to the crime as charged- HIS CONVICTION HAS BECOME INEVITABLE.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Darwin Ajero y Relato having been found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Repealing R.A. No. 6425 and amending
R.A. 7659), is hereby sentenced to suffer the indivisible penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT, absent any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance (Art. 63(2), R.P.C.), with all the accessory penalties provided by law,
and to pay the fine of P500,000.00.
All the proceeds of the crime shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government to be disposed of in
accordance with the provisions of Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165.
The period of the preventive imprisonment already served by the herein accused shall be credited in the
service of his sentence pursuant to the provision of Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.9
Ruling of the CA
Relato appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), submitting that:
I sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE CONFLICTING
TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME
CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT
On May 24, 2006, however, the CA affirmed the conviction,10 stating:
In closing, there being no misappreciation of facts, distortion of evidence, and speculative, arbitrary and
unsupported conclusions drawn by the court a quo in support of its judgment of conviction, We defer to such
findings and conclusion. Thus, well- settled is the rule that the findings of facts and assessment of credibility of
witnesses is a matter best left to the trial court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive
and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses’ deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is
denied to the appellate courts (Lim, Jr. vs. San, 438 SCRA 102).
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the court a quo’s assailed decision dated 09
August is perforce affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
Relato argues that the CA should have reversed his conviction for being contrary to the established facts, and
to the pertinent law and jurisprudence.
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 provides the procedure to be followed in the seizure and custody of
prohibited drugs, to wit:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. ̶ The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
117
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The provisions of Article II, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act
No. 9165 provide:
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(a) The apprehending office/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items;
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A review of the records establishes that the aforestated procedure laid down by Republic Act No. 9165 and its
IRR was not followed. Several lapses on the part of the buy-bust team are readily apparent. To start with, no
photograph of the seized shabu was taken. Secondly, the buy-bust team did not immediately mark the
seized shabu at the scene of the crime and in the presence of Relato and witnesses. Thirdly, although there
was testimony about the marking of the seized items being made at the police station, the records do not
show that the marking was done in the presence of Relato or his chosen representative. And, fourthly, no
representative of the media and the Department of Justice, or any elected official attended the taking of the
physical inventory and to sign the inventory.
Under the foregoing rules, the marking immediately after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link,
because succeeding handlers of the prohibited drugs or related items will use the markings as reference. It
further serves to segregate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar and related evidence from
the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings,
obviating switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence. 11 It is crucial in ensuring the integrity of the chain
of custody, which is defined in Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of
2002,12 thus:
b. "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the
time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of
the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody
were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition;
While the last paragraph of Section 21(a) of the IRR provides a saving mechanism to ensure that not every
case of non-compliance irreversibly prejudices the State’s evidence, it is significant to note that the application
of the saving mechanism to a situation is expressly conditioned upon the State rendering an explanation of
the lapse or lapses in the compliance with the procedures.13 Here, however, the Prosecution tendered no
explanation why the buy-bust team had failed to mark the seized shabu immediately after the arrest.
Nevertheless, even assuming that marking the shabu at the scene of the crime by the buy-bust team had not
been practical or possible for the buy-bust team to do, the saving mechanism would still not be applicable due
to the lack of a credible showing of any effort undertaken by the buy-bust team to keep the shabu intact while
in transit to the police station.
The procedural lapses committed by the buy-bust team underscored the uncertainty about the identity and
integrity of the shabu admitted as evidence against the accused.14 They highlighted the failure of the
Prosecution to establish the chain of custody, by which the incriminating evidence would have been
authenticated. An unavoidable consequence of the non-establishment of the chain of custody was the serious
doubt on whether the shabupresented as evidence was really the shabu supposedly seized from Relato.
In a prosecution of the sale and possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride prohibited under Republic Act
No. 9165,15 the State not only carries the heavy burden of proving the elements of the offense of, but also
bears the obligation to prove the corpus delicti, failing in which the State will not discharge its basic duty of
proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It is settled that the State does not establish
the corpus delicti when the prohibited substance subject of the prosecution is missing or when substantial
gaps in the chain of custody of the prohibited substance raise grave doubts about the authenticity of the
prohibited substance presented as evidence in court.16 Any gap renders the case for the State less than
complete in terms of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 17 Thus, Relato deserves
exculpation, especially as we recall that his defense of frame-up became plausible in the face of the
weakness of the Prosecution’s evidence of guilt.
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the decision promulgated on May 24, 2006 affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Bulan, Sorsogon, Branch 65; and ACQUIT accused DARWIN RELATO y AJERO due
to the failure of the State to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
ACCORDINGLY, we DIRECT the immediate release from detention of DARWIN RELATO y AJERO, unless
he is detained for some other lawful cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to implement this Decision, and to report his action
hereon to this Court within 10 days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
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