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Republic of the Philippines (5) ordering defendants-spouses Manuel and Maria Guerrero to pay

SUPREME COURT plaintiff the amount of P200.00 by way of litigation expenses.


Manila
All other claims of the parties are denied. With costs against
SECOND DIVISION defendants-spouses.

G.R. No. L-44570 May 30, 1986 The petitioners adopt the respondent court's findings of fact excepting, however, to its
conclusion that tenancy relations exist between the petitioners and the respondents,
MANUEL GUERRERO and MARIA GUERRERO, petitioners, thus:
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and APOLINARIO BENITEZ, respondents. In 1969, plaintiff Apolinario Benitez was taken by defendants-
spouses Manuel and Maria Guerrero to take care of their 60 heads
A.D. Guerrero for petitioners. of cows which were grazing within their 21-hectare coconut
plantation situated at Bo. San Joaquin, Maria Aurora, Subprovince
of Aurora, Quezon. Plaintiff was allowed for that purpose to put up a
Bureau of Legal Assistance for private respondents. hut within the plantation where he and his family stayed. In addition
to attending to the cows, he was made to clean the already
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: fruitbearing coconut trees, burn dried leaves and grass and to do
such other similar chores. During harvest time which usually comes
Whether or not a tenancy relationship exists between the parties Manuel Guerrero, et every three months, he was also made to pick coconuts and gather
al and Apolinario Benitez, et al. as to determine their respective rights and obligations the fallen ones from a 16-hectare portion of the 21-hectare
to one another is the issue in this petition to review the decision of the then Court of plantation. He had to husk and split the nuts and then process its
Appeals, now the Intermediate Appellate Court, which affirmed in toto the decision of meat into copra in defendants' copra kiln. For his work related to the
the Court of Agrarian Relations in CAR Case No. 6793-NE (SA-Q) '73, the dispositive coconuts, he shared 1/3 of the proceeds from the copra he
portion of which reads: processed and sold in the market. For attending to the cows he was
paid P500 a year.

In view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:


Sometime in the early part of 1973, plaintiff was refrained from
gathering nuts from the 10-hectare portion of the 16-hectare part of
(1) ordering defendants-spouses Manuel and Maria Guerrero to the plantation from where he used to gather nuts. He felt aggrieved
reinstate plaintiff Apolinario Benitez to the 10-hectare portion of the by the acts of defendants and he brought the matter to the attention
16-hectare coconut holding in question, located at Bo. San Joaquin, of the Office of Special Unit in the Office of the President in
Maria Aurora Sub-province Quezon and to maintain said plaintiff in Malacanang, Manila. This led to an execution of an agreement, now
the peaceful possession and cultivation thereof, with all the rights marked as Exh. D, whereby defendants agreed, among others, to let
accorded and obligations imposed upon him by law; plaintiff work on the 16-hectare portion of the plantation as tenant
thereon and that their relationship will be guided by the provisions of
(2) ordering defendants Paulino and Rogelio both surnamed Latigay republic Act No. 1199. The Agricultural Tenancy Act of the
to vacate the said ten-hectare portion and deliver possession thereof Philippines.
to plaintiff Apolinario Benitez;
Then in July, 1973, he was again refrained from gathering nuts from
(3) ordering defendants-spouses Manuel and Maria Guerrero to pay the 10-hectare portion of the plantation with threats of bodily harm if
damages to plaintiffs in the amount of P14,911.20 beginning from he persists to gather fruits therefrom. Defendant spouses, the
July, 1973 and to pay the same amount every year thereafter until Guerreros, then assigned defendants Rogelio and Paulino Latigay to
plaintiff is effectively reinstated to the ten-hectare portion; do the gathering of the nuts and the processing thereof into copra.
Defendants Guerreros also caused to be demolished a part of the
cottage where plaintiff and his family lived, thus, making plaintiffs feel
(4) denying plaintiff-tenants' prayer for reconstruction of the copra
that they (defendants) meant business. Hence, this case for
cottage: and
reinstatement with damages.
The lower court formulated four (4) issues by which it was guided in latter or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in both
the resolution of the questions raised by the pleadings and evidence (Section 3, Republic Act 1199, The Agricultural tenancy Act, as amended.)
and we pertinently quote as follows:
With petitioner reference to this case, "share tenancy" exists whenever two persons
(1) whether or not plaintiff is the tenant on the coconut landholding in agree on a joint undertaking for agricultural production wherein one party furnishes the
question consisting of sixteen (16) hectares; land and the other his labor, with either or both contributing any one or several of the
items of production, the tenant cultivating the land with the aid of labor available from
(2) In The affirmative, whether or not he was unlawfully dispossessed members of his immediate farm household, and the produce thereof to be divided
of ten (10) hectare thereof; between the landholder and the tenant in proportion to their respective contributions
(Sec. 4, RA 1199; Sec. 166(25) RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code).
(3) Whether or not the parties are entitled to actual and moral
damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses. In contrast, a farmhand or agricultural laborer is "any agricultural salary or piece worker
but is not limited to a farmworker of a particular farm employer unless this Code
expressly provides otherwise, and any individual whose work has ceased as a
This petition for review poses the following questions of law: consequence of, or in connection with, a current agrarian dispute or an unfair labor
practice and who has not obtained a substantially equivalent and regular employment"
I (Sec. 166(15) RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code).

Whether or not with the passage of Presidential Decree 1038 only The petitioners contend that the two courts below applied erroneous definitions of
last October 21, 1976, Republic Act 6389 otherwise known as the "tenancy" found in repealed laws. They assert that the Agricultural Tenancy Act and
Code of Agrarian Reforms has repealed in their entirety the the Agricultural Land Reform Code have been superseded by the Code of Agrarian
Agricultural Tenancy Act (Republic Act 1199) and the Agricultural Reforms, Rep. Act 6389, which the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to cite
Reform Code (Republic Act 3844) abrogating or nullifying therefore and apply.
all agricultural share tenancy agreements over all kinds of lands, as
the one involved in the case at bar-over coconut plantation-and There is no question that the latest law on land and tenancy reforms seeks to abolish
hence, the complaint below as well as the challenged decision by the agricultural share tenancy as the basic relationship governing farmers and landowners
courts below, based as they are on such share tenancy agreements, in the country.
have lost their validity cessante ratio legis, cessat ipsa lex.
On August 8, 1963, Republic Act 3844 abolished and outlawed share tenancy and put
II in its stead the agricultural leasehold system. On September 10, 1971, Republic Act
6389 amending Republic Act 3844 declared share tenancy relationships as contrary to
Assuming arguendo that said laws have not thus been repealed, is public policy. On the basis of this national policy, the petitioner asserts that no cause
respondent Benitez hereunder the undisputed fact of the case as of action exists in the case at bar and the lower court's committed grave error in
found by the courts below a share tenant within the purview of the upholding the respondent's status as share tenant in the petitioners' landholding.
said laws, i.e., Republic Acts 1199 and 3844, or a mere farmhand or
farm worker as such relationship were extensively discussed The petitioners' arguments are regressive and, if followed, would turn back the
in Delos Reyes vs. Espinelli, 30 SCRA 574. (Copied verbatim from advances in agrarian reform law. The repeal of the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the
Petition, p. 31- rollo) Agricultural Land Reform Code mark the movement not only towards the leasehold
system but towards eventual ownership of land by its tillers. The phasing out of share
Petitioner insists in this petition that Benitez was a mere farmhand or laborer who was tenancy was never intended to mean a reversion of tenants into mere farmhands or
dismissed as an employee from the landholding in question and not ousted therefrom hired laborers with no tenurial rights whatsoever.
as tenant. Whether a person is a tenant or not is basically a question of fact and the
findings of the respondent court and the trial court are, generally, entitled to respect It is important to note that the Agricultural Tenancy Act (RA 1199) and the Agricultural
and non-disturbance. Land Reform Code (RA 3844) have not been entirely repealed by the Code of Agrarian
Reform (RA 6389) even if the same have been substantially modified by the latter.
The law defines "agricultural tenancy" as the physical possession by a person of land
devoted to agriculture, belonging to or legally possessed by another for the purpose of However, even assuming such an abrogation of the law, the rule that the repeal of a
production through the labor of the former and of the members of his immediate farm statute defeats all actions pending under the repealed statute is a mere general
household in consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest with the
principle. Among the established exceptions are when vested rights are affected and the agricultural produce. His share is necessarily dependent on the
obligations of contract are impaired. (Aisporna vs. Court of Appeals, 108 SCRA 481). amount of harvest.

The records establish the private respondents' status as agricultural tenants under the Hence, the lower court's computation of damages in favor of respondent based on the
legal definitions. number of normal harvests. In most cases, we have considered the system of sharing
produce as convincing evidence of tenancy relations.
Respondent Benitez has physically possessed the landholding continuously from 1969
until he was ejected from it. Such possession of longstanding is an essential distinction The petitioners entered into an agreement on May 2, 1973 which in clear and
between a mere agricultural laborer and a real tenant within the meaning of the tenancy categorical terms establishes respondent as a tenant, to wit:
law (Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 Edition), a tenant being one who, has the
temporary use and occupation of land or tenements belonging to another (Bouvier's AGREEMENT
Law Dictionary, Vol. II, p. 3254) for the purpose of production (Sec. 3, Republic Act
1199; delos Reyes vs. Espinelli, 30 SCRA 574). Respondent Benitez lives on the
landholding. He built his house as an annex to the petitioner's copra kiln. A hired laborer This agreement entered into by and between Manuel Guerrero
would not build his own house at his expense at the risk of losing the same upon his hereinafter referred to as the landowner and Apolinario Benitez
dismissal or termination any time. Such conduct is more consistent with that of an hereinafter referred to as tenant.
agricultural tenant who enjoys security of tenure under the law.
xxx xxx xxx
Cultivation is another important factor in determining the existence of tenancy
relationships. It is admitted that it had been one Conrado Caruruan, with others, who The petitioners, however, contend that the word "tenant" in the aforequoted agreement
had originally cleared the land in question and planted the coconut trees, with the was used to mean a hired laborer farm employee as understood agreed upon by the
respondent coming to work in the landholding only after the same were already fruit parties. The fact that their relationship would be guided by the provisions of Republic
bearing. The mere fact that it was not respondent Benitez who had actually seeded the Act 1199 or the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines militates against such an
land does not mean that he is not a tenant of the land. The definition of cultivation is assertion. It would be an absurdity for Republic Act 1199 to govern an employer-
not limited merely to the tilling, plowing or harrowing of the land. It includes the employee relationship. If as the petitioners insist a meaning other than its general
promotion of growth and the care of the plants, or husbanding the ground to forward acceptation had been given the word "tenant", the instrument should have so stated '.
the products of the earth by general industry. The raising of coconuts is a unique Aided by a lawyer, the petitioners, nor the respondent could not be said to have
agricultural enterprise. Unlike rice, the planting of coconut seedlings does not need misconstrued the same. In clear and categorical terms, the private respondent appears
harrowing and plowing. Holes are merely dug on the ground of sufficient depth and to be nothing else but a tenant:
distance, the seedlings placed in the holes and the surface thereof covered by soil.
Some coconut trees are planted only every thirty to a hundred years. The major work Finally, comes the admission by the petitioners' counsel of the respondent's status as
in raising coconuts begins when the coconut trees are already fruitbearing. Then it is tenant:
cultivated by smudging or smoking the plantation, taking care of the coconut trees,
applying fertilizer, weeding and watering, thereby increasing the produce. The fact that
respondent Benitez, together with his family, handles all phases of farmwork from ATTY. ESTEBAN:
clearing the landholding to the processing of copra, although at times with the aid of
hired laborers, thereby cultivating the land, shows that he is a tenant, not a mere farm Q You said you are living at San Joaquin, who
laborer. (delos Reyes vs. Espinelli, supra Marcelo vs. de Leon, 105 Phil. 1175). cause the sowing of the lumber you made as
annex in the house?
Further indicating the existence of a tenancy relationship between petitioners and
respondent is their agreement to share the produce or harvest on a "tercio basis" that ATTY. NALUNDASAN
is, a 1/3 to 2/3 sharing in favor of the petitioner-landowners. Though not a positive
indication of the existence of tenancy relations perse the sharing of harvest taken
Please remember that under the law, tenant is
together with other factors characteristic of tenancy shown to be present in the case at
given the right to live in the holding in question. We
bar, strengthens the claim of respondent that indeed, he is a tenant. The case of delos
admit him as tenant.
Reyes vs. Espinelli (supra) clearly explains the matter thus:

xxxxxxxxx
The agricultural laborer works for the employer, and for his labor he
receives a salary or wage, regardless of whether the employer
makes a profit. On the other hand, the share tenant par ticipates in
(Apolinario Benitez on Redirect, TSN, June 25, It is true that leasehold tenancy for coconut lands and sugar lands has not yet been
1974, pp. 4950). implemented. The policy makers of government are still studying the feasibility of its
application and the consequences of its implementation. Legislation still has to be
The respondent's status as agricultural tenant should be without question. enacted. Nonetheless, wherever it may be implemented, the eventual goal of having
strong and independent farmers working on lands which they own remains. The
petitioners' arguments which would use the enactment of the Agrarian Reform Code as
Once a tenancy relationship is established, the tenant has the right to continue working the basis for setting back or eliminating the tenurial rights of the tenant have no merit.
until such relationship is extinguished according to law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the
The Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 (Republic Act 1199), the Agricultural Land Reform appellate court is AFFIRMED. No costs.
Code of 1963 (Republic Act 3844), the Code of Agrarian Reforms (Republic Act 6389)
and Presidential Decree 1038 (Strengthening the Security of Tenure of Tenant Tillers
in Non-Rice/Corn Producing Agricultural Lands) all provide for the security of tenure of SO ORDERED.
agricultural tenants. Ejectment may be effected only for causes provided by law, to wit:
Fernan, Alampay, Paras and Cruz, * JJ., concur.
l) Violation or failure of the tenant to comply with any of the terms
and conditions of the tenancy contract or any of the provisions of the Feria, J., took no part.
Agricultural Tenancy Act;

2) The tenant's failure to pay the agreed rental or to deliver the


landholder's share unless the tenant's failure is caused by a
fortuitous event or force majeure;

3) Use by the tenant of the land for purposes other than that specified
by the agreement of the parties;

4) Failure of the tenant to follow proven farm practices:

5) Serious injury to the land caused by the negligence of the tenant;

6) Conviction by a competent court of a tenant or any member of his


immediate family or farm household of a crime against the landholder
or a member of his immediate family. (Section 50, Rep. Act 1199).

None of the above causes exists in the case at bar. The respondent has been unlawfully
deprived of his right to security of tenure and the Court of Agrarian Reforms did not err
in ordering the reinstatement of respondent as tenant and granting him damages
therefor.

Before we close this case, it is pertinent to reiterate that the respondent's right as share
tenant do not end with the abolition of share tenancy. As the law seeks to "uplift the
farmers from poverty, ignorance and stagnation to make them dignified, self-reliant,
strong and responsible citizens ... active participants in nation-building", agricultural
share tenants are given the right to leasehold tenancy as a first step towards the
ultimate status of owner-cultivator, a goal sought to be achieved by the government
program of land reform.
Republic of the Philippines SEC. 39. Prohibition on Pre-threshing. — It shall be unlawful for either the tenant or landholder,
SUPREME COURT without mutual consent, to reap or thresh a portion of the crop at any time previous to the
Manila date set for its threshing; ... Any violation of this section by either party shall be treated and
penalized in accordance with this Act and/or under the general provisions of law applicable to
FIRST DIVISION the act committed,

In Beltran v. Cruz2 the Court expressed that although the tenant is given the right under the
Agricultural Tenancy Act to determine when to reap the harvest, it is likewise provided under
G.R. No. L-23785 November 27, 1975
the Act that the reaping "shall be after due notice to the landholder" (Section 36, paragraph
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, 1). Pre-reaping or pre-threshing is considered a serious violation, subject to the sanction of
vs. dispossession of the tenant (Section 50, subsection b) and the penalty of a "fine not exceeding
ELIAS ADILLO, defendant-appellee. Two Thousand Pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of the
court" (Section 57). The "moving idea behind the requirement of the advance notice of the
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de reaping, and the prohibition of doing it in advance of the date set," said the Court, "is to enable
Castro and Solicitor Alejandro B. Afurong for plaintiff-appellant. the landholder to witness, personally or by representative, the reaping and threshing
operations. Pre-reaping in the absence of one party, due to unilateral advancing of the date of
Ernesto S. Tengco for defendant-appellee. the harvest, inevitably generates ill feeling and strains relations between landholder and
tenant due to the suspicion aroused that part of the harvest may have been illegally diverted.
Such suspicion tends to poison the tenancy relation and is inimical to agricultural peace and
MARTIN, J.: progress; wherefore, strict compliance with the legal and contractual prescriptions as to the
date of reaping and threshing are of the essence of the statutory policy." This applies
The decisive question presented to Us in this direct appeal from the dismissal judgment of the particularly to rice share tenancy and may not be extended to embrace the agricultural
Court of First Instance of Laguna in its Criminal Case SC-663 is whether or not the penal liability leasehold. The two tenancy systems are distinct and different from each other. In sharehold,
of a share-tenant for pre-reaping or pre-threshing under the Agricultural Tenancy Act (Republic the tenant may choose to shoulder, in addition to labor, any one or more of the items of
Act No. 1199, enacted on August 30, 1954) has been obliterated by the Agricultural Land contributions (such as farm implements, work animals, final harrowing, transplanting), while
Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844, enacted on August 8, 1963) and the subsequent agrarian in leasehold, the tenant or lessee always shoulders all items of production except the land.
laws. Under the sharehold system, the tenant and the landholder are co-managers, whereas in
leasehold system, the tenant is the sole manager of the farmholding. Finally, in sharehold
The defendant-appellee Elias Adillo was a share-tenant of one Saturnino L. Rebong on a parcel
tenancy, the tenant and the landholder divide the harvest in proportion to their contributions,
of riceland situated at Victoria, Laguna. On January 4, 1962, he was charged before the Court
while in leasehold tenancy, the tenant or lessee gets the whole produce with the mere
of First Instance of Laguna for violation of Section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act in that:
obligation to pay a fixed rental.3 There is thus justification for the view that notice for reaping
(O)n or about October 3, 1960 in the Municipality of Victoria, Province of Laguna, Republic of or threshing is not required by the Act in leasehold system, because the lessee's principal
the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused above-named obligation is to pay the rental, which is to deliver a generic thing in the absence of any specific
being then the tenant of a piece of land owned by Saturnino L. Rebong under a share system, agreement to the contrary, and that the rental is supposed to be a specific amount, as fixed
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously reap and thresh a portion of and limited in Section 45 of the Act. Without any legal obligation imposed on the lessee to give
palay planted on said piece of land without the knowledge and consent of Saturnino Rebong such notice, the lessor should take it upon himself to verify from the tenant-lessee the date of
and even before a date has been fixed for the reaping and threshing of the palay, to the reaping and threshing.4
damage and prejudice of Saturnino Rebong.
On August 8, l963, the Tenancy Act of 1954 was amended by the Agricultural Land Reform
On August 24, 1964, the counsel for the defendant-appellee1 moved for the quashal of the Code. Agricultural share tenancy was declared "to be contrary to public policy and shall be
information on the submission that the Agricultural Tenancy Act, on which the accusatory abolished."5 Nonetheless, based on transitory provision in the first proviso of Section 4 of the
pleading against defendant-appellee was based, has been repealed or abrogated by the new Code, existing share tenancy contracts were allowed to continue temporarily in force and
Agricultural Land Reform Code, thereby resulting in the extinction of defendant-appellee's effect, notwithstanding their express abolition, until whichever or the following events occurs
criminal responsibility for pre-reaping and pre-threshing under the former law. The lower court earlier: (a) the end of the agricultural year when the National Land Reform Council makes the
favorably resolved the motion and ordered the dismissal of the case. proclamation declaring the region or locality a land reform area; or (b) the shorter period
provided in the share tenancy contracts express; or (c) the share tenant sooner exercises his
Hence, the present appeal interposed by the State. option to elect the leasehold system.6

The particular provision of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, subject of this litigation, provides:
In the Code of Agrarian Reforms (Republic Act No. 6389), which took effect on September 10, Thus confronted with the issue as to whether or not the penal liability of a share tenancy for
1971 agricultural share tenancy throughout the country was declared contrary to public policy pre-reaping or pre-threshing under the Agricultural Tenancy Act (Republic Act No. 1199)
and was automatically converted to agricultural leasehold upon the effectivity of Section 4 enacted on August 30, 1954, has been obliterated by the Agricultural Land Reform Code
thereof although existing share tenancy contracts were again allowed to continue temporarily (Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Republic Act No. 6389) and the subsequent Presidential
in force and effect in any region or locality, to be governed in the meantime by the pertinent Decrees and Proclamations, the solution to the issue seems to be clear that the injunction
provisions of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, "until the end of the agricultural year when against pre-reaping and pre-threshing under the Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 has lost its
the President of the Philippines shall have organized by executive order the Department of operative force and effect, and the penal sanction therein subdued. Specifically, Section 39 of
Agrarian, Reform in accordance with the provisions of this amendatory Act, unless such the Act, upon which the accusatory pleading against defendant-appellee is predicted, is no
contracts provide for a shorter period or the tenant sooner exercises his option to elect the longer carried in the subsequent agrarian laws and decrees and its violation thereof considered
leasehold system."7 no longer an offense. As a result it would be illogical to prosecute or sentence defendant-
appellee for such offense which no longer exists. 9
Immediately after the declaration of martial law, the President of the Philippines issued
Presidential Decree No. 2 on September 26, 1972, proclaiming the entire country "as a land The whole failure of the laws and decrees subsequent to the Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954
reform area." The proclamation of the entire country "as a land reform area" in accordance to penalize the acts of pre-reaping and pre-threshing which constituted the offense defined
with the first proviso of Section 4 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code, as amended, and penalized under the said Section 39 carries with it the deprivation of the courts of
unqualifiedly abolished the sharehold system in the Philippine agricultural life. To the extreme, jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence persons charged with its
the Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 was withdrawn from the mass of living agrarian laws violations. 10
specifically in rice and corn tenancy. On October 21, 1972 the President issued Presidential
Decree No. 27 emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil. To safeguard this new ACCORDINGLY, the order of dismissal of the information against defendant-appellee for
right of the tenancy, Presidential Decree No. 316 of October 22, 1973, was promulgate violation of Section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act (Republic Act No. 1199) is hereby
interdicting the ejectment or removal of the tenant-farmer from his farmholding until the affirmed without pronouncement as to costs.
promulgation of the rules and regulations implementing the said Presidential Decree No. 27.8
SO ORDERED.
It will be noted that Section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 (Republic Act No. 1199)
which prohibited either the tenant or landholder, without mutual consent, to reap or thresh a
portion of the crop at any time previous to the date set for its threshing and penalized any
violation thereof by either party is no longer found in the Agricultural Land Reform Code
(Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Republic Act No. 6389) for the obvious reason that
agricultural share tenancy provided in the Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 has already been
abolished by the new Code. The omission of such provision as Section 39 of the Agricultural
Tenancy Act of 1954 in the new Code operates as an implied repeal of said provision. It is a
well settled principle of statutory construction that when

An act which purports to set out in full all that it intends to contain, operates as repeal of
anything omitted which was contained in the old act and not included in the amendatory act.
(Construction of Statutes, Crawford, p. 621, citing State v. Mac Cafferty, 25 Okla 2, 105 Pac.
992).

Also,

Where the language of the statute as amended is set out in full in an act the old law is not
repealed except as to those parts omitted which are inconsistent with the amendment, the
remainder of the act being a continuation of the original law. (Idem, citing People v.
Montgomery County, 67 N. Y. 109; Reid v. Smoulter, 128 Pa. St. 324, 18 Atl. 445,5 A.L.R. 517)

Likewise,

When the legislature declares that an existing statute shall be amended, the legislature
thereby evinces the intention to make the new statute a substitute for the amended statute
exclusively and only those portions of the amended statute repeated in the new one are
retained (Idem, at p. 620, citing State ex rel Nagle v. Leader Co., 97 Mont. 586,37 Pac. (2) 561).
Republic of the Philippines Defendant Fule became a member of the petitioner COCOMA from 1964 to 1972, while Eddie
SUPREME COURT A. Escudero became a member of the same cooperative-corporation from 1972 to 1975.
Manila During the time that the land was under contract with these persons, petitioner COCOMA
claims to have acted as their agent in providing management and marketing services. 3
SECOND DIVISION
Consequently, from 1964 up to 1975, petitioner COCOMA hired allegedly for and on behalf of
G.R. Nos. L-46281-83 August 19, 1988 Fule and Eddie A. Escudero, the necessary laborers to harvest and transport the coconut
produce from the land. Among these workers were respondents Pedro and Hermogenes
COCONUT COOPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATION, INC. (COCOMA), petitioner,
Cosico who were recommendees of Fule, and who were hired to clean the land of grass,
vs.
shrubs, dried coconut leaves and husks. The work done in the land and the expenses incurred
COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO COSICO, HERMOGENES COSICO and LUCAS
therefor were approved and paid by Fule and Eddie A. Escudero, through petitioner COCOMA.
COSICO, respondents.
And all the cleaning and planting expenses were covered with receipts duly signed by the
F.M. Poonin & Associates, for petitioner. laborers. 4

Manuel A. Cordero for respondents. During all the time that petitioner COCOMA was rendering management and marketing
services in the land in question, all the proceeds from the sale of the coconut produce thereof,
less the necessary expenses mentioned above, were paid and delivered, after every harvest
season, to said Fule and Eddie A. Escudero, respectively, in compliance with the terms of their
PADILLA, J.: marketing agreements with petitioner COCOMA. 5
Petition to review on certiorari the decision * of the Court of Appeals, promulgated 19 May On 9 October 1971, or after seven (7) years from 1964 that all the workers had been receiving
1977, in CA G.R. No. SP-05096R entitled "Pedro Cosico, Hermogenes Cosico, and Lucas Cosico, their wages as hired workers in said land from Fule and later from Eddie A. Escudero, through
plaintiffs-appellees versus Rosario Vda. de Fule, et al., defendants, and Coconut Cooperative the petitioner COCOMA, the respondents Pedro, Hermogenes and Lucas, all surnamed Cosico,
Marketing Association, Inc. defendants-appellants," which affirmed the defendant- started to claim to be the tenants in three (3) separate portions of said landholding, consisting
appellee. ** of the Court of Agrarian Relations, dated 26 January 1976, in CAR Case Nos. 2236, of about four (4) hectares each, more or less. They instituted individually CAR Cases Nos. 2236,
2237 and 2238, finding private respondents Pedro Cosico and Hermogenes Cosico to be share 2237 and 2238 against defendants Rosario Paraiso Vda. de Fule and Villa Escudero Corporation
tenants of the coconut landholdings of the petitioner. (VESCO). Respondents later amended their complaint in said cases by including, petitioner
The facts of the case: COCOMA as defendant. 6

The owners of the coconut land in question located in Bo. Imok Calauan, Laguna, consisting of On 26 January 1976 the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) rendered a joint decision:' in the
fifteen (15) hectares, more or less, are the spouses Pedro Rulloda and Salud Sanchez. Prior to, three (3) cases, the dispositive part of which is as follows:
and including the years 1964 up to 1971, Rosario Paraiso Vda. de Fule (Fule, hereafter) WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered:
obtained legal possession of the land c,irrency virtue of a yearly contract of sale (pakyaw) of
all the coconut produce and other fruits from said land. In 1972, Fule did not renew the 1. Declaring plaintiffs Pedro Cosico (CAR CASE No. 2236) and Hermogenes Cosico (CAR CASE
contract but spouses (Pedro Rulloda and Salud Sanchez) executed a similar contract with Eddie No. 2237), as true and lawful tenants of the Coconut Marketing Association (COCOMA), its duly
A. Escudero, which was renewed every year until 1975.1 authorized representatives, successors in interest and/or assigns, over four (4) hectares each
of coconut land described in their respective complaints;
During the period prior to 1964, Fule had utilized the services of Pedro, Hermogenes and Lucas
Cosico as caretakers over four (4) hectares each of the land in question, paying them for their 2. Declaring, furthermore, plaintiff Hermogenes Cosico as the true and lawful tenant of
services in cash, which was equivalent to 1/7 of the proceeds of the sale of coconuts harvested defendant COCOMA, its duly authorized representatives, successors in interest and/or assigns,
from the land they each caretook. As caretakers, the Cosico's would check or visit said over that four (4) hectares of coconut land described in CAR CASE No. 2238, which is
plantation to see whether there was stealing in the plantation, and they would report to her contiguous to that referred to in CAR CASE No. 2237;
(Fule). They lived in a place about 2 and 1/2 kms. away from the land in question. They had no
work animals to cultivate the land with; they used bolos to clean and clear the land by cutting 3. Declaring that no tenancy relations exists between defendant COCOMA and Lucas Cosico,
grass and burning them. Private respondents (Cosicos) alleged that they also planted coconut plaintiff in CAR CASE No. 2238;
trees and other permanent trees in the land, for which they have not allegedly been paid. The
4. Ordering defendant COCOMA, its representatives, successors in interest and/or assigns, to
tasks of harvesting, gathering, picking and hauling coconuts were performed by laborers hired
immediately reinstate plaintiffs Pedro Cosico and Hermogenes Cosico to the landholdings
and paid by Fule or her coconut buyer. And when respondent Pedro Cosico was hired to gather
mentioned in the next preceding paragraphs and to maintain them in peaceful possession and
coconuts in the land, he was paid for his labor. The payment for his labor was separate from
tenancy thereof, on a sharing arrangement of 70-30 in favor of the defendant COCOMA on the
his 1/7 share received as caretaker.2
proceeds of the net harvest until such time as said parties shall have mutually agreed on fixed Share tenancy or agricultural tenancy is defined as:
rentals;
... the physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture, belonging to or legally
5. Ordering defendant COCOMA, its representatives, successors in interest and/or assigns to possessed by another for the purpose of production through the labor of the former and of
deliver to plaintiffs Pedro Cosico and Hermogenes Cosico the amount of P28,994.00 the members of his immediate farm household in consideration of which the former agrees to
representing the 30% share of the said plaintiffs from the coconuts harvested from the land in share the harvest with the latter or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce
question for the period covering November 12, 1971 up to June 4, 1975 or in money or in both (Section 3, Republic Act 1199, the Agricultural Tenancy Act, as
amended).
6. Ordering defendant COCOMA, its representatives, successors in interest and/or assigns to
render an accounting of the harvests of the land for the period starting June 5, 1975, up to the ... share tenancy exists whenever two persons agree on a joint undertaking for agricultural
present and to deposit to the Court, the equivalent of the 30% share of the aforementioned production wherein one party furnishes the land and the other his labor, with either or both
plaintiffs, for delivery to said plaintiffs; 7. Ordering defendant COCOMA, its representatives, contributing any one or several of the items of production, the tenant cultivating the land with
successors in interest and/or assigns, to pay plaintiffs Pedro Cosico and Hermogenes Cosico the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm household, and the produce
the amount of Four Thousand Pesos ( P4,000.00) or Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) each, as thereof to be divided between the landholder and the tenant in proportion to their respective
expenses of litigation and other incidental expenses; and 8. Denying the claim for decision-' of contributions (Sec. 4, RA 1199; Sec. 166 (25), RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code).13
all three defendants; All other claim and counterclaims are denied for lack of merit. 7
On the other hand, the Court has defined an agricultural worker as follows:
On 19 February 1976, petitioner COCOMA appealed the CAR decision:' to the Court of Appeals.
On 19 May 1977, the Court of Appeals, as earlier stated, rendered a decision, the dispositive ... . A "farm worker" is any "agricultural wage, salary or piece worker but is not limited to a
part of which is as follows: farm worker of a particular farm employer unless this Code (Agricultural Land Reform Code,
supplied) explicitly states otherwise, and any individual whose work has ceased as a
WHEREFORE, finding the decision appealed from to be in accordance with law and supported consequence of, or in connection with, a current agrarian dispute or an unfair labor practice
by substantial evidence, the same is hereby affirmed in toto without pronouncement as to and who has not obtained a substantially equivalent and regular employment." The term
costs in this instance. 8 includes "farm laborer and/or farm employer." An agricultural worker' is not a whit different
from a farm worker.
Hence, the instant petition of COCOMA.
From the definition of a "farm worker" thus fashioned, it is quite apparent that there should
The four (4) issues raised by the petitioner are: (1) whether or not the private respondents are be an employer-employee relationship between the farm employer and the farm worker. In
share tenants in the coconut land in question; (2) whether or not private respondent determining; the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the elements that are
Hermogenes Cosico can be adjudged a share tenant and the COCOMA ordered the reinstate generally considered are the following: (1) selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the
him in the land involved in CAR Case No. 2238 when Hermogenes Cosico is not even a plaintiff payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the employer's power to control the
in said Case No. 2238, but one Lucas Cosico; (3) whether or not COCOMA, contending to be a employee's conduct. It is this last element that constitutes the most important index of the
mere marketing agent which provides management and marketing services to the members existence of relationship. 14
of the cooperative, can be held directly liable to the private respondents-tenants for their
share in the coconuts harvested; and (4) whether or not the computation of the alleged shares The above-mentioned characteristics of an agricultural worker or farm worker do not exist in
due the respondents Pedro Cosico and Hermogenes Cosico, made by the trial court is patently share tenancy.
erroneous because the same was based on a wrong number of coconuts harvested and on
conjectured prices. Further, in one case, the Court compared an agricultural worker with a share tenant, and set
out the following distinctions, among others, between the two:
As to the first issue, petitioner contends that private respondents were merely caretakers, of
Fule and, later, Eddie Escudero, whose task included clearing the land by cutting grass and ... . The agricultural laborer works for the farm employer, and for his labor he receives a salary
burning them to smudge the coconut trees to make them bear fruits, 9 planting of coconuts, or wage, regardless of whether the employer makes a profit. On the other hand, the share
and other fruit bearing trees, 10 and harvesting, gathering, picking and hauling coconuts, 11 and tenant participates in the agricultural produce. His share is necessarily dependent on the
that, as caretakers, private respondents were paid separately in cash. 12 Hence, the petitioner amount of the harvest.
would like this Court to believe that since private respondents were mere caretakers who were
Since the relationship between farm employer and agricultural laborer is that of employer and
paid in cash for their services, they were therefore, hired laborers, not share tenants.
employee, the decisive factor is the control exercised by the former over the latter. On the
Petitioner's contention is without merit. other hand, the landholder has the 'right to require the tenant to follow those proven farm
practices which have been found to contribute towards increased agricultural production and
In determining the nature of the relationship of the parties in the instant case, it would be well to use fertilizer of the kind or kinds shown by proven farm practices adapted to the
to review the concept of a share tenant as against that of an agricultural worker.
requirements of the land." This is but the right of a partner to protect his interest, not the Anyone who has had fruit trees in his yard, will disagree with the above description of the
control exercised by an employer. ... 15 relationship. He knows the caretaker must water the trees, even fertilize them for better
production, uproot weeds and turn the soil, sometimes fumigate to eliminate plant pests, etc.
The record of this case is bare of evidence to support the conclusion that the private Those chores obviously mean 'working or cultivating' the land. Besides, it seems that
respondents are mere agricultural workers. Unlike ordinary laborers, respondents did not defendant planted other crops, (i.e. cultivated the lot) giving the landowner his corresponding
observe regular hours of work. They did not work in shifts. Petitioner COCOMA could not even share. 20
remember the number of days that private respondents worked on the land for each
agricultural year. While petitioner kept a record of the full amount paid to respondents for Applying the foregoing precedents to the case at bar, and given the kind of work performed
each agricultural season, it did not keep an accurate record of the actual number of days by respondents on the landholding in question, the Court holds that respondents are share
respondents reported for work. 16 The petitioner did not lay down regulations under which tenants, not hired workers, of the petitioner.
respondents were supposed to do their work. Neither did petitioner prescribe the manner by
which the private respondents were to perform their duties as farmworkers. We do not find Further supportive of the existence of a share tenancy relationship between petitioner and
that degree of control and supervision essential to the presence of an employer-employee respondents is their agreement to share the produce or harvest on a 1/7 to 6/7 basis in favor
relationship between petitioner and respondents and before that, between Fule or Escudero, of the petitioner COCOMA. Though not a decisive indication per se of the existence of tenancy
on the one hand and respondents, on the other. relationship, such sharing of the harvests, taken together with the other factors characteristic
of tenancy shown to be present in the case at bar, strengthens the claim of respondents that,
Petitioner, in an attempt attempt to support its pretense that private respondents are only indeed, they are tenants.
hired laborers, not share tenants, claims that private respondents are mere caretakers who
paid for their services as such, and whose work consists of clearing and cleaning the land, To prove petitioner's claim that the private respondents are hired workers and not its tenants,
planting the coconut and other fruit-bearing trees, and harvesting, gathering, picking and petitioner would rely mainly on the receipts signed by respondents and other persons tending
hauling coconuts. to show that they were paid by petitioner for services rendered especially for cutting grass. 21

We do not sustain the petitioner's pretense. This Court cannot re-examine the facts as found by the Court of Appeals, except for unusual
and urgent reasons which however do not exist in this case. Whether a person is a tenant or
Now well-settled is the rule that cultivation is an important factor in determining; the existence not is basically a question of fact and the findings of the respondent court and the trial court
of a share tenancy relationship. 17 As to the meaning of cultivation, this Court has already held are, generally, entitled to respect and non-disturbance.22
that:
The conclusion then, anent the first issue, as borne out by the evidence on record, is that
... . The definition of cultivation is not limited merely to the tilling, plowing or harrowing of the private respondents Pedro and Hermogenes, both surnamed Cosico, are share tenants of the
land. It includes the promotion to growth and the care of the plants, or husbanding the ground land in dispute.
to forward the products of the earth by general industry . The raising of coconuts is a unique
agricultural enterprise. Unlike rice, the planting of coconut seedlings does not need harrowing On the second issue, petitioner questions the recognition by the trial court and the Court of
and plowing. Holes are merely dug on the ground of sufficient depth and distance, the Appeals of respondent Hermogenes Cosico as tenant in the landholding where his co-
seedlings placed in the holes and the surface thereof covered by soil. Some coconut trees are respondent Lucas Cosico claims to be the tenant, when the former is not even a party to the
planted only every thirty to a hundred years. The major work in raising coconuts begins when separate case filed by the latter and he (Hermogenes Cosico) did not allege such tenancy in his
the coconut trees are already fruit-bearing. Then it is cultivated by smudging or smoking the own amended complaint. In other words, it is petitioner's submission that even if respondent
plantation, taking care of the coconut trees, applying fertilizer, weeding and watering, thereby Hermogenes Cosico were to be considered a tenant in the landholding described in his
increasing the produce. The fact that respondent Benitez, together with his family, handles all amended complaint, the court had no legal basis, however, in declaring him also a tenant of a
phases of farmwork from clearing the landholding to the processing of copra, although at times landholding described and claimed by another person in another case in which he
with the aid of hired laborers, thereby cultivating the land, shows that he is a tenant, not a (Hermogenes) is not a party and which he did not claim to be a tenant of, in his own
mere farm laborer. 18 complaint. 23

It may thus be said that the caretaker of an agricultural land can also be considered Petitioner's contention. is without merit.
the cultivator of the land. 19
It should be noted that the three (3) cases filed by the three (3) private respondents were
In Marcelo v. De Leon, plaintiff therein argued that the defendant was not a tenant inasmuch jointly tried and their common evidence showed that, although Hermogenes and Lucas Cosico
as the latter did not till or cultivate the land in order to grow the fruit-bearing trees because were supposed to have separate holdings, from 1956, of four (4) hectares each, both of them
they were already full-grown; that he did not do the actual gathering of the fruits but merely worked the two (2) holdings jointly in their entirety, but it was only Hermogenes Cosico who
supervised the gathering; that after deducting the expenses, he gave one-half of the fruits to received the tenant's share from the whole. In other words, it was Hermogenes Cosico who
the plaintiff all in consideration of the land. Ruling in the above-mentioned case, this Court acted as sole tenant of the two (2) holdings. Hence, the latter's recognition by the Court of
held: Agrarian Relations and the Court of Appeals; as the tenant in the holding also claimed by Lucas
Cosico. The facts, therefore, warranted Hermogenes Cosico's recognition as the tenant in both possession of the landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the
landholding. 24 legal possession of the landholdings, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated
to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor.
In Teodoro vs. Macaraeg, this Court ruled:
Further, in several cases, this Court sustained the preservation of the landholder-tenant
Significantly, the Court of Agrarian Relations is not 'restricted to the specific relief claimed or relationship, in cases of transfer of legal possession:
demands made by the parties to the dispute, but may include in the order or decision any
matter or determination which may be deemed necessary and expedient for the purpose of ... in case of transfer or in case of lease, as in the instant case, the tenancy relationship between
settling the dispute or preventing further disputes, provided said matter for determination has the landowner and his tenant should be preserved in order to insure the well-being of the
been established by competent evidence during the hearing. 25 tenant or protect him from being unjustly dispossessed by the transferee or purchaser of the
land; in other words, the purpose of the law in question is to maintain the tenants in the
Further, R.A. 3844, Section 155, provides: peaceful possession and cultivation of the land or afford them protection against unjustified
dismissal from their holdings. (Primero v. CAR, 101 Phil. 675);
SEC. 155. Powers of the Court; Rules of Procedure. ... The Courts of Agrarian Relations shall be
governed by the Rules of Court: Provided, That in the hearing, investigation and determination It is our considered judgment, since the return by the lessee of the leased property to the
of any question or controversy pending before them the Courts without impairing substantial lessor upon the expiration of the contract involves also a transfer of legal possession, and
rights, shall not be bound strictly by the technical rules of evidence and procedure, except in taking into account the manifest intent of the lawmaking body in amending the law, i.e., to
expropriation cases. provide the tenant with security of tenure in all cases of transfer of legal possession, that the
instant case falls within and is governed by the provisions of Section 9 of Republic Act 1199, as
We now move to the third issue.
amended by Republic Act 2263. (Joya v. Pareja, 106 Phil. 645)
It is contended by the petitioner COCOMA that it has never been a landholder of the land in
... that the tenant may proceed against the transferee of the land to enforce obligation
question, since it was, at no time, owner, lessee or sub-lessee of the land, or buyer of the
incurred by the former landholder in relation to said land, for the reason that 'such obligation.
coconut produce thereof, or usufructuary or legal possessor of the same, or even an assignee
. . falls upon the assignee or transferee of the land' pursuant to Sec. 9 abovementioned. Since
of any right affecting it. Thus, assuming, without conceding, that respondents Pedro and
respondents are in turn free to proceed against the former landholder for reimbursement, it
Hermogenes Cosico are considered tenants of the land, petitioner COCOMA submits that,
is not iniquitous to hold them responsible to the tenant for said obligations. Moreover, it is the
being only an agent of defendants Fule and Escudero, it can not be held liable for the acts of
purposes of Republic Act 1199, particularly Sec. 9 thereof, to insure that the right of the tenant
its principals. Petitioner's cooperative-corporation is not in accordance with applicable laws,
to receive his lawful share of the produce of the land is unhampered by the transfer of said
because —
land from one landholder to another. (Almarinez v. Potenciano, 120 Phil. 1154.)
A landholder shall mean a person, natural or juridical, who, either as owner, lessee,
Therefore, petitioner, being a landholder, can be held liable to private respondents for their
usufructuary or legal possessor lets or grants to another the use or cultivation of his land for a
shares in the coconuts harvested from the landholding in question.
consideration either in shares under the share tenancy system, or a price certain or
ascertainable under the leasehold system. 26 As to the fourth issue, i.e., that the computation of the private respondents thirty percent
(30%) share in the harvest from 1971 to 1975, made by the Court of Agrarian Relations and
In accordance with the above provision, petitioner COCOMA is the landholder of the subject
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is erroneous, this Court finds no compelling reason to depart
landholdings for (a) it is juridical person" being a domestic corporation established under the
from such computation, as it is a part of the findings of fact and conclusions drawn therefrom
laws of the Philippines; (b) it is the "legal possessor" of the land for it has the sole management
by the respondent appellate court. Such findings and conclusions should not be disturbed on
and administration thereof, 27 (c) it has authorized or retained the private respondents to
appeal, in the absence of proof that they are unfounded or were arbitrarily arrived at or that
cultivate the land; and (d) it has shared the harvest with the latter, albeit unlawfully, making it
the Court of Appeals had failed to consider important evidence to the contrary.
appear that they are laborers instead of tenants. 28
In Bagsican v. Court of appeals, it was held that:
Petitioner, being a landholder, as defined by law, is therefore subject to the rights, obligations,
and limitations provided for under the agrarian laws. ... in agrarian cases, all that is required is mere substantial evidence.
There is also no question that, in this case, there was a transfer of the legal possession of the xxx xxx xxx
land from one landholder to another (Fule to petitioner COCOMA). In connection therewith,
Republic Act 3844, Sec. 10 states: Under this rule, all that the appellate court has to do, insofar as the evidence is concerned, is
to find out if the decision:' is supported by substantial evidence. So much so that the findings
SEC. 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of Period, etc.–The of fact of the Court of Agrarian Relations, if supported by such evidence, are conclusive on the
agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not be extinguished by mere expiration of appellate tribunal. 29
the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal
The respondent appellate court, in the case at bar, acted correctly when it ruled:

On the whole, we are not at liberty to reverse the foregoing findings of fact of the Agrarian
Court in the absence of any proof that are unfounded or where arbitrarily arrived at or that
the court had failed to consider important evidence to the contrary. It is well-established that
so long as the findings of fact of the Agrarian Court attain the minimum, evidentiary support
demanded by law, that is, supported by substantial evidence, such findings cannot be reversed
by the appellate tribunals. In the present case, We do not find any cogent reason to adopt a
conclusion different from that reached by the court a quo.30

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision:' appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against
the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

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