REPUBLIC ACT No.

6397

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE INTEGRATION OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR, AND APPROPRIATING
FUNDS THEREFOR.

Section 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to
effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the bar to discharge
its public responsibility more effectively.

Section 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the
National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such
sums as may be necessary for the same purpose shall be included in the annual appropriations for the
Supreme Court.

Section 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved: September 17, 1971

Rules of Court RULE 139-A Integrated Bar of the Philippines

Section 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the
Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to
ten percent (10%) of the collection from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled
members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.

Section 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule,
default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the
Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name
of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
A.M. No. 491 October 6, 1989

IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES.

PER CURIAM:

In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereafter "IBP") held on
June 3, 1989 at the Philippine International Convention Center (or PICC), the following were elected by
the House of Delegates (composed of 120 chapter presidents or their alternates) and proclaimed as
officers:

NAME POSITION

Atty. Violeta Drilon President

Atty. Bella Tiro Executive Vice-President

Atty. Salvador Lao Chairman, House of Delegates

Atty. Renato F. Ronquillo Secretary, House of Delegates

Atty. Teodoro Quicoy Treasurer, House of Delegates

Atty. Oscar Badelles Sergeant at Arms, House of Delegates

Atty. Justiniano Cortes Governor & Vice-President for Northern Luzon

Atty. Ciriaco Atienza Governor & Vice-President for Central Luzon

Atty. Mario Jalandoni Governor & Vice-President for Metro Manila

Atty. Jose Aguilar Grapilon Governor & Vice-President for Southern Luzon

Atty. Teodoro Almine Governor & Vice-President for Bicolandia

Atty. Porfirio Siyangco Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Visayas

Atty. Ricardo Teruel Governor & Vice-President for Western Visayas

Atty. Gladys Tiongco Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Mindanao

Atty. Simeon Datumanong Governor & Vice-President for Western Mindanao

The newly-elected officers were set to take the their oath of office on July 4,1989, before the Supreme
Court en banc. However,disturbed by the widespread reports received by some members of the Court
from lawyers who had witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the adverse comments
published in the columns of some newspapers about the intensive electioneering and overspending by
the candidates, led by the main protagonists for the office of president of the association, namely,
Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use of government planes,
and the officious intervention of certain public officials to influence the voting, all of which were done in
violation of the IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities. The Supreme Court en banc, exercising its
power of supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the oath-taking of the IBP officers-
elect and to inquire into the veracity of the reports.
It should be stated at the outset that the election process itself (i.e. the voting and the canvassing of
votes on June 3, 1989) which was conducted by the "IBP Comelec," headed by Justice Reynato Puno of
the Court of Appeals, was unanimously adjudged by the participants and observers to be above board.
For Justice Puno took it upon himself to device safeguards to prevent tampering with, and marking of,
the ballots.

What the Court viewed with considerable concern was the reported electioneering and extravagance that
characterized the campaign conducted by the three candidates for president of the IBP.

I. MEDIA ACCOUNT OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN.

Emil Jurado, in his column "IBP Group Questions Drilon Election" (Manila Standard, Sunday, June 17,
1989), Luis Mauricio, in two successive columns: "The Invertebrated Bar" (Malaya, June 10, 1989) and
"The Disintegrating Bar" (Malaya, June 20, 1989), and Teodoro Locsin Jr. in an article, entitled "Pam-
Pam" (The Philippines Free Press, July 8,1989), and the editorial, entitled 'Wrong Forum" of the Daily
Globe (June 8, 1989), were unanimously critical of the "vote-buying and pressure tactics" allegedly
employed in the campaign by the three principal candidates: Attys. Violeta C. Drilon, Nereo Paculdo and
Ramon Nisce who reportedly "poured heart, soul, money and influence to win over the 120 IBP
delegates."

Mr. Jurado mentioned the resentment of Atty. Drilon's rivals who felt at a disadvantage because Atty.
Drilon allegedly used PNB helicopters to visit far-flung IBP chapters on the pretext of distributing Bigay
Puso donations, and she had the added advantage of having regional directors and labor arbiters of the
Department of Labor and Employment (who had been granted leaves of absence by her husband, the
Labor Secretary) campaigning for her. Jurado's informants alleged that there was rampant vote-buying
by some members of the U.P. Sigma Rho Fraternity (Secretary Drilon's fraternity), as well as by some
lawyers of ACCRA (Angara, Concepcion, Cruz, Regala and Abello Law Office) where Mrs. Drilon is
employed, and that government positions were promised to others by the office of the Labor Secretary.

Mr. Mauricio in his column wrote about the same matters and, in addition, mentioned "talk of personnel
of the Department of Labor, especially conciliators and employers, notably Chinese Filipinos, giving aid
and comfort to her (Atty. Drilon's) candidacy," the billeting of out-of-town delegates in plush hotels where
they were reportedly "wined and dined continuously, womened and subjected to endless haggling over
the price of their votes x x x" which allegedly "ranged from Pl5,000 to P20,000, and, on the day of the
election, some twelve to twenty votes which were believed crucial, appreciated to P50,000."

In his second column, Mr. Mauricio mentioned "how a top official of the judiciary allegedly involved
himself in IBP politics on election day by closeting himself with campaigners as they plotted their election
strategy in a room of the PICC (the Philippine International Convention Center where the
convention/election were held) during a recess x x x."

Mr. Locsin in his column and editorial substantially re-echoed Mauricio's reports with some
embellishments.

II. THE COURT'S DECISION TO INVESTIGATE.

Responding to the critical reports, the Court, in its en banc resolution dated June 15, 1989, directed the
outgoing and incoming members of the IBP Board of Governors, the principal officers and Chairman of
the House of Delegates to appear before it on Tuesday, June 20, 1989, at 2:00 o'clock p.m., and there to
inform the Court on the veracity of the aforementioned reports and to recommend, for the consideration
of the Court, appropriate approaches to the problem of confirming and strengthening adherence to the
fundamental principles of the IBP.

In that resolution the Court "call[ed] to mind that a basic postulate of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), heavily stressed at the time of its organization and commencement of existence, is that the IBP
shall be non-political in character and that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning in the choice of
members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates, and of the IBP officers, national, or
regional, or chapter. The fundamental assumption was that officers, delegates and governors would be
chosen on the basis of professional merit and willingness and ability to serve."

The resolution went on to say that the "Court is deeply disturbed to note that in connection with the
election of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates, there is a widespread
belief, based on reports carried by media and transmitted as well by word of mouth, that there was
extensive and intensive campaigning by candidates for IBP positions as well as expenditure of
considerable sums of money by candidates, including vote-buying, direct or indirect."

The venerable retired Supreme Court Justice and IBP President Emeritus, Jose B.L. Reyes, attended
the dialogue, upon invitation of the Court, to give counsel and advice. The meeting between the Court en
banc on the one hand, and the outgoing and in coming IBP officers on the other, was an informal one.
Thereafter, the Court resolved to conduct a formal inquiry to determine whether the prohibited acts and
activities enumerated in the IBP By-Laws were committed before and during the 1989 elections of IBP's
national officers.

The Court en banc formed a committee and designated Senior Associate Justice Andres R. Narvasa, as
Chairman, and Associate Justices Teodoro R. Padilla, Emilio A. Gancayco, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and
Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, as members, to conduct the inquiry. The Clerk of Court, Atty. Daniel Martinez,
acted as the committee's Recording Secretary.

A total of forty-nine (49) witnesses appeared and testified in response to subpoenas issued by the Court
to shed light on the conduct of the elections. The managers of three five-star hotels the Philippine Plaza,
the Hyatt, and the Holiday Inn where the three protagonists (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) allegedly set up
their respective headquarters and where they billeted their supporters were summoned. The officer of
the Philippine National Bank and the Air Transport Office were called to enlighten the Court on the
charge that an IBP presidential candidate and the members of her slate used PNB planes to ferry them
to distant places in their campaign to win the votes of delegates. The Philippine Airlines officials were
called to testify on the charge that some candidates gave free air fares to delegates to the convention.
Officials of the Labor Department were also called to enable the Court to ascertain the truth of the
reports that labor officials openly campaigned or worked for the election of Atty. Drilon.

The newspaper columnists, Messrs. Luis Mauricio, Jesus Bigornia and Emil Jurado were subpoenaed to
determine the nature of their sources of information relative to the IBP elections. Their stories were
based, they said, on letters, phone calls and personal interviews with persons who claimed to have
knowledge of the facts, but whom they, invoking the Press Freedom Law, refused to identify.

The Committee has since submitted its Report after receiving, and analyzing and assessing evidence
given by such persons as were perceived to have direct and personal knowledge of the relevant facts;
and the Court, after deliberating thereon, has Resolved to accept and adopt the same.

III. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES UNDER IBP BY-LAWS.

Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly non-political" character of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, thus:

"SEC. 4. Non-political Bar. — The Integrated Bar is strictly non-political, and every
activity tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized
accordingly. No lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in
the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for
election or appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof. A
Delegate, Governor, officer or employee of the Integrated Bar, or an officer or employee
of any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his position as of the
moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any elective public office or accepts
 appointment to any judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof. "'

Section 14 of the same By-Laws enumerates the prohibited acts relative to IBP elections:

SEC. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to elections. — The following acts and
practices relative to election are prohibited, whether committed by a candidate for any
elective office in the Integrated Bar or by any other member, directly or indirectly, in any
form or manner, by himself or through another person:

(a) Distribution, except on election day, of election campaign material;

(b) Distribution, on election day, of election campaign material other than a statement of
the biodata of a candidate on not more than one page of a legal-size sheet of paper; or
causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than those authorized
by the officer presiding at the elections;

(c) Campaigning for or against any candidate, while holding an elective, judicial, quasi-
judicial or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof;

(d) Formation of tickets, single slates, or combinations of candidates, as well as the

advertisement thereof;

(e) For the purpose of inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote
for or against a candidate, (1) payment of the dues or other indebtedness of any
member; (2) giving of food, drink, entertainment, transportation or any article of value, or
any similar consideration to any person; or (3) making a promise or causing an
expenditure to be made, offered or promised to any person."

Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for violations of the above rules:

(d) Any violation of the rules governing elections or commission of any of the prohibited
acts and practices defined in Section 14 prohibited Acts and Practices relative to
elections) of the by-laws of the Integrated Bar shall be a ground for the disqualification of
a candidate or his removal from office if elected, without prejudice to the imposition of
sanctions upon any erring member pursuant to the By-laws of the Integrated Bar.

At the formal investigation which was conducted by the investigating committee, the following violations
were established:

(1) Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes by the candidates for president, executive vice-
president, the officers of candidate the House of Delegates and Board of Governors.

The three candidates for IBP President Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo began travelling around the country to
solicit the votes of delegates as early as April 1989. Upon the invitation of IBP President, Leon Garcia,
Jr. (t.s.n., July 13,1989, p. 4), they attended the Bench and Bar dialogues held in Cotabato in April 1989
(t.s.n., June 29, 1989, p. 123), in Tagaytay City, Pampanga, and in Baguio City (during the conference of
chapter presidents of Northern Luzon (t.s.n., July 3,1989, p. 113; t.s.n., July 10, p. 41; t.s.n., July 13, p.
47) where they announced their candidacies and met the chapter presidents.

Atty. Nisce admitted that he went around the country seeking the help of IBP chapter officers, soliciting
their votes, and securing their written endorsements. He personally hand-carried nomination forms and
requested the chapter presidents and delegates to fill up and sign the forms to formalize their
commitment to his nomination for IBP President. He started campaigning and distributing the nomination
forms in March 1989 after the chapter elections which determined the membership of the House of
Delegates composed of the 120 chapter presidents (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-86). He obtained forty
(40) commitments. He submitted photocopies of his nomination forms which read:

"Nomination Form

I Join in Nominating

RAMON M. NISCE

as

National President of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines

______________ _______________

Chapter Signature"

Among those who signed the nomination forms were: Onofre P. Tejada, Candido P. Balbin, Jr.,
Conizado V. Posadas, Quirico L. Quirico Ernesto S. Salun-at, Gloria C. Agunos, Oscar B. Bernardo,
Feliciano F. Wycoco, Amor L. Ibarra, Jose M. Atienza, Jose N. Contreras, Romeo T. Mendoza, Leo C.
Medialdea, Jr., Paulino G. Clarin, Julius Z. Neil, Roem J. Arbolado Democrito M. Perez, Abelardo
Fermin, Diosdado B. Villarin, Jr., Daniel C. Macaraeg, Confesor R. Sansano Dionisio E. Bala, Jr.,
Emesto A. Amores, Romeo V. Pefianco, Augurio C. Pamintuan, Atlee T. Viray, Ceferino C. Cabanas,
Jose S. Buban, Diosdado Z. Reloj, Jr., Cesar C. Viola, Oscar C. Fernandez, Ricardo B. Teruel Rodrigo
R. Flores, Sixto Marella, Jr., Arsenio C. Villalon, Renato F. Ronquillo, Antonio G. Nalapo Romualdo A.
Din Jr., Jose P. Icaonapo Jr., and Manuel S. Person.

Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms at the Hyatt Hotel based on the commitments he had
obtained (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-85). Unfortunately, despite those formal commitments, he
obtained only 14 votes in the election (t.s.n., June 29, 1 989, p. 86). The reason, he said, is that. some of
those who had committed their votes to him were "manipulated, intimidated, pressured, or remunerated"
(t.s.n., June 29,1989, pp. 8695; Exhibit "M-4-Nisce," t.s.n., July 4, 1989, pp. 100-1 04).

(2) Use of PNB plane in the campaign.

The records of the Philippine National Bank (Exhibit C-1-Crudo and Exhibit C-2-Crudo) show that
Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. of the Department of Environment & Natural Resources (DENR)
borrowed a plane from the Philippine National Bank for his Bicol CORD (Cabinet Officers for Regional
Development) Assistant, Undersecretary Antonio Tria. The plane manifest (Exh. C-2-Crudo) listed Atty.
Violeta Drilon, Arturo Tusi (Tiu), Assistant Secretary for Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Tony Tria, Atty. Gladys Tiongco, and Amy Wong. Except for Tony Tria, the rest of the passengers were
IBP candidates.

Atty. Drilon admitted that she "hitched" a ride on a PNB plane. She said that she was informed by Atty.
Tiu about the availability of a PNB plane (t.s.n., July 3,1989, pp. 116-118).

Atty. Tiu, who ran for the position of IBP executive vice-president in the Drilon ticket, testified that
sometime in May 1989 he failed to obtain booking from the Philippine Airlines for the projected trip of his
group to Bicol. He went to the DENR allegedly to follow up some papers for a client. While at the DENR,
he learned that Assistant Secretary Tria was going on an official business in Bicol for Secretary
Fulgencio Factoran and that he would be taking a PNB plane. As Assistant Secretary Tria is his fraternity
brother, he asked if he, together with the Drilon group, could hitch a ride on the plane to Bicol. His
request was granted. Their purpose in going to Bicol was to assess their chances in the IBP elections.
The Drilon company talked with the IBP chapter presidents in Daet, Naga, and Legaspi, and asked for
their support (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 549).

Assistant Secretary Antonio S. Tria confirmed the use of a PNB plane by Atty. Drilon and her group. He
recalled that on May 23,1989, DENR Secretary Factoran instructed him to go to Bicol to monitor certain
regional development projects there and to survey the effect of the typhoon that hit the region in the
middle of May. On the same day, Atty. Tiu, a fraternity brother (meaning that Tiu belongs to the Sigma
Rho fraternity) went to the DENR office and requested the Secretary (Factoran) if he (Tiu) could be
allowed to hitch a ride on the plane. Assistant Secretary Tria, together with the Drilon group which
included Attorneys Drilon, Grapilon, Amy Wong, Gladys Tiongco, and Tiu, took off at the Domestic
Airport bound for Naga, Daet and Legaspi. In Legaspi the Drilon group had lunch with Atty. Vicente Real,
Jr., an IBP chapter president (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 54-69).

(3) Formation of tickets and single slates.

The three candidates, Paculdo, Nisce and Drilon, admitted having formed their own slates for the
election of IBP national officers on June 3, 1989.

Atty. Paculdo's slate consisted of — himself for President; Bella D. Tiro, for Executive Vice-President;
and for Governors: Justiniano P. Cortez (Northern Luzon), Oscar C. Fernandez (Central Luzon), Mario
C.V. Jalandoni (Greater Manila), Petronilo A. de la Cruz (Southern Luzon), Teodorico C. Almine, Jr.
(Bicolandia), Ricardo B. Teruel (Western Visayas), Porfirio P. Siyangco (Eastern Visayas), Jesus S.
Anonat (Western Mindanao), Guerrero A. Adaza, Jr. (Eastern Mindanao) (Exhibit M-Nisce).

The Drilon ticket consisted of. Violeta C. Drilon for President, Arturo Tiu for Executive Vice President,
Salvador Lao for Chairman of the House of Delegates, and, for Governors: Basil Rupisan (Northern
'Luzon), Acong Atienza (Central Luzon), Amy Wong (Metro Manila), Jose Grapilon (Southern Tagalog),
Teodoro Almine (Bicolandia), Baldomero Estenzo (Eastern Visayas), Joelito Barrera (Western Visayas),
Gladys Tiongco (Eastern Mindanao), Simeon Datumanong (Western Mindanao) (Exhibit M-1-Nisce).

Atty. Ramon N. Nisce's line-up listed himself and Confessor B. Sansano Benjamin B. Bernardino,
Antonio L. Nalapo Renato F. Ronquillo, Gloria C. Agunos, Mario Valderrama, Candido P. Balbin Jr.,
Oscar C. Fernandez, Cesar G. Viola, Leo C. Medialdea, Jr., Vicente P. Tordilla, Jr., Jose S. Buban, Joel
A. Llosa, Jesus T. Albacite and Oscar V. Badelles.

(4) Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and alternates.

Atty. Nisce admitted having bought plane tickets for some delegates to the convention. He mentioned
Oscar Badelles to whom he gave four round-trip tickets (worth about P10,000) from Iligan City to Manila
and back. Badelles was a voting delegate. Nisce, however, failed to get a written commitment from him
because Atty. Medialdea assured him (Nisce) "sigurado na 'yan, h'wag mo nang papirmahin." Badelles
won as sergeant-at-arms, not in Nisce's ticket, but in that of Drilon.

Badelles admitted that Nisce sent him three airplane tickets, but he Badelles said that he did not use
them, because if he did, he would be committed to Nisce, and he Badelles did not want to be committed
(t.s.n., July 4,1989, pp. 77-79, 95-96).

Nisce also sent a plane ticket to Atty. Atilano, who was his candidate, and another ticket to Mrs. Linda
Lim of Zamboanga. Records of the Philippine Airlines showed that Atty. Nisce paid for the plane tickets
of Vicente Real, Jr. (Exh. D-1-Calica), Romeo Fortes (Exh. D-1-Calica), Cesar Batica (Exh. D-2-Calica),
Jose Buban of Leyte (Exh. D-2-Calica), Delsanto Resuello (Exh. D-3- Calica), and Ceferino Cabanas
(Exh. D-3-Calica).

In spite of his efforts and expense, only one of Nisce's candidates won: Renato Ronquillo of Manila 4, as
Secretary of the House of Delegates (t.s.n. July 3, p. 161).

(5) Giving free hotel accommodations, food, drinks, entertainment to delegates.

(a) ATTY. NEREO PACULDO

Atty. Paculdo alleged that he booked 24 regular rooms and three suites at the Holiday Inn, which served
as his headquarters. The 24 rooms were to be occupied by his staff (mostly ladies) and the IBP
delegates. The three suites were to be occupied by himself, the officers of the Capitol Bar Association,
and Atty. Mario Jalandoni. He paid P150,000 for the hotel bills of his delegates at the Holiday Inn, where
a room cost P990 per day with breakfast.

Those listed as guests of Atty. Paculdo at the Holiday Inn were: Emesto C. Perez, Tolomeo Ligutan
Judge Alfonso Combong, Ricardo Caliwag, Antonio Bisnar, Benedicto Balajadia, Jesus Castro, Restituto
Villanueva, Serapio Cribe Juanita Subia, Teodorico J. Almine, Rudy Gumban, Roem Arbolado, Ricardo
Teruel, Shirley Moises, Ramon Roco, Alberto Trinidad, Teodoro Quicoy Manito Lucero, Fred Cledera
Vicente Tordilla, Julian Ocampo, Francisco Felizmenio Marvel Clavecilla, Amador Capiral, Eufronio
Maristela, Porfirio Siyangco, William Llanes, Jr., Marciano Neri, Guerrero Adaza, Diosdado Peralta, Luis
C. Formilleza, Jr., Democrito Perez, Bruno Flores, Dennis Rendon, Judge Ceferino Chan, Mario
Jalandoni, Kenneth Siruelo Bella Tiro, Antonio Santos, Tiburcio Edano James Tan, Cesilo A. Adaza,
Francisco Roxas, Angelita Gacutan, Jesse Pimentel, Judge Jaime Hamoy, Jesus Anonat, Carlos Egay,
Judge Carlito Eisma, Judge Jesus Carbon, Joven Zach, and Benjamin Padon.

Noel de Guzman, Holiday Inn's credit manager, testified that Atty. Paculdo booked 52 (not 24) rooms,
including the presidential suite, which was used as the Secretariat. The group bookings were made by
Atty. Gloria Paculdo, the wife of Nereo Paculdo (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 63-68). The total sum of
P227,114.89 was paid to Holiday Inn for the use of the rooms.

(b) ATTY. VIOLETA C. DRILON

The delegates and supporters of Atty. Drilon were billeted at the Philippine Plaza Hotel where her
campaign manager, Atty. Renato Callanta, booked 40 rooms, 5 of which were suites. According to Ms.
Villanueva, Philippine Plaza banquet and conventions manager, the contract that Atty. Callanta signed
with the Philippine Plaza was made in the name of the "IBP c/o Atty. Callanta."

Mrs. Lourdes Juco, a sales manager of the Philippine Plaza, recalled that it was Mr. Mariano Benedicto
who first came to book rooms for the IBP delegates. She suggested that he obtain a group (or
discounted) rate. He gave her the name of Atty. Callanta who would make the arrangements with her.
Mr. Benedicto turned out to be the Assistant Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE).

The total sum of P316,411.53 was paid by Atty. Callanta for the rooms, food, and beverages consumed
by the Drilon group, with an unpaid balance of P302,197.30. Per Attorney Daniel Martinez's last
telephone conversation with Ms. Villanueva, Atty. Callanta still has an outstanding account of
P232,782.65 at Philippine Plaza.

Atty. Callanta admitted that he signed the contract for 40 rooms at the Philippine Plaza. He made a
downpayment of P123,000. His "working sheet' showed that the following persons contributed for that
down payment:

(a) Nilo Pena (Quasha Law Office) P 25,000

 (b) Antonio Carpio 20,000

(c) Toto Ferrer (Carpio Law Office) 10,000

(d) Jay Castro 10,000

(e) Danny Deen 20,000

(f) Angangco Tan (Angara Law Office) 10,000

(g) Alfonso Reyno 20,000

(h) Cosme Rossel 15,300

(t.s.n. July 4, 1 989, pp. 3-4)

Atty. Callanta explained that the above listed persons have been contributing money every time the IBP
embarks on a project. This time, they contributed so that their partners or associates could attend the
legal aid seminar and the IBP convention too.

Atty. Drilon alleged that she did not know that Atty. Callanta had billeted her delegates at the Philippine
Plaza. She allegedly did not also know in whose name the room she occupied was registered. But she
did ask for a room where she could rest during the convention. She admitted, however, that she paid for
her hotel room and meals to Atty. Callanta, through Atty. Loanzon (t.s.n. July 3,1989).

The following were listed as having occupied the rooms reserved by Atty. Callanta at the Philippine
Plaza: Violeta Drilon, Victoria A. Verciles, Victoria C. Loanzon, Leopoldo A. Consulto Ador Lao, Victoria
Borra, Aimee Wong, Callanta, Pena, Tiu, Gallardo, Acong Atienza, D. Bernardo, Amores, Silao Caingat,
Manuel Yuson, Simeon Datumanong, Manuel Pecson, Sixto Marella, Joselito Barrera, Radon Macalalag,
Oscar Badelles, Antonio Acyatan, Ildefonso C. Puerto, Nestor Atienza, Gil Batula Array Corot, Dimakuta
Corot Romeo Fortes Irving Petilla, Teodoro Palma, Gil Palma, Danilo Deen, Delsanto, Resuello, Araneta,
Vicente Real, Sylvio Casuncad Espina, Guerrero, Julius Neri, Linda Lim, Ben Lim, C. Batica, Luis
Formilleza, Felix Macalag Mariano Benedicto, Atilano, Araneta, Renato Callanta.

Atty. Nilo Pena admitted that the Quasha Law Office of which he is a senior partner, gave P25,000 to
Callanta for rooms at the Philippine Plaza so that some members of his law firm could campaign for the
Drilon group (t.s.n. July 5,1989, pp. 7678) during the legal aid seminar and the IBP convention. Most of
the members of his law firm are fraternity brothers of Secretary Drilon (meaning, members of the Sigma
Rho Fraternity). He admitted being sympathetic to the candidacy of Atty. Drilon and the members of her
slate, two of whom Jose Grapilon and Simeon Datumanong — are Sigma Rhoans. They consider Atty.
Drilon as a "sigma rho sister," her husband being a sigma rhoan.

Atty. Antonio Carpio, also a Sigma Rhoan, reserved a room for the members of his own firm who
attended the legal aid seminar and the convention. He made the reservation through Atty. Callanta to
whom he paid P20,000 (t.s.n. July 6,1989, pp. 30-34).

Atty. Carpio assisted Atty. Drilon in her campaign during the convention, by soliciting the votes of
delegates he knew, like Atty. Albacite his former teacher (but the latter was already committed to Nisce),
and Atty. Romy Fortes, a classmate of his in the U.P. College of Law (t. t.s.n. July 6, 1989, pp. 22, 29,
39).

(c) ATTY. RAMON NISCE.

Atty. Nisce, through his brother-in-law, Ricardo Paras, entered into a contract with the Hyatt Hotel for a
total of 29 rooms plus one (1) seventh-floor room. He made a downpayment of P20,000 (t.s.n. June 28,
1989, p. 58) on April 20, 1989, and P37,632.45 on May 10, or a total of P57,632.45.
Ms. Cecile Flores, Ms. Milagros Ocampo, and Mr. Ramon Jacinto, the sales department manager, credit
manager, and reservation manager, respectively of the Hyatt, testified that Atty. Nisce's bill amounted to
P216,127.74 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 57-58; Exhibits E-Flores, F-Jacinto G-Ocampo).

As earlier mentioned, Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms for those who committed themselves
to his candidacy.

The hotel guests of Atty. Nisce were: Gloria Agunos Dennis Habanel B. Batula, John E. Asuncion,
Reynaldo Cortes, Lourdes Santos, Elmer Datuin, Romualdo Din, Antonio Nalapo, Israel Damasco,
Candido Balbin, Serrano Balot, Ibarra, Joel Llosa, Eltanal, Ruperto, Asuncion, Q. Pilotin Reymundo P.
Guzman, Zoilo Aguinaldo, Clarin, R. Ronquillo, Dominador Carillo, Filomeno Balinas, Ernesto Sabulan,
Yusop Pangadapun, A. Viray, Icampo, Abelardo Fermin, C. Quiaoit, Augurio Pamintuan, Daniel
Macaraeg, Onofre Tejada.

(6) Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta Drilon

In violation of the prohibition against "campaigning for or against a candidate while holding an elective,
judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government' (Sec. 14[c], Art. I, IBP By-Laws), Mariano
E. Benedicto II, Assistant Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment, testified that he took a leave
of absence from his office to attend the IBP convention. He stayed at the Philippine Plaza with the Drilon
group admittedly to give "some moral assistance" to Atty. Violeta Drilon. He did so because he is a
member of the Sigma Rho Fraternity. When asked about the significance of Sigma Rho, Secretary
Benedicto explained: "More than the husband of Mrs. Drilon being my boss, the significance there is that
the husband is my brother in the Sigma Rho."

He cheered up Mrs., Drilon when her spirits were low. He talked to her immediate circle which included
Art Tiu, Tony Carpio, Nilo Pena, Amy Wong, Atty. Grapilon, Victor Lazatin, and Boy Reyno. They
assessed the progress of the campaign, and measured the strengths and weaknesses of the other
groups The group had sessions as early as the later part of May.

Room 114, the suite listed in the name of Assistant Secretary Benedicto toted up a bill of P23,110 during
the 2-day IBP convention/election. A total of 113 phone calls (amounting to Pl,356) were recorded as
emanating from his room.

Opposite Room 114, was Room 112, also a suite, listed in the names of Mrs. Drilon, Gladys Tiongco
(candidate for Governor, Eastern Mindanao) and Amy Wong (candidate for Governor, Metro Manila).
These two rooms served as the "action center' or "war room" where campaign strategies were discussed
before and during the convention. It was in these rooms where the supporters of the Drilon group, like
Attys. Carpio, Callanta, Benedicto, the Quasha and the ACCRA lawyers met to plot their moves.

(7) Paying the dues or other indebtedness of any number (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws).

Atty. Teresita C. Sison, IBP Treasurer, testified that she has heard of candidates paying the IBP dues of
lawyers who promised to vote for or support them, but she has no way of ascertaining whether it was a
candidate who paid the delinquent dues of another, because the receipts are issued in the name of the
member for whom payment is made (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 24-28).

She has noticed, though, that there is an upsurge of payments in March, April, May during any election
year. This year, the collections increased by P100,000 over that of last year (a non-election year from
Pl,413,425 to Pl,524,875 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 25).

(8) Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more than one page of legal size sheet of paper
(Sec. 14[a], IBP By-Laws).
On the convention floor on the day of the election, Atty. Paculdo caused to be distributed his bio-data
and copies of a leaflet entitled "My Quest," as wen as, the lists of his slate. Attys. Drilon and Nisce
similarly distributed their tickets and bio-data.

The campaign materials of Atty. Paculdo cost from P15,000 to P20,000. They were printed by his own
printing shop.

(9) Causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than those authorized by the
officer presiding at the election (Sec. 14[b], IBP By-Laws).

Atty. Paculdo employed uniformed girls to distribute his campaign materials on the convention floor. Atty.
Carpio noted that there were more campaign materials distributed at the convention site this year than in
previous years. The election was more heated and expensive (t.s.n. July 6,1989, p. 39).

Atty. Benjamin Bernardino, the incumbent President of the IBP Rizal Chapter, and a candidate for
chairman of the House of Delegates on Nisce's ticket, testified that campaign materials were distributed
during the convention by girls and by lawyers. He saw members of the ACCRA law firm campaigning for
Atty. Drilon (t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp. 142-145).

(10) Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for or against a candidate (Sec.
14[e], IBP BY-Laws).

Atty. Bernardino disclosed that his cousin, Atty. Romeo Capulong, urged him to withdraw his candidacy
for chairman of the House of Delegates and to run as vice-chairman in Violy Drilon's slate, but he
declined (t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp. 137, 149).

Atty. Gloria Agunos personnel director of the Hyatt Terraces Hotel in Baguio and president of the
Baguio-Benguet IBP Chapter, recalled that in the third week of May 1989, after the Tripartite meet of the
Department of Labor & Employment at the Green Valley Country Club in Baguio City, she met Atty.
Drilon, together with two labor officers of Region 1, Attys. Filomeno Balbin and Atty. Mansala Atty. Drilon
solicited her (Atty. Agunos') vote and invited her to stay at the Philippine Plaza where a room would be
available for her. Atty. Paculdo also tried to enlist her support during the chapter presidents' meeting to
choose their nominee for governor for the Northern Luzon region (t.s.n. July 13,1989, pp. 43-54).

Atty. Nisce testified that a Manila Chapter 4 delegate, Marcial Magsino, who had earlier committed his
vote to Nisce changed his mind when he was offered a judgeship (This statement, however, is admittedly
hearsay). When Nisce confronted Magsino about the alleged offer, the latter denied that there was such
an offer. Nisce's informant was Antonio G. Nalapo an IBP candidate who also withdrew.

Another Nisce candidate, Cesar Viola, withdrew from the race and refused to be nominated (t.s.n. June
29, 1989, p. 104). Vicente P. Tordilla who was Nisce's candidate for Governor became Paculdo's
candidate instead (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 104).

Nisce recalled that during the Bench and Bar Dialogue in Cotabato City, Court Administrator Tiro went
around saying, "I am not campaigning, but my wife is a candidate." Nisce said that the presidents of
several IBP chapters informed him that labor officials were campaigning for Mrs. Drilon (t.s.n. June
29,1989, pp. 109-110). He mentioned Ciony de la Cerna, who allegedly campaigned in La Union (t.s.n.
June 29,1989,p.111)

Atty. Joel A. Llosa, Nisce's supporter and candidate for governor of the Western Visayas, expressed his
disappointment over the IBP elections because some delegates flip-flopped from one camp to another.
He testified that when he arrived at the Manila Domestic Airport he was met by an assistant regional
director of the DOLE who offered to bring him to the Philippine Plaza, but he declined the offer. During
the legal aid seminar, Atty. Drilon invited him to transfer to the Philippine Plaza where a room had been
reserved for him. He declined the invitation (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 102-106).
Atty. Llosa said that while he was still in Dumaguete City, he already knew that the three candidates had
their headquarters in separate hotels: Paculdo, at the Holiday Inn; Drilon, at the Philippine Plaza; and
Nisce, at the Hyatt. He knew about this because a week before the elections, representatives of Atty.
Drilon went to Dumaguete City to campaign. He mentioned Atty. Rodil Montebon of the ACCRA Law
Office, accompanied by Atty. Julve the Assistant Regional Director of the Department of Labor in
Dumaguete City. These two, he said, offered to give him two PAL tickets and accommodations at the
Philippine Plaza (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 101-104). But he declined the offer because he was already
committed to Atty. Nisce.

Atty. Llosa also revealed that before he left for Manila on May 31, 1989, a businessman, Henry Dy,
approached him to convince him to vote for Atty. Paculdo. But Llosa told Dy that he was already
committed to Nisce.

He did not receive any plane tickets from Atty. Nisce because he and his two companions (Atty. Eltanal
and Atty. Ruperto) had earlier bought their own tickets for Manila (t.s.n. July 4, 1989, p. 101).

SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES INCURRED

BY THE CANDIDATES

Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250,000 during his three weeks of campaigning. Of this
amount, the Capitol Bar Association (of which he was the chapter president) contributed about
P150,000. The Capitol Bar Association is a voluntary bar association composed of Quezon City lawyers.

He spent about P100,000 to defray the expenses of his trips to the provinces (Bicol provinces,
Pampanga, Abra, Mountain Province and Bulacan) (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 9-14).

Atty. Nisce's hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to P216,127.74. This does not include the expenses for his
campaign which began several months before the June 3rd election, and his purchases of airplane
tickets for some delegates.

The records of the Philippine Plaza Hotel, headquarters of Atty. Drilon's camp, showed that her
campaign rang up over P600,000 in hotel bills. Atty. Callanta paid P316,411.53 for the rooms, food, and
beverage consumed by Atty. Drilon's supporters, but still left an unpaid bill of P302,197.30 at
convention's end.

FINDINGS.

From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in which the principal candidates for the national
positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3, 1989,
violated Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly non-political"
Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws.

The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three principal candidates (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo)
in five-star hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the Holiday Inn and The Hyatt the better for them to corral and
entertain the delegates billeted therein; the island hopping to solicit the votes of the chapter presidents
who comprise the 120-member House of Delegates that elects the national officers and regional
governors; the formation of tickets, slates, or line-ups of candidates for the other elective positions
aligned with, or supporting, either Drilon, Paculdo or Nisce; the procurement of written commitments and
the distribution of nomination forms to be filled up by the delegates; the reservation of rooms for
delegates in three big hotels, at the expense of the presidential candidates; the use of a PNB plane by
Drilon and some members of her ticket to enable them to "assess their chances" among the chapter
presidents in the Bicol provinces; the printing and distribution of tickets and bio-data of the candidates
which in the case of Paculdo admittedly cost him some P15,000 to P20,000; the employment of
uniformed girls (by Paculdo) and lawyers (by Drilon) to distribute their campaign materials on the
convention floor on the day of the election; the giving of assistance by the Undersecretary of Labor to
Mrs. Drilon and her group; the use of labor arbiters to meet delegates at the airport and escort them to
the Philippine Plaza Hotel; the giving of pre-paid plane tickets and hotel accommodations to delegates
(and some families who accompanied them) in exchange for their support; the pirating of some
candidates by inducing them to "hop" or "flipflop" from one ticket to another for some rumored
consideration; all these practices made a political circus of the proceedings and tainted the whole
election process.

The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but
also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to
obey and uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law and legal processes"
and to abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system"
(Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely eroded when
lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be millions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and
cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP formulated for their observance.

The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of the association detracted from
the dignity of the legal profession. The spectacle of lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one way or
another, certainly did not uphold the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the public's esteem.

The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be the evasions, denials and outright prevarications
that tainted the statements of the witnesses, including tome of the candidates, during the initial hearing
conducted by it before its fact-finding committee was created. The subsequent investigation conducted
by this Committee has revealed that those parties had been less than candid with the Court and seem to
have conspired among themselves to deceive it or at least withhold vital information from it to conceal
the irregularities committed during the campaign.

CONCLUSIONS.

It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the provision in the 1987 Constitution (See. 8, Art.
VIII) providing for a Judicial and Bar Council composed of seven (7) members among whom is "a
representative of the Integrated Bar," tasked to participate in the selection of nominees for appointment
to vacant positions in the judiciary, may be the reason why the position of IBP president has attracted so
much interest among the lawyers. The much coveted "power" erroneously perceived to be inherent in
that office might have caused the corruption of the IBP elections. To impress upon the participants in that
electoral exercise the seriousness of the misconduct which attended it and the stern disapproval with
which it is viewed by this Court, and to restore the non-political character of the IBP and reduce, if not
entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering for the top positions in the organization which, as the
recently concluded elections revealed, spawned unethical practices which seriously diminished the
stature of the IBP as an association of the practitioners of a noble and honored profession, the Court
hereby ORDERS:

1. The IBP elections held on June3,1989 should be as they are hereby annulled.

2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by the House of Delegates (approved by this
Court in its resolution of July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) of the following national officers:

(a) the officers of the House of Delegates;

(b) the IBP president; and

(c) the executive vice-president,

be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend, modify or repeal the By-Laws of the IBP under
Section 77, Art. XI of said By-Laws.
3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected by the Board of
Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [91 IBP regions) from among themselves (as
provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of automatic
succession by the Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the expiration of their two-year term
(which was abolished by this Court's resolution dated July 9,1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should be as it
is hereby restored.

4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall automatically succeed
to the office of president. The incoming board of governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-President
from among themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among the nine (9)
IBP regions. One who has served as president may not run for election as Executive Vice-President in a
succeeding election until after the rotation of the presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have been
completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.

5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read as follows:

Section 47. National Officers. — The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a
President and Executive Vice-President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from
among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. The
governors shall be ex oficio Vice-President for their respective regions. There shall also
be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors to be appointed by the President
with the consent of the Board.

6. Section 33(b), Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended as follows:

(b) The President and Executive Vice President of the IBP shall be the Chairman and
Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the House of Delegates. The Secretary, Treasurer, and
Sergeant-at-Arms shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the House of
Delegates.'

7. Section 33(g) of Article V providing for the positions of Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary-Treasurer
and Sergeant-at- Arms of the House of Delegates is hereby repealed

8. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as follows:

Section 37. Composition of the Board. — The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall be
governed by a Board of Governors consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine (9)
regions as delineated in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the representation basis of
one (1) Governor for each region to be elected by the members of the House of
Delegates from that region only. The position of Governor should be rotated among the
different Chapters in the region.

9. Section 39, Article V is hereby amended as follows:

Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors at least one (1) month before the
national convention the delegates from each region shall elect the governor for their
region, the choice of which shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in
the region.

10. Section33(a), Article V hereby is amended by addingthe following provision as part of the first
paragraph:

No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the general membership shall be held
prior to any election in an election year.
11. Section 39, (a), (b), (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of Article VI should be as they are hereby
deleted.

All other provisions of the By-Laws including its amendment by the Resolution en banc of this Court of
July 9, 1985 (Bar Matter No. 287) that are inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified.

12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held in the nine (9) IBP regions within three (3)
months, after the promulgation of the Court's resolution in this case. Within thirty (30) days thereafter, the
Board of Governors shall meet at the IBP Central Office in Manila to elect from among themselves the
IBP national president and executive vice-president. In these special elections, the candidates in the
election of the national officers held on June 3,1989, particularly identified in Sub-Head 3 of this
Resolution entitled "Formation of Tickets and Single Slates," as well as those identified in this Resolution
as connected with any of the irregularities attendant upon that election, are ineligible and may not
present themselves as candidate for any position.

13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker board shall be appointed by the Court to administer the
affairs of the IBP. The Court makes clear that the dispositions here made are without prejudice to its
adoption in due time of such further and other measures as are warranted in the premises.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla. Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-
Aquino and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Fernan, C.J. and Medialdea, J., took no part.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.

A.C. No. 3694 June 17, 1993

ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, ISABELO ONGTENGCO, ACHILLES BARTOLOME, AND ST. LUKES

MEDICAL CENTER, complainants,
vs.
ATTORNEY BENJAMIN M. GRECIA, respondent.

Norberto Gonzales for Fernandez.

Bu Castro for Ongtengco & Bartolome.

Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Peña & Nolasco for St. Luke's Hospital.

Joaquin P. Yuseco for respondent Benjamin Grecia.

PER CURIAM:

This disbarment complaint against Attorney Benjamin M. Grecia was filed on August 20, 1991 by Doctors
Alberto Fernandez, Isabelo Ongtengco and Achilles Bartolome and the St. Luke's Medical Center
(hereafter "St. Luke's" for brevity) where they are accredited medical practitioners. The respondent is
charged with dishonesty and grave misconduct in connection with the theft of some pages from a
medical chart which was material evidence in a damage suit filed by his clients against the aforenamed
doctors and St. Luke's.

Disciplinary proceedings like this one are in a class by themselves. As we observed in In Re Almacen,
31 SCRA 562,600, they are neither purely civil nor purely criminal. "Public interests is the primary
objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such." The purpose is "to protect the court and the public from the misconduct
of officers of the court" (In Re Montagne & Dominguez, 3 Phil. 577, 588), or to remove from the
profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney (Ledesma vs. Climaco, 57 SCRA 473; Atienza vs.
Evangelista, 80 SCRA 338).

Disbarment is nothing new to respondent Grecia. On November 12, 1987, he was disbarred for his
immoral complicity or "unholy alliance" with a judge in Quezon City to rip off banks and Chinese business
firms which had the misfortune to be sued in the latter's court (Prudential Bank vs. Judge Jose P. Castro
and Atty. Benjamin M. Grecia [Adm. Case No. 2756], 155 SCRA 604).

Three years later, on December 18, 1990, the Court, heeding his pleas for compassions and his promise
to mend his ways, reinstated him in the profession. Only eight (8) months later, on August 20, 1991, he
was back before the court facing another charge of dishonesty and unethical practice. Apparently, the
earlier disciplinary action that the Court took against him did not effectively reform him.

The complaint of St. Luke's against Attorney Grecia was referred by the Court to Deputy Court of
Administrator Juanito A. Bernad for investigation, report and recommendation. The following are Judge
Bernad's findings:

The late Fe Linda Aves was seven (7) months pregnant when she was admitted as a patient at St.
Luke's Hospital on December 20, 1990. She complained of dizziness, hypertension, and abdominal
pains with vaginal bleeding. Dr. Fernandez, head of the OB-GYNE Department of St. Luke's, Dr.
Ongtengco, Jr., a cardiologist, and Dr. Bartolome, a urologist, examined Mrs. Aves and diagnosed her
problem as mild pre-eclampsia (p. 63, Rollo). Five (5) days later, on Christmas day, December 25, 1990,
Mrs. Aves was discharged from the hospital, to celebrate Christmas with her family.
However, she was rushed back to the hospital the next day, December 26, 1990. On December 27,
1990, she died together with her unborn child.

Blaming the doctors of St. Luke's for his wife's demise, Attorney Damaso B. Aves, along with his three
(3) minor children, brought an action for damages against the hospital and the attending physicians of
his wife. Their counsel, respondent Attorney Benjamin Grecia, filed a complaint entitled: "Attorney
Damaso B. Aves, et al. vs. St. Luke's Medical Center, Drs. Alberto Fernandez, Isabelo Ongtengco, Jr.
and Achilles Bartolome" in the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Bulacan, where it was docketed as
Civil Case No. 3548-V and assigned to Branch 172, presided over by Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong.

On July 4, 1991, the medical records of Fe Linda Aves were produced in court by St. Luke's, as
requested by Attorney Grecia. The records were entrusted to the Acting Branch Clerk of Court, Avelina
Robles.

On July 16, 1991, between 8:30-9:00 o' clock in the morning, upon arriving in court for another hearing of
the case, Attorney Grecia borrowed from Mrs. Robles the folder containing the medical records of Mrs.
Aves.

While leafing through the folder, Grecia surreptitiously tore off two (2) pages of the medical records. The
respondent's act was notified by Mrs. Robles and Maria Arnet Sandico, a clerk. They saw Grecia
crumple the papers and place them inside the right pocket of his coat. He immediately returned the folder
to Mrs. Roblesa (who was momentarily rendered speechless by his audacious act) and left the office.

Mrs. Robles examined the medical chart and found pages "72" and "73" missing. She ordered Sandico
to follow the respondent. Sandico saw Grecia near the canteen at the end of the building, calling a man
(presumably his driver) who was leaning against a parked car (presumably Grecia's car). When the man
approached, Grecia gave him the crumpled papers which he took from his coatpocket. Sandico returned
to the office and reported what she had seen to Mrs. Robles. The latter in turn reported it to Judge
Capulong. The three of
them — Judge Capulong, Mrs. Robles and Ms. Sandico — went downstairs. Ms. Sandico pointed to
Judge Capulong the man to whom Grecia had given the papers which he had filched from medical folder
of Linda Aves. Judge Capulong told Sandico to bring the man to her chamber. On the way back to
chamber, Judge Capulong saw the plaintiff, Attorney Damaso Aves, and St. Luke's counsel, Attorney
Melanie Limson. She requested them to come to her office.

In the presence of Attorneys Aves and Limson, Mrs. Robles, Ms. Sandico, and a visitor, Judge Capulong
confronted the man and ordered him to give her the papers which Grecia had passed on to him. The
man at first denied that he had the papers in his possession. However, when Sandico declared that she
saw Grecia hand over the papers to him, the man sheepishly took them from his pants pocket and gave
them to Judge Capulong. When the crumpled pages "72" and "73" of the medical folder were shown to
Sandico, she identified them as the same papers that she saw Grecia hand over to the man.

After the confrontation, Sandicio and Robles went back to their office. Mrs. Robles collapsed in a dead
faint and was rushed to the Fatima Hospital where she later regained consciousness.

In the ensuing excitement and confusion of recovering the stolen exhibits, no one thought of ascertaining
the identity of the man from whom they were recovered. Judge Capulong belatedly realized this, so she
directed the Valenzuela Police to find out who he was. She also ordered Sandico to submit a formal
report of the theft of the exhibits to the police.

A police investigator, PO3 Arnold Alabastro, tried to ascertain the name of Grecia's driver who was
known only as "SID." He located Grecia's house in Quezon City. Although he was not allowed to enter
the premises, he was able to talk with a house maid. He pretended to be a cousin of "SID" and asked for
the latter. The housemaid informed him that "SID" was sent home to his province by Grecia.

He talked with Grecia himself but the latter denied that he had a driver named "SID."
PO3 Alabastro also talked wit one of Grecia's neighbors across the street. The neighbor confirmed that
Grecia's driver was a fellow named "SID".

The incident caused enormous emotional strain to the personnel of Judge Capulong's court, so much so
that the Acting Branch Clerk of Court, Avelina Robles, was hospitalized. Because of the incident, Judge
Capulong inhibited herself from conducting the trial of Civil Case No. 3548-V.

On August 20, 1991, St. Luke's failed this disbarment case against Grecia.

At the investigation of the case by Judge Bernad, Attorney Damaso Aves, the surviving spouse of the
late Fe Linda Aves and plaintiff in Civil case No. 3548-V, testified that it was Attorney Bu Castro, counsel
of the defendants in said Civil Case No. 3548-V, who lifted two pages from the medical folder which lay
among some papers on top of the table of Acting Branch Clerk of Court Robles. When he allegedly went
outside the courthouse to wait for Attorney Grecia to arrive, he noticed Attorney Castro come out of the
building and walk toward a man in the parking lot to whom he handed a piece of paper. Afterward,
Attorney Castro reentered the courthouse.

Respondent Grecia denied any knowledge of the theft of the exhibits in the Aves case. He alleged that
the person who was caught in possession of the detached pages of the medical record was actually
"planted" by his adversaries to discredit him and destroy his reputation.

He denied that he had a driver. He alleged that his car was out of order on July 16, 1991, so he was
fetched by the driver of Attorney Aves in the latter's "Maxima" car. He arrived in the courthouse at exactly
9:15 in the morning and went straight to the courtroom on the second floor of the building. He did not
leave the place until his case was called at 9:40. Since it was allegedly a very warm day, he wore a dark
blue barong tagalog, not a business suit. He branded the testimony of Ms. Sandico as an absolute
falsehood. He alleged that he would not have done the act imputed to him, because the medical chart
was the very foundation of the civil case which he filed against St. Luke's and its doctors. He wondered
why the man, alleged to be his driver, to whom he supposedly gave the detached pages of the medical
chart, was neither held nor arrested. His identity was not even established.

He likewise branded the testimony of Police Investigator Alabastro as a fabrication for he had never seen
him before.

He underscored the fact that none of the lawyers in the courthouse, nor any of the court personnel,
accosted him about the purloined pages of the medical record and he alleged that the unidentified man
remained in the courtroom even after the confrontation in the Judge's chamber.

In evaluating the testimonies of the witnesses, Judge Bernad found the court employee, Maria Arnie
Sandico, and Acting branch Clerk of Court Avelina Robles entirely credible and "without any noticeable
guile nor attempt at fabrication, remaining constant even under pressure of cross examination" (p. 11,
Judge Bernad's Report).

That the Acting Branch Clerk of Court, Mrs. Robles, who is not even a lawyer, and her lowly clerk, Ms.
Sandico, did not promptly raise a hue and cry on seeing Grecia tear off two pages of the medical record,
was understandable for they hesitated to confront a man of his stature. Nevertheless, they had the
presence of mind to immediately report the matter to their Judge who forthwith took appropriate steps to
recover the exhibits. Robles, Sandico and PO3 Alabastro had absolutely no motive to testify falsely
against the respondent.

While Judge Capulong took the blame for failing to ascertain the identity of Attorney Grecia's "driver," her
swift action in summoning and confronting him led to the recovery of the stolen pages of the medical
chart.

Unfortunately, the inquiry made by Police Investigation Arnold Alabastro into identity of the man was
fruitless for he was never seen again.
Attorney Aves' allegation that it was St. Luke's counsel, Attorney Castro, not Grecia, who stole the pages
from the medical folder and slipped them to an unidentified man, is an incredible fabrication. Not only is it
directly contradicted by Mrs. Robles and Ms. Sandico, but, significantly, Attorney Aves failed to mention it
during the confrontation with the man inside Judge Capulong's chamber where he (Attorney Aves) was
present.

His other allegation that he saw the man inside the courtroom afterwards, is not credible for he would
have called the attention of Judge Capulong who, he knew, had been looking for the man to ascertain
his identity.

In view of his obvious bias for his counsel, Aves' testimony was properly disregarded by the investigator,
Judge Bernad. Likewise wanting in truth and candor was Grecia's testimony. Judge Bernad noted that
while Grecia was punctilious when testifying on the hour of his arrival in court (9:15 A.M.) on July 16,
1991, and he even remembered that on that day he wore a dark blue barong tagalog (an apparel that
has no pockets), his memory was not sharp when he was cross-examined regarding more recent events.
For instance, he insisted that Judge Bernad was absent on August 4, 1992, but the truth is that a hearing
was held on that date as shown by the transcript.

When he was confronted with exhibits "A" and "B," Grecia tried to make an issue of the absence of a
court order to deposit Linda Aves' medical chart in court. He forgot that it was he who asked that the
chart be left with the clerk of court.

His allegation that he would be the last person to remove pages 72 and 73 of the medical chart for the
entries therein are favorable to his client's cause is specious. As a matter of fact, the entries show that
after Mrs. Aves was readmitted to the hospital on December 26, 1990, the doctors were able to stabilize
her blood pressure with a normal reading of 120/80.

On the basis of the evidence presented before Judge Bernad, the Court is convinced that the charge
against Attorney Benjamin M. Grecia is true. By stealing two pages from Linda Aves' medical chart and
passing them on to his driver, he violated Rule 1.01, canon 1 of the Rules of Professional Responsibility
as well as canon 7 thereof which provide that:

Canon 1. . . .

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful
conduct.

Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession
and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the
ends of justice" (People ex rel Karlin vs. Culkin, 60 A.L.R. 851, 855). An incorrigible practitioner of "dirty
tricks," like Grecia would be ill-suited to discharge the role of "an instrument to advance the ends of
justice."

The importance of integrity and good moral character as part of a lawyer's equipment in the practice of
his profession has been stressed by this Court repeatedly.

. . . The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty
and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by
faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To
this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend
to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of
the profession. (Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr., A.C. No. 3248, September 18, 1992, pp. 13-14.)
 . . . . The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a person of
good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to
the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice
of law, in the exercise of privileges of members of the Bar. Gross misconduct on the part
of a lawyer, although not related to the discharge of professional duties as a member of
the bar, which puts his moral character in serious doubt, renders him unfit to continue in
the practice of law. (Melendrez vs. Decena, 176 SCRA 662, 676.)

. . . public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant should be
entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications and who are sworn to observe
the rules and the ethics of the profession, a s well as being subject for judicial disciplinary
control for the protection of court, clients and the public. (Phil. Association of Free Labor
Unions [PAFLU] vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Company, 42 SCRA 302, 305.)

By descending to the level of a common thief, respondent Grecia has demeaned and disgraced the legal
profession. He has demonstrated his moral unfitness to continue as a member of the honorable fraternity
of lawyers. He has forfeited his membership in the BAR.

Generally, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in
honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court, or
an unfit or unsafe person to enjoy the privileges and to manage the business of others in
the capacity of an attorney, or for conduct which tends to bring reproach on the legal
profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the public. (Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr.,
A.C. No. 3248, September 18, 1992, p. 15.)

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Attorney Benjamin Grecia guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, and
grossly unethical behavior as a lawyer. Considering that this is his second offense against the canons of
the profession, the Court resolved to impose upon him once more the supreme penalty of
DISBARMENT. His license to practice law in the Philippines is hereby CANCELLED and the Bar
Confidant is ordered to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and
Quiason, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., took no part.

Padilla, J., is on leave.

 [A.C No. 4749. January 20, 2000]

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R.

LLAMAS, respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against
respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.

In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr.,
himself a member of the bar, alleged that:

On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction

the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not
indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his
pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using
this for at least three years already, as shown by the following attached sample
pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals available)

Annex "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated

A.......- December 1, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-25253, RTC,
Br. 224, QC

Annex "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November

B.......- 13, 1996 in Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257),
Paraaque, MM

Annex "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to

C.......- File Required Comment and Opposition" dated January
17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP (not Civil Case) No. 42286, CA
6th Div.

This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that
only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is
entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that
"default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a
ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys."

Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the
bar standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and with the
IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to be a member. Jksm

Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does
not indicate any PTR for payment of professional tax.
 Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an attorney
may be done not only by the Supreme Court but also by the Court of Appeals or a
Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy furnishing some of these courts).

Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown
by:

1........his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-
CJ En Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 ( in SCRA )

2........his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No.
11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached copy of the Order dated February 14,
1995 denying the motion for reconsideration of the conviction which is purportedly
on appeal in the Court of Appeals).

Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November 13, 1996,
and January 17, 1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what appears to be
respondents signature above his name, address and the receipt number "IBP Rizal 259060."[1] Also
attached was a copy of the order,[2] dated February 14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr.
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying respondents motion for reconsideration of
his conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal
Code.

On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification[3] dated March 18, 1997, by the then president of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondents "last payment
of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to cover his
membership fees up to the present."

On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days from receipt
of notice, after which the case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.
In his comment-memorandum,[4] dated June 3, 1998, respondent alleged:[5]

3. That with respect to the complainants absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996 and
1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no
longer a member in good standing.

Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the bar
who is in good standing is entitled to practice law.

The complainants basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good
standing, were as above cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of
dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC,
concealment of encumbrances. Chief

As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside and
reversed and respondent was even promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to
Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.

Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was
appealed to the Court of Appeals and is still pending.
 Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal as a
Judge was never set aside and reversed, and also had the decision of conviction for a
light felony, been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Undersigned himself would
surrender his right or privilege to practice law.

4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in his
dues.

Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return, up to
the present, that he had only a limited practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax
Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of which he is. His 30 hectares orchard
and pineapple farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.

Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since 1992,
is legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in the
payment of taxes, income taxes as an example. Being thus exempt, he honestly
believe in view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a limited
practice, the subsequent payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by
such exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote and
be voted upon.

Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if
only to show that he never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused
compliance with such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues
even with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such
fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and
frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by the complainant, but as an honest
act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay such dues despite his
candor and honest belief in all food faith, to the contrary. Esmsc

On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution[6] adopting and approving the
report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three months and until he pays his IBP
dues. Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a
resolution,[7]dated April 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(b) of the Rules of Court, this
case is here for final action on the decision of the IBP ordering respondents suspension for three
months.

The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:

On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondents non-indication of the proper
IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter
complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at least three years."

The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter
President Ida R. Makahinud Javier that respondents last payment of his IBP dues was
in 1991."

While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by respondent,
he has invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt
 under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect in 1992 in the payment
of taxes, income taxes as an example."

....

The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact,
respondent admitted that he is still in the practice of law when he alleged that the
"undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income tax Return up to
the present time that he had only a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondents
Memorandum).

Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines. Esmmis

On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court about
his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least
six years and therefore liable for his actions. Respondent in his memorandum did not
discuss this issue.

First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having paid
his IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this
Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995,
1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number
for the years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a
"limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes,
such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, 4 as a senior citizen since 1992.

Rule 139-A provides:

Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual
dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme
Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from each
Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and
the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.

Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of

this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one
year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the
Roll of Attorneys.

In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his
dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, 4 grants
senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual
taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include payment of
membership or association dues.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public
and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY

AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Esmso

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO

THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

Respondents failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court
indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondents advanced age, his express
willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law,[8] we believe the
penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever
is later, is appropriate.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this decision be
attached to Atty. Llamas personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished
to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

[1]
Rollo, pp. 4-9.
[2]
Id., p. 11.
[3]
Id., p. 13.
[4]
Records, pp. 35-42.
[5]
Id., pp. 39-40.
[6]
Records, p. 57.
[7]
Rollo, p. 38.
[8]
Comment-Memorandum, pp. 6-7; Records, pp. 40-41.
 [B.M. No. 1370. May 9, 2005]

LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION

FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) dues filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
In his letter,[1] dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment of
IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-
2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of
the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and worked in, the
USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot
be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since
the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of ones profession while in government service,
and neither can he be assessed for the years when he was working in the USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment.[2]
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment [3] stating inter alia: that
membership in the IBP is not based on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues to
be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a member of the IBP; that
one of the obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as determined by the IBP
Board of Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9
and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing dues on the IBP
members has been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of an Integrated Bar Program;
and that the policy of the IBP Board of Governors of no exemption from payment of dues is
but an implementation of the Courts directives for all members of the IBP to help in defraying
the cost of integration of the bar. It maintained that there is no rule allowing the exemption of
payment of annual dues as requested by respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary
termination and reinstatement of membership. It asserted that what petitioner could have
done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his
membership in the IBP could have been terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could
have been stopped. It also alleged that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of
discussing proposals for the creation of an inactive status for its members, which if approved
by the Board of Governors and by this Court, will exempt inactive IBP members from payment
of the annual dues.
In his reply[4] dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what he is questioning is
the IBP Board of Governors Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership
dues of lawyers regardless of whether or not they are engaged in active or inactive practice.
He asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues
suffers from constitutional infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the due process
clause. He also posits that compulsory payment of the IBP annual membership dues would
indubitably be oppressive to him considering that he has been in an inactive status and is
without income derived from his law practice. He adds that his removal from nonpayment of
annual membership dues would constitute deprivation of property right without due process
of law. Lastly, he claims that non-practice of law by a lawyer-member in inactive status is
neither injurious to active law practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to the
community where the inactive lawyers-members reside.
Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment
of his dues during the time that he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in
the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-2003?
We rule in the negative.
An Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as
distinguished from bar association organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership
in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member
of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the objectives of the Bar
as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction
of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to
be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the
Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective
discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or
professional responsibility, breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by
the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of
the offending member.[5]
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer
population. This requires membership and financial support of every attorney as
condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court.[6]
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend
or not to attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its
elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of his
annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster the States legitimate interest in elevating
the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession
in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the
lawyers.[7]
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice
of law and in the integration of the Philippine Bar[8] - which power required members of a
privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses
of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is, indeed,
imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the noble
objectives and purposes of integration.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the Philippine
Bar,[9] thus:

For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court is
attempting to levy a tax.

A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax purpose
of a tax is a revenue. If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that
as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would
not be possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means to defray the
expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it the power to impose
such exaction.

The only limitation upon the States power to regulate the privilege of law is that the
regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by
the integration of the Bar far outweighs the slight inconvenience to a member resulting
from his required payment of the annual dues.

Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which

no one is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as
long as ones membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type
of practice, the member is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership
dues. At most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the
Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case, his membership in
the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues could have been
discontinued.
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of Governors is in
the process of discussing the situation of members under inactive status and the nonpayment
of their dues during such inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty bound to comply with
his obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.
Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would amount to
a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional
rights.
This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial Edillon,[10] in this wise:

. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that
entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at
length, as it [is] clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary
powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondents right to practice
law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and
inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then
a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
compliance with the lawyers public responsibilities.

As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions,[11] one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide
by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic
move.
 WHEREFORE, petitioners request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is DENIED.
He is ordered to pay P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as membership fees for
the years 1977-2005, within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of this
decision, with a warning that failure to do so will merit his suspension from the practice of
law.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, and Garcia,
JJ., concur.

[1]
Rollo, p. 1.
[2]
Rollo, p. 5.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 12-16.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 18-25.
[5]
In re Atty. Marcial Edillon, A.C. No. 1928, 03 August 1978, 84 SCRA 554, 562.
[6]
In re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, 09 January 1973, 49 SCRA 22, 25.
[7]
Ibid., citing Lathrop v. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102, N.W. 2d 404; Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 6 L.
ed. 2d 1191, 81 S. Ct. 1826.
[8]
Article VIII, Sec. 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution.
[9]
Appendix D, Legal and Judicial Ethics, Martin, Ruperto G., p. 440.
[10]
Supra, note 5, pp. 567-568.
[11]
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Deliquency of Atty. M.A. Edillon, A.C. No. 1928, 19 December
1980, 101 SCRA 612, 617.

A.C. No. 244 March 29, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO,

vs.
SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.

BENGZON, C.J.:

After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao was admitted
to the Bar.

About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his application
for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications. The matter was in due
course referred to the Solicitor General who caused the charge to be investigated; and later he
submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys, because
contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not completed,
before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private
Education, specially, in the following particulars:
 (a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and

(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom —
which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his application for examination,
and of his allegation therein of successful completion of the "required pre-legal education".

Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first charge: but he
claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army,
passed the General Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high
school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army
service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.

We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with respondent's failure to exhibit any
certification to that effect (the equivalence) by the proper school officials. However, it is unnecessary to
dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly meritorious. Diao never obtained his A.A. from
Quisumbing College; and yet his application for examination represented him as an A.A. graduate (1940-
1941) of such college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in April,
1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in
his school records.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved
by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not
covered by this stipulation of facts.
1äw phï1.ñët

This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was obviously of his own
making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also
have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester
of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not have
been permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the applicant for the Bar
examination must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had successfully and
satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of
Private Education," (emphasis on "previous").

Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his false
representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such
admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. The fact that he
hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally
essential..

The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A. Diao. And
the latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So ordered.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and
Makalintal, JJ., concur.
 [A.C. No. 4921. March 6, 2003]

CARMELITA I. ZAGUIRRE, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALFREDO

CASTILLO, respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

Before this Court is a Petition for Disbarment filed by Carmelita I. Zaguirre against Atty.
Alfredo Castillo on the ground of Gross Immoral Conduct.
The facts as borne by the records are as follows:
Complainant and respondent met sometime in 1996 when the two became officemates
at the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).[1] Respondent courted complainant and
promised to marry her while representing himself to be single.[2] Soon they had an intimate
relationship that started sometime in 1996 and lasted until 1997. [3] During their affair,
respondent was preparing for the bar examinations which he passed. On May 10, 1997, he
was admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar. [4] It was only around the first week of May
1997 that complainant first learned that respondent was already married when his wife went
to her office and confronted her about her relationship with respondent. [5] On September 10,
1997, respondent, who by now is a lawyer, executed an affidavit, admitting his relationship
with the complainant and recognizing the unborn child she was carrying as his.[6] On
December 09, 1997, complainant gave birth to a baby girl, Aletha Jessa. [7] By this time
however, respondent had started to refuse recognizing the child and giving her any form of
support.[8]
Respondent claims that: he never courted the complainant; what transpired between
them was nothing but mutual lust and desire; he never represented himself as single since it
was known in the NBI that he was already married and with children;[9] complainant is almost
10 years older than him and knew beforehand that he is already married; [10] the child borne by
complainant is not his, because the complainant was seeing other men at the time they were
having an affair.[11] He admits that he signed the affidavit dated September 10, 1997 but
explains that he only did so to save complainant from embarrassment. Also, he did not know
at the time that complainant was seeing other men.[12]
After due hearing, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Alfredo Castillo
guilty of gross immoral conduct and recommends that he be meted the penalty of indefinite
suspension from the practice of law.
The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

xxx xxx xxx

CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

xxx xxx xxx

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Immoral conduct has been defined as:

xxx that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the
opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Furthermore, such conduct
must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common
sense of decency. [13]

In his affidavit dated September 10, 1997, duly acknowledged before a notary public, he
declared explicitly:

1. That I had a relationship with one Carmelita Zaguirre, my officemate;

2. That as a result of that relationship, she is presently pregnant with my child;

3. That I hereby voluntarily recognize the child now under (sic) her womb to be my own;

4. That I am willing to support the said child henceforth, including his/her personal and
medical needs, education, housing, food, clothing and other necessities for living, which I
will give through his/her mother, Carmelita Zaguirre, until he/she becomes of legal age
and capable to live on his/her own;

5. That I undertake to sign the birth certificate as an additional proof that he/she is my
child; however, my failure to sign does not negate the recognition and acknowledgement
already done herein;

6. That I am executing this affidavit without compulsion on my part and being a lawyer, I
have full knowledge of the consequence of such acknowledgment and recognition. [14]

More incriminating is his handwritten letter dated March 12, 1998 which states in part:

Ayoko ng umabot tayo sa kung saan-saan pa. All your officemates, e.g., Ate Ging, Glo,
Guy and others (say) that I am the look like(sic) of your daughter.
Heres my bargain. I will help you in supporting your daughter, but I cannot promise fix
amount for monthly support of your daughter. However it shall not be less than P500 but
not more than P1,000. [15]

In the recent case of Luguid vs. Judge Camano, Jr., the Court in castigating a judge
stated that:

...even as an ordinary lawyer, respondent has to conform to the strict standard of conduct
demanded of members of the profession. Certainly, fathering children by a woman other
than his lawful wife fails to meet these standards. [16]

Siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a conduct way below the standards of
morality required of every lawyer.[17]
Moreover, the attempt of respondent to renege on his notarized statement recognizing
and undertaking to support his child by Carmelita demonstrates a certain unscrupulousness
on his part which is highly censurable, unbecoming a member of a noble profession,
tantamount to self-stultification.[18]
This Court has repeatedly held:

as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must
also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the
highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and
officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the
keeping of mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public
by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. [19]

While respondent does not deny having an extra-marital affair with complainant he seeks
understanding from the Court, pointing out that men by nature are polygamous, [20] and that
what happened between them was nothing but mutual lust and desire. [21] The Court is not
convinced. In fact, it is appalled at the reprehensible, amoral attitude of the respondent.
Respondent claims that he did not use any deception to win her affection. Granting
arguendo that complainant entered into a relationship with him knowing full well his marital
status, still it does not absolve him of gross immorality for what is in question in a case like
this is respondents fitness to be a member of the legal profession. It is not dependent whether
or not the other party knowingly engaged in an immoral relationship with him.
We agree with the IBP that the defense of in pari delicto is not feasible. The Court held
in Mortel vs. Aspiras:

In a disbarment proceeding, it is immaterial that the complainant is in pari

delicto because this is not a proceeding to grant relief to the complainant, but one to purge
the law profession of unworthy members, to protect the public and the courts. [22]

The illicit relationship with Carmelita took place while respondent was preparing to take
the bar examinations. Thus, it cannot be said that it is unknown to him that an applicant for
admission to membership in the bar must show that he is possessed of good moral character,
a requirement which is not dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar. [23] This
qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but its
continued possession is essential to maintain ones good standing in the profession;[24] it is a
continuing requirement to the practice of law[25] and therefore admission to the bar does not
preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning
his mental or moral fitness before he became a lawyer. This is because his admission to
practice merely creates a rebuttable presumption that he has all the qualifications to become
a lawyer.
The Court held:

The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show
that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege. We must stress that membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege to practice law only during good
behavior. He can be deprived of his license for misconduct ascertained and declared by
judgment of the court after giving him the opportunity to be heard. [26]

and in Dumadag vs. Lumaya:

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid
standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful
compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for
remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice
law.[27]

Respondent repeatedly engaged in sexual congress with a woman not his wife and now
refuses to recognize and support a child whom he previously recognized and promised to
support. Clearly therefore, respondent violated the standards of morality required of the legal
profession and should be disciplined accordingly.
As consistently held by this Court, disbarment shall not be meted out if a lesser
punishment could be given.[28] Records show that from the time he took his oath in 1997, he
has severed his ties with complainant and now lives with his wife and children in Mindoro. As
of now, the Court does not perceive this fact as an indication of respondents effort to mend
his ways or that he recognizes the impact of his offense on the noble profession of law.
Nevertheless, the Court deems it more appropriate under the circumstances that indefinite
suspension should be meted out than disbarment. The suspension shall last until such time
that respondent is able to show, to the full satisfaction of the Court, that he had instilled in
himself a firm conviction of maintaining moral integrity and uprightness required of every
member of the profession.
The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even
if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor.[29]
ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent GUILTY of Gross
Immoral Conduct and ordered to suffer INDEFINITE SUSPENSION from the practice of law.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Castillos personal record in the Office of
the Bar Confidant and a copy thereof be furnished the IBP and all courts throughout the
country.
 SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago and Corona, JJ., on leave.

[1]
Rollo, p. 11.
[2]
Id., p. 2.
[3]
Id., p. 12.
[4]
Annex A, Rollo, p. 5.
[5]
Rollo, p. 2.
[6]
Id., p. 7.
[7]
Annex B, Rollo, p. 6.
[8]
Rollo, p. 2.
[9]
Id., at p. 11.
[10]
Id., at p. 13.
[11]
Id., at p.12.
[12]
Id., at p. 13.
[13]
Narag vs. Narag, 291 SCRA 451, 464 (1998).
[14]
Annex C, Rollo, p. 7.
[15]
Id., p. 39.
[16]
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1509, August 8, 2002.
[17]
Paras vs. Paras, 343 SCRA 414, 426 (2000).
[18]
Marcayda vs. Naz, 125 SCRA 466, 469 (1983).
[19]
Narag vs. Narag, supra, footnote 13.
[20]
Rollo, p. 14.
[21]
Id.,at p.11.
[22]
100 Phil. 586, 592 (1956).
[23]
Cordova vs. Cordova, 179 SCRA 680, 683 (1989); Vda. de Mijares vs. Villalluz, 274 SCRA 1, 8 (1997).
[24]
Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos, 285 SCRA 93, 100 (1998); Igual vs. Javier, 254 SCRA 416 (1996); Villanueva vs.
Sta. Ana, 245 SCRA 707 (1995); People vs. Tunada, 18 SCRA 692 (1990); Melendrez vs. Decena, 176
SCRA 662 (1989).
[25]
Nakpil vs. Valdes, 286 SCRA 758, 774 (1998).
[26]
Sebastian vs. Calis, 344 SCRA 1, 8 (1999).
[27]
334 SCRA 513, 521 (2000).
[28]
Saburnido vs. Madrono, A.C. No. 4497, September 26, 2001.
[29]
Nakpil vs. Valdes, supra.
 [A.C. No. 4148. July 30, 1998]

REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, complainant, vs. ATTY. LAURO L.

TAPUCAR, respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant Remedios Ramirez Tapucar

sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of continuing
grossly immoral conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Pea under scandalous
circumstances.[1]
Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively charged four times for
conduct unbecoming an officer of the court. in Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved on
April 11, 1980, respondent, at that time the Judge of Butuan City, was meted the penalty of
six months suspension without pay,[2] while in Administrative Matter Nos. 1720, 1911 and
2300-CFI, which were consolidated,[3] this Court on January 31, 1981 ordered the separation
from service of respondent.[4]
Now he faces disbarment.
The records reveal the following facts:
From the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline, it appears
that complainant and respondent were married on October 29, 1953 at the Sacred Heart
Roman Catholic Church in Quezon City. They established their residence in Antipolo, Rizal,
were eight of their eleven children were born. In 1962 respondent relocated his family to
Dadiangas, Cotabato (Now General Santos City), where his last three children were born and
where he practiced his profession until his appointment as a CFI Judge in Butuan City on
January 30, 1976.
In August, 1976, shortly after being appointed as CFI Judge, respondent began
cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Pea, in Nasipit, Agusan Del Norte. On December 28,
1977 Elena gave birth to their first child, named Ofelia Sembrano Pea.
In view of this cohabitation, a certain Atty. Tranquilino Calo filed an administrative
complaint against respondent for immorality. After investigation, the penalty of suspension
from office for a period of six months without pay was meted by this Court upon respondent. [5]
Despite this penalty, respondent still continued to cohabit with Elena, giving rise to
another charge of immorality and other administrative cases, such as conduct unbecoming
an officer of the court, and grossly immoral conduct. These cases were consolidated and
after investigation, this Court ordered his dismissal and separation from the service.[6]
But his dismissal as a judge did not impel respondent to mend his ways. He continued
living with Elena, which resulted in the birth on September 20, 1989, of their second child
named Laella Pea Tapucar. Moreover, he completely abandoned complainant and his
children by her.
Respondent later moved from Nasipit, Agusan del Norte back to Antipolo, Rizal, bringing
along Elena and their two children. And on March 5, 1992, respondent contracted marriage
with Elena in a ceremony solemnized by Metropolitan Trial Court Judge Isagani A. Geronimo
of Antipolo, Rizal. This was done while the respondents marriage to complainant subsists, as
nothing on record shows the dissolution thereof.
Complainant, in the meanwhile, had migrated to United States of America upon her
retirement from the government service in 1990. However, her children, who remained in
Antipolo, kept her posted of the misery they allegedly suffered because of their fathers acts,
including deception and intrigues against them. Thus, despite having previously withdrawn a
similar case which she filed in 1976, complainant was forced to file the present petition for
disbarment under the compulsion of the material impulse to shield and protect her children
from the despotic and cruel acts of their own father. Complainant secured the assistance of
her eldest daughter, Atty. Ma. Susana Tapucar-Baua, to represent her in this case.
Consistent with Section 20, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the matter was referred to
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation,
report and recommendation. After conducting a thorough investigation, the Commission
through Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez recommended that respondent be disbarred, and
his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys. Mainly, this was premised on the ground that,
notwithstanding sanctions previously imposed upon him by the Honorable Supreme Court,
respondent continued the illicit liaison with Elena.[7]
In his report Commissioner Fernandez noted that, instead of contradicting the charges
against him, respondent displayed arrogance, and even made a mockery of the law and the
Court, as when he said:

I have been ordered suspended by Supreme Court for two months without pay in
1980 for having a mistress, the same girl Ms. Elena (Helen) Pea, now my
wife. Being ordered separated in later administrative case constitute double
jeopardy. If now disbarred for marrying Ms. Elena Pea will constitute triple
jeopardy. If thats the law so be it. [8]

Based on said report, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
passed on May 17, 1997, a Resolution adopting the Commissioners recommendation, as
follows:

RESOLUTION NO. XII-97-97

Adm. Case No. 4148
Remedios Ramirez Tapucar vs. Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-titled case, herein made part of the
Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation therein to be
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
Respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED and that his name be
stricken off the roll of attorneys.

We find the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez, as approved and

adopted by the Board of Governors of IBP, more than sufficient to justify and support the
foregoing Resolution, herein considered as the recommendation to this Court by said Board
pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b), of the Rules of Court.* We are in agreement that
respondents actuations merit the penalty of disbarment.
Well settled is the rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent for
admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain ones
good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity.[9] There is perhaps no profession after
that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more imperative than that of
law.[10] The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that:

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave
in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. *

As this Court often reminds members of the Bar, they must live up to the standards and
norms expected of the legal profession, by upholding the ideals and tenets embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility always. Lawyers must maintain a high standards of legal
proficiency, as well as morality including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. For they are at all
times subject to the scrutinizing eye of public opinion and community approbation. Needless
to state, those whose conduct both public and private fails this scrutiny would have to be
disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, penalized accordingly.
Moreover, it should be recalled that respondent here was once a member of the judiciary,
a fact that aggravates this professional infractions. For having occupied that place of honor
in the Bench, he knew a judges actuations ought to be free from any appearance of
impropriety.[11] For a judge is the visible representation of the law, more importantly, of
justice. Ordinary citizens consider him as a source of strength that fortifies their will to obey
the law.[12] Indeed, a judge should avoid the slightest infraction of the law in all of his
actuations, lest it be a demoralizing example to others. [13] Surely, respondent could not have
forgotten the Code of Judicial Conduct entirely as to lose its moral imperatives. [14]
Like a judge who is held to a high standard of integrity and ethical conduct, [15] an attorney-
at-law is also invested with public trust. Judges and lawyers serve in the administration of
justice. Admittedly, as officers of the court, lawyers must ensure the faith and confidence of
the public that justice is administered with dignity and civility. A high degree or moral integrity
is expected of a lawyer in the community where he resides. He must maintain due regard for
public decency in an orderly society.
A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession
by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his
clients.[16]Exacted from him, as a member of the profession charged with the responsibility to
stand as a shield in the defense of what is right, are such positive qualities of decency,
truthfulness and responsibility that have been compendiously described as moral character.
To achieve such end, every lawyer needs to strive at all times to honor and maintain the
dignity of his profession, and thus improve not only the public regard for the Bar but also the
administration of justice.
On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to continue as an
officer of the court.[17]
The power to disbar, however, is one to be exercised with great caution, and only in a
clear case of misconduct which seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as
an officer of the Court of and member of the bar.[18] For disbarment proceedings are intended
to afford the parties thereto full opportunity to vindicate their cause before disciplinary action
is taken, to assure the general public that those who are tasked with the duty of administering
justice are competent, honorable, trustworthy men and women in whom the Courts and the
clients may repose full confidence.
In the case of Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr.,[19] a complaint for disbarment was filed against a
member of the bar by his wife. She was able to prove that he had abandoned his wife and
their son; and that he had adulterous relations with a married but separated
woman. Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence presented by his wife that he
was guilty of grossly immoral conduct. In another case,[20] a lawyer was disbarred when he
abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child. The
Court held that respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and
required of a member of a bar.
In the present case, the record shows that despite previous sanctions imposed upon by
this Court, respondent continued his illicit liaison with a woman other than lawfully-wedded
wife.The report of the Commissioner assigned to investigate thoroughly the complaint found
respondent far from contrite; on the contrary, he exhibited a cavalier attitude, even arrogance;
in the face of charges against him. The IBP Board of Governors, tasked to determine whether
he still merited the privileges extended to a member of the legal profession, resolved the
matter against him. For indeed, evidence of grossly immoral conduct abounds against him
and could not be explained away. Keeping a mistress, entering into another marriage while
a prior one still subsists, as well as abandoning and/or mistreating complainant and their
children, show his disregard of family obligations, morality and decency, the law and the
lawyers oath. Such gross misbehavior over a long period of time clearly shows a serious flaw
in respondents character, his moral indifference to scandal in the community, and his outright
defiance of established norms. All these could not but put the legal profession in disrepute
and place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril, hence the need for strict but
appropriate disciplinary action.
IN VIEW THEREOF, respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED. The
Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Martinez, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, no part due to personal relationships.
Purisima, J., no part.

[1]
Rollo, pp. 2-8.
[2]
Records, p.2; Rollo, p.3.
[3]
Dy Teban Hardware & Auto Supply Co. v. Tapucar, 102 SCRA 493 (1981).
[4]
Ibid., p.510.
[5]
Administrative Matter No. 1740 (Tranquilino Calo, Jr. v. Judge Lauro Tapucar) April 11, 1980.
[6]
Supra 3 at p.510.
[7]
Report of Commissioner Fernandez, Commission on Bar Discipline, IBP, p.4.
[8]
Records of the Case-IBP, Vol. II, p.101, par. 3(b) (emphasis supplied).
*
b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its local membership, determines that the respondent should be
suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the
Supreme Court for final action.
[9]
Rayos-Omboc v. Atty. Rayos, Adm. Case No. 2884, January 28, 1998; Leda v. Tabang, 206 SCRA 395
(1992); People v. Tuanda, 181 SCRA 692 (1990); Melendrez v. Decena, 176 SCRA 662 (1989).
[10]
Ruben Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 4th ed. (1989), p.22.
*
Emphasis supplied.
[11]
Ernesto Pineda, Legal & Judicial Ethics, 1994 ed., p.336, citing Luque v. Kayanan, 29 SCRA 165; Otero v.
Esguerra, 57 SCRA 57; Jugueta v. Boncaros, 60 SCRA 27.
[12]
Ruben Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 4th ed. (1989), p.454.
[13]
Ibid., p.465.
[14]
Rule 1.01 - A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.
Rule 2.01 - A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary. (Italics ours)
[15]
Office of the Court Administrator v. Estacion, Jr., 247 SCRA 503 (1995).
[16]
Nadayag v. Grageda, 237 SCRA 202 (1994); Marcelo v. Javier, Sr., 214 SCRA 1 (1992).
[17]
Sec. 27, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court.
[18]
Siervo v. Infante, 73 SCRA 35; Andres v. Cabrera, 127 SCRA 802.
[19]
Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr., 128 SCRA 485, 487.
[20]
Toledo v. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768.
JOSELANO GUEVARRA V ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA AC No 7136

PER CURIAM:
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for Disbarment[1] before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose
Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated
violation of the lawyers oath.

In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:

He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainants) then-fiancee Irene Moje
(Irene) introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled
Mary Ann) Tantoco with whom he had three children.

After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from January to March
2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which
read I love you, I miss you, or Meet you at Megamall.

Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the
morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about her
whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parents house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with
her work.

In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two
occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal
house.

On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irenes birthday celebration at which he saw
her and respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and
humiliation, he left the venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house
and hauled off all her personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household
appliances.

Complainant later found, in the masters bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words I Love
You on its face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the
day of his wedding to Irene, reading:

My everdearest Irene,

By the time you open this, youll be moments away from walking down the aisle. I will say a prayer for
you that you may find meaning in what youre about to do.
Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness but experience eternal
pain? Is it only for us to find a true love but then lose it again? Or is it because theres a bigger
plan for the two of us?
I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done everything humanly possible to
love you. And today, as you make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!

I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes on you, to the time we
spent together, up to the final moments of your single life. But more importantly, I will love
you until the life in me is gone and until we are together again.

Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to last me a
lifetime. Always remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL
ALWAYS

. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!

BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS
ALONE!

I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS IM LIVING MY

TWEETIE YOULL BE![2]

Eternally yours,

NOLI

Complainant soon saw respondents car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-
B 11th Street, New Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was
already residing. He also learned still later that when his friends saw Irene on or about January
18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert, she was pregnant.

In his ANSWER,[3] respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which
the above-quoted letter was handwritten.
On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:

14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS

RELATIONSHIP as they attended social functions together. For instance, in or about
the third week of September 2001, the couple attended the launch of the Wine All You
Can promotion of French wines, held at the Mega Strip of SM Megamall B
at Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was reported in Section B of the Manila
Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page 21. Respondent and
Irene were photographed together; their picture was captioned: Irene with Sportscaster
Noli Eala. A photocopy of the report is attached as Annex C.[4] (Italics and emphasis
in the original; CAPITALIZATION of the phrase flaunting their adulterous relationship
supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous
relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth of the
matter being that their relationship was low profile and known only to the
immediate members of their respective families, and that Respondent, as far as
the general public was concerned, was still known to be legally married to Mary
Anne Tantoco.[5] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:

15. Respondents adulterous conduct with the complainants wife and his
apparent abandoning or neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross moral
depravity, making him morally unfit to keep his membership in the bar. He flaunted his
aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a piece of paper. Morally reprehensible
was his writing the love letter to complainants bride on the very day of her wedding,
vowing to continue his love for her until we are together again, as now they
are.[6] (Underscoring supplied),

respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:

5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the

Complaint regarding his adulterous relationship and that his acts demonstrate gross
moral depravity thereby making him unfit to keep his membership in the bar, the reason
being that Respondents relationship with Irene was not under scandalous
circumstances and that as far as his relationship with his own family:

5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship

with [his wife] Mary Anne as in fact they still occasionally meet in public, even if
Mary Anne is aware of Respondents special friendship with Irene.

xxxx

5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the institution
of marriage by calling the institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his
reference [in his above-quoted handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage between
Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper was merely with respect to the formality
of the marriage contract.[7] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondent admitted[8] paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:

18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey
the laws. The Constitution regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the
foundation of the family (Article XV, Sec. 2).[9]
 And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:

19. Respondents grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the laws he, as
a lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the
complainants wife, he mocked the institution of marriage, betrayed his own family,
broke up the complainants marriage, commits adultery with his wife, and degrades the
legal profession.[10] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the

Complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the acts of Respondent
with respect to his purely personal and low profile special relationship with Irene
is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral
conduct as would be a ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of
the Rules of Court.[11] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To respondents ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,[12] alleging that Irene gave

birth to a girl and Irene named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girls
father. Complainant attached to the REPLY, as Annex A, a copy of a Certificate of Live
Birth[13] bearing Irenes signature and naming respondent as the father of her daughter
Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14, 2002 at St. Lukes Hospital.

Complainants REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO

DISMISS[14] dated January 10, 2003 from respondent in which he denied having personal
knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth attached to the complainants Reply.[15] Respondent
moved to dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a civil case filed by complainant for
the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a criminal complaint for adultery against
respondent and Irene which was pending before the Quezon City Prosecutors Office.

During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainants Complaint-Affidavit

and REPLY to ANSWER were adopted as his testimony on direct
[16] [17]
examination. Respondents counsel did not cross-examine complainant.

After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a

12-page REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION[18] dated October 26, 2004, found the charge
against respondent sufficiently proven.
 The Commissioner thus recommended[19] that respondent be disbarred for
violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reading:

Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct (Underscoring supplied),

and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:

Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Underscoring supplied)

The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the case for lack of merit, by
Resolution dated January 28, 2006 briefly reading:

RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06

CBD Case No. 02-936
Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala

RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE,
the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE
the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit.[20] (Italics and emphasis
in the original)

Hence, the present petition[21] of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant to
Section 12 (c), Rule 139[22] of the Rules of Court.
The petition is impressed with merit.

Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner and dismissing the case for lack of merit, gave no
reason therefor as its above-quoted 33-word Resolution shows.

Respondent contends, in his Comment[23] on the present petition of complainant, that

there is no evidence against him.[24] The contention fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating
Commissioner observed:
 While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. C) and
the news item published in the Manila Standard (Exh. D), even taken together do
not sufficiently prove that respondent is carrying on an adulterous relationship with
complainants wife, there are other pieces of evidence on record which support the
accusation of complainant against respondent.

It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, respondent

through counsel made the following statements to wit: Respondent specifically
denies having [ever] flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in
paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being [that] their relationship
was low profile and known only to immediate members of their respective families .
. . , and Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the
complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the acts of the respondents
with respect to his purely personal and low profile relationship with Irene is neither
under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct . . .

These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that

there is indeed a special relationship between him and complainants wife, Irene,
[which] taken together with the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha Louise
Irene Moje (Annex H-1) sufficiently prove that there was indeed an illicit
relationship between respondent and Irene which resulted in the birth of the child
Samantha. In the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha it should be noted that
complainants wife Irene supplied the information that respondent was the
father of the child. Given the fact that the respondent admitted his special
relationship with Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene would lie or make
any misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the child. It should be
underscored that respondent has not categorically denied that he is the father of
Samantha Louise Irene Moje.[25] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Indeed, from respondents ANSWER, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous

relationship with Irene, adultery being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as
that committed by any married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her
husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if
the marriage be subsequently declared void.[26] (Italics supplied) What respondent denies
is having flaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it was low profile and known only to
the immediate members of their respective families.

In other words, respondents denial is a negative pregnant,

a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded
to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was
directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression
which carries with it in affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to
the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts
alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language
and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has
 been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is
admitted.[27] (Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

A negative pregnant too is respondents denial of having personal knowledge of Irenes

daughter Samantha Louise Irene Mojes Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene
named respondent a lawyer, 38 years old as the childs father. And the phrase NOT MARRIED
is entered on the desired information on DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE. A comparison
of the signature attributed to Irene in the certificate[28] with her signature on the Marriage
Certificate[29] shows that they were affixed by one and the same person. Notatu dignum is that,
as the Investigating Commissioner noted, respondent never denied being the father of the child.

Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Lukes Medical Center, in his January
29, 2003 Affidavit[30] which he identified at the witness stand, declared that Irene gave the
information in the Certificate of Live Birth that the childs father is Jose
Emmanuel Masacaet Eala, who was 38 years old and a lawyer.[31]

Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been
sufficiently proven by more than clearly preponderant evidence that evidence adduced by one
party which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other party and, therefore, has
greater weight than the other[32] which is the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative
case against a lawyer.

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are
distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or
suspension, clearly preponderant evidence is all that is required.[33] (Emphasis
supplied)

Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his relationship with
Irene was not, under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, reading:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds

therefor. ─ A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for
a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
 the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court

or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted
as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action
includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall
be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied),

under scandalous circumstances.[34]

The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or

suspension uses the phrase grossly immoral conduct, not under scandalous
circumstances.Sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances is, following Article
334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:

ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the
conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances,
with a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be
punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.

x x x x,

an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse with a
woman elsewhere.

Whether a lawyers sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of
marriage should be characterized as grossly immoral conduct depends on the surrounding
circumstances.[35] The case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a
married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out
discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:[36]

On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-
marital affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is
not so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.

xxxx
 While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual
relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative
sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital
vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under
penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral
as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital
vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.[37](Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:[38]

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent
did contract a bigamous marriage . . . It is enough that the records of this
administrative case substantiate the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as
well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has been carrying
on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct
and indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his
profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and
undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his license confers
upon him.[39] (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent in fact also violated the lawyers oath he took before admission to
practice law which goes:

I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the

Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic
of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no
man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of
my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my
clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the

Constitution reading:

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family

and shall be protected by the State.
In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this
constitutional provision, obligates the husband and the wife to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.[40]

Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from
engaging in any conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.

Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of the case
before the IBP Commissioner, filed a Manifestation[41] on March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-
CBD that complainants petition for nullity of his (complainants) marriage to Irene had been
granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, and that the criminal
complaint for adultery complainant filed against respondent and Irene based on the same set
of facts alleged in the instant case, which was pending review before the Department of Justice
(DOJ), on petition of complainant, had been, on motion of complainant, withdrawn.

The Secretary of Justices Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting complainants Motion
to Withdraw Petition for Review reads:

Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of the
petition for review, we are inclined to grant the same pursuant to Section 10 of
Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, which provides that notwithstanding
the perfection of the appeal, the petitioner may withdraw the same at any time before it
is finally resolved, in which case the appealed resolution shall stand as though no
appeal has been taken.[42] (Emphasis supplied by complainant)

That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared
void ab initio is immaterial. The acts complained of took place before the marriage was
declared null and void.[43] As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage.[44] In carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene
prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and void, and
despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred
by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.

As for complainants withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ, respondent
glaringly omitted to state that before complainant filed his December 23, 2003Motion
to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution
on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by the Quezon City Prosecutors Office of
complainants complaint for adultery. In reversing the City Prosecutors Resolution, DOJ
Secretary Simeon Datumanong held:

Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant would, in the

fair estimation of the Department, sufficiently establish all the elements of the offense
of adultery on the part of both respondents. Indeed, early on,
respondent Moje conceded to complainant that she was going out on dates with
respondent Eala, and this she did when complainant confronted her
about Ealas frequent phone calls and text messages to her. Complainant also personally
witnessed Moje and Eala having a rendezvous on two
occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knew Moje to be married
to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was married to another
woman. Moreover, Mojes eventual abandonment of their conjugal home, after
complainant had once more confronted her about Eala, only served to confirm the illicit
relationship involving both respondents. This becomes all the more apparent
by Mojes subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City,
which was a few blocks away from the church where she had exchange marital vows
with complainant.

It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited. Especially
since Ealas vehicle and that of Mojes were always seen there. Moje herself admits that
she came to live in the said address whereas Eala asserts that that was where he held
office. The happenstance that it was in that said address that Eala and Moje had decided
to hold office for the firm that both had formed smacks too much of a coincidence. For
one, the said address appears to be a residential house, for that was where Moje stayed
all throughout after her separation from complainant. It was both respondents love nest,
to put short; their illicit affair that was carried out there bore fruit a few months later
when Moje gave birth to a girl at the nearby hospital of St. Lukes Medical Center.What
finally militates against the respondents is the indubitable fact that in the certificate of
birth of the girl, Moje furnished the information that Eala was the father. This speaks
all too eloquently of the unlawful and damning nature of the adulterous acts of the
respondents. Complainants supposed illegal procurement of the birth certificate is
most certainly beside the point for both respondents Eala and Moje have not
denied, in any categorical manner, that Eala is the father of the child Samantha
Irene Louise Moje.[45] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be

prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant complainants motion to
withdraw his petition for review. But even if respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of
adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed in court, the same would not have
been a bar to the present administrative complaint.

Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,[46] viz:

 x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to
these [administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied
by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of x x x criminal
law. Moreover, this Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different
capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal case[47] (Italics in the
original),

this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,[48] held:

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are
distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed

on January 28, 2006 by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippinesis ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral

conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule
7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records
of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines.And let
copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all
courts.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES- SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

[1]
Rollo, pp. 1-8. admonition, reprimand, citing Municipality
[2]
Id. at 2-3; Exhibit C, p. 10. or fine) it shall issue a of Moncada v. Cajuigan, 21 Phil. 184
[3]
Id. at 31-35. decision exonerating (1912); Stronghold Insurance Company,
[4]
Id. at 6. respondent or imposing Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 619,
[5]
Id. at 32. such sanction. The case May 29, 1989; Metro Manila Transit Corp.
[6]
Id. at 6. shall be deemed v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104408, June
[7]
Id. at 32-33. terminated unless upon 21, 1993, 223 SCRA 521, 534.
[8] [33]
Id. at 31. petition of the Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v.
[9]
Id. at 7. complainant or other Naldoza, 374 Phil. 1, 9-10 (1999).
[10] [34]
Ibid. interested party filed Vide rollo, p. 443.
[11] [35]
Id. at 33. with the Supreme Court Arciga v. Maniwang, 193 Phil. 731,735-736
[12]
Id. at 37-42; Exhibit E. within fifteen (15) days (1981).
[13] [36]
Id. at 43; Exhibit F. from notice of the A.C. No. 6313, September 7, 2006, 501
[14]
Id. at 71-76. Boards resolution, the SCRA 166.
[15] [37]
Id. at 71. Supreme Court orders Id. at 177-178.
[16] [38]
Id. at 199-200; TSN, February 21, 2003, pp. otherwise. 376 Phil. 336 (1999).
[23] [39]
41-42. Rollo pp. 429-445. Id. at 340.
[17] [24] [40]
Id. at 200; TSN, February 21, 2003, p. 42. Id. at 434-440. Article 68.
[18] [25] [41]
Id. at 333-344. Id. at 342-343. Rollo, pp. 233-246.
[19] [26] [42]
Rollo, pp. 340-344. REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 333. Id. at 455-456.
[20] [27] [43]
Id. at 332. Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 453 Phil. 1059, Id. at 1-8, 277-283.
[21] [44]
Id. at 345-354. 1107 (2003). RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Section 3
[22] [28]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 139-B, Section 12 Id. at 43; Exhibits F and F-3; TSN, December (aa); Sevilla v. Cardenas, G.R. No.
(c): 2, 2003, pp. 226-227. 167684, July 31, 2006, 497 SCRA 428,
[29]
If the respondent is Id. at 9; Exhibit B. 443-445.
[30] [45]
exonerated by the Id. at 63. Rollo, pp. 481-482.
[31] [46]
Board or the Id. at 63, 215-219; TSN, December 2, 2003, 107 SCRA 1 (1981).
[47]
disciplinary sanction pp. 12-14, vide p. 43. Id. at 6-7.
[32] [48]
imposed by it is less Habagat Grill v. DMC-Urban Property 374 Phil. 1, 9 (1999).
than suspension or Developer, Inc., G.R. No. 155110, March
disbarment (such as 31, 2003, 454 SCRA 653, 664-665,