G.R. No.
L-32328 September 30, 1977
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANO MALOTO: ALDINA
MALOTO CASIANO, CONSTANCIO MALOTO, PURIFICACION
MIRAFLOR, ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF MOLO, and ASILO
DE MOLO, petitioners-appellants
vs.
FELINO MALOTO and FELINO MALOTO, oppositors-appellees.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition to review the order dated April 13, 1970 of the Court
of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch III, in Special Proceeding No. 2176
dismissing the petition for the probate of a will. 1
One Adriana Maloto died on October 20, 1963 in Iloilo City, her place
of residence.
Aldina Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto, Panfilo Maloto, and Felino
Maloto, niece and nephews, respectively, of Adriana Maloto, in the
belief that decedent died intestate, commenced on November 4, 1963
in the Court of First Instance of iloilo an intestate proceeding docketed
as Special Proceeding No. 1736. In the course of said intestate
proceeding, Aldina Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto, Panfilo Maloto
and Felino Maloto executed an extrajudicial Partition of the estate of
Adriana Maloto on February 1, 1964 whereby they adjudicated said
estate unto themselves in the proportion of one-fourth (1/4) share for
each. 2 The Court of First Instance of iloilo, then prescribed by Judge
Emigdio V. Nietes, ed he diamond partition on March approve
extrajudicial on March 21, 1964. 3
On April 1, 1967, a document dated January 3, 1940 purporting to be
the last with and testament of Adriana Maloto was delivered to the
Clerk of Art of the Art of First Instant of Iloilo. 4 It appears that Aldina
Maloto Casiano Consent Maloto, Panfilo Maloto, and Felino Maloto are
named as heirs but Maloto Casiano and Constancio Maloto allegedly
have shares in said with which are bigger, different and more valuable
than what they obtained in the extrajudicial partition. The said will also
allegedly made dispositions to certain devisees and/or legatees,
among whom being the Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of
Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor.
On May 24, 1967, Aldina Maloto Casiano and Constancio Maloto filed
in Special Proceeding No. 1736 a motion (1) for reconsideration; (2)
annulment of the proceedings; and (3) for the allowance of the last will
and testament of Adriana Maloto. 5 The Asilo de Molo, the Roman
Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor also filed in Special
Proceeding No. 1736 petitions for the allowance of the will of Adriana
Maloto. 6
Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto opposed the motion of Aldina Maloto
Casiano and Constancio Maloto.
The Court of First Instance of iloilo, through Judge Emigdio V. Nietes,
issued an order dated November 16, 1968 denying the motion to
reopen the proceedings on the ground that the said motion had been
filed out of time. A motion for reconsideration of said order was denied.
Petitioners appealed from the order of denial. On motion of Panfilo
Maloto and Felino Maloto, the lower court dismissed the appeal on the
ground that it was filed late. A motion for reconsideration of the order of
dismissal was denied. A supplemental order dated April 1, 1969 stating
as additional ground that the appeal is improper was issued.
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the
Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. L-30479. This Court dismissed
the petition in a resolution dated May 14, 1969 which reads:
L-010479 (Constancio Maloto, et al, vs. Hon.
Emigdio V. Nietes, etc., et al.) — THE COURT
RESOLVED to dismiss the petition for certiorari
and mandamus, without passing on the issue of
whether or not the petitioners appeal from the
order of November 16, 1968 of respondent Judge
was made on time, it appearing that the more
appropriate remedy of petitioners in the premises
stated in the petition is for petitioners to initiate a
separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged
will in question. 7
Acting on the petitioners' motion for reconsideration and citation, fl Art
issued a resolution dated July 15, 1969 which reads:
Acting on the motion for reconsideration and/or
clarification filed by petitioner in G. R. No. L-
30479, Constancio Maloto, et al., vs. Hon. Emigdio
V. Nietes, etc. et al., dated June 11, 1969, the
Court resolved to DENY the motion for
reconsideration, with the clarification that the
matter of whether or not the pertinent findings of
facts of respondent Judge in his herein subject
order of November 16, 1968 constitute res
adjudicata may be raised in the proceedings for
probate of the alleged will in question indicated in
the resolution of this Court of May 14, 1969,
wherein such matter will be more appropriately
determined. 8
Thereupon, the herein petitioners commenced Special Proceeding No.
2176 in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the probate of the
alleged last will and testament of Adriana Maloto. 9
Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto filed an opposition with a motion to
dismiss on the following grounds:
I. THAT THE ALLEGED WILL SOUGHT TO BE
PROBATED HAD BEEN DESTROYED AND
REVOKED BY THE TESTATRIX.
II. THAT THE INSTANT PETITION FOR
PROBATE IS NOW BARRED BY PRIOR
JUDGMENT OR ORDER (OR RES JUDICATA).
III. THAT THE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANA
MALOTO HAD ALREADY PASSED OUT OF
EXISTENCE AND TITLE THERETO HAD
ALREADY ARRESTED IN THE DISTRIBUTEES
OF THEIR ASSIGNS.
IV. THAT PETITIONERS ALDINA MALOTO
CASIANO AND CONSTANCIO MALOTO ARE
NOW ESTOPPED FROM SEEKING THE
REMEDY TENDER THIS PROCEEDING, THEY
HAVING CEASED TO BE INTERESTED
PARTIES. 10
In an order dated April 13, 1970, the probate court dismissed the
petition for the probate of the with on the basis of the finding of said
court in Special Proceeding No. 1736 that the alleged win sought to be
Probated had been destroyed and revoked by the testatrix. The
probate court sustained the oppositors' contention that the petition for
probate is now barred by the order of November 16, 1968 in the
intestate estate proceeding, Special Proceeding No. 1736. 11
The herein petitioners allege that the probate court committed the
following errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE .kl).NIITTEI)I,Y GENUINE LAST WILL AND
TESTAMENT OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO
(THE SUBJECT OF PETITION FOR PROBATE —
SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 2176, CFI ILOILO)
 HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN REVOKED BY HER As to the retirement benefits:
(ADRIANA MALOTO).

II Widow 4/16

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

SAID PETITION (FOR PROBATE OF THE Legitimate Son 8/16
AFORESAID LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF
THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO) IS NOW
BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT. I. E., THAT
Illegitimate
THE MATTER CONCERNED IS NOW RES 2/16
Daughter
ADJUDICATA

III
Illegitimate Son 2/16

THE LOWER COURT, THEREFORE, ERRED IN

DISMISSING THE AFORESAID PETITION FOR
PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL AND
TESTAMENT OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO
AND IN NOT, INSTEAD, GIVING IT (THE
PETITION ABOVE-CITED DUE COURSE.12
The instant petition for review is meritorious.
As to the monetary value of the terminal leave pay and unused
vacation and sick leave, the SC treated the same as conjugal property
and as such, ½ goes to the widow as her share in the conjugal
partnership and the other half to be distributed to the legal heirs in the
same way as in the retirement benefits. This is so because ‘vacation
with pay is not a gratuity but is compensation for services rendered’.

The probate court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for the
probate of the alleged with of Adriana Maloto in Special Proceeding
No. 1736. Indeed, the motion to reopen the was denied because the
same was filed out of time. Moreover, it is not proper to make a finding
in an intestate estate proceeding that the discovered will has been
revoked. As a matter of fact, the probate court in Special Proceeding
No. 1736 stated in the order of November 16, 1968 that "Movants
should have filed a separate action for the probate of the Will." 13 And
this court stated in its resolution of May 14, 1969 that "The more
appropriate remedy of the petitioners in the premises stated in the
petition is for petitioners to initiate a separate proceeding for the
probate of the alleged with in question."
In view of the foregoing, the order of November 16, 1968 in Special
Proceeding No. 1736 is not a bar to the present petition for the probate
of the alleged will of Adriana Maloto.
WHEREFORE, the order dated April 13, 1970 dismissing the petition
for the probate of the alleged will of Adriana Maloto is hereby set aside
and the lower court is directed to proceed with the hearing of the
petition in Special Proceeding No. 2176 on the merits, with costs
against the respondents.
Concurring Opinion AQUINO, J.:
I concur. The provisions on legitime are found under the rubric of
testamentary succession. That does not mean that the legitime is
taken into account only in testamentary succession. The legitime must
also be taken into consideration in legal succession.
There may be instances, like the instant case where in legal
succession the estate is distributed according to the rules on legitime
without applying the rules on intestate succession. The reason is that
sometimes the estate is not even sufficient to satisfy the
legitimes. The legitimes of the primary compulsory heirs, like a child or
descendant, should first be satisfied.
In this case the decedent's legal heirs are his legitimate child, his
widow and two illegitimate children. His estate is partitioned among
those heirs by giving them their respective legitimes.
The legitimate child gets one-half of the estate as his legitime which is
regarded as his share as a legal heir (Art. 888, Civil Code).
The widow's legitime is one-fourth of the estate. That represents also
her share as a legal heir (Art. 892, 1st sentence, Civil Code).

The remaining one-fourth of the estate, which is the free portion, goes
SO ORDERED.
to the two illegitimate children in equal shares, as their legitime,
pursuant to the provision that "the legitime of the illegitimate children
In Re: Chanliongco shall be taken from the portion of of the estate at the free disposal of
AM No. 190. 18 October 1977 the testator, provided that in no case shall the total legitime of such
illegitimate children exceed that free portion, and that the legitime of
the surviving spouse must first be fully satisfied" (Last par., art. 895,
FACTS: Civil Code).

The matter refers to the claims for retirement benefits by the heirs of
the late Atty. Chanliongco of the SC, who was more than 63 years of
age, with more than 38 years of service in the government. He left as
heirs the following: his widow, one legitimate child and 2 illegitimate
children. He died intestate and stated in his application for membership
with the GSIS the beneficiary, of his retirement benefits, should he
die before retirement.
ISSUE:
How should the retirement benefits and the monetary value of terminal
leave of the decedent be settled?
RULING:
The rule in Santillon vs. Miranda, L-19281, June 30, 1965, 14 SCRA
563, that when the surviving spouse concurs with only one legitimate
child, the spouse is entitled one-half of the estate and the child gets the
other half, pursuant to article 996 of the Civil Code, does not apply to
this case because her illegitimate children concur with the surviving
spouse and the legitimate child.
In this case, to divide the estate between the surviving spouse and the
legitimate child would deprive the illegitimate children of their legitime.
So, the decedent's estate is distributed in the proportion of 1/2 for the
legitimate child, 1/4 for the widow and 1/8 each for the two illegitimate
children.
Also not of possible application to this case is the rule natural that the
legitime of an acknowledged natural child is 1/2 of the legitime of the
legitimate child and that the legitime of the spurious child is 2/5 of that
of the legitime of the legitimate child or 4/5 of that of the acknowledged
natural child.
That rule cannot be applied because the estate is not sufficient to
cover the legitimes of all the compulsory heirs. That is one of the flaws
of the law of succession.
A situation, as in the instant case, may arise where the illegitimate
children get less than their legitime.
With respect to the decedent's unpaid salary and the money value of
his terminal leave, the same are conjugal properties because of the
rule that property "obtained by the industry, or work, or as salary of the
spouses, or either of them", is conjugal in character (Art. 153[2], Civil
Code).
NUGUID v. NUGUID
17 SCRA 449 (1966)
FACTS: Rosario Nuguid, died without descendants. Her surviving
relatives are her parents and six brothers and sisters. On May 18,
1963, Remedios, sister of the deceased, filed a petition to probate a
holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario 11 years prior to her
death. Both parents opposed on the ground that the institution of
Remedios as universal heir resulted to their preterition, they being
compulsory heirs in the direct ascending line.
ISSUE: Whether the will is void due to preterition.
HELD: Yes. Petitioner contends that what we have is a case of
disinheritance rather than preterition. This is not meritorious, as this
argument fails to appreciate the distinction between preterition and
disinheritance. Preterition is the omission in the testator’s will of the
forced heirs or anyone of them, either by not mentioning them, or
although mentioned they are neither instituted as heirs nor are
expressly disinherited. Disinheritance is a testamentary disposition
depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause
authorized by law. The will does not explicitly disinherit the parents. It
simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather than being labeled
ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the forced heir suffers
from preterition.
The effects of preterition are totally different from disinheri-tance.
Preterition annuls the institution of heirs, except devises and legacies
insofar as the latter are not inofficious. In disinheri-tance the nullity is
limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have
been illegally deprived. Considering, however that the will before us
solely provides for the institution of the petitioner as universal heir and
nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will is void.
Legal Effects of preterition:
1. Annulment of the institution of heirs: The annulment of the
institution is mandatory so that a portion of the estate may be freed to
satisfy the remaining unpaid legitimes.
2. Legacies and devises cannot be cancelled but can be
reduced only if the estate is still insufficient to pay the legitimes after
the annulment of the institution. Instituted heirs do not enjoy any
preference over specific properties unlike legatees and devisees who
enjoy a priority because the testator has indicated the specific property
to be given to them. Nevertheless, legatees and devisees can still lose
their legacies and devises if the portion of the estate is insufficient to
pay the legitime(s) of the preterited heir(s).
Where the court held that ORDINARILY, while the probate is going on,
intestate proceedings may not proceed. However, in the case of
Remedios Nuguid v. Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, L-23445,
June 30, 1966, the Court held that while it is true that the probate
should deal only with EXTRINSIC VALIDITY, and NEVER with
INTRINSIC VALIDITY, still if it is alleged that the will is VOID be-cause
of PRETERITION (which is a matter of intrinsic validity), a probate
would be useless, if indeed there was a preterition, and no legacies or
devises are involved. Indeed, the authentication or probate of the will
decides no other questions than such as touch upon the capacity of
the testator, and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities
which the law prescribes for the validity of a will. It does not determine
nor even by implication prejudice the validity or efficacy of the
provisions; that may be impugned as being vicious or null,
notwithstand-ing its authentication. The questions relating to those
points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the will
has been authenticated. (Palacios v. Catimbang Palacios, L-12207,
Dec. 24, 1959). Similarly, it has been held that a deed of partition
approved in the course of settlement of estate proceedings CANNOT
BAR on the ground of res judicata an accion reivindicatoria over the
properties involved.
G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992
MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA
SAYSON-LIRIO, REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES and JUANA C.
BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON,
assisted by her husband, CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON
AND DORIBEL SAYSON, respondents.
At issue in this case s the status of the private respondents and their
capacity to inherit from their alleged parents and grandparents. The
petitioners deny them that right, asserting if for themselves to the
exclusion of all others.
The relevant genealogical facts are as follows.
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio,
Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November
10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had married
Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later,
on March 26, 1981. Their properties were left in the possession of
Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be
their children.
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together
with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition
and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. It
was docketed as Civil Case No. 1030 in Branch 13 of the Regional
Trial Court of Albay. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and
Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights to the disputed estate
as the decedents' lawful descendants.
On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own
complaint, this time for the accounting and partition of the intestate
estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four
surviving children. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1042 in the
Regional Trial Court of Albay, Branch 12. The complainants asserted
the defense they raised in Civil Case No. 1030, to wit, that Delia and
Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was the legitimate
daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled to inherit
Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of representation.
Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private respondents on
the basis of practically the same evidence.
Judge Rafael P. Santelices declared in his decision dated May 26,
1986, 1 that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted children of
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by virtue of the decree of adoption dated
March 9, 1967. 2 Doribel was their legitimate daughter as evidenced by
her birth certificate dated February 27, 1967. 3 Consequently, the three
children were entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of
representation.
In his decision dated September 30, 1986, 4 Judge Jose S. Sañez
dismissed Civil Case No. 1030, holding that the defendants, being the
legitimate heirs of Teodoro and Isabel as established by the
aforementioned evidence, excluded the plaintiffs from sharing in their
estate.
Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were
consolidated. In its own decision dated February 28, 1989, 5 the
respondent court disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 1030 (CA-G.R.
No. 11541), the appealed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED. In Civil case No. 1042 (CA-G.R. No.
12364), the appealed decision is MODIFIED in
that Delia and Edmundo Sayson are disqualified
from inheriting from the estate of the deceased
spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, but is
affirmed in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
That judgment is now before us in this petition for review by certiorari.
Reversal of the respondent court is sought on the ground that it
disregarded the evidence of the petitioners and misapplied the
pertinent law and jurisprudence when it declared the private
respondents as the exclusive heirs of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson.
The contention of the petitioners is that Delia and Edmundo were not
legally adopted because Doribel had already been born on February
27, 1967, when the decree of adoption was issued on March 9, 1967.
The birth of Doribel disqualified her parents from adopting. The
pertinent provision is Article 335 of the Civil Code, naming among
those who cannot adopt "(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated,
acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction."
Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue that Doribel herself is not
the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel but was in fact born to
one Edita Abila, who manifested in a petition for guardianship of the
child that she was her natural mother. 6
The inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent. The
petitioners seek to annul the adoption of Delia and Edmundo on the
ground that Teodoro and Isabel already had a legitimate daughter at
the time but in the same breath try to demolish this argument by
denying that Doribel was born to the couple.
On top of this, there is the vital question of timeliness. It is too late now
to challenge the decree of adoption, years after it became final and
executory. That was way back in 1967. 7 Assuming the the petitioners
were proper parties, what they should have done was seasonably
appeal the decree of adoption, pointing to the birth of Doribel that
disqualified Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and Edmundo.
They did not. In fact, they should have done this earlier, before the
decree of adoption was issued. They did not, although Mauricio
claimed he had personal knowledge of such birth.
As the respondent court correctly observed:
When Doribel was born on February 27, 1967, or
about TEN (10) days before the issuance of the
Order of Adoption, the petitioners could have
notified the court about the fact of birth of
DORIBEL and perhaps withdrew the petition or
perhaps petitioners could have filed a petition for
the revocation or rescission of the adoption
(although the birth of a child is not one of those
provided by law for the revocation or rescission of
an adoption). The court is of the considered
opinion that the adoption of the plaintiffs DELIA
and EDMUNDO SAYSON is valid, outstanding and
binding to the present, the same not having been
revoked or rescinded.
Not having any information of Doribel's birth to Teodoro and Isabel
Sayson, the trial judge cannot be faulted for granting the petition for
adoption on the finding inter alia that the adopting parents were not
disqualified.
A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their
challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally, as
in their action for partition, but in a direct proceeding frontally
addressing the issue.
The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite
jurisdictional facts exists, whether erroneous or
not, cannot be questioned in a collateral
proceeding, for a presumption arises in such
cases where the validity of the judgment is thus
attacked that the necessary jurisdictional facts
were proven [Freeman on Judgments, Vol. I, Sec.
350, pp. 719-720]. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case of Santos v. Aranzanso, 8 this Court declared:
Anent this point, the rulings are summed up in 2
American Jurisprudence, 2nd Series, Adoption,
Sec. 75, p. 922, thus:
An adoption order implies the finding of the necessary facts
and the burden of proof is on the party attacking it; it cannot
be considered void merely because the fact needed to show
statutory compliance is obscure. While a judicial
determination of some particular fact, such as the
abandonment of his next of kin to the adoption, may be
essential to the exercise of jurisdiction to enter the order of
adoption, this does not make it essential to the jurisdictional
validity of the decree that the fact be determined upon
proper evidence, or necessarily in accordance with the truth;
a mere error cannot affect the jurisdiction, and the
determination must stand until reversed on appeal, and
hence cannot be collaterally attacked. If this were not the
rule, the status of adopted children would always be
uncertain, since the evidence might not be the same at all
investigations, and might be regarded with different effect by
different tribunals, and the adoption might be held by one
court to have been valid, while another court would hold it to
have been of no avail. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the
trial courts as affirmed by the respondent court must be sustained.
Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one of
the prescribed means of recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code
and Article 172 of the Family Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress,
that the birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence 9 of filiation
and may be refuted by contrary evidence. However, such evidence is
lacking in the case at bar.
Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to
Edita Abila was understandbly suspect, coming as it did from an
interested party. The affidavit of Abila 10 denying her earlier statement
in the petition for the guardianship of Doribel is of course hearsay, let
alone the fact that it was never offered in evidence in the lower courts.
Even without it, however, the birth certificate must be upheld in line
with Legaspi v. Court of Appeals, 11where we ruled that "the evidentiary
nature of public documents must be sustained in the absence of
strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity."
Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the
impropriety of the present proceedings for that purpose. Doribel's
legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and
accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party.
The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil
Code . . . does not have this purely evidential
character. It serves a more fundamental purpose.
It actually fixes a civil status for the child born in
wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked
collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be
 impugned only in a direct action brought for that
purpose, by the proper parties, and within the
period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by
way of defense or as a collateral issue in another
action for a different purpose. . . . 12 (Emphasis
supplied.)
In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel, as the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and
Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to the
intestate estate of the deceased couple, conformably to the following
Article 979 of the Civil Code:
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their
descendants succeed the parents and other
ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age,
and even if they should come from different
marriages.
An adopted child succeeds to the property of the
adopting parents in the same manner as a
legitimate child.
obligation to share the estate of their parents with the petitioners. The
Court of Appeals was correct, however, in holding that only Doribel has
the right of representation in the inheritance of her grandparents'
intestate estate, the other private respondents being only the adoptive
children of the deceased Teodoro.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the
petitioners.
Salao, et al. v. Salao
L-26699, Mar. 16, 1976
FACTS: If a person dies intestate survived by a nephew (child of a
brother), a grandniece, and great grandnephews, who will inherit?
HELD: Only the nephew, since in the collateral lines, rep-resentation
(in intestate succession) takes place only in favor of the children of
brothers and sisters, whether they be of the full or half blood. (Art. 972,
Civil Code). The nephew excludes a grandniece or great
grandnephews. (Pavia v. Iturralde, 5 Phil. 176).

The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends

first to his children and grandchildren before it ascends to his parents
and thereafter spreads among his collateral relatives. It is also
supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring properties is to leave
them eventually to his children as a token of his love for them and as a
provision for their continued care even after he is gone from this earth.

Coming now to the right of representation, we stress first the following

pertinent provisions of the Civil Code:

Art. 970. Representation is a right created by

fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative
is raised to the place and the degree of the person
represented, and acquires the rights which the
latter would have if he were living or if he could
have inherited.

Art. 971. The representative is called to the

succession by the law and not by the person
represented. The representative does not succeed
the person represented but the one who the
person represented would have succeeded.

Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and

descendants of other children who are dead,
survive, the former shall inherit in their own right,
and the latter by right of representation.

There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and

thus the granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to
represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate
of her grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled to
the share her father would have directly inherited had he survived,
which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents' other
children. 13

But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and

Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total strangers. While it is
true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and
have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of
representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between
only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend
to the blood relatives of either party. 14

In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the
adopted children and Doribel as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro
Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive heirs and are under no