Banawa v. Mirano No.
Petitioners, not being the real “parties-in-interest” in the
L-24750, May 16, 1980
The rule with respect to reversion adoptiva prescribed in
Sec. 5, Rule 100, of the former Rules of Court applies only to property
that had been received by a judicially adopted child. Extrajudicial
adoption is not within the contemplation and spirit of the rule. It is an
elementary rule of construction that when the language of the law is
clear and unequivocal, the law must be taken to mean exactly what it
says.
[NOTE: This reserva adoptal is believed to have been
abolished by the Civil Code in view of the desire of the Code
Commission to abolish all reservas. As has been said
before, the retention of “reserva troncal” was not intended by
the Code. Besides, according to the Civil Code, “the
proceedings for adop-tion shall be governed by the Rules of
Court insofar as they are not in conflict with this Code.” (Art.
345). It follows therefore that all the substantive provisions
on adoption in the Rules of Court have been repealed by the
new Civil Code. HOWEVER, this reserva adoptal has been
REVIVED under Art. 39 of PD 603
Manuel v. Ferrer
63 SCAD 764
(1995)
Article 992 of the Civil Code enunciates what is so commonly referred
to in the rules on succession as the “principle of absolute separation
between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family.’’
When the law speaks of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces as
legal heirs of an illegitimate child, it refers to illegitimate brothers and
sisters as well as to the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of
such brothers and sisters.
FACTS:
The petitioners in this case were the legitimate children of
spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling. During his marriage with
Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital affair with Ursula Bautista, from
which Juan Manuel was born. Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of
Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In consideration of the marriage,
a donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land was registered in his
name. He would later buy two parcels and register the same under his
name. The couple were not blessed with a child of their own. Their
desire to have one impelled the spouses to take private respondent
Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so raised her as their own
“daughter”.
On 03 June 1980, Juan Manuel executed in favor of
Estanislao Manuel a Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro over a one-half
(1/2) portion of his land. Juan Manuel died intestate on 21 February
1990. Two years later, or on 04 February 1992, Esperanza Gamba
also passed away.
On 05 March 1992, a month after the death of Esperanza,
Modesta executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication claiming for herself
the three parcels of land Modesta executed in favor of her co-
respondent Estanislao Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim
over the unredeemed one-half (1/2) portion of the land that was sold to
the latter by Juan Manuel under the 1980 Deed of Sale Con Pacto de
Retro. These acts of Modesta apparently did not sit well with
petitioners. In a complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court, the
petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the instruments.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners had the legal personality to
contest the actions of Modesta.
RULING:
case, had neither the standing nor the cause of action to initiate the
complaint.
Although inn her answer to the complaint, Modesta admitted
that she was not an intestate heir of Juan Manuel because she was
adopted without the benefit of formal or judicial adoption and therefore
was neither a compulsory nor a legal heir, the court still reiterated the
following rules:
a. where the illegitimate child had half-brothers who were
legitimate, the latter had no right to the former’s inheritance
b. the legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot
succeed from her illegitimate child
c. a natural child cannot represent his natural father in the
succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent
d. the natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her
deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of her natural father
e. an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from
the legitimate children and relatives of his father
DIAZ v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
150 SCRA 645
FACTS:
Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. De
Santero who together with Felisa’s mother Juliana were the only
legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila
Asuncion. Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents
Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. De Santero. Pablo Santero
died in 1973 and at the time of his death was survived by his mother
Simona Santero snd his six minor natural children.
Private respondent filed a petition praying among other
things, that the corresponding letters of Administration be issued in her
favor and that she be appointed as special administratrix of the
properties of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. Judge
Jose Raval in his Order declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the sole
legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Petitioner Anselma Diaz, as guardian of her minor children,
filed her “Opposition and Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti Jardin from
further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate
estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate
estate of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners herein as illegitimate children of Pablo
Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of
representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
RULING:
No. Since the hereditary conflict refers solely to the intestate
estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, who is the legitimate mother
of Pablo Santero, the applicable law is the provision of Article 992 of
the Civil Code.
Pablo Santero is not an illegitimate child. On the other hand,
the petitioners are the illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Thus,
petitioners cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in the
succession of the latter to the intestate estate of his legitimate mother
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, because of the barrier provided for
under Article 992 of the New Civil Code.
DIAZ v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
182 SCRA 427
FACTS: The decision of the Second Division of the Court in a case of
Anselma Diaz, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., and its
Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration, are being
challenged in this Second Motion for Reconsideration.
The present controversy is confined solely to the intestate estate of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero . Petitioners claim that the
amendment of Articles 941 and 943 of the Old Civil Code by Articles
990 and 992 of the New Civil Code constitute a substantial and not
merely a formal change, which grants illegitimate children certain
successional rights. A careful evaluation of the New Civil Code
provisions, especially Articles 902, 982, 989, and 990, claimed by
petitioners to have conferred illegitimate children the right to represent
their parents in the inheritance of their legitimate grandparents, would
in point of fact reveal that such right to this time does not exist. The
petitioners further argue that the consistent doctrine adopted by this
Court which identically held that an illegitimate child has no right to
succeed ab intestate the legitimate father of his natural parent is
already abrogated by the amendments made by the New Civil Code
and thus cannot be made to apply to the instant case.
ISSUE: Who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero —
her niece Felisa Pamuti-Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural
children of Pablo Santero)?
RULING: Felisa Pamuti Jardin is the sole legitimate heir to the
intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. The word
“relatives” should be construed in its general application. According to
Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more
restrictive sense than it is used and intended is not warranted by any
rule of interpretation. Thus, the word “relatives” is a general term and
when used in a statute it embraces not only collateral relatives but also
all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context indicates
that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense — which, as
already discussed earlier , is not so in the case at bar. In the light of the
foregoing, the Court concludes that until Article 992 is suppressed or at
least amended to clarify the term “relatives,” there is no other
alternative but to apply the law literally.
LEONARDO v. COURT OF APPEALS
120 Phil 890
FACTS: Francisca Reyes who died intestate on July 12, 1942 was
survived by two (2) daughters, Maria and Silvestra Cailles and a
grandson, Sotero Leonardo, the son of her daughter, Pascuala Cailles
who predeceased her. Sotero Leonardo died in 1944, while Silvestra
Cailles died in 1949 without any issue. On October 29, 1964, petitioner
Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the son of the late Sotero
Leonardo, filed a complaint seeking, among others, that he be
declared as one of the lawful heirs of the deceased Francisca Reyes,
entitled to one-half share in the estate of said deceased jointly with
Maria Cailles. In her Answer, Maria Cailles asserted exclusive
ownership over the subject properties and alleged that petitioner is an
illegitimate child who cannot succeed by right of representation. For his
part, the other defendant, private respondent James Bracewell,
claimed that said properties are now his by virtue of a valid and legal
deed of sale which Maria Cailles had subsequently executed in his
favor. These properties were allegedly mortgaged to respondent Rural
Bank of Paranaque, Inc. sometime in September 1963. After hearing
on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the
petitioner. From said judgment, private respondents appealed to the
Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the trial court, thereby
dismissing petitioner’s complaint.
ISSUE: Can Leonardo, being a great grandson, inherit based on the
evidence he presented in court?
RULING: Carefully going over the evidence, we believe that the trial
judge misinterpreted the evidence as to the identification of the lands in
question. These parcels of land now being sought by the plaintiff are
the same parcels subject of these deeds. The first property
(Deposorio) was bought in 1908 by Maria Cailles under a deed of sale.
After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles paid the realty taxes
starting from 1918 up to 1948. Thereafter as she and her son Narciso
Bracewell, left for Nueva Ecija, Francisca Reyes managed the property
and paid the realty tax of the land. However, for unexplained reasons,
she paid and declared the same in her own name. Because of this,
plaintiff decided to run after this property, erroneously thinking that as
the great grandson of Francisca Reyes, he had some proprietary right
over the same. The second parcel was purchased by Maria Cailles in
1917 under a deed of sale. After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles
likewise paid the realty tax in 1917 and continued paying the same up
to 1948. Thereafter when she and her son, Narciso Bracewell,
established their residence in Nueva Ecija, Francisco Reyes
administered the property and like in the first case, declared in 1949
the property in her own name. Thinking that the property is the
property of Francisca Reyes, plaintiff filed the instant complaint,
claiming a portion thereof as the same allegedly represents the share
of his father.
Going to the issue of filiation, plaintiff claims that he is the son of
Sotero Leonardo, the son of one of the daughters (Pascuala) of
Francisca Reyes. He further alleges that since Pascuala predeceased
Francisca Reyes, and that his father, Sotero, who subsequently died in
1944, survived Francisca Reyes, plaintiff can consequently succeed to
the estate of Francisca Reyes by right of representation. In support of
his claim, plaintiff submitted in evidence his alleged birth certificate
showing that his father is Sotero Leonardo, married to Socorro Timbol,
his alleged mother. However, this piece of evidence does not in any
way lend credence to his tale. This is because the name of the child
described in the birth certificate is not that of the plaintiff but a certain
‘Alfredo Leonardo’ who was born on September 13, 1938 to Sotero
Leonardo and Socorro Timbol. Other than his bare allegation, plaintiff
did not submit any durable evidence showing that the ‘Alfredo
Leonardo’ mentioned in the birth certificate is no other than he himself.
Thus, plaintiff failed to prove his filiation which is a fundamental
requisite in this action where he is claiming to be an heir in the
inheritance in question. Even if it is true that petitioner is the child of
Sotero Leonardo, still he cannot, by right of representation, claim a
share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca Reyes considering
that he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he
was born on September 13, 1938, his alleged putative father and
mother were not yet married, and what is more, his alleged father’s first
marriage was still subsisting.
TOMAS CORPUS vs RAFAEL CORPUS
G.R. No. L-22469
October 23, 1978
FACTS:
Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila on April 20, 1939 at the age of
seventy-seven years. His will dated August 29, 1934 was probated in
the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 54863.
The decree of probate was affirmed in this Court's 1941 decision
in Corpus vs. Yangco, 73 Phil. 527.
Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest
relatives were (1) his half brother, Luis R. Yangco, (2) his half sister,
Paz Yangco, the wife of Miguel Ossorio (3) Amalia Corpus, Jose A. V.
Corpus, and Ramon L. Corpus, the children of his half brother, Pablo
Corpus, and (4) Juana (Juanita) Corpus, the daughter of his half
brother Jose Corpus. Juanita died in October, 1944 at Palauig,
Zambales.
Teodoro R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona
Arguelles, the widow of Tomas Corpus. Before her union with Luis
Rafael Yangco, Ramona had begotten five children with Tomas
Corpus, two of whom were the aforenamed Pablo Corpus and Jose
Corpus.
On October 5, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita corpus,
filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover her
supposed share in Yangco intestate estate. He alleged in his complaint
that the dispositions in his Yangcos will sing perpetual prohibitions
upon alienation rendered it void under article 785 of the old Civil Code
and that the 1949 partition is invalid and, therefore, the decedent's
estate should be distributed according to the rules on intestacy.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioners has cause of action for the recovery of hereditary
share of Teodoro Yangco.
HELD:
Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was
illegitimate and since Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose
Corpus, himself a legitimate child, we hold that appellant Tomas
Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed
hereditary share of his mother, Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in
Yangco's estate. Juanita Corpus was not a legal heir of Yangco
because there is no reciprocal succession between legitimate and
illegitimate relatives.
Article 943 "prohibits all successory reciprocity mortis causa
between legitimate and illegitimate relatives" 16 Sanchez Roman, Civil
Code, pp. 996-997 cited in Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279,
287. See 16 Scaevola Codigo Civil, 4th Ed., 455-6).
The rule in article 943 is now found in article 992 of the Civil
Code which provides that "an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner
from the illegitimate child"
Daya Maria Tol-Noquera v. Hon. Adriano R. Villamor and Diosdado
Tol GR 84250, July 20, 1992
FACTS:
Questioned in this action is the dismissal of a petition filed by Daya
Maria-Tol Noquera for appointment as administratrix of the property of
the absentee Remigio Tol. In Special Proceedings No. P-056, which
was filed in Dec. 1986, Daya Maria-Tol alleged that she was the
acknowledged natural child of Remigio Tol, who had been missing
since 1984. She claimed that a certain Diosdado Tol had fraudulently
secured a free patent over Remigio’s property and had obtained title
thereto in his name. She was seeking the administration of the
absentee’s estate in order that she could recover the said prop-erty.
The petition was opposed by Diosdado Tol, who argued that Daya
Maria Tol was not an acknowledged natural child of the absentee and
that the property sought to be administered was covered by an original
certificate of title issued in his name. On Mar. 31, 1987, the trial court
dismissed the petition on the ground that it was a collateral attack on a
Torrens title. The court also declared in effect that it was useless to
appoint an administrator in view of the claim of a third person that he
was the owner of the absentee’s property. The petitioner’s mo-tion for
reconsideration having been denied, she filed a notice of appeal with
this Court on June 4, 1984. However, inasmuch as only questions of
law were involved, we resolved to require the petitioner to seek review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court within 15 days from
notice.
It is argued that the original petition in the trial court was not intended
as a collateral attack on a Torrens Title; hence, Art. 389 of the Civil
Code was not applicable. The pri-vate respondent, on the other hand,
contends that since the petitioner claims she is an illegitimate child of
Remigio Tol, she is prohibited under Art. 992 of the Civil Code from
inher-iting ab intestato from the relatives of her father. The private
respondent likewise questions the necessity of her appointment for the
purpose only of having the title annulled. He adds that in view of her
allegations of fraud, she should have sued for the annulment of the title
within a period of one year, which had already expired. Lastly, the
decision of the trial court had already become final and executory
because 76 days had already elapsed from the date of receipt of the
said decision on May 21, 1987, to the date the petition was filed before
this Court on Aug. 5, 1987.
HELD:
A study of the record reveals that the lower court was rather hasty in
dismissing the petition. As we see it, the petition was not a collateral
attack on a Torrens title. The pe-titioner did say there was a need to
appoint an administrator to prevent the property from being usurped,
but this did not amount to a collateral attack on the title. The alleged
fraudulent issuance of title was mentioned as a justification for her
appoint-ment as administrator. But there was nothing in the petition to
indicate that the petitioner would attack the title issued to Diosdado in
the same proceeding. In fact, the petitioner declared that whatever
remedy she might choose would be pursued in another venue, in a
proceeding entirely distinct and separate from her petition for
appointment as administratrix. Regarding the Torrens certificate of title
to the disputed property which was presented to defeat the petitioner’s
appointment, we feel that the position of trial court was rather
ambivalent. For while relying on such title to justify the dismissal of the
petition, it suggested at the same time that it could be attacked as long
as this was not done in the proceeding before it. The private
respondent’s argu-ments that the petitioner cannot inherit ab intestato
from the legitimate parents of the absentee is immaterial to this case.
Her disqualification as an heir to her supposed grandparents does not
inhibit her from petitioning for a declaration of absence or to be
appointed as an administratrix of the absentee’s estate.
It is not necessary that a declaration of absence be made in a
proceeding separate from and prior to a petition for ad-ministration.
Thus, the court may declare that the petition to declare the husband an
absentee and the petition to place the management of the conjugal
properties in the hands of the wife can be combined and adjudicated in
the same proceeding. The purpose of the cited rules is the protection
of the interests and property of the absentee, not of the administrator.
Thus, the question of whether the administrator may inherit the prop-
erty to be administered is not controlling. What is material is whether
she is one of those allowed by law to seek the declara-tion of absence
of Remigio Tol and whether she is competent to be appointed as
administratrix of his estate. The issue of whether or not the property
titled to Diosdado Tol is really owned by him should be resolved in
another proceeding. The right of Daya Maria Tol to be appointed
administratrix cannot be denied outright by reason alone of such issue.
Even if it be assumed that the title obtained by Diosdado Tol is already
indefeasible because of the lapse of the one-year period for at-tacking
it on the ground of fraud, there are still other remedies available to one
who is unjustly deprived of his property. One of these is a claim for
reconveyance, another is a complaint for damages. The petitioner can
avail herself of such remedies if she is appointed administratrix of the
estate of the absentee.
Finally, we find that the appeal was perfected seasonably. Notice of
appeal was filed on June 4, 1987, within the 15-day extension of the
period to appeal as granted by this Court in its resolution dated July 8,
1987. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. This case is hereby
REMANDED to the court of origin for determination of the legal
personality of Daya Maria-Tol to petition the declaration of Remigio
Tol’s absence and of her competence to be appointed as administratrix
of his estate.
G.R. No. L-29288 November 29, 1976
JOVENCIO ARCENAS, NEMESIO ACAIN, and ROSA
DIONGSON, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO D. CINCO, Presiding Judge, Branch VIII, Court of
First Instance of Cebu, and TEODORA VDA. DE
ARCENAS, respondents.
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, petitioners seek the
nullification of the Order of respondent Judge dated May 18, 1968,
dismissing the appeal of petitioners in Civil Case No. P118, 1 and the
issuance of an order for said respondent to approve the Record on
Appeal.
On August 11, 1966, respondent Teodora Vda. de Arcenas, widow of
the deceased Alfonso Arcenas, filed an action (Civil Case No. P-118)
with the Court of First Instance of Cebu against Jovencio Arcenas,
Nemesio Acain and Rosa Diongson for the partial annulment of certain
deeds of pacto de retro and or sale executed by her only son, Jovencio
Arcenas, in favor of Spouses Nemesio Acain and Rosa Diongson
insofar as it encroached upon her rights as co-owner; for the return to
her of the possession of the portions of the property taken from her by
defendants, the accounting by defendants of her share of the produce,
and the partition of the properties by the segregation of the portion
belonging to her.
On February 24, 1967, the parties in the aforementioned civil case
submitted a "Stipulation of Facts" stating in substance that Alfonso
Arcenas died intestate on March 4, 1962, leaving as his heirs his wife,
Teodora Vda. de Arcenas, and his only son, Jovencio Arcenas; that the
deceased left to his heirs three (3) real properties, namely: (a) a parcel
of agricultural land in Cabangbang, Bantayan, Cebu, with an area of
77,250 square meters, more or less; (b) a parcel of agricultural land in
Sillon, Bantayan, Cebu, containing an area of 18,375 square meters,
more or less; and (c) a parcel of land in the Poblacion of Bantayan,
Cebu, containing an area of 235 square meters, more or less; that the
parcels of land in (a) Cabangbang and (b) Sillon were sold, with right of
repurchase, by Jovencio Arcenas to Nemesio Acain and Rosa
Diongson sometime on July 5, 1963 and June 26, 1963, respectively,
without the knowledge and conformity of Teodora Vda. de Arcenas;
that subsequently, on March 23, 1966, Jovencio Arcenas executed a
deed of absolute sale of the agricultural land in Sillon in favor of
Nemesio Acain and Rosa Diongson who, thereafter, planted thereon
about 400 to 500 coconut trees "more or less one year old" aside from
fencing the said parcel; that from the date of the pacto de retro sale
executed by Jovencio, Teodora Vda. de Arcenas has not received her
share of the produce of said property; that Teodora Vda. de Arcenas
waives her right to the residential lot in the Poblacion of Bantayan in
favor of her son, Jovencio, but "seeks to enforce her rights as heir" on
the properties in Cabangbang and Sillon; that Jovencio Arcenas,
Nemesio Acain and Rosa Diongson agreed" to return voluntarily the
share of said Teodora Vda. de Arcenas in the properties" situated at
Cabangbang and Sillon, Bantayan, Cebu; that the parties agreed "to
partition the properties" situated in Cabangbang and Sillon, "submitting
for the decision of the Court the issue in the interpretation of Article
996, New Civil Code, as to the share of the surviving spouse Teodora
Vda. de Arcenas", and finally, all the parties waived all their demands
"for accounting, reimbursement of improvements introduced, and any
or all claims for damages, attorney's fees or costs."
To assist the court in its determination of the share of the surviving
spouse, the parties submitted their respective memoranda. In her
memorandum, Teodora Vda. de Arcenas contended that in view of the
ruling of this Court in Santillon v. Miranda, 2 the surviving spouse is
entitled to a share equivalent to one-half (1/2) of the estate, while her
son, Jovencio Arcenas, is entitled to the other half, under Article 996 of
the New Civil Code. On the other hand, the herein petitioners claimed
that since the surviving spouse survived with one legitimate son, she is
entitled to only one-fourth (1/4) of the entire estate, while her son is
entitled to three-fourths (3/4) thereof.
On the basis of the afore-mentioned stipulation and memoranda of the
parties, the court a quo, on June 9, 1967, rendered judgment declaring
the plaintiff, Teodora Vda. de Arcenas, as "the lawful owner in fee
simple of an undivided one-half share of the land described in
paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b) of the afore-quoted Stipulation of Facts;
declaring Jovencio Arcenas the exclusive owner of the land described
in paragraph 2(c) of the Stipulation of Facts above-quoted; ordering
defendants Nemesio Acain and Rosa Diongson to deliver to the
plaintiff the undivided one-half portions of the two parcels of land just
described which correspondingly pertain to the surviving spouse, but
erroneously ceded by the son, Jovencio, to the Acains." It also ordered
the parties to partition the agricultural lands in Cabangbang and Sillon
and to "submit the corresponding deed of partition to the Court for its
approval."
On September 16, 1967, Teodora Vda. de Arcenas, claiming that the
decision of June 9, 1967 had become final, moved for the issuance of
a Writ of Execution. This was opposed by petitioners who contended
that the decision is interlocutory as it did not finally dispose of the
action but left something for the parties to do, that is, to partition the
property and submit the corresponding agreement of partition to the
court for its approval. They likewise prayed that the decision be
modified in order that the land situated in Sillon, which was sold to the
spouses Nemesio Acain and Rosa Diongson and wherein they have
introduced improvements, be awarded to them, while the land in
Cabangbang be given in its entirety to Teodora Vda. de Arcenas. This
was opposed by the widow, hence, on September 30, 1967, the
respondent Judge appointed Municipal Judge Marcelino M. Escalona
of Madridejos Cebu as Commissioner to partition the properties and to
submit the project of partition to the court for approval.
In his report dated November 29, 1967, Commissioner Escalona
recommended to the court that, since the Sillon property, although
much smaller, has been improved by the Acain spouses by planting
thereon 150 coconut trees, said property should be awarded to them in
full, while the Cabangbang land, which is much larger, more
productive, and with higher market value, should be awarded to
Teodora Vda. de Arcenas. This was opposed by Teodora Vda. de
Arcenas, who insisted that it would modify the judgment which ordered
a physical division into two parts each of the two parcels, and
consequently, the court a quo, on January 6, 1967, directed the
Commissioner to make a "physical division of each of the two
properties in the presence of the parties or their representatives" and
to make the necessary recommendation as to which half should
pertain to Jovencio and which half should pertain to the widow.
Thereafter, the Commissioner submitted his second report, informing
the court that he had divided the two parcels into two portions, to wit:
(1) Cabangbang A, which is the northern portion of the property, with
an area of 3.7080 hectares, with five (5) bamboo groves, and
Cabangbang B, which is the southern portion, with an area of 4.0170
hectares, containing six (6) bamboo groves; and (2) Sillon A, which is
the northern half of this land with an area of .91875 hectare, containing
150 coconut trees; and Sillon B, or the southern half of the same
property, with an area of .91875 hectare and having 150 coconut trees
planted thereon. He, however, opined that it would be inequitable to
award one-half of the Cabangbang property to the Acain spouses
considering that the Cabangbang property has been mortgaged by
Jovencio Arcenas to the Bantayan Rural Bank to secure a loan of
P2,000.00, with the knowledge and consent of his mother, Teodora,
and the same is about to be foreclosed. Moreover, it would be unfair to
deprive the Acain spouses of the Sillon property since they have
introduced in good faith valuable improvements thereon by planting
about 300 coconut trees. This notwithstanding, the court a quo, on
March 27, 1968, issued an Order awarding Cabangbang A and Sillon B
to Teodora Vda. de Arcenas, while Cabangbang B and Sillon A were
awarded to Jovencio Arcenas.
On April 25, 1967, petitioners filed with the respondent court their
Notice of Appeal, stating that they were appealing the trial court's
Orders dated January 6, 1968 and March 27, 1968 to this Court "on
questions of law". To show that the appeal was filed within the
reglementary period, they stated that they received the Order of
January 6, 1968 on January 22, 1968, while that of March 27, 1968
was received by them through their counsel on April 4, 1968. After the
filing of the Record on Appeal, respondent court, on May 18, 1968,
issued an Order dismissing the appeal of petitioners on the ground that
the decision of June 9, 1967 had already become final and executory
and that the orders sought to be reviewed are merely orders issued to
implement the afore-mentioned decision. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied by the trial court on June 20, 1968, hence,
this petition for certiorari and mandamus.
Submitted for resolution is the issue of whether or not the decision of
respondent court in Civil Case No. P-118, dated June 9, 1967, is
immediately executory and, therefore, not appealable.
There is no question that if the parties to the litigation submitted a
compromise agreement to the court for approval and in the absence of
opposition, the court renders judgment strictly in accordance with such
agreement, the judgment rendered is not appealable. It is immediately
executory, except that in case a motion to set aside the compromise on
the ground of fraud, an order of the court denying such motion may be
appealed. 3 The judgment rendered has the authority of res
judicata from the moment it was rendered and is conclusive upon the
parties and their privies. 4
We find, however, that the decision of June 9, 1967 was not a
judgment based on a judicial compromise but one based on an agreed
statement of facts. A "compromise" under Article 2028 of the Civil Code
is a contract whereby the parties in interest, by making reciprocal
concessions, avoid a litigation or terminate one already commenced. It
is likewise defined as "an agreement between two or more persons,
who, for preventing or putting an end to a lawsuit, adjust their
difficulties by mutual consent in the manner which they agree on, and
which every one of them prefers to the hope of gaining, balanced by
the danger of losing." 5
While the parties in the "Stipulation of Facts" were in agreement that
Teodora Vda. de Arcenas had a share in the said properties, they were
in disagreement as to the extent of the share of said widow. As a
matter of fact, in the respective memoranda of the parties, there was a
marked disparity in the view of said parties as to the share of the
surviving spouse, the widow insisting on her claim to one-half (1/2) of
the estate, while the other party was willing to concede to her only one-
fourth (1/4) of said estate. The agreed statement of facts submitted by
the parties did not, therefore, put an end to the lawsuit because it did
not definitely determine which specific portion of the property sold by
Jovencio Arcenas to the Acain spouses should be returned to the
surviving spouse, which was the main purpose of the action instituted
by the latter.
Moreover, Civil Case No. P-118 is also an action of partition, hence,
the Order of the court of June 9, 1967, directing the partition of the
properties and requiring the parties "to submit the corresponding deed
of partition to the Court for its approval", could not be final. It left
something more to be done in the trial court for the complete
disposition of the case, such as appointment of the commissioner and
submission by the latter of his report which must be set for hearing. It
is only after said hearing that the court may render a final judgment
finally disposing of the action. 6 As a matter of fact, the court a quo,
after the parties were unable to agree on the partition, had to appoint a
commissioner to make the partition. Even assuming that the judgment
terminated the action with respect to the claim of the widow for a one-
half (1/2) share in the estate, there is no question that the Order of the
court of March 27, 1968, approving the project of partition even when
considered as incident to the judgment, could still be appealable.
According to Moran, "when the terms of the judgment are not entirely
clear and there is room for interpretation and the interpretation given is
wrong in the opinion of the defeated party, the latter should be allowed
to appeal from said order so that the appellate tribunal may pass upon
the legality and correctness of the said order." 6*
We note, however, that since its inception, this case has been pending
in the courts for more than ten (10) years. It appears in the
manifestation of the respondents that Teodora Vda. de Arcenas is
already 86 years of age. It cannot be denied that if petitioners continue
with their appeal, there will be further delays in its termination. It is in
the milieu of such circumstance that this Court finds it relevant to make
certain observations, in the hope that on the basis thereof, the parties
themselves, with the assistance of the respondent court, may be able
to resolve their differences in a fair and equitable manner. Thus, on the
question regarding the share of the surviving spouse in the estate of
the deceased, We note that the trial court was correct in declaring that
Teodora Vda. de Arcenas is entitled to one-half (1/2) of the estate. This
is in accordance with the rule enunciated by this Court in Santillon v.
Miranda, supra, to the effect that when intestacy occurs, a surviving
spouse concurring with only one legitimate child of the deceased is
entitled to one-half (1/2) of the estate of the deceased spouse under
Article 996 of the Civil Code. The afore-mentioned court was,
nevertheless, in error in insisting that each and every parcel should be
physically divided and apportioned to the parties in the manner
indicated. Section 4 of Rule 69 of the Rules specifically requires that in
making the partition, the commissioners shall (1) view and examine the
real estate, after due notice to the parties, to attend at such view and
examination; (2) to hear the parties as to their preference in the portion
of the property to be set apart to them and the comparative value
thereof; and (3) to set apart the same to the several parties in such lots
or parcels as will be most advantageous and equitable, having due
regard to the improvements, situation and quality of the different parts
thereof.
According to the report of the Commissioner, 150 coconut trees
planted by Nemesio Acain on the Sillon parcel, and this land is
adjacent to the Acain's property. On the other hand, according to the
Commissioner, one-half (1/2) portion of the Cabangbang parcel cannot
possibly compensate for the loss which Acain will suffer by losing one-
half (1/2) of the Sillon parcel since the Cabangbang land is mortgaged
to the Bantayan Rural Bank by Jovencio and "will probably be
foreclosed any time now for the loan is now due, and the prospect of
the loan to be paid is bleak." These circumstances should have been
carefully considered.
It appears to be the settled rule that in an action for partition, where it is
practicable to make a division of the property, "the generally if not
universally recognized rule is that a court of equity, on ascertaining that
one of two or more tenants in common has made permanent and
valuable improvements on the property involved, will allot to him that
portion on which the improvements are located, or so much thereof as
represents his share of the whole tract." 7Thus, "in keeping with the
familiar principle of equity jurisprudence requiring that one who seeks
equity must do equity, the rule has been generally adopted that a court
of equity should take improvements into account when decreeing
partition, and should award to the cotenant in possession who has
necessarily and in good faith improved the common property and
enhanced its value at his own cost such equitable compensation as will
leave only the value of the estate without the improvements to be
divided among the tenants in common." 8 Indeed, the rule requires that
the properties should be partitioned in a manner that would be most
advantageous and equitable to the parties, having "due regard to the
improvements, situation and quality of the different parts" of the
properties subject of the partition.
ACCORDINGLY, certiorari is granted and respondent Court's Order of
May 18, 1968 is hereby set aside, with costs against the private
respondent.
Arcenas v. Cinco
L-29288, Nov. 29, 1976
FACTS: A man died intestate leaving his wife and one legitimate child.
Distribute the man’s estate.
HELD: The wife gets 1/2 and the legitimate child gets the other half.
(See also Santillon v. Miranda, June 30, 1965; Art. 996, Civil Code).
Del Rosario vs. Conanan
G.R. No. L-37903
March 30, 1977
Topic/Doctrine: Share of Surviving Spouse Concurring With
Legitimate Ascendants and Illegitimate Children (Article 1000 in
relation to Article 343)
FACTS:
On November 13, 1972, petitioner filed with the court subject of which
is the estate left by her late son, Felix L. del Rosario, who died in a
plane crash on September 12, 1969 at Antipolo, Rizal.
The oppositor admits that petitioner is the legitimate mother of the late
Felix L. Del Rosario. The latter admits that oppositor Dorotea Otera del
Rosario, is the legitimate surviving wife of the deceased Felix Del
Rosario. Petitioner also admits that Marilou Del Rosario, is the legally
adopted child of the late Felix and Dorotea Otera del Rosario. They are
the only surviving nearest relatives of Felix(deceased). A petition for
summary settlement is allowed under the provision of the rules of
court, the same rule specifically limits the action to estates the gross
value of which does not exceed P10, 000.00. In the instant petition,
however, clearly alleges that the value of the real properties alone left
by the deceased Felix amounts to P33,000.00 which is obviously over
and above the value of the estate allowed under the rules. The action
taken by the petitioner construed as one filed under an intestate
proceeding as the requirements provided by law for the same has not
been complied with.
The contention of the petitioner that Article 343 is applicable in the
instant case where it does not exclude the surviving parent of the
deceased adopter, not only because a contrary view would defeat the
intent of the framers of the law, but also because in intestate
succession, where legitimate parents or ascendants concur with the
surviving spouse of the deceased, the latter does not necessarily
exclude the former from the inheritance.
The respondents countered petitioner’s record on appeal violates the
material data rule in that it does not state when the notice of appeal
and appeal bond were filed with the lower court in disregard of the
requirement of Section 6, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court that the record
on appeal must contain such data as will show that the appeal was
perfected on time. Further, the petitioner not being included as
intestate heir of the deceased cannot be considered as a co-owner of
or have any right over the properties sought to be partitioned and
under the provisions of Section 1, Rule 69 in relation to Section 2, Rule
3 of the Revised Rules of Court, such action must be commenced or
instituted by the party in interest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the legitimate mother is included as intestate heir to be
considered as Co-owner with the surviving spouse and adopted child
of Felix Del Rosario (deceased) over the properties sought to be
partitioned
HELD:
YES. As provided under Article 343 of the Civil Code in relation to
Article 1000 should apply in resolving their hereditary rights. Under
Article 343, an adopted child surviving with legitimate parents of the
deceased adopter, has the same successional rights as an
acknowledged natural child, which is comprehended in the term
“illegitimate children”. Consequently, the respective charges of the
surviving spouse, ascendant and adopted child should be determined
by Article 1000 of the New Civil Code, which reads: “Art. 1000.—If
legitimate ascendants, the surviving spouse and illegitimate children
are left, the ascendants shall be entitled to one-half of the
inheritance, and the other half shall be divided between the surviving
spouse and the illegitimate children so that such widow or widower
shall have one-fourth of the estate, the illegitimate children the
other fourth.”Thus, Dorotea Otera del Rosario, the legitimate
surviving wife, shall be entitled to ¼, Marilou Del Rosario, the legally
adopted child gets ¼ , and the legitimate mother ½ . The adopted child
in such case gets the rights of an acknowledged natural child (Articles
343, 341, and 1000 of the Civil Code), not of a legitimate child,
otherwise the legitimate ascendant (the mother) would be excluded.
The presence of adopted child does not exclude the legitimate parent
or ascendant.
Bacayo vs. Borromeo
G.R. No. L- 19382
August 31, 1965
TOPIC/DOCTRINE: Laws of Succession, a decedent’s uncle and
aunts may not succeed abintastado so long as the nephews and
nieces of the decedent survived, willing and qualified to succeed.
FACTS:
Melodia Ferraris died without a surviving direct descendant,
ascendant, or spouse but survived by her aunt Filomena, nephews and
nieces who were children of Melodia’s only brother who predeceased
the decedent. These two classes of heirs sought to participate in the
estate of Melodia. The trial court ruled that the nephews and nieces
shall succeed by right of representation and excluded Filomena.
ISSUE:
Who should inherit the estate of the decedent?
HELD:
Our laws of succession, a decedent’s uncles and aunts may not
succeed ab intestado so long as the nephews and nieces are willing
and qualified to succeed.
G.R. No. L-28032 September 24, 1986
FRANCISCA TIOCO DE PAPA, MANUEL TIOCO, NICOLAS TIOCO
and JANUARIO PAPA, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
DALISAY TONGKO CAMACHO, PRIMO TONGKO and
GODOFREDO CAMACHO, defendants-appellants.
FACTS:
This case, which involves the application of Article 891 of the Civil
Code on reservatroncal,which was submitted for judgement.
Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and the plaintiffs, Francisco
Tioco de Papa, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, are legitimate
relatives, plaintiffs being said defendant's grandaunt and granduncles.
Plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. Tongo-Camacho have as a
common ancestor the late BalbinoTioco (who had a sister by the name
of RomanaTioco), father of plaintiffs and great grandfather of
defendant.RomanaTioco during her lifetime gratuitously donated four
(4) parcels of land to her niece ToribiaTioco (legitimate sister of
plaintiffs).
ToribiaTioco died intestate in l9l5, survived by her husband,
EustacioDizon, and their two legitimate children, Faustino Dizon and
Trinidad Dizon (mother of defendant Dalisay D, Tongko-Camacho) and
leaving the afore-mentioned four (4) parcels of land as the inheritance
of her said two children in equal pro-indiviso shares.
BalbinoTioco died intestate, owning 3 parcel of land and survived by
his legitimate children by his wife Marciana Felix (among them
plaintiffs) and legitimate grandchildren Faustino Dizon and Trinidad
Dizon.
Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and without issue, leaving his
one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share in the seven (7) parcels of land above-
mentioned to his father, EustacioDizon, as his sole intestate heir, who
received the said property subject to a reservatroncal.
Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her rights and interests in
the parcels of land abovementioned were inherited by her only
legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho, subject to the
usufructuary right of her surviving husband, defendant Primo Tongko.
Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal advice, the other
half of the said seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned by virtue of
the reservatroncal imposed thereon upon the death of Faustino Dizon
and under the laws on intestate succession; but the plaintiffs, also
upon legal advice, oppose her said claim because they claim three-
fourths (3/4) of the one-half pro-indiviso interest in said parcel of land,
which interest was inherited by EustacioDizon from Faustino Dizon, or
three-eights (3/8) of the said parcels of land, by virtue of their being
also third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon. the lower Court declared
the plaintiffs Francisco Tioco, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, as well
as the defendant DalisayTongko-Camacho, entitled, as reservatarios,
to one-half of the seven parcels of land in dispute, in equal proportions.
ISSUE:
Whether the plaintiffs, as third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon are
reservatarios
HELD:
Had the reversionary property passed directly from thepraepositus,
there is no doubt that the plaintiffs-appellees would have been
excluded by the defendant-appellant under the rules of intestate
succession. There is no reason why a different result should obtain
simply because "the transmission of the property was delayed by the
interregnum of the reserva;" 6i.e., the property took a "detour" through
an ascendant-thereby giving rise to the reservation before its
transmission to the reservatario.

Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the
defendant-appellant DalisayTongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety
of the reversionary property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs-appellees.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower Court is reversed

and set aside and the complaint is dismissed, with costs against the
plaintiffs-appellants.

SO ORDERED.