Volume 27 Number 10/11 2001 5

The Islamic Model of Administration: Strategy,

Implementation and Implications
by Dr. Muhammad A. Al-Buraey, Director, Center for Economics & Management Sys-
tems, Research Institute, KFUPM, Dhahran

Abstract

A model of an Islamic administration is presented in this paper. The emphasis however is

placed on the strategy, implementation, implications and possible emergent problems
arising from its implementation in the contemporary Muslim world. The author has taken
upon himself to answer some tough questions such as: How can plans and programs be
implemented? What are the formal and informal ways? What are the implications as to
what must be changed and who are the change agents? What is the impact of such
changes on the societies involved? These and other questions make up the bulk of this pa-
per.

Objective

This paper deals with the strategy, implementation, implications and problems and pros-
pects of the Islamic model of administrative development in the contemporary Muslim
world. How can plans and programs be implemented? What are the informal and formal
methods of implementation? What are the implications as to what must be changed?
Who are the change-agents? And what is the impact of such changes on the societies
concerned? These and other issues will be explored in the following pages.

Outline of Paper

The paper begins with a discussion of the requirement to devise a strategy for carrying
out the decisions arrived at in the model by people (civil or public servants, etc.) plan,
policy, or program. This is the strategy that should be adopted in implementing the pol-
icy arrived at by consensus. Policy (plan or program) is meaningless if there is no action
to put it into practice. Likewise, “decisions without actions are vain” (Waldo, 1980:73).

Considered next is the implementation of such decisions P6 is an integral part of

the whole process and not as an independent and autonomous stage as some may claim
(Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). Here, implementation will be treated as administration
– in the old terminology, carrying out a legislative mandate; ‘administering’ a ‘policy de-
cision’ of some kind; and ‘carrying out’ or ‘executing’ decisions (Waldo, 1980: 73-5).
Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky (1973), on the other hand, view implementation
as an independent movement which grows out of the policy-analysis movement, and es-
sentially is an extension of it, ‘perhaps in a search for still another intellectual territory to
open, perhaps out of a feeling that decisions without action are vain, perhaps out of a per-
ception that policy analysis would shortly be in oversupply, and a new product should be
developed for marketing’ (Waldo, 1980: 73). Moreover, Pressman and Wildavsky ‘claim
to have found virgin territory Spang [sic] in the busy center of the social sciences and of
public affairs. Policy is not enough they found; it must be implemented, and strangely,
this has not been realized, and must now be attended to’ (ibid. : 74).1
Managerial Finance 6

Implementation is considered here purely for the convenience of organization and

not because of the independence of implementation as a field in and of itself. To the con-
trary, implementation is a vital step in the decision-making process.

The implications of implementing the Islamic model in administration shall be ex-

plored in some detail. This will be followed by an analysis of the problems and the pros-
pects in utilizing the indigenous perspective in administrative development, as
exemplified in the Islamic model, rather than relying on the extant theories and models of
development which are, on the whole exogenous and alien to the very nature of the envi-
ronment in which they exist for several reasons.2

An Islamic Administrative Model

1. Some Prerequisites:

Before delving into the details of the model of an ideal Islamic administration, a few
points on the prerequisites to such an endeavor are helpful at this stage. It is obvious that
the variation of sources and resources from which an authentic and modern form of in-
digenous administrative development must evolve in the Islamic State poses a tremen-
dous challenge to those involved in the process. The task becomes even more difficult
and complex in administration than in the case of political or socio-economic develop-
ment or both. The reason is simply that an articulate vision, as well as a relatively well
assembled body of knowledge and literature in an Islamic framework, already exists in
the political and socio-economic spheres.9 The same, unfortunately, cannot be said for
the issue of administration and administrative development schema, the following points
should be considered. The Islamist is used here as the major actor in constructing models
and implementing decisions in the Islamic environment. The Islamist also acts as a
change-agent in devising a strategy for the implementation of the model.

First, the Islamist has to understand the theory and practice of the process of Islami-
zation because of its extreme value in the realm of administration. The Islamization pro-
cess as it exists in the scarce and scattered Islamic literature means ‘the overdue need for
derivation, development and systematic examination of the Islamic theory of social
change and its validity in contemporary society’ (Idris, 1977:v). The overall objective of
this process is to re-instate the lost Islamic values in every area of human activity includ-
ing administrative development, administrative reform, and administrative vitality. In the
words of Sadiq al-Mahdi (1980: 38-41), what is needed now is a detailed answer to the
question: ‘How to Islamize modern thought?’ Moreover, this process of Islamization is
based on the fact that Islam is both a message and a method. ‘The way the message is to
be conveyed or practiced’, writes Idris (1977: 15) ‘is an inseparable part of that message,
and as such cannot be ignored’. If this is accepted, then we can always find guidance in
the methods the Prophet adopted at any period of his life.

Second, the Islamist has to derive the Islamic principles of government and admini-
stration by going back, in spirit, to the history and life of the Prophet and the Four Pious
Caliph but not necessarily copy the structural systems of their government and admini-
stration. Institutions such as the diwan and hisbah are not meant to be transferred from
one specific point in history to another, for it is impossible to take an entire historical
situation from one period and superimpose it on a later one. Rather, they provide us with
the spirit and ethics by which they were administered in the light of the Islamic shariah.
Volume 27 Number 10/11 2001 7

Third, and related to the preceding point, the Islamist is called upon to provide a
positive and detailed method for implementing the principles of administration. These
should depart from the general to the specific, from the past to the present and future, and
from the grand principles to more limited, detailed, and specific guidelines that address
contemporary problems. In other words, the Islamist should choose a specific methodol-
ogy which can help him in changing his overall program for reform from the state of ‘eth-
ical sermon’ (preaching) to that of a formulation of the problem, its definition, and the
exact process for solving it in a detailed manner. For example, it is not enough to quote
the general Islamic principle for hiring employees as stated in the Quran (XXVIII: 26):
‘Hire him! For the best (man) that thou canst hire is the strong, the trustworthy.’ Though
no Muslim can have the slightest doubt of this, the situation in modern times necessitates
a detailed list of conditions including, in addition to the two cited above, qualifications
such as education, years of experience, and competence, among others. The same can be
said for the concepts of consultation (shura), interest and usury (riba), corruption (fasad)
and so forth. In other words, the establishment of a detailed program of administrative
development from the Islamic point of view is the first step and a prerequisite for any ac-
tual reform effort in this sphere. The lack of such a plan places a heavier burden on the
Islamist and may delay the process for some time.

Finally, the Islamist is expected to develop a new, Islamic model which may draw
from the Islamic sources of administrative roots. However, these roots must be synthe-
sized with modern thought in a systematic way, using modern techniques and tools and
modern technology, and seeking the help and advice, when needed, of modern theorists,
practitioners, and experts. It is through this practical model that the present lack of credi-
bility in Islamic application of various programs and plans will be overcome. This exten-
sive and important undertaking cannot be achieved overnight. But once a systematic
approach is articulated and a serious commitment to Islam is solicited, Islamization will
become a progressive process.

The new model should reflect its builder’s unique characteristics as well as the
original Islamic texts in such a manner as to absorb new formulations dictated by change
in time and place. It should reflect the efforts of the Islamist in developing and utilizing
the faith, spirit of enquiry, and self-confidence that Islam strives to inculcate in him by
addressing the modern challenges and seizing the opportunities of modern times and cir-
cumstances without loss of identity. As an Islamist puts it, the communists and secular-
ists in the Muslim world want to implement models of modernization at the expense of
identity. The fundamentalists and some ‘ulama groups are concerned with identity at the
expense of development, growth, and modernization. The Islamist would satisfy both
these quests10 (al-Mahdi, 1980:40).

Basic elements and environments

Simply stated, the basic elements of the Islamic administrative model are Six P’s. The
Six P’s version of this dynamic open system model consists of the following:

P1 = People (civil or public servants, bureaucrats, sala men, officials, authorities, etc.)

P2 = Place (diwan) or organization, board, sala bureau, office, etc. Referred to in the
diagram as box 2
Managerial Finance 8

P3 = Problem (demands and support as major ingredients of the inputs after being
shifted, screened, and synthesized by P1)
P4 = Process or procedure (conversion process) referred to as shura, for it is the
main process by which P1 makes decisions.
P5 = Plan, policy, or program. This is what is normally called output in the basic
systems approach. P5 is the result of inputs conversion through P4 by P1 util-
izing the already classified and arranged demands and support in the form of
P3, the problem.
P6 = Performance (implementation and execution of policy or policies P5 or output
to carry out to completion the decisions and policies in their final forms)
Information Feedback P1 obtains information about these possible consequences of
their previous behavior. This mechanism puts P1 in a position to take advantage of the
information and feedback that have been directed to them and to correct or adjust their
behavior for the achievement of their goals.
Feedback also transcends the immediate organizational setting to its intra-societal
environment; it basically has the same function as ‘information feedback’ but on a larger
scale. Here, the feedback comes from the intra-societal environment which includes,
among other things, the political system, the religious system, the ecological system, the
biological system, and the social systems.
Intra-Societal Environment comprises the political system, religious system, eco-
logical system, biological system, and social systems described above.
Extra-Societal Environment comprises the international political systems, the inter-
national ecological systems, and the international social systems (socio-economic, cul-
tural, demographic, and other subsystems).
Strategy:
The Islamist in our model – P1 or civil servant – must spell out the strategy by which the
outcome of the model P5 will be put into practice or operation. Essentially, he must de-
vise a strategy for utilizing one of two basic methods of implementation. First, the infor-
mal or personal method is a way to carry out the plan or decision P5 in an environment
that is not purely Islamic in nature – that is, where the Islamic State is not in full operation
and the Khilafah is absent from the existing political order. Second, the formal or institu-
tional method is a way to achieve the plan or decision P5 in a purely Islamic environment
that permits the entire model of an Islamic administrative system to materialize and func-
tion under its own auspices, guidance, and care. This strategy, to an Islamist, is not as dif-
ficult and complicated as the former because here governmental institutions and
departments assume the onerous task of implementation and individual or personal initia-
tives are undertaken only in this context.
Whether the strategy adopted is formal or informal, institutional or personal, the
key element is still the Islamist or the implementer, referred to here as the ‘change agent’.
While recognizing the value and importance of P1 in our model as the theoretical
change-agent, the people who actually assume the task of implementation are called the
Volume 27 Number 10/11 2001 9

practical or actual change-agents. Therefore, a brief analysis of the role of Islamist as a

change-agent is appropriate at this point before examining the two basic methods of im-
plementation.
The Islamist as a Change-agent
The Quran states in a very clear way, which is not subject to misunderstanding or misin-
terpretation, these two verses which call for dynamic change as a pre-condition to trans-
formation:
That is because Allah never changeth the grace He hath bestowed on any people until
they first change that which is in their hearts, and (that is) because Allah is Hearer,
Knower. (Quran, VIII:53)

Lo! Allah changeth not the condition of a folk until they (first) change that which is in
their hearts; and if Allah willeth misfortune for a folk there is none that can repel it,
nor have they a defender beside Him. (Quran, XIIIL:11)

In simple terms, the change-agent in the Islamic administrative model is the Isla-
mist who fully and uncompromisingly believe in the above two verses as the ultimate
truth.
Comparatively speaking, however, the contemporary literature on the change-agent
reflects another perspective. Warren Bennis (1966: 137, 137n), for example, defines the
term ‘change-agent’ as ‘a person or group, practitioners or social scientists, who are using
the theory …. In order to improve the functioning and effectiveness of organization’. He
notes that they have come from different backgrounds and academic traditions, of Lewin
and academic psychology, of psycho-analytic practice, and of applied disciplines such as
rural sociology, social work, or education. Whatever their differences and backgrounds,
‘they seem to receive their impetus as much from the urge to improve society as from
simple curiosity about its working (ibid.:137n). Bennis (ibid.) describes change-agents in
this manner:
They seem to be as intimately involved in affecting change as they are in studying it.
They have developed a self-consciousness about the strategies of social change as
well as about its goals. They are driven by a radical rather than conservative ethic,
which means simply that their attitude toward social change springs from locating the
ills of society in its institutions, where something can be done about them, rather than
in human nature, where very little can be done about them. In short, the change-
agents are not only interpreting the world in different ways; some intend to change it.

This description of the change-agent portrays both the theoretical and the practical,
the one who contemplates plans and methods for change, and the one who actually puts
them into practice. From the Islamic viewpoint, the change-agent, whether of the arm-
chair or the field worker type, is committed to change not simply for the sake of change
but to bring society, as much as possible, closer to the society envisaged by the Quran.
He knows very well what is and what is not subject to change. In addition to being an Is-
lamist, with energy and ambition, the change agent may be an academician, scholar, re-
searcher, man of contemplation or philosopher. According to Bennis (1966:114), the
change-agent is a professional who for the most part has been trained in various fields.
Unlike the change-agent of Bennis, however, the Islamic change-agent does not necessar-
ily have to have a ‘doctorate degree in the behavioral sciences’. Nor does he have to hold
Managerial Finance 10

a university post, be a full-time consultant, or owe his professional allegiances to the be-
havioral science discipline notwithstanding the value of such training to his career.

To put into practice the intention of changing society, the change-agent – Islamist
or otherwise – should be familiar with the dynamics of change, its mechanisms and types.
It is by working through a series of various and different kinds of change that the
change-agent is able to make sense of what he sees and does, Bennis (1966:83-4), for ex-
ample, identifies eight types of change, some of which are relevant to this discussion:

1. Planned change, which ‘entails mutual goal setting, an equal power ratio
(eventually) and deliberateness on the part of both sides’.
2. Indoctrination, which ‘involves mutual goal setting and is deliberate, but …
involves an imbalanced power ratio’.
3. Coercive change, which ‘ is characterized by non-mutual goal setting, an im-
balanced power ratio, and only one sided deliberateness’ (‘brainwashing’ and
thought control are forms of coercive change).
4. Technocratic change, which ‘follows primarily an “engineering” model: the
client defines his difficulties as deriving from inadequate knowledge and as-
sumes that this lack of knowledge is accidental or a matter of neglect – not
something that is functional to the system itself. The technocrat colludes in
this assumption and merely makes and reports his findings’.
5. Interactional change, which ‘is characterized by mutual goal setting, a fairly
equal power distribution, but no deliberateness on either side of the relation-
ship’.
6. Socialization change, which ‘has a direct kinship with hierarchical controls.
Parent-child relationships would be the most obvious examples, although the
counselor-camper and teacher-pupil relationships would also be instances’.
7. Emulative change, which ‘takes place for the most part in the formal organiza-
tions where there is a clear-cut superior-subordinate relationship. Change is
brought about through identification with, and emulation of, the “power fig-
ures" by the subordinates.’ (Carried further, this category also reflects the
dominant-dominated or metropolis-satellite relationships of countries in the
international scene.)
8. Natural change, which ‘refers to that class of changes brought about with no
apparent deliberateness and no goal setting on the part of those involved in it.
Primarily it is a residual category encompassing all accidents, “quirks of fate”,
unanticipated consequences, spontaneous innovations, etc., In concluding his
description of these eight categories, Bennis (ibid.:84) gives this caveat: ‘This
typology is crude: in nature we can rarely observe these change processes ex-
emplified so neatly. In addition, the distinctions made in it are somewhat arbi-
trary and certainly not all-inclusive.’
Scanning the environment of the contemporary Muslim world, one recognizes
some of Bennis’s categories of change in one form or another. For example, Jamal Abdul
Volume 27 Number 10/11 2001 11

Nasser, who ruled Egypt between 1953 and 1970, used a combination of ‘indoctrination’
and ‘coercive change’ in advancing an ‘Arab form of socialism.’ The characteristics of
non-mutual goal setting, imbalanced power ratio and only one-sided deliberateness, in
addition to brainwashing and thought control, are exemplified forms of coercive change
normally prevalent in military dictatorship regime such as that of Egypt’s Nasser. Other
countries, however, have indulged in emulative change because of their fascination with
technological and industrial development in the West. Muslim and Arab countries in this
category suffer from an ‘inferiority complex’ as they identify themselves in superior-
subordinate, metropolis-satellite, developed- underdeveloped, and dominant-dominated
relationships. Change in this group of countries has come about through identification
with, and emulation of, the ‘power centers’ by the satellites. The Shah of Iran and Ataturk
of Turkey represented this category even though they also used other forms of change
(coercive and indoctrination) in addition to emulative change.
The re-awakening of the Muslim people and the call for a return to the pure Islam
provide an opportunity for re-examination and to research other forms of change which
should reflect the Islamic identity and at the same time provide the Muslim people with a
chance to plan their change according to Islamic principles and tenets. Though the overall
goal of the Islamist (change-agent) is to devise a planned change strategy in which there
is mutual goal setting between the change-agent and the client as well as the existence of
a state of deliberateness, and an eventual equal power ratio, the Islamist at this stage may
use other forms to bring them closer to this goal. Some of the strategies used in this pro-
cess are examined in Table 1.
Elements of Administrative Development in the Muslim Countries
Table 1 lists the following elements of administrative development in the Muslim coun-
tries: the issue of development, sources, process, outcome, implementation methods and
end results.8
The Issue
The Islamist must address many issues of development in the quest for Islamic solutions
to problems facing the Muslim world – for example, the problems of man and develop-
ment, the issue of political development and the issue of socioeconomic development, in
addition to the issue of administrative development. Since the problems of administrative
development differ from one Muslim environment to another, the Islamist has to study
the particular environment very carefully in order to determine the priorities. For exam-
ple, manpower is a serious problem in Saudi Arabia while monetary resources are not.
The opposite is true in Egypt, Pakistan, and other over-populated Muslim countries.
Other issues or problems include under-utilization of available resources, the develop-
ment of an administrative cadre, and the application of modern technologies and methods
to serve the objectives of administrative development - to name a few.
The Sources
(The sources of administrative roots in Islamic theory and practice) The detailed and
sometimes lengthy discussion of sources has been necessary since there exists no viable
and practical overall administrative model reflecting Islamic characteristics, Islam is very
strong in the believer’s mind and heart, but lacks credibility in its application because as
yet there are no articulate political, socio-economic and administrative programs or a
 Managerial Finance 12

Table 1. Elements of administrative development in the Muslim countries

Issue of Sources Process Outcome Implementation End Results
Development Methods

Administrative Islamic Shariah Screening Administrative Penetration Administrative

Sifting and Models that Systems which
Quran Synthesis reflect Islamic Bureaucracy are:
Sunnah principles and Institutions
Ijam A mental ideals, and Islamic
process of address modern Integration Indigenous
Practice of the transforming questions for Original
Prophet the preceding each Muslim Cooperation
step to the country
Practice of the following one Opposition
Pious Caliphate The six Ps
version of the Covert
Theoretical Islamic Overt
Guidance Administrative Withdrawal
Model
Documents
Manuscripts

Administrative
Institutions

Diwans
Hisbah

Pioneers of
Islamic
Administration

Modern
Thoughts on
Administration

codification of law based on Islamic principles that take into account the problems of
modern society. Thus, these primary and secondary original sources may pave the way
for the Islamist, and other individuals interested in this process of planned social change,
to develop the needed programs and models. The variations in these sources will enable
the outcome and the end results to be flexible and suitable for the time and place.
The Process
The whole developmental process relies heavily on the ability and the clear vision of the
Islamist to screen, sift, and synthesize a model or models that are based on Islamic princi-
ples and beliefs, or at least on foundations that do not violate or contradict them. What is
required most here is a model that preserves the Islamic identity in the face of cultural and
social invasion by foreign ideas and practices3.
The Outcome
This model or program or plan will be the outcome of the Islamist’s screening, sifting,
and synthesis process described above. For any administrative model to be Islamic, it
Volume 27 Number 10/11 2001 13

must meet the minimum requirement of conforming to the Islamic law (shari’ah). It need
not be called ‘Islamic’ as such, but it must reflect Islamic principles and ideals such as
justice, consultation, and probity. While these principles are not a monopoly of Islam and
can and do exist in other societies, the Islamic shari’ah is nevertheless the final yard-
stick. These models and plans, while similar in general principles and ideals to models
from non-Islamic societies, may differ in detail such as structure and methodology. This
difference is necessary to accommodate the various social and political environments of
the vast Muslim World.
Implementation Methods and End Results
Implementation methods and end results of the Islamic administrative development
decision-making process are considered below.
Implementation
Briefly, implementation can be described as the stage in the decision-making process be-
tween a decision P5 and actual operations. In our model implementation is designated by
P6 - performance, execution of policy and/or decision; it is a difficult step involving the
effort to put in place - to make operational - what has been decided P5. More and more
frequently, one is warned to give considerable attention to this stage in the policy process
where so much can go wrong (Williams, 1980:1).
Implementation is an extremely broad and complex concept. Recent literature4 in
the social sciences reflects a movement under the rubric ‘implementation’ led by Jeffrey
Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky (1973, 1979). They note that ‘implementation in recent
years has been discussed but rarely studied [and] except for an excellent book by Martha.
Derthick we have not been able to locate any thoroughgoing analysis of implementation’
(Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973:xiii).
Simply stated, implementation is the better management of programs. It is not an
abstract social science concept. Individuals and groups within organizations must take ac-
tion after a decision has been made. ‘To decide’ does not necessarily mean ‘to do’. For
an individual or a group, a decision requiring implementation may demand commitment,
capacity, or both for execution. When the decision-maker differs from the implementer, a
third demand arises - the demand for communications. In this case, the decision-maker
needs to get the message across to the implementer. According to Williams (1980:3),
‘The implementation issue most straightforwardly concerns how to bring together com-
munications commitment, and capacity so as to carry a decision into action.’ Two imple-
mentation issues spring from the above statement. First ‘is the process of trying to get
from the here of a decision to the there of operating policy such that people in the organi-
zation are doing things in a different way’. The second implementation issue ‘is the more
general aspect of the first one. It is the capacity problem. Over a period of time any major
organization will be making new unspecified decisions that will demand changes in or-
ganizational behavior. A basic question is one of what can be done to raise organiza-
tional capabilities to implement these future, yet unspecified decisions’ (ibid.).
In our model, P6 designates the implementation stage in which the implementers,
after proper and clear communications from P1, go ahead and implement the decision or
decisions in the intrasocietal environment, which includes the political, religious, ecologi-
cal, biological, and social systems. Basically, as stated earlier, there are two methods for
Managerial Finance 14

carrying out the implementation stage: the first - the informal/personal method - is used in
the absence of an Islamic State; the second - the formal/institutional method - is used
given the existence of the Islamic State in which the Islamic administrative system is but
a subsystem of the total Islamic State system.
Informal/Personal Methods
It has already been stated that the development of models, which have little or no chance
of applicability, is merely an intellectual exercise. Therefore, we discuss below the vari-
ous informal/ personal methods that the Islamist may use to implement effectively the
model for administrative development.
Penetration
This method may prove to be the most important in a Muslim but not essentially Islamic
system. Unlike penetration in the context of political development, this strategy is a vi-
able one the administrative context and may take one or more of the following forms.
Penetration of the bureaucracy
The Islamist can try to implement his model through penetration of the bureaucracy and
other civil service areas. Every person in Islam who accepts this faith is obliged to spend
his life and all his wealth in the discharge of his covenant with God. An Islamist is ex-
pected to do all. he can within his power, irrespective of the conduct of others (Quran, V:
105), because his obligations to God take precedence over his rights. Therefore, penetrat-
ing the bureaucracy for the purpose of reforming it according to the Islamist’s model is an
effective implementation method, especially if the secular forces are not strong.
Penetration of institutions
The Islamist can influence other institutions such as the institutions of public administra-
tion (IPA), universities and administrative colleges in the Muslim countries, and other re-
lated educational institutions and organizations. A content analysis of various courses on
IPA in the Muslim countries reveals that almost all of them ignore Islamic administration.
The universities offer one or two courses on Islamic administrative thought but only from
an historical perspective, with no linkage to the present. The role of the Islamist is to ap-
proach these institutions with a specific list of courses and books that show such linkages.
Moreover, the Islamist also can approach various higher commissions of administrative
reform and try to influence their outcome. This is also an area for co-operation with the
extant political systems, which will be discussed below.
Other areas for penetration include the public mass media in which the views of the
Islamist are voiced and reactions are solicited. Since the environment is largely Muslim,
this method of penetration may stimulate public opinion by reminding the people of Is-
lamic values. al-Ghofaily (1980:123), for example, recommends that the public mass me-
dia in Saudi Arabia be used to play a major role in promoting the dignity of manual labor
and vocational occupations by utilizing the Islamic teachings in the area of work in order
to stimulate more Saudi participation in the development process.
Finally, the use of Islamic religious institutions such as mosques (masajid) as well
as the roles of imams, sermon deliverers, and preachers in the process will be helpful. Re-
Volume 27 Number 10/11 2001 15

cent developments in Egypt proved the electrifying effect of charismatic speakers in re-
ligious public gatherings.
Integration
This method will be more effective if the reformist finds an integrative political force to
support his model or program. This situation exists in the post-Pahlavi Iran. The Shah had
tried to uproot Islam and implant alien concepts and values violating the people’s identity
and dignity. The bureaucracy and the civil service were among the institutions adversely
affected by the Shah’s policy. In post-Pahlavi Iran, the Iranian identity was saved from
the complete alienation, which the Turks suffered under Ataturk. It has restored the aus-
terity and simplicity in leadership that Iran enjoyed at the early centuries of Hijrah. In
this context and environment, the reformist will have total support of the political author-
ity to implement his model and recommendations in the area of administrative develop-
ment from the Islamic point of view.
Co-operation
The Islamist also can choose to co-operate with the existing political regime to implement
his model or program of administrative development. Such co-operation can take various
forms. For example, in the Sudan, the 1977 National Reconciliation was a positive step
that marked the end of the armed conflict between the political regime of President Ja’far
Nimairi and the leader of the Ansars (Mahdists). As a result, a Special Committee on
Islamization was established to work out a formula to develop an Islamic political sys-
tem. According to al-Mahdi (1980:40), any political system must meet two criteria to be-
come Islamic. First, its political, economic, administrative, and social aspects should
heed certain general principles of Islam to guide the system; and second, the legal code
should be based either on Islam or on foundations, which do not contradict its spirit.
Through this and other committees, the Islamist can influence the public admini-
stration of various Muslim countries. For instance, in Saudi Arabia the Islamist can pres-
ent his strategy to the Higher Commission on Administrative Reform. The role of this
commission is to provide recommendations on administrative reform to the political
authority for approval and implementation.
Another way of co-operating with the existing system is by advocating the conduct
of international conferences, seminars, and meetings at which experts in the field of ad-
ministrative reform and development can gather to discuss various issues and produce ap-
plicable recommendations.
Opposition
Overt or covert opposition and withdrawal are different expressions of this method. Op-
position, however, is of limited value, especially in the area of administration; as indi-
cated earlier, it usually occurs in the political and socio-economic spheres. Normally, the
Islamist, in his efforts to introduce administrative reform from an Islamic perspective,
will not use this strategy unless he has no viable alternative. For example, an individual
Muslim whose conscience cannot approve of an administrative behavior or practice in his
department may ask for a transfer if he is unable to change the behavior or practice or if
he cannot resist it. Opposition, in this case withdrawal may save him from indulging in
corrupt practices, but it will not change the existing corruptive practices of the system.
Managerial Finance 16

Formal/Institutional Methods

The formal/institutional method of implementation presupposes the existence of the Is-

lamic State. This method is self-explanatory in that it follows the normal procedure in
any systems model. Briefly, the formal/institutional method depends heavily upon other
institutions in the intra-societal environment to help put into operation P5 - the plan, pro-
gram, or policy. Nevertheless, individuals and groups are involved in this process, but in
this case they are acting in their full capacities and roles as formal agents of these organi-
zations.

The formal/institutional method can be best understood by this example. Let us

suppose that the Islamic administrative system model (the Six Ps version) exists in an Is-
lamic State. It will function only as a part of the whole system including the political, re-
ligious, ecological, biological, and social systems. Since all of these systems have one
thing in common - they are all Islamic in nature - the administrative system’s P6 - the per-
formance or implementation and execution of a plan or policy - will not encounter resis-
tance in the other systems which complement rather than contradict the administrative
system. Thus, implementation in its formal/institutional form tends to be much easier to
accomplish than in its informal/personal form5.

Some may prefer the formal/institutional method of implementation on the ground

that it provides a higher level of measurement of performance than the informal/personal
method. This is not the case, however. In fact, the results of performance measurement of
both methods are similar. For example, efforts to measure P6 - ‘administrative perform-
ance’ or ‘implementation’ or ‘execution’ of P5 ‘policy’- variously termed in the literature
‘administrative capability’ or ‘administrative productivity’- ‘have yielded inconclusive
results because of the inherent methodological difficulty of providing the performance in-
dicators (or factors) let alone valid (and acceptable) measures of performance’ (Iglesias,
1976:xxviii).

Whether or not measurement of performance is achieved and whether formal or in-

formal, institutional or personal methods are used, successful implementation of any plan
needs spontaneous support from all resources available. This includes P1 people or per-
sonnel, technology, organization, finance, and leadership. For example, the failure to
create a higher level of responsibility and morale among personnel involved in imple-
mentation may inhibit effective implementation of the given plan whether this plan is car-
ried out by informal/personal or formal/institutional methods of implementation.

In sum, it may well be true that implementation, regardless of the method used,
does not commence until goals and objectives have been established (or identified) by
prior policy decisions (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975:448). Furthermore, the whole
process of implementation is seen ‘as a progression from the general to the particular, a
narrowing of the field of view or of thought, a limiting of choice and discretion. It is a
progression also from the abstract and metaphysical towards the concrete and physical,
each stage more pragmatic than the preceding stage, closer to the hard facts of the real.
world. Wisdom may reside at one end, but knowledge comes from the other; policy is
blind if not led by operation’ (Dunsire, 1978:83).

It is also important to note that, regardless of the method used to implement it, a
plan that cannot secure the behavior it envisages is considered utopian. On the other
Volume 27 Number 10/11 2001 17

hand, a practical plan - one that can be effective - is based upon realistic consideration of
what people will do and can be induced and encouraged to do. How do we arrange a chain
of behavior - starting with immediate organizational activities - that will bring about the
desired change?

The successful planner, according to Herbert Simon et al. (1950:440), must under-
stand the type of changes that are resisted so that he can avoid them or plan ways to over-
come such resistance. The principal types of resistance are: (a) inertia; (b) community or
personal mores and beliefs; (c) personal self-interest; (d) the desire to be rational; and (e)
the dislike of subordination. If these can be dealt with effectively, change will occur
smoothly. The treatment of these types of resistance will even be clearer as we turn to the
implications of implementing the Islamic administrative model in the contemporary Mus-
lim countries.

Implications

Instituting a model of this magnitude obviously will have a significant impact on indi-
viduals and groups in the societies concerned. Briefly considered here are both the posi-
tive and negative, effects of the implementation of an Islamic administrative development
model.

Some segments of the society will feel threatened when an Islamic model is put
into practice. People tend to resist change because of a perceived threat - real or imagi-
nary - to their existing norms and values. This is so because any significant change of the
prevailing ‘state of things’ and especially in human organization involves a rearrange-
ment of patterns of power, association, status, skills, values, and priorities (Bennis,
1966:1405). Thus, some segments of the population, especially those with Western orien-
tations, may view an anticipated change to Islamic ideals as ‘threatening’ their status and
positions and hence reject it. Others, on the other hand, especially those who identify
with Islamic ideals, may view it as ‘enhancing’ and embrace it. In any case, change typi-
cally involves risk and fear. The trust and continuous support of the Islamist as a change-
agent during the period of the actual transformation, which is characterized by great
stress and anxiety, may help to ‘ready’ the client for the change and make it as smooth as
humanly possible6.

Many people in the developing nations, and to a lesser degree in the industrial na-
tions, wish to keep their accustomed patterns of life-style and behavior intact. Normally,
those who stick to their old ways have a vested interest in them; they fear the uncertain-
ties of the new, they give strange meaning to change, and they dislike having their cus-
toms, traditions, symbols, and ways of dealing with people disturbed. People seldom
resist change just to be stubborn. Some scholars explain this phenomenon by stating that
people resist change because it hurts them economically, psychologically, or socially
(Sayles and Strauss, 1967). This writer believes that people resist change because they
are ignorant of the effects and fearful of their inability to cope with the new order or the
outcome of change; or they are fearful of its social and moral effects on them and others
(Buraey, 1972-3:16).

In addition to the inherent risks in change (both perceived and real), other factors in
the environment of the Muslim countries add to the difficulty of administering change
and normally pose a strong barrier to, development. Many customs and traditions handi-
Managerial Finance 18

cap any effort to develop trade, introduce changes, and improve administrative methods
in their societies. Some governments also contribute to, the resistance-of-change syn-
drome by discouraging or rejecting the adoption of new administrative methods or tech-
niques, depending on the kind of government.

Problems and Prospects

No one can claim that discussing and analyzing an Islamic ideal model of administrative
development and presenting it to, intellectuals and scholars outside the fold of Islam is an
easy task. Even with the background and explanation of the environment - political and
socio-economic - provided in this study, some misunderstanding is bound to occur. It is
hoped that the discussion below will clarify and shed more light on the Islamic model.

First, regarding values in the Islamic model, it should be re-emphasized that values
which are mandated and sanctioned by Islamic law (i.e. shari’ah) have priority over any
other values that may spring from indigenous customs, mores and cultural practices or
from exogenous foreign and alien sources. In Western models, for example, scholars and
intellectuals in the West have never been able to solve the riddle of how to make effi-
ciency compatible with democracy. They believe in both, and simply wanting both does
not solve the problem.

In the Islamic model, on the other hand, there is a yardstick, a measure or scale of a
divine origin. If two concepts conflict, the only way to choose between them is to select
the one that comes closest to the Islamic shar’ah - that is, to select the concept that
weighs heavy on the scale of Islam, and to discard the lighter one, even if it means a loss
in efficiency as the term is understood in its Western meaning. Efficiency and effective-
ness in the Islamic model take on a different meaning. If a process or procedure should
lead to the attainment and realization of the Islamic shari’ah, then it is efficient, economi-
cal, and effective. If it does not, then it is not efficient, economical, and effective. It is as
simple as that. Dollars and cents are not the sole criterion of efficiency, economy and ef-
fectiveness. If a system succeeds in making the whole population wealthy and healthy but
fails to make them good Muslims, its efficient and effective score on the Islamic scale are
zero if not negative.

Second, it is not suggested here that there can be no conflict in Islamic societies. In
the world of real people, decisions have to be made about allocating resources. How
much should some people be regulated to protect others? Does everyone need the same
level of material goods? And if not, how much does the government equalize? How is
this decided? How much of a burden is placed on the public to make the bureaucracy effi-
cient? How much freedom will be taken away from people who do not observe the rules
of Islam? And how are programs to do all those things decided and implemented under
the model?

Regarding the last question, it is hoped that this paper on the implementation pro-
cess may have provided an answer. As for the other questions, suffice it to say here that
the feasibility of the whole model presented in this study depends on man himself. The
perfectibility of man and the absence of original sin in the Islamic worldview are two im-
Volume 27 Number 10/11 2001 19

portant values assuring such feasibility. Unless this point (in addition to others discussed
earlier is understood, the questions listed above and others will be raised again and
again8.
Third, resistance of some segments of society to the Islamic model is a natural phe-
nomenon. Resistance to change and transformation from one state of affairs to another is
expected and should be dealt with wisdom, patience, and sympathy. Resistance to the Is-
lamic way of life normally comes from the following segments7 of the Arab/Muslim so-
cieties.
One. Communists - Islam as a religion and a way of life constitutes a major threat to
the doctrine of communism which rests, among other things, on atheistic founda-
tions.
Two. Arab and ‘other’ nationalists - who believe that the essence of Arabic civilization
is independent from Islam. The slogan of Arab nationalism (or for that matter
Pakistani nationalism, Indonesian nationalism, etc.) is advanced to disintegrate
completely the Muslim world by alienating the Muslim Arabs further and further
from Islam as their rallying force, and thereby, gradually restricting and dividing
them into increasingly narrow, artificial territorial loyalties until their entity as a
people is completely destroyed (Jameelah, 1977:197-8). Islam and the introduc-
tion of an Islamic model would enhance Islamism and reduce or dissolve Ara-
bism. Therefore, Arab nationalists vehemently oppose Islam and resist any
transformation towards it no matter the field or subsystem of the total social sys-
tem.
Three. Secularists and Westernized Muslims - Islam, and indeed other religions as well,
frightens the secularists who want to divorce religion from their daily lives and
push it into a corner where it can only be observed once a week - on the Sabbath
(Saturday for Jews, Sunday for Christians, Friday for Muslims). Religion should
be distinguished from priesthood, maintain the secularists in the Muslim world
(Khalid, 1953). Religion is humane and altruistic whereas priesthood is totalitar-
ian; religion is progressive while priesthood is reactionary (ibid.). Westernized
Muslims are those who find comfort in the Western way of life and thus seek to
maintain this in the face of Islam and Islamic change. They claim that Islam is a
barrier to progress and development. In this context, it is useful to quote Fred W.
Riggs (1964:427-8):
Those who insist on the cultural relativity of developmental potentialities often
suggest that religion or linguistic patterns or family structures stand in the way of devel-
opment; the idea of time or of fate or of shame, said to be unique to a particular culture, is
identified as the villain blocking progress. I would insist on learning the nature of the
block. If Buddhism is a barrier to progress in some countries, it has not proven so in Ja-
pan. If Christianity assures progress, then we can point to some Christian countries in
Latin American which have not developed very far.... If Fate is used as a rationalization
to justify lethargy, it can also be used to explain the need to change.
Summary and Conclusion
The development of a strategy and implementation are important - indeed, critical -
stages in any decision-making model. Yet, many program designers and evaluators have
Managerial Finance 20

focused primarily on policies and outcomes to the neglect of measuring the extent of im-
plementation. Policies and decisions if not implemented are just like guilty sentences or
acquittals pronounced by the court but not carried out by judicial administration. What is
being emphasized throughout this paper is the importance of putting decisions and poli-
cies into practice through the mechanism of implementation. All too often, once policies
and decisions have been agreed upon, the practical problems of implementing change are
virtually ignored.

This paper addresses the strategy and method of implementation in the organiza-
tional context - from the processes of decision-making to the choice of the appropriate
method of implementation, to the effects on individuals and groups who are affected to
their reaction in the form of resistance to change. The basic two methods of implementa-
tion explored are (a) informal/personal and (b) formal/institutional. It is through one or
both of these two strategies that the Islamist as a change-agent is involved in administer-
ing change.

The role of the Islamist extends beyond the process of decision-making to that of
implementation. Communication plays a major role in the process, especially if the Isla-
mists who made the decisions are not the same Islamists who implement them. It has
been shown that the outcome of the Islamic - administrative model requires a sound and
effective implementation strategy with various alternatives. Even the existence and
availability of such techniques is not enough unless and until the strategy is put into prac-
tice - that is, implemented. The challenge now becomes more difficult, but the Islamist
who is equipped with viable strategies can have confidence in his mission. Thus, he ap-
plies his model sometimes with the blessing and co-operation of the political power (in
the case of an Islamic State), and often through the subtle process of penetration. In the fi-
nal analysis, the Islamist or change-agent makes sure that whatever strategy he uses, the
most important issue is putting the model into practice - that is, implementing it - with the
least number of problems.

The implications as well as the problems and prospects of the Islamic administra-
tive model are also discussed in this paper. It has been suggested that resistance to any
change is bound to occur and resistance to implementation of the Islamic model is no ex-
ception. Suggestions as to who leads such resistance and how to deal with this problem
are also given so that major obstacle, when their sources are understood, can be dealt with
in an Islamic manner.
Volume 27 Number 10/11 2001 21

Endnotes
1. Dwight Waldo (1980:74) is a critic of this implementation movement, noting that its
proponents claim to discover the already discovered, and to come up with something new
when it is already old: I am reminded of something read long ago and which I remember
as: “It is as though a child taken for a walk in Hyde Park should claim to have discovered
the Round Pond.”
Looking at the positive side of this movement, however, Waldo states:
The persons now exploring implementation are able ... I judge that they have made
a contribution, even if nothing further comes of the movement. They have been attending
to matters that those, in public administration ought to have attended to but did not, or did
not adequately. I expect public administration to be enriched and stimulated by this litera-
ture, in the manner of what has taken place with respect to policy studies. Contrariwise, I
can at least hope that those concerned with implementation might discover that there is a
literature under the rubric of public administration that has at least a marginal importance
in carrying out public policy. I stand ready to tell them where they can find it’ (ibid.).
2. Fred W. Riggs, for example, believes that the influence of foreign models upon the in-
digenous circumstances is largely due to two powerful considerations:
First, leading officials and politicians have received their formal education, if not
actually abroad, at least in schools and universities structured on foreign models. The re-
sulting foreign orientation of the intelligentsia, from which the political and administra-
tive elite are typically drawn in ‘transitional’ societies, increases receptivity to alien
models for public policy decisions.
According to Riggs, the second powerful consideration is that alien models are de-
liberately and sometimes even vigorously thrust upon local policy-makers by foreign or-
ganizations. The United Nations and its specialized agencies, as well as the United
States, Colombo Plan, and other bilateral aid programs, provide the funds and resources
for such efforts (Riggs, 1964:338).
A third and most important consideration can be added, one that tends to elude
many analysts. When the stage in any political and administrative environment is unoccu-
pied by local players, foreign and outside actors find little or no resistance or opposition.
This is why we insist on a strong local, indigenous methodology towards development -
one that calls not only for an intellectual posture (Braibanti, 1978: 103) but for a program
of practical action and application. It is suggested that the ideal Islamic administrative
model is capable of fulfilling this task.
3. This model is discussed in detailed in ‘Management & Administration in Islam’, by
Muhammad Al-Buraey, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.
4. A review of implementation in the recent social science literature produces the follow-
ing works. An important contribution appears in Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron B. Wil-
davsky, Implementation: How great Expectations in Washington Are Dashed in Oakland,
etc., 2nd ed., Berkeley and Los Angeles, The University of California Press, 1979; the
book was first published in 1973. For an introduction to the implementation literature, see
Eugene Bardach, The Implementation Game: What Happens After a Bill Becomes a Law,
Managerial Finance 22

Cambridge, Mass., 1979. For an analysis of implementation in the social service delivery
programs, see Walter Williams, The Implementation Perspective: A Guide for Managing
Social Service Delivery Programs, Berkeley, The University of California Press, 1980.

Other important works on implementation include: Andrew Dunsire, Implementa-

tion in a Bureaucracy, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1978; N. Gross, J. V. Giacquinta
and M. Bernstein, Implementing Organizational Innovations, New York, Basic Books,
1971; Douglas T. Yates and Richard R. Nelson, eds., Innovation and Implementation in
Public Organizations, Farnborough, Lexington Books, 1967; and Cateheryn Secker-
Hudson, Organization and Management; Theory and Practice, Washington, D.C.,
American University Press, 1955. Yet Pressman and Wildavsky (1979:xix) consider only
Martha Derthick’s New Towns In-Town, Washington, D.C., Urban Institute, 1972, to be
significant: except for an excellent book by Martha Derthick, we have not been able to lo-
cate any thoroughgoing analysis of implementation’.

On the International level, implementation literature is not any brighter. Though

the need to study and analyze it is growing greater by the day, ‘over the years since the
1950s there had been mounting evidence of plan failures due to weakness in plan imple-
mentation’ (Iglesias, 1976:xvi). For example, Iglesias quotes M. Martin as saying of
some 1500 national development plans which have been prepared in the last twenty-five
years, not many have been seriously implemented (ibid.). See Gabriel U. Iglesias, ed.,
Implementation: The Problem of Achieving Results: A CaseBook on Asian Experiences,
Manila, Philippines, Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration, 1976, es-
pecially Iglesias’s article ‘Implementation and the Planning of Development’, pp. xv-xl.
Finally, the reader may wish to consult The United Nations, Some Problems of Plan Im-
plementation in the Second Development Decade, Bangkok, Thailand, Economic Com-
mission for Asia and the Far East, 1971.

5. This is so, because here governmental institutions and departments assume this respon-
sibility, backed by the power and legitimacy of the political system. Individuals here act
only in their capacity as a part of these governmental institutions and administrative de-
partments.

6. For a discussion of ‘Resistance to Change’ see F. C. Mann and F. W. Neff, Managing

Major Change in Organizations, Ann Arbor, Mich., Foundation for Research on Human
Behavior, 1961; and A. Zander, ‘Resistance to Change: Its Analysis and Prevention’, in
Bennis et al., The Planning of Change, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961, pp.
543-8.

7. For a detailed and critical discussion of these segments, see Maryam Jameelah, Islam
and Modernism, Lahore, Muhammad Yusuf Khan, 1977. In this work she is critical of
the writings of the modernists in the Muslim world; her analysis also deals with the na-
tionalists, Arab socialists, and secularists.

8. For a detailed and critical discussion of these issues, see Muhammad Al-Buraey, Man-
agement & Administration in Islam, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia (1990)
Volume 27 Number 10/11 2001 23

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