Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Street, Manila covered by TCT No. 9616—8/39 (1/6 + 1/26) thereof pro indiviso shall pertain
1. “1.At the time of the dissolution of the first marriage or about five years after to each of the children of Nicolas Delizo “of the first marriage, namely: Urbana, Severino
acquisition, according to plaintiffs’ evidence, only about 20 hectares of the and the late Francisco Delizo (the last represented by his children Rancivillano, Soltrifilo,
Caanawan property had been cultivated, the remaining 47 hectares were Josefina, Eufrocina, Aurea, Edita and Fe); and 1/26 thereof pro indiviso shall pertain to each
therefore cleared and improved during the second marriage thru the labor and of the children of the second marriage and their mother Dorotea Ocampo; (a) of all other
industry of the spouses Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea Ocampo for 46 years (1911- properties acquired during the second marriage—19/195 thereof pro indiviso shall pertain to
1957). These improvements were made in good faith considering that Nicolas each of the three children by the first marriage, 2/65 thereof pro indiviso shall pertain to
Delizo administered the properties of the first marriage. The second marriage is each of the nine children of the second marriage, while 28/65 thereof pro indiviso shall
entitled to reimbursement for the increase in value of these 47 hectares (Art. 226
516, N.C.C.). Even the Muñoz property acquired during the second marriage had
226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
to be improved by the spouses Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea Ocampo.
2. “2.The one-half of the fruits of the Caanawan property which should pertain to the Vda. de Delizo vs. Delizo
heirs of Rosa Villasfer refers only to one-half of the net after deducting the pertain to the widow Dorotea Ocampo. The rest of the judgment particularly paragraphs 2
expenses of clearing the land, cultivating, gathering and preservation. Forty- and 3 are affirmed; without pronouncement as to costs in both instances.”
seven hectares of the Caanawan property were cleared and cultivated only From this adverse judgment, petitioners-appellants interposed the present
during the second marriage. Even under a liberal apportionment of the produce, petition for review. The thrust of petitioners-appellants’ petition is that the
the heirs of the second marriage could not be entitled to more than 30% of the
Appellate Court acted under a misapprehension of the facts or decided the legal
gross produce.
3. “3.Part of the price used in the purchase of the properties acquired during the issues in a way which is not in consonance with law and with the applicable
second marriage were the proceeds of a loan. This decisions of this Court, (a) since the 67-hectare Caanawan properties could not
have been properties of the first marriage because they were then public lands
being homesteads, and while the first conjugal partnership may have had valuable for agricultural than forestry purposes, and is not occupied by other person; and showing the
location of the land by stating the province, municipality, and barrio in which the same is situated, and
possessory rights over said properties, it was only during the second marriage as accurate a description as may be given, showing the boundaries of the land, having reference to
that the requirements of the public land law were complied with, resulting in the natural objects and permanent monuments, if any. Upon the filing of said application the Chief of the
confirmation, registration and issuance of the Torrens Title over said properties Bureau of Public Lands shall summarily determine, by inquiry of the Chief of the Bureau of Forestry and
to Nicolas Delizo and his second wife, Dorotea de Ocampo; (b) apart from the fact from the available land records, whether the land described is prima facie subject under the law to
homestead settlement, and if he shall find nothing to the contrary, the applicant, upon the payment of
that the legal presumption that all properties of the marriage belong to the ten pesos, Philippine currency, shall be permitted to enter the quantity of land specified.
conjugal partnership of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea de Ocampo were not “SEC. 3. No certificate shall be given or patent issued for until the expiration of five years from the
sufficiently rebutted, these properties were actually in the adverse possession date of the filing of the application; and if, at the expiration of such time or at any time within three years
thereafter, the person filing such application shall prove by two credible witnesses that he has resided
under claim of title of petitioners-appellants continuously for a period of 47 years upon and cultivated the land for the term of five years immediately succeeding the time of filing the
(1911 to 1957), and consequently, the claim of respondents-appellees for partition application aforesaid, and shall make affidavit
should have been considered barred by acquisitive and extinctive prescription, 228
laches and estoppel; and (c) in any event, there being serious doubts as to whether 228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
said properties belong to the first marriage, it would have been more equitable if
Vda. de Delizo vs. Delizo
the said partnership properties were divided between the different partnerships
in proportion to the duration of each and the capital of the spouses, pursuant to after he has complied with all the requirements of the law. One of the most
Article 189 of the Civil Code. important requirements is that the “person filing the application shall prove by
From the findings of the Appellate Court that sixty-six (66) hectares of the two credible witnesses that he has resided upon and cultivated the land for the
Caanawan properties were acquired by Nicolas Delizo as homesteads during the term of five years immediately succeeding the time of filing the application
period of the first marriage, thus: sixteen (16) hectares as a homestead from the aforesaid, and shall make affidavit that no part of said land has been alienated or
Government in 1905; and the 16-hectare homestead of Nicolas Dacquel, the 16- encumbered * * * ” (Section 3 of Act 926.
hectare homestead of Mariano Antolin, and the 16-hectare homestead of
________________
Francisco Pascua by purchase in 1906, 1907 and 1908, respectively, it does not
necessarily follow that they should be considered as properties of the first
that no part of said land has been alienated or encumbered, and that he has borne true allegiance to
marriage, considering that being homesteads they were part of the public domain, the Government of the United States and that of the Philippine Islands, then, upon payment of a fee of
and it was not shown that all the requirements of the ten pesos, Philippine Currency, to such officer as may be designated by law as local land officer, or in case
227 there be no such officer then to the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands, he shall be entitled to a
patent; Provided, however, That in the event of the death of an applicant prior to the issuance of a patent,
VOL. 69, JANUARY 30, 1976 227 his widow shall be entitled to have a patent for the land applied for issue to her upon showing that she
has consummated the requirements of law for homesteading the lands as above set out; and in case the
Vda. de Delizo vs. Delizo
applicant dies before the issuance of the patent and does not leave a widow, then the interest of the
Homestead Law to warrant the grant of a patent to the homesteader have been applicant in the land shall descend and patent shall issue to the persons who under the laws of the
complied with prior to the death in 1909 of Delia’s first wife, Rosa Villasfer. Philippine Islands would have taken had the title been perfected by patent before the death of the
Under Act 926, which was then the applicable law, the right of the
1
applicant, upon proof by the persons thus entitled of compliance with said requirements and conditions.
“SEC. 4. No lands acquired under the provisions of this chapter shall in any event become liable to
homesteader to the patent does not become absolute until the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the issuance of patent therefor.
“SEC. 5. If, at any time after the filing of the application as hereinabove provided and before the
_______________ expiration of the period allowed by law for the making of final proof, it is proved to the satisfaction of the
Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands, after due notice to the homesteader, that the land entered is not
under the law subject to homestead entry, or that the homesteader has actually changed his. residence,
1 The pertinent provisions of Act No. 926, provide, as follows:
voluntarily abandoned the land for more than six months at any one time during the five years of
“SECTION 1. Any citizen of the Philippine Islands * * * over the age of twenty-one years, or the
residence herein required, or has otherwise failed to comply with the requirements of law, then in that
head of a family, may, as hereinafter provided, enter a homestead of not exceeding sixteen hectares of
event the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands may cancel the entry, subject to appeal under proper
unoccupied, unreserved, unappropriated agricultural public land in the Philippine Islands * * * but no
regulations to the Secretary of the Interior, and the land thereupon shall become subject to disposition as
person who is the owner of more than sixteen hectares of land in said Islands or who has had the benefits
other public lands of like character.
of any gratuitous allotment of sixteen hectares of land since the acquisition of the Islands by the United
“SEC. 6. Not more than one homestead entry shall be allowed to any one person.
States, shall be entitled to the benefits of this chapter.
“SEC. 7. Before final proof shall be submitted by any person claiming to have complied with the
“SEC 2. Any person applying to enter land under the provisions of this chapter shall file with such
provisions of this chapter, due notice, as prescribed by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands with
officer as may be designated by law as local land officer, or in case there be no such officer then with the
229
Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands, an application under oath showing that he has the qualifications
required under section one of this chapter, and that he possesses none of the disqualifications there VOL. 69, JANUARY 30, 1976 229
mentioned; that such application is made for his exclusive use and benefit; that the same is mode for the
purpose of actual settlement and cultivation, and not either directly or indirectly, for the use or benefit of Vda. de Delizo vs. Delizo
any other person, persons, corporation, or association of persons; that the land applied for * * * is more
italics supplied). Prior to the fulfillment of such requirement, the applicant has no then of recent vintage, having been enacted by the Philippine Commission by
complete equitable estate over the homestead which he can sell and convey, authority of the United States Government, only on October 7, 1903.
mortgage or lease . Until a homestead right is established and registered under
2 Considering that Nicolas Dacquel must have been in possession of his
Section 3 of Act 926, there is only an inchoate right to the property and it has not homestead for barely a year when he transferred his rights in 1906, Mariano
ceased to be a part of the public domain and, therefore, not susceptible to Antolin for about two years with respect to his homestead in 1907, and Francisco
alienation as such. Conversely, when a “homesteader has complied with all the
3 Pascua for about three years in 1908 as regards to his homestead, at the time of
terms and conditions which entitled him to a patent for a particular tract of public their respective conveyances to Nicolas Delizo, it is, therefore, obvious that not
land, he acquires a vested interest therein and has to be regarded an equitable one of them could have complied with the requirements of Act No. 926 to entitle
owner thereof.” The decisive factor, therefore, in the determination of whether a
4 any one of them to the issuance of a homestead patent before they sold or
parcel of land acquired by way of homestead is conjugal property of the first or the assigned their rights to Nicolas Delizo. The law was quite specific, that “No
second marriage, is not necessarily the time of the issuance of the homestead certificate shall be given or patent issued for the land applied for until the
patent but the time of the fulfillment of the requirements of the public land law expiration of five years from the date of the filing of the application; and if, at the
for the acquisition of such right to the patent. 5 expiration of such time or at any time within three years thereafter, the person
filing such application shall prove by two credible witnesses that he has resided
_______________ upon and cultivate the land for the term of five years immediately succeeding the
time of filing the application aforesaid, and shall make affidavit that no part of
the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, shall be given to the public of his intention to make said land has been alienated or encumbered, and that he has borne true
such proof, stating therein the time and place, and giving a description of the land and the names of the
witnesses by whom it is expected that the necessary facts will be established.
allegiance to the Government of the United States and that of the Philippine
Islands, then, upon payment of a fee of ten pesos, Philippine currency, to such
*** *** *** officer as may be designated by law as local land officer, or in case there be no
such officer then to the Chief of the Bureau of Lands, he shall be entitled to a
“SEC. 9. No patent shall issue under the provisions of this chapter until the land has been surveyed patent.” (Section 3, Act No. 926, italics supplied). Having neither legal nor
under the direction of the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands and an accurate plat made thereof, the cost equitable title thereon, what was transferred by them to Nicolas Delizo were,
of which survey shall be borne by the Insular Government.” (Italics supplied. This law was later amended therefore, not
by Acts Nos. 1573, 1699, 1864, 1908, 2051, 2222, 2325, and repealed by Act No. 2874. This law was
231
replaced completely by Commonwealth Act No. 141 on November 7, 1936.)
Juanico v. American Land Commercial Company, Inc., 97 Phil. 221, citing Simmons v Wagner, 10
2
VOL. 69, JANUARY 30, 1976 231
U.S. 260, 68 C.J.S., 875.
See Uy Un v. Perez and Villaplana, 71 Phil. 508, where the principle was applied to occupants of
3 Vda. de Delizo vs. Delizo
public lands who have not perfected their rights under Section 45 of Act No. 2874. rights of ownership, but inchoate rights as applicants for homesteads over
Balboa v. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498.
portions of the public domain. Similarly, having received the homestead only in
4
In Fiel et al., v. Wagner, et al. 48 O.G., 195 (January 9, 1950), Justice Concepcion, citing various
5
authorities, reiterated the doctrine that the decisive factor in order to determine whether a land is 1905, Nicolas Delizo could not have perfected his rights thereon by the completion
conjugal property or belongs to one only of the spouses, is not the date of the issuance of the homestead of the five-year occupancy and cultivation requirement of the law, in 1909.
patent but the time of fulfillment of the requirements of the public land law. Although this was a Court of
Buttressing the conclusion that Nicolas Delizo could not have perfected his rights
Appeals decision, the same was sustained by the Supreme Court in its resolution of March 22, 1950.
230 to the four homesteads before 1909 is the specific limitation imposed by section 3
of Act No. 926 which provides that “No person who is the owner of more than
230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
sixteen hectares of land in said Islands or who has had the benefits of any
Vda. de Delizo vs. Delizo gratuitous allotment of sixteen hectares of land since the acquisition of the
As testified to by Lorenzo Delizo, his brother, Nicolas Delizo, and the latter’s wife, Islands by the United States, shall be entitled to the benefits of this chapter.”
Rosa Villasfer, arrived in Barrio Caanawan, San Jose, Nueva Ecija, from Barrio The foregoing sufficiently show that the Appellate Court erred in holding that
Ungag, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, during the year 1905. It was during that same year the entire Caanawan properties belong to the conjugal partnership of Nicolas
that Pedro Salvador and Mauricio Salvador, who were then the cabecillias, were Delizo and Rosa Villasfer. Considering, however, that about twenty (20) hectares
distributing lands to homesteaders in Barrio Caanawan. Nicolas Dacquel, were cultivated and rendered productive during the period from 1905 to 1909,
Mariano Antolin and Francisco Pascua must have received their respective justice and equity demand that the rights to said properties be apportioned to the
homesteads from the same officers of the government that same year, considering parties in proportion to the extent to which the requirements of the public land
that their respective homesteads are all adjacent to the homestead of Nicolas laws had been complied with during the existence of each conjugal partnership.
Delizo, and according to the evidence, this was the time when the homesteads in
that barrio were parceled out to the new settlers. Indeed, the Homestead Act was
II Caanawan lands contributed considerably to the acquisition of these properties,
and We have held that the children of the first marriage, as a matter of equity,
In connection with the other properties, such as Lot No. 498 of the San Jose should share in the Caanawan properties. To deny the respondents-appellees a
Cadastre, under Original Certificate of Title No. 5622; a parcel of land in San share in such properties would have
Jose, Nueva Ecija, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2985 (Exh. I or 13), and
agricultural land of about 17.4753 hectares in Sitio Rangayan, Muñoz, Nueva _______________
Ecija, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5162 (Exh. J or 14); a parcel of land
in Caanawan, San Jose, with an area of about 14.0354 hectares, under Transfer 6 Article 1407 provides:
“ART. 1407. All the property of the spouses shall be deemed partnership property in the absence of
Certificate of Title No. 11910 (Exh. K or 10); a cornland in Barrio Rangayan, proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife.”
Muñoz, Nueva Ecija, of about 1,500 square meters under Tax Declaration No. 233
5476; a riceland in Rangayan, Muñoz, of about 17.4755 hectares, under Tax VOL. 69, JANUARY 30, 1978 233
Declaration No. 812; a riceland, Lot No. 847, of about 13.0902 hectares covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3585, issued on April 29, 1929 in the name of Vda. de Delizo vs. Delizo
“Nicolas Delizo, married to Dorotea de Ocampo” (Exh. L or 15); a camarin of exacerbated discord instead of enhancing family solidarity and understanding.
strong materials with galvanized iron roofing in San Jose, Nueva Ecija; a Considering these circumstances and since the capital of either marriage or
residential lot at Sanchez Street, San Jose, the contribution of each spouse cannot be determined with mathematical
232 precision, the total mass of these properties should be divided between the two
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED conjugal partnerships in proportion to the duration of each partnership. Under 7
this criterion, the second conjugal partnership should be entitled to 46/64 or 23/32
Vda. de Delizo vs. Delizo of the total mass of properties, and the first conjugal partnership to 18/64 or 9/32
Nueva Ecija; Lot No. 1790 of the San Jose Cadastre, consisting of about 2,840 thereof pro indiviso. The share of the estate of Nicolas Delizo is one-half (1/2) pro
square meters, more or less, under Original Certificate of Title No. 8131 “in indiviso of the net remainder of the conjugal partnership of gains of the first and
8
another name but claimed by the heirs under deed of sale, Exhibit N-l”; a sugar second marriages, which would amount to 32/64 or 1/2 of the whole estate. This
mill in San Jose, Nueva Ecija and several heads of carabaos (Exh. 0); Lots Nos. should be distributed in equal shares to his children of both marriages, with the 9
495 and 496 of the San Jose Cadastre, possessed by defendants although widow having the same share as that of legitimate child. The widow. Dorotea de
10
adjudicated in the name of Marcelo Tomas and Guillermo Cabiso, respectively; Ocampo, is entitled to one-half (1/2) of the net remainder of the second conjugal
and another lot, Lot No. 494-A of the San Jose Cadastre adjudicated in the name partnership and to her share as heir of her deceased husband which amounts to
of Nicolas Delizo, married to Dorotea de Ocampo, the Appellate Court decision 23/64 of said properties, plus 1/13 of 32/64 pro indiviso. The share of the heirs of
penned by Justice Arsenio Solidum held that “there is no controversy that these Rosa. Villasfer would be 9/64 thereof.
were all acquired during the existence of the second marriage of Nicolas Delizo”. The foregoing is recapitulated as follows:
The same opinion, however, held that since these properties were acquired
Share of Rosa Villasfer, 1st wife 9/64 of whole estate to be
from the produce of the Caanawan properties although such produce is the result
of the labor and industry of the spouses Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea de Ocampo, divided among three (3) children
only eighty per cent (80%) of said properties acquired during the second marriage Share of Dorotea de Ocampo, 2nd wife 23/64 of whole estate plus her
should appertain to the second conjugal partnership, while twenty per cent (20%)
share in Nicolas Delizo s estate.
thereof adjudicated to the children of the first marriage. The two concurring
Appellate Justices, although of the view that the legal presumption that those Share of Nicolas Delizo, husband 32/64 of whole estate to be
properties acquired during the regime of the second conjugal partnership belong divided into thirteen (13) equal parts.
to said partnership has not been rebutted by respondents-appellees and,
Whole Estate 64/64
therefore, would hold that such after-acquired properties should belong to the
second conjugal partnership, concurred nevertheless in the result aforesaid, in
_______________
order to reach a judgment in the case. It would have been facile to hold that those
after-acquired properties belong to the second conjugal partnership in view of the 7Article 1431, now Article 189, Civil Code.
statutory presumption enunciated in Article 1407 of the old Civil Code (now 8Articles 1392 and 1426, now Articles 142 and 185, Civil Code.
Article 160, New Civil Code). There are, however, important considerations which
6
9Article 932, now Article 980, Civil Code.
Article 999, Civil Code.
preclude Us from doing so. There is the established fact that the produce of the 10
234
235
234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
VOL. 69, JANUARY 30. 1976 235
Vda. de Delizo vs. Delizo
Republic vs. Presiding Judge, CFI of Lanao del Norte, Br. II
Computation of Sharing
within one year from the issuance of the decree of registration. Applied to
3/64 + 1/26 = 142/1664] homesteads the decree of registration corresponds to the promulgation of the
3/64 + 1/26 = 142/1664] —Share of each child of 1st marriage order of the Director of Lands for the issuance of the patent and not the actual
issue of the patent. (Lopez VS. Padilla, L-27559, May 18, 1972).
3/64 + 1/26 = 142/1664] b) Underlying principle for enactment of Public Land Law.—The plain intent
1/26 = 64/1664] of the law is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for
himself and his family the land that the State had gratuitously given to him as a
1/26 = 64/1664]
reward for his labor in cleaning and cultivating it. It is in this sense that the
1/26 = 64/1664] provision of law, Section 119 of Commonwealth Act 141, becomes unqualified and
unconditional. And in keeping with such reasons behind the passage of the law,
1/26 = 64/1664]
—Share of each child of 2nd marriage its basic objective is to promote public policy, that is, to provide home and decent
1/26 = 64/1664] living for destitutes, aimed at promoting a class of independent small landholders
which is the bulwark of peace and order. (Simeon vs. Peña, L-29049, December
1/26 = 64/1664]
29, 1970).
1/26 = 64/1664] c) Conjugal partnership.—Article 160 of the Civil Code must be construed in
1/26 = 64/1664] relation to Articles 153 to 159 of the same Code, enumerating the properties
“acquired x x x during the marriage” that constitute the conjugal partnership.
23/64 + 1/26 = 662/1664 —Share of Dorotea Ocampo. Consequently therewith, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove
32/64 + 13/26 = 1664/1664 —Whole Estate that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. In other
words, proof of acquisition during coverture is a condition sine qua non for the
operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal partnership. (Ponce de Leon vs.
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, L-24571, December 18, 1970).
In the partition of the properties, the probate court should take into account the
fact that the respondents-appellees are in possession of the Muñoz lands, while ——oOo——
the petitioners-appellants have been in possession of the Caanawan properties as
well as the house and lot at 562 P. Campa Street. Sampaloc, Manila, as directed
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in the trial court’s order of April 23, 1958 (Record on Appeal, pp. 76-77). Should it
be convenient for the parties, their respective shares should be taken from the
properties presently under their custody.
Having reached the foregoing conclusions, it is unnecessary to resolve the
other legal questions raised in the appeal.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
modified as herein indicated. The records of these cases should be, as they are
hereby, remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with
this judgment, No costs.
Fernando, Barredo and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.
Castro, C.J., in the result.
Aquino, J., did not take part.
Decision modified.
Notes.—a) Homesteaa patent deemed issued upon promulgation of order for its
issuance,—In ordinary registration proceedings involving private lands, courts
may reopen proceedings already closed by final decision or decree, only when
application for review is filed by the party aggrieved,
Same; Indispensable Parties; Section 7, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court; Without
VOL. 232, MAY 27, 1994 579
the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, a judgment of the court cannot
Uy vs. Court of Appeals attain real finality.—Section 7, Rule 3, of the Revised Rules of Court defines indispensable
parties to be “(p)arties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an
G.R. No. 102726. May 27, 1994. *
action x x x.” Even private respondents, in their complaint in Civil Case No. 91-573, have
TSHIATE L. UY and RAMON UY, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, acknowledged that petitioners “claim some interest in the Estate of Menilo B. Uy, Sr.” The
NATIVIDAD CALAUNAN-UY, and THE ESTATE OF MENILO B. UY, SR., trial court itself, in setting aside its previous judgment upon compromise, has expressed
REPRESENTED BY MENILO C. UY, JR., NILDA C. UY, MELVIN C. UY and “that the intervenors have legal interest in the matter in litigation,” a statement which we
MERLITO C. UY, respondents. find hard to brush aside. In the interest of adjudicating the whole controversy, petitioners’
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Family Code; The action for partition of property inclusion in the action for partition, given the circumstances, not only is preferable but
on alleged co-ownership is governed by Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code considering rightly essential in the proper disposition of the case. It is a settled rule that without the
that the co-owner died on September 27, 1990, after the effectivity of E.O. 209 (Family Code) presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, a judgment of the court cannot
on August 3, 1988.—The action for partition in Civil Case No. 91-573 is predicated on an attain real finality.
alleged co-ownership between private respondent Natividad Calaunan-Uy and deceased
Menilo, Sr., of property evidently acquired during the period of their common-law PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
relationship. The governing provisions, applicable to their case, are now found in Article 147
and Article 148 of the Family Code, considering that Menilo Uy, Sr., died on 27 September
1990, well after the effectivity of Executive Order No. 209 (The Family Code of the
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Philippines) on 03 August 1988. Abad, Santos and Associates for petitioners.
Civil Procedure; Motion for Intervention; Motion for intervention filed at the stage Cristino C. Abasolo and Jose C. Cordova for Natividad Calaunan-Uy.
where trial has been concluded and judgment has been promulgated is manifestly late,
beyond the period prescribed under Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court.—The case VITUG, J.:
Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, may not be on all fours to the case at bench but
the rationale behind the decision can well be applicable. Citing Manila Railroad Co. vs.
Attorney-General, this Court held: ‘It is quite clear and patent that the motions for
This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision,
581
intervention filed by the movants at this stage of the proceedings where trial has already
been concluded, a judgment thereon had been promulgated in favor of private respondent VOL. 232, MAY 27, 1994 581
and on appeal by the losing party, the Director of Lands, the same was affirmed by the
Uy vs. Court of Appeals
Court of Appeals and the instant petition for certiorari to review said judgment is already
submitted for decision by the Supreme Court, are obviously and manifestly late, beyond the dated 23 September 1991, of respondent Court of Appeals, which has reversed the
period prescribed under the aforecoded Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court. questioned order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Makati, Metro Manila.
The facts, hereunder recited, are culled from the findings of the Court of
_______________ Appeals.
Private respondent Natividad Calaunan-Uy was the commonlaw wife of the
THIRD DIVISION.
*
580
late Menilo B. Uy, Sr., for about thirty-six (36) years. Their union bore four
children—Melito, Jr., Nilda, Melvin and Merlito—all surnamed Uy. On 31
5 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED October 1990, soon after the death of Menilo Uy, Sr., herein petitioners Tshiate
80 Uy and Ramon Uy initiated before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 65,
Uy vs. Court of Appeals
Makati, Metro Manila, Special Proceedings No. M-2606, entitled “In the Matter of
Same; Same; Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court’s proper aim is to facilitate the
the Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Menilo B. Uy, Sr.” On
application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was not created to hinder 28 February 1991, private respondent filed a motion to hold the special
and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice.—But Rule 12 of the proceedings in abeyance. The day before, or on 27 February 1991, private
Rules of Court like all other Rules therein promulgated, is simply a rule of procedure, the respondent filed with the RTC, Branch 58, Makati, Civil Case No. 91-573 for
whole purpose and object of which is to make the powers of the court fully and completely “Partition of Properties Under Co-ownership,” against the Estate of Menilo Uy,
available for justice. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to Sr. (supposedly represented by their four children).
facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created On the day of trial in Civil Case No. 91-573, or on 23 April 1991, the parties,
not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does
upon the suggestion of the trial court, submitted a Compromise Agreement. On 24
not constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is
designed as the means best adopted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an
April 1991, a judgment, based on that compromise, was rendered, and a writ of
end. execution was issued on 15 May 1991. On 24 May 1991, petitioner Tshiate Uy
filed an omnibus motion, alleging that by virtue of a Hong Kong marriage, she
was the surviving legal spouse of Menilo, Sr. She prayed that she and her son Uy vs. Court of Appeals
Ramon Uy be allowed to intervene in the civil case, submitting at the same time governed by the rules on co-ownership.
their answer in intervention. The intervenors contended, among other things, “In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together
that the judgment upon the compromise was a patent nullity. On 10 June 1991, shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall
the trial court issued an order allowing the intervention and setting aside the be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
“compromise judgment.” Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration; it participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
was denied by the trial court in its order of 08 July 1991. A petition contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and
for certiorari was filed with respondent appellate court, which, on 23 September maintenance of the family and of the household.
“Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the
1991, promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of which read:
property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the
582
other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED “When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party
in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case
Uy vs. Court of Appeals
of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each
“WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and the orders of respondent court dated vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
June 10, 1991 and July 8, 1991 are hereby SET ASIDE. No costs. descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall
“SO ORDERED.” 1
The case Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals , may not be on all fours to the
3
compromise, has expressed “that the intervenors have legal interest in the matter
case at bench but the rationale behind the decision can well be applicable. Citing in litigation,” a statement which we find hard to brush aside. In the interest of
Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney-General, this Court held:
4
adjudicating the whole controversy, petitioners’ inclusion in the action for
“It is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention filed by the movants at this partition, given the circumstances, not only is preferable but rightly essential in
stage of the proceedings where trial has already been concluded, a judgment thereon had
the proper disposition of the case. It is a settled rule that without the presence of
been promulgated in favor of private respondent and on appeal by the losing party, the
Director of Lands, the same was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the instant petition indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, a judgment of the court cannot
for certiorari to review said judgment is already submitted for decision by the Supreme attain real finality. 6
Court, are obviously and manifestly late, beyond the period prescribed under the aforecoded Private respondents argue that their failure to implead peti-
Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court.
“But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court like all other Rules therein promulgated, is simply a _______________
rule of procedure, the whole purpose and object of which is to make the powers of the court
fully and completely available for justice. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. 5Rollo, p. 38.
Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending 6Lozano vs. Ballesteros, 195 SCRA 681.
parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the 586
administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts are always 586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best adopted to obtain that thing.
In other words, it is a means to an end. Uy vs. Court of Appeals
“The denial of the motions for intervention arising from the strict application of the tioners in the complaint for partition has been cured by the filing of
Rule due to alleged lack of notice to, or the alleged petitioners’ omnibus motion asking leave to intervene and attaching thereto an
answer in intervention. Private respondents overlook the fact that the motion has
_______________
been filed subsequent to the judgment based upon the compromise agreement
3 93 SCRA 238.
(among private respondents themselves) that did not include, and thereby cannot
4 20 Phil. 523. be held to bind, petitioners. 7
649
On July 6, 2006, the writ was partially executed with the petitioner paying
VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 649 the respondents the amount of P46,870.00, representing the following payments:
Quiao vs. Quiao (a) P22,870.00—as petitioner’s share of the payment of the conjugal share;
Further, except for the personal and real properties already foreclosed by the RCBC, all (b) P19,000.00—as attorney’s fees; and
the remaining properties, namely: (c) P5,000.00—as litigation expenses.11
1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte; _______________
2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte; 8 Id., at p. 59.
9 Id., at pp. 58-59.
3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
10 Id., at p. 59.
4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur; 11 Id., at p. 60.
5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan 651
City;
6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located in Manila de VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 651
Bugabos, Butuan City; Quiao vs. Quiao
7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
On July 7, 2006, or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the
8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City;
shall be divided equally between herein [respondents] and [petitioner] subject to the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, 12 asking
respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities of the RTC to define the term “Net Profits Earned.”
[P]45,740.00. To resolve the petitioner’s Motion for Clarification, the RTC issued an
[Petitioner’s] share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is Order13 dated August 31, 2006, which held that the phrase “NET PROFIT
forfeited in favor of the common children. EARNED” denotes “the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting
He is further ordered to reimburse [respondents] the sum of [P]19,000.00 as attorney’s the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts.”14 The Order further
fees and litigation expenses of [P]5,000.00[.] held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in
SO ORDERED.”
favor of the common children because the offending spouse does not have any
5
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period
right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and
provided for under Section 17(a) and (b) of the Rule on Legal Separation. 6
43, No. (2) of the Family Code.15 The dispositive portion of the Order states:
On December 12, 2005, the respondents filed a motion for execution 7 which “WHEREFORE, there is no blatant disparity when the sheriff intends to forfeit all the
the trial court granted in its Order dated December 16, 2005, the dispositive remaining properties after deducting the payments of the debts for only separate properties
portion of which reads: of the defendant-respondent shall be delivered to him which he has none.
_______________ The Sheriff is herein directed to proceed with the execution of the Decision.
5 Id., at pp. 56-57.
IT IS SO ORDERED.” 16
6 A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC.
7 Rollo, p. 185. Not satisfied with the trial court’s Order, the petitioner filed a Motion for
650 Reconsideration17 on September 8, 2006. Consequently, the RTC issued another
650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Order18 dated November 8, 2006, holding that although the Decision dated
October 10, 2005 has become final and executory, it may still consider
Quiao vs. Quiao _______________
“Wherefore, finding the motion to be well taken, the same is hereby granted. Let a writ 12 Id., at pp. 61-69.
of execution be issued for the immediate enforcement of the Judgment. 13 Id., at pp. 70-76.
14 Id., at p. 75.
SO ORDERED.” 8
15 Id., at pp. 74-75.
Subsequently, on February 10, 2006, the RTC issued a Writ of 16 Id., at pp. 75-76.
Execution9 which reads as follows: 17 Id., at pp. 77-86.
“NOW THEREFORE, that of the goods and chattels of the [petitioner] BRIGIDO B. 18 Id., at pp. 87-91.
QUIAO you cause to be made the sums stated in the afore-quoted DECISION [sic], together 652
with your lawful fees in the service of this Writ, all in the Philippine Currency. 652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Quiao vs. Quiao While the petitioner has raised a number of issues on the applicability of
the Motion for Clarification because the petitioner simply wanted to clarify the certain laws, we are well-aware that the respondents have called our attention to
meaning of “net profit earned.”19 Furthermore, the same Order held: the fact that the Decision dated October 10, 2005 has attained finality when the
“ALL TOLD, the Court Order dated August 31, 2006 is hereby ordered set aside. NET Motion for Clarification was filed.24 Thus, we are constrained to resolve first the
PROFIT EARNED, which is subject of forfeiture in favor of [the] parties’ common children, issue of the finality of the Decision dated October 10, 2005 and subsequently
is ordered to be computed in accordance [with] par. 4 of Article 102 of the Family Code.”
20 discuss the matters that we can clarify.
On November 21, 2006, the respondents filed a Motion for The Decision dated October 10, 2005
Reconsideration,21 praying for the correction and reversal of the Order dated has become final and executory at
November 8, 2006. Thereafter, on January 8, 2007,22 the trial court had changed the time the Motion for Clarification
its ruling again and granted the respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration whereby was filed on July 7, 2006.
the Order dated November 8, 2006 was set aside to reinstate the Order dated _______________
23 Id., at p. 18.
August 31, 2006. 24 Id., at pp. 143-146.
Not satisfied with the trial court’s Order, the petitioner filed on February 27, 654
2007 this instant Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising 654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
the following:
Quiao vs. Quiao
Issues Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
“Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal.—The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is
required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30)
I days from notice of the judgment or final order.
IS THE DISSOLUTION AND THE CONSEQUENT LIQUIDATION OF THE COMMON The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
PROPERTIES OF THE HUSBAND AND WIFE BY VIRTUE OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
SEPARATION GOVERNED BY ARTICLE 125 (SIC) OF THE FAMILY CODE? reconsideration shall be allowed.”
II
In Neypes v. Court of Appeals,25 we clarified that to standardize the appeal
WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE NET PROFITS EARNED BY THE CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP FOR PURPOSES OF EFFECT-
periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal
_______________ their cases, we held that “it would be practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days
19 Id., at p. 90. within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the
20 Id., at p. 91.
21 Id., at pp. 92-97. order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.”26
22 Id., at pp. 115-122. In Neypes, we explained that the “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule
653
40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the RTCs; Rule 42 on
VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 653 petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA); Rule 43 on
Quiao vs. Quiao appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA and Rule 45 governing appeals
ING THE FORFEITURE AUTHORIZED UNDER ARTICLE 63 OF THE FAMILY CODE? by certiorari to the Supreme Court. We also said, “The new rule aims to regiment
III or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order
WHAT LAW GOVERNS THE PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE HUSBAND AND denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or
WIFE WHO GOT MARRIED IN 1977? CAN THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES partial) or any final order or resolution.”27 In other words, a party litigant may
BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING THE NET file his notice of appeal within a fresh 15-day period from his receipt of the trial
PROFITS SUBJECT OF FORFEITURE AS A RESULT OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL
court’s decision or final order denying his motion for new trial or motion for
SEPARATION WITHOUT IMPAIRING VESTED RIGHTS ALREADY ACQUIRED UNDER
THE CIVIL CODE? reconsideration. Failure to avail of the fresh 15-day period from the
_______________
IV
25 506 Phil. 613, 629; 469 SCRA 633, 644 (2005).
WHAT PROPERTIES SHALL BE INCLUDED IN THE FORFEITURE OF THE SHARE OF 26 Id., at p. 626; p. 644.
THE GUILTY SPOUSE IN THE NET CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP AS A RESULT OF 27 Id., at p. 627; p. 645.
THE ISSUANCE OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION? 23
655
applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of In our en banc Resolution dated October 18, 2005 for ABAKADA Guro Party
the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the List Officer Samson S. Alcantara, et al. v. The Hon. Executive Secretary Eduardo
Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. The latter provision is R. Ermita,63 we also explained:
_______________
applicable because according to Article 256 of the Family Code “[t]his Code shall 60 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Art. 143.
have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired 61 G.R. No. 172027, July 29, 2010, 626 SCRA 180, 201.
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other law.”58 62 Id., at p. 199.
63 The Court consolidated the following cases: ABAKADA Guro Party List Officer Samson S.
Now, the petitioner asks: Was his vested right over half of the common Alcantara, et al. v. The Hon. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, G.R. No. 168056; Aquilino Q.
properties of the conjugal partnership violated when the trial court forfeited them Pimen-
in favor of his children pursuant to Articles 63(2) and 129 of the Family Code? 663
We respond in the negative. VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 663
Indeed, the petitioner claims that his vested rights have been impaired,
Quiao vs. Quiao
arguing: “As earlier adverted to, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of
“The concept of “vested right” is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due
the conjugal properties, the same being owned in common by the spouses. If the
process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is
provisions of the Family Code are to be given retroactive application to the point protected against arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal or equitable title to the
of authorizing the forfeiture of the petitioner’s share in the net remainder of the enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created after the right
conjugal partnership properties, the same impairs his rights acquired prior to the has become vested. Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present
effectivity of the Family Code.”59 In other words, the petitioner is saying that interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed and irrefutable.” (Emphasis and
64
since the property relations between the spouses is governed by the regime of underscoring supplied)
Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired From the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not be deprived of his
vested rights over half of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, “vested right,” he may lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation
pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which is founded in law and jurisprudence.
_______________ In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due
57 Id., at Art. 143. process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in her complaint
58 FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Art. 256.
59 Rollo, p. 29. that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her. 65 In fact, in his Answer, the
662 petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the community assets between the
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the
accounting and inventory of all the community properties of the
Quiao vs. Quiao parties.66 Second, when the Decision dated October 10, 2005 was promulgated,
provides: “All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common the petitioner never questioned the trial court’s ruling forfeiting what the trial
by the husband and wife.”60 Thus, since he is one of the owners of the properties court termed as “net profits,” pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family
covered by the conjugal partnership of gains, he has a vested right over half of the Code.67 Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due
said properties, even after the promulgation of the Family Code; and he insisted process.
that no provision under the Family Code may deprive him of this vested right by _______________
virtue of Article 256 of the Family Code which prohibits retroactive application of tel, Jr., et al. v. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 168207; Association of
Pilipinas Shell Dealers, Inc., et al. v. Cesar V. Purisima, et al., G.R. No. 168461; Francis Joseph G.
the Family Code when it will prejudice a person’s vested right. Escudero v. Cesar V. Purisima, et al., G.R. No. 168463; and Bataan Governor Enrique T. Garcia, Jr. v.
However, the petitioner’s claim of vested right is not one which is written on Hon. Eduardo R. Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 168730.
stone. In Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,61 we define and explained “vested right” in 64 Id.
65 Rollo, p. 37.
the following manner:
66 Id., at p. 39.
“A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do not depend upon events 67 Id., at pp. 55-57.
foreign to the will of the holder, or to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is 664
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED From the above discussions, Article 129 of the Family Code clearly applies to
the present case since the parties’ property relation is governed by the system of
Quiao vs. Quiao relative community or conjugal partnership of gains and since the trial court’s
Furthermore, we take note that the alleged deprivation of the petitioner’s Decision has attained finality and immutability.
“vested right” is one founded, not only in the provisions of the Family Code, but in The net profits of the conjugal
Article 176 of the Civil Code. This provision is like Articles 63 and 129 of the partnership of gains are all the
Family Code on the forfeiture of the guilty spouse’s share in the conjugal fruits of the separate properties
partnership profits. The said provision says: of the spouses and the products
“Art. 176. In case of legal separation, the guilty spouse shall forfeit his or her share of of their labor and industry.
the conjugal partnership profits, which shall be awarded to the children of both, and the
The petitioner inquires from us the meaning of “net profits” earned by the
children of the guilty spouse had by a prior marriage. However, if the conjugal partnership
property came mostly or entirely from the work or industry, or from the wages and salaries,
conjugal partnership for purposes of effecting
_______________
or from the fruits of the separate property of the guilty spouse, this forfeiture shall not 69 Id., at pp. 890-891; p. 663.
apply. 70 Rollo, p. 55.
In case there are no children, the innocent spouse shall be entitled to all the net profits.” 71 Malayan Employees Association-FFW v. Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., G.R. No. 181357, February
From the foregoing, the petitioner’s claim of a vested right has no basis 2, 2010, 611 SCRA 392, 399; Catmon Sales Int’l. Corp. v. Atty. Yngson, Jr., G.R. No. 179761, January 15,
considering that even under Article 176 of the Civil Code, his share of the 2010, 610 SCRA 236, 245.
666
conjugal partnership profits may be forfeited if he is the guilty party in a legal
separation case. Thus, after trial and after the petitioner was given the chance to 666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
present his evidence, the petitioner’s vested right claim may in fact be set aside Quiao vs. Quiao
under the Civil Code since the trial court found him the guilty party. the forfeiture authorized under Article 63 of the Family Code. He insists that
More, in Abalos v. Dr. Macatangay, Jr.,68 we reiterated our long-standing since there is no other provision under the Family Code, which defines “net
ruling that: profits” earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation, then Article
“[P]rior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in the 102 of the Family Code applies.
conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an
What does Article 102 of the Family Code say? Is the computation of “net
equitable estate, and does not ripen into title until it appears that there are assets in the
community as a result of the liquidation and settlement. The interest of each spouse is profits” earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the same with the
limited to the net remainder or “remanente liquido” (haber ganancial) resulting from the computation of “net profits” earned in the absolute community?
liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the right of the Now, we clarify.
husband or First and foremost, we must distinguish between the applicable law as to the
_______________
68 482 Phil. 877-894; 439 SCRA 649, 663-664 (2004).
property relations between the parties and the applicable law as to the definition
665 of “net profits.” As earlier discussed, Article 129 of the Family Code applies as to
VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 665 the property relations of the parties. In other words, the computation and the
succession of events will follow the provisions under Article 129 of the said Code.
Quiao vs. Quiao Moreover, as to the definition of “net profits,” we cannot but refer to Article 102(4)
wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and liquidation of of the Family Code, since it expressly provides that for purposes of computing the
the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally determined
net profits subject to forfeiture under Article 43, No. (2) and Article 63, No. (2),
that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided
between the spouses or their respective heirs.” (Citations omitted)
69
Article 102(4) applies. In this provision, net profits “shall be the increase in value
Finally, as earlier discussed, the trial court has already decided in its Decision between the market value of the community property at the time of the
dated October 10, 2005 that the applicable law in this case is Article 129(7) of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its
Family Code.70 The petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration nor a dissolution.”72 Thus, without any iota of doubt, Article 102(4) applies to both the
notice of appeal. Thus, the petitioner is now precluded from questioning the trial dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of the Family
court’s decision since it has become final and executory. The doctrine of Code, and to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129
immutability and unalterability of a final judgment prevents us from disturbing of the Family Code. Where lies the difference? As earlier shown, the difference
the Decision dated October 10, 2005 because final and executory decisions can no lies in the processes used under the dissolution of the absolute community regime
longer be reviewed nor reversed by this Court.71 under Article 102 of the Family Code, and in the processes used under the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family
Code.
_______________ part of the absolute community. And its market value at the time of the
72 FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Art. 102(4).
667
dissolution of the absolute community constitutes the “market value at
dissolution.”
VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 667 (b) Thus, when the petitioner and the respondent finally were legally
Quiao vs. Quiao separated, all the properties which remained will be liable for the debts and
Let us now discuss the difference in the processes between the absolute obligations of the community. Such debts and obligations will be subtracted from
community regime and the conjugal partnership regime. the “market value at dissolution.”
On Absolute Community Regime: (c) What remains after the debts and obligations have been paid from the
When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband total assets of the absolute community constitutes the net remainder or net asset.
and the wife becomes joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever And from such net asset/remainder of the petitioner and respondent’s remaining
property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the properties, the market value at the time of marriage will be subtracted and the
marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the resulting totality constitutes the “net profits.”
_______________
common mass of the couple’s properties. And when the couple’s marriage or
75 Tolentino, Arturo, M., COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE
community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or PHILIPPINES: VOLUME ONE WITH THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, pp. 401-402 (1990).
their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have established, 669
irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned.73 VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 669
Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon dissolution of marriage, an
inventory is prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute Quiao vs. Quiao
community and the exclusive properties of each; then the debts and obligations of (d) Since both husband and wife have no separate properties, and
the absolute community are paid out of the absolute community’s assets and if the nothing would be returned to each of them, what will be divided equally between
community’s properties are insufficient, the separate properties of each of the them is simply the “net profits.” However, in the Decision dated October 10, 2005,
couple will be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance. Whatever is left of the the trial court forfeited the half-share of the petitioner in favor of his children.
separate properties will be delivered to each of them. The net remainder of the Thus, if we use Article 102 in the instant case (which should not be the case),
absolute community is its net assets, which shall be divided between the husband nothing is left to the petitioner since both parties entered into their marriage
and the wife; and for purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture, without bringing with them any property.
said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the On Conjugal Partnership Regime:
community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market Before we go into our disquisition on the Conjugal Partnership Regime, we
value at the time of its dissolution.74 make it clear that Article 102(4) of the Family Code applies in the instant
_______________ case for purposes only of defining “net profit.” As earlier explained, the
73 Id., at Art. 91; See also Tolentino, Arturo, M., COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL definition of “net profits” in Article 102(4) of the Family Code applies to both the
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES: VOLUME ONE WITH THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 379 (1990).
74 FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Art. 102.
absolute community regime and conjugal partnership regime as provided for
668 under Article 63, No. (2) of the Family Code, relative to the provisions on Legal
Separation.
668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Now, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of
Quiao vs. Quiao gains under Article 142 of the Civil Code, “the husband and the wife place in
Applying Article 102 of the Family Code, the “net profits” requires that we common fund the fruits of their separate property and income from their work or
first find the market value of the properties at the time of the community’s industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the
dissolution. From the totality of the market value of all the properties, we partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse
subtract the debts and obligations of the absolute community and this result to during the marriage.”76 From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his
the net assets or net remainder of the properties of the absolute community, from and her own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or
which we deduct the market value of the properties at the time of marriage, merger of those debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a
which then results to the net profits.75 complete separation of capitals.77
Granting without admitting that Article 102 applies to the instant case, let us _______________
76 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Art. 142.
see what will happen if we apply Article 102:
77 Tolentino, Arturo, M., COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE
(a) According to the trial court’s finding of facts, both husband and wife have PHILIPPINES: VOLUME ONE, p. 365 (1974).
no separate properties, thus, the remaining properties in the list above are all 670
5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan
670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
City;
Quiao vs. Quiao 6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located in Manila de
Considering that the couple’s marriage has been dissolved under the Family Bugabos, Butuan City;
Code, Article 129 of the same Code applies in the liquidation of the couple’s 7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City.
properties in the event that the conjugal partnership of gains is dissolved, to wit:
80
“Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following
(b) Ordinarily, the benefit received by a spouse from the conjugal
procedure shall apply: partnership during the marriage is returned in equal
_______________
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the conjugal
78 Tolentino, Arturo, M., COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE
partnership and the exclusive properties of each spouse. PHILIPPINES: VOLUME ONE WITH THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 472 (1990).
(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal debts and 79 Rollo, p. 55.
obligations of either spouse shall be credited to the conjugal partnership as an asset thereof. 80 Id., at pp. 56-57.
(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive funds in the 672
acquisition of property or for the value of his or her exclusive property, the ownership of
672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
which has been vested by law in the conjugal partnership.
(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of the Quiao vs. Quiao
conjugal assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable amount to the assets of the conjugal partnership;81 and if the community is
for the unpaid balance with their separate properties, in accordance with the provisions of enriched at the expense of the separate properties of either spouse, a restitution
paragraph (2) of Article 121.
of the value of such properties to their respective owners shall be made.82
(5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be
delivered to each of them. (c) Subsequently, the couple’s conjugal partnership shall pay the debts of the
(6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source, the loss or conjugal partnership; while the debts and obligation of each of the spouses shall
deterioration of movables used for the benefit of the family, belonging to either spouse, even be paid from their respective separate properties. But if the conjugal partnership
due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse from the conjugal funds, if any. is not sufficient to pay all its debts and obligations, the spouses with their
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the separate properties shall be solidarily liable.83
profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different (d) Now, what remains of the separate or exclusive properties of the husband
proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or unless there has been and of the wife shall be returned to each of them. 84 In the instant case, since it
a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code.
was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon the
partition in accordance with Article 51. separate properties,85 there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed
(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is properties above are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily,
situated shall, unless otherwise agreed what remains in the above-listed properties should be divided equally between
671 the spouses and/or their respective heirs.86 However, since the trial court found
VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 671 the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal
partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2)
Quiao vs. Quiao
of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community
upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common
children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen
regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership
the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the regime, because there is no separate property which may be accounted for
court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children.” in the guilty party’s favor.
_______________
In the normal course of events, the following are the steps in the liquidation of
81 FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Art. 129(2).
the properties of the spouses: 82 Id., at Art. 129(3).
(a) An inventory of all the actual properties shall be made, separately listing 83 Id., at Art. 129(4).
the couple’s conjugal properties and their separate properties. 78 In the instant 84 Id., at Art. 129(5).
85 Rollo, p. 55.
case, the trial court found that the couple has no separate properties 86 FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Art. 129(7).
when they married.79 Rather, the trial court identified the following conjugal 673
properties, to wit:
VOL. 675, JULY 4, 2012 673
1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte; Quiao vs. Quiao
3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
In the discussions above, we have seen that in both instances, the petitioner is
not entitled to any property at all. Thus, we cannot but uphold the Decision dated
October 10, 2005 of the trial court. However, we must clarify, as we already did
above, the Order dated January 8, 2007.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 1 of Butuan City is AFFIRMED. Acting on the Motion for
Clarification dated July 7, 2006 in the Regional Trial Court, the Order dated
January 8, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court is hereby CLARIFIED in accordance
with the above discussions.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Perez and Sereno, JJ.,
concur.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes.—With the advent of the fresh period rule, parties who availed
themselves of the remedy of motion for reconsideration are now allowed to file a
notice of appeal within fifteen days from the denial of that motion. (Sumiran vs.
Damaso, 596 SCRA 450 [2009])
The fresh period rule can be made applicable to actions pending upon its
effectivity without danger of violating anyone else’s rights. (Id.)
In Neypes v. Court of Appeals, 469 SCRA 633 (2005), the Court allowed a fresh
period of fifteen (15) days within which to file a notice of appeal in the Regional
Trial Court to be counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new
trial or motion for reconsideration; The “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule
45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. (Tejano, Jr. vs.
Sandiganbayan, 584 SCRA 191 [2009])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
conclusively explain such deduction, there exists the legal presumption that all property of
VOL. 183, MARCH 26, 1990 713
the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership absent any proof that it is the exclusive
Toda, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals property of either spouse. Since Rose Marie failed to prove that the amount forms part of
her paraphernal property, it is presumed to be conjugal property. Consequently, Benigno is
G.R. Nos. 78583-84. March 26, 1990. *
entitled to the said amount of P360,095.12, hence he rightfully deducted the same from the
BENIGNO TODA, JR., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ROSE MARIE amount due to Rose Marie.
TUASON-TODA, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 78696-97. March 26, 1990. * PETITION to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
ROSE MARIE TUASON-TODA, petitioner, vs. BENIGNO TODA, JR.,
respondent. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Civil Law; Property; Conjugal Partnership; The separation of property is not effected Bautista, Picazo, Buyco, Tan & Fider for Benigno Toda, Jr.
by the mere execution of the contract or agreement of the parties but by the decree of the court Belo, Abiera & Associates for petitioner Rose Marie Tuason-Toda.
approving the same; The conjugal partnership is dissolved only upon the issuance of a decree 715
of separation of property.—We are in agreement with the holding of the Court of Appeals
that the compromise agreement became effective only on June 9, 1981, the date when it was VOL. 183, MARCH 26, 1990 715
approved by the trial court, and not on March 30, 1981 when it was signed by the parties. Toda, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
Under Article 190 of the Civil Code, “(i)n the absence of an express declaration in the
marriage settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall
not take place save in virtue of a judicial order.” Hence, the separation of property is not REGALADO, J.:
effected by the mere execution of the contract or agreement of the parties, but by the decree
of the court approving the same. It, therefore, becomes effective only upon judicial approval, These consolidated cases seek a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
without which it is void. Furthermore, Article 192 of said Code explicitly provides that promulgated on January 29, 1987 in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 06675 and 07936, the
1
agreement by reason of the fact that the amount was deducted by Benigno from the P2 termination of conjugal partnership for alleged mismanagement and dissipation
million which he paid on April 14, 1981. While no sufficient proof was adduced to of conjugal funds against Benigno.
After hearings were held, the parties in order to avoid further 7Ibid., 62.
8Ibid., 122-125.
717
________________
VOL. 183, MARCH 26, 1990 717
Justice Jose A.R. Melo, ponente, with Justices Ricardo P. Tensuan and Jaime M. Lantin,
1
Toda, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
concurring; Rollo, G.R. Nos. 78583-84, 29-45.
Presided over by then Judge Rizalina Bonifacio Vera.
2
at the rates stipulated in the compromise agreement from date of demand by Rose
716 Marie. 9
716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED The compromise agreement which, as earlier stated, was incorporated in the
petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership and was approved by the court
Toda, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals below, contains the following stipulations:
“disagreeable proceedings,” filed on April 1, 1981 a joint petition for judicial xxx
approval of dissolution of conjugal partnership under Article 191 of the Civil “4. For the best interest of each of them, petitioners have agreed to dissolve their
Code, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 9478, which was consolidated with the
3 conjugal partnership and to partition the assets thereof, under the following terms and
aforesaid civil case. This petition which was signed by the parties on March 30, conditions—this document, a pleading, being intended by them to embody and evidence
1981, embodied a compromise agreement allocating to the spouses their their agreement;
respective shares in the conjugal partnership assets and dismissing with
prejudice the said Civil Case No. 35566, CA-G.R. No. 11123-SP of the Court of 1. “(a)Petitioners as the parties hereto agree upon the dissolution of their conjugal
Appeals and G.R. No. 56121 of this Court. The said petition and the compromise partnership during the marriage and further agree to obtain judicial approval of
agreement therein were approved by the trial court in its order of June 9, 1981. 4
their said agreement as provided by Article 191 of the Civil Code.
2. “(b)The following shall be adjudicated to petitioner Rose Marie Tuason-Toda:
Thereafter, several orders were issued by the lower court pertaining to the
interpretation and implementation of the compromise agreement, as follows:
1. (1)Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00) to be paid as follows:
1. 1.Order, dated November 20, 1981, ordering Benigno, inter alia, to pay
1. (a)Petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr. shall assume the payment of the estate taxes,
Rose Marie the cash dividends on the shares declared on April 25, 1981
interest and penalties thereon, pertaining to the estate of petitioner Rose Marie
amounting to P37,126.30; that declared on July 25, 1981 amounting to Tuason-Toda’s late brother Manuel Tuason, Jr. in the sum of P15,749,135.32 as
P40,196.12; that declared on July 1, 1981, given on September 25, 1981 of March 31, 1981—all interest and penalty charges after March 31, 1981 to be
amounting to P2,191.62; and the payment of P360,095.12 to Rose Marie the responsibility of petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr.
which is the balance of P2 million paid on April 4, 1981; 5
2. (b)P2,000,000.00 to be paid within 30 days after signing of this agreement.
2. 2.Order, dated June 2, 1982, ordering Benigno to pay Rose Marie interest 3. (c)The balance shall be paid within six (6) months after date of signing of this
at 18% per annum on the amounts required to be paid in the order of agreement. If not paid when due, the balance shall bear interest at 18% per
November 20, 1981, as well as 5% non-payment penalty should the said annum until paid and there shall be a 5% non-payment penalty. The proceeds
from any sale of or loss with respect to, Rubicon’s shares in Philippine Air Lines,
order of November 20, 1981 be sustained on appeal; 6
3 Rollo, G.R. Nos. 78696-97, 69-74. 1. other obligation under this agreement.
4 Ibid., 75-84. 2. (2)All shares of stock in San Miguel Corporation registered solely in the name of
5 Ibid., 85-98. petitioner Rose Marie Tuason-Toda whether stock dividends or stocks acquired
6 Ibid., 102-105.
on pre-emptive rights including those acquired in the names of both petitioners 1. “(c)All other properties of the conjugal partnership of whatever kind wherever
Benigno Toda, Jr. and Rose Marie Tuason-Toda (whether jointly or alternately located shall be adjudicated to petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr. even though acquired
‘and/or’), free from all liens and encumbrances. in the name of petitioner Rose Marie Tuason-Toda or both of them—she
3. (3)All shares of stock in San Miguel Corporation acquired whether as stock undertaking to execute the corresponding deeds of conveyances.
dividends of or on pre-emptive rights pertaining to the shares of stock in said 2. “(d)Petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr. shall assume the payment of all conjugal
corporation of petitioner Rose Marie Tuason-Toda’s brother the late Manuel obligations, petitioner Rose Marie Tuason-Toda representing and warranting
Tuason, Jr. (of course, the original shares of the latter pertain to petitioner Rose that she has no pending obligation or incurred no obligation chargeable to the
Marie Tuason-Toda also), free from all liens and encumbrances except for the conjugal partnership except those listed in Annex ‘A’ hereof.“If the Rosaria
estate tax lien. Petitioner Rose Marie Tuason-Toda hereby grants petitioner Apartment is subject to a mortgage loan and such loan is a conjugal debt,
Benigno Toda, Jr. an irrevocable proxy, for three years through the 1983 petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr. shall assume such loan and shall obtain the
stockholders’ meeting whether annual or special to elect directors for all shares discharge of the mortgage.
of stock she owns directly or indirectly including those from the late Manuel 3. “(e)After the signing of this document:
Tuason, Jr. in San Miguel Corporation.
4. (4)The Banaba Forbes Park conjugal dwelling and its contents free from all liens
1. (1)Each of them shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy his or her
and encumbrances except that petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr. shall remove
separate estate, present and future, without the consent of the other;
therefrom his personal effects including furniture and appliances in his study
2. (2)All earnings from any profession business or industry shall likewise belong to
room and T.V. room and, from the family room, all antiques, rugs, paintings of
each of them respectively;
Old Fort Manila, books and mementos. Petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr. commits
3. (3)All expenses and obligations incurred by each of them shall be their respective
that no servant now living in the Tolentino street apartments shall be evicted.
and separate responsibilities.
5. (5)The San Francisco apartment at Apartment 905, No. 1750 Taylor Street, San
Francisco, California, U.S.A., and its contents, free from all liens and
encumbrances, except that petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr. shall remove therefrom 1. “(f)With the signing of this document, Civil Case No. 35566 of this same
his personal effects. Court, CA-G.R. No. 11123-SP and SC-G.R. No. L-56121 shall be deemed
6. (6)The artifacts already removed by petitioner Rose Marie Tuason-Toda from the dismissed with prejudice as between the parties
Madrid Apartment at No. 4 San Pedro de Valdivia. She shall return to it its
silver ware, china ware, paintings and etchings. She may retain the three fans 720
encased in glass and may remove her clothes, perfumes and toiletries, the Sansa
painting of a shell dedicated to her, the painting of the Madonna and tapestry 720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
hanging in her bedroom, 5 Persian rugs, 1 writing desk and chair and the 2 Toda, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
lamps thereon and 1 lamp on the night table, and the statuette given her by
hereto.”
Hagedorn.
10
to hold petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr. harmless from any claim for attorneys’ fees
and expenses that may be filed against the conjugal partnership or herself for
services rendered to her in the prosecution of her claims against said conjugal Ironically, the said agreement failed to fully subserve the intended amicable
partnership or against petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr. or to secure her paraphernal settlement of all the disputes of the spouses. Instead, as lamented by the counsel
estate. of one of them, the compromise agreement which was designed to terminate a
2. (10)Two shares with two lots in Valley Golf & Country Club. litigation spawned two new petitions, with each party initiating one against the
3. (11)One share in Club Puerta de Hierro in Madrid, Spain if there is one registered other. Thus, illustrative of the saying that a solution which creates another
in petitioner Rose Marie Tuason-Toda’s name. problem is no solution, the contradictory interpretations placed by the parties on
4. (12)Share in Montemar Beach Club in Bagac, Bataan—petitioner Rose Marie
Tuason-Toda agreeing to asume the balance of the acquisition cost thereof.
some provisions of the agreement resulted in appeals to respondent court and, order.” Hence, the separation of property is not effected by the mere execution of
eventually, the present recourse to us. the contract or agreement of the parties, but by the decree of the court approving
Benigno appealed from the aforestated orders of the trial court of November the same. It, therefore, becomes effective only upon judicial approval, without
20, 1981, June 2, 1982, December 9, 1982, March 1, 1983 and March 14, 1983 which it is void. Furthermore, Article 192 of
15
containing the directives hereinbefore respectively set out. The same were
disposed of by the Court of Appeals as explained at the start of this decision. _________________
Rose Marie now submits that the Court of Appeals erred:
Ibid., 22.
12
1. 1.In holding that the compromise agreement of the parties herein became Now Art. 134 of the Family Code.
14
effective only after its judicial approval on June 9, 1981 and not upon Lacson vs. Lacson, et al., 24 SCRA 837 (1968); see also Tolentino, Civil Code, Vol. I, 1987 Ed., 487.
15
722
its execution on March 30, 1981;
2. 2.In setting aside the order of the lower court dated June 2, 1981 722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
directing Benigno to pay interest of eighteen percent and non-payment Toda, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
penalty of five percent; and dissolved only upon the issuance of a decree of separation of property.
3. 3.In setting aside the order of the lower court directing the Consequently, the conjugal partnership of Benigno and Rose Marie should be
considered dissolved only on June 9, 1981 when the trial court approved their
_______________ joint petition for voluntary dissolution of their conjugal partnership. Conformably
thereto, the cash dividends declared on July 1, 1981 and July 25, 1981 in the
Ibid., 69-73.
amount of P2,191.62 and P40,196.12, respectively, should pertain to Rose Marie;
10
Ibid., 73.
11
721 and that declared on April 25, 1981 in the amount of P37,126.30 ought to be paid
to Benigno, pursuant to Paragraph 4 (c) of the compromise agreement which
VOL. 183, MARCH 26, 1990 721
awards to Benigno the conjugal assets not otherwise specifically assigned to Rose
Toda, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals Marie.
On the other hand, Benigno contends in his present petition before us that: With respect to the amount of P360,095.12 which Benigno deducted from the
P2 million supposed to be paid to Rose Marie, it is not clear from the records
1. 1.The Court of Appeals erred on a question of law when it affirmed the lower where said amount came from. The Court of Appeals, in holding that it is conjugal
court’s award of P4,623,929.24 without trial and evidence-taking and overruled and therefore belongs to Benigno, presumed it to be in the nature of cash
petitioner’s claim of violation of his due process right; dividends declared prior to the approval of the compromise agreement by reason
2. 2.The Court of Appeals erred on a question of law and due process when it upheld of the fact that the amount was deducted by Benigno from the P2 million which
the lower court’s denial of petitioner’s motion for her inhibition/disqualification; he paid on April 14, 1981. While no sufficient proof was adduced to conclusively
3. 3.Since the document (the parties’ compromise agreement) explicitly provided for
explain such deduction, there exists the legal presumption that all property of the
assumption of liability rather than agency to pay and since there was no
evidence-taking, the Court of Appeals’ finding of an agency to pay is reviewable marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership absent any proof that it is the
as a question of law; and exclusive property of either spouse. Since Rose Marie failed to prove that the
16
4. 4.The Court of Appeals erred on a question of law involving the parol evidence amount forms part of her paraphernal property, it is presumed to be conjugal
rule. 13 property. Consequently, Benigno is entitled to the said amount of P360,095.12,
hence he rightfully deducted the same from the amount due to Rose Marie.
The award of cash dividends basically depends on the date of effectivity of the The issue regarding the annotation of the lien on Benigno’s properties has
compromise agreement as this will determine whether the same is conjugal been mooted by our resolution dated April 3, 1989 wherein, at his instance, we
property or separate property of the spouses. ordered the cancellation thereof upon his posting of the corresponding bond. In
We are in agreement with the holding of the Court of Appeals that the our resolution of February 26, 1990, we noted Benigno’s compliance, approved the
compromise agreement became effective only on June 9, 1981, the date when it bond he filed, and ordered the cancellation of the liens annotated on the
was approved by the trial court, and not on March 30, 1981 when it was signed by certificates of title of the properties
the parties. Under Article 190 of the Civil Code, “(i)n the absence of an express
14
_______________
declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between
spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial
16 Article 160, Civil Code.
723 that he was deprived of his day in court. Furthermore, respondent court correctly
VOL. 183, MARCH 26, 1990 723 held that the issue involved was more of a question of interpretation of a contract
rather than a determination of facts. Benigno failed to make a plausible showing
Toda, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
that the supposed evidence he had intended to present, if any, would not be
Likewise, the order denying the motion to inhibit Judge Rizalina Bonifacio Vera
merely collateral matters.
has become academic considering that she no longer presides over the court where Considering that the amount of P4,623,982.24 actually forms an integral part
the case was filed. Besides, as correctly explained by respondent court, the ground of the P40 million (minus the lawful and authorized deductions that may be made
for inhibition raised by Benigno is not valid it being merely on the basis of the therefrom) which Benigno categorically undertook to pay to Rose Marie, the same
judge having acquired knowledge of the facts surrounding the agreement of the must earn interest at the rate of 18% per annum and 5% non-payment penalty,
parties, hence she would be a material witness to the issue of the true agreement the same being included in and within the contemplation of Paragraph 4 (b) (1) (c)
which is contested by the parties. However, those facts came to the knowledge of
of the compromise agreement. Said provision of the agreement provides for the
the judge in the course of her efforts to effect a compromise between parties and payment of the interest and penalty upon non-payment of the balance of the P40
are also known to the parties. This is not a ground for disqualification; on the million after the specific authorized deductions therefrom. Since the amount of
contrary, said acts of the judge were in accord with the rule encouraging P4,623,982.24 was not to be lawfully deducted by Benigno, as hereinbefore
compromises in litigations, especially between members of the same family. explained, it constitutes part of the contemplated contingent balance which might
Anent the tax savings of P4,623,982.24 obtained by Benigno, we hold that this turn out to be due to Rose Marie and, therefore, subject to the imposition of said
forms part of the P40 million allocated to Rose Marie under paragraph 4 (b) (1) of
increments on Benigno’s liability.
the compromise agreement. We give credit to the ratiocination thereon of the trial
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with the
court as quoted with approval by respondent court: modification that Benigno Toda, Jr. is hereby
“The records show that petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr. paid only P1,125,152.48 in estate taxes,
although the amount stated in the Compromise Agreement was P15,749,135.32. The
________________
balance of P4,623,929.24 is now being claimed by both parties as aforestated. In the opinion
of this court, the pertinent terms of the Agreement as quoted, are clear and do not require
any interpretation. In brief, under the Agreement, petitioner Rose Marie T. Toda is Rollo, G.R. Nos. 78696-97, 61-62.
17
725
adjudicated the fixed sum of P40 million, to be paid as follows: (a) Payment by petitioner
Benigno Toda, Jr. of the estate taxes, interests and penalties thereon, pertaining to the VOL. 183, MARCH 27, 1990 725
estate of the late Manuel Tuason, Jr. in the amount of P15,749,135.32 as of March 31, 1982;
(b) P2 million within 30 days after signing of the Agreement; (c) the balance within six United Realty Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
months after date of signing of the Agreement. This Court notes that the amount of taxes, 18% per annum and 5% non-payment penalty on the tax savings of P4,623,982.24
interests and penalties is fixed at P15,749,135.32 and this figure was provided by Benigno from date of formal demand until the same is fully paid.
Toda, Jr. There is no provision as contended by petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr. that the SO ORDERED.
amount was only an assumed liability and that he could attempt to reduce it by suit or Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras, Padilla andSarmiento, JJ., concur.
compromise. It is clear that if the amount of P4,623,929.24 is to be credited to Benigno Toda, Judgment affirmed with modification.
Jr. then the P40 million which petitioner Rose Marie T. Toda is to receive would be short by
Note.—When the property is registered in the name of a Spouse only and
that amount. This VOL. 183, MARCH 26, 1990
724 there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by said spouse, the
property belongs exclusively to said spouse. (PNB vs. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA
724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
435.)
Toda, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
Benigno Toda, Jr. was constituted as agent to pay to the government the liability of the ——o0o——
estate of the late Manuel Tuason, Jr. in the fixed amount of P15,749,135.32 and if he was
able to secure a reduction thereof, then he should deliver to his principal such reduction. . .
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
xxx” 17
We do not believe that Benigno was denied due process when the trial court
resolved the motion of Rose Marie for the payment of P4,623,982.24 without the
benefit of a hearing. The records disclose that the hearing thereon was postponed
twice at the instance of Benigno, which prompted the court to thereafter consider
the motion submitted for resolution on the basis of the allegations therein and the
answer filed by counsel for both parties. Benigno cannot now be heard to claim
Same; Prescription; Petitioners’ action which was filed on December 23, 1985 or more
600 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
than forty (40) years from the execution of the deed of donation on May 22, 1944 was clearly
Valencia vs. Locquiao time-barred.—Viewing petitioners’ action for reconveyance from whatever feasible legal
angle, it is definitely barred by prescription. Petitioners’ right to file an action for the
G.R. No. 122134. October 3, 2003. *
reconveyance of the land accrued in 1944, when the Inventario Ti Sagut was executed. It
ROMANA LOCQUIAO VALENCIA and CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, must be remembered that before the effectivity of the New Civil Code in 1950, the Old Code
petitioners, vs. BENITO A. LOCQUIAO, now deceased and substituted by JIMMY of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) governed prescription. Under the Old Code of Civil
LOCQUIAO, TOMASA MARA and the REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OF Procedure, an action for recovery
602
PANGASINAN, respondents.
CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, petitioner, vs. BENITO A. LOCQUIAO, now 6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
deceased and substituted by JIMMY LOCQUIAO, respondent. 02
Attorneys; Notary Public; Failure of the notary public to furnish a copy of the deed to
the appropriate office is a ground for disciplining him but certainly not for invalidating the Valencia vs. Locquiao
document or for setting aside the transaction therein involved.—The certification is not of the title to, or possession of, real property, or an interest therein, can only be
sufficient to prove the alleged inexistence or spuriousness of the challenged document. The brought within ten years after the cause of such action accrues. Thus, petitioners’ action,
appellate court is correct in pointing out that the mere absence of the notarial record does which was filed on December 23, 1985, or more than forty (40) years from the execution of
not prove that the notary public does not have a valid notarial commission and neither does the deed of donation on May 22, 1944, was clearly time-barred.
the absence of a file copy of the document with the archives effect evidence of the Same; Same; The prescriptive period for the reconveyance of property allegedly
falsification of the docu- registered through fraud is ten (10) years reckoned from the date of the issuance of the
certificate of title.—As early as May 15, 1970, when the deed of donation was registered and
_______________ the transfer certificate of title was issued, petitioners were considered to have constructive
knowledge of the alleged fraud, following the jurisprudential rule that registration of a deed
*SECOND DIVISION. in the public real estate registry is constructive notice to the whole world of its contents, as
601 well as all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. As it is now settled that the
VOL. 412, OCTOBER 3, 2003 601 prescriptive period for the reconveyance of property allegedly registered through fraud is
ten (10) years, reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title, the action
Valencia vs. Locquiao filed on December 23, 1985 has clearly prescribed.
ment. This Court ruled that the failure of the notary public to furnish a copy of the
deed to the appropriate office is a ground for disciplining him, but certainly not for
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
invalidating the document or for setting aside the transaction therein involved.
Same; Same; A public document executed and attested through the intervention of the
Appeals.
notary public is evidence of the facts therein expressed in clear unequivocal manner.—
Thirdly, the questioned deeds, being public documents as they were duly notarized, are The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
admissible in evidence without further proof of their due execution and are conclusive as to Romeo C. Dela Cruz for respondents.
the truthfulness of their contents, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary. A public document executed and attested through the intervention of the notary
TINGA, J.:
public is evidence of the facts therein expressed in clear, unequivocal manner.
Civil Law; Donations; The celebration of the marriage between the beneficiary couple
in tandem with compliance with the prescribed form was enough to effectuate the donation The Old Civil Code and the Old Code of Civil Procedure, repealed laws that they
1 2
propter nuptias under the Old Civil Code.—Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter both are notwithstanding, have not abruptly become mere quiescent items of legal
nuptias must be made in a public instrument in which the property donated must be history since their relevance do not wear off for a long time. Verily, the old
specifically described. However, Article 1330 of the same Code provides that “acceptance is statutes proved to be decisive in the adjudication of the case at bar.
not necessary to the validity of such gifts.” In other words, the celebration of the marriage Before us is a petition for review seeking to annul and set aside the
between the beneficiary couple, in tandem with compliance with the prescribed form, was
joint Decision dated November 24, 1994, as well as the Resolution dated
3 4
enough to effectuate the donation propter nuptias under the Old Civil Code.
Same; Same; As provided in Article 129, express acceptance is not necessary for the
September 8, 1995, of the former Tenth Division of the 5
validity of donations propter nuptias; Implied acceptance is sufficient.—Under the New Civil
Code, the rules are different. Article 127 thereof provides that the form of donations propter _______________
nuptias are regulated by the Statute of Frauds. Article 1403, paragraph 2, which contains
the Statute of Frauds requires that the contracts mentioned thereunder need be in writing 1 Otherwise referred to as the Civil Code of Spain of 1889.
only to be enforceable. However, as provided in Article 129, express acceptance “is not 2 Act No. 190.
Rollo, pp. 45-58.
necessary for the validity of these donations.”Thus, implied acceptance is sufficient.
3
Id, at p. 59.
4
due course, the original title was cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate
Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., ponente, with former Associate Justice Jaime M.
of Title No. 84897 was issued in the name of the respondents Benito and Tomasa.
5
15
Valencia vs. Locquiao parcels of land left by their common progenitors, excluding the land in question
Court of Appeals in two consolidated cases involving an action for annulment of and other lots disposed of by the Locquiao spouses earlier. Contained in the deed
title and an action for ejectment.
6 7
is a statement that respondent Benito and Marciano Locquiao, along with the
Both cases involve a parcel of land consisting of 4,876 square meters situated heirs of Lucio Locquiao, “have already received our shares in the estates of our
in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. This land was originally owned by the spouses parents, by virtue of previous donations and conveyances,” and that for that
Herminigildo and Raymunda Locquiao, as evidenced by Original Certificate of reason the heirs of Lucio Locquaio were not made parties to the deed. All the
Title No. 18383 issued on October 3, 1917 by the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan.
8
living children of the Locquaio spouses at the time, including petitioner Romana,
On May 22, 1944, Herminigildo and Raymunda Locquiao executed a deed of confirmed the previous dispositions and waived their rights to whomsoever the
donation propter nuptias which was written in the Ilocano dialect, denominated properties covered by the deed of partition were adjudicated. 17
consideration of the impending marriage of the donees. distribution of the two (2) lots. Although not directly involved in the discord,
The donees took their marriage vows on June 4, 1944 and the fact of their Benito signed the compromise agreement together with his feuding siblings,
marriage was inscribed at the back of O.C.T. No. 18383. 10
nephews and nieces. Significantly, all the signatories to the compromise
Herminigildo and Raymunda died on December 15, 1962 and January 9, 1968, agreement, including petitioner
respectively, leaving as heirs their six (6) children, namely: respondent Benito,
Marciano, Lucio, Emeteria, Anastacia, and petitioner Romana, all surnamed _______________
Locquiao. With the permission of respondents Benito and Tomasa, petitioner
11
Romana Valencia (hereinafter, Romana) took possession and cultivated the TSN, October 2, 1986, pp. 19, 22.
13
605
Maria Alicia Austria-Martinez (now Supreme Court Associate Justice), concurring. VOL. 412, OCTOBER 3, 2003 605
CA-G.R. No. CV-21311.
6
Exhibit “7-B,” Annotation at the back of OCT 18383, supra; Vide RTC Decision in Civil Case No. U-
10
4348, Record, p. 253. Sometime in 1983, the apparent calm pervading among the heirs was
TSN, October 2, 1986, pp. 11, 13.
11
disturbed when petitioner Constancia filed an action for annulment of title
TSN, April 7, 1987, p. 21.
12
against the respondents before the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan. The 20
604
record shows that the case was dismissed by the trial court but it does not
604 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED indicate the reason for the dismissal. 21
Valencia vs. Locquiao On December 13, 1983, respondent Benito filed with the Municipal Trial
ter, petitioner Constancia) took over, and since then, has been in possession of the Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan a Complaint seeking the ejectment of petitioner
22
land. 13
Constancia from the subject property.
Meanwhile, respondents Benito and Tomasa registered the Inventario Ti
Sagut with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan on May 15, 1970. In 14
On November 25, 1985, the Municipal Trial Court rendered prescribed, considering that the complaint for annulment of title was filed more
a Decision, ordering the defendant in the case, petitioner Constancia, to vacate
23 than fifteen (15) years after the issuance of the title, or beyond the ten (10)-year
the land in question. prescriptive period for actions for reconveyance. It likewise rejected the
Petitioners Romana and Constancia countered with a Complaint for the 24 petitioners’ assertion that the donation propter nuptias is null and void for want
annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 84897 against respondents Benito of acceptance by the donee, positing that the implied acceptance flowing from the
and Tomasa which they filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan on
25 very fact of marriage between the respondents, coupled with the registration of
December 23, 1985. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of the transfer the fact of marriage at the back of OCT No. 18383, constitutes substantial
certificate of title was fraudulent; that the Inventario Ti Sagut is spurious; that compliance with the requirements of the law.
the notary public who notarized the document had no authority to do so, and; that The petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the
29
the donation did not observe the form required by law as there was no written appellate court in its Resolution dated September 8, 1995. Hence, this petition.
30
acceptance on the document itself or in a separate public instrument. We find the petition entirely devoid of merit.
Meanwhile, the decision in the ejectment case was appealed to the same RTC Concerning the annulment case, the issues to be threshed out are: (1) whether
where the case for annulment of title was also pending. Finding that the question the donation propter nuptiasis authentic; (2) whether acceptance of the donation
of ownership was the central issue in both cases, the court issued by the donees is required; (3) if
an Order suspending the
26
_______________
_______________
Supra, item 4.
27
20 Agrarian Case No. 1406, Vide Decision dated January 30, 1989, supra; TSN, April 7, 1987, pp. 13- Rollo, pp. 104-118.
29
Ibid.
21
607
Vide Complaint in Civil Case No. U-4338, Record, p. 3.
22
VOL. 412, OCTOBER 3, 2003 607
Ibid.
23
Locquiao, the adopted son Benito Locquiao, as party-defendant. Vide Order dated March 23, 1988,
Record, p. 215. barred by prescription and laches.
Order dated September 29, 1986, cited in the RTC decision dated January 31, 1989, Records, pp.
26
The lnventario Ti Sagut which contains the donation propter nuptias was
102-103.
executed and notarized on May 22, 1944. It was presented to the Register of
606
Deeds of Pangasinan for registration on May 15, 1970. The photocopy of the
606 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED document presented in evidence as Exhibit “8” was reproduced from the original
Valencia vs. Locquiao kept in the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan. 31
proceedings in the ejectment case until it shall have decided the ownership issue The petitioners have launched a two-pronged attack against the validity of the
in the title annulment case. donation propter nuptias, to witfirst, the Inventario Ti Sagut is not authentic; and
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision dated January 30, 1989 dismissing
27
second, even assuming that it is authentic, it is void for the donee’s failure to
the complaint for annulment of title on the grounds of prescription and laches. It accept the donation in a public instrument.
likewise ruled that the Inventario Ti Sagut is a valid public document which To buttress their claim that the document was falsified, the petitioners rely
transmitted ownership over the subject land to the respondents. With the mainly on the Certification dated July 9, 1984 of the Records Management and
32
dismissal of the complaint and the confirmation of the respondents’ title over the Archives Office that there was no notarial record for the year 1944 of Cipriano V.
subject property, the RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC in the Abenojar who notarized the document on May 22, 1944 and that therefore a copy
ejectment case. 28
of the document was not available.
Dissatisfied, petitioners elevated the two (2) decisions to the respondent Court The certification is not sufficient to prove the alleged inexistence or
of Appeals. Since they involve the same parties and the same property, the spuriousness of the challenged document. The appellate court is correct in
appealed cases were consolidated by the appellate court. pointing out that the mere absence of the notarial record does not prove that the
On November 24, 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered the notary public does not have a valid notarial commission and neither does the
assailed Decision affirming the appealed RTC decisions. The appellate court absence of a file copy of the document with the archives effect evidence of the
upheld the RTC’s conclusion that the petitioners’ cause of action had already falsification of the document. This Court ruled that the failure of the notary public
33
to furnish a copy of the deed to the appropriate office is a ground for disciplining Decision, p. 3, supra.
35
609
transaction therein involved. 34
Moreover, the heirs of the Locquaio spouses, including petitioner Romana, VOL. 412, OCTOBER 3, 2003 609
made reference in the deed of partition and the compromise agreement to the Valencia vs. Locquiao
previous donations made by the spouses in The petitioners fault the RTC for admitting in evidence the deed of partition and
the compromise agreement on the pretext that the documents “were not properly
_______________ submitted in evidence”, pointing out that “when presented to respondent Tomasa
Mara for identification, she simply stated that she knew about the documents but
Vide Certification dated August 11, 1983 at the bottom of Exhibit “8,” Record, p. 9.
she did not actually identify them.”
31
37
608 bother to object to the documents at the time they were offered in evidence, it is 39
608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED now too late in the day for them to question their admissibility. Secondly, the
documents were identified during the Pre-Trial, marked as Exhibits “2” and “3”
Valencia vs. Locquiao
and testified on by respondent Tomasa. Thirdly, the questioned deeds, being
40
favor of some of the heirs. As pointed out by the RTC respondent Benito was not
public documents as they were duly notarized, are admissible in evidence without
35
allotted any share in the deed of partition precisely because he received his share
further proof of their due execution and are conclusive as to the truthfulness of
by virtue of previous donations. His name was mentioned in the deed of partition
their contents, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. A 41
only with respect to the middle portion of Lot No. 2638 which is the eleventh
public document executed and attested through the intervention of the notary
(11th) parcel in the deed but that is the same one-third (1/3) portion of Lot No.
public is evidence of the facts therein expressed in clear, unequivocal manner. 42
nuptias. Similarly, Marciano Locquiao and the heirs of Lucio Locquiao were not
the Civil Code of Spain (Old Civil Code), the acceptance by the donees should be
allocated any more share in the deed of partition since they received theirs by
made in a public instrument. This argument was rejected by the RTC and the
virtue of prior donations or conveyances.
appellate court on the theory that the implied acceptance of the donation had
The pertinent provisions of the deed of partition read:
flowed from the celebration of the marriage between the respondents, followed by
...
That the heirs of Lucio Locquiao are not included in this Partition by reason of the fact the registration of the fact of marriage at the back of OCT No. 18383.
that in the same manner as we, BENITO and MARCIANO LOCQUIAO are concerned, we The petitioners, the appellate court and the trial court all erred in applying
have already received our shares in the estate of our parents by virtue of previous donations the requirements on ordinary donations to the present
and conveyances, and that we hereby confirm said dispositions, waiving our rights to
whomsoever will these properties will now be adjudicated; _______________
...
That we, the Parties herein, do hereby waive and renounce as against each other any Petition, p. 31, citing TSN, April 7, 1987, pp. 12-13.
37
claim or claims that we may have against one or some of us, and that we recognize the rights Section 36, Rule 132, Revised Rules of Court.
38
of ownership of our coheirs with respect to those parcels already distributed and Order dated May 22, 1987, Record, p. 192.
39
adjudicated and that in the event that one of us is cultivating or in possession of any one of TSN, April 7, 1987, Folder of TSN, p. 107.
40
the parcels of land already adjudicated in favor of another heir or has been Gerales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85909, 9, February 1993, 218 SCRA 638, 648, citing Baranda
41
and waive our right of possession in favor of the heir in whose favor the donation or Article 633 of the Old Civil Code provides that the acceptance in an ordinary donation must appear
43
especially as regards the formal essential requisites. Even if the provisions of the New Civil Code were to be applied, the case of the
Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptiasmust be made in a public petitioners would collapse just the same. As earlier shown, even implied
instrument in which the property donated must be specifically acceptance of a donation propter nuptias suffices under the New Civil Code. 51
described. However, Article 1330 of the same Code provides that acceptance is not
45 With the genuineness of the donation propter nuptiasand compliance with the
necessary to the validity of such gifts”. In other words, the celebration of the applicable mandatory form requirements fully
marriage between the beneficiary couple, in tandem with compliance with the
prescribed form, was enough to effectuate the donation propter nuptias under the _______________
Old Civil Code.
Under the New Civil Code, the rules are different. Article 127 thereof provides Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration vs. Gonzalez, G.R. No. 34628, 30 July 1979, 92 SCRA
46
172, cited in Ortigas Co., Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126102, 346 SCRA 748 (2000).
that the form of donations propter nuptias are regulated by the Statute of Frauds. Ilejay v. Ilejay, et al., (S.C.) 49 O.G. 4903; Casabar v. Sino Cruz, et al., 96 Phil. 970 (1954), cited in I
47
Article 1403, paragraph 2, which contains the Statute of Frauds requires that the A. Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines Commentaries and Jurisprudence 18 (1990 ed.)
contracts mentioned thereunder need be in writing only to be enforceable. Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, 75 Phil. 371 (1945).
48
However, as provided in Article 129, express acceptance “is not necessary for the Ebero v. Canizares, 79 Phil. 152 (1947).
49
The petitioners argued that the deed of donation did not comply with the requirements of Article
50
validity of these donations.” Thus, implied acceptance is sufficient. 633 of the Old Civil Code. Petition, p. 28, Record, p. 29.
Article 129, New Civil Code, supra
51
_______________ 612
612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
44 Article 126, New Civil Code. The definition was retained in Article 82 of the Family Code. Article
1327 of the Old Civil Code similarly defines donations by reason of marriage as “those bestowed before its Valencia vs. Locquiao
celebration in consideration of the same, upon one or both of the spouses.” established, petitioners’ hypothesis that their action is imprescriptible cannot
Article 1328 of the Old Civil Code provides that donations propter nuptias are governed by the
take off.
45
rules on ordinary donations (Title II, Book III of the Code) “insofar as they are not modified by the
following articles.” Article 633 of the same Code, which is under Title II, Book III, provides that ordinary Viewing petitioners’ action for reconveyance from whatever feasible legal
donations must be made in a public instrument in which the property donated must be specifically angle, it is definitely barred by prescription. Petitioners’ right to file an action for
described. It is also settled that a donation of real estate propter nuptias is void unless made by public
the reconveyance of the land accrued in 1944, when the Inventario Ti Sagut was
instrument. Solis v. Barroso, 53 Phil. 912 (1928); Camagay v. Lagera, 7 Phil. 397 (1907); Velasquez v.
Biala, 18 Phil. 231 (1911). executed. It must be remembered that before the effectivity of the New Civil Code
611 in 1950, the Old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) governed
VOL. 412, OCTOBER 3, 2003 611 prescription. Under the Old Code of Civil Procedure, an action for recovery of the
52
title to, or possession of, real property, or an interest therein, can only be brought
Valencia vs. Locquiao within ten years after the cause of such action accrues. Thus, petitioners’ action,
53
The pivotal question, therefore, is which formal requirements should be applied which was filed on December 23, 1985, or more than forty (40) years from the
with respect to the donation propter nuptias at hand. Those under the Old Civil execution of the deed of donation on May 22, 1944, was clearly timebarred.
Code or the New Civil Code? Even following petitioners’ theory that the prescriptive period should
It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract commence from the discovery of the alleged fraud, the conclusion would still be
are applicable thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter are specifically the same. As early as May 15, 1970, when the deed of donation was registered
intended to have retroactive effect. Consequently, it is the Old Civil Code which
46
and the transfer certificate of title was issued, petitioners were considered to have
applies in this case since the donation propter nuptias was executed in 1944 and constructive knowledge of the alleged fraud, following the jurisprudential rule
the New Civil Code took effect only on August 30, 1950. The fact that in 1944 the
47
that registration of a deed in the public real estate registry is constructive notice
Philippines was still under Japanese occupation is of no consequence. It is a well- to the whole world of its contents, as well as all interests, legal and equitable,
known rule of the Law of Nations that municipal laws, as contra-distinguished included therein. As it is now settled that the prescriptive period for the
54
from laws of political nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty. This 48
reconveyance of property allegedly registered through fraud is ten (10) years,
Court specifically held that during the Japanese occupation period, the Old Civil reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title, the action filed on 55
Code was in force. As a consequence, applying Article 1330 of the Old Civil Code
49
December 23, 1985 has clearly prescribed.
in the determination of the validity of the questioned donation, it does not matter
In any event, independent of prescription, petitioners’ action is dismissible on Costs against petitioners.
the ground of laches. The elements of laches are present in this case, viz.:
_______________
_______________
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) v. Court of Appeals, 7 October 1998, G.R.
56
52 Amerol, et al. v. Molok Bagumbaran, G.R. No. L-33261, 30 September 1987, 154 SCRA 396. No. 126000, 297 SCRA 287, 306 (1998).
53 Section 40, Act 190. Chan Sui Bi vs. Court of Appeals, 29 September 2000, G.R. No. 129507, 341 SCRA 364, 372 (2000).
57
54 Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 22 January 1980, G.R. Nos. L-48971 & 49011, 95 SCRA 380 (1980), 614
citing Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 (1915). 614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
55 Caro v. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 402 (1990).
613 Cruz vs. Court of Appeals
VOL. 412, OCTOBER 3, 2003 613 SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Quisumbing and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Valencia vs. Locquiao
Austria-Martinez, J., No part. Concurred in CA decision.
Judgment affirmed.
1. (1)conduct on the part of the defendant, or one under whom he claims, Note.—Article 1602 of the Civil Code enumerates the instances when a
giving rise to the situation that led to the complaint and for which the contract will be presumed to be an equitable mortgage. (Ching Sen Ben vs. Court
complainant seeks a remedy; of Appeals, 314 SCRA 762 [1999])
2. (2)delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, having had knowledge or
notice of defendant’s conduct and having been afforded an opportunity ——o0o——
to institute a suit;
3. (3)lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the © Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit, and
4. (4)injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to
the complainant, or the suit is not held barred. 56
Of the facts which support the finding of laches, stress should be made of the
following: (a) the petitioners Romana unquestionably gained actual knowledge of
the donation propter nuptias when the deed of partition was executed in 1973 and
the information must have surfaced again when the compromise agreement was
forged in 1976, and; (b) as petitioner Romana was a party-signatory to the two
documents, she definitely had the opportunity to question the donation propter
nuptias on both occasions, and she should have done so if she were of the mindset,
given the fact that she was still in possession of the land in dispute at the time.
But she did not make any move. She tarried for eleven (11) more years from the
execution of the deed of partition until she, together with petitioner Constancia,
filed the annulment case in 1985.
Anent the ejectment case, we find the issues raised by the petitioners to be
factual and, therefore, beyond this Court’s power of review. Not being a trier of
facts, the Court is not tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties and
analyze, assess, and weigh them to ascertain if the trial court and the appellate
court were correct in according them superior credit in this or that piece of
evidence of one party or the other. In any event, implicit in the affirmance of the
57
_______________
VITUG, J.:
*FIRST DIVISION.
222 The petition for review bewails, purely on a question of law, an alleged error
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED committed by the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-92-12539. Petitioner
avers that the court a quo has failed to apply the correct law that should govern
22
the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation where a marriage is declared
Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon City void ab initio because of psychological incapacity on the part of either or both of
is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party the parties to the contract.
who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having The pertinent facts giving rise to this incident are, by and large, not in
contributed thereto jointly if said party’s “efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of dispute.
the family household.” Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple’s
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971.
separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
Same; Same; When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry
Begotten during the marriage were five children. In a petition, dated 22 June
or when they do not live exclusively with each other, only the property acquired by both of 1992, Valdes sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article
them through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in 36 of the Family Code (docketed Civil Case No. Q-92-12539, Regional Trial Court
common and in proportion to their respective contributions.—When the common-law spouses of Quezon City, Branch 102). After hearing the parties following the joinder of
suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live exclusively with each issues, the trial court, in its decision of 29 July 1994, granted the petition; viz:
1
other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them through “WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
their actual jointcontribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and “(1) The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdez and respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes
in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares, is hereby declared null and void under
however, are prima faciepresumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to
another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, ________________
if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore 1 Hon. Perlita Tria Tirona, presiding.
expressed. 224
Same; Same; The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, applying
224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 relates only by its explicit terms, to voidable
marriages and exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 of the Code.—The rules set Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon City
up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to
gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case comply with their essential marital obligations;
until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that “(2) The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and Angela Rosario
exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, shall choose which parent they would want to stay with.
applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5)of Article 43, relates only, by its explicit terms,
“Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their mother, herein “Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychologically
respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes. incapacitated.
“The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children who are in
the custody of the other. “II
“(3) The petitioner and respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of
their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with
“Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the
the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code, within thirty (30) days from notice
disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio,
of this decision.
including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses.
“Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong,
Metro Manila, for proper recording in the registry of marriages.” (Italics ours.)
2
_________________
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing
compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the 3 Rollo, p. 42.
Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of 4 Rollo, pp. 38-39.
common property in “unions without marriage.” Parenthetically, during the 226
hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing their desire 226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
to remain with their father, Antonio Valdes, herein petitioner. Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon City
In an Order, dated 05 May 1995, the trial court made the following
clarification:
“III
“Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the
property acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary,
are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be “Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the
owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their ‘family home’ and all ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with
their other properties for that matter in equal shares. Article 129.
_________________ “IV
2Rollo, p. 22. “It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children wish to
225 stay.” 5
VOL. 260, JULY 31, 1996 225 The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the
cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of
Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon City
cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as
“In the liquidation and partition of the properties owned in common by the plaintiff and
the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the
defendant, the provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply.” (Emphasis
Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases; it provides:
3
supplied.)
6
“ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of the family
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
dwelling, the trial court said: void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
“Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between petitioner and property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
respondent as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner rules on co-ownership.
and respondent shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. “In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together
“The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no application since shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall
Article 102 refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
property and Article 129 refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the absolute participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
community of property.” 4
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied on 30 maintenance of the family and of the household.
October 1995. “Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the
In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the
the Family Code should be held controlling; he argues that: other, until after the
__________________
“I
Rollo, pp. 24-25.
5
6 See Margaret Maxey vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 187; Aznar, et al. vs. Garcia, et al., 102 Phil. 1055.
household.” Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple’s
8
wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term declaration of nullity of the marriage. 10
“capacitated” in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or
capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any “male or female of the age of when they do not live exclusively with each
eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in
Articles 37 and 38” of the Code.
7
__________________
___________________ 1. (6)Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
2. (7)Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
3. (8)Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
Art. 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
7
4. (9)Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person’s
impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may contract marriage.
spouse or his or her own spouse.
Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether the
relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
8Article 147, Family Code.
9Article 147, Family Code.
1. (1)Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
Articles 43, 50 and 51, Family Code.
10
Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon City In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through parties’ common property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor
their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. precipitately; a court which had jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity
Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been must be deemed likewise clothed with authority to resolve incidental and
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that
acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto petitioner and private respondent own the “family home” and all their common
jointly if said party’s “efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and
partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co- the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Article 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the
said profits shall be the increase in
ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles
102 and 129, of the Family Code,
12
231
_______________ VOL. 260, JULY 31, 1996 231
Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon City
Article 148, Family Code.
11
Art. 50. The effects provided for in paragraph (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in Article 44
12 of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the
shall also apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the
judgment under Articles 40 and 45. co-ownership
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. _________________
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be
notified of the proceedings for liquidation. value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
accordance with the provisions of
230
1. (5)The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in
230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED accordance with Article 51.
2. (6)Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal
Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon City dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the
should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are
absolute community or the conjugal partnership deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is
no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said
children.
__________________
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following procedure shall
Articles 102 and 129.
apply;
Art. 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed
as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound
securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such 1. (1)An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the conjugal
matters. partnership and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
The children or their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may ask for the enforcement of the 2. (2)Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal debts and
judgment. obligations of either spouse shall be credited to the conjugal partnership as an asset thereof.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate 3. (3)Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive funds in the acquisition
successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either or both of the parents; but the value of property or for the value of his or her exclusive property, the ownership of which has been
of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered vested by law in the conjugal partnership.
as advances on their legitime. 4. (4)The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of the conjugal
Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the
distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children’s presumptive legitimes unpaid balance with their separate properties, in accordance with the provisions of
shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not paragraph (2) of Article 121.
affect their persons. 5. (5)Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply: each of them.
6. (6)Unless the owner has been indemnified from whatever source, the loss or deterioration of
movables used for the benefit of the family, belonging to either spouse, even due to
1. (1)An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute
fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse from the conjugal
community and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
2. (2)The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In case
of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance 232
with their separate properties in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of
Article 94. 232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
3. (3)Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to
each of them. Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon City
4. (4)The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net that exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Article 50 of the
assets, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43, relates only, 13
proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has
been a voluntary waiver of such share as provided in this Code. For purposes of computing by its explicit terms, to
________________ 2. (5)The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to
inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession.
1. funds, if any.
2. (7)The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on
14
shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall
15
forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code. be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
3. (8)The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition in absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
accordance with Article 51. was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set
4. (9)In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically
16
said children. terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a
judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil
13Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall registry of the residence of the
produce the following effects: 234
SO ORDERED.
Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a
Padilla (Chairman), Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. The
Bellosillo, J., On leave.
latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old
Orders affirmed.
doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and no
judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring
for purposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final judgment of the ——o0o——
previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away with any
________________
continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is not then
illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 and 42, of the 15 16
parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the
Family spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially
determined in case such fact is disputed.
_________________ 235
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
1. revocable; and
[No. 22383. October 6, 1924] These bonds were sold by the plaintiff bank on or before August 19, 1922, having
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, plaintiff and appellee, vs. MARGARITA realized the sum of P2,360 from the sale thereof. (Exhibit 3.)
QUINTOS E YPARRAGUIRRE and ANGEL A. ANSALDO, defendants and "On August 21, 1920, the herein defendant, Mr. Angel Ansaldo, in his answer
appellants. to a letter of the bank addressed to him or to his wife, his codefendant Margarita
HUSBAND AND WlFE; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP; OBLIGATIONS Q. de Ansaldo, stated, as may be seen in Exhibit B, that the balance in his current
CONTRACTED DURING MARRIAGE; LIABILITY OF SPOUSES.—The conjugal account in favor of said bank in the sum of P33,558.45 on July 31, 1920, had been
partnership is liable for obligations contracted during marriage, and in default of examined by him and found correct. This balance with the interest due from the
conjugal property, the spouses are jointly liable therefor with their private properties, said date up to September 30, 1922, amounted to P41,212.05 and after deducting
unless by express stipulation, they shall have bound themselves solidarily. the credit and deposits from August 1, 1920, to September 30, 1922, which
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Concepcion, J. amount to P9,426.09, there remains a balance of P31,785.96, payment of which is
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. claimed in the complaint.
Angel A. Ansaldo for appellants. "And the complaint was filed because between April 2, 1921, and July 22,
Roman J. Lacson for appellee. 1922, the 'date of the letter Exhibit 6, the defendant Mr. Ansaldo was several
times required to pay his debt, the securities given having been found to be
VlLLAMOR, J.: insufficient to secure the payment of his obligations, but the defendants failed to
give the new additional securities demanded.
The appellants pray for the dismissal of the complaint with costs against the 372
plaintiff, alleging that the judgment appealed from is erroneous: (1) Because it 372 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
holds that the document Exhibit A does not contain anything that makes the
National Bank vs. Quintos and Ansaldo
plaintiff agent of the defendants; (2) because it finds without any ground that the
defendants were husband and wife when they executed said document; (3) "The defendants discuss in the first place the nature of the obligation sued on,
because upon this finding, it considers unnecessary to discuss whether or not the maintaining that the same is not of a solidary nature because, say they, there is
obligation evidenced by said document is solidary between the defendants; (4) nothing in it that expressly determines said character, and therefore it binds only
because to maintain such opinion amounts to compelling the defendants to those who have contracted the same to the extent of their share in said obligation;
comply with said obligation in a manner distinct from that stipulated in the and in connection with this point it was attempted to prove that the defendant
contract; and (5) because it sanctions an arbitrary, unjust and illegal procedure. Margarita Q. de Ansaldo, making use of the credit granted, has received from the
The Honorable Pedro Concepcion, judge, who tried this case, rendered bank only the sum of ?10,000, (Exhibit 5). As an answer to the question raised the
decision in the following terms: attorney for the bank calls attention to Exhibit A where it appears that the
"The plaintiff seeks to recover of the defendants the sum of P31,785.96, the defendant Angel A. Ansaldo 'and or' Margarita Q. de Ansaldo, both or either of
amount of an alleged overdraft against them and in favor of the plaintiff bank, them indiscriminately, could sign checks against the bank in their current
with interest thereon at 8 per cent per annum from October 1, 1922. account.
371 "The court is of the opinion that it is not necessary to discuss whether the
obligation in question is solidary or joint, because in either case this debt is in the
VOL. 46, OCTOBER 6, 1924 371
last analysis chargeable to the conjugal partnership of the defendant spouses.
National Bank vs. Quintos and Ansaldo According to article 1408 of the Civil Code, all the debts and obligations
"It appears from the evidence that in a document dated June 20, 1918, the contracted during the marriage by the husband, as well as those incurred by the
Philippine National Bank granted the defendants a credit to the amount of wife in those cases in which she may legally bind the partnership, are chargeable
P31,284, and to secure the payment thereof, as well as the interest and costs, the to the conjugal partnership. In the instant case, the defendant Margarita Q. de
defendants mortgaged and pledged to the bank certain certificates of one hundred Ansaldo joined her husband in the execution of the document, evidencing the
fifty-eight shares of stock of the Bank of the Philippine Islands of the nominal obligation in question, on June 20, 1918, Exhibit A. (See Joaquin vs.Avellana, 11
value of P200 each. Later on, a certificate of fifty shares and another of forty were Phil., 249; Fulgencio vs. Gatchalian, 21 Phil., 252; Falcon vs. Manzano, 15 Phil.,
substituted by others of 10 and 30 shares, respectively. Besides these shares, the 441.)
defendants delivered to the bank, as additional securities, fifty shares of stock of "Another question raised, although indirectly, by the defendants is that, this
the 'Compañía Naviera' of the nominal value of P100 each; eighty shares of stock being, as. it is, a case of a loan for an indefinite period of time they were not asked
of the 'Compañía Mercantil' of P100 each; fifty shares of stock of the Davao to pay in accordance with law, articles 313 and 316 of the Code of Commerce. This
Agriculture and Commercial Company of P100 each, and 10 second liberty bonds. contention is untenable. Under the provision of section 33 of Act No. 2938,
amending the charter of the Philippine National Bank, if, from any cause P33,548.55, (Exhibit B), is not any evidence that may legally bind the defendant
whatsoever, any of the securities specified for the loans provided Margarita Q. de Ansaldo, who has not accepted it as correct. The truth, however,
373 is that the defendant Mr. Ansaldo who gave his conformity with the aforesaid
VOL. 46, OCTOBER 6, 1924 373 balance is the husband of the other defendant and the legal manager of the
property of the conjugal partnership which is liable for the payment of this debt.
National Bank vs. Quintos and Ansaldo
"The interest computed was likewise discussed in this case, the defendants
for therein, or accepted by said bank as security for loans, should decline or claiming that the same was not fixed with their consent, nor does there exist, say
depreciate in market value wholly or in part, said bank may demand additional they, any proof that it was ever fixed by the Board of Directors of the bank. It
securities or may forthwith declare such obligation due and payable; and it is a appears, however, from the evidence of the plaintiff that the National Bank had
fact admitted by the defendants themselves that the securities given by them authorized various officers thereof to fix certain rate of interest on certain
have suffered a considerable depreciation and it is a fact proven that they were
occasions; as for instance, the rate of interest for the months of August to
required to give additional securities but failed to do so. September, 1920, was raised from 9 to 12 per cent. It remained stationary at the
"If the securities were found to have depreciated in value, say the defendants, rate of 12 per cent until April, 1922, when it lowered from 12 to 8 per cent. At all
'the plaintiff bank's remedy was the one provided in the document executed by the events, we believe that the defendants have no right to raise this question
defendants in its favor and in accordance with its own charter. According to the because they have paid interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum, as appears f
contract, it may hold or sell the securities above mentioned although as an agent rom the document marked Exhibit I.
(articles 1710, 1713, 1714, 1718, 1719, and 1796 of the Civil Code); and in
"For all of the foregoing, judgment is rendered sentencing the defendants to
accordance with its charter (section 42, Act No. 2612), said sale may be ordered:
pay the plaintiff bank the sum of thirty-
15 days after a demand in writing is made upon the debtor to increase the 375
amount thereof, if in the meantime said debtor should have failed to comply with
VOL. 46, OCTOBER 6, 1924 375
this requirement * * * The plaintiff, say they, cannot be considered authorized to
be negligent, as soon as it shall have learned that the securities had begun to National Bank vs. Quintos and Ansaldo
depreciate, as compared with the value they had when they were delivered; for one thousand seven hundred eighty-five pesos and ninetysix centavos
then it neither would comply with the agency stipulated in the document in its f (P31,785.96), with interest thereon at the rate of 8 per cent per annum from
avor, which would render it liable, nor could in justice claim from the debtor what October 1, 1922, until full payment, with the costs; in case of failure to pay, let the
by its own negligence it may have failed to receive/ As an answer to this, it may be certificates of shares described in Exhibit A be sold, and if the proceeds of the sale
said that: of said shares are not sufficient to cover the whole amount of the debt, let an
" '* * * it must be borne in mind that it is a recognized doctrine in the matter execution issue against any property of the conjugal partnership of the
of suretyship that with respect to the surety, the creditor is under no obligation to defendants and, in default thereof, against the private property of each of them,
display any diligence in the enforcement of his rights as a creditor. His mere sufficient to cover the whole amount of the balance that may be remaining
inaction, indulgence, passiveness, or delay in proceeding against the principal unpaid.
debtor, or the fact that he did not enforce the guaranty or apply to the payment of "So ordered.
such funds as were available, constitute no defense at all for the surety, unless "Manila, P. I., February 5, 1924.
the contract expressly requires diligence (Sgd.) "PEDRO CONCEPCION
374 "Judge"
374 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED As the transcript of the testimony of the witnesses was not forwarded to this
court, we cannot, according to the constant jurisprudence of this court, review the
National Bank vs. Quintos and Ansaldo
evidence and so we have to abide by the findings of fact set forth in the judgment
and promptness on the part of the creditor, which is not the case in the present of the trial court.
action.' (Clark vs. Sellner, 42 Phil., 384.) We agree with the appellants that, according to the contract of pledge Exhibit
"Furthermore, there is nothing in the document evidencing the contract which A, attached to the complaint, the defendants authorized the plaintiff to act as
makes the plaintiff, as the defendants believe, their agent with the obligation to their agent with full power and authority to dispose of the effects pledged in the
sell the securities given as pledge; on the contrary, the plaintiff, according to the
manner stipulated in said contract; but it appears that the plaintiff had also an
document, has a right, not an obligation, to elect to enforce the securities in the
option, not an obligation precisely, to enforce the securities given.
manner it now does by bringing this action. The question whether or not the appellants executed the aforesaid document
"As to the amount of the obligation, the defendants argue that the Exhibit A as husband and wife was decided by the trial court in the sense that the
acknowledgment of the debit balance on July 31, 1920, in the amount of
defendant appellant Mr. Ansaldo is the husband of the other defendant Doña property was found, then against any private property of each of them sufficient
Margarita Q. e Iparraguirre. For the reason above given we cannot alter this to cover the whole amount of the balance remaining unpaid.
finding of the trial court and consequently if the defendants are husband and There can be no doubt that the property pledged being insufficient, the
wife, it is immaterial whether the debt was contracted by one or the other, for in property of the conjugal partnership is liable for this obligation in accordance
either case as the debt was contracted with article 1408 of the Civil Code, because the same was contracted by the
376 spouses during the marriage; but in def ault of property of the conjugal
376 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED partnership (article 1401), what- is the liability of the spouses as to the private
property (article 1396) of each of them?
National Bank vs. Quintos and Ansaldo
In this jurisdiction we do not believe that a similar question was heretofore
during the marriage of the defendants it must be paid for the account of the ever raised and decided, and so far as the research of the writer hereof discloses,
conjugal partnership in accordance with article 1408 of the Civil Code.
it finds no precedent in the Spanish jurisprudence.
After a thorough study of the judgment appealed from, we do not find therein By express provision of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership begins to
any substantial error that justifies the reversal thereof and therefore the same exist at the celebration of the marriage, and the separation of the properties
must be, as is hereby, affirmed with costs against the appellants. So ordered. between the spouses shall take place (article 1432) only when it is expressly
Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Ostrand, and Romualdez, JJ., concur. stipulated in the marriage settlement, or is judicially decreed, or in the case
Judgment affirmed. provided in article 50 of the Code. This conjugal partnership, however, is confined
DECISION UPON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION to the properties mentioned in article 1401 of the Civil Code, to wit: (a) Those
December 10, 1924. acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common
property whether the acquisition is made f or the community or f or only one of
VILLAMOR, J.: them; (b) those obtained by the industry, salary or labor of the spouses or any of
them; (c) the fruits, rents or interest received or accruing during the marriage,
In view of the juridical importance of the question raised in this motion, wherein from the common or the private property of each of the spouses. The partnership
it is maintained that the obligation of the defendants is chargeable to the conjugal does not produce the merger of the properties of each spouse. Each of them,
partnership, and not to the private property of the spouses, and much less to the notwithstanding the existence
private property of Margarita Quintos de Ansaldo, we deem it well to enlarge 378
upon our decision published October 6, 1924. 378 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
It will be remembered that the defendants signed a document of pledge in National Bank vs. Quintos and Ansaldo
favor of the plaintiff Philippine National Bank to secure the payment of a loan in
of the partnership, continues to be the owner of what he or she had before
current account to the amount of P31,284. In said document it does not clearly
contracting marriage, as well as of what he or she may have acquired later by
appear that the signers were husband and wife, although there is proof in the
lucrative title, by right of' redemption, or by exchange with his or her property, or
record tending to show their civil status as husband and wif e. Nor does it appear
by purchase with his or her money.
in the said document that the signers have bound themselves solidarily to pay the
The ganancial partnership, to use the expression of Mr. Manresa, is the same
debt owing to plaintiff.
conjugal partnership constituted, in its economical aspect, under the system
The judgment appealed from, affirmed by this court in a decision published
established by the law as suppletory. It is, therefore, formed by the husband and
October 6, 1924, sentences the defendants to pay the plaintiff bank the sum of
the wife, each with his or her own property and with his or her own debts. The
thirty-one thousand seven hundred eighty-five pesos and ninety-six centavos
legislator does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or
(P31,785.96) with interest thereon at 8 per cent per annum from October 1, 1922,
properties between the spouses. The partnership maintains the separation of the
until full payment, with
377
properties brought by each spouse f rom those that he or she may substitute for
them, or privately acquire afterwards by lucrative title.
VOL. 46, OCTOBER 6, 1924 377 Under the provisions of the Code it appears evident that the conjugal
National Bank vs. Quintos and Ansaldo partnership does not produce the merger of properties, nor does it cause the
the costs; providing that, in default of payment, the certificates of shares personality of the wife to disappear; on the contrary, the law establishes absolute
described in Exhibit A must be sold, and in case the proceeds of the sale were not separation of capitals—a complete independence of the capital account from the
sufficient to cover the whole amount of the debt, an execution shall issue against account of benefits pertaining to the conjugal partnership, all of which constitutes
the property of the conjugal partnership of the defendants and, 'if no such an unsurmountable obstacle to the presumption of solidarity between spouses.
The question submitted to our consideration presupposes the insolvency of the ____________
conjugal partnership, and as there is no presumption of solidarity of properties
between the spouses, the question may be asked, What liability do the partners © Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
have with respect to the debts of the partnership? The legal provisions about
conjugal partnership, contained in chapter 5, title 3, book 4, of the Civil Code, do
not give an adequate answer to this question; so that we have to resort to other
sources for a solution thereof. Mr. Manresa already indicates in his commentaries
on article 1395 that in view of the provisions of the Code regard-
379
sons Rey John Tan and Ariel Tan. And these documents were annotated at the back of the public auction of four mortgaged parcels of land
title in question. In the absence of proof, nay allegation, that the signatures of respondent
Jose B. Tan on the abovementioned documents were forged, this Court is constrained to _______________
uphold their genuineness.
Same; Same; Husband and Wife; Conjugal Partnership; The statement in the title that 1Exhibit “E,” Index of Exhibits for the Plaintiffs, p. 16.
the property is “registered in accordance with the provisions of Section 103 of the Property 385
Registration Decree in the name of JOSE B. TAN, of legal age, married to Eliza Go Tan” does VOL. 509, NOVEMBER 30, 2006 385
not prove or indicate that the property is conjugal.—In any event, lack of respondent Eliza
Go Tan’s consent to the mortgage covering the title in question would not render the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. Tan
encumbrance void under the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code. For proof including that covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T53267 (the title in
is wanting that the property covered by the title is conjugal—that it was acquired during question) registered in the name of herein respondent Jose B. Tan who was
respondents’ marriage which is what would give rise to the presumption that it is conjugal referred to in the title as “JOSE B. TAN, of legal age, Filipino, married to Eliza
property. The statement in the title that the property is “registered in accordance with the
Go Tan....” 2
*THIRD DIVISION. Office of the Provincial Sheriff of Misamis Oriental, for removal of cloud on the
384 title in question and injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis
3 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Oriental. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-225.
84 Respondents cited the following grounds-bases of their complaint:
17, 1998 following which the Office of the Provincial Sheriff of Misamis Oriental respondent Eliza Go Tan denying that the signature appearing on the real estate
issued a Sheriff’s mortgage dated November 5, 1992 was hers, and finding that 12
“... the existing loans covered by real estate mortgages annotated at the back of subject TCT
No. T-53267 of the Registry of Deeds for Cagayan de Oro, had been fully paid as of July 1,
_______________
1997, defendant Metrobank had no basis to be paid again through the extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings” (italics supplied)[,]
13
13 Id., at p. 245.
Petitioners further alleged that the deeds of real estate mortgage, promissory 7
388
notes, and credit line agreements bore the signature of respondent Jose B. Tan
8 9
_______________ 1. tle, TCT No. T-53267, of the Registry of Deeds for Cagayan de Oro, all said
mortgages are null and void ab initio;
Exhibit “F,” Index of Exhibits for the Plaintiffs, p. 17.
4
2. c)Declaring the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedingstaken by the defendant
Index of Records, pp. 25-29.
5
sheriff, including the sheriffs certificate of sale as null and void;
Index of Records, p. 27.
3. d)Making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction against the defendant
6
Id., at pp. 30-34; vide marked originals, Exhibits “16,” “17,” “18,” “19,” and “20,” Index of Exhibits
7
for the Defendants, pp. 16-20. sheriff, and the Office of the Provincial Sheriff of Misamis Oriental enjoining
Index of Records, pp. 35-40; vide marked originals, Exhibits “5,” “6,” “7,” “8,” “9,” and “10,” Index of
8 and restraining them, their agents, and representatives from issuing a final
Exhibits for the Defendants, pp. 5-10. certificate of sale in favor of defendant Metrobank covering the parcel of land
Index of Records, pp. 41-45; vide marked originals, Exhibits “11,” “12,” “13,” “14,” and “15,” Index of
9
covered by TCT No. T-53267;
Exhibits for the Defendants, pp. 11-15. 4. e)Ordering the removal of the cloud on the title, TCT No. T-53267, of the Registry
387 of Deeds for Cagayan de Oro, and the cancellation of all the entries of the real
VOL. 509, NOVEMBER 30, 2006 387 estate mortgages and amendment of mortgages annotated at the back of TCT
No. T-53267, of the Registry of Deeds for Cagayan de Oro City;
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. Tan 5. f)Absolving the plaintiffs spouses from financial liability from the null and
By way of Counterclaim, petitioners prayed for the award of attorney’s fees, void real estate mortgages;
compensatory and/or moral damages, exemplary damages, and other reliefs. 10 6. g)Declaring the principal obligations obtained by Rey John Tan through
the annulled real estate mortgages as FULLY PAID by him;
7. h)Ordering defendant Metrobank to pay attorney’s fee and expenses of litigation in 390
the amount of P100,000 and the costs. 390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. Tan
SO ORDERED.” (Emphasis and italics supplied)
1996; five Credit Line Agreements dated September 9, 1991, September 24, 1992,
14
Petitioners appealed the trial court’s decision before the Court of Appeals.
22
By Decision of November 21, 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
15
September 2, 1993, November 3, 1994, and April 25, 1996; an Amendment of 23
court’s decision and accordingly dismissed petitioners’ appeal. And it denied Real Estate Mortgage from P15,000,000 to P25,000,000; and October 29,
petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration. 16
1996 Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage from P25,000,000 to P40,000,000.
24
15Penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. with the concurrence of In the absence of proof, nay allegation, that the signatures of respondent Jose
Associate Justices Buenaventura J. Guerrero and Regalado E. Maambong, CA Rollo, pp. 211-228. B. Tan on the abovementioned documents were forged, this Court is constrained
Id., at pp. 231-243.
to uphold their genuineness.
16
389
27
As for the claim that respondent Eliza Go Tan did not give her consent to the
VOL. 509, NOVEMBER 30, 2006 389
mortgage of the title in question, the same is belied by her signature on Exhibit 28
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. Tan “18”-Real Estate Mortgage which is annotated as Entry No. 174644 at the back of
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari filed on July 7, 2004. 17 the title. Her bare denial that the signature was forged, without more, does not
The petition is impressed with merit. lie.
Petitioners assail, in the main, the appellate court’s affirmance of the trial
court’s decision absolving respondents from liability for the principal obligation _______________
obtained by their son Rey John Tan which was secured by real estate mortgages,
including that covered by the title in question, and declaring such principal Exhibits “5”-“10,” Index of Exhibits for the Defendants, pp. 510.
22
by him as of July 1, 1997, before the questioned extra-judicial foreclosure and Vide Exhibits “5-a,” “6-a,” “7-a,” “8-a,” “9-a,” “10-a,” “11-a,” “12-a,” “13-a,” “14-a,” “15-a,” “19-a,” and
25
public auction sale conducted on April 17, 1998. 18 “20-a,” Index of Exhibits for the Defendants, pp. 5-15, 19-20.
Exhibits “16”-“20”, Index of Exhibits for the Defendants, pp. 16-20; Exhibits “C-5”-“C-7,” Index of
Respondent Jose B. Tan insisted that he was not a party to the documents
26
19
above his typewritten name on the Credit Line Agreements, promissory notes, (presumption in favor of genuineness of signatures).
disclosure statements, and an Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage. Respondents Vide Exhibit “18-b,” Index of Exhibits for the Defendants, p. 18.
28
391
presented in evidence Promissory Notes—Exhibits “B-2” and “B-4” dated July 1,
1997 and June 24, 1997, respectively; three Credit Line Agreements—Exhibits VOL. 509, NOVEMBER 30, 2006 391
“B-6,” “B-7,” and “B-8,” dated May 2, 1997; and the Agreement amending the real
20
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. Tan
estate mortgage—Exhibit “B-9,” all dated May 2, 1997.
21
In any event, lack of respondent Eliza Go Tan’s consent to the mortgage covering
Petitioners, on the other hand, presented six Promissory Notes dated the title in question would not render the encumbrance void under the second
February 26, 1996, May 8, 1996, August 27, 1996, October 8, 1996, October 25, paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code. For proof is wanting that the
29
1996, and November 18, property covered by the title is conjugal—that it was acquired during
respondents’ marriage which is what would give rise to the presumption that it is
_______________
conjugal property. The statement in the title that the property is “registered in
30
accordance with the provisions of Section 103 of the Property Registration Decree
Rollo, pp. 16-49.
in the name of JOSE B. TAN, of legal age, married to Eliza Go Tan” does not
17
19 A Notice of Death together with a Certificate of Death of respondent Jose B. Tan showing that he prove or indicate that the property is conjugal. So Ruiz v. Court of
died on December 26, 2004 was submitted before this Court during the pendency of the present petition Appeals instructs: 32
or on February 10, 2005. “The property subject of the mortgage is registered in the name of “Corazon G. Ruiz, of legal
Index of Exhibits for the Plaintiffs, pp. 4, 6, 8-10.
age, married to Rogelio Ruiz, Filipinos.” Thus, title is registered in the name of Corazon
20
21 Id., at p. 11.
alone because the phrase “married to Rogelio Ruiz” is merely descriptive of the civil
Promissory Note Debit Memo
status of Corazon and should not be construed to mean that her husband is also a
registered owner. Furthermore, registration of the property in the name of “Corazon G. P1,000,000) payment of AGRICDO-074-96E)
Ruiz, of legal age, married to Rogelio Ruiz” is not proof that such property was acquired
Exhibit “9” or AGRI-075-96 (for P2,000,000) Exhibit “G-8” (Debit Memo for P2,000,000 in full
_______________ payment of AGRICDO-075-96E)
393
29 The relevant portion reads:
“x x x x
VOL. 509, NOVEMBER 30, 2006 393
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without the authority of the court or the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. Tan
written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
x x x x” “H” and “H-1” issued by an accountant, one Glenn Cabading.
36
30 Vide Art. 116 of the Family Code: “All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to
have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the
Rebutting Exhibits “G” to “G-11” inclusive, petitioners presented credit
contrary is proved.” memos which, to them, cancelled respondents’ debit memos. From a comparison
37
31 Exhibits “C-2” and “C-3,” Index of Exhibits for the Plaintiffs, p. 12 (emphasis supplied).
392 the unquestioned explanation of petitioner Uy on the reason behind the issuance
392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED of these memos, viz.:
ATTY. DEL CASTILLO:
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. Tan
during the marriage, and thus, is presumed to be conjugal. The property could have been Q You said, when a loan is renewed you credit a certain amount. Can you expound that a little bit?
acquired by Corazon while she was still single, and registered only after her marriage to A Actually, the Banco Central punish[es] if the loan cannot be renewed for several years without
Rogelio Ruiz. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts.The
presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code that properties acquired during the payment. Just to circumvent that policy, we do the credit first and the debit just for the renewal.
marriage are presumed to be conjugal cannot apply in the instant case. Before such Q Why is that?
presumption can apply, it must first be established that the property was in fact acquired
during the marriage. In other words, proof of acquisition during the marriage is a A To show that amount is fully paid and we avail.
condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership. Q How is that done?
No such proof was offered nor presented in the case at bar.” (Emphasis and italics supplied) 33
On respondents’ claim of payment, they presented debit memo-Exhibits “G” to “G- A We credit first the renewed amount and we debit the old promissory note.
11” (of which only Exhibits “G-6” to “G-11” are relevant to the issues) and
34 35
Q When you credit, there were other papers accomplished?
certifications-Exhibits
A Yes.
_______________ Q What are these papers called?
A Credit Memos on loan release.
Id., at pp. 418-419.
33
debit memos amount to P72,100,000 while the loan in this case totalled P40,000,000. Furthermore, only
A It is credited on their accounts.
Exhibits “G-6” to “G-11” correspond to the promissory notes presented by petitioners: Q On the existing accounts?
Promissory Note Debit Memo A Yes, deposit account.
Exhibit “5” or PN No. BDS-041-96 (for Exhibit “G-6” (Debit Memo forP2,900,000 in full
_______________
P2,900,000) payment of AGRICDO-X41-96F)
Exhibit “6” or AGR-CDO 037-96 (for Exhibit “G-11” (Debit Memo for P12,000,000 in
Exhibit “10” or AGRI-CDO-081-96 (for Exhibit “G-9” (Debit Memo for P20,100,000 in full
P12,000,000) full payment of AGRICDO-037-96E)
P20,100,000) payment of AGRICDO-081-96E)
Exhibit “7” or AGR-CDO 065-96 (for Exhibit “G-10” (Debit Memo for P2,000,000 in
P2,000,000) full payment of AGRICDO-065-96E) 36 Index of Exhibits for the Plaintiffs, pp. 22-23.
37 Exhibits “25,” “27,” “29,” “30,” “32,” and “33,” Index of Exhibits for the Defendants, pp. 26, 28, 37,
Exhibit “8” or AGR-CDO 074-96 (for Exhibit “G-7” (Debit Memo for P1,000,000 in full 38, 41, and 47.
38 Exhibits “26,” “28’ and submarkings, “31,” Index of Exhibits for the Defendants, pp. 27, 33-36, 39-
40.
394
this Court is persuaded by petitioners’ claim that the debit memos represented
“payment” only in the bank’s book entries but did not actually involve
payment/settlement of the original obligation.
In fine, the extrajudicial foreclosure and subsequent sale of the mortgaged
property covered by the title in question was valid.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the
appellate court is SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 98225, “Jose B. Tan and Eliza Go
Tan v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, et al.” filed before and raffled to
Branch 38 of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio, Tinga and Velasco Jr., JJ., concur.
Petition granted, assailed decision set aside. Civil Case No. 98-225 dismissed.
Notes.—The disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as
administrator in appropriate cases must be with the written consent of the wife,
otherwise, the disposition is void. (Jader-Manalo vs. Camaisa, 374 SCRA
498 [2002])
Any transaction entered by the wife without the court or the husband’s
authority is unenforceable. (Fabrigas vs. San Francisco Del Monte, Inc., 476
SCRA 247 [2005])
——o0o——
_______________
395
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse
VOL. 153, AUGUST 31, 1987 435
and the rights of innocent third parties are involved.
Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals Same; Same; Same; Same; PNB is a mortgagee in good faith as it was not aware that
at the time the mortgages were constituted there was a flaw of the mortgagor's title.—The
No. L-57757. August 31, 1987. *
PNB had a reason to rely on what appears on the certificates of title of the properties
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF mortgaged. For all legal purposes, the PNB is a mortgagee in good faith for at the time the
APPEALS, PRAGMACIO VITUG AND MAXIMO VITUG, respondents. mortgages covering said properties were constituted the PNB was not aware to any flaw of
Civil Law; Land Registration; Mortgage; The PNB had the right to rely on what the title of the mortgagor.
appears in the certificate of title where on its face the properties are owned by the mortgagor, Same; Same; Same; Same; Parties; Although actions for recovery of real property and
and there is no reason to doubt the status of the registered owner and her ownership for partition are real actions, they are actions in personam that bind only the particular
thereof.—When the subject properties were mortgaged to the PNB they were registered in individuals who are parties thereto; PNB, not being a party to the cases earlier decided nor
the name of Donata Montemayor, widow. Relying on the torrens certificate of title covering aware of said decisions, it is not bound by said decisions; PNB was a purchaser for value in
said properties the mortgage loan applications of Donata were granted by the PNB and the good faith, when the properties were sold at public auction.—At any rate, although actions
mortgages were duly constituted and registered in the office of the Register of Deeds. In for recovery of real property and for partition are real actions, however, they are actions
processing the loan applications of Donata Montemayor, the PNB had the right to rely on in personam that bind only the particular individuals who are parties thereto. The PNB not
what appears in the certificates of title and no more. On its face the properties are owned by being a party in said cases is not bound by the said decisions, Nor does it appear that the
Donata Montemayor, a widow. The PNB had no reason to doubt nor question the status of PNB was aware of the said decisions when it extended the above described mortgage loans.
said registered owner and her ownership thereof. Indeed, there are no liens and Indeed, if the PNB knew of the conjugal nature of said properties it would not have
encumbrances covering the same. approved the mortgage applications covering said properties of Donata Montemayor without
Same; Same; Same; Same; Rule that a person dealing with a registered land has a requiring the consent of all the other heirs or co-owners thereof. Moreover, when said
right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificates of title and to dispense with the need of properties were sold at public auction, the PNB was a purchaser for value in good faith so
inquiring further; Exception.—The well-known rule in this jurisdiction is that a person its right thereto is beyond question.
dealing with a registered land has a right to rely upon the f ace of the torrens certificate of 437
title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party concerned VOL. 153, AUGUST 31, 1987 437
has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious
man to make such inquiry. Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A Torrens title concludes all controversies over Same; Same; Same; Same; Estoppel; Laches; Respondents are in estoppel when they
ownership of the land covered by a final decree of registration.—A torrens title concludes all never raised the conjugal nature of the property nor took issue as to the ownership of their
controversy over ownership of the land covered by a final decree of registration. Once the mother; For failure of respondents to assert their rights over the property, respondents are
title is registered the owner may rest assured without the necessity of stepping into the guilty of laches.—Pragmacio and Maximo Vitug are now estopped from questioning the title
portals of the court or sitting in the mirador de su casa to avoid the possibility of losing his of Donata Montemayor to the said properties. They never raised the conjugal nature of the
land. property nor took issue as to the ownership of their mother, Donata Montemayor, over the
same. Indeed private respondents were among the defendants in said two cases wherein in
_____________ their answers to the complaint they asserted that the properties in question are
paraphernal properties belonging exclusively to Donata Montemayor and are not conjugal in
*FIRST DIVISION. nature. Thus they leased the properties from their mother Donata Montemayor for many
436 years knowing her to be the owner. They were in possession of the property for a long time
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED and they knew that the same were mortgaged by their mother to the PNB and thereafter
were sold at public auction, but they did not do anything. It is only after 17 years that they
36 remembered to assert their rights. Certainly, they are guilty of laches.
Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; Same; Property; Presumption of conjugality, not a case of; When the PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
property is registered in the name of a spouse only and there is no showing as to when the
property was acquired by said spouse, the property belongs exclusively to said spouse; The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Presumption under Art 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of
only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved.—The presumption
applies to property acquired during the lifetime of the husband and wife. In this case, it GANCAYCO, J.:
appears on the face of the title that the properties were acquired by Donata Montemayor
when she was already a widow. When the property is registered in the name of a spouse Does the presumption of conjugality of properties acquired by the spouses during
only and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by said spouse, this is an coverture provided for in Article 160 of the Civil Code apply to property covered
indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse. And this presumption under by a Torrens certificate of title in the name of the widow? This is the issue posed
in this petition to review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals 439
in CA-G.R. No. 60903which is an action for reconveyance and damages. **
VOL. 153, AUGUST 31, 1987 439
On November 28, 1952, Donata Montemayor, through her son, Salvador M.
Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals
Vitug, mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) several parcels of land
ing titles were issued.
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 2289—Pampanga to guarantee
6
the loan granted by the PNB to Salvador Jaramiila and Pedro During the lifetime of Clodualdo Vitug he married two times. His first wife
was Gervacia Flores with whom he had 3 children, namely, Victor, Lucina and
______________
Julio all surnamed Vitug. Victor now dead is survived by his 5 children: Leonardo,
Juan, Candido, Francisco and Donaciano, all surnamed Vitug. Juan Vitug is also
Penned by Mr. Justice Porfirio V. Sison, and concurred in by Messrs. Justices Juan Sison and Elias
**
dead and is survived by his only daughter Florencia Vitug.
B. Asuncion. The second wife of Clodualdo Vitug was Donata Montemayor with whom he
438 had 8 children, namely, Pragmacio, Maximo, Jesus, Salvador, Prudencio and
438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Anunciacion, all surnamed Vitug, the late Enrique Vitug represented by his wife
Natalia Laquian, and the late Francisco Vitug who is survived by 11 children,
Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals
namely, Antonio, Francisco, Aurora, Pedro, Honorio, Corazon, Anselmo, Benigno,
Bacani in the amount of P40,900.00 which was duly registered in the Office of the
Eligio, Jesus and Luz.
Register of Deeds of Pampanga.1 *
Clodualdo Vitug died intestate on May 20,1929 so his estate was settled and
On December 1, 1963, Donata Montemayor also mortgaged in favor of PNB
distributed in Special Proceeding No. 422 in the Court of First Instance of
certain properties covered by TCT Nos. 2887 and 2888—Pampanga to guarantee
Pampanga wherein Donata Montemayor was the Administratrix.
the payment of the loan account of her son Salvador Vitug in the amount of
7
On March 21, 1970 Pragmacio Vitug and Maximo Vitug filed an action for
4
Salvador Vitug failed to pay his account so the bank foreclosed the mortgaged
partition and reconveyance with damages in the Court of First Instance of
properties covered by TCT Nos. 2887 and 2888. They were sold at public auction
Pampanga against Marcelo Mendiola, special administrator of the intestate estate
on May 20,1968 in which the PNB was the highest bidder. The titles thereto were
of Donata Montemayor who died earlier, Jesus Vitug, Sr.,
thereafter consolidated in the name of PNB.
Likewise, Salvador Jaramilla and Pedro Bacani failed to settle their accounts ______________
with the PNB so the latter foreclosed the properties covered by TCT No. 2889
which were sold at public auction and likewise PNB was the buyer thereof. On 6Pars. 6 to 10 and 11, Partial Stipulation of Facts, pp. 124, 125 and 139, Record on Appeal.
August 30, 1968, a certificate of sale was issued by the Register of Deeds covering 7Pars. 22, 23 and 24, Partial Stipulation of facts, pp. 144-145, Record on Appeal.
said properties in favor of the PNB. When the title of the PNB was consolidated a 8Pars. 5, 6, 7, 8, 15, pp. 136-140, supra.
440
new title was issued in its name. 5
On September 2,1969, the PNB sold the properties covered by TCT Nos. 2887 440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
and 2888-Pampanga to Jesus M. Vitug, Anunciacion V. de Guzman, Prudencia V. Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals
Fajardo, Salvador Vitug and Aurora V. Gutierrez in those names the correspond- Salvador, Natalia, Prudencia, Anunciacion, all surnamed Vitug, Antonio,
Francisco, Aurora, Pedro, Honorio, Corazon, Anselmo, Benigno, Eligio, Jesus and
_____________
Luz, all surnamed Fajardo and the PNB.
The subject of the action is 30 parcels of land which they claim to be the
Annex 2, Answer of PNB, Record on Appeal; par. 11, Partial Stipulation of Facts, p. 139; Record on
1
Appeal. conjugal property of the spouses Donata Montemayor and Clodualdo Vitug of
Annex 1, Answer of PNB, Record on Appeal; par. 17, Partial Stipulation of Facts, pp. 141-142,
2 which they claim a share of 2/11 of 1/2 thereof. They assailed the mortgage to the
supra. PNB and the public auction of the properties as null and void. They invoked the
Par. 16, Partial Stipulation of Facts, p. 141, supra.
case of Vitug vs. Montemayor, L-5297 decided by this Court on Oct. 20, 1953
3
Pars. 12, 13, 19, 20, 21, and 22, Partial Stipulation of Facts, pp. 139-144, supra.
5
which is an action for partition and liquidation of the said 30 parcels of land ENTERED INTO A CONTRACT OF LEASE WITH DONATA MONTEMAYOR AS THE
wherein the properties were found to be conjugal in nature. OWNERLESSOR.
In a decision of Sept. 15, 1975, the lower court dismissed the complaint with
costs against the plaintiffs and ordered them to pay attorney's fees of P5,000.00 to IV
the defendant's counsel. Plaintiffs then interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals, wherein in due course a decision was rendered on May 20, 1981, the THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PNB
dispositive part of which reads as follows: WAS A MORTGAGEE IN BAD FAITH."
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed The petition is impressed with merit.
and set aside, and another one entered in accordance with the tenor of the prayer of When the subject properties were mortgaged to the PNB they were registered
appellant's complaint with the modification that the sale at public auction of the 22 parcels in the name of Donata Montemayor, widow. Relying on the torrens certificate of
be considered valid with respect to the 1/2 thereof. No costs." title covering said properties the mortgage loan applications of Donata were
Hence the herein petition for certiorari filed by the PNB raising the following granted by the PNB and the mortgages were duly constituted and registered in
assignments of error: the off ice of the Register of Deeds.
In processing the loan applications of Donata Montemayor, the PNB had the
"I right to rely on what appears in the certificates of title and no more. On its face
the properties are
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING TO THE CASE AT 442
BAR THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN FLORENCIA VITUG 442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
VS. DONATA MONTEMAYOR, ET AL., 91 PHIL. 286 (1953) BECAUSE:
Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals
1. A.BETWEEN A PROVISION OF A SPECIAL LAW AND THE JUDICIAL owned by Donata Montemayor, a widow. The PNB had no reason to doubt nor
INTERPRETATION AND/OR APPLICATION OF A PROVISION OF A question the status of said registered owner and her ownership thereof. Indeed,
GENERAL LAW THE FORMER PREVAILS. there are no liens and encumbrances covering the same.
The well-known rule in this jurisdiction is that a person dealing with a
441 registered land has a right to rely upon the face of the torrens certificate of title
and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party
VOL. 153, AUGUST 31, 1987 441
concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a
Philippine National Bank vs, Court of Appeals reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry. 9
A torrens title concludes all controversy over ownership of the land covered by
1. B.THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS IS NOT A MECHANICAL FORMULA a final degree of registration. Once the title is registered the owner may rest
10
OF ADHERENCE. assured without the necessity of stepping into the portals of the court or sitting in
2. C.PNB WAS NOT A PARTY, AND HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE the mirador de su casa to avoid the possibility of losing his land. 11
ABOVECITED CASE. D. SIMILARLY, PRAGMACIO VITUG AND MAXIMO Article 160 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
VITUG WERE NOT PARTIES IN SAID CASE. "Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."
II The presumption applies to property acquired during the lifetime of the husband
and wife. In this case, it appears on the face of the title that the properties were
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RECOGNIZING THE acquired by Donata Montemayor when she was already a widow. When the
CONCLUSIVENESS OF THE CERTIFICATE, OF TITLE, AS PROVIDED IN ACT 496, AS property is registered in the name of a spouse only and there is no showing as to
AMENDED (THE LAND REGISTRATION). when the property was acquired by said spouse, this is an indication that the
property belongs exclusively to said spouse. And this presumption under Article
12
III 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one
spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved. 13
Nable Jose vs. Nable Jose, 41 Phil. 713; Seva vs. Nolan, 340
13 PNB was a purchaser for value in good faith so its right thereto is beyond
443 question. 20
VOL. 153, AUGUST 31, 1987 443 Pragmacio and Maximo Vitug are now estopped from questioning the title of
Donata Montemayor to the said properties. They never raised the conjugal nature
Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals
of the property nor took issue as to the ownership of their mother, Donata
The PNB had a reason to rely on what appears on the certificates of title of the Montemayor, over the same. Indeed private respondents were among the
properties mortgaged. For all legal purposes, the PNB is a mortgagee in good defendants in said two cases wherein in their answers to the complaint they
faith for at the time the mortgages covering said properties were constituted the asserted that the properties in question are paraphernal properties belonging
PNB was not aware to any flaw of the title of the mortgagor. 14
exclusively to Donata Montemayor and are not conjugal in nature. Thus they 21
True it is that in the earlier cases decided by this Court, namely Vitug vs. leased the properties from their mother Donata Montemayor for many years
Montemayor decided on May 15, 1952, which is an action for recovery of knowing her to be the owner. They were in possession of the property for a long
possession of a share in said parcels of land, and in the subsequent action for
15
time and they knew that the same were mortgaged by their mother to the PNB
partition between the same parties decided on Oct. 20, 1953, this court found the16
and thereafter were sold at public auction, but they did not do anything. It is only22
30 parcels of land in question to be conjugal in nature and awarded the after 17 years that they remembered to assert their rights. Certainly, they are
corresponding share to the property of Florencia Vitug, an heir of the late guilty of laches.23
Clodualdo Vitug from the first marriage. In said cases this Court affirmed the Moreover, as correctly held by the lower court. Pragmacio and Maximo Vitug
decision of the lower court. In the dispositive part of the decision of the trial court as occupants and lessees of the property in question cannot now dispute the
it made the observation that "but from the conduct of Clodualdo Vitug and ownership of their mother over the same who was their lessor. 24
Donata Montemayor during the existence of their marital life, the inference is WHEREFORE, the subject decision of the respondent
clear that Clodualdo had the unequivocal intention of transmitting the full
ownership of the 30 parcels of land to his wife Donata Montemayor, thus ______________
considering the 1/2 of the funds of the conjugal property so advanced for the
purchase of said parcels of land as reimbursible to the estate of Clodualdo Vitug Fule vs. Legare, supra; Arches vs. Billanes, L-20452, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 715.
20
on his death." That must be the reason why the property was registered in the
17 Vitug vs. Montemayor, 91 Phil. 286, 288; see also Exhibits 3 Mendiola, 3-A Mendiola, 3-B
21
Exhibits 1, 1-A, and 1-B Mendiola, 2 and 2-A Mendiola, pp. 236-238, Record on Appeal.
22
At any rate, although actions for recovery of real property and for partition Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, L-21450, April 15, 1968, 32 SCRA 29.
23
are real actions, however, they are actions in personam that bind only the Section 3 (b), Rule 131, Rules of Court.
24
particular individuals who are parties thereto. The PNB not being a party in said
19
445
cases is not bound by the said decisions. Nor does it appear that the VOL. 153, AUGUST 31. 1987 445
Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals
_____________
Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and set aside and another decision is
Cui and Joven vs. Henson, 51 Phil. 606, 612; Roxas vs. Dinglasan, L-27234, May 30, 1969, 28
14
hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint and ordering private respondents to
SCRA 430. pay attorney's fees and expenses of litigation to petitioner PNB in the amount of
91 Phil. 286.
15
P20,000.00 and the costs of the suit.
93 Phil. 99.
SO ORDERED.
16
91 Phil. 289.
17
circumstances of this case, the non-applicability of the presumption should also be upheld.
DIOSDIDIT, BALDOMERO, FILOMENO, ELPIDIO, AIDA, all surnamed In the light of these findings a new trial would only be an unnecessary exercise and
CUENCA, petitioners, vs. RESTITUTO CUENCA, MELADORA CUENCA and ineffective. The documents sought to be presented during a new trial would not in any way
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. change the result. The motion for new trial was correctly denied although not for the reason
New Trial; Since the motion for new trial was filed before the appellate court’s given by the respondent court.
judgment could become final and executory, the motion was filed within the reglementary
period.—The rules are clear and leave no room for interpretation. Rule 37 speaks of a trial PETITION for certiorari to review the resolutions of the Court of Appeals.
court while Rule 53 speaks of the Court of Appeals. Undoubtedly, the appellate court erred
in denying the petitioner’s motion for new trial on the ground that it was filed out of time
pursuant to Rule 37. The applicable law is Rule 53 and since the motion for new trial was The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
filed before the appellate court’s judgment could become final and executory, the motion was De Castro & Cagampang Law Offices for petitioners.
filed within the reglementary period. With these findings, the usual procedure would be to Cipriano C. Alvizo, Sr. for respondents.
remand the case to the appellate court. Nevertheless, since all the relevant facts needed to
resolve the issue as to whether or not the petitioners’ motion for new trial is meritorious are GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
before us, we find no need to refer the case back to the appellate court. (See Tejones v.
Gironella, et al., G.R. No. L-35506 March 21, 1988; Alger Electric, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
(135 SCRA 37 [1985]), and Beautifont, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 50141, This petition for review on certiorari seeks the reversal of the resolutions of the
January 29, 1988). then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, denying the
Same; Same; Conjugal Partnership; Presumption that all property of the marriage is petitioners’ motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively Private respondents Restituto Cuenca and Meladora Cuenca filed a complaint
to the husband or the wife.—Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that “All property of for recovery of real property and damages against the petitioners before the then
the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it Court of First Instance of Davao del Norte. The case was docketed as Civil Case
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife,” In the cases of Philippine National Bank
No.
v. Court of Appeals, (153 SCRA 435 [August 31, 1987]); Magallon v. Montej (146 SCRA 282 337
[December 16, 1986]) and Maramba v. Lozano (20 SCRA 474 [June 29, 1967]) this Court
ruled that the presumption refers only to the property acquired during marriage and does VOL. 168, DECEMBER 8, 1988 337
not operate when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was Cuenca vs. Cuenca
acquired.
1240.
_______________ After trial, the lower court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners. The
lower court dismissed the complaint.
*THIRD DIVISION. The private respondents appealed the decision to the then Intermediate
336 Appellate Court.
3 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED On November 26, 1984, the appellate court reversed and set aside the decision
36 of the lower court. It rendered a decision in favor of the private respondents the
dispositive portion of which reads:
Cuenca vs. Cuenca “WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and another one entered
Same; Same; Newly discovered evidence; The presumption cannot prevail when the declaring plaintiff Restituto Cuenca the absolute and exclusive owner of that parcel of land
title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved.— known as Lot 3063 Pls-22 of the Cadastral Survey of the Municipality of Butuan, Province
In the case at bar, the documents sought to be presented as newly discovered evidence do of Agusan located at Bo. Pinamangculan, containing an area of six (6) hectares, more or less,
not show that the claims to the subject parcels consisting of homestead lands were perfected declared in the name of Restituto Cuenca; ordering the defendants to restore to said
during the marriage of Agripino Cuenca and petitioner Engracia Basadre. The perfection of plaintiff Restituto Cuenca the possession of said parcel of land; declaring the parcel of land
the homestead claims is considered the time of acquisition of the properties. (See Magallon described as Lot 3060 Pls-22 of the Cadastral Survey of the Municipality of Butuan,
v. Montejo supra) The fact that these parcels were surveyed for Agripino Cuenca and Province of Agusan, located at Barrio Pinamangculan, Butuan, Agusan, containing an area
approved during the marriage of Agripino Cuenca and petitioner Engracia Basadre is not of 17 hectares, 732 centares, more or less, declared in the name of Restituto Cuenca as
determinative of the issue as to whether or not the parcels were the conjugal properties of conjugal partnership property of deceased spouses Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon in
Agripino and Engracia. Moreover, the documents show that 5 of the 8 parcels covered by the effect declaring one half portion of said parcel of conjugal partnership property the share of
the deceased Maria Bangahon to be divided exclusively share and share alike between the 339
plaintiffs Restituto Cuenca and Meladora Cuenca as the heirs of Maria Bangahon; declaring VOL. 168, DECEMBER 8, 1988 339
the other half portion of said parcel as the share of the late Agripino Cuenca also with
plaintiffs as the only surviving heirs of the said Agripino Cuenca entitled to divide Cuenca vs. Cuenca
exclusively between themselves share and share alike the said one half portion of Agripino “SECTION 1. Petition—Before a final order or judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals
Cuenca, and the other one half of the share of Agripino Cuenca to be divided among the becomes executory, a motion for new trial may be filed on the ground of newly discovered
plaintiffs Restituto Cuenca and Meladora Cuenca and defendant Engracia Basadre in equal evidence which could not have been discovered prior to the trial in the court below by the
shares under Article 892 of the New Civil Code. The other claim of the plaintiffs for exercise of due diligence and which is of such a character as would probably change the
damages and accounting of the value of the produce corresponding to their shares is not result. The motion shall be accompanied by affidavits showing the facts constituting the
granted for lack of evidence. The counterclaim of defendants is likewise dismissed for lack of grounds therefor and the newly discovered evidence. (Italics supplied)
merit.” (Rollo, pp. 37-38) The rules are clear and leave no room for interpretation. Rule 37 speaks of a trial
On December 3, 1984, the petitioners received a copy of the appellate court’s court while Rule 53 speaks of the Court of Appeals. Undoubtedly, the appellate
decision. court erred in denying the petitioners’ motion for new trial on the ground that it
338
was filed out of time pursuant to Rule 37. The applicable law is Rule 53 and since
338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED the motion for new trial was filed before the appellate court’s judgment could
Cuenca vs. Cuenca become final and executory, the motion was filed within the reglementary period.
With these findings, the usual procedure would be to remand the case to the
On December 14, 1984, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the
appellate court. Nevertheless, since all the relevant facts needed to resolve the
decision.
issue as to whether or not the petitioners’ motion for new trial is meritorious are
On February 22, 1985, the petitioners filed a Supplemental Motion for
before us, we find no need to refer the case back to the appellate court.
Reconsideration and/or Motion for New Trial on the ground of newly discovered
(See Tejones v. Gironella, et al., G.R. No. L-35506 March 21, 1988; Alger Electric,
evidence.
Inc. v. Court of Appeals (135 SCRA 37 [1985]), and Beautifont, Inc., et al. v. Court
In a Resolution dated August 6, 1985, the appellate court denied the motion
of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 50141, January 29, 1988).
for reconsideration for lack of merit and the supplemental motion for
Civil Case No. 1240 had for its subject matter parcels of land which were
reconsideration and/or new trial for having been filed out of time. The court ruled
claimed by two sets of families. Private respondents Restituto Cuenca and
that under section 1, Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of Court, a motion for new trial
Meladora Cuenca claimed ownership over the subject parcels of land on the
on the ground of newly discovered evidence must be filed only within thirty (30)
ground that they are the legitimate children of Agripino Cuenca and Maria
days after notice of the decision is received.
Bangahon, both deceased, owners of the subject parcels of land. They alleged that
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the August 6, 1985
some of the parcels are paraphernal property of Maria while all the others are
resolution insofar as the same held that the motion for new trial was filed out of
conjugal properties of Maria and Agripino. They also alleged that Agripino
time. The motion was denied for lack of merit and legal basis.
Cuenca and Engracia Basadre were not legally married because at the time they
Hence, this petition.
lived together Agripino was married to a certain Jesusa Pagar.
In a resolution dated September 14, 1987, we gave due course to the petition.
On the other hand, the petitioners (defendants below) Diosdidit, Baldomero,
The sole issue raised in the instant petition pertains to the period when a
Filomeno Elpidio, Aida, Anita and Engra-
party may file a motion for new trial before the appellate court. 340
The Rules of Court under Rule 37 and Rule 53 provide two (2) instances when
a party may file a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered 340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
evidence. Cuenca vs. Cuenca
Rule 37, Section 1 states: cia Vda. de Cuenca denied the legitimacy of the marriage between Agripino
“SECTION 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial—Within the period for Cuenca and Maria Bangahon as well as the legitimacy of the plaintiffs as children
perfecting appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment of the couple. They claimed that Agripino Cuenca and their mother Engracia
and grant a new trial for one or more of the following causes materially affecting the
Basadre were legally married and that they are the legitimate children of the
substantial rights of said party.”
xxx xxx xxx couple. They contend that the subject parcels of lands are conjugal properties of
“b) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence have Agripino and Engracia.
discovered, and produced at the trial and which if presented would probably alter the result; The appellate court stated its findings as follows:
(italics supplied)” “The records show that defendant Bartolome Sanchez upon manifestation of his counsel is
xxx xxx xxx no longer a necessary party as Engracia Basadre-Cuenca has repurchased that portion of
while section 1, Rule 53 states:
the land in question sold to Bartolome Sanchez making plaintiffs’ claim against defendant their marriage without, however, presenting any document to prop up their pretense; that
Bartolome Sanchez moot and academic. they are the legitimate children of Agripino Cuenca and Engracia Basadre-Cuenca who
“Our review of the evidence shows that Agripino Cuenca in his lifetime expressed in the succeeded to the properties in litigation. We find no evidentiary value in the extrajudicial
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Maria Bangahon executed on June 13, 1950 before settlement of the estate of Agripino Cuenca executed by the defen-
Notary Public Francisco Ro. Cupin (Exh. “C”) that: 342
“ ‘Parcel of agricultural land situated in Pinamangculan, Butuan, Agusan, planted to coconut, under the
342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
present possession of the heirs of Maria Bangahon, bounded on the North, Lot No. 3062, Lucio Plaza, Lot
No. 4319, A. Cuenca, portion of Lot No. 3063, in the possession of A. Cuenca, on the south Road, on the Cuenca vs. Cuenca
West by Lot No. 3057, S. Dumanon, 3058, B. Adormio, 3059, A. Cuenca and east portion of Lot No. 3063,
containing an area of six (6) hectares, more or less (This is a portion of Lot No. 3063, Pls-22 of Cad. of dants of Engracia Basadre-Cuenca and her children. It is self-serving and proves nothing.
Municipality of Butuan), which parcel of land belongs exclusively to Maria Bangahon during her lifetime In passing, We note that the defendants presented tax declaration (Exhibits 3-17-A),
and which property is separate from the conjugal property of the marriage of said Maria Bangahon and pieces of evidence which have been ruled in a long line of decisions by our Supreme Court to
Agripino Cuenca. be not real evidence at all sufficient to prove ownership or possession.
That parcel of land situated in Rendon, Butuan, Agusan, planted to rice with irrigation under the After considering the evidence of both parties, in sum, We find convincing evidence to
present possession of the heirs, bounded on the North by Mariano Agagdang, on the East by Clerencia show that Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon were legally married with Restituto
Tagonsod, on the South by Suatan River and on the West by Mariano Agagdang, containing an area of
Cuenca and Meladora Cuenca as their issues; that Maria Bangahon brought properties into
1.2500 hectares, more or less, under Tax Dec. 3055, assessed at P250.00 by the property records of
Agusan. her marriage; that the couple acquired properties during the marriage; that by virtue of the
That parcel of land situated in Rendon, Butuan, Agusan, planted to coconut, under the present extrajudicial settlement executed by Agripino Cuenca and his children, Restituto is the
possession of the heirs, bounded on the North by Maximo Bangahon, on the East, by Sergio Pagar, on the absolute owner of the parcels of land described in paragraph 2(a) (b) and (c) of the
South, by Macaria Agagdang, on the West, by Folgencio Buyan, containing an area of 1.1722 hectares, complaint; that one half of the land described in par. 6 of the complaint belongs to Agripino
341 Cuenca and the other half to Maria Bangahon the same having been acquired by Agripino
VOL. 168, DECEMBER 8, 1988 341 Cuenca and Maria Bangahon during their marriage—conjugal partnership property.
Therefore, upon the dissolution of the conjugal relationship by the death of spouses Agripino
Cuenca vs. Cuenca Cuenca and Maria Bangahon, one half goes to Agripino Cuenca which portion after the
more or less, assessed at P670.00 by Tax Dec. No. 4026 of Agusan.’ ” death of Agripino Cuenca goes to his alleged third wife, Engracia Basadre-Cuenca together
belong to Maria Bangahon as her inheritance from her parents. This declaration against with the plaintiffs as forced heirs of Agripino Cuenca (Arts. 185 & 189, New Civil Code).
interest is further reiterated by Agripino Cuenca in that judicial settlement and sale From the evidence of the plaintiffs, We find the present appeal impressed with merit.”
executed by him on October 19, 1950. These two documents, as rightly contended by the (Rollo, pp. 33-37)
plaintiffs, are ample proofs that the properties in question described in par. 2 of the In their motion for new trial the petitioners alleged:
complaint, belong exclusively to Maria Bangahon as her paraphernal property, a fact
declared by no less than the husband himself in a declaration against his interest. It was
error for the trial court to unceremoniously brush aside the importance of the declaration of 1. “1.There are newly discovered evidence consisting of ancient, authentic
Agripino Cuenca in the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Maria Bangahon. These records which establish beyond reasonable doubt, the status of
public documents carry sufficient evidentiary weight to prove the origin of the properties in defendants-appellees as legitimate children of the deceased Agri-pino
question and the nature of their ownership as properties brought into the marriage by Cuenca whose estate is the subject matter of this case.
Maria Bangahon to Agripino Cuenca as against the bare testimony of the defendants and 2. 2.There is documentary proof beyond doubt that Agripino Cuenca
their witnesses. More importantly, Juan Buyan and former Judge Francisco Ro. Cupin,
was never married to Jesusa Pagar.
parties who participated in the execution of the two documents—the first as an intrumental
witness to the documents and the other the intervening Notary Public—testified to the due
3. 3.The totality of defendants-appellees’ evidence prove that Engracia A.
execution of the said documents. These witnesses likewise proved the genuineness of Basadre was married legally to Agripino Cuenca in 1920 and that
Exhibits C and D. defendant-appellees are legitimate children of Agripino Cuenca and
The ownership of Maria Bangahon of the three parcels of land was testified to further legitimate half-brother/half-sisters of plaintiffs-appellants who are
by Adel Ras who declared unrebutted that Maria Bangahon was the daughter of Isidro entitled to equal shares of their father’s estate.
Bangahon, the first cousin of his father; that the three parcels of land in question were 4. 4.There is sufficient documentary evidence to prove that the lands in
inherited by Maria Bangahon from her parents; that Maria Bangahon later married question were conjugal properties of Agripino Cuenca and Engracia A.
Agripino Cuenca bringing into their marriage the properties which she inherited from her
Basadre acquired during their marriage.” (Rollo, p. 60)
father, Isidro Bangahon. These pieces of evidence established the fact that the plaintiffs are
the forced heirs of Maria Bangahon and Agripino Cuenca, who by law should succeed to the
possession and ownership of the properties in question. On the other hand, defendants’ 343
evidence consist only of the oral testimonies of Marta Legaspi, Engracia Basadre-Cuenca, VOL. 168, DECEMBER 8, 1988 343
Baldomero Cuenca and Diosdidit Cuenca which proved nothing concrete as they merely are
inferences and deductions conveniently tailored to support their claim that Agripino Cuenca Cuenca vs. Cuenca
married Engracia BasadreCuenca; that the properties in question were acquired during
The petitioners wanted to prove that Engracia Basadre was legally married to v. Montejo (146 SCRA 282 [December 16, 1986]) and Maramba v. Lozano (20
their father Agripino Cuenca and that all the other petitioners were the SCRA 474 [June 29, 1967]) this Court ruled that the presumption refers only to
legitimate children of the couple. In this connection, the petitioners attached to the property acquired during marriage and does not operate when there is no
their motion an alleged newly discovered evidence consisting of a certified true showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired.
copy of the Register of Birth of petitioner Diosdidit Cuenca, first child of Agripino In the case at bar, the documents sought to be presented as newly discovered
Cuenca and petitioner Engracia Basadre issued by the National Archives or evidence do not show that the claims to the subject parcels consisting of
Bureau of Records Management which discloses that Diosdidit is a legitimate homestead lands were perfected during the marriage of Agripino Cuenca and
child of the couple and a notarized public document dated August 13, 1948 which petitioner Engracia Basadre. The perfection of the homestead claims is considered
discloses that Jesusa Pagar was married to Santiago Barkowel disproving the the time of acquisition of the properties. (See Magallon v. Montejo supra) The fact
respondents’ evidence that Jesusa Pagar was married to Agripino Cuenca. that these parcels were surveyed for Agripino Cuenca and approved during the
The issue as to whether or not petitioner Engracia Basadre was legally marriage of Agripino Cuenca and petitioner Engracia Basadre is not
married to Agripino Cuenca was settled by the appellate court in this wise: determinative of the issue as to whether or not the parcels were the conjugal
“After considering the evidence of both parties, in sum, We find convincing evidence to show properties of Agripino and Engracia. Moreover, the
that Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon were legally married with Restituto Cuenca and 345
Meladora Cuenca as their issues; that Maria Bangahon brought properties into her
VOL. 168, DECEMBER 8, 1988 345
marriage; that the couple acquired properties during the marriage; that by virtue of the
extrajudicial settlement executed by Agripino Cuenca and his children, Restituto is the Cuenca vs. Cuenca
absolute owner of the parcels of land described in paragraph 2(a) (b) and (c) of the documents show that 5 of the 8 parcels covered by the documents are titled in the
complaint; that one half of the land described in par. 6 of the complaint belongs to Agripino name of either respondent Meladora Cuenca or respondent Restituto Cuenca. The
Cuenca and the other half to Maria Bangahon the same having been acquired by Agripino
presumption cannot prevail “when the title is in the name of only one spouse and
Cuenca and Maria Bangahon during their marriage—conjugal partnership
property. Therefore, upon the dissolution of the conjugal relationship by the death of spouses the rights of innocent third parties are involved. (Philippine National Bank v.
Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon, one half goes to Agripino Cuenca which portion after Court of Appeals, supra citing Nable Jose v. Nable Jose, 41 Phil. 713) Under the
the death of Agripino Cuenca goes to his alleged third wife, Engracia Basadre-Cuenca circumstances of this case, the non-applicablility of the presumption should also
together with the plaintiffs as forced heirs of Agripino Cuenca (Arts. 185 & 189, New Civil be upheld.
Code).” (Rollo, pp. 36-37) (Italics supplied) In the light of these findings a new trial would only be an unnecessary
The dispositive portion of the decision states that petitioner Engracia Basadre exercise and ineffective. The documents sought to be presented during a new trial
was entitled to inherit from Agripino Cuenca together with the latter’s legitimate would not in any way change the result. The motion for new trial was correctly
children by Maria Bangahon, the private respondents herein in accordance denied although not for the reason given by the respondent court.
with Article 892 of the New Civil Code. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The questioned
344 resolutions of the appellate court are AFFIRMED. For non-compliance with this
Accordingly, the appellate court declared Engracia Basadre as surviving spouse. Court’s Resolution dated March 2, 1988, ordering him to show cause for his
There was, therefore no need to prove the legality of marriage between petitioners failure to file a memorandum within the period given to him, Atty. Cipriano C.
Engracia Basadre and Agripino Cuenca much less to prove the legitimacy of the Alvizo, Sr. is fined Five Hundred (P500.00) Pesos. If he fails to pay the fine within
other petitioners who are undoubtedly the children of Agripino and Engracia. ten (10) days from notice of this decision, he shall be imprisoned for five (5) days.
The petitioners also alleged the finding of newly discovered evidence to prove SO ORDERED.
that the subject parcels of land were conjugal properties of Agripino Cuenca and Fernan (C.J.), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortés, JJ., concur.
petitioner Engracia Basadre. These consist of eight (8) sketch maps obtained on Petition dismissed. Resolutions affirmed.
December 27, 1984 from the Regional Office of the Bureau of Lands in Cagayan Notes.—There is no need to include the name of the wife where husband is
de Oro City “after extensive research.” The petitioners alleged that these parcels sued in order to bind the conjugal partnership. (G-Tractors, Inc. vs. Court of
were surveyed for Agripino Cuenca and approved when Agripino Cuenca was Appeals, 135 SCRA 192.)
already married to Engracia as indicated in the documents, hence, there is the The conjugal partnership must equally bear the indebtedness of the husband
presumption that these are conjugal properties and therefore petitioners have in pursuit of his career or profession and his losses from a legitimate business.
hereditary rights over these properties. (Ibid.)
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that “All property of the marriage
is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife,” In the cases of Philippine
National Bank v. Court of Appeals, (153 SCRA 435 [August 31, 1987]); Magallon
award-ed,”—– as they are in the case at bar—– as well as “in any other case where the court
deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees x x x be recovered.”
No. L-28589. January 8, 1973. Same; Same; Same; Factors considered in awarding attorney’s fees.—–The quantity
RAFAEL ZULUETA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. PAN AMERICAN and quality of the services rendered by the plaintiffs’ counsel appearing on record, apart
WORLDAIRWAYS,INC., defendant-appellant. from the nature of the case and the amount involved therein, as well as his prestige as one
Courts; Jurisdiction; Question of jurisdictional amount;Where original claim less than of the most distinguished members of the legal profession in the Philippines, of which
jurisdictional amount, counter-claim within original jurisdiction of court filed cures defect.— judicial cognizance may be taken, amply justify the award, which is a little over 10% of the
– Although the original claim involves less than the jurisdictional amount, jurisdiction can damages (P700,000) collectible by the plaintiffs herein.
be sustained if the counterclaim (of the compulsory type)—– based upon the damages Same; Conjugal partnership; Damages claimed in case at bar form part of conjugal
allegedly suffered by the defendant in consequence of the filing of the complaint—– exceeds partnership property.—–Considering that the damages in question have arisen from, inter
the jurisdictional amount. alia, a breach of plaintiffs’ contract of carriage with the defendant, for which plaintiffs paid
Same; Same; When party estopped from impugning jurisdiction of the court.—–The their fare with funds presumably belonging to the conjugal partnership, the said damages
defendant not only failed to question the jurisdiction of the trial court—– either in that fall under paragraph (1) of article 153 of the Civil Code, the right thereto having been
court or in the Supreme Court, before the rendition of the latter’s decision, and even “acquired by onerous title during the marriage x x x.”
subsequently thereto, by filing the aforementioned motion for reconsideration and seeking Same; Same; Same; Reasons therefor.—–The damages involved in the case at bar do
the reliefs therein prayed for—– but, also, urged both courts to exercise jurisdiction over the not come under any of the provi-
3
merits of the case, defendant is now estopped from impugning said jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Nature of claim for damages as one not capable of pecuniary estimation VOL. 49, JANUARY 8, 1973 3
and, therefore, within the original jurisdiction of courts of first instance; Reasons therefor.—–
Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways, Inc.
A claim for moral damages is one not susceptible of pecuniary estimation. Article 2217 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that “(t)hough incapable of pecuniary sions of article 148 or of other provisions forming part of Chapter 3, Title VI, of Book I
computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the of the Civil Code, which chapter is entitled “Paraphernal Property.” What is more, if “(t)hat
defendant’s wrongful act or omission.” Hence, “(n)o proof of pecuniary loss is necessary”—– which is acquired by right of redemption or by exchange with other property belonging to
pursuant to article 2216 of the same Code—– “in order that moral x x x damages may be only one of the spouses,” and “(t)hat which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or
adjudicated.” And (t)the assessment of such damages x x x is left to the discretion of the of the husband,” belong exclusively to such wife or husband it follows necessarily that that
court”—– said article adds—– “according to the circumstances of each case.” which is acquired with money of the conjugal partnership belongs thereto or forms part
Civil law; Damages; Breach by common carrier of contract of carriage justifies award thereof.
of damages to passenger(s); Case at bar.—–The plaintiffs had a contract of carriage with the Same; Same; Where husband and wife plaintiffs or defendants in a common cause,
defendant, as a common carrier, pursuant to which the latter was bound, for a substantial settlement with one of the spouses not favored.—–It is true that the law favors and
monetary consideration paid by the former, not merely to transport them to Manila, but, encourages the settlement of litigations by compromise agreement between the contending
also, to do so with “extraordinary diligence” or “utmost diligence.” The parties, but, it certainly does not favor a settlement with one of the spouses, both of whom
2 are plaintiffs or defendants in a common cause, such as defense of the rights of the conjugal
partnership, when the effect, even if indirect, of the compromise is to jeopardize “the
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
solidarity of the family”—– which the law seeks to protect—– by creating an additional
Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways, Inc. cause for the misunderstanding that had arisen between such spouses during the litigation,
responsibility of the common carrier, under said contract, as regards the passenger’s and thus rendering more difficult, a reconciliation between them.
safety is of such a nature, affecting as it does public interest, that it “cannot be dispensed MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the Supreme Court.
with” or even “lessened by stipulation, by the posting of notices, by statements on tickets, or The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
otherwise.” In the case at bar, the defendant did not only fail to comply with its obligation to Alfredo L. Benipayo for plaintiffs-appellees Rafael Zulueta and Carolina
transport the plaintiff to Manila, but, also, acted in a manner calculated to humiliate him, Zulueta.
to chastise him, to make him suffer, to cause to him the greatest possible inconvenience by Justo L. Albert for plaintiff-appellee Telly Albert Zulueta.
leaving him in a desolate island, in the expectation that he would be stranded there for a
V. E. del Rosario & Associates and Salcedo, Del Rosario, Bito, Misa &
“minimum of one week” and, in addition thereto, charged therefor $13.30 a day.
Same; Same; Award of exemplary damages; When justified; Case at bar.—It is obvious Lozada for defendant-appellant.
that in off-loading the plaintiff at Wake Island, under the circumstances heretofore adverted RESOLUTION
to. the defendant’s agents had acted with malice aforethought and evident bad faith. If
“gross negligence” warrants the award of exemplary damages, with more reason is its
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
imposition justified when the act performed is deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad
faith.
Same; Same; Award of attorney’s fees; When proper; Case at bar.—–Article 2208 of the Both parties in this case have moved for the reconsideration of the decision of this
Civil Code expressly authorizes the award of attorney’s fees “when exemplary damages are Court promulgated on February 29, 1972. Plaintiffs maintain that the decision
appealed from should be affirmed in toto. The defendant, in turn, prays that the
decision of this Court be “set aside x x x with or without a new trial, x x x and also, within the original jurisdiction of said courts, thereby curing the alleged
that the complaint be dismissed, with costs; or, in the alternative, that the defect if any, in plaintiffs’ complaint. 3
4 “We need not consider the jurisdictional controversy as to the amount the appellant sues to
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED recover because the counter-claim interposed establishes the jurisdiction of the District
Court. Merchants’ Heat & Light Co. v. James B. Clow & Sons, 204 U.S. 286, 27 S. Ct. 285,
Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways, Inc. 51 L. Ed. 488; O. J. Lewis Mercantile Co. v. Klepner, 176 F. 343 (C.C.A. 2), certiorari
amount of the award embodied therein be considerably reduced.” denied 216 U.S. 620, 30 S Ct. 575, 54 L. Ed. 641. x x x.” 4
Subsequently to the filing of its motion for reconsideration, the defendant filed “x x x courts have said that ‘when the jurisdictional amount is in question, the
a “petition to annul proceedings and/or to order the dismissal of plaintiffs- tendering of a counterclaim in an amount which in itself, or added to the amount claimed in
the petition, makes up a sum equal to the amount necessary to the jurisdiction of this court,
appellees’ complaint,” upon the ground that “appellees’ complaint actually seeks
jurisdiction is established, whatever may be the state of the plaintiff’s complaint.’ American
the recovery of only P5,502.85 as actual damages, because, for the purpose of Sheet & Tin Plate Co. v. Winzeler(D.C.) 227 F. 321, 324.” Thus, in Ago v. Buslon, We held:
5 6
determining the jurisdiction of the lower court, the unspecified sums representing “x x x. Then, too, petitioner’s counterclaim for P37,000.00 was, also, within the exclusive
items of alleged damages, may not be considered, under the settled doctrines of original jurisdiction of the latter courts, and there are ample precedents to the effect that
this Honorable Court,” and “the jurisdiction of courts of first instance when the ‘although the original claim involves less than the jurisdictional amount, x x x jurisdiction
complaint in the present case was filed on Sept. 30, 1965” was limited to cases “in can be sustained if the counter-claim (of the compulsory type)’—– such as the one set up by
which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in petitioner herein, based upon the damages allegedly suffered by him in consequence of the
controversy amounts to more than ten thousand pesos” and “the mere fact that filing of said complaint—– ‘exceeds the jurisdictional amount.’ (Moore Federal Practice, 2nd
ed. [1948], Vol. 3, p. 41; Ginsburg vs. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. of California, 69 Fed. [2d]
the complaint also prays for unspecified moral damages and attorney’s fees, does
97; Home Life Ins. Co. vs. Sipp., 11 Fed, [2d] 474; American Sheet & Tin Plate Co. vs.
not bring the action within the jurisdiction of the lower court.” Winzeler [D.C.] 227 Fed. 321, 324; Brix vs. People’s Mutual Life Ins. Co., 41 P. 2d. 537, 2
We find no merit in this contention. To begin with, it is not true that “the Cal. 2d. 446; Emery vs. Pacific Employees Ins. Co., 67 P. 2d. 1046, 8 Cal. 2d. 663).”
unspecified sums representing items or other alleged damages, may not be
considered”—– for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of the court—– _______________
“under the settled doctrines of this Honorable Court.” In fact, not a single case has
been cited in support of this allegation. 2Sec. 44(a), Rep, Act No. 296.
Secondly, it has been held that a claim for moral damages is one not 3See 38 Harvard Law Review, 744-751; 45 Yale Law Journal 416.
Ginsburg v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 69 F. (2d) 97, 98.
susceptible of pecuniary estimation. In fact, Article 2217 of the Civil Code of the
4
Philippines explicitly provides that “(t)hough incapable of pecuniary 6L-19631, Jan. 31, 1964. Italics ours.
computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of 6
the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.” Hence, “(n)o proof pecuniary loss 6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
necessary”—– pursuant to Article 2216 of the same Code—– “in order that moral
Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways, Inc.
x x x damages may be adjudicated.” And “(t)he assessment of such damages x x x
is left to the discretion of the court”—– said article adds—– “according to the Needless to say, having not only failed to question the jurisdiction of the trial
circumstances of each case.” Appellees’ complaint is, therefore, court—– either in that court or in this Court, before the rendition of the latter’s
decision, and even subsequently thereto, by filing the aforementioned motion for
_______________ reconsideration and seeking the reliefs therein prayed for—– but, also, urged both
courts to exercise jurisdiction over the merits of the case, defendant is now
1 Layda v. Court of Appeals, L-4487, Jan. 29, 1952; Yutuk v. Manila Electric Co., L-13016, May 31, estopped from impugning said jurisdicton. 7
1961. Before taking up the specific questions raised in defendant’s motion for
5 reconsideration, it should be noted that the same is mainly predicated upon the
VOL. 49, JANUARY 8, 1973 5 premise that plaintiffs’ version is inherently incredible, and that this Court
Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways, Inc.
should accept the theory of the defense to the effect that petitioner was off-loaded
because of a bomb-scare allegedly arising from his delay in boarding the aircraft
within the original jurisdiction of courts of first instance, which includes “all civil
and subsequent refusal to open his bags for inspection. We need not repeat here
actions in which the subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary
the reasons given in Our decision for rejecting defendant’s contention and not
estimation.”
disturbing the findings of fact of His Honor, the Trial Judge, who had the decided
2
10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED said contract, as regards the passenger’s safety, is of such a nature, affecting as it
Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways, Inc. does public interest, that it “cannot be dispensed with” or even “lessened by
stipulation, by the posting of notices, by statements on tickets, or otherwise.” In
lines, as well as in several criminal cases, and some cases for libel and slander.
10
the present case, the defendant did not only fail to comply with its obligation to
None of these cases is, however, in point. Said cases against airlines referred to
transport Mr. Zulueta to Manila, but, also, acted in a manner calculated to
passengers who were merely constrained to take a tourist class
humiliate him, to chastise him, to make him suffer, to cause to him the greatest
accommodation, despite the fact that they had first class tickets, and that
possible inconvenience, by leaving him in a desolate island, in the expectation
although, in one of such cases, there was proof that the airline involved had acted
that he would be stranded there for a “minimum of one week” and, in addition
as it did to give preference to a “white” passenger, this motive was not disclosed
thereto, charged therefor $13.30 a day.
until the trial in court. In the case at bar, plaintiff Rafael Zulueta was “off-loaded”
It is urged by the defendant that exemplary damages are not recoverable in
at Wake Island, for having dared to retort to defendant’s agent in a tone and
quasi-delicts, pursuant to Article 2231 of our Civil Code, except when the
manner matching, if not befitting his intemperate language and arrogant
defendant has acted with “gross negligence,” and that there is no specific finding
attitude. As a consequence, Capt. Zentner’s attempt to humiliate Rafael Zulueta
that it had so acted. It is obvious, however, that in off-loading plaintiff at Wake
had boomeranged against him (Zentner), in the presence of the other passengers
Island, under the circumstances heretofore adverted to, defendant’s agents had
and the crew. It was, also, in their presence that defendant’s agent had referred to
acted with malice aforethought and evident bad faith. If “gross negligence”
the plaintiffs as “monkeys,” a racial insult not made openly and publicly in the
warrants the award of exemplary damages, with more reason is its imposition
abovementioned previous cases against airlines.
justified when the act performed is deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad
In other words, Mr. Zulueta was off loaded, not to protect the safety of the
faith. Thus, in Lopez v. PAN AM, We held:
aircraft and its passengers, but to retaliate and punish him for the
11
“The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the name implies, to provide
embarrassment and loss of face thus suffered by defendant’s agent. This an example or correction for
vindictive rnotive is made more manifest by the note delivered to Mr. Zulueta by
defendant’s airport manager at Wake Island, Mr. Sitton, stating that the former’s _______________
9Articles 1733 and 1755, Civil Code of the Philippines. “x x x xxxx xxx
Article 1757, Civil Code of the Philippines.
10
“Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
Supra.
damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their
11
12
custody.
12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED “x x x xxxx x x x.”
Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways, Inc.
Obviously, the amount of damages awarded in the Palisoc case is not and cannot
public good. Defendant having breached its contracts in bad faith, the court, as stated
serve as the measure of the damages recoverable in the present case, the latter
earlier, may award exemplary damages in addition to moral damages (Articles 2229, 2232, having been caused directly and intentionally by an employee or agent of the
New Civil Code.)” defendant, whereas the student who killed the young Palisoc was in no wise an
Similarly, in NWA v. Cuenca, this Court declared that an award for exemplary
12 agent of the school. Moreover, upon her arrival in the Philippines, Mrs. Zulueta
damages was justified by the fact that the airline’s “agent had acted in a wanton, reported her husband’s predicament to defendant’s local manager and asked him
reckless and oppressive manner” in compelling Cuenca, upon arrival at Okinawa, to forthwith have him (Mr. Zulueta) brought to Manila, which defendant’s
to transfer, over his objection, from the first class, where he was accommodated aforementioned manager refused to do, thereby impliedly ratifying the off-loading
from Manila to Okinawa, to the tourist class, in his trip to Japan, “under threat of of Mr. Zulueta at Wake Island.
otherwise leaving him in Okinawa,” despite the fact that he had paid in full the It is next urged that, under the contract of carriage with the defendant, Mr.
first class fare and was issued in Manila a first class ticket. Zulueta was bound to be present at the time scheduled for the departure of
Defendant cites Rotea v. Halili, in support of the proposition that a principal
13 defendant’s plane and that he had, consequently, violated said contract when he
is not liable for exemplary damages owing to acts of his agent unless the former did not show up at such time. This argument might have had some weight had
has participated in said acts or ratified the same. Said case involved, however, the defendant’s plane taken off before Mr. Zulueta had shown up. But the fact is that
subsidiary civil liability of an employer arising from criminal acts of his employee, he was ready, willing and able to board the plane about two hours beforeit
and “exemplary damages x x x may be imposed when the crime was committed actually took off, and that he was deliberately and maliciously off-loaded on
with one or more aggravating circumtances.” Accordingly, the Rotea case is not in
14 account of his altercation with Capt. Zentner. It should, also, be noted that,
point, for the case at bar involves a breach of contract, as well as a quasi-delict. although Mr. Zulueta was delayed some 20 to 30 minutes, the arrival or
Neither may the case of Palisoc v. Brillantes, invoked by the defendant, be
15 departure of planes is often delayed for much longer periods of time. Followed to
equated with the case at bar. The Palisoc case dealt with the liability of school its logical conclusion, the argument adduced by the defense suggests that airlines
officials for damages arising from the death of a student (Palisoc) due to fist blows should be held liable for damages due to the inconvenience and
14
given by another student (Daffon), in the course of a quarrel between them, while
in a laboratory room of the Manila Technical Institute. In an action for damages, 14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
the head thereof and the teacher in charge of said laboratory were held jointly Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways, Inc.
and severally liable with the student who caused said death, for failure of the
anxiety, aside from actual damages, suffered by many passengers either in their
school to provide “adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the
haste to arrive at the airport on scheduled time just to find that their plane will
school premises,” to protect them “from
not take off until later, or by reason of the late arrival of the aircraft at its
destination.
_______________
PANAM impugns the award of attorney’s fees upon the ground that no
Supra.
12
penalty should be imposed upon the right to litigate; that, by law, it may be
109 Phil. 495.
13 awarded only in exceptional cases; that the claim for attorney’s fees has not been
Article 2230, New Civil Code.
14
proven; and that said defendant was justified in resisting plaintiff’s claim
L-29025; October 4, 1971.
15
“because it was patently exorbitant.”
13
Nothing, however, can be farther from the truth. Indeed, apart from plaintiff’s
VOL. 49, JANUARY 8, 1973 13 claim for actual damages, the amount of which is not contested, plaintiffs
Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways, Inc. did not ask any specific sum by way of exemplary and moral damages, as well as
harm, whether at the hands of fellow students or other parties.” Such liability attorney’s fees, and left the amount thereof to the “sound discretion” of the lower
was predicated upon Article 2180 of our Civil Code, the pertinent part of which court This, precisely, is the reason why PANAM, now, alleges—– without
reads: justification—– that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
“ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own the present case.
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
Moreover, Article 2208 of our Civil Code expresslyauthorizes the award of wife except: x x x (2) If they have in fact been separated for at least one year.”
attorney’s fees “when exemplary damages are awarded,”—– as they are in this This provision, We held, however, re-
case—– as well as “in any other case where the court deems it just and equitable
that attorney’s fees x x x be recovered,” and We so deem it just and equitable in _______________
the present case, considering the “exceptional” circumstances obtaining therein,
particularly the bad faith with which defendant’s agent had acted, the place Supra.
16
16
where and the conditions under which Rafael Zulueta was left at Wake Island,
the absolute refusal of defendant’s manager in Manila to take any step 16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
whatsoever to alleviate Mr. Zulueta’s predicament at Wake and have him brought Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways, Inc.
to Manila—– which, under their contract of carriage, was defendant’s obligation fers to suits in which the wife is the principal or real party in interest, not to the
to discharge with “extraordinary” or “utmost” diligence—– and, the “racial” factor case at bar, “in which the husband is the main party in interest, both as the
that had, likewise, tainted the decision of defendant’s agent, Capt. Zentner, to off- person principally aggrieved and as administrator of the conjugal partnership x x
load him at Wake Island. x he having acted in this capacity in entering into the contract of carriage with
As regards the evidence necessary to justify the sum of P75,000 awarded as PANAM and paid the amount due to the latter, under the contract, with funds of
attorney’s fees in this case, suffice the conjugal partnership,” to which the amounts recoverable for breach of said
15
contract, accordingly, belong. The damages suffered by Mrs. Zulueta were mainly
VOL. 49, JANUARY 8, 1973 15 an incident of the humiliation to which her husband had been subjected. The
Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways, Inc. Court ordered that said sum of P50,000 paid by PANAM to Mrs. Zulueta be
it to say that the quantity and quality of the services rendered by plaintiffs’ deducted from the aggregate award in favor of the plaintiffs herein for the simple
counsel appearing on record, apart from the nature of the case and the amount reason that upon liquidation of the conjugal partnership, as provided by law, said
involved therein, as well as his prestige as one of the most distinguished members amount would have to be reckoned with, either as part of her share in the
of the legal profession in the Philippines, of which judicial cognizance may be partnership, or as part of the support which might have been or may be due to her
taken, amply justify said award, which is a little over 10% of the damages (P700,- as wife of Rafael Zulueta. It would surely be inane to sentence the defendant to
000) collectible by plaintiffs herein. Indeed, the attorney’s fees in this case is pay the P700,-000 due to the plaintiffs and to direct Mrs. Zulueta to return said
proportionally much lessthan that adjudged in Lopez v. PANAM in which the
16
P50,006 to the defendant.
judgment rendered for attorney’s fees (P50,000) was almost 20% of the damages In this connection, it is noteworthy that, for obvious reasons of public policy,
(P275,000) recovered by the plaintiffs therein. she is not allowed by law to waive her share in the conjugal partnership, before
The defense assails the last part of the decision sought to be reconsidered, in the dissolution thereof. She cannot even acquire any property by gratuitous title,
17
which—– relying upon Article 172 of our Civil Code, which provides that “(t)he without the husband’s consent, except from her ascendants, descendants, parents-
wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband’s consent, except in-law, and collateral relatives within the fourth degree. 18
in cases provided by law,” and it is not claimed that this is one of such cases—– It is true that the law favors and encourages the settlement of litigations by
We denied a motion, filed by Mrs. Zulueta, for the dismissal of this case, insofar compromise agreement between the contending parties, but, it certainly does not
as she is concerned—– she having settled all her differences with the defendant, favor a settlement with one of the spouses, both of whom are plaintiffs or
which appears to have paid her the sum of P50,000 therefor—– “without prejudice defendants in a common cause, such as the defense of the rights of the conjugal
to this sum being deducted from the award made in said decision.” Defendant now partnership, when the effect, even if indirect, of the compromise is to jeopardize
alleges that this is tantamount to holding that said compromise agreement is both “the solidarity of the family”—– which the law seeks 19
from the award, and, because it is due (or part of the amount due) from the
Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 179.
defendant, with or without its compromise agreement with Mrs. Zulueta. What is
17
ineffective is the compromise agreement, insofar as the conjugal partnership is Id., Article 220.
19
concerned. Mrs. Zulueta’s motion was for the dismissal of the case insofar as she 17
was concerned, and the defense cited in support thereof Article 113 of said Code, VOL. 49, JANUARY 8, 1973 17
pursuant to which “(t)he husband must be joined in all suits by or against the
Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways, Inc.
to protect—– by creating an additional cause for the misunderstanding that had fare with funds presumably belonging to the conjugal partnership, We hold that
arisen between such spouses during the litigation, and thus rendering more said damages fall under paragraph (1) of said Article 153, the right thereto
difficult a reconciliation between them. having been “acquired by onerous title during the marriage x x x.” This conclusion
It is urged that there is no proof as to the purpose of the trip of the plaintiffs, is bolstered up by Article 148 of our Civil Code, according to which:
that neither is there any evidence that the money used to pay the plane tickets “ART. 148. The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:
came from the conjugal funds and that the award to Mrs. Zu-lueta was for her
personal suffering or injuries. There was, however, no individual or specific award 1. “(1)That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own;
in favor of Mrs. Zulueta or any of the plaintiffs. The award was made in their 2. “(2)That which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title;
favor collectively. Again, in the absence of said proof, the presumption is that the 3. “(3)That which is acquired by right of redemption or by exchange with other
purpose of the trip was for the common benefit of the plaintiffs and that the property belonging to only one of the spouses;
money had come from the conjugal funds, for, unless there is proof to the 4. “(4)That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband.”
contrary, it is presumed “(t)hat things have happened according to the ordinary
course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.” In fact Manresa maintains that
20 21 The damages involved in the case at bar do not come under any of these
they are deemed conjugal, when the source of the money used therefor is not provisions or of the other provisions forming part of Chapter 3, Title VI, of Book I
established, even if the purchase had been made by the wife. And this is the rule
22 of the Civil Code, which chapter is entitled “Paraphernal Property.” What is more,
obtaining in the Philippines. Even property registered, under the Torrens system, if “(t)hat which is acquired by right of redemption or by exchange with other
in the name of one of the spouses, or in that of the wife only, if acquired during property belonging to only one of the spouses,” and “(t)hat which is purchased
the marriage, is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless there is with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband,” belong exclusively to such
24
competent proof to the contrary. 23 wife or husband, it follows necessarily that that which is acquired with money of
PANAM maintains that the damages involved in the case at bar are not the conjugal partnership belongs thereto or forms part
among those forming part of the conjugal partnership pursuant to Article 153 of
the Civil Code, reading: _______________
“ART. 153. The following are conjugal partnership property :
Pursuant to Article 148.
24
_______________ 19
ad May 6, 1904 as well as those of September 2, 1896, March 6, 1897, April 23, 1898, November 30, 1903 defendant’s motion for reconsideration, are, in effect, adverse thereto. In both
and September 20, 1907.
Flores v. Flores, 48 Phil. 288; Guinguing v. Abuton, 48 Phil. 144; Bucoy v. Paulino, G.R. No. L-
23
cases, it was merely held that the presumption under Article 160 of our Civil
25775, April 26, 1968. Code—– to the effect that all property of the marriage belong to the conjugal
18 partnership—– does not apply unless it is shown that it was
18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED acquired during marriage. In the present case, the contract of carriage was
concededly entered into, and the damages claimed by the plaintiffs were
Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways, Inc.
incurred, during marriage. Hence, the rights accruing from said contract,
including those resulting from breach thereof by the defendant, are presumed to
1. “(1)That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of belong to the conjugal partnership of Mr. and Mrs. Zulueta. The fact that such
the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one breach of contract was coupled, also, with a quasi-delict constitutes an
of the spouses;
aggravating circumstances and can not possibly have the effect of depriving the
2. “(2)That which is obtained by the industry, or work, or as salary of the spouses, or
of either of them;
conjugal partnership of such property rights.
3. “(3)The fruits, rents or interests received or due during the marriage, coming from Defendant insists that the use of conjugal funds to redeem property does not
the common property or from the exclusive property of each spouse.” make the property redeemed conjugal if the right of redemption pertained to the
wife. In the absence, however, of proof that such right of redemption pertains to
the wife—– and there is no proof that the contract of carriage with PANAM or the
Considering that the damages in question have arisen from, inter alia, a breach of
money paid therefor belongs to Mrs. Zulueta—– the property involved, or the
plaintiffs’ contract of carriage with the defendant, for which plaintiffs paid their
rights arising therefrom, must be presumed, therefore, to form part of the 28Italics ours.
Although Colin y Capitant actually said that the question has not been “expressly” settled under
conjugal partnership.
29
the Spanish law, they did not say that it has been “impliedly” settled and in what way.
It is true that in Lilius v. Manila Railroad Co., it was held that the
27
30Art. 119, Civil Code of the Philippines.
“patrimonial and moral damages” awarded to a young and beautiful woman by 21
reason of a scar—– in consequence of an injury resulting from an automobile VOL. 49, JANUARY 8, 1973 21
accident—–which disfigured her face and fractured her left leg, as well as caused
Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways, Inc.
a permanent deformity, are her paraphernal property. Defendant cites, also, in
support of its contention the following passage from Colin y Capitant: presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
“No esta resuelta expresamente en la legislación española pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” 31
No similar rules are found in the French Civil Code. What is more, under the
_______________ provisions thereof, the conjugal partnership exists only when so stipulated in the
“capitulaciones matrimoniales” or by way of exception. In the language of
L-21533, June 29, 1967.
25 Manresa—–
L-22320, May 22, 1968.
26
“Prescindimos de los preceptos de los Codigos de Francia, Italia, Holanda, Portugal,
62 Phil. 56, 64-65.
27
Alemania y Suiza, porsue sólo excepcionalmente, o cuando asi se pacta en las capitulaciones,
20
admiten el sistema de gananciales.” 32
20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Again, Colin y Capitant, as well as the Lilius case, refer to damages recovered
Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways, Inc. for physical injuries suffered by the wife. In the case at bar, the party mainly
la cuestión de si las indemnizaciones debidas por accidentes del trabajo tienen la injured, although not physically, is the husband.
consideración de gananciales o son bienes particulares de los conyuges. Accordingly, the other Philippine cases and those from Louisiana—– whose
33
“Inclinan a la solución de que estas indemnizaciones deben ser consideradas como civil law is based upon the French Civil Code—–cited by the defendant, which
gananciales, el hecho de que la sociedad pierde la capacidad de trabajo con el accidente, que similarly refer to moral damages due to physical injuries suffered by the wife, are,
a ella le pertenece, puesto que de la sociedad son los frutos de ese trabajo; en cambio, la likewise, inapplicable to the case at bar.
consideración de que de igual manera que los bienes que sustituyen a los que cada cónyuge We find, therefore, no plausible reason to disturb the views expressed in Our
lleva al matrimonio como propios tienen el caracter de propios, hace pensar que las decision promulgated on February 29, 1972.
indemnizaciones que vengan a suplir la capacidad de trabajo aportada por cada cónyuge a
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration above-referred to should be, as
la sociedad, deben ser juridicamente reputadas como bienes propios del cónyuge que haya
sufrido el accidente. Asi se llega a la misma solución aportada por la jurisprudencia they are hereby denied.
francesa.” 28
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Makasiar, Antonioand Esguerra,
This opinion is, however, undecisive, to say the least. It should be noted that JJ., concur.
Colin y Capitant were commenting on the French Civil Code; that their comment Barredo, J., voted to modify the judgment by reducing the amount of the
referred to indemnities due in consequence of “accidentes del trabajo” resulting awarded damages and individualizing the same, and now reserves the filing of a
in physical injuries sustained by one of the spouses (which Mrs. Zulueta separate concurring and dissenting opinion in support of his vote.
has not suffered); and that said commentators admit that the question whether or
not said damages are paraphernal property or belong to the conjugal partnership _______________
is not settled under the Spanish law. Besides,29 the French law and
Art. 160, Civil Code of the Philippines, and Art. 1407 of the Civil Code of Spain.
jurisprudence—– to which the comments of Planiol and Ripert, likewise, refer—–
31
are inapposite to the question under consideration, because they differ Strebel v. Figueras, 96 Phil. 321; Araneta v. Arreglado, 104 Phil. 529; Soberano v. Manila
33
basically from the Spanish law in the treatment of the property relations between Railroad Co., L-19407, Nov. 23, 1966.
husband and wife. Indeed, our Civil Code, like the Spanish Civil Code, favors the 22
system of conjugal partnership of gains. Accordingly, the former provides that 2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
“(i)n the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system 2
of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains x x x shall govern the
property relations between” the spouses. Hence, “(a) 11 property of the marriage
30
In re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines
is Castro and Teehankee, JJ., took no part.
Motions denied.
_______________ Notes.—–a) When counterclaim considered to determine jurisdiction of the
court.—– The claim of the plaintiff and the counterclaim of the defendant can only
be considered in the alternative form for determining the jurisdiction of the court.
(Rio y Compañia vs. Vda. de Vasquez, L-12097, July 19, 1960).
b) Measure and amount of damages.—– The amount of damages to be
awarded must be determined by adequately considering the official, political,
social, and financial standing of the offended parties on one hand, and the
business and financial position of the offender on the other. (Lopez vs. Pan-
American World Airways, Inc., L-22415, March 30, 1966).
c) Recovery of attorney’s fees.—– Under the new Civil Code, attorney’s fee is an
element of recoverable damages whether it be in writing or not stipulated at all.
(Santiago vs. Dimayuga, L-17883, December 30, 1961).
See also annotations on Moral Damages for Breach of Contract, 16 SCRA 445-
448; Recovery of Damages Based on Quasi-Delict, 22 SCRA 567-577; and
Attorney’s Fees as Damages, 18 SCRA 360-371.
LEGAL RESEARCH SERVICE
See SCRA Quick Index-Digest, volume 1, page 177 on Attorneys; page 364 on
Conjugal Partnership; page 501 on Courts; page 656 on Damages.
See also SCRA Quick Index-Digest, volume 2, page 1114 on Jurisdiction.
—–—–—–—–—–
be permitted to falsify it. (Sotto v. Teves, 86 SCRA 154). Estoppel can only be invoked
EFREN V. MENDOZA and INOCENCIA R. DE MENDOZA, between the person making the misrepresentation and the person to whom it was
petitioners, vs. PONCIANO S. REYES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, addressed. It is essential that the latter shall have relied upon the misrepresentation and
respondents. had been influenced and misled thereby.
Same; Same; Same; Estoppel, not applicable, where misrepresentation is absent.—
No. L-31625. August 17, 1983.
There is no showing that the respondent had intentionally and deliberately led the
*
JULIA R. DE REYES, petitioner, vs. PONCIANO S. REYES and COURT OF petitioners Mendozas to believe what was contained in the pleading, “Exh. 11”, and to make
APPEALS, respondents. them act upon it. As observed by the respondent, they were not even a party in the case
Civil Law; Property; Conjugal Partnership; Presumption of conjugality.—The where the said pleading was filed. Neither is there any assertion by the Mendozas that the
presumption is a strong one. As stated in Camia de Reyes v. Reyes de Ilano (63 Phil. 629, said pleading was shown to them or that they happened to see it or to have any knowledge
639), “it is sufficient to prove that the property was acquired during the marriage in order about it before they purchased the properties in question. The alleged misrepresentation
that the same may be deemed conjugal property.” And in Laluan v. Malpaya (65 SCRA 494, was never addressed to the petitioners, much less made with the intention that they would
504) we stated, “proof of acquisition of the property in dispute during the marriage suffices act upon it. Moreover, there is no specific and clear reference to the disputed lots as
to render the statutory presumption operative.” paraphernal in the cited answer. The petitioners cannot invoke estoppel in these petitions.
Same; Same; Same; Theory that property bought from personal funds of wife negated Same; Same; Same; Unjust enrichment, not a case of, where the person alleged to be
by fact that the funds were also invested by husband and wife in other business; Case at enriched has not been benefited.—The final
bar.—As a matter of fact, Mrs. Reyes’ testimony about a loan from Mrs. Rosa Borja, the sale 156
of a lot in Cabiao, Nueva Ecija given by her mother, and the loan from PNB only emphasize
1 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
the conjugal nature of the disputed properties because she stated that these sums were also
used to put up their gravel and sand business, a poultry farm, and a banana plantation plus 56
a jeepney transportation line although according to her, every business venture handled by
Mendoza vs. Reyes
her husband failed. The two were establishing businesses and buying properties together as
husband and wife, in happier times. argument refers to the alleged unjust enrichment by Ponciano Reyes if the deed of
Same; Same; Same; Conjugal nature of property not destroyed even if property sale is nullified. The petitioners admit that the benefit including that represented by one-
registered in the name of only one of the spouses; Reason.—Property acquired during a half of the purchase price, accrued not to the respondent but to his wife. Since Mr. Reyes did
marriage is presumed to be conjugal and the fact that the land is later registered in the not receive any part of the proceeds of the sale and his wife has been aligning herself with
name of only one of the spouses does not destroy its conjugal nature. (Bucoy v. Paulino, 23 the Mendoza couple, there could be no unjust enrichment as alleged.
SCRA 249). Section 46 of P.D. 1529, the Property Registration Decree, reiterates the proviso
in Section 70 of the PETITIONS for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
No. 198840 was issued on 06 June 1974, and the filing of the action for the reconveyance of
JOSEPHINE B. BELCODERO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF the property with the court a quo on 30 October 1980, barely a period of six (6) years and
APPEALS, ET AL., respondents. four (4) months had elapsed. The case has accordingly been initiated seasonably.
Civil Law; Property; Conjugal Partnership; Presumption that all property of the
marriage belong to the conjugal partnership has not been convincingly rebutted.—Whether
the property in question was acquired PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The defendants went to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court’s Ricardo Francisco.
order for the reconveyance but reversed the decision on the award for damages, Ably presented by Atty. Jaime Infante.
2
thus— 308
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as defendant 308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Josephine Bosing is ordered to execute a deed of reconveyance of the property granting the
same to the legal heirs of the deceased Alayo D. Bosing, and REVERSED insofar as it Belcodero vs. Court of Appeals
awards actual, tionably was acquired by Alayo. Alayo’s letter, dated 06 October 1959, to
307 Magdalena Estate, Inc., merely authorized the latter to have the title to the
VOL. 227, OCTOBER 20, 1993 307 property transferred to her name. More importantly, she implicitly recognized
Alayo’s ownership when, three years after the death of Alayo, she and Josephine
Belcodero vs. Court of Appeals
executed the deed of extrajudicial partition and sale in which she asserted a one-
moral and exemplary damages.
half (1/2) interest in the property in what may be described as her share in the
1
“conjugal partnership” with Alayo, plus another one-fourth (1/4) interest as the
“surviving widow”, the last one-fourth (1/4) going to Josephine as the issue of the
1. 1.THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE deceased. Observe that the above adjudication would have exactly conformed with
ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE HAD LONG PRESCRIBED. a partition in intestacy had they been the sole and legitimate heirs of the
2. 2.THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT, THE decedent.
ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE IS BASED UPON AN IMPLIED OR The appellate court below, given the above circumstances, certainly cannot be
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST. said to have been without valid basis in concluding that the property really
3. 3.THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT, THE belonged to the lawful conjugal partnership between Alayo and his true spouse
PROPERTY IN QUESTION BELONGS EXCLUSIVELY TO THE Juliana.
PETITIONERS. As regards the property relations between common-law spouses, Article 144 of
4. 4.THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING the Civil Code merely codified the law established through judicial precedents
PETITIONERS’ MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BASED ON NEWLY under the old code (Margaret Maxey vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-45870, 11
DISCOVERED EVIDENCE, AND LIKEWISE ERRED IN HOLDING May 1984). In both regimes, the co-ownership rule had more than once been
THAT EVEN IF A NEW TRIAL IS GRANTED THE SAME WOULD repudiated when either or both spouses suffered from an impediment to marry
NOT SERVE A USEFUL PURPOSE. (Jeroniza vs. Jose, 89 SCRA 306). The present provisions under Article 147 and
Article 148 of the Family Code did not much deviate from the old rules; in any
We rule for affirmance.
case, its provisions cannot apply to this case without interdicting prior vested 310
rights (Article 256, Family Code). 310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
It was at the time that the adjudication of ownership was made following
Belcodero vs. Court of Appeals
Alayo’s demise (not when Alayo merely allowed the property to be titled; in
discovered or considered as necessary evidence during the trial of the case below” by the
Josefa’s name which clearly was not intended to be adversarial to Alayo’s former counsel; it is therefore more properly considered as forgotten evidence, which the
interest), that a constructive trust was deemed to have been created by operation appellant knew or should have known during the trial (Tesoro vs. Court of Appeals, 54
of law under the provisions of Article 1456 of the Civil Code. SCRA 296; Republic vs. Vda. de Castelvi, 58 SCRA 336). Moreover, assuming the sale is
“Article 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by proven, it does not follow that the proceeds were used to pay the lot in question; the
force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom payments were made in installments, not in one lump sum.
the property comes. Neither is the second ground deserving of merit. Assuming that the marriage to Ballit
309 in 1961 is duly proven, and that this provided a cause for legal separation and consequent
VOL. 227, OCTOBER 20, 1993 309 disqualification of the guilty spouse to succeed to the husband’s intestate estate under
Article 1002 of the Civil Code, the fact remains that no action for legal separation was
Belcodero vs. Court of Appeals brought by the husband during his lifetime and within the period provided by law. It is too
The applicable prescriptive period for an action seeking a reconveyance of the late to raise the issue at this time.
property by the beneficiaries thereof is ten (10) years (Article 1144, Civil Code). Accordingly, assuming that the Motion for New Trial complies with the formal
Ordinarily, that period starts from the establishment of the implied trust being requisites for such a motion (See Minister of Natural Resources vs. Heirs of Orval Hughes,
the day when the cause of action would be considered to have accrued (Article et. al., GR No. 62662, prom. November 12, 1987), a question We don’t find necessary to
decide, a new trial would not serve a useful purpose in altering the result of the questioned
1150, Civil Code). Unfortunately for Josef a and Josephine, however, the property
decision.
involved in this case is a realty titled under the Torrens System. The prescriptive
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from in the instant petition for review on
period is thus to be counted from the time the transaction affecting the property is
certiorari is AFFIRMED.
registered with the corresponding issuance of a new certificate of title. Between
SO ORDERED.
3
the time Transfer Certificate of Title No. 198840 was issued on 06 June 1974, and
Feliciano (Chairman), Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ.,concur.
the filing of the action for the reconveyance of the property with the court a
Appealed decision affirmed.
quo on 30 October 1980, barely a period of six (6) years and four (4) months had
Note.—In the absence of proof as to the time when the improvements existing
elapsed. The case has accordingly been initiated seasonably.
on the exclusive property of the spouse were made, the presumption is that they
The four-year prescriptive period, mentioned in passing by the petitioners,
belong exclusively to said spouse (Villanueva vs. Intermediate Appellate
would have had some value and relevance had the private respondents or their
Court, 192 SCRA 21).
predecessor in interest been parties to the extrajudicial partition and sale. In that
event, the latter’s action could only then be predicated on a vitiation of
——o0o——
consent where the applicable statutory limitation would be four years.
4 5
The last issue raises the supposed error in the rejection of a new trial on the
311
basis of newly discovered evidence. We concur with the resolution of the appellate © Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
court below (on appellant’s [petitioners herein] motion for reconsideration
thereat), thus—
Appellants’ prayer for a new trial based upon what they claim is newly discovered evidence
deserves scant consideration.
Appellant proposes to prove (1) that Josefa Bosing sold certain property for P8,000.00 in
1948 and was therefore in a financial position to make the payments to Magdalena Estate
Inc. and (2) that appellee Juliana Bosing got married in 1961 to one Burayos Ballit, and
thus, “forfeited” her right to the conjugal partnership.
The first ground is not meritorious. It is not newly discovered evidence. As described in
appellants’ Motion the documents were “not
_______________
3 See Articles 708-709, 711, Civil Code; Amerol vs. Bagumbaran, 154 SCRA 396.
4 Article 1390, Civil Code.
5 Article 1391, Ibid.
sufficient means of livelihood and that they were totally dependent on their mother Lucia
VOL. 233, JUNE 27, 1994 335
for the support of their family. This fact strengthens the claim of Lucia that the price of the
Embrado vs. Court of Appeals property was fictitious and that Eda Jimenez could not have paid the price of the property
as she was financially incapable to do so. In fact, Eda Jimenez did not prove as to how she
G.R. No. 51457. June 27, 1994. *
obtained the money to pay for the property she supposedly bought from Lucia. When the
LUCIA EMBRADO and ORESTE TORREGIANI, petitioners, vs. COURT OF source of the purchase price is “intriguing” and is not convincingly shown to have been given
APPEALS, PACIFICO CIMAFRANCA, MARCOS SALIMBAGAT, EDA by the “buyer” to the “seller,” the claim of the latter that she signed the deed of sale without
JIMENEZ and SANTIAGO JIMENEZ, respondents. her consent may be upheld.
Civil Law; Husband and Wife; Conjugal Properties; Paraphernal Same; Same; Sale; Land Registration; Certificate of Title; Registration does not vest
Property; Presumption; That the funds used were conjugal.—In the case at bar, the Venta title, it is merely evidence of such title over a particular property.—Even assuming in gratia
Definitiva over Lot 564 in favor of Lucia Embrado was executed by the Carpitanoses on 2 argumentithat Lucia signed the document knowing that it was a deed of sale of the
July 1946 when her marriage to petitioner Oreste Torregiani was already subsisting. property, the sale thereof by Lucia to Eda Jimenez without her husband’s conformity should
Although ownership was acquired during the marriage and hence presumed conjugal, the be considered void ab initiobeing contrary to law. Since “(t)he wife cannot bind the conjugal
presumption of conjugality was successfully overcome by the terms of the Venta partnership without the husband’s consent, except in cases provided by law,” it follows that
Definitiva which contains a positive assertion of exclusive ownership, which was duly 337
supported by the testimony of Matias Carpitanos, one of the original sellers of the lot. VOL. 233, JUNE 27, 1994 337
However, a decisive fact appears which prevents us from ultimately affirming the validity of
her sale of Lot 564 to private respondent Eda Jimenez. The trial court found as a fact the Embrado vs. Court of Appeals
construction in 1958 of a residential/commercial building on said lot a part of which was Lucia Embrado Torregiani could not, by herself, validly dispose of Lot 564 without
leased to third persons and another part serving as the Torregianis’ conjugal dwelling. her husband’s consent. Consequently, Eda Jimenez likewise could not have acquired
Although no evidence was presented on the source of funds used in the construction to ownership over the land. The issuance of a certificate of title in favor of Eda Jimenez did not
determine whether the same was conjugal or paraphernal, other than the testimony of vest upon her ownership over the property. Neither did it validate the alleged purchase
Torregiani, petitioners nevertheless enjoy in their favor the presumption that the funds thereof which is null and void. Registration does not vest title. It is merely evidence of such
used were conjugal. title. Our land registration laws do not give the holder any better title than what he actually
has. Being null and void, the sale to Eda Jimenez and the transfer of the property she made
_______________ to Salimbagat and Cimafranca produced no legal effects whatsoever. Quod nullum est,
nullum producit effectum. There being no valid title to the land that Eda Jimenez acquired
*FIRST DIVISION. from Lucia, it follows that no title to the same land could be conveyed by the former to
336 Salimbagat and Cimafranca.
3 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Same; Same; Same; Burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith and for
value lies upon him who asserts that status.—It is worthy to note that Salimbagat and
36 Cimafranca, as buyers of Eda Jimenez, have not proved their status as purchasers in good
Embrado vs. Court of Appeals faith and for value of the land which, in the first place, Eda Jimenez had no right to sell.
The burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith and for value lies upon him
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Paraphernal property becomes conjugal upon the
who asserts that status. In discharging the burden, it is not enough to invoke the ordinary
construction of the residential/commercial building at the expense of the partnership.—The
presumption of good faith, i.e., that everyone is presumed to act in good faith. The good faith
second paragraph of Art. 158 of the Civil Code provides that “[b]uildings constructed, at the
that is here essential is integral with the very status which must be proved.
expense of the partnership, during the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses,
Same; Same; Same; Findings that purchasers had knowledge of facts and
also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse
circumstances with the defects in the title of their vendors.—We agree with the trial court
who owns the same.” Under this article, the land becomes conjugal upon the construction of
when it found that Salimbagat and Cimafranca purchased the disputed lot from Eda and
the building without awaiting reimbursement before or at the liquidation of the partnership
Santiago Jimenez with knowledge of facts and circumstances which should have put them
upon the concurrence of two conditions, to wit: (a) the construction of the building at the
upon such inquiry and investigation as might be necessary to acquaint them with the
expense of the partnership; and, (b) the ownership of the land by one of the spouses. The
defects in the title of their vendor. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should
conditions have been fully met in the case at bench. Thus, even if Lot 564 was originally the
put a reasonable man on his guard and then claim that he acted in good faith under the
paraphernal property of Lucia as evident from the “Venta Definitiva”, the same became
belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor. His mere refusal to believe that
conjugal upon the construction of the residential/commercial building in 1958.
such defect exists, or his willful closing of his eyes to the possibility of the existence of a
Same; Evidence; Rule that an instrument duly notarized is admissible in evidence
defect in the vendor’s title will not make him an innocent purchaser for value if afterwards
without further proof of its execution and conclusive as to the truthfulness of its contents, not
it develops that the title is in fact defective, and it appears that he had such notice of the
absolute but may be rebutted by evidence to the contrary.—While it is true that a notarized
defect as would have led to its discovery had he acted with the measure of precaution which
document is admissible in evidence without proof of its due execution and is conclusive as to
may reasonably be required of a prudent man in like situation.
the truthfulness of its contents, this rule is not absolute and may be rebutted by evidence to 338
the contrary. In this case, it was clearly shown that Eda and Santiago Jimenez had no
338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Embrado vs. Court of Appeals Jimenez, for the sum of P1,000.00. Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-99 was
canceled to give way to TCT No. T-17103 in the name of Eda Jimenez,
6
August 1972, conveyed 301 square meters of the same lot to Pacifico
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Cimafranca for P30,000. Both sales were duly annotated on TCT No. T-17103.
8
Alerio P. Acosta for petitioner. On 25 September 1972, the Torregianis instituted in the Court of First
Roseller L. Barinaga & Venancio M. Carpio for respondents Santiago and Instance, now Regional Trial Court, of Zamboanga del Norte an action for
Eda Jimenez. declaration of nullity of contract, annulment of sales, reconveyance and
Pacifico Cimafranca for and in his own behalf. damages against the spouses Santiago and Eda Jimenez, Marcos Salimbagat and
9
Pacifico Cimafranca alleging that the sale of Lot 564 by Lucia Embrado to Eda
BELLOSILLO, J.: Jimenez was void not only for lack of consideration but also because Oreste
Torregiani did not consent to the sale, which consent was necessary because Lot
LUCIA EMBRADO and ORESTE TORREGIANI, spouses, filed this petition for 564 was conjugal property. In addition, the petitioners claim that Lucia was
review on certiorari from the decision of respondent Court of Appeals upholding 1
misled into signing the deed of sale marked as Exh. “D” on the belief that Lot 564
the validity of the Deed of Sale over Lot No. 564 executed by petitioner Lucia was merely intended as security for a loan that the Jimenez spouses were then
Embrado in favor of private respondent Eda Jimenez. negotiating with the First Insular Bank of Cebu. Since the Jimenez spouses did
Lot No. 564 is a 366-square meter lot situated in Dipolog City originally not acquire valid title to the land, the subsequent sales in favor of Salimbagat and
owned by Juan, Pastor and Matias Carpitanos. On 2 July 1946, a Venta Cimafranca were without legal effect.
Definitiva, a notarized document written entirely in Spanish, was executed by the
Carpitanos whereby they sold Lot No. 564 to “Srta. LUCIA C. EMBRADO x x x _______________
soltera, con residencia y direccion postal Municipio de Dipolog, Provincia de
Zamboanga.” The document provided that even though the deed was prepared and
2 4TSN, 27 June 1973, p. 24.
signed on 2 July 1946, the effects of the document would retroact to the 15th day 5Folder of Exhibits, p. 7.
Id., p. 23.
of April 1941, the date the lot and its improvements were actually sold to Lucia C.
6
that the sale of Lot 564 to Eda Jimenez and its subsequent transfers to Marcos
_______________
Salimbagat and Pacifico Cimafranca, who were declared buyers in bad faith, were
Decision penned by then Presiding Justice Andres Reyes, concurred in by Associate Justices
1
void and of no effect. More specifically, the judgment (a) declared Exhs. “D,” “G”
Samuel F. Reyes and Carlos L. Sundiam, promulgated 26 April 1979, Rollo, pp. 37-45. and “H” as well as TCT No. 17103 null and void and of no force and effect; (b)
Exh. “1,” Folder of Exhibits, p. 33.
2
ordered defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs the sum of P2,000.00 as
Id., p. 3.
3
actual damages and P1,500.00 for attorney’s fees; (c) ordered the Register of
339
Deeds of Dipolog City to cancel TCT No. 17103 in the name of Eda Jimenez and
VOL. 233, JUNE 27, 1994 339 issue another one in favor of plaintiff Lucia Embrado, married to Oreste
Embrado vs. Court of Appeals Torregiani, and to cancel all the annotations thereon emanating from the void
99 was canceled and replaced on 19 October 1970 by the phrase “married to transfers in favor of Marcos Salimbagat and Pacifico Cimafranca; (d) ordered
Oreste Torregiani.” The Torregianis then made their conjugal abode on the lot defendants Eda and Santiago Jimenez to return to defendant Pacifico Cimafranca
and in 1958 constructed a residential/ commercial building thereon. 4
the sum of P30,000.00 paid by him for the 301 square meters and the house in
As appearing from a document entitled Absolute Deed of Sale dated 1 May question, and to defendant Marcos Salimbagat the P6,500.00 paid by him for the
1971, Lucia Embrado Torregiani sold Lot No. 564, described as her “own
5
65 square meters occupied by Comendador Clinic with legal interest of six percent
paraphernal property,” to her adopted daughter, herein private respondent Eda (6%) until fully paid; and, (e) ordered defendant Cimafranca to pay plaintiffs all
the rents he has been collecting from the lessees of the first floor of the house with However, a decisive fact appears which prevents us from ultimately affirming
legal interest thereon from the time he started collecting them until fully paid, the validity of her sale of Lot 564 to private respondent Eda Jimenez. The trial
with costs against defendants. 11 court found as a fact the
The foregoing judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeals which held that
since Lucia Embrado actually agreed with Juan, Pastor and Matias Carpitanos, _______________
the original owners, to the purchase of Lot 564 on 15 April 1941 when she was 12
not yet married, then the lot was her paraphernal property since a sale is Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it
13
contract. In addition, the respondent court declared Salimbagat and Cimafranca 342
buyers in good faith since the con-
342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Decision penned by Presiding Judge Dimalanes B. Buissan of the then Court of First Instance of
10
which was leased to third persons and another part serving as the Torregianis’
Zamboanga del Norte dated 14 June 1976, Rollo, pp. 22-36.
conjugal dwelling.
Id., pp. 35-36.
11
Embrado vs. Court of Appeals The second paragraph of Art. 158 of the Civil Code provides that “[b]uildings
trary was not proved. Consequently, the complaint in the trial court was ordered constructed, at the expense of the partnership, during the marriage on land
dismissed by respondent Court of Appeals. belonging to one of the spouses, also pertain to the partnership, but the value of
Three (3) issues are herein involved: (a) whether Lot 564 was paraphernal the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same.” Under this
property of Lucia Embrado or conjugal with her husband Oreste Torregiani; (b) article, the land becomes conjugal upon the construction of the building without
whether the sale in favor of Eda Jimenez was valid; and, (c) whether vendees awaiting reimbursement before or at the liquidation of the partnership upon the
Marcos Salimbagat and Pacifico Cimafranca were buyers in good faith so that the concurrence of two conditions, to wit: (a) the construction of the building at the
sale to them was valid, hence, would bar reconveyance. expense of the partnership; and, (b) the ownership of the land by one of the
We sustain petitioners. While we agree with respondent court that Lot 564 spouses. The conditions have been fully met in the case at bench. Thus, even if
18
was originally the paraphernal property of Lucia, we cannot adopt its conclusion Lot 564 was originally the paraphernal property of Lucia as evident from the
that because Lucia and the original owners agreed in 1941 for its purchase and “Venta Definitiva”, the same became conjugal upon the construction of the
sale, ownership was already acquired by Lucia at that moment. Under Art. 1496 residential/commercial building in 1958.
of the Civil Code, “ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the Lucia claims that she was misled by her daughter and son-in-law into signing
moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, a deed of absolute sale in their favor thinking that she would be helping them
or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred obtain a loan from a bank if they could mortgage the property as security for their
from the vendor to the vendee,” and under Art. 1498, “(w)hen the sale is made loan; that although she signed the deed of sale, she did not consent to the sale nor
through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the did she intend to convey or transfer her title to Eda Jimenez; and, that she never
delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the received the alleged amount of P1,000.00 as consideration for the sale of the
contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred.” property.
In the case at bar, the Venta Definitiva over Lot 564 in favor of Lucia
Embrado was executed by the Carpitanoses on 2 July 1946 when her marriage to _______________
petitioner Oreste Torregiani was already subsisting. Although ownership was
acquired during the marriage and hence presumed conjugal, the presumption of Rollo, p. 23.
15
conjugality was successfully overcome by the terms of the Venta Definitiva which
13
TSN, 8 August 1974, p. 16.
16
Vda. de Padilla v. Paterno, No. L-8748, 26 December 1961, 3 SCRA 678, 691; see also Vitug, J. C.,
18
the testimony of Matias Carpitanos, one of the original sellers of the lot. 14
Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 ed., p. 67; Tolentino A., Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. I, 1983 ed., pp. 423-424.
343
VOL. 233, JUNE 27, 1994 343 the land which, in the first place, Eda Jimenez had no right to sell. The burden of
proving the status of a purchaser in good faith and for value lies upon him who
Embrado vs. Court of Appeals asserts that status. In discharging the burden, it is not enough to invoke the
While it is true that a notarized document is admissible in evidence without proof ordinary presumption of good faith, i.e., that everyone is presumed to act in good
of its due execution and is conclusive as to the truthfulness of its contents, this faith. The good faith that is here essential is integral with the very status which
rule is not absolute and may be rebutted by evidence to the contrary. In this case, 19
must be proved. 25
it was clearly shown that Eda and Santiago Jimenez had no sufficient means of We agree with the trial court when it found that Salimbagat and Cimafranca
livelihood and that they were totally dependent on their mother Lucia for the purchased the disputed lot from Eda and Santiago Jimenez with knowledge of
support of their family. This fact strengthens the claim of Lucia that the price of facts and circumstances which should have put them upon such inquiry and
the property was fictitious and that Eda Jimenez could not have paid the price of investigation as might be necessary to acquaint them with the defects in the title
the property as she was financially incapable to do so. In fact, Eda Jimenez did of their vendor. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a
not prove as to how she obtained the money to pay for the property she reasonable man on his guard and then claim that he acted in good faith under the
supposedly bought from Lucia. When the source of the purchase price is belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor. His mere refusal to
“intriguing” and is not convincingly shown to have been given by the “buyer” to believe that such defect exists, or his willful closing of his eyes to the possibility of
the “seller,” the claim of the latter that she signed the deed of sale without her the existence of a defect in the vendor’s title will not make him an innocent
consent may be upheld. 20
purchaser for value if afterwards it develops that the title is in fact defective, and
Even assuming in gratia argumenti that Lucia signed the document knowing it appears that he had such notice of the defect as would have led to its discovery
that it was a deed of sale of the property, the sale thereof by Lucia to Eda Jimenez had he acted with the measure of precaution which may reasonably be required of
without her husband’s conformity should be considered void ab initio being a prudent
contrary to law. Since “(t)he wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without
21
the husband’s consent, except in cases provided by law,” it follows that Lucia 22
_______________
Embrado Torregiani could not, by herself, validly dispose of Lot 564 without her
husband’s consent. Consequently, Eda Jimenez likewise could not have acquired De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, No. L-46935, 21 December 1987, 156 SCRA 701; Cruz v.
23
ownership over the land. The issuance of a certificate of title in favor of Eda Cabana, G.R. No. 56232, 22 June 1984, 129 SCRA 656.
Solid State Multi-Products Corporations v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83383, 6 May 1991, 196
Jimenez did not vest upon her ownership over the property. Neither did it
24
SCRA 631.
validate the alleged purchase thereof which is null and void. Registration does not Baltazar v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78728, 8 December 1988, 168 SCRA 354.
25
vest title. It is merely evidence of such title. Our land registration laws do not 345
VOL. 233, JUNE 27, 1994 345
_______________
Embrado vs. Court of Appeals
Mendezona v. Phil. Sugar Estate Dev. Co., 41 Phil. 475 (1921).
19 man in like situation. 26
Baranda v. Baranda, G.R. No. 73275, 20 May 1987, 150 SCRA 59.
20
Cimafranca is a close relative of Santiago Jimenez and at the same time
Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. I, 1983 ed., p. 453; see also La Urbana v. Villasor, 59
21
godfather to one of his children. As such, there can be no doubt that Cimafranca
Phil. 644 (1934); Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. I, 1984 ed. p. 545.
Art. 172, Civil Code of the Philippines; see also Tinitigan v. Tinitigan, Sr., No. L-45418, 30 October
22
was aware of the personal circumstances and financial standing of the Jimenez
1980, 100 SCRA 619, 636. spouses, including their financial ability to acquire any property. It would be
344 impossible for Cimafranca not to know that Santiago Jimenez was only twenty-
344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED two years old, a working student earning six pesos per day with a wife and three
27
children to support. With these facts, there is every reason for him to inquire
28
the sale to Eda Jimenez and the transfer of the property she made to Salimbagat
a registered property, is not gainfully employed or did not have an independent
and Cimafranca produced no legal effects whatsoever. Quod nullum est, nullum
source of income or is financially incapable of paying the price of the property she
producit effectum. There being no valid title to the land that Eda Jimenez
bought, this is sufficient to engender doubt as to whether Eda validly bought the
acquired from Lucia, it follows that no title to the same land could be conveyed by property from Lucia. 29
Cardente v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73651, 27 November 1987, 155 SCRA 685, 690-
33
prior to the alleged sale by Lucia Torregiani of the property to Eda Jimenez on 1 691; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., v. Court of Appeals, No. L-41233, 21 November 1979, 94 SCRA 413, 422-
May 1991. There can be no doubt that Salimbagat’s daughter was aware of the 423; Barrios v. Court of Appeals, No. L-32531, 31 August 1977, 78
347
_______________ VOL. 233, JUNE 27, 1994 347
Embrado vs. Court of Appeals
Francisco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 30162, 31 August 1987, 156 SCRA 330; Cardente v.
26
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73651, 27 November 1987, 155 SCRA 685, 690-691; J.M. Tuason realty, his first duty is to read the public manuscript, i.e., to look and see who is
& Co., Inc., v. Court of Appeals, No. L-41233, 21 November 1979, 94 SCRA 413, 422-423; Barrios v. Court there upon it, and what are his rights. A want of caution and diligence which an
of Appeals, No. L-32531, 31 August 1977, 78 SCRA 427, 435; Paylago v. Jarabe, No. L-20046, 27 March
honest man of ordinary prudence is accustomed to exercise in making purchases
1968, 22 SCRA 1247, 1252; Manacop, Jr. v. Cansino, No. L-13971, 27 February 1961, 1 SCRA 572,
576; Leung Yee v. Strong Machinery Company, 37 Phil. 645, 651 (1918). is, in contemplation of law, a want of good faith. The buyer who has failed to know
TSN, 9 October 1975, p. 81.
27 or discover that the land sold to him is in the adverse possession of another, is a
TSN, 27 June 1973, p. 21.
28
buyer in bad faith. 34
346 relatively young age and meager financial standing of the Jimenez spouses,
346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
should have been sufficient for Cimafranca to hesitate accepting Eda’s transfer
certificate of title at its face value. Cimafranca, after deliberately closing his eyes
Embrado vs. Court of Appeals to such a vital information, is now claiming good faith. For obvious reasons, we
factual background of the property and the personal circumstances of the owners cannot accept his contention. We thus declare him, together with Marcos
thereof especially that they are all occupying the same building. During the time Salimbagat, to be purchasers in bad faith hence not entitled to protection under
that Salimbagat was already interested in buying the property, it would have the Torrens system of registration.
been usual and part of ordinary human nature for him to inquire about the Lot 564 is now registered in the name of Eda Jimenez “married to Santiago
property from his daughter who was living very near the supposed owners. Jimenez” under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-17103 which was issued
Considering that the Torregiani and Jimenez families are not total strangers to pursuant to the “Absolute Deed of Sale” executed in her favor by petitioner Lucia
Salimbagat, it is safe to conclude that Salimbagat had some knowledge of the Embrado. We have already declared said deed of sale as null and void since its
financial status of the supposed vendors which should have put him on guard object, Lot 564, is conjugal property which was sold by Lucia Embrado without
before buying the property. Moreover, the records show that this would not have her husband’s conformity. The present vendees, Marcos Salimbagat and Pacifico
escaped the notice of Salimbagat and Cimafranca that at the time of the sale to Cimafranca, who bought the property from Eda Jimenez have failed to persuade
them petitioners were in actual possession of the property with Salimbagat’s us that they acquired the property in good faith.
daughter renting a portion thereof. For that matter, at the time of the sale to WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated 26 April
Salimbagat and Cimafranca, petitioners had already been in continuous 1979 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision of the then Court of First
possession of the property for fourteen (14) years, or since 1958. Santiago Jimenez Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Zamboanga del Norte dated 14 June 1976
admitted that after his marriage he and his wife Eda lived and stayed with her is REINSTATED and ADOPTED herein as the decision in this case.
parents, herein petitioners, and dependent on them for support. 31
Before buying the property, Salimbagat and Cimafranca allegedly inquired _______________
from the office of the Register of Deeds concerning the genuineness of the
certificate of title of Eda Jimenez, and from the Clerk of Court of the Court of SCRA 427, 435; Paylago v. Jarabe, No. L-20046, 27 March 1968, 22 SCRA 1247, 1252; Manacop, Jr.
First Instance of Dipolog City as to whether the property was involved in any v. Cansino, No. L-13971, 27 February 1961, 1 SCRA 572, 576; Leung Yee v. Strong Machinery
Company, 37 Phil. 645, 651 (1918).
litigation. However, they failed to inquire from petitioners as to why they were
32
J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, No. L-41233, 21 November 1979, 94 SCRA 413, 422-
34
the ones in actual possession of the property. 423; see also Angelo v. Pacheco, 56 Phil. 70 (1931); Andaya v. Manansala, 107 Phil. 1151 (1960).
The rule is settled that a buyer of real property which is in the possession of 348
persons other than the seller must be wary and should investigate the rights of 348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
those in possession. Otherwise, without such inquiry, the buyer can hardly be
Marquino vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
regarded as a buyer in good faith. When a man proposes to buy or deal with
33
SO ORDERED.
_______________
Cruz (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Decision reversed and set aside.
Notes.—Registration does not vest title, it is merely evidence of such title
over a particular property (Solid State-Multi-Products Corp. vs. Court of
Appeals, 196 SCRA 630).
Where the document is notarized, the party challenging the recital of the
document must prove his claim with clear and convincing evidence (Diaz vs. Court
of Appeals, 145 SCRA 314).
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