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We hold that the shipboard employment contract is controlling

BAGONG FILIPINAS OVERSEAS in this case. The contract provides that the beneficiaries of the
CORPORATION v. NLRC +DECISION seaman are entitled to P20,000 "over and above the benefits"
for which the Philippine Government is liable under Philippine
G.R. No. 66006 law.
AQUINO, J.:
Hongkong law on workmen's compensation is not the
The issue in this case is whether the shipboard employment applicable law. The case of Norse Management Co. vs.
contract or Hongkong law should govern the amount of death National Seamen Board, G.R. No. 54204, September 30, 1982,
compensation due to the wife of Guillermo Pancho who was 117 SCRA 486 cannot be a precedent because it was expressly
employed by Golden Star Shipping, Ltd. a Hongkong based stipulated in the employment contract in that case that the
firm. workmen's compensation payable to the employee should be in
accordance with Philippine Law or the Workmen's Insurance
The shipboard employment contract dated June 1, 1978 was Law of the country where the vessel is registered "whichever is
executed in this country between Pancho and Bagong Filipinas greater".
Overseas Corporation, the local agent of Golden Star
Shipping. It was approved by the defunct National Seamen The Solicitor General opines that the employment contract
Board. Pancho was hired as an oiler in the M/V Olivine for 12 should be applied. For that reason, he refused to uphold the
months with a gross monthly wage of US$195. decision of the NLRC.
In October, 1978, he had a cerebral stroke. He was rushed to WHEREFORE, the judgment of the National Labor Relations
the hospital while the vessel was docked at Gothenberg, Commission is reversed and set aside. The decision of the
Sweden. He was repatriated to the Philippines and confined at National Seamen Board dated February 26, 1981 is
the San Juan de Dios Hospital. He died on December 13, 1979. affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
The National Seamen Board awarded his widow, Proserfina, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Escolin, and Cuevas,
P20,000 as disability compensation benefits pursuant to the JJ., concur.
above-mentioned employment contract plus P2,000 as Makasiar, J., (Chairman), reserve his vote.
attorney's fees. Proserfina appealed to the National Labor
Relations Commission which awarded her $621 times 36
months or its equivalent in Philippine currency plus 10% of the
benefits as attorney's fees. Golden Star Shipping assailed that
decision by certiorari.
JOSE B. ATIENZA, Petitioner, v. Instead, it is dearly stated therein that the insurance benefits
shall be "as per NSB Standard Format," in the event "of death
PHILIMARE SHIPPING AND of the seaman during the term of his contract, over and above
EQUIPMENT SUPPLY, TRANS the benefits for which the Philippine Government is liable
under Philippine law."cralaw virtua1aw library
OCEAN LINER (Pte.) LTD.,
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NSB MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 71,
AMENDING NSB MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 46
EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION NOT GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT; CASE AT BAR. —
AND NATIONAL LABOR The effectivity of NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71, which
appears to have been retroactively applied by the NLRC in
RELATIONS increasing the compensation from P40,000.O0 The amended
COMMISSION, Respondents. award was based by the POEA on NSB Memorandum Circular
No. 46, which became effective in 1979. The NLRC,
apparently laboring under the belief that Memorandum Circular
Linsangan Law Office for Petitioner.
No. 71 was already effective at the time of the seaman’s death
on May 12, 1981, increased the death benefits to P75,000.00 as
Prudencio Cruz for Private Respondents.
provided thereunder. The fact, though, is that the new rule
became effective only in December 1981, as certified by the
SYLLABUS
POEA itself, or seven months after Atienza’s fatal accident.
1. LABOR LAWS; EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION;
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; LAW APPLICABLE ON DEATH
DEATH BENEFITS; RULING IN NORSE MANAGEMENT
COMPENSATION FOR SEAMAN; CASE OF STA. RITA
CO. V. NATIONAL SEAMAN BOARD (117 SCRA 486)
AND WELL RUN MARITIME SA LTD. V. NLRC
NOT APPLICABLE; IN CASE AT BAR. — Norse is not
REITERATED. — On the petitioner’s claim that the award
applicable to the present petition. In that case, it was
should be adjusted in view of the decrease in the purchasing
specifically stipulated by the parties in the Crew Agreement
power of the Philippine peso, it Suffices to cite the following
that "compensation shall be paid to employee in accordance
relevant ruling of the Court in Sta. Rite and Well Run Maritime
with and subject to the limitations of the Workmen’s
SA Ltd. NLRC: Regarding the third contention of the
Compensation Act of the Philippines or the Workmen’s
petitioners the records show that when Sta. Rita died on
Insurance Law of the registry of the vessel, whichever is
September 14, 1981, NSB Memorandum Circular No. 46
greater." That was why the higher benefits prescribed by the
(Series of 1979) was the applicable law. Pursuant to this
foreign law were awarded. By contrast, no such stipulation
circular in case of a seaman’s death during the terms of his
appears in the Crew Agreement now under consideration.
contract, the company shall pay his beneficiaries the amount of
P30,000.00. On November 18,1981 or more than one month On May 12, 1981, Atienza died as a result of an accident which
after Sta. Rita’s death the administrative regulations were befell him while working on the vessel in Bombay, India. 3 In
amended to increase death compensation for seamen to due time, his father, the herein petitioner, filed a claim for
P50,000.00, effective December 1, 1981. Considering that the death benefits computed at the rate of 36 months times the
applicable law governing death compensation for seamen at the seaman’s monthly salary plus ten per cent thereof in
time of Sta Rita’s death was Memorandum Circular No. 46, accordance with the Workmen’s Compensation Law of
Series of 1979, the petitioner’s liability should be limited to Singapore, for a total of $30,600.00. The private respondents,
P30,000.00. Moreover, if manning agents or shipping while admitting liability, contended that this was limited to
corporations secure employer’s insurance to cover their only P40,000.00 under Section D(1) of the NSB Standard
liabilities for death, total disability and sickness of officers and Format.
ratings on board foreign going vessels, the extent of the
coverage is based on the applicable law at the time. It would be On November 6, 1984, the Philippine Overseas Employment
unjust to compel them to pay benefits based on a law not yet in Administration sustained the private respondent and held that
effect at the time the contingency occurs. the applicable law was Philippine law. 4 On appeal, the
decision was affirmed by the National Labor Relations
Commission except that it increased the award to P75,000.00
DECISION pursuant to NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71, Series of
1981. 5
CRUZ, J.:
The facts of this case are not disputed. Even the legal issues are In the petition before us, we are asked to reverse the public
simple and are soon resolved.chanrobles.com : virtual law respondent on the ground that Singaporean law should have
library been applied in line with our ruling in Norse Management Co.
v. National Seamen Board, 6 where the foreign law was held
Joseph B. Atienza was engaged by Philimare Shipping and controlling because it provided for greater benefits for the
Equipment Supply, as agent for Trans Ocean Liner Etc. Ltd. of claimant. For their part, the private respondents question the
Germany, based on Singapore, to work as Third Mate on board application of NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71, Series of
the MV Tibati for the stipulated compensation of US$850.00 a 1981, which they say became effective alter the seaman’s
month from January 20, 1981 to January 20, 1982. 1 The Crew death. 7
Agreement signed by the parties on January 3, 1981, provided
for insurance benefits "as per NSB Standard Format" and was On the first issue, our ruling is that Norse is not applicable to
validated and approved by the National Seamen Board on the present petition. The reason is that in that case, it was
January 14, 1981. 2 specifically stipulated by the parties in the Crew Agreement
that "compensation shall be paid to employee in accordance for which the Philippine Government is liable under Philippine
with and subject to the limitations of the Workmen’s Law.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Compensation Act of the Philippines or the Workmen’s
Insurance Law of the registry of the vessel, whichever is Hongkong law on workmen’s compensation is not the
greater." 8 That was why the higher benefits prescribed by the applicable law. The case of Norse Management Co. v. National
foreign law were awarded. By contrast, no such stipulation Seaman Board, G.R. No. 54204, September 30, 1982, 117
appears in the Crew Agreement now under consideration. SCRA 486 cannot be a precedent because it was expressly
Instead, it is dearly stated therein that the insurance benefits stipulated in the employment contract in that case that the
shall be "as per NSB Standard Format," in the event "of death workmen’s compensation payable to the employee should be in
of the seaman during the term of his contract, over and above accordance with Philippine Law or the Workmen’s Insurance
the benefits for which the Philippine Government is liable Law of the country where the vessel is registered "whichever is
under Philippine law." 9 greater."cralaw virtua1aw library

The petitioner argues that the Standard Format prescribed only The next issue involves the effectivity of NSB Memorandum
the minimum benefits and does not preclude the parties from Circular No. 71, which appears to have been retroactively
stipulating for higher compensation. That may be true enough applied by the NLRC in increasing the compensation from
But the point is that the parties in this case did not provide for P40,000.O0 The amended award was based by the POEA on
such higher benefits as the parties did in the Norse case. There NSB Memorandum Circular No. 46, which became effective in
was no stipulation in the Crew Agreement of January 3, 1981, 1979. 11 The NLRC, apparently laboring under the belief that
that the employee would be entitled to whichever greater Memorandum Circular No. 71 was already effective at the time
insurance benefits were offered by either Philippine law or the of the seaman’s death on May 12, 1981, increased the death
foreign law; on the contrary, it was plainly provided that benefits to P75,000.00 as provided thereunder. The fact,
insurance benefits would be determined according to the NSB though, is that the new rule became effective only in December
Standard Format then in force. The consequence is that the 1981, as certified by the POEA itself, 12 or seven months after
petitioner cannot now claim a higher award than the Atienza’s fatal accident.
compensation prescribed in the said format.
On the petitioner’s claim that the award should be adjusted in
As We said in Bagong Filipinas Overseas Corporation v. view of the decrease in the purchasing power of the Philippine
NLRC; 10 peso, it Suffices to cite the following relevant ruling of the
Court in Sta. Rite and Well Run Maritime SA Ltd. NLRC: 13
We hold that the shipboard employment contract is controlling
in this case. The contract provides that the beneficiaries of the Regarding the third contention of the petitioners the records
seaman are entitled to P20,000.00 ‘over and above the benefits’ show that when Sta. Rita died on September 14, 1981, NSB
Memorandum Circular No. 46 (Series of 1979) was the
applicable law. Pursuant to this circular in case of a seaman’s Pakistan International Airlines v. Ople
death during the terms of his contract, the company shall pay
his beneficiaries the amount of P30,000.00. On November G.R. No. 61594, 28 September 1990
18,1981 or more than one month after Sta. Rita’s death the
administrative regulations were amended to increase death FACTS:Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (“PIA”), a
compensation for seamen to P50,000.00, effective December 1, foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines,
1981. executed in Manila two (2) separate contracts of employment,
one with private respondent Ethelynne B. Farrales and the other
Considering that the applicable law governing death with private respondent Ma. M.C. Mamasig.
compensation for seamen at the time of Sta Rita’s death was
Memorandum Circular No. 46, Series of 1979, the petitioner’s The contracts provided that (1) the Duration of Employment is
liability should be limited to P30,000.00. Moreover, if manning for a period of 3 years, (2) PIA reserves the right to terminate
agents or shipping corporations secure employer’s insurance to this agreement at any time by giving the EMPLOYEE notice in
cover their liabilities for death, total disability and sickness of writing in advance one month before the intended termination or
officers and ratings on board foreign going vessels, the extent in lieu thereof, by paying the EMPLOYEE wages equivalent to
of the coverage is based on the applicable law at the time. It one month’s salary; and (3) the agreement shall be construed and
would be unjust to compel them to pay benefits based on a law governed under and by the laws of Pakistan, and only the Courts
not yet in effect at the time the contingency occurs. of Karachi, Pakistan shall have the jurisdiction to consider any
matter arising out of or under this agreement.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the NLRC dated 15 July 1985
is SET ASIDE and that of the POEA is REINSTATED, Farrales and Mamasig then commenced training in Pakistan and
without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered. after such, they began discharging their job functions as flight
attendants with base station in Manila and flying assignments to
different parts of the Middle East and Europe.

Roughly one (1) year and four (4) months prior to the expiration
of the contracts of employment, PIA sent separate letters to
private respondents advising both that their services as flight
stewardesses would be terminated. PIA claimed that both were
habitual absentees, were in the habit of bringing in from abroad
sizeable quantities of “personal effects”.
Prior Proceedings: Regional Director of MOLE ordered the In this case, the law relating to labor and employment is an area
reinstatement of private respondents with full backwages or, in which the parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and
the alternative, the payment to them of the amounts equivalent their relationship from by simply contracting with each other.
to their salaries for the remainder of the fixed three-year period
of their employment contracts having attained the status of
regular employees.

On appeal the Deputy Minister of MOLE, adopted the findings


of fact and conclusions of the Regional Director and affirmed
the latter’s award save for the portion thereof giving PIA the
option, in lieu of reinstatement, “to pay each of the complainants
[private respondents] their salaries corresponding to the
unexpired portion of the contract[s] [of employment] . . .”

Hence, this instant Petition for Certiorari by PIA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the provisions of the contract superseded the


general provisions of the Labor Code

RULING:

No. The principle of freedom to contract is not absolute. Art.


1306 provides that stipulations by the parties may be allowed
provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order & policy. Thus, the principle of autonomy of
contracting parties must be counterbalanced with the general
rule that provisions of the applicable law are deemed written into
the contract.
GOVERNMENT VS. FRANK Thereafter, Frank left the service of the Plaintiff and refused to
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ make a further compliance with the terms of the contract.
THE GOVT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. FRANK
G. R. No. 2935 The Plaintiff commenced an action in the CFI-Manila to
March 23, 1909 recover from Frank the sum of money, which amount the
FACTS: In 1903, in the city of Chicago, Illinois, Frank entered Plaintiff claimed had been paid to Frank as expenses incurred
into a contract for a period of 2 years with the Plaintiff, by in traveling from Chicago to Manila, and as half-salary for the
which Frank was to receive a salary as a stenographer in the period consumed in travel.
service of the said Plaintiff, and in addition thereto was to be
paid in advance the expenses incurred in traveling from the It was expressly agreed between the parties to said contract that
said city of Chicago to Manila, and one-half salary during said Laws No. 80 and No. 224 should constitute a part of said
period of travel. contract.
Said contract contained a provision that in case of a violation of
its terms on the part of Frank, he should become liable to the The Defendant filed a general denial and a special defense,
Plaintiff for the amount expended by the Government by way alleging in his special defense that
of expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila and (1) the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended
the one-half salary paid during such period. Laws No. 80 and No. 224 and had thereby materially altered
the said contract, and also that
Frank entered upon the performance of his contract and was (2) he was a minor at the time the contract was entered into and
paid half-salary from the date until the date of his arrival in the was therefore not responsible under the law.
Philippine Islands. the lower court rendered a judgment against Frank and in favor
of the Plaintiff for the sum of 265. 90 dollars
ISSUE: against him. The record discloses that, at the time the contract
1. Did the amendment of the laws altered the tenor of the was entered into in the State of Illinois, he was an adult under
contract entered into between Plaintiff and Defendant? the laws of that State and had full authority to contract. Frank
2. Can the defendant allege minority/infancy? claims that, by reason of the fact that, under that laws of the
Philippine Islands at the time the contract was made, made
HELD: the judgment of the lower court is affirmed persons in said Islands did not reach their majority until they
1. NO; It may be said that the mere fact that the legislative had attained the age of 23 years, he was not liable under said
department of the Government of the Philippine Islands had contract, contending that the laws of the Philippine Islands
amended said Acts No. 80 and No. 224 by Acts No. 643 and governed.
No. 1040 did not have the effect of changing the terms of the
contract made between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. The It is not disputed — upon the contrary the fact is admitted —
legislative department of the Government is expressly that at the time and place of the making of the contract in
prohibited by section 5 of the Act of Congress of 1902 from question the Defendant had full capacity to make the same. No
altering or changing the terms of a contract. The right which rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing upon the
the Defendant had acquired by virtue of Acts No. 80 and No. execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are
224 had not been changed in any respect by the fact that said determined b the law of the place where the contract is made.
laws had been amended. These acts, constituting the terms of Matters connected with its performance are regulated by the
the contract, still constituted a part of said contract and were law prevailing at the place of performance. Matters respecting
enforceable in favor of the Defendant. a remedy, such as the bringing of suit, admissibility of
evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of
2. NO; The Defendant alleged in his special defense that he the place where the suit is brought.
was a minor and therefore the contract could not be enforced
agreements are more than contractual in nature. The
Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc. Constitution itself, in Article XIII Section 3, guarantees the
special protection of workers.
vs. NLRC
FACTS:
on 6:55 AM in Case Digests, Labor Osdana, a Filipino citizen, was recruited by Triple Eight for
Law, Private International Law employment with the latter’s principal, Gulf Catering Company
0 (GCC), a firm based in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The
employment contract (originally as “food server” but later
G.R. No. 129584, December 3, 1998
changed to “waitress”) was executed in the Philippines but was
o LABOR LAW: Disease as Ground for Dismissal, requisites: to be performed in Riyadh. Once in Riyadh, however, Osdana
(1) the disease must be such that employee’s continued was made to perform strenuous tasks (washing dishes,
employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health as janitorial work), which were not included in her designation as
well as to the health of his co-employees; and (2) there must be a waitress. Because of the long hours and strenuous nature of
a certification by competent public authority that the disease is her work, she suffered from Carpal Tunnel Syndrome, for
of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a which she had to undergo surgery. But during her weeks of
period of 6 months with proper medical treatment.
confinement at the hospital for her recovery, she was not given
o LABOR LAW: same; The requirement for a medical certificate
under Article 284 of the Labor Code cannot be dispensed with; any salary. And after she was discharged from the hospital,
otherwise, it would sanction the unilateral and arbitrary GCC suddenly dismissed her from work, allegedly on the
determination by the employer of the gravity or extent of the ground of illness. She was not given any separation pay nor
employee’s illness and thus defeat the public policy on the was she paid her salaries for the periods when she was not
protection of labor. allowed to work. Thus, upon her return to the Philippines, she
o PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Lex Loci Contractus: filed a complaint against Triple Eight, praying for unpaid and
Established is the rule that lex loci contractus (the law of the underpaid salaries, among others.
place where the contract is made) governs in this
jurisdiction. There is no question that the contract of The LA ruled in her favour, which ruling NLRC affirmed.
employment in this case was perfected here in the Philippines. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
o PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Law of the Forum vis-
a-vis Public Policy: Settled is the rule that the courts of the
ISSUE:
forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the
forum’s public policy. Here in the Philippines, employment o Whether or not Osdana was illegally dismissed
o If so, whether or not she is entitled to award for salaries for and not here in the Philippines. Hence, there was a physical
the unexpired portion of the contract impossibility to secure from a Philippine public health
authority the alluded medical certificate that public
HELD: respondent’s illness will not be cured within a period of six
months.”
The petition must fail.
Petitioner entirely misses the point, as counsel for private
Disease as a Ground for Dismissal
respondent states in the Comment. The rule simply prescribes a
Under Article 284 of the Labor Code and the Omnibus Rules “certification by a competent public health authority” and not a
Implementing the Labor Code, for disease to be a valid ground “Philippine public health authority.”
for termination, the following requisites must be present:
If, indeed, Osdana was physically unfit to continue her
employment, her employer could have easily obtained a
certification to that effect from a competent public health
1. The disease must be such that employee’s continued authority in Saudi Arabia, thereby heading off any complaint
employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health as for illegal dismissal.
well as to the health of his co-employees
2. There must be a certification by competent public authority that The requirement for a medical certificate under Article 284 of
the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be the Labor Code cannot be dispensed with; otherwise, it would
cured within a period of 6 months with proper medical
sanction the unilateral and arbitrary determination by the
treatment
employer of the gravity or extent of the employee’s illness and
thus defeat the public policy on the protection of labor. As the
In the first place, Osdana’s continued employment despite her Court observed in Prieto v. NLRC, “The Court is not unaware
illness was not prohibited by law nor was it prejudicial to her of the many abuses suffered by our overseas workers in the
health, as well as that of her co-employees. In fact, the medical foreign land where they have ventured, usually with heavy
report issued after her second operation stated that “she had hearts, in pursuit of a more fulfilling future. Breach of
very good improvement of the symptoms.” Besides, “Carpal contract, maltreatment, rape, insufficient nourishment, sub-
Tunnel Syndrome” is not a contagious disease. human lodgings, insults and other forms of debasement, are
only a few of the inhumane acts to which they are subjected by
On the medical certificate requirement, petitioner erroneously their foreign employers, who probably feel they can do as they
argues that “private respondent was employed in Saudi Arabia please in their country. While these workers may indeed have
relatively little defense against exploitation while they are
abroad, that disadvantage must not continue to burden them This public policy should be borne in mind in this case because
when they return to their own territory to voice their muted to allow foreign employers to determine for and by themselves
complaint. There is no reason why, in their own land, the whether an overseas contract worker may be dismissed on the
protection of our own laws cannot be extended to them in full ground of illness would encourage illegal or arbitrary pre-
measure for the redress of their grievances.” termination of employment contracts.

Which law should apply: Lex Loci Contractus Award of Salaries granted but reduced

Petitioner likewise attempts to sidestep the medical certificate In the case at bar, while it would appear that the employment
requirement by contending that since Osdana was working in contract approved by the POEA was only for a period of twelve
Saudi Arabia, her employment was subject to the laws of the months, Osdana’s actual stint with the foreign principal lasted
host country. Apparently, petitioner hopes to make it appear for one year and seven-and-a-half months. It may be inferred,
that the labor laws of Saudi Arabia do not require any therefore, that the employer renewed her employment contract
certification by a competent public health authority in the for another year. Thus, the award for the unexpired portion of
dismissal of employees due to illness. the contract should have been US$1,260 (US$280 x 4 ½
months) or its equivalent in Philippine pesos, not US$2,499 as
Again, petitioner’s argument is without merit. adjudged by the labor arbiter and affirmed by the NLRC.

First, established is the rule that lex loci contractus (the law of As for the award for unpaid salaries and differential amounting
the place where the contract is made) governs in this to US$1,076 representing seven months’ unpaid salaries and
jurisdiction. There is no question that the contract of one month underpaid salary, the same is proper because, as
employment in this case was perfected here in the Philippines. correctly pointed out by Osdana, the “no work, no pay” rule
Therefore, the Labor Code, its implementing rules and relied upon by petitioner does not apply in this case. In the
regulations, and other laws affecting labor apply in this first place, the fact that she had not worked from June 18 to
case. Furthermore, settled is the rule that the courts of the August 22, 1993 and then from January 24 to April 29, 1994,
forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the was due to her illness which was clearly work-related. Second,
forum’s public policy. Here in the Philippines, employment from August 23 to October 5, 1993, Osdana actually worked as
agreements are more than contractual in nature. The food server and cook for seven days a week at the Hota Bani
Constitution itself, in Article XIII Section 3, guarantees the Tameem Hospital, but was not paid any salary for the said
special protection of workers. period. Finally, from October 6 to October 23, 1993, she was
confined to quarters and was not given any work for no reason Conflict of Laws Case Digest:
at all.
HASEGAWA vs KITAMURA 538
Moral Damages granted but reduced SCRA 26 (2007)
KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING
Now, with respect to the award of moral and exemplary
CONSULTANTS CO., LTD.,
damages, the same is likewise proper but should be
reduced. Worth reiterating is the rule that moral damages are vs MINORU KITAMURA
recoverable where the dismissal of the employee was attended
G.R. No. 149177
by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor,
or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or November 23, 2007
public policy. Likewise, exemplary damages may be awarded
if the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or FACTS:
malevolent manner. Nippon Engineering Consultants (Nippon), a Japanese
consultancy firm providing technical and management support
According to the facts of the case as stated by public in the infrastructure projects national permanently residing in the
respondent, Osdana was made to perform such menial chores, Philippines. The agreement provides that Kitamaru was to
as dishwashing and janitorial work, among others, contrary to extend professional services to Nippon for a year. Nippon
her job designation as waitress. She was also made to work assigned Kitamaru to work as the project manager of the
long hours without overtime pay. Because of such arduous Southern TagalogAccess Road (STAR) project. When the
working conditions, she developed Carpal Tunnel STAR project was near completion, DPWH engaged the
Syndrome. Her illness was such that she had to undergo consultancy services of Nippon, this time for the detailed
surgery twice. Since her employer determined for itself that engineering & construction supervision of the Bongabon-Baler
she was no longer fit to continue working, they sent her home Road Improvement (BBRI) Project. Kitamaru was named as the
posthaste without as much as separation pay or compensation project manger in the contract.
for the months when she was unable to work because of her
illness. Since the employer is deemed to have acted in bad
faith, the award for attorney’s fees is likewise upheld. Hasegawa, Nippon’s general manager for its International
Division, informed Kitamaru that the company had no more
intention of automatically renewing his ICA. His services would
be engaged by the company only up to the nationals may be assailed on the principles of lex loci
substantial completion of the STAR Project. celebrationis, lex contractus, “the state of the most significant
relationship rule,” or forum non conveniens.

Kitamaru demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project.


Nippon insisted that Kitamaru’s contract was for a fixed term HELD:
that had expired. Kitamaru then filed for specific performance &
damages w/ the RTC of Lipa City. Nippon filed a MTD.
NO. In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, 3
consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and
Nippon’s contention: The ICA had been perfected in Japan & recognition and enforcement of judgments. Jurisdiction &
executed by & between Japanese nationals. Thus, the RTC of choice of law are 2 distinct concepts.Jurisdiction considers
Lipa City has no jurisdiction. The claim for improper pre- whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state;
termination of Kitamaru’s ICA could only be heard & ventilated choice of law asks the further question whether
in the proper courts of Japan following the principles of lex loci the application of a substantive law w/c will determine the
celebrationis & lex contractus. merits of the case is fair to both parties. The power to exercise
jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional
authority to apply forum law. While jurisdiction and the choice
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The CA ruled hat the of the lex foriwill often coincide, the “minimum contacts” for
principle of lex loci celebrationis was not applicable to the case, one do not always provide the necessary “significant contacts”
because nowhere in the pleadings was the validity of the written for the other. The question of whether the law of a state can be
agreement put in issue. It held that the RTC was correct in applied to a transaction is different from the question of whether
applying the principle of lex loci solutionis. the courts of that state have jurisdiction to enter a judgment.

ISSUE: In this case, only the 1st phase is at issue—jurisdiction.


Jurisdiction, however, has various aspects. For a court to validly
exercise its power to adjudicate a controversy, it must have
Whether or not the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine jurisdiction over the plaintiff/petitioner, over the
courts in civil cases for specific performance & damages defendant/respondent, over the subject matter, over the issues of
involving contracts executed outside the country by foreign the case and, in cases involving property, over the res or the
thing w/c is the subject of the litigation. In assailing the trial of the place where a contract is executed or to be performed.” It
court's jurisdiction herein, Nippon is actually referring to subject controls the nature, construction, and validity of the contract and
matter jurisdiction. it may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties
or the law intended by them either expressly or implicitly.Under
the “state of the most significant relationship rule,” to ascertain
Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is what state law to apply to a dispute, the court should determine
conferred by the sovereign authority w/c establishes and which state has the most substantial connection to the occurrence
organizes the court. It is given only by law and in the manner and the parties. In a case involving a contract, the court should
prescribed by law. It is further determined by the allegations of consider where the contract was made, was negotiated, was to
the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to be performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place of
all or some of the claims asserted therein. To succeed in its incorporation of the parties. This rule takes into account several
motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction over contacts and evaluates them according to their relative
the subject matter of the claim, the movant must show that the importance with respect to the particular issue to be resolved.
court or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to it because
no law grants it the power to adjudicate the claims.
Since these 3 principles in conflict of laws make reference to the
law applicable to a dispute, they are rules proper for the
In the instant case, Nippon, in its MTD, does not claim that the 2nd phase, the choice of law. They determine which state's law is
RTC is not properly vested by law w/ jurisdiction to hear the to be applied in resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts
subject controversy for a civil case for specific performance & problem. Necessarily, as the only issue in this case is that of
damages is one not capable of pecuniary estimation & is jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only inapplicable but
properly cognizable by the RTC of LipaCity. What they rather also not yet called for.
raise as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the
principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus, and the
“state of the most significant relationship rule.” The Court finds Further, Nippon’s premature invocation of choice-of-law rules
the invocation of these grounds unsound. is exposed by the fact that they have not yet pointed out any
conflict between the laws of Japan and ours. Before determining
which law should apply, 1st there should exist a conflict of laws
Lex loci celebrationis relates to the “law of the place of the situation requiring theapplication of the conflict of laws
ceremony” or the law of the place where a contract is made. The rules. Also, when the law of a foreign country is invoked to
doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci contractus means the “law
provide the proper rules for the solution of a case, the existence
of such law must be pleaded and proved.

It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a


foreign element, is brought before a court or
administrative agency, there are 3 alternatives open to the latter
in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either because of lack of
jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case; (2)
assume jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal law of
the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and take into
account or apply the law of some other State or States. The
court’s power to hear cases and controversies is derived from the
Constitution and the laws. While it may choose to recognize
laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by foreign
sovereign law short of treaties or other formal agreements, even
in matters regarding rights provided by foreign sovereigns.

Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be


used to deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction. 1st, it is not a proper
basis for a motion to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules
of Court does not include it as a ground. 2nd, whether a suit
should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the said
doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and
is addressed to the sound discretion of the RTC. In this case, the
RTC decided to assume jurisdiction. 3rd, the propriety of
dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual
determination; hence, this conflicts principle is more properly
considered a matter of defense.
EDGAR SAN LUIS, petitioner, should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in
Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal
vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because
respondent. her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio.
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the orders of the
G.R. No. 133743. February 6, 2007. trial court, and, hence, the case before the Supreme Court.

Facts: Issue:

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition
Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former for letters of administration
governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime,
Felicisimo contracted three marriages. The first marriage was Held:
with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born
six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a
Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of
The second was Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by
Tobias; and Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and
with whom he had no children with respondent but lived with Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her
her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death. marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the
U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article
Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property
assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December relations between parties who live together as husband and wife
17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 146. the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or
both of them through their work or industry or their wages and
Thereater, the heirs of Virginia Sulit filed a motion to dismiss on salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-
the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired
action. But the trial court issued an order denying the two through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property
motions to dismiss. On September 12, 1995, the trial court acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions
at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the
and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition contrary is proven.
Morover, the Supreme Court founnd that respondent’s legal Case Digest: Roehr v. Rodriguez
capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration
may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner,
as his co- owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article
148 of the Family Code. vs. MARIA CARMEN D.
RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE
The order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’
motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA,
dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is affirmed. It
was also REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch
149, respondents.
G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003
QUISUMBING, J.:

Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen, married


private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December
11, 1980 in Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified
on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of their
union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine.

Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage


before the Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC). Wolfgang filed
a motion to dismiss, but it was denied.

Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce from the


Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese. Said decree
also provides that the parental custody of the children should
be vested to Wolfgang.

Wolfgang filed another motion to dismiss for lack of


jurisdiction as a divorce decree had already been promulgated,
and said motion was granted by Public Respondent RTC Judge Ruling: Yes.
Salonga.
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in
Carmen filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction. But the
prayer that the case proceed for the purpose of determining the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the
issues of custody of children and the distribution of the children, must still be determined by our courts.
properties between her and Wolfgang. Judge Salonga partially
set aside her previous order for the purpose of tackling the Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign
issues of support and custody of their children. judgment, such as the award of custody to Wolfgang by the
German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the
1st Issue: W/N Judge Salonga was correct in granting a partial judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on
motion for reconsideration. grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of
Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil
Ruling: Yes. Procedure).

A judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent
not yet attained finality, as in the case at bar. was given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the
German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment
The Supreme Court goes further to say that the court can as res judicata with regard to the rights of Wolfgang to have
modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become parental custody of their two children. The proceedings in the
executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its German court were summary. As to what was the extent of
decision unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and Carmen’s participation in the proceedings in the German court,
circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or the records remain unclear.
alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and
executory and when it becomes imperative in the higher Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain
interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it. custody of the children, the trial court was correct in setting the
issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody,
2nd issue: W/N Judge Salonga's act was valid when she care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the
assumed and retained jurisdiction as regards child custody and children.
support.
REPUBLIC VS ORBECIDO divorce decree is obtained abroad by alien spouse capacitating
him/her to remarry.
Posted by kaye lee on 9:15 AM
However, Orbecido is barred from remarrying because he did
472 SCRA 114, GR NO. 154380, not present competent evidence showing his wife had obtained
October 5, 2005 [Article 26;Divorce] a divorce decree and had remarried.

FACTS:
Orbecido and Villanueva were married ad had two children.
Wife went to US to work and later became a US citizen.
Thereafter he learned from his son that his wife obtained
divorce and married another man. Orbecido filed a petition for
authority to remarry under the Article 26 (2) of the Family
Code. RTC Zamboanga del Sur granted his petition. The
SolGen's motion for reconsideration was denied. Orbecido filed
a petition for review of certiorari on the Decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 (2).

RULING:
Yes. Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage.

The reckoning point is not their citizenship at the time of


celebration of marriage, but their citizenship at the time the
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas Case Digest
The Court held that alien spouses cannot claim the right as it is
only in favor of Filipino spouses. The legislative intent of
G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010 Article 26 is for the benefit of the clarification of the marital
FACTS: status of the Filipino spouse.
Gerbert Corpuz, a former Filipino citizen but now a naturalized
Canadian, married Daisylyn Sto. Tomas, a Filipina. He soon However, aliens are not strip to petition to the RTC for his
left to Canada after their wedding due to work commitments. foreign divorce decree as it is a conclusive presumption of
He returned to Philippines on April 2005 only to find out evidence of the authenticity of foreign divorce decree with
Daisylyn has an affair with another man. Gerbert returned to confirmity to the alien's national law.
Canada to file a divorce that took effect on January 2006.
The Pasig City Registrar's Office acted out of line when it
Two years later, he found another Filipina and wanted to marry registered the foreign divorce decree without judicial order
her in the Philippines. He went to Pasig City Registrar's Office recognition. Therefore, the registration is still deemed to be
to register his Canadian divorce decree but was denied void.
considering that his marriage with Daisylyn still subsists under
Philippine law, that the foregin divorce must be recognized
judicially by the Philippine court.

Gerbert subsequently filed at the Regional Trial Court a


judicial recognition of foreign divorce but was subsequently
denied since he is not the proper party and according to Article
26 of the Civil Code, only a Filipino spouse can avail the
remedy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 26 can also be applied to Corpuz'


petition of recognition of the foreign divorce decree

HELD:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki), a Japanese national married
respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the
Philippines on January 23, 2004. Sadly, petitioner Fujiki could
not bring respondent Marinay back to Japan and they
eventually lost contact with one another. In 2008, Marinay met
Shinichi Maekara and they married without the earlier marriage
being dissolved.
FUJIKI vs. MARINAY
Citation: G.R. No. 196049, June 26,
Marinay suffered abuse from Maekara and so she left him and
2013 was able to reestablish contact with Fujiki and rekindle their
relationship. The couple was able to obtain a judgment in a
Ponente: Carpio; SECOND DIVISION Japanese court that declared Marinay's marriage to Maekara
Doctrine: void on the ground of bigamy in 2010. Fujiki then filed a
petition in the RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Recognition of foreign judgment declaring nullity of marriage Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)”. In this
– A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify case, petitioner prayed that:
a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the
effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case
which was already tried and decided under foreign law. Article (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that
26 of the Family Code further confers jurisdiction on the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be
Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the
decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage
that “[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or in the National Statistics Office (NSO).
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.”
FACTS:
The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it did YES. Firstly, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
not meet standing and venue requirements as prescribed on the Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
Rule on Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one
02-11-10-SC), specifically, only the spouses (i.e. Marimay or of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover,
Maekara) may file an action for declaration of nullity of in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in
marriage. Petitioner in a Motion for Reconsideration claimed A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a
that the case should not be dismissed as the above rule applied declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage “does not apply
only to cases of annulment of marriage on the ground of if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.”
psychological incapacity and not in a petition for recognition of
a foreign judgment. Notably, when the Solicitor General was
asked for comment, it agreed with the Petitioner stating that the The Supreme Court further held that:
above rule should not apply to cases of bigamy and that insofar
as the Civil Registrar and the NSO are concerned, Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court provide the procedure to be For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating
followed. Lastly, the Solicitor General argued that there is no to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen
jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the
108, citing De Castro v. De Castro and Niñal v. foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be
Bayadog which declared that “[t]he validity of a void marriage more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted
may be collaterally attacked.” in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24
and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court. Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court
ISSUE: judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a
certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of
Whether or not a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a
the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign
petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the
subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign
proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign
citizen on the ground of bigamy.
service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.

HELD:
xxx
A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a
marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage
effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case
void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of
which was already tried and decided under foreign law. Article
the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of
26 of the Family Code further confers jurisdiction on
marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign
Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce
laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They
decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The
legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides
jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only
that “[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
of evidence.
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.”
xxx

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove


as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the Petition was granted and the RTC was ordered to reinstate the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of proceedings.
bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese
Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine
public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from
the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy
is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court
judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arguments of Benguet Consolidated,
Inc. are correct.
Renato Tayag vs Benguet Consolidated, HELD: No. Benguet Consolidated is a corporation who owes its
existence to Philippine laws. It has been given rights and
Inc. privileges under the law. Corollary, it also has obligations under
December 13, 2012 the law and one of those is to follow valid legal court orders. It
In March 1960, Idonah Perkins died in New York. She left is not immune from judicial control because it is domiciled here
behind properties here and abroad. One property she left behind in the Philippines. BCI is a Philippine corporation owing full
were two stock certificates covering 33,002 shares of stocks of allegiance and subject to the unrestricted jurisdiction of local
the Benguet Consolidated, Inc (BCI). Said stock certificates courts. Its shares of stock cannot therefore be considered in any
were in the possession of the Country Trust Company of New wise as immune from lawful court orders. Further, to allow
York (CTC-NY). CTC-NY was the domiciliary administrator of BCI’s opposition is to render the court order against CTC-NY a
the estate of Perkins (obviously in the USA). Meanwhile, in mere scrap of paper. It will leave Tayag without any remedy
1963, Renato Tayag was appointed as the ancillary administrator simply because CTC-NY, a foreign entity refuses to comply
(of the properties of Perkins she left behind in the Philippines). with a valid court order. The final recourse then is for our local
courts to create a legal fiction such that the stock certificates in
A dispute arose between CTC-NY and Tayag as to who between issue be declared lost even though in reality they exist in the
them is entitled to possess the stock certificates. A case ensued hands of CTC-NY. This is valid. As held time and again, fictions
and eventually, the trial court ordered CTC-NY to turn over the which the law may rely upon in the pursuit of legitimate ends
stock certificates to Tayag. CTC-NY refused. Tayag then filed have played an important part in its development.
with the court a petition to have said stock certificates be
declared lost and to compel BCI to issue new stock certificates Further still, the argument invoked by BCI that it can only issue
in replacement thereof. The trial court granted Tayag’s petition. new stock certificates in accordance with its bylaws is
misplaced. It is worth noting that CTC-NY did not appeal the
BCI assailed said order as it averred that it cannot possibly issue order of the court – it simply refused to turn over the stock
new stock certificates because the two stock certificates declared certificates hence ownership can be said to have been settled in
lost are not actually lost; that the trial court as well Tayag favor of estate of Perkins here. Also, assuming that there really
acknowledged that the stock certificates exists and that they are is a conflict between BCI’s bylaws and the court order, what
with CTC-NY; that according to BCI’s by laws, it can only issue should prevail is the lawful court order. It would be highly
new stock certificates, in lieu of lost, stolen, or destroyed irregular if court orders would yield to the bylaws of a
certificates of stocks, only after court of law has issued a final corporation. Again, a corporation is not immune from judicial
and executory order as to who really owns a certificate of stock. orders.
The wife of Testator, Magdalena Bohanan claims that she
should be entitled to receive but the last will has not given her
TESTATE ESTATE OF BOHANAN any share of the of Estate left by the testator. Therefore the
court refused to recognize her claim on the ground that the laws
VS BOHANAN Et al. of Nevada of which the deceased is a citizen allows him to
dispose all of his estate or properties without requiring him to
GR NO L-12105, Jan 30, 1960 leave any portion of his estate to his wife. Therefore
Labrador J.: Magdalena Bohanan has no right to share in the inheritance left
by the testator.
Facts
For the second issue, the old Civil Code, which is applicable to
C.O. Bohanan was born in Nebraska therefore he is a citizen of this case because the
Nebraska and even though he lived in the Philippines for a long testator died in 1944, expressly provides that successional
period of time. he still remained a citizen of the united states. rights to personal property are to be earned by the national law
C.O. Bohanan eventually chose Nevada to spend the rest of his of the person whose succession is in question, thus the two-
days so therefore when he died. He remained a citizen of the third rule is not enforceable.
united states.

Issues

1. Whether or not the disposition of C.O. Bohanan’s Estate is


valid because the petitioner. His Former wife, Magdalena
Bohanan and two of her children Mary Lydia and Edward
Bohanan claims that they have been deprived of their share of
the Estate under the laws of the Philippines.

2. The claim of the testator’s children, Edward and Mary Lydia


Bohanan, who had received legacies in the amount of PHP 6,
000 each only, and, therefore, have not been given their shares
in the estate which, in accordance with the laws, should be two-
thirds of the estate left by the testator.
Ruling
Miciano vs. Brimo No, although the disposition provides an express provision that
it shall be governed by Philippine Laws and those who opposed
G.R. No. L-22595, November 1, 1927 – Krist the condition of the provisions given shall be cancelled from
the disposition, the fact is that the condition itself is void for
being contrary to law. Article 792 of the Civil Code provides:
Facts:
“Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good
The judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased, Joseph morals shall be considered as not imposed and shall not
Brimo, filed a scheme of partition. However, one of the prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even
brothers of the deceased opposed the said partition. should the testator otherwise provide.”

According to the scheme and its provision, that the deceased


requests that all his relatives respect his wishes, otherwise
It is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the decedent’s
those who opposed the same shall be cancelled in said
national law, according to Article 10 of the Civil Code, such
disposition in favor of the oppositor.
national law shall govern his testamentary dispositions.
The apellant in the case, who opposed the same, based his
Therefore, the institution of the legatees are unconditional and
opposition on the fact that the deceased was a Turkish citizen,
are valid, as well as those favorable to herein appellant-
that his disposition should be in accordance with the laws of his
oppositor.
nationality.

Issue:
WON the disposition shall be made in accordance with
Philippine Laws
WON there shall be cancellation of disposition/s in favor of the
appellant-oppositor

Held: