We hold that the shipboard employment contract is controlling
BAGONG FILIPINAS OVERSEAS
CORPORATION v. NLRC +DECISION
G.R. No. 66006
AQUINO, J.:
The issue in this case is whether the shipboard employment
contract or Hongkong law should govern the amount of death
compensation due to the wife of Guillermo Pancho who was
employed by Golden Star Shipping, Ltd. a Hongkong based
firm.
The shipboard employment contract dated June 1, 1978 was
executed in this country between Pancho and Bagong Filipinas
Overseas Corporation, the local agent of Golden Star
Shipping. It was approved by the defunct National Seamen
Board. Pancho was hired as an oiler in the M/V Olivine for 12
months with a gross monthly wage of US$195.
In October, 1978, he had a cerebral stroke. He was rushed to
the hospital while the vessel was docked at Gothenberg,
Sweden. He was repatriated to the Philippines and confined at
the San Juan de Dios Hospital. He died on December 13, 1979.
The National Seamen Board awarded his widow, Proserfina,
P20,000 as disability compensation benefits pursuant to the
above-mentioned employment contract plus P2,000 as
attorney's fees. Proserfina appealed to the National Labor
Relations Commission which awarded her $621 times 36
months or its equivalent in Philippine currency plus 10% of the
benefits as attorney's fees. Golden Star Shipping assailed that
decision by certiorari.
in this case. The contract provides that the beneficiaries of the
seaman are entitled to P20,000 "over and above the benefits"
for which the Philippine Government is liable under Philippine
law.
Hongkong law on workmen's compensation is not the
applicable law. The case of Norse Management Co. vs.
National Seamen Board, G.R. No. 54204, September 30, 1982,
117 SCRA 486 cannot be a precedent because it was expressly
stipulated in the employment contract in that case that the
workmen's compensation payable to the employee should be in
accordance with Philippine Law or the Workmen's Insurance
Law of the country where the vessel is registered "whichever is
greater".
The Solicitor General opines that the employment contract
should be applied. For that reason, he refused to uphold the
decision of the NLRC.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the National Labor Relations
Commission is reversed and set aside. The decision of the
National Seamen Board dated February 26, 1981 is
affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Escolin, and Cuevas,
JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., (Chairman), reserve his vote.
 JOSE B. ATIENZA, Petitioner, v.
PHILIMARE SHIPPING AND
EQUIPMENT SUPPLY, TRANS
OCEAN LINER (Pte.) LTD.,
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION
AND NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS
COMMISSION, Respondents.
Linsangan Law Office for Petitioner.
Prudencio Cruz for Private Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR LAWS; EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION;
DEATH BENEFITS; RULING IN NORSE MANAGEMENT
CO. V. NATIONAL SEAMAN BOARD (117 SCRA 486)
NOT APPLICABLE; IN CASE AT BAR. — Norse is not
applicable to the present petition. In that case, it was
specifically stipulated by the parties in the Crew Agreement
that "compensation shall be paid to employee in accordance
with and subject to the limitations of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act of the Philippines or the Workmen’s
Insurance Law of the registry of the vessel, whichever is
greater." That was why the higher benefits prescribed by the
foreign law were awarded. By contrast, no such stipulation
appears in the Crew Agreement now under consideration.
Instead, it is dearly stated therein that the insurance benefits
shall be "as per NSB Standard Format," in the event "of death
of the seaman during the term of his contract, over and above
the benefits for which the Philippine Government is liable
under Philippine law."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NSB MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 71,
AMENDING NSB MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 46
NOT GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT; CASE AT BAR. —
The effectivity of NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71, which
appears to have been retroactively applied by the NLRC in
increasing the compensation from P40,000.O0 The amended
award was based by the POEA on NSB Memorandum Circular
No. 46, which became effective in 1979. The NLRC,
apparently laboring under the belief that Memorandum Circular
No. 71 was already effective at the time of the seaman’s death
on May 12, 1981, increased the death benefits to P75,000.00 as
provided thereunder. The fact, though, is that the new rule
became effective only in December 1981, as certified by the
POEA itself, or seven months after Atienza’s fatal accident.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; LAW APPLICABLE ON DEATH
COMPENSATION FOR SEAMAN; CASE OF STA. RITA
AND WELL RUN MARITIME SA LTD. V. NLRC
REITERATED. — On the petitioner’s claim that the award
should be adjusted in view of the decrease in the purchasing
power of the Philippine peso, it Suffices to cite the following
relevant ruling of the Court in Sta. Rite and Well Run Maritime
SA Ltd. NLRC: Regarding the third contention of the
petitioners the records show that when Sta. Rita died on
September 14, 1981, NSB Memorandum Circular No. 46
(Series of 1979) was the applicable law. Pursuant to this
circular in case of a seaman’s death during the terms of his
contract, the company shall pay his beneficiaries the amount of
P30,000.00. On November 18,1981 or more than one month
after Sta. Rita’s death the administrative regulations were
amended to increase death compensation for seamen to
P50,000.00, effective December 1, 1981. Considering that the
applicable law governing death compensation for seamen at the
time of Sta Rita’s death was Memorandum Circular No. 46,
Series of 1979, the petitioner’s liability should be limited to
P30,000.00. Moreover, if manning agents or shipping
corporations secure employer’s insurance to cover their
liabilities for death, total disability and sickness of officers and
ratings on board foreign going vessels, the extent of the
coverage is based on the applicable law at the time. It would be
unjust to compel them to pay benefits based on a law not yet in
effect at the time the contingency occurs.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
The facts of this case are not disputed. Even the legal issues are
simple and are soon resolved.chanrobles.com : virtual law
library
Joseph B. Atienza was engaged by Philimare Shipping and
Equipment Supply, as agent for Trans Ocean Liner Etc. Ltd. of
Germany, based on Singapore, to work as Third Mate on board
the MV Tibati for the stipulated compensation of US$850.00 a
month from January 20, 1981 to January 20, 1982. 1 The Crew
Agreement signed by the parties on January 3, 1981, provided
for insurance benefits "as per NSB Standard Format" and was
validated and approved by the National Seamen Board on
January 14, 1981. 2
On May 12, 1981, Atienza died as a result of an accident which
befell him while working on the vessel in Bombay, India. 3 In
due time, his father, the herein petitioner, filed a claim for
death benefits computed at the rate of 36 months times the
seaman’s monthly salary plus ten per cent thereof in
accordance with the Workmen’s Compensation Law of
Singapore, for a total of $30,600.00. The private respondents,
while admitting liability, contended that this was limited to
only P40,000.00 under Section D(1) of the NSB Standard
Format.
On November 6, 1984, the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration sustained the private respondent and held that
the applicable law was Philippine law. 4 On appeal, the
decision was affirmed by the National Labor Relations
Commission except that it increased the award to P75,000.00
pursuant to NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71, Series of
1981. 5
In the petition before us, we are asked to reverse the public
respondent on the ground that Singaporean law should have
been applied in line with our ruling in Norse Management Co.
v. National Seamen Board, 6 where the foreign law was held
controlling because it provided for greater benefits for the
claimant. For their part, the private respondents question the
application of NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71, Series of
1981, which they say became effective alter the seaman’s
death. 7
On the first issue, our ruling is that Norse is not applicable to
the present petition. The reason is that in that case, it was
specifically stipulated by the parties in the Crew Agreement
that "compensation shall be paid to employee in accordance
with and subject to the limitations of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act of the Philippines or the Workmen’s
Insurance Law of the registry of the vessel, whichever is
greater." 8 That was why the higher benefits prescribed by the
foreign law were awarded. By contrast, no such stipulation
appears in the Crew Agreement now under consideration.
Instead, it is dearly stated therein that the insurance benefits
shall be "as per NSB Standard Format," in the event "of death
of the seaman during the term of his contract, over and above
the benefits for which the Philippine Government is liable
under Philippine law." 9
The petitioner argues that the Standard Format prescribed only
the minimum benefits and does not preclude the parties from
stipulating for higher compensation. That may be true enough
But the point is that the parties in this case did not provide for
such higher benefits as the parties did in the Norse case. There
was no stipulation in the Crew Agreement of January 3, 1981,
that the employee would be entitled to whichever greater
insurance benefits were offered by either Philippine law or the
foreign law; on the contrary, it was plainly provided that
insurance benefits would be determined according to the NSB
Standard Format then in force. The consequence is that the
petitioner cannot now claim a higher award than the
compensation prescribed in the said format.
As We said in Bagong Filipinas Overseas Corporation v.
NLRC; 10
We hold that the shipboard employment contract is controlling
in this case. The contract provides that the beneficiaries of the
seaman are entitled to P20,000.00 ‘over and above the benefits’
for which the Philippine Government is liable under Philippine
Law.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Hongkong law on workmen’s compensation is not the
applicable law. The case of Norse Management Co. v. National
Seaman Board, G.R. No. 54204, September 30, 1982, 117
SCRA 486 cannot be a precedent because it was expressly
stipulated in the employment contract in that case that the
workmen’s compensation payable to the employee should be in
accordance with Philippine Law or the Workmen’s Insurance
Law of the country where the vessel is registered "whichever is
greater."cralaw virtua1aw library
The next issue involves the effectivity of NSB Memorandum
Circular No. 71, which appears to have been retroactively
applied by the NLRC in increasing the compensation from
P40,000.O0 The amended award was based by the POEA on
NSB Memorandum Circular No. 46, which became effective in
1979. 11 The NLRC, apparently laboring under the belief that
Memorandum Circular No. 71 was already effective at the time
of the seaman’s death on May 12, 1981, increased the death
benefits to P75,000.00 as provided thereunder. The fact,
though, is that the new rule became effective only in December
1981, as certified by the POEA itself, 12 or seven months after
Atienza’s fatal accident.
On the petitioner’s claim that the award should be adjusted in
view of the decrease in the purchasing power of the Philippine
peso, it Suffices to cite the following relevant ruling of the
Court in Sta. Rite and Well Run Maritime SA Ltd. NLRC: 13
Regarding the third contention of the petitioners the records
show that when Sta. Rita died on September 14, 1981, NSB
Memorandum Circular No. 46 (Series of 1979) was the
applicable law. Pursuant to this circular in case of a seaman’s
death during the terms of his contract, the company shall pay
his beneficiaries the amount of P30,000.00. On November
18,1981 or more than one month after Sta. Rita’s death the
administrative regulations were amended to increase death
compensation for seamen to P50,000.00, effective December 1,
1981.
Considering that the applicable law governing death
compensation for seamen at the time of Sta Rita’s death was
Memorandum Circular No. 46, Series of 1979, the petitioner’s
liability should be limited to P30,000.00. Moreover, if manning
agents or shipping corporations secure employer’s insurance to
cover their liabilities for death, total disability and sickness of
officers and ratings on board foreign going vessels, the extent
of the coverage is based on the applicable law at the time. It
would be unjust to compel them to pay benefits based on a law
not yet in effect at the time the contingency occurs.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the NLRC dated 15 July 1985
is SET ASIDE and that of the POEA is REINSTATED,
without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Pakistan International Airlines v. Ople
G.R. No. 61594, 28 September 1990
FACTS:Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (“PIA”), a
foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines,
executed in Manila two (2) separate contracts of employment,
one with private respondent Ethelynne B. Farrales and the other
with private respondent Ma. M.C. Mamasig.
The contracts provided that (1) the Duration of Employment is
for a period of 3 years, (2) PIA reserves the right to terminate
this agreement at any time by giving the EMPLOYEE notice in
writing in advance one month before the intended termination or
in lieu thereof, by paying the EMPLOYEE wages equivalent to
one month’s salary; and (3) the agreement shall be construed and
governed under and by the laws of Pakistan, and only the Courts
of Karachi, Pakistan shall have the jurisdiction to consider any
matter arising out of or under this agreement.
Farrales and Mamasig then commenced training in Pakistan and
after such, they began discharging their job functions as flight
attendants with base station in Manila and flying assignments to
different parts of the Middle East and Europe.
Roughly one (1) year and four (4) months prior to the expiration
of the contracts of employment, PIA sent separate letters to
private respondents advising both that their services as flight
stewardesses would be terminated. PIA claimed that both were
habitual absentees, were in the habit of bringing in from abroad
sizeable quantities of “personal effects”.
Prior Proceedings: Regional Director of MOLE ordered the In this case, the law relating to labor and employment is an area
reinstatement of private respondents with full backwages or, in which the parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and
the alternative, the payment to them of the amounts equivalent their relationship from by simply contracting with each other.
to their salaries for the remainder of the fixed three-year period
of their employment contracts having attained the status of
regular employees.

On appeal the Deputy Minister of MOLE, adopted the findings

of fact and conclusions of the Regional Director and affirmed
the latter’s award save for the portion thereof giving PIA the
option, in lieu of reinstatement, “to pay each of the complainants
[private respondents] their salaries corresponding to the
unexpired portion of the contract[s] [of employment] . . .”

Hence, this instant Petition for Certiorari by PIA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the provisions of the contract superseded the

general provisions of the Labor Code

RULING:

No. The principle of freedom to contract is not absolute. Art.

1306 provides that stipulations by the parties may be allowed
provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order & policy. Thus, the principle of autonomy of
contracting parties must be counterbalanced with the general
rule that provisions of the applicable law are deemed written into
the contract.
GOVERNMENT VS. FRANK
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
THE GOVT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. FRANK
G. R. No. 2935
March 23, 1909
FACTS: In 1903, in the city of Chicago, Illinois, Frank entered
into a contract for a period of 2 years with the Plaintiff, by
which Frank was to receive a salary as a stenographer in the
service of the said Plaintiff, and in addition thereto was to be
paid in advance the expenses incurred in traveling from the
said city of Chicago to Manila, and one-half salary during said
period of travel.
Said contract contained a provision that in case of a violation of
its terms on the part of Frank, he should become liable to the
Plaintiff for the amount expended by the Government by way
of expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila and
the one-half salary paid during such period.
Frank entered upon the performance of his contract and was
paid half-salary from the date until the date of his arrival in the
Philippine Islands.
Thereafter, Frank left the service of the Plaintiff and refused to
make a further compliance with the terms of the contract.
The Plaintiff commenced an action in the CFI-Manila to
recover from Frank the sum of money, which amount the
Plaintiff claimed had been paid to Frank as expenses incurred
in traveling from Chicago to Manila, and as half-salary for the
period consumed in travel.
It was expressly agreed between the parties to said contract that
Laws No. 80 and No. 224 should constitute a part of said
contract.
The Defendant filed a general denial and a special defense,
alleging in his special defense that
(1) the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended
Laws No. 80 and No. 224 and had thereby materially altered
the said contract, and also that
(2) he was a minor at the time the contract was entered into and
was therefore not responsible under the law.
the lower court rendered a judgment against Frank and in favor
of the Plaintiff for the sum of 265. 90 dollars
ISSUE:
1. Did the amendment of the laws altered the tenor of the
contract entered into between Plaintiff and Defendant?
2. Can the defendant allege minority/infancy?
HELD: the judgment of the lower court is affirmed
1. NO; It may be said that the mere fact that the legislative
department of the Government of the Philippine Islands had
amended said Acts No. 80 and No. 224 by Acts No. 643 and
No. 1040 did not have the effect of changing the terms of the
contract made between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. The
legislative department of the Government is expressly
prohibited by section 5 of the Act of Congress of 1902 from
altering or changing the terms of a contract. The right which
the Defendant had acquired by virtue of Acts No. 80 and No.
224 had not been changed in any respect by the fact that said
laws had been amended. These acts, constituting the terms of
the contract, still constituted a part of said contract and were
enforceable in favor of the Defendant.
2. NO; The Defendant alleged in his special defense that he
was a minor and therefore the contract could not be enforced
against him. The record discloses that, at the time the contract
was entered into in the State of Illinois, he was an adult under
the laws of that State and had full authority to contract. Frank
claims that, by reason of the fact that, under that laws of the
Philippine Islands at the time the contract was made, made
persons in said Islands did not reach their majority until they
had attained the age of 23 years, he was not liable under said
contract, contending that the laws of the Philippine Islands
governed.
It is not disputed — upon the contrary the fact is admitted —
that at the time and place of the making of the contract in
question the Defendant had full capacity to make the same. No
rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing upon the
execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are
determined b the law of the place where the contract is made.
Matters connected with its performance are regulated by the
law prevailing at the place of performance. Matters respecting
a remedy, such as the bringing of suit, admissibility of
evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of
the place where the suit is brought.

Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc.
vs. NLRC
on 6:55 AM in Case Digests, Labor
Law, Private International Law
0 (GCC), a firm based in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The
G.R. No. 129584, December 3, 1998
o LABOR LAW: Disease as Ground for Dismissal, requisites:
(1) the disease must be such that employee’s continued
employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health as
well as to the health of his co-employees; and (2) there must be
a certification by competent public authority that the disease is
of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a
period of 6 months with proper medical treatment.
o LABOR LAW: same; The requirement for a medical certificate
under Article 284 of the Labor Code cannot be dispensed with;
otherwise, it would sanction the unilateral and arbitrary
determination by the employer of the gravity or extent of the
employee’s illness and thus defeat the public policy on the
protection of labor.
o PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Lex Loci Contractus:
Established is the rule that lex loci contractus (the law of the
place where the contract is made) governs in this
jurisdiction. There is no question that the contract of
employment in this case was perfected here in the Philippines.
o PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Law of the Forum vis-
a-vis Public Policy: Settled is the rule that the courts of the
forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the
forum’s public policy. Here in the Philippines, employment
agreements are more than contractual in nature. The
Constitution itself, in Article XIII Section 3, guarantees the
special protection of workers.
FACTS:
Osdana, a Filipino citizen, was recruited by Triple Eight for
employment with the latter’s principal, Gulf Catering Company
employment contract (originally as “food server” but later
changed to “waitress”) was executed in the Philippines but was
to be performed in Riyadh. Once in Riyadh, however, Osdana
was made to perform strenuous tasks (washing dishes,
janitorial work), which were not included in her designation as
a waitress. Because of the long hours and strenuous nature of
her work, she suffered from Carpal Tunnel Syndrome, for
which she had to undergo surgery. But during her weeks of
confinement at the hospital for her recovery, she was not given
any salary. And after she was discharged from the hospital,
GCC suddenly dismissed her from work, allegedly on the
ground of illness. She was not given any separation pay nor
was she paid her salaries for the periods when she was not
allowed to work. Thus, upon her return to the Philippines, she
filed a complaint against Triple Eight, praying for unpaid and
underpaid salaries, among others.
The LA ruled in her favour, which ruling NLRC affirmed.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
o Whether or not Osdana was illegally dismissed
o If so, whether or not she is entitled to award for salaries for
the unexpired portion of the contract
HELD:
The petition must fail.
Disease as a Ground for Dismissal
Under Article 284 of the Labor Code and the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code, for disease to be a valid ground
for termination, the following requisites must be present:
1. The disease must be such that employee’s continued
employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health as
well as to the health of his co-employees
2. There must be a certification by competent public authority that
the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be
cured within a period of 6 months with proper medical
treatment
In the first place, Osdana’s continued employment despite her
illness was not prohibited by law nor was it prejudicial to her
health, as well as that of her co-employees. In fact, the medical
report issued after her second operation stated that “she had
very good improvement of the symptoms.” Besides, “Carpal
Tunnel Syndrome” is not a contagious disease.
On the medical certificate requirement, petitioner erroneously
argues that “private respondent was employed in Saudi Arabia
and not here in the Philippines. Hence, there was a physical
impossibility to secure from a Philippine public health
authority the alluded medical certificate that public
respondent’s illness will not be cured within a period of six
months.”
Petitioner entirely misses the point, as counsel for private
respondent states in the Comment. The rule simply prescribes a
“certification by a competent public health authority” and not a
“Philippine public health authority.”
If, indeed, Osdana was physically unfit to continue her
employment, her employer could have easily obtained a
certification to that effect from a competent public health
authority in Saudi Arabia, thereby heading off any complaint
for illegal dismissal.
The requirement for a medical certificate under Article 284 of
the Labor Code cannot be dispensed with; otherwise, it would
sanction the unilateral and arbitrary determination by the
employer of the gravity or extent of the employee’s illness and
thus defeat the public policy on the protection of labor. As the
Court observed in Prieto v. NLRC, “The Court is not unaware
of the many abuses suffered by our overseas workers in the
foreign land where they have ventured, usually with heavy
hearts, in pursuit of a more fulfilling future. Breach of
contract, maltreatment, rape, insufficient nourishment, sub-
human lodgings, insults and other forms of debasement, are
only a few of the inhumane acts to which they are subjected by
their foreign employers, who probably feel they can do as they
please in their country. While these workers may indeed have
relatively little defense against exploitation while they are
abroad, that disadvantage must not continue to burden them
when they return to their own territory to voice their muted
complaint. There is no reason why, in their own land, the
protection of our own laws cannot be extended to them in full
measure for the redress of their grievances.”
Which law should apply: Lex Loci Contractus
Petitioner likewise attempts to sidestep the medical certificate
requirement by contending that since Osdana was working in
Saudi Arabia, her employment was subject to the laws of the
host country. Apparently, petitioner hopes to make it appear
that the labor laws of Saudi Arabia do not require any
certification by a competent public health authority in the
dismissal of employees due to illness.
Again, petitioner’s argument is without merit.
First, established is the rule that lex loci contractus (the law of
the place where the contract is made) governs in this
jurisdiction. There is no question that the contract of
employment in this case was perfected here in the Philippines.
Therefore, the Labor Code, its implementing rules and
regulations, and other laws affecting labor apply in this
case. Furthermore, settled is the rule that the courts of the
forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the
forum’s public policy. Here in the Philippines, employment
agreements are more than contractual in nature. The
Constitution itself, in Article XIII Section 3, guarantees the
special protection of workers.
This public policy should be borne in mind in this case because
to allow foreign employers to determine for and by themselves
whether an overseas contract worker may be dismissed on the
ground of illness would encourage illegal or arbitrary pre-
termination of employment contracts.
Award of Salaries granted but reduced
In the case at bar, while it would appear that the employment
contract approved by the POEA was only for a period of twelve
months, Osdana’s actual stint with the foreign principal lasted
for one year and seven-and-a-half months. It may be inferred,
therefore, that the employer renewed her employment contract
for another year. Thus, the award for the unexpired portion of
the contract should have been US$1,260 (US$280 x 4 ½
months) or its equivalent in Philippine pesos, not US$2,499 as
adjudged by the labor arbiter and affirmed by the NLRC.
As for the award for unpaid salaries and differential amounting
to US$1,076 representing seven months’ unpaid salaries and
one month underpaid salary, the same is proper because, as
correctly pointed out by Osdana, the “no work, no pay” rule
relied upon by petitioner does not apply in this case. In the
first place, the fact that she had not worked from June 18 to
August 22, 1993 and then from January 24 to April 29, 1994,
was due to her illness which was clearly work-related. Second,
from August 23 to October 5, 1993, Osdana actually worked as
food server and cook for seven days a week at the Hota Bani
Tameem Hospital, but was not paid any salary for the said
period. Finally, from October 6 to October 23, 1993, she was
confined to quarters and was not given any work for no reason
at all.
Moral Damages granted but reduced
Now, with respect to the award of moral and exemplary
damages, the same is likewise proper but should be
reduced. Worth reiterating is the rule that moral damages are
recoverable where the dismissal of the employee was attended
by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor,
or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or
public policy. Likewise, exemplary damages may be awarded
if the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or
malevolent manner.
According to the facts of the case as stated by public
respondent, Osdana was made to perform such menial chores,
as dishwashing and janitorial work, among others, contrary to
her job designation as waitress. She was also made to work
long hours without overtime pay. Because of such arduous
working conditions, she developed Carpal Tunnel
Syndrome. Her illness was such that she had to undergo
surgery twice. Since her employer determined for itself that
she was no longer fit to continue working, they sent her home
posthaste without as much as separation pay or compensation
for the months when she was unable to work because of her
illness. Since the employer is deemed to have acted in bad
faith, the award for attorney’s fees is likewise upheld.
Conflict of Laws Case Digest:
HASEGAWA vs KITAMURA 538
SCRA 26 (2007)
KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING
CONSULTANTS CO., LTD.,
vs MINORU KITAMURA
G.R. No. 149177
November 23, 2007
FACTS:
Nippon Engineering Consultants (Nippon), a Japanese
consultancy firm providing technical and management support
in the infrastructure projects national permanently residing in the
Philippines. The agreement provides that Kitamaru was to
extend professional services to Nippon for a year. Nippon
assigned Kitamaru to work as the project manager of the
Southern TagalogAccess Road (STAR) project. When the
STAR project was near completion, DPWH engaged the
consultancy services of Nippon, this time for the detailed
engineering & construction supervision of the Bongabon-Baler
Road Improvement (BBRI) Project. Kitamaru was named as the
project manger in the contract.
Hasegawa, Nippon’s general manager for its International
Division, informed Kitamaru that the company had no more
intention of automatically renewing his ICA. His services would
be engaged by the company only up to the
substantial completion of the STAR Project.
Kitamaru demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project.
Nippon insisted that Kitamaru’s contract was for a fixed term
that had expired. Kitamaru then filed for specific performance &
damages w/ the RTC of Lipa City. Nippon filed a MTD.
Nippon’s contention: The ICA had been perfected in Japan &
executed by & between Japanese nationals. Thus, the RTC of
Lipa City has no jurisdiction. The claim for improper pre-
termination of Kitamaru’s ICA could only be heard & ventilated
in the proper courts of Japan following the principles of lex loci
celebrationis & lex contractus.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The CA ruled hat the
principle of lex loci celebrationis was not applicable to the case,
because nowhere in the pleadings was the validity of the written
agreement put in issue. It held that the RTC was correct in
applying the principle of lex loci solutionis.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine
courts in civil cases for specific performance & damages
involving contracts executed outside the country by foreign
nationals may be assailed on the principles of lex loci
celebrationis, lex contractus, “the state of the most significant
relationship rule,” or forum non conveniens.
HELD:
NO. In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, 3
consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and
recognition and enforcement of judgments. Jurisdiction &
choice of law are 2 distinct concepts.Jurisdiction considers
whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state;
choice of law asks the further question whether
the application of a substantive law w/c will determine the
merits of the case is fair to both parties. The power to exercise
jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional
authority to apply forum law. While jurisdiction and the choice
of the lex foriwill often coincide, the “minimum contacts” for
one do not always provide the necessary “significant contacts”
for the other. The question of whether the law of a state can be
applied to a transaction is different from the question of whether
the courts of that state have jurisdiction to enter a judgment.
In this case, only the 1st phase is at issue—jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction, however, has various aspects. For a court to validly
exercise its power to adjudicate a controversy, it must have
jurisdiction over the plaintiff/petitioner, over the
defendant/respondent, over the subject matter, over the issues of
the case and, in cases involving property, over the res or the
thing w/c is the subject of the litigation. In assailing the trial
court's jurisdiction herein, Nippon is actually referring to subject
matter jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is
conferred by the sovereign authority w/c establishes and
organizes the court. It is given only by law and in the manner
prescribed by law. It is further determined by the allegations of
the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to
all or some of the claims asserted therein. To succeed in its
motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the claim, the movant must show that the
court or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to it because
no law grants it the power to adjudicate the claims.
In the instant case, Nippon, in its MTD, does not claim that the
RTC is not properly vested by law w/ jurisdiction to hear the
subject controversy for a civil case for specific performance &
damages is one not capable of pecuniary estimation & is
properly cognizable by the RTC of LipaCity. What they rather
raise as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the
principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus, and the
“state of the most significant relationship rule.” The Court finds
the invocation of these grounds unsound.
Lex loci celebrationis relates to the “law of the place of the
ceremony” or the law of the place where a contract is made. The
doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci contractus means the “law
of the place where a contract is executed or to be performed.” It
controls the nature, construction, and validity of the contract and
it may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties
or the law intended by them either expressly or implicitly.Under
the “state of the most significant relationship rule,” to ascertain
what state law to apply to a dispute, the court should determine
which state has the most substantial connection to the occurrence
and the parties. In a case involving a contract, the court should
consider where the contract was made, was negotiated, was to
be performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place of
incorporation of the parties. This rule takes into account several
contacts and evaluates them according to their relative
importance with respect to the particular issue to be resolved.
Since these 3 principles in conflict of laws make reference to the
law applicable to a dispute, they are rules proper for the
2nd phase, the choice of law. They determine which state's law is
to be applied in resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts
problem. Necessarily, as the only issue in this case is that of
jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only inapplicable but
also not yet called for.
Further, Nippon’s premature invocation of choice-of-law rules
is exposed by the fact that they have not yet pointed out any
conflict between the laws of Japan and ours. Before determining
which law should apply, 1st there should exist a conflict of laws
situation requiring theapplication of the conflict of laws
rules. Also, when the law of a foreign country is invoked to
provide the proper rules for the solution of a case, the existence
of such law must be pleaded and proved.

It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a

foreign element, is brought before a court or
administrative agency, there are 3 alternatives open to the latter
in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either because of lack of
jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case; (2)
assume jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal law of
the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and take into
account or apply the law of some other State or States. The
court’s power to hear cases and controversies is derived from the
Constitution and the laws. While it may choose to recognize
laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by foreign
sovereign law short of treaties or other formal agreements, even
in matters regarding rights provided by foreign sovereigns.

Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be

used to deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction. 1st, it is not a proper
basis for a motion to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules
of Court does not include it as a ground. 2nd, whether a suit
should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the said
doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and
is addressed to the sound discretion of the RTC. In this case, the
RTC decided to assume jurisdiction. 3rd, the propriety of
dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual
determination; hence, this conflicts principle is more properly
considered a matter of defense.
EDGAR SAN LUIS, petitioner,
vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS,
respondent.
G.R. No. 133743. February 6, 2007.
Facts:
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of
Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former
governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime,
Felicisimo contracted three marriages. The first marriage was
with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born
six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and
Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
The second was Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son,
Tobias; and Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos,
with whom he had no children with respondent but lived with
her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death.
Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December
17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 146.
Thereater, the heirs of Virginia Sulit filed a motion to dismiss on
the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of
action. But the trial court issued an order denying the two
motions to dismiss. On September 12, 1995, the trial court
dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that,
at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor
and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition
should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in
Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal
capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because
her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio.
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the orders of the
trial court, and, hence, the case before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition
for letters of administration
Held:
Respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a
direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of
their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by
petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and
Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her
marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the
U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article
144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property
relations between parties who live together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from
the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or
both of them through their work or industry or their wages and
salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-
ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired
through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions
belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the
contrary is proven.
Morover, the Supreme Court founnd that respondent’s legal Case Digest: Roehr v. Rodriguez
capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration
may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner,
as his co- owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article
148 of the Family Code. vs. MARIA CARMEN D.
RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE
The order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’
motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA,
dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is affirmed. It
was also REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch
149, respondents.
G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003
QUISUMBING, J.:

Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen, married

private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December
11, 1980 in Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified
on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of their
union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine.

Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage

before the Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC). Wolfgang filed
a motion to dismiss, but it was denied.

Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce from the

Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese. Said decree
also provides that the parental custody of the children should
be vested to Wolfgang.

Wolfgang filed another motion to dismiss for lack of

jurisdiction as a divorce decree had already been promulgated,
and said motion was granted by Public Respondent RTC Judge
Salonga.
Carmen filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a
prayer that the case proceed for the purpose of determining the
issues of custody of children and the distribution of the
properties between her and Wolfgang. Judge Salonga partially
set aside her previous order for the purpose of tackling the
issues of support and custody of their children.
1st Issue: W/N Judge Salonga was correct in granting a partial
motion for reconsideration.
Ruling: Yes.
A judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has
not yet attained finality, as in the case at bar.
The Supreme Court goes further to say that the court can
modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become
executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its
decision unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and
circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or
alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and
executory and when it becomes imperative in the higher
interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.
2nd issue: W/N Judge Salonga's act was valid when she
assumed and retained jurisdiction as regards child custody and
support.
Ruling: Yes.
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in
other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction. But the
legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the
children, must still be determined by our courts.
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign
judgment, such as the award of custody to Wolfgang by the
German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the
judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on
grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of
Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure).
In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent
was given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the
German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment
as res judicata with regard to the rights of Wolfgang to have
parental custody of their two children. The proceedings in the
German court were summary. As to what was the extent of
Carmen’s participation in the proceedings in the German court,
the records remain unclear.
Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain
custody of the children, the trial court was correct in setting the
issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody,
care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the
children.
REPUBLIC VS ORBECIDO divorce decree is obtained abroad by alien spouse capacitating
him/her to remarry.
Posted by kaye lee on 9:15 AM
However, Orbecido is barred from remarrying because he did
472 SCRA 114, GR NO. 154380, not present competent evidence showing his wife had obtained
October 5, 2005 [Article 26;Divorce] a divorce decree and had remarried.

FACTS:
Orbecido and Villanueva were married ad had two children.
Wife went to US to work and later became a US citizen.
Thereafter he learned from his son that his wife obtained
divorce and married another man. Orbecido filed a petition for
authority to remarry under the Article 26 (2) of the Family
Code. RTC Zamboanga del Sur granted his petition. The
SolGen's motion for reconsideration was denied. Orbecido filed
a petition for review of certiorari on the Decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 (2).

RULING:
Yes. Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage.

The reckoning point is not their citizenship at the time of

celebration of marriage, but their citizenship at the time the
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas Case Digest
G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010
FACTS:
Gerbert Corpuz, a former Filipino citizen but now a naturalized
Canadian, married Daisylyn Sto. Tomas, a Filipina. He soon
left to Canada after their wedding due to work commitments.
He returned to Philippines on April 2005 only to find out
Daisylyn has an affair with another man. Gerbert returned to
Canada to file a divorce that took effect on January 2006.
Two years later, he found another Filipina and wanted to marry
her in the Philippines. He went to Pasig City Registrar's Office
to register his Canadian divorce decree but was denied
considering that his marriage with Daisylyn still subsists under
Philippine law, that the foregin divorce must be recognized
judicially by the Philippine court.
The Court held that alien spouses cannot claim the right as it is
only in favor of Filipino spouses. The legislative intent of
Article 26 is for the benefit of the clarification of the marital
status of the Filipino spouse.
However, aliens are not strip to petition to the RTC for his
foreign divorce decree as it is a conclusive presumption of
evidence of the authenticity of foreign divorce decree with
confirmity to the alien's national law.
The Pasig City Registrar's Office acted out of line when it
registered the foreign divorce decree without judicial order
recognition. Therefore, the registration is still deemed to be
void.

Gerbert subsequently filed at the Regional Trial Court a

judicial recognition of foreign divorce but was subsequently
denied since he is not the proper party and according to Article
26 of the Civil Code, only a Filipino spouse can avail the
remedy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 26 can also be applied to Corpuz'

petition of recognition of the foreign divorce decree

HELD:

FUJIKI vs. MARINAY
Citation: G.R. No. 196049, June 26,
2013
Ponente: Carpio; SECOND DIVISION
Doctrine:
Recognition of foreign judgment declaring nullity of marriage
– A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify
a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the
effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case
which was already tried and decided under foreign law. Article
26 of the Family Code further confers jurisdiction on
Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce
decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides
that “[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.”
FACTS:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki), a Japanese national married
respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the
Philippines on January 23, 2004. Sadly, petitioner Fujiki could
not bring respondent Marinay back to Japan and they
eventually lost contact with one another. In 2008, Marinay met
Shinichi Maekara and they married without the earlier marriage
being dissolved.
Marinay suffered abuse from Maekara and so she left him and
was able to reestablish contact with Fujiki and rekindle their
relationship. The couple was able to obtain a judgment in a
Japanese court that declared Marinay's marriage to Maekara
void on the ground of bigamy in 2010. Fujiki then filed a
petition in the RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)”. In this
case, petitioner prayed that:
(1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that
the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be
declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the
Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct
the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the
Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage
between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation
to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General
in the National Statistics Office (NSO).
The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it did
not meet standing and venue requirements as prescribed on the
Rule on Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC), specifically, only the spouses (i.e. Marimay or
Maekara) may file an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage. Petitioner in a Motion for Reconsideration claimed
that the case should not be dismissed as the above rule applied
only to cases of annulment of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity and not in a petition for recognition of
a foreign judgment. Notably, when the Solicitor General was
asked for comment, it agreed with the Petitioner stating that the
above rule should not apply to cases of bigamy and that insofar
as the Civil Registrar and the NSO are concerned, Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court provide the procedure to be
followed. Lastly, the Solicitor General argued that there is no
jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule
108, citing De Castro v. De Castro and Niñal v.
Bayadog which declared that “[t]he validity of a void marriage
may be collaterally attacked.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a
petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign
citizen on the ground of bigamy.
HELD:
YES. Firstly, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one
of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover,
in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage “does not apply
if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.”
The Supreme Court further held that:
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating
to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen
of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the
foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be
more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted
in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24
and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court. Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court
judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a
certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of
the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign
country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign
service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.
xxx
 A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a
marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage
effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case
void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of
which was already tried and decided under foreign law. Article
the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of
26 of the Family Code further confers jurisdiction on
marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign
Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce
laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They
decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The
legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides
jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only
that “[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
of evidence.
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.”
xxx

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove

as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the Petition was granted and the RTC was ordered to reinstate the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of proceedings.
bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese
Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine
public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from
the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy
is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court
judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

Renato Tayag vs Benguet Consolidated,
Inc.
December 13, 2012
In March 1960, Idonah Perkins died in New York. She left
behind properties here and abroad. One property she left behind
were two stock certificates covering 33,002 shares of stocks of
the Benguet Consolidated, Inc (BCI). Said stock certificates
were in the possession of the Country Trust Company of New
York (CTC-NY). CTC-NY was the domiciliary administrator of
the estate of Perkins (obviously in the USA). Meanwhile, in
1963, Renato Tayag was appointed as the ancillary administrator
(of the properties of Perkins she left behind in the Philippines).
A dispute arose between CTC-NY and Tayag as to who between
them is entitled to possess the stock certificates. A case ensued
and eventually, the trial court ordered CTC-NY to turn over the
stock certificates to Tayag. CTC-NY refused. Tayag then filed
with the court a petition to have said stock certificates be
declared lost and to compel BCI to issue new stock certificates
in replacement thereof. The trial court granted Tayag’s petition.
BCI assailed said order as it averred that it cannot possibly issue
new stock certificates because the two stock certificates declared
lost are not actually lost; that the trial court as well Tayag
acknowledged that the stock certificates exists and that they are
with CTC-NY; that according to BCI’s by laws, it can only issue
new stock certificates, in lieu of lost, stolen, or destroyed
certificates of stocks, only after court of law has issued a final
and executory order as to who really owns a certificate of stock.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arguments of Benguet Consolidated,
Inc. are correct.
HELD: No. Benguet Consolidated is a corporation who owes its
existence to Philippine laws. It has been given rights and
privileges under the law. Corollary, it also has obligations under
the law and one of those is to follow valid legal court orders. It
is not immune from judicial control because it is domiciled here
in the Philippines. BCI is a Philippine corporation owing full
allegiance and subject to the unrestricted jurisdiction of local
courts. Its shares of stock cannot therefore be considered in any
wise as immune from lawful court orders. Further, to allow
BCI’s opposition is to render the court order against CTC-NY a
mere scrap of paper. It will leave Tayag without any remedy
simply because CTC-NY, a foreign entity refuses to comply
with a valid court order. The final recourse then is for our local
courts to create a legal fiction such that the stock certificates in
issue be declared lost even though in reality they exist in the
hands of CTC-NY. This is valid. As held time and again, fictions
which the law may rely upon in the pursuit of legitimate ends
have played an important part in its development.
Further still, the argument invoked by BCI that it can only issue
new stock certificates in accordance with its bylaws is
misplaced. It is worth noting that CTC-NY did not appeal the
order of the court – it simply refused to turn over the stock
certificates hence ownership can be said to have been settled in
favor of estate of Perkins here. Also, assuming that there really
is a conflict between BCI’s bylaws and the court order, what
should prevail is the lawful court order. It would be highly
irregular if court orders would yield to the bylaws of a
corporation. Again, a corporation is not immune from judicial
orders.
 The wife of Testator, Magdalena Bohanan claims that she
should be entitled to receive but the last will has not given her
TESTATE ESTATE OF BOHANAN any share of the of Estate left by the testator. Therefore the
court refused to recognize her claim on the ground that the laws
VS BOHANAN Et al. of Nevada of which the deceased is a citizen allows him to
dispose all of his estate or properties without requiring him to
GR NO L-12105, Jan 30, 1960 leave any portion of his estate to his wife. Therefore
Labrador J.: Magdalena Bohanan has no right to share in the inheritance left
by the testator.
Facts
For the second issue, the old Civil Code, which is applicable to
C.O. Bohanan was born in Nebraska therefore he is a citizen of this case because the
Nebraska and even though he lived in the Philippines for a long testator died in 1944, expressly provides that successional
period of time. he still remained a citizen of the united states. rights to personal property are to be earned by the national law
C.O. Bohanan eventually chose Nevada to spend the rest of his of the person whose succession is in question, thus the two-
days so therefore when he died. He remained a citizen of the third rule is not enforceable.
united states.

Issues

1. Whether or not the disposition of C.O. Bohanan’s Estate is

valid because the petitioner. His Former wife, Magdalena
Bohanan and two of her children Mary Lydia and Edward
Bohanan claims that they have been deprived of their share of
the Estate under the laws of the Philippines.

2. The claim of the testator’s children, Edward and Mary Lydia

Bohanan, who had received legacies in the amount of PHP 6,
000 each only, and, therefore, have not been given their shares
in the estate which, in accordance with the laws, should be two-
thirds of the estate left by the testator.
Ruling
Miciano vs. Brimo
G.R. No. L-22595, November 1, 1927 – Krist
Facts:
The judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased, Joseph
Brimo, filed a scheme of partition. However, one of the
brothers of the deceased opposed the said partition.
No, although the disposition provides an express provision that
it shall be governed by Philippine Laws and those who opposed
the condition of the provisions given shall be cancelled from
the disposition, the fact is that the condition itself is void for
being contrary to law. Article 792 of the Civil Code provides:
“Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good
morals shall be considered as not imposed and shall not
prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even
should the testator otherwise provide.”

According to the scheme and its provision, that the deceased

requests that all his relatives respect his wishes, otherwise
It is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the decedent’s
those who opposed the same shall be cancelled in said
national law, according to Article 10 of the Civil Code, such
disposition in favor of the oppositor.
national law shall govern his testamentary dispositions.
The apellant in the case, who opposed the same, based his
Therefore, the institution of the legatees are unconditional and
opposition on the fact that the deceased was a Turkish citizen,
are valid, as well as those favorable to herein appellant-
that his disposition should be in accordance with the laws of his
oppositor.
nationality.

Issue:
WON the disposition shall be made in accordance with
Philippine Laws
WON there shall be cancellation of disposition/s in favor of the
appellant-oppositor

Held: