G.R. No.
L-52688 October 17, 1980 Doctor Balbas in his report dated November 3, 1977 found that Ambal was a "passive-aggressive,
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HONORATO AMBAL, accused-appellant.
AQUINO, J.:
Honorato Ambal appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camiguin convicting
him of parricide, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay an indemnity of
twelve thousand pesos to the heirs of his deceased wife, Felicula Vicente-Ambal (Criminal Case
No. 155-C).
In the morning of January 20, 1977, the barangay captain found under some flowering plants near
the house of Honorato Ambal located in Barrio Balbagon, Mambajao, Camiguin, Felicula Vicente-
Ambal, 48, mortally wounded. She asked for drinking water and medical assistance.
She sustained seven incised wounds in different parts of her body. She was placed in an
improvised hammock and brought to the hospital where she died forty minutes after arrival
thereat (Exh. B and G).
On that same morning, Honorato Ambal, husband of Felicula, after entrusting his child to a
neighbor, went to the house of the barangay captain and informed the latter's spouse that he
(Honorato) had killed his wife Feling. After making that oral confession, Ambal took a pedicab,
went to the municipal hall and surrendered to a policeman, also confessing to the latter that he
had liquidated his wife.
The policeman confiscated Ambal's long bolo, the tip of which was broken (Exh. F). Ambal was
bespattered with blood. His shirt was torn. He appeared to be weak.
The killing was the climax of a fifteen-year-old marriage featured by quarrels and bickerings which
were exacerbated by the fact that the wife sometimes did not stay in the conjugal abode and
chose to spend the night in the poblacion of Mambajao. The couple had eight children.
The immediate provocation for the assault was a quarrel induced by Felicula's failure to buy
medicine for Ambal who was afflicted with influenza. The two engaged in a heated alteration.
Felicula told her husband that it would be better if he were dead ("Mas maayo ka pang
mamatay"). That remark infuriated Ambal and impelled him to attack his wife (Exh. 1).
On January 27, 1977, a police lieutenant charged Ambal with parricide in the municipal court.
After a preliminary examination, the case was elevated to the Court of First Instance where on
March 4, 1977 the fiscal filed against Ambal an information for parricide. At the arraignment,
Ambal, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty.
After the prosecution had presented its evidence, accused's counsel de oficio manifested that the
defense of Ambal was insanity.
The trial court in its order of September 15, 1977 directed the municipal health officer, Doctor
Maximino R. Balbas, Jr., a 1960 medical graduate who had undergone a six-month training in
psychiatry in the National Mental Hospital, to examine Ambal and to submit within one month a
report on the latter's mental condition (p. 65, Record).
emotionally unstable, explosive or inadequate personality" (Exh. 1).
Doctor Balbas testified that during the period form February 1 (twelve days after the killing) to
November 3, 1977, when he placed Ambal under observation, the latter did not show any mental
defect and was normal (44-46 tsn November 3,1977).
Asked directly whether Ambal suffered from a mental disease or defect, Doctor Balbas replied:
"Before the commission of the crime, he was normal. After the commission of the crime, normal,
but during the commission of the crime, that is what we call "Psychosis" due to short frustration
tolerance" (45 tsn).
Doctor Cresogono Llacuna,a 1937 medical graduate who undertook a two-month observation of
mental cases and who in the course of his long practice had treated around one hundred cases of
mental disorders, attended to Ambal in 1975. He found that Ambal suffered from a
psychoneurosis, a disturbance of the functional nervous system which is not insanity (65
November 15, 1977). The doctor concluded that Ambal was not insane. Ambal was normal but
nervous (68 He had no mental disorder.
Ambal, 49, who reached Grade four, testified on November 16, 1977 or about ten months after
the incident. He said that at the time of the killing he did not know what he was doing because he
was allegedly not in full possession of his normal mental faculties. He pretended not to know that
he was charged with the capital offense of having killed his wife.
But he admitted that he knew that his wife was dead because he was informed of her death.
During his confinement in jail he mopped the floor and cooked food for his fellow prisoners.
Sometimes, he worked in the town plaza or was sent unescorted to buy food in the market.
He said that his wife quarrelled with him. She was irritable. he admitted that he rode on a tricycle
when he surrendered on the day of the killing. He remembered that a week before the incident he
got wet while plowing. He feel asleep without changing his clothes. At midnight, when he woke
up, he had chills. That was the commencement, his last illness.
The trial court concluded from Ambal's behavior immediately after the incident that he was not
insane and that he acted like a normal human being. We agree with the court's conclusion.
Courts should be careful to distinguish insanity in law from passion or eccentricity, mental
weakness or mere depression resulting from physical ailment. The State should guard against sane
murderers escaping punishment through a general plea of insanity. (People vs. Bonoan, 64 Phil.
87, 94.)
Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code exempts from criminal liability an imbecile or an insane
person unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval. *
According to the dictionary imbecile is a person marked by mental deficiency while an insane
person is one who has an unsound mind or suffers from a mental disorder. "imbecil vale tanto
como escaso de razon y es loco el que ha perdido el juico." An insane person may have lucid
intervals but "el embecil no puede tener, no tiene estos intervalos de Corazon, pues en el no hay
una alteracion, sino una carencia del juico mismo" (1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 4th Ed., p. 92.)
Insanity has been defined as "a manifestation in language or conduct of disease or defect of the
brain, or a more or less permanently diseased or disordered condition of the mentality, functional
or organic, and characterized by perversion, inhibition, or disordered function of the sensory or of
the intellective faculties, or by impaired or disordered volition" (Sec. 1039, Revised Administrative
Code).
The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary (Art.
800, Civil Code re Testamentary Succession; U.S. vs. Martinez, 34 Phil. 305, 308). The law always
presumes all acts to be voluntary. It is improper to presume that acts were executed
unconsciously (People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288, 292; People vs. Tagasa, 68 Phil. 147, 153; U.S. vs.
Guevara, 27 Phil. 547; People vs. Fausto, 113 Phil. 841).
When there is no proof that the defendant was not of sound mind at the time he performed the
criminal act charged to him, or that he performed it at the time of madness or of mental
derangement, or that he was generally considered to be insane — his habitual condition being, on
the contrary, healthy — the legal presumption is that he acted in his ordinary state of mind and
the burden is upon the defendant to overcome this presumption (U.S. vs. Zamora, 32 Phil. 218.)
Without positive proof that the defendant had lost his reason or was demented, a few moments
prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal
condition (U.S. vs. Hontiveros Carmona, 18 Phil. 62).
A defendant in a criminal case, who interposes the defense of mental incapacity, has the burden
of establishing that fact, meaning that he was insane at the very moment when the crime was
committed (People vs. Bascos, 44 Phil. 204.)
What should be the criterion for insanity or imbecility? We have adopted the rule, based on
Spanish jurisprudence, that in order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the
meaning of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, he must be deprived completely of reason or
discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime (People vs. Formigonez,
87 Phil. 658, 660)
In order that insanity may be taken as an exempting circumstance, there must be complete
deprivation of intelligence in the commission of the act or that the accused acted without the
least discernment. Mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability.
(People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288,292; People vs. Renegado, L-27031, May 31,1974,57 SCRA 275,
286.)
A man who could feel the pangs of jealousy and who tried to vindicate his honor by taking violent
measures to the extent of killing his wife (whom he suspected of infidelity) can hardly be regarded
as an imbecile (Formigones case).
Where the accused had a passionate nature, with a tendency to having violent fits when angry, his
acts of breaking glasses and smashing dishes are indications of an explosive temper and not
insanity, especially considering that he did not turn violent when a policeman intercepted him
after he had killed his wife. (Cruz case.)
There is a vast difference between an insane person and one who has worked himself up into such
a frenzy of anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in what he does. Persons who get
into a quarrel or fight seldom, if ever, act naturally during the fight. An extremely angry man,
often, if not always, acts like a madman. The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that he
is insane. The popular meaning of the word I "crazy" is not synonymous with the legal terms
"insane", "non compos mentis," "unsound mind","idiot", or "lunatic" (U.S. vs. Vaquilar, 27 Phil. 88,
91.)
The heat of passion and feeling produced by motives of anger, hatred, or revenge is not insanity.
(People vs. Foy, 138 N.Y. 664, cited in Vaquilar case, on p. 92.)
One who, in possession of a sound and, commits a criminal act under the impulse of passion or
revenge, which may temporarily dethrone reason and for the moment control the will, cannot
nevertheless be shielded from the consequences of the act by the plea of insanity. Insanity will
only excuse the commission of a criminal act, when it is made affirmatively to appear that the
person committing it was insane, and that the offense was the direct consequence of his insanity
(State vs. Strickly, 41 Iowa 232, cited in Vaquilar case, on p. 94.)
The defense of insanity was rejected in a case where the accused killed by strangulation a sixteen-
year-old girl, who got leaves from his banana plants, and sliced the flesh of her legs, thighs and
shoulders, cooked the flesh and ate it like a cannibal. (People vs. Balondo, L-27401, October 31,
1969, 30 SCRA 155).
Being weak-minded does not necessarily mean that the accused is insane (People vs. Martin, 120
Phil. 14, 20-21).
Justice Cardozo in his article, "What Medicine Can Do For The Law", traces briefly the origin of the
rule regarding insanity as a defense. He says:
In the early stages of our law, way back in medieval times, insanity was never a defense for crime.
The insane killer, like the man who killed in self-defense, might seek a pardon from the king, and
would often get one. He had no defense at law. Gradually insanity was allowed, but only within
narrow limits This was what was become known as the wild-beast stage of the defense. Then the
limits of the defense were expanded, but still slowly and narrowly. The killer was excused if the
disease of the mind was such that he was incapable of appreciating the difference between right
and wrong. At first this meant, not the right and wrong of particular case, but right and wrong
generally or in the abstract, the difference, as it was sometimes said, between good and evil.
Later, the rule was modified in favor of the prisoner so that capacity to distinguish between right
and wrong generally would not charge with responsibility if there was no capacity to understand
the difference in relation to the particular act, the subject of the crime.
The rule governing the subject was crystallized in England in 1843 by the answer made by the
House of Lords to questions submitted by judges in the famous case of McNaghten, who was tried
for the murder of one Drummond, the secretary of Sir Robert Peel.
In the M'Naghten case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, Clark and Finelly 200, the following rule was laid down:
"To establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of
committing the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of
the mind, as not, to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that
he did not know he was doing what was wrong."
In the M'Naghten case, it appears that Daniel M'Naghten shot Edward Drummond on January 20,
1843. Drummond died as a consequence of the gunshot wound on April 25, 1843. Drummond was
the private secretary of Sir Robert Peel, prime minister M'Naghten shot Drummond, thinking he
was Sir Robert. M'Naghten labored under the the insane delusion that he was being hounded by
his enemies and that the prime minister was one of them. Medical evidence tended to prove that
M'Naghten was affected by morbid delusions which carried him beyond the power of his own
control, leaving him unable to distinguish right and wrong, and that he was incapable of
controlling his conduct in connection with the delusion. The jury found him not guilty by reason of
insanity.
As stated in another case, the "test of the responsibility for criminal acts, when insanity is
asserted, is the capacity of the accused to distinguish between right and wrong at the time and
with respect to the act which is the subject of the inquiry. (Coleman's case,1 N.Y. Cr. Rep. 1.)
Another test is the so-called "irresistible impulse" test which means that "assuming defendant's
knowledge of the nature and quality of his act and his knowledge that the act is wrong, if, by
reason of disease of the mind, defendant has been deprived of or lost the power of his will which
would enable him to prevent himself from doing the act, then he cannot be found guilty." The
commission of the crime is excused even if the accused knew what he was doing was wrong
provided that as a result of mental disease he lacked the power to resist the impulse to commit
the act. (State v. White, 270 Pac. 2d. 727, 730; Leslie Kast, 31 North Dakota Law Review, pp. 170,
173.)
The latest rule on the point is that "the so-called right wrong test, supplemented by the irresistible
impulse test, does not alone supply adequate criteria for determining criminal responsibility of a
person alleged mental incapacity." "An accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act is
the product of a mental disease or a mental defect. A mental disease relieving an accused of
criminal responsibility for his unlawful act is a condition considered capable of improvement or
deterioration; a mental defect having such effect on criminal responsibility is a condition not
considered capable of improvement or deterioration, and either congenital, or the result of injury
or of a physical or mental disease." (Syllabi, Durham v. U.S., 214 F. 2nd. 862, 874, 45 A.L.R. 2d.
1430 [1954].)
As stated in 22 C.J.S. 203, "the general test of criminal responsibility may be stated to be the
capacity to understand the nature and consequences of the act charged and the ability to
distinguish between right and wrong as to such act, and in a majority of jurisdictions this is the
exclusive test."
And, as noted in 21 Am Jur 2d. 118, the rule in the M'Naghten case exists along with the
"irresistible impulse" test or some other formula permitting a defendant to be exculpated on the
ground that, although he knew the act was wrong, he was unable to refrain from committing it.
Since the broadest test suggested, which is the Durham or "Product" rule, also permits inability to
distinguish between right and wrong to be considered, even though it refuses to limit the inquiry
to that topic, it would appear that insanity which meets this test is a defense in all Anglo-American
jurisdictions and that the only controversy is over whether there are some cases in which the
right-and-wrong test is not met, but in which a defense on grounds of insanity should
nevertheless be recognized. (21 Am Jur 2d 118.)
In the instant case, the alleged insanity of Ambal was not substantiated by any sufficient evidence.
The presumption of sanity was not overthrown. He was not completely bereft of reason or
discernment and freedom of will when he mortally wounded his wife. He was not suffering from
any mental disease or defect.
The fact that immediately after the incident he thought of surrendering to the law-enforcing
authorities is incontestable proof that he knew that what he had done was wrong and that he was
going to be punished for it.
Ambal is guilty of parricide with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to the
authorities. Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code punishes parricide with reclusion perpetua to
death. The lesser penalty should be imposed because of the presence of one mitigating
circumstance and the absence of aggravating circumstances (Art. 63[3], Revised Penal Code).
WHEREFORE, the trial court's decision is affirmed. Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-3246 November 29, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ABELARDO FORMIGONES, defendant-appellant.
Luis Contreras for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur finding the
appellant guilty of parricide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased in the amount of P2,000, and to pay the costs. The following facts are not disputed.
In the month of November, 1946, the defendant Abelardo Formigones was living on his farm in
Bahao, Libmanan, municipality of Sipocot, Camarines Sur, with his wife, Julia Agricola, and his five
children. From there they went to live in the house of his half-brother, Zacarias Formigones, in the
barrio of Binahian of the same municipality of Sipocot, to find employment as harvesters of palay.
After about a month's stay or rather on December 28, 1946, late in the afternoon, Julia was sitting
at the head of the stairs of the house. The accused, without any previous quarrel or provocation
whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house and stabbed his wife, Julia, in the back, the
blade penetrating the right lung and causing a severe hemorrhage resulting in her death not long
thereafter. The blow sent Julia toppling down the stairs to the ground, immediately followed by
her husband Abelardo who, taking her up in his arms, carried her up the house, laid her on the
floor of the living room and then lay down beside her. In this position he was found by the people
who came in response to the shouts for help made by his eldest daughter, Irene Formigones, who
witnessed and testified to the stabbing of her mother by her father.
Investigated by the Constabulary, defendant Abelardo signed a written statement, Exhibit D,
wherein he admitted that he killed The motive was admittedly of jealousy because according to
his statement he used to have quarrels with his wife for the reason that he often saw her in the
company of his brother Zacarias; that he suspected that the two were maintaining illicit relations
because he noticed that his had become indifferent to him (defendant).
During the preliminary investigation conducted by the justice of the peace of Sipocot, the accused
pleaded guilty, as shown by Exhibit E. At the trial of the case in the Court of First Instance, the
defendant entered a plea of not guilty, but did not testify. His counsel presented the testimony of
two guards of the provincial jail where Abelardo was confined to the effect that his conduct there
was rather strange and that he behaved like an insane person; that sometimes he would remove
his clothes and go stark naked in the presence of his fellow prisoners; that at times he would
remain silent and indifferent to his surroundings; that he would refused to take a bath and wash
his clothes until forced by the prison authorities; and that sometimes he would sing in chorus with
his fellow prisoners, or even alone by himself without being asked; and that once when the door
of his cell was opened, he suddenly darted from inside into the prison compound apparently in an
attempt to regain his liberty.
The appeal is based merely on the theory that the appellant is an imbecile and therefore exempt
from criminal liability under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court rejected this same
theory and we are inclined to agree with the lower court. According to the very witness of the
defendant, Dr. Francisco Gomez, who examined him, it was his opinion that Abelardo was
suffering only from feeblemindedness and not imbecility and that he could distinguish right from
wrong.
In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of
reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime. The
provisions of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code are copied from and based on paragraph 1,
article 8, of the old Penal Code of Spain. Consequently, the decisions of the Supreme Court of
Spain interpreting and applying said provisions are pertinent and applicable. We quote Judge
Guillermo Guevara on his Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 4th Edition, pages 42 to 43:
The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstances may be taken
into account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the
act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own
acts; that he acts without the least discernment;1 that there be a complete absence of the power
to discern, or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will. For this reason, it was held
that the imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a
person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does
not exclude imputability.2
The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be equaled to imbecility or
insanity.
The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that the
defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during the
perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by
law are always reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a person acted
unconsciously, in order to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental condition, unless his
insanity and absence of will are proved.
As to the strange behaviour of the accused during his confinement, assuming that it was not
feigned to stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either to his being feebleminded or eccentric,
or to a morbid mental condition produced by remorse at having killed his wife. From the case of
United States vs. Vaquilar (27 Phil. 88), we quote the following syllabus:
Testimony of eye-witnesses to a parricide, which goes no further than to indicate that the accused
was moved by a wayward or hysterical burst of anger or passion, and other testimony to the
effect that, while in confinement awaiting trial, defendant acted absentmindedly at times, is not
sufficient to establish the defense of insanity. The conduct of the defendant while in confinement
appears to have been due to a morbid mental condition produced by remorse.
After a careful study of the record, we are convinced that the appellant is not an imbecile.
According to the evidence, during his marriage of about 16 years, he has not done anything or
conducted himself in anyway so as to warrant an opinion that he was or is an imbecile. He
regularly and dutifully cultivated his farm, raised five children, and supported his family and even
maintained in school his children of school age, with the fruits of his work. Occasionally, as a side
line he made copra. And a man who could feel the pangs of jealousy to take violent measure to
the extent of killing his wife whom he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in
doing so he was vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile. Whether or not
his suspicions were justified, is of little or no import. The fact is that he believed her faithless.
But to show that his feeling of jealousy had some color of justification and was not a mere product
of hallucination and aberrations of a disordered mind as that an imbecile or a lunatic, there is
evidence to the following effect. In addition to the observations made by appellant in his written
statement Exhibit D, it is said that when he and his wife first went to live in the house of his half
brother, Zacarias Formigones, the latter was living with his grandmother, and his house was
vacant. However, after the family of Abelardo was settled in the house, Zacarias not only
frequented said house but also used to sleep there nights. All this may have aroused and even
partly confirmed the suspicions of Abelardo, at least to his way of thinking.
The appellant has all the sympathies of the Court. He seems to be one of those unfortunate
beings, simple, and even feebleminded, whose faculties have not been fully developed. His action
in picking up the body of his wife after she fell down to the ground, dead, taking her upstairs,
laying her on the floor, and lying beside her for hours, shows his feeling of remorse at having killed
his loved one though he thought that she has betrayed him. Although he did not exactly surrender
to the authorities, still he made no effort to flee and compel the police to hunt him down and
arrest him. In his written statement he readily admitted that he killed his wife, and at the trial he
made no effort to deny or repudiate said written statement, thus saving the government all the
trouble and expense of catching him, and insuring his conviction.
Although the deceased was struck in the back, we are not prepared to find that the aggravating
circumstance of treachery attended the commission of the crime. It seems that the prosecution
was not intent or proving it. At least said aggravating circumstance was not alleged in the
complaint either in the justice of the peace court or in the Court of First Instance. We are inclined
to give him the benefit of the doubt and we therefore declined to find the existence of this
aggravating circumstance. On the other hand, the fact that the accused is feebleminded warrants
the finding in his favor of the mitigating circumstance provided for in either paragraph 8 or
paragraph 9 of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, namely that the accused is "suffering some
physical defect which thus restricts his means of action, defense, or communication with his
fellow beings," or such illness "as would diminish the exercise of his will power." To this we may
add the mitigating circumstance in paragraph 6 of the same article, — that of having acted upon
an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation. The accused
evidently killed his wife in a fit of jealousy.
With the presence of two mitigating circumstances without any aggravating circumstance to
offset them, at first we thought of the possible applicability of the provisions of article 64,
paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code for the purpose of imposing the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by article 246 for parricide, which is reclusion perpetua to death. It will be observed
however, that article 64 refers to the application of penalties which contain three periods
whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties, each one of
which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of articles 76 and 77, which is not true in
the present case where the penalty applicable for parricide is composed only of two indivisible
penalties. On the other hand, article 63 of the same Code refers to the application of indivisible
penalties whether it be a single divisible penalty, or two indivisible penalties like that of reclusion
perpetua to death. It is therefore clear that article 63 is the one applicable in the present case.
Paragraph 2, rule 3 of said article 63 provides that when the commission of the act is attended by
some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall
be applied. Interpreting a similar legal provision the Supreme Court in the case of United States vs.
Guevara (10 Phil. 37), involving the crime of parricide, in applying article 80, paragraph 2 (rule 3 of
the old Penal Code) which corresponds to article 63, paragraph 2 (rule 3 of the present Revised
Penal Code), thru Chief Justice Arellano said the following:
And even though the court should take into consideration the presence of two mitigating
circumstances of a qualifying nature, which it can not afford to overlook, without any aggravating
one, the penalty could not be reduced to the next lower to that imposed by law, because,
according to a ruling of the court of Spain, article 80 above-mentioned does not contain a precept
similar to that contained in Rule 5 of article 81 (now Rule 5, art. 64 of the Rev. Penal Code.)
(Decision of September 30, 1879.)
Yet, in view of the excessive penalty imposed, the strict application of which is inevitable and
which, under the law, must be sustained, this court now resorts to the discretional power
conferred by paragraph 2 of article 2 of the Penal Code; and.
Therefore, we affirm the judgment appealed from with costs, and hereby order that a proper
petition be filed with the executive branch of the Government in order that the latter, if it be
deemed proper in the exercise of the prerogative vested in it by the sovereign power, may reduce
the penalty to that of the next lower.
Then, in the case of People vs. Castañeda (60 Phil. 604), another parricide case, the Supreme
Court in affirming the judgment of conviction sentencing defendant to reclusion perpetua, said
that notwithstanding the numerous mitigating circumstances found to exist, inasmuch as the
penalty for parricide as fixed by article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is composed of two
indivisible penalties, namely, reclusion perpetua to death, paragraph 3 of article 63 of the said
Code must be applied. The Court further observed:
We are likewise convinced that appellant did not have that malice nor has exhibited such moral
turpitude as requires life imprisonment, and therefore under the provisions of article 5 of the
Revised Penal Code, we respectfully invite the attention of the Chief Executive to the case with a
view to executive clemency after appellant has served an appreciable amount of confinement.
In conclusion, we find the appellant guilty of parricide and we hereby affirm the judgment of the
lower court with the modification that the appellant will be credited with one-half of any
preventive imprisonment he has undergone. Appellant will pay costs.
Following the attitude adopted and the action taken by this same court in the two cases above
cited, and believing that the appellant is entitled to a lighter penalty, this case should be brought
to the attention of the Chief Executive who, in his discretion may reduce the penalty to that next
lower to reclusion perpetua to death or otherwise apply executive clemency in the manner he
sees fit.
G.R. No. 129291 July 3, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ENRICO A. VALLEDOR, accused-appellant.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa
City, Branch 47, in Criminal Case Nos. 9359, 9401, and 9489, convicting accused-appellant of the
crimes of murder, attempted murder and frustrated murder, respectively.
The informations filed against accused-appellant read:
In Criminal Case No. 9359, for murder:
That on or about the 6th day of March, 1991, in the afternoon, at Barangay Tagumpay, Puerto
Princesa City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
with treachery and evident premeditation, with intent to kill and while armed with a knife, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab therewith one Elsa
Villon Rodriguez thereby inflicting upon the latter stabbed (sic) wound on the chest, which was
the immediate cause of her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
In Criminal Case No.9401, for attempted murder:
That on or about the 6th day of March, 1991, in the afternoon, at Bgy. Tagumpay, Puerto Princesa
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent
to kill, with treachery and evident premiditation (sic) and while armed with a knife, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab therewith one Ricardo
Maglalang thereby inflicting upon the latter physical injuries on the different parts of his body,
thus commencing the commission of the crime of murder directly by overt acts and does not
perform all the acts of execution which would produce the felony by reason of some causes or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance that is, by the timely and able medical
assistance rendered to said Ricardo Maglalang which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
In Criminal Case No.9489, for frustrated murder:
That on or about the 6th day of March, 1991 at Bgy. Tagumpay, Puerto Princesa City, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, with intent to kill
with treachery and evidence (sic) premeditation and while armed with a butcher knife, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab therewith on (sic) Roger
Cabiguen, hitting him on his right forearm, thus performing all the acts of execution which
produce the crime of murder as a consequence but which nevertheless did not produce it by
reason of causes independent of his will, that is, by the timely and able medical attendance
rendered to him which saved his life.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
After his arrest, accused-appellant was intermittently confined at the National Center for Mental
Health. Thus, he was arraigned only on February 19, 1993 wherein he pleaded not guilty.5
Thereafter, the cases were archived until November 15, 1994, when accused-appellant was
declared mentally fit to withstand trial.6 This time, accused-appellant admitted commission of the
crimes charged but invoked the exempting circumstance of insanity. The lower court thus
conducted reverse and joint trial, at which the following facts were established:
On March 6, 1991, at around 1:45 in the afternoon, Roger Cabiguen was in his house at Burgos
Street, Barangay Tagumpay, Puerto Princesa City. He was working on a lettering job inside his
bedroom together with his first cousin, then 25-year old Elsa Rodriguez, and his friends, Simplicio
Yayen and Antonio Magbanua. Roger was working at his table and seated on his bed while Elsa
was across the table. Antonio was on the left side, while Simplicio was seated near the door, on
the right side of Roger.7
All of a sudden, accused-appellant entered the room; uttered Roger's nickname ("Jer") and
immediately attacked him with a knife, but Roger was able to parry the thrust and was stabbed
instead on the right forearm. Accused-appellant then stabbed Elsa Rodriguez on the chest and
said, "Ako akabales den, Elsa." (I had my revenge, Elsa). Thereafter, accused-appellant fled,
leaving the stunned Simplicio and Antonio unharmed.8
Roger and Elsa were immediately brought to the hospital. On their way out, Antonio noticed a
commotion and saw that Ricardo Maglalang, a neighbor of the victim, was wounded. Antonio
learned from the by-standers that Ricardo was likewise stabbed by accused-appellant.9
Upon reaching the hospital, Elsa was declared dead on arrival. Roger on the other hand was
treated for the 5-centimeter wound sustained by him on his right forearm.10
Prosecution witness Roger Cabiguen testified that sometime in 1980, accused-appellant suspected
him of killing his pet dog. In 1989, accused-appellant courted Elsa but she jilted him. On one
occasion, Elsa spat on and slapped accused-appellant.11
Accused-appellant's defense of insanity was anchored on the following facts:
Accused-appellant, then 30 years of age, was a resident of Barangay Tagumpay, Puerto Princesa
City, and employed as provincial jail guard at the Palawan Provincial Jail. Sometime in January
1990, Pacita Valledor, his mother noticed that accused-appellant was behaving abnormally. For
days he was restless and unable to sleep. He likewise complained that their neighbors were
spreading rumors that he was a rapist and a thief. This prompted Pacita to bring his son to Dr.
Deriomedes de Guzman, a medical practitioner. Pacita disclosed to Dr. de Guzman that insanity
runs in their family. After examining accused-appellant, Dr. de Guzman diagnosed him as suffering
from "psychosis with schizophrenia."12 He prescribed a depressant known as Thoracin, which kept
accused-appellant sane for a period two months.13
On March 4, 1991, Pacita noticed that accused-appellant was again acting strangely. She left to
buy Thoracin but when she returned he was nowhere to be found.14
On March 6, 1991, at around 6:00 in the morning, accused-appellant was seen swimming across
the river of Barangay Caruray, San Vicente, Palawan. Barangay Captain Rufino Nuñez and
Barangay Councilman Antonio Sibunga took accused-appellant out of the water and took him on
board a pump boat. Inside the boat, accused-appellant kept on crying and uttering words to the
effect that his family will be killed. Suspecting that accused-appellant was mentally ill, Barangay
Captain Nuñez, asked Councilman Sibunga to accompany accused-appellant to Puerto Princesa
City. Sibunga acceded and thereafter took a jeepney with accused-appellant at Barangay Bahile.
At about 1:00 in the afternoon, they reached Junction I at the intersection of the National
Highway and Rizal Avenue, Puerto Princesa City. Suddenly, accused-appellant jumped off the
jeepney. Sibunga tried but failed to chase accused-appellant, who immediately boarded a tricycle.
Later that day, he learned that accused-appellant killed and harmed somebody.15
Meanwhile, at around 2:00 in the afternoon of March 6, 1991, Pacita Valledor was awakened by
her daughter who told her that accused-appellant has returned. She rushed out of the house and
saw him standing in the middle of the road, dusty and dirty. She asked him where he came from
but his answer was "Pinatay niya kayong lahat." Pacita dragged him inside the house and later
learned that he killed and wounded their neighbors. Thirty minutes later, accused-appellant was
arrested and detained at the city jail.16
On March 11, 1991, Dr. Manuel Bilog, City Health Officer I of Puerto Princesa City interviewed
accused-appellant and thereafter made the following conclusions and recommendation, to wit:
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:
Cooperative; talkative but incoherent
Disoriented as to time, place and person
DISPOSITION AND RECOMMENDATION:
Respectfully recommending that subject patient be committed to the National Mental Hospital,
Metro Manila for proper medical care and evaluation soonest.17
The defense offered in evidence the April 27, 1992 medical findings on accused-appellant by Dr.
Guia Melendres of the National Center for Mental Health, pertinent portion of which reads:
REMARKS AND RECCOMENDATION:
In view of the foregoing history, observations, physical mental and psychological examinations the
patient Enrico Valledor y Andusay is found suffering from Psychosis or Insanity classified under
Schizophrenia. This is a thought disorder characterized by deterioration from previous level of
functioning, auditory hallucination, ideas of reference, delusion of control, suspiciousness, poor
judgment and absence of insight.
Likewise, he is found to be suffering from Psychoactive Substance Use Disorder, Alcohol, abuse.
This is characterized by a maladaptive pattern of psychoactive substance use indicated by
continued use despite knowledge of having a persistent or recurrent social, occupational,
psychological or physical problems.18
Dr. Oscar Magtang, a psychiatrist assigned at the Medical Service of the PNP, Puerto Princesa City
was likewise presented by the defense to interpret the aforecited findings of Dr. Melendres.19
On February 28, 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed judgment of conviction. The
dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused ENRICO A. VALLEDOR is hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of MURDER in Criminal Case No. 9359; of FRUSTRATED
MURDER in Criminal Case No. 9489; and of ATTEMPTED MURDER in Criminal Case No. 9401 as
charged herein. Accordingly he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in
Criminal Case No. 9359; reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. 9489; and imprisonment of from
EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to TEN (10) YEARS in Criminal Case No. 9401. It is understood
that the accused shall serve these penalties successively or one after the other.
The accused is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim Elsa Villon Rodriguez
the sum of P50,000.00 and to indemnify the victim Roger Cabiguen, the sum of P14,000.00 as
actual damages, and the sum P15,000.00 for loss of income.
Considering that the accused is found to be suffering from a serious mental disorder at present as
certified to by the National Center for Mental Health, Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila, the
service of his sentence is hereby ordered SUSPENDED pursuant to Article 12 and 79 of the Revised
Penal Code. He (Enrico Valledor) is ordered shipped to and confined at the National Center for
Mental Health, Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila, for his treatment, until such time that he
becomes fit for the service of his sentence at the national penitentiary, Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila. As to his civil liability, the same is subject to execution after this judgment shall have
become final executory.
IT IS ORDERED.20
Accused-appellant interposed this appeal and raised the lone assignment of error that:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED DESPITE THE FACT THAT WHEN HE
ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED THE OFFENSE CHARGED HE WAS MENTALLY ILL, OUT OF HIS MIND OR
INSANE AT THE (sic) TIME.21
The appeal has no merit.
In considering a plea of insanity as a defense, the starting premise is that the law presumes all
persons to be of sound mind. Otherwise stated, the law presumes all acts to be voluntary, and it is
improper to presume that acts were done unconsciously.22
In People v. Estrada,23 it was held that:
In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The
accused must be "so insane as to be incapable of entertaining a criminal intent." He must be
deprived of reason and act without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of
the power to discern or a total deprivation of freedom of the will.
Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as an exempting
circumstance must prove it by clear and positive evidence. And the evidence on this point must
refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution.
Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is
manifested in language and conduct. An insane person has no full and clear understanding of the
nature and consequences of his acts. Hence, insanity may be shown by the surrounding
circumstances fairly throwing light on the subject, such as evidence of the alleged deranged
person's general conduct and appearance, his acts and conduct consistent with his previous
character and habits, his irrational acts and beliefs, as well as his improvident bargains. The
vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts, by means of which we read thoughts,
motives and emotions of a person, and through which we determine whether the acts conform to
the practice of people of sound mind.24
In the case at bar, accused-appellant failed to discharge the burden of overcoming the
presumption of sanity at the time of the commission of the crime. The following circumstances
clearly and unmistakably show that accused-appellant was not legally insane when he perpetrated
the acts for which he was charged: 1) Simplicio Yayen was positioned nearest to accused-
appellant but the latter chose to stab Roger and Elsa; 2) Accused-appellant called out the
nickname of Roger before stabbing him; 3) Simplicio Yayen and Antonio Magbanua who were
likewise inside the room were left unharmed; 4) Accused-appellant, a spurned suitor of Elsa,
uttered the words, "Ako akabales den, Elsa." (I had my revenge, Elsa) after stabbing her; and 5)
Accused-appellant hurriedly left the room after stabbing the victims.
Evidently, the foregoing acts could hardly be said to be performed by one who was in a state of a
complete absence of the power to discern. Judging from his acts, accused-appellant was clearly
aware and in control of what he was doing as he in fact purposely chose to stab only the two
victims. Two other people were also inside the room, one of them was nearest to the door where
accused-appellant emerged, but the latter went for the victims. His obvious motive of revenge
against the victims was accentuated by calling out their names and uttering the words, "I had my
revenge" after stabbing them. Finally, his act of immediately fleeing from the scene after the
incident indicates that he was aware of the wrong he has done and the consequence thereof.
Accused-appellant's acts prior to the stabbing incident to wit: crying; swimming in the river with
his clothes on; and jumping off the jeepney; were not sufficient to prove that he was indeed
insane at the time of the commission of the crime. As consistently held by this Court, "A man may
act crazy but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally so." 25 Then, too, the
medical findings showing that accused-appellant was suffering from a mental disorder after the
commission of the crime, has no bearing on his liability. What is decisive is his mental condition at
the time of the perpetration of the offense. Failing to discharge the burden of proving that he was
legally insane when he stabbed the victims, he should be held liable for his felonious acts.
In Criminal Case No. 9489, accused-appellant should be held liable only for attempted murder and
not frustrated murder. The wound sustained by Roger Cabiguen on his right forearm was not
fatal. The settled rule is that where the wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his
death, the crime is only attempted murder, since the accused did not perform all the acts of
execution that would have brought about death.26
Pursuant to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty to be imposed upon the principal of
an attempted crime shall be lower by two degrees than that prescribed for the consummated
felony. Before its amendment by R.A. No. 7659, Article 248 provided that the penalty for murder
was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Under Article 61(3), the penalty two
degrees lower would be prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium. As there is no
modifying circumstance, the medium period of the penalty, which is prision mayor minimum,
should be imposed. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant is entitled to a
minimum penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correcional in its medium
period, the penalty next lower than the penalty for attempted murder.27
For the murder of Elsa Rodriguez, in Criminal Case No. 9359, the trial court correctly imposed
upon accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua, considering that no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance was proven by the prosecution.
Accused-appellant's civil liability must be modified. Not being substantiated by evidence, the
award of P14,000.00 as actual damages, and P15,000.00 for loss of income, to Roger Cabiguen in
Criminal Case No. 9489, should be deleted. However, in lieu thereof, temperate damages under
Article 2224 of the Civil Code may be recovered, as it has been shown that Roger Cabiguen
suffered some pecuniary loss but the amount thereof cannot be proved with certainty. For this
reason, an award of P10,000.00 by way of temperate damages should suffice.28
In addition to the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity which was properly awarded by the
trial court in Criminal Case No. 9359, the heirs of Elsa Rodriguez are entitled to another
P50,000.00 as moral damages which needs no proof since the conviction of accused-appellant for
the crime of murder is sufficient justification for said award. 29 The heirs of the deceased are
likewise entitled to the amount of P29,250.00 representing actual damages30 based on the
agreement of the parties.31
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and
Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, is MODIFIED as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 9359, accused-appellant Enrico A. Valledor is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua; and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Elsa Rodriguez the following amounts:
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P29,250.00 as actual damages;
2. In Criminal Case No. 9489, accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt only of
the crime of attempted murder and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as
maximum; and to indemnify Roger Cabiguen in the amount of P10,000.00 by way of temperate
damages;
3. In Criminal Case No. 9401, accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of attempted murder and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 138453 May 29, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
MELECIO ROBIÑOS y DOMINGO, appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Where the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties, as in the present case
for parricide with unintentional abortion, the lesser one shall be applied in the absence of any
aggravating circumstances. Hence, the imposable penalty here is reclusion perpetua, not death.
The Case
For automatic review by this Court is the April 16, 1999 Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Camiling, Tarlac (Branch 68), in Criminal Case No. 95-45, finding Melecio Robiños2 y Domingo
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion and
sentencing him to death. The decretal portion of the Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding accused Melecio Robiños guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex
crime of parricide with unintentional abortion, this Court hereby renders judgment sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of DEATH by lethal injection. He is also ordered to pay P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for the death of the victim; and P22,800.00 s actual damages."3
In an Information dated May 31, 1995,4 appellant was accused of killing his pregnant wife and the
fetus inside her. It reads thus:
"That on or about March 25, 1995 at around 7:00 a.m. in Brgy. San Isidro, Municipality of
Camiling, Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused Melecio Robinos, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab by
means of a bladed knife 8 inches long, his legitimate wife Lorenza Robinos, who was, then six (6)
months pregnant causing the instantaneous death of said Lorenza Robinos, and the fetus inside
her womb."5
When arraigned on July 27, 1995, appellant, with the assistance of his counsel, 6 pleaded not
guilty.7 After due trial, the RTC convicted him.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) narrates the prosecution's version of how appellant
assaulted his pregnant wife, culminating in a brutal bloodbath, as follows:
"1. On March 25, 1995, at around seven o'clock in the morning, fifteen-year old Lorenzo Robiños
was in his parents' house at Barangay San Isibro in Camiling, Tarlac. While Lorenzo was cooking,
he heard his parents, appellant Melecio Robiños and the victim Lorenza Robiños, who were at the
sala, quarrelling.
"2. Lorenzo heard his mother tell appellant, 'Why did you come home, why don't you just leave?'
After hearing what his mother said, Lorenzo, at a distance of about five meters, saw appellant,
with a double-bladed knife, stab Lorenza on the right shoulder. Blood gushed from where Lorenza
was hit and she fell down on the floor. Upon witnessing appellant's attack on his mother, Lorenzo
immediately left their house and ran to his grandmother's house where he reported the
incident.1âwphi1.nêt
"3. At around eight o'clock in the morning of the same day, Benjamin Bueno, the brother of the
victim Lorenza Robiños, was at the house of his mother Remedios Bueno at Barangay San Isidro.
Benjamin, a resident of Barangay Mabilang in Paniqui, Tarlac, went to his mother's house for the
purpose of informing his relatives that on the evening of March 24, 1995, appellant had killed his
uncle, Alejandro Robiños, at Barangay Mabilang. However while Benjamin was at his mother's
house, he received the more distressing news that his own sister Lorenza had been killed by
appellant.
"4. Upon learning of the attack on his sister, Benjamin did not go to her house because he was
afraid of what appellant might do. From his mother's house, which was about 150 meters away
from his sister's home, Benjamin saw appellant who shouted at him, 'It's good you would see how
your sister died.'
"5. Benjamin sought the help of Barangay Captain Virgilio Valdez who called the police station at
Camiling, Tarlac. SPO1 Herbert Lugo and SPO3 Tirso Martin, together with the other members of
the PNP Alert Team at Camiling, Tarlac, immediately went to Barangay San Isidro. The police,
together with Benjamin Bueno and some barangay officials and barangay folk, proceeded to the
scene of the crime where they saw blood dripping from the house of appellant and Lorenza. The
police told appellant to come out of the house. When appellant failed to come out, the police,
with the help of barangay officials, detached the bamboo wall from the part of the house where
blood was dripping. The removal of the wall exposed that section of the house where SPO1 Lugo
saw appellant embracing [his] wife.
"6. Appellant and Lorenza were lying on the floor. Appellant, who was lying on his side and
holding a bloodstained double-bladed knife with his right hand, was embracing his wife. He was
uttering the words, 'I will kill myself, I will kill myself.' Lorenza, who was lying on her back and
facing upward, was no longer breathing. She appeared to be dead.
"7. The police and the barangay officials went up the stairs of the house and pulled appellant
away from Lorenza's body. Appellant dropped the knife which was taken by SPO3 Martin.
Appellant tried to resist the people who held him but was overpowered. The police, with the help
of the barangay officials present, tied his hands and feet with a plastic rope. However, before he
was pulled away from the body of his wife and restrained by the police, appellant admitted to
Rolando Valdez, a neighbor of his and a barangay kagawad, that he had killed his wife, showing
him the bloodstained knife.
"8. Upon examining Lorenza, SPO1 Lugo found that she was already dead. She was pale and not
breathing. The police thus solicited the services of a funeral parlor to take Lorenza's body for
autopsy. Appellant was brought to the police station at Camiling, Tarlac. However, he had to be
taken to the Camiling District Hospital for the treatment of a stab wound.
"9. After the incident, Senior Inspector Reynaldo B. Orante, the Chief of Police at Camiling, Tarlac,
prepared a Special Report which disclosed that:
'The victim Lorenza Robiños was six (6) months pregnant. She suffered 41 stab wounds on the
different parts of her body.
'That suspect (Melecio Robiños) was under the influence of liquor/drunk [who] came home and
argued/quarreled with his wife, until the suspect got irked, [drew] a double knife and delivered
forty one (41) stab blows.
'Suspect also stabbed his own body and [was] brought to the Provincial Hospital.
'Recovered from the crime scene is a double blade sharp knife about eight (8) inches long
including handle.'
"10. During the trial of the case, the prosecution was not able to present the doctor who
conducted the autopsy on Lorenza Robiños' body. Nor, was the autopsy report presented as
evidence."8
Version of the Defense
Appellant does not refute the factual allegations of the prosecution that he indeed killed his wife,
but seeks exoneration from criminal liability by interposing the defense of insanity as follows:
"Pleading exculpation, herein accused-appellant interposed insanity. The defense presented the
testimonies of the following:
"FEDERICO ROBIÑOS, 19 years old son of Melecio Robiños, testified that his parents had
occasional quarrels[. B]efore March 23, 1995, his father told him that he had seen a person went
[sic] inside their house and who wanted to kill him. On March 23, 1995, he heard his father told
the same thing to his mother and because of this, his parents quarreled and exchanged heated
words.
"LOURDES FAJARDO, nurse of the Tarlac Penal Colony, testified that she came to know Melecio
Robiños only in May to June 1996. Every time she visited him in his cell, accused isolated himself,
'laging nakatingin sa malayo', rarely talked, just stared at her and murmured alone.
"BENEDICT REBOLLOS, a detention prisoner of the Tarlac Penal Colony, testified that he and the
accused were seeing each other everyday from 6:00 o'clock in the morning up to 5:30 o'clock in
the afternoon. He had observed that accused sometime[s] refused to respond in the counting of
prisoners. Sometimes, he stayed in his cell even if they were required to fall in line in the plaza of
the penal colony.
"DOMINGO FRANCISCO, another detention prisoner of the Tarlac Penal Colony, testified that as
the accused's inmate, he had occasion to meet and mingle with the latter. Accused sometimes
was lying down, sitting, looking, or staring on space and without companion, laughing and
sometimes crying.
"MELECIO ROBIÑOS, herein accused-appellant, testified that on March 25, 1995, he was in their
house and there was no unusual incident that happened on that date. He did not know that he
was charged for the crime of parricide with unintentional abortion. He could not remember when
he was informed by his children that he killed his wife. He could not believe that he killed his
wife."9
In view of the penalty imposed by the trial court, this case was automatically elevated to this A: Yes, sir.
Court for review.10 ATTY. IBARRA:
The Issues Q: Did you hear what they talked about?
Appellant submits for our consideration the following assignment of errors: A: Yes, sir.
"I Q: What did you hear?
The court a quo erred in not giving probative weight to the testimony and psychiatric evaluation A: 'Why did you come home, why don't you just leave?', Sir.
of Dr. Maria Mercedita Mendoza finding the accused-appellant to be suffering from psychosis or
COURT:
insanity classified under schizophrenia, paranoid type.
In other words, you better go away, you should have not come back home.
"II
ATTY. IBARRA:
The court a quo erred in disregarding accused-appellant's defense of insanity."11
Q: After you mother uttered those words, what did your father do?
The Court's Ruling
A: That was the time that he stabbed my mother, sir."17
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Furthermore, appellant was obviously aware of what he had done to his wife. He was even
Main Issue
bragging to her brother, Benjamin Bueno, how he had just killed her. Bueno testified thus:
Insanity as an Exempting Circumstance
"ATTY. JOAQUIN:
At the outset, it bears noting that appellant did not present any evidence to contravene the
Q: Now, from the house of your mother, can you see the house of your sister?
allegation that he killed his wife. Clear and undisputed are the RTC findings on the identity of the
culprit and the commission of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion. A: Yes, sir.
Appellant, however, interposes the defense of insanity to absolve himself of criminal liability. Q: When you arrived at the house of your mother, Lorenzo Robiños was already there in the
Insanity presupposes that the accused was completely deprived of reason or discernment and house of your mother, is that right, Mr. Witness?
freedom of will at the time of the commission of the crime.12 A defendant in a criminal case who A: Yes, sir.
relies on the defense of mental incapacity has the burden of establishing the fact of insanity at the Q: And he was the one who informed you about your sister already dead?
very moment when the crime was committed.13 Only when there is a complete deprivation of
A: Yes, Sir.
intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime should the exempting circumstance of
insanity be considered.14 Q: Did you go near the house of your sister upon learning that she was already dead?
The presumption of law always lies in favor of sanity and, in the absence of proof to the contrary, A: No, Sir.
every person is presumed to be of sound mind.15 Accordingly, one who pleads the exempting ATTY. JOAQUIN:
circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving it.16 Failing this, one will be presumed to be Q: Why?
sane when the crime was committed.
A: My brother-in-law was still amok, Sir.
A perusal of the records of the case reveals that appellant's claim of insanity is unsubstantiated
and wanting in material proof. Testimonies from both prosecution and defense witnesses show no COURT:
substantial evidence that appellant was completely deprived of reason or discernment when he Q: Why do you know that he was amok?
perpetrated the brutal killing of his wife. A: Yes, sir, because he even shouted at me, sir.
As can be gleaned from the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, a domestic altercation Q: How?
preceded the fatal stabbing. Thus, it cannot be said that appellant attacked his wife for no reason
A: It's good you would see how your sister died, Sir."18
at all and without knowledge of the nature of his action. To be sure, his act of stabbing her was a
deliberate and conscious reaction to the insulting remarks she had hurled at him as attested to by Finally, the fact that appellant admitted to responding law enforcers how he had just killed his
their 15-year-old son Lorenzo Robiños. We reproduce Lorenzo's testimony in part as follows: wife may have been a manifestation of repentance and remorse -- a natural sentiment of a
husband who had realized the wrongfulness of his act. His behavior at the time of the killing and
"Q: Before your father Melecio Robiños stabbed your mother, do you recall if they talked to
immediately thereafter is inconsistent with his claim that he had no knowledge of what he had
one and the other?
just done. Barangay Kagawad Rolando Valdez validated the clarity of mind of appellant when the
latter confessed to the former and to the police officers, and even showed to them the knife used "It could be that accused-appellant was insane at the time he was examined at the center. But, in
to stab the victim. Valdez's testimony proceeded as follows: all probability, such insanity was contracted during the period of his detention pending trial. He
"Q: And what did you discover when you went there at the house of Melecio Robiños? was without contact with friends and relatives most of the time. He was troubled by his
conscience, the realization of the gravity of the offenses and the thought of a bleak future for him.
A: When we arrived at the house of Melecio Robiños, it was closed. We waited for the police
The confluence of these circumstances may have conspired to disrupt his mental equilibrium. But,
officers to arrive and when they arrived, that was the time that we started going around the
it must be stressed, that an inquiry into the mental state of accused-appellant should relate to the
house and when we saw blood, some of our companions removed the walling of the house and at
period immediately before or at the precise moment of doing the act which is the subject of the
that time, we saw the wife of Melecio Robiños lying down as if at that moment, the wife of
inquiry, and his mental condition after that crucial period or during the trial is inconsequential for
Melecio Robiños was already dead, Sir.
purposes of determining his criminal liability. In fine, this Court needs more concrete evidence on
Q: When you were able to remove this walling, what did you do? the mental condition of the person alleged to be insane at the time of the perpetration of the
A: We talked to Melecio Robiños, Sir. crimes in order that the exempting circumstance of insanity may be appreciated in his favor. x x
xxx xxx xxx x."23 (Italics supplied)

Q: What was he doing when you talked to him? Indeed, when insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from criminal responsibility, the
evidence must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its
A: When we saw them they were both lying down and when we got near, he said he killed his
execution. If the evidence points to insanity subsequent to the commission of the crime, the
wife and showing the weapon he used, sir.
accused cannot be acquitted.24
Q: What is that weapon?
The testimony of Dr. Maria Mercedita Mendoza, the psychiatrist who conducted an examination
A: Double bladed weapon, Sir. of the mental condition of appellant, does not provide much help in determining his state of mind
COURT: at the time of the killing. It must be noted that she examined him only on September 11, 1995, or
What is that, knife? six months after the commission of the crime.25 Moreover, she was not able to make a
background study on the history of his mental condition prior to the killing because of the failure
A: It's a double bladed knife, sir. of a certain social worker to gather data on the matter.26
xxx xxx xxx Although Dr. Mendoza testified that it was possible that the accused had already been suffering
COURT: from psychosis at the time of the commission of the crime, 27 she likewise admitted that her
He admitted to you that he killed his wife? conclusion was not definite and was merely an opinion.28 As correctly observed by the trial court,
her declarations were merely conjectural and inconclusive to support a positive finding of
A: Yes, sir.
insanity. According to the RTC:
Q: How did he say that, tell the court exactly how he tell you that, in tagalog, ilocano or what?
"The testimony of Dr. Maria Mercidita Mendoza, who examined accused at the National Center
A: What I remember Sir he said, 'Pinatay ko ni baket ko' meaning 'I killed my wife,' Sir."19 for Mental Health, Mandaluyong City, that at the time of examination accused Melecio Robiños
Clearly, the assault of appellant on his wife was not undertaken without his awareness of the was still mentally ill; that accused was experiencing hallucination and suffering from insanity and
atrocity of his act. it is possible that the sickness have occurred eight (8) to nine (9) months before examination; and
Similarly, an evaluation of the testimonies of the defense witnesses hardly supports his claim of in her opinion accused was suffering from delusion and hallucination. And her opinion that at the
insanity. The bulk of the defense evidence points to his allegedly unsound mental condition after time accused stabbed himself, he was not in his lucid interval, is merely her conclusion. xxx xxx xxx
the commission of the crime. Except for appellant's 19-year-old son Federico Robiños,20 all the Aside from being her opinion, she conducted the mental, physical and neurological examinations
other defense witnesses testified on the supposed manifestations of his insanity after he had on the accused seven (7) months after the commission of the offense. That span of seven (7)
already been detained in prison. months has given accused an opportunity to contrive and feign mental derangement. Dr.
Mendoza had no opportunity to observed (sic) and assessed (sic) the behavior of the accused
To repeat, insanity must have existed at the time of the commission of the offense, or the accused
immediately before, during and immediately after the commission of the offense. Her finding is
must have been deranged even prior thereto. Otherwise he would still be criminally responsible. 21
conjectural, inconclusive. She did not conduct background examination of the mental condition of
Verily, his alleged insanity should have pertained to the period prior to or at the precise moment
the accused before the incident by interviewing persons who had the opportunity to associate
when the criminal act was committed, not at anytime thereafter. In People v. Villa,22 this Court
with him."29
incisively ratiocinated on the matter as follows:
Hence, appellant who invoked insanity should have proven that he had already been completely
deprived of reason when he killed the victim.30 Verily, the evidence proffered by the defense did
not indicate that he had been completely deprived of intelligence or freedom of will when he
stabbed his wife to death. Insanity is a defense in the nature of a confession or avoidance and, as
such, clear and convincing proof is required to establish its existence.31 Indubitably, the defense
failed to meet the quantum of proof required to overthrow the presumption of
sanity.1âwphi1.nêt
Second Issue:
Proper Penalty
Although the RTC correctly rejected the defense of insanity, it nonetheless erred in imposing the
death penalty on appellant. It imposed the maximum penalty without considering the presence or
the absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The imposition of the capital penalty
was not only baseless, but contrary to the rules on the application of penalties as provided in the
Revised Penal Code. Even the Office of the Solicitor General concedes this error in the imposition
of the death penalty.32
Since appellant was convicted of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion, the
penalty to be imposed on him should be that for the graver offense which is parricide. This is in
accordance with the mandate of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which states: "When a
single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, x x x, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, x x x."
The law on parricide, as amended by RA 7659, is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death. In
all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties, the court is
mandated to impose one or the other, depending on the presence or the absence of mitigating
and aggravating circumstances.33 The rules with respect to the application of a penalty consisting
of two indivisible penalties are prescribed by Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the pertinent
portion of which is quoted as follows:
"In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the
following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
xxx xxx xxx
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the
deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied." (Italics supplied)
Hence, when the penalty provided by law is either of two indivisible penalties and there are
neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the lower penalty shall be imposed.34
Considering that neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances were established in this case,
the imposable penalty should only be reclusion perpetua.35
Indeed, because the crime of parricide is not a capital crime per se, it is not always punishable
with death. The law provides for the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death -- two
indivisible penalties, the application of either one of which depends on the presence or the
absence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances.36
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac (Branch 68) in Criminal
Case No. 95-45 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty is REDUCED to
reclusion perpetua. Consistent with current jurisprudence, appellant shall pay the heirs of the
victim the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P22,800 as actual damages, which were duly
proven. No pronouncement as to costs.
ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 162052. January 13, 2005]
ALVIN JOSE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 22289 affirming with modification the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba,
Laguna, Branch 36, convicting the accused therein of violation of Section 21(b), Article IV in
relation to Section 29, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
The records show that Alvin Jose and Sonny Zarraga were charged with the said crime in an
Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about November 14, 1995, in the municipality of Calamba, Province of Laguna, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, not being licensed or authorized by law, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to other person
METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (or shabu) weighing 98.40 grams, a regulated drug, and in
violation of the aforestated law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
As culled by the trial court, the evidence of the prosecution established the following:
[O]n November 14, 1995, P/Supt. Joseph R. Castro of the Fourth Regional Narcotics Unit received
an information from an unnamed informant. Said unnamed informant was introduced to him by
former Narcom P/Senior Inspector Recomono. The information was that a big time group of drug
pushers from Greenhills will deliver 100 grams of shabu at Chowking Restaurant located at Brgy.
Real, Calamba, Laguna.
Acting on such report, SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra was assigned to act as the poseur-buyer. SPO2
William Manglo and SPO2 Wilfredo Luna were the other members of the team. SPO1 Guevarra
was provided with marked money consisting of a P1,000.00 bill on top of a bundle of make-
believe money bills supposedly amounting to P100,000.00. P/Supt. Joseph R. Castro, SPO2 William
Manglo and Wilfredo Luna went to the place on a Mitsubishi Lancer while SPO1 Guevarra and the
informant boarded an L-300 van. They arrived at the Chowking Restaurant at about 11:00 in the
morning. They positioned their cars at the parking area where they had a commanding view of
people going in and out (TSN, October 3, 1996, pp. 2-8 and TSN, July 11, 1996, pp. 4-7).
It was about 4 oclock in the afternoon when a Toyota Corolla with Plate No. UBV-389 arrived.
Sonny Zarraga was the driver with Alvin Jose. The unnamed informant approached and talked to
Sonny Zarraga. Then, the informant called SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra and informed the latter that
Sonny Zarraga had with him 100 grams of shabu. SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra offered to buy the
shabu. Sonny Zarraga asked SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra if he had the money to buy 100 grams of
shabu. Guevarra responded in the affirmative. He showed the aforecited bundle of money bills.
Sonny Zarraga then asked Alvin Jose to bring out the shabu and handover (sic) to Bonifacio
Guevarra. SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra, in turn, handed the bundle of money bills.
Guevarra scratched his head, the pre-arranged signal to signify that the transaction was
consummated (TSN, July 30, 1996, pp. 3-8). Immediately thereafter, William Manglo and Wilfredo
Luna approached and introduced themselves as Narcom Operatives. They arrested Sonny Zarraga
and Alvin Jose. The buy-bust bundle of money bills and the shabu were recovered. The two were
brought to Camp Vicente Lim for investigation. Edgar Groyon conducted the investigation. The
shabu was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination (TSN, July 30, 1996, pp. 9-10 and
TSN, October 3, 1996, pp. 9-13). P/Senior Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo examined the shabu. She
reported and testified that the specimen, indeed, was a second or low grade methamphetamine
hydrochloride (TSN, July 30, 1996, pp. 31-36).[4]
On the other hand, the accused therein were able to establish the following facts:
Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose claimed that, on November 13, 1995, they were at SM Mega Mall
(sic), Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, to change money. Suddenly, a person with a hand bag
appeared and ordered them to handcuff themselves. They were later able to identify three of
these people as Police Supt. Joseph Roxas Castro, SPO3 Noel Seno and a certain Corpuz. They
were all in civilian clothes.
They proceeded to where Sonny Zarragas car was parked. Sonny Zarraga was forced to board
another car while another person drove Sonny Zarragas car with Alvin Jose as passenger. They
drove towards Greenhills. They were eventually blindfolded. On the way to Greenhills, one of the
men opened the gloves compartment of Sonny Zarragas car. One of the men saw a substance
inside the said compartment. He tasted it. Said person asked Sonny Zarraga if he could come up
with P1.5 Million peso (sic). Col. Castro even showed the picture of Sonny Zarragas mother-in-law
who was supposed to be a rich drug pusher.
They ended up inside a room with a lavatory. While inside the said room, Sonny Zarragas cellular
phone rung. It was a call from Sonny Zarragas wife. Col. Castro talked to Pinky Zarraga and asked
her if she could pay P1.5 Million as ransom for the release of Sonny Zarraga. Sonny Zarraga
instead offered to withdraw money from the bank in the amount of P75,000.00. The agreement
was that in the bank, Pinky Zarraga would withdraw the money and deliver it to Col. Castro in
exchange for Sonny Zarragas release. The agreement did not materialize. Col. Castro and Pinky
Zarraga met inside the bank but Pinky Zarraga refused to withdraw the money as Sonny Zarraga
was nowhere to be seen. There was a commotion inside the bank which prompted the bank
manager to call the police.
Col. Castro left the bank in a hurry, passed by for Alvin Jose who was left at the room and brought
them to Camp Vicente Lim. There, they were investigated.
The defense claimed that SPO3 Noel Seno got Sonny Zarragas jewelry, P85,000.00 in cash and
Sonny Zarragas car spare tire, jack and accessories. Noel Seno was even able to withdraw the
P2,000.00 using Sonny Zarragas ATM card.[5]
On June 10, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment convicting both accused of the crime charged
and sentencing each of them to an indeterminate penalty. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds both the accused Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, for violation of R.A. 6425, as amended, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, six (6) years and one
(1) day to ten (10) years.
Both accused are hereby ordered to pay the fine of P2 million each and to pay the cost of suit.
In the service of sentence, the preventive imprisonment undergone both by the accused shall be
credited in their favor.
Atty. Christopher R. Serrano, Branch Clerk of Court, is hereby ordered to deliver and surrender the
confiscated Methamphetamine Hydrochloride to the Dangerous Drugs Board.
SO ORDERED.[6]
On appeal to the CA, the accused-appellants averred that the trial court erred as follows:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY
THE PROSECUTION.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE MERE PRESENTATION OF THE
SHABU IN COURT IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO FIND, WITH ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY, THAT THE
APPELLANTS COMMITTED THE CRIME OF SELLING PROHIBITED DRUGS, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE
IDENTITY OF THE DRUG WAS NOT PARTICULARLY SET OUT IN THE TESTIMONY OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
III
EVEN GRANTING THAT THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THE APPELLANTS GUILTY OF THE
CRIME CHARGED AGAINST THEM:
(a) THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT IMPOSE THE PROPER PENALTY AGAINST THEM.
(b) EACH OF THE APPELLANTS CANNOT BE MADE TO PAY A FINE IN THE AMOUNT OF P2 MILLION
PESOS (SIC) AND THE COST OF THE SUIT.[7]
The CA rendered judgment affirming the decision appealed from with modification. The appellate
court reduced the penalty imposed on appellant Alvin Jose, on its finding that he was only
thirteen (13) years old when he committed the crime; hence, he was entitled to the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority and to a reduction of the penalty by two degrees. The
appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that since the Information failed to allege
that he acted with discernment when the crime was committed and that the prosecution failed to
prove the same, he should be acquitted. The appellate court denied the motion.
Appellant Jose, now the petitioner, filed his petition for review on certiorari, alleging that
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING PETITIONER DESPITE (1) THE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT PETITIONER, WHO
WAS ONLY 13 YEARS OLD WHEN THE CRIME WAS ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED BY HIM IN
CONSPIRACY WITH CO-ACCUSED SONNY ZARRAGA, ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT, AND (2) THE
ABSENCE OF A DECLARATION BY THE TRIAL COURT THAT PETITIONER SO ACTED WITH
DISCERNMENT, PURSUANT TO THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND
THE ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.[8]
The petitioner asserts that, under paragraph 3, Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a minor over
nine (9) and under fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission of the crime is exempt
from criminal liability unless he acted with discernment, in which case he shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Article 192 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, as amended by P.D.
No. 1179, as provided for in Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code. He avers that the prosecution
was burdened to allege in the Information and prove beyond reasonable doubt that he acted with
discernment, but that the prosecution failed to do so. The petitioner insists that the court is
mandated to make a finding that he acted with discernment under paragraph 1, Article 68 of the
Revised Penal Code and since the CA made no such finding, he is entitled to an acquittal.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asserts that the allegation in the Information
that the petitioner and his co-accused conspired and confederated to sell the shabu subject of the
Information sufficiently avers that the petitioner acted with discernment; hence, there was no
need for the public prosecutor to allege specifically in the Information that the petitioner so
acted. It contends that it is not necessary for the trial and appellate courts to make an express
finding that the petitioner acted with discernment. It is enough that the very acts of the petitioner
show that he acted knowingly and was sufficiently possessed with judgment to know that the acts
he committed were wrong.
The petition is meritorious.
Under Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code, a minor over nine years of age and under fifteen is
exempt from criminal liability if charged with a felony. The law applies even if such minor is
charged with a crime defined and penalized by a special penal law. In such case, it is the burden of
the minor to prove his age in order for him to be exempt from criminal liability. The reason for the
exemption is that a minor of such age is presumed lacking the mental element of a crime the
capacity to know what is wrong as distinguished from what is right or to determine the morality of
human acts; wrong in the sense in which the term is used in moral wrong.[9] However, such
presumption is rebuttable.[10] For a minor at such an age to be criminally liable, the prosecution
is burdened[11] to prove beyond reasonable doubt, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that he
acted with discernment, meaning that he knew what he was doing and that it was wrong.[12]
Such circumstantial evidence may include the utterances of the minor; his overt acts before,
during and after the commission of the crime relative thereto; the nature of the weapon used in
the commission of the crime; his attempt to silence a witness; his disposal of evidence or his
hiding the corpus delicti.
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner,
who was thirteen (13) years of age when the crime charged was committed, acted with
discernment relative to the sale of shabu to the poseur-buyer. The only evidence of the
prosecution against the petitioner is that he was in a car with his cousin, co-accused Sonny
Zarraga, when the latter inquired from the poseur-buyer, SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra, if he could
afford to buy shabu. SPO1 Guevarra replied in the affirmative, after which the accused Zarraga
called the petitioner to bring out and hand over the shabu wrapped in plastic and white soft
paper. The petitioner handed over the plastic containing the shabu to accused Zarraga, who
handed the same to the poseur-buyer:
Q Whom did you approach to buy the shabu?
A The two of them, Sir.
Q While the two of them was (sic) sitting inside the car, what did you tell them?
A They asked me if I can afford to buy the 100 grams, Sir.
Q And what was your response?
A I answer in (sic) affirmative, Sir.
Q And what happened next?
A After that I showed my money, Sir.
Q Now, tell us when you said they reply (sic) in the affirmative specifically. I withdraw that.
Q When you said they asked you whether you can afford to buy 100 grams tell us who asked you
that question?
A Sonny Zarraga, Sir.
Q And after you answer (sic) in the affirmative, what was his response?
A He let his companion to (sic) bring out the shabu, Sir.
Q Did his companion bring out the shabu?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What happened to the shabu?
A Alvin Jose handed the shabu to his companion Sonny Zarraga.
Q After that, what did Sonny Zarraga do with the shabu?
A He handed it to me, Sir.
Q After this shabu was handed to you, what happened next?
A After examining the shabu, I put it in my pocket and then I handed to him the money, Sir.
Q When you say money, which money are you referring to?
A The P1,000.00 bill with the bundle of boodle money, Sir.
Q Now, after you handed the money to the accused, what happened next?
A I made signs to my companions, Sir.
Q What signs did you give?
A I acted upon our agreement by scratching my head, Sir.
Q And how did your companions respond to your signal?
A After scratching my head, my companions approached us and arrested them.
Q Now, tell us, do you know, in particular, who arrested Sonny Zarraga? Q Mr. Guevarra, may I remind you that, in your affidavit, you stated the age of the boy?
A Yes, Sir. A I cannot recall anymore, Sir.
Q Tell us. Q Were you not surprised from just looking at the boy at his age, were you not surprised that a
A SPO1 William Manglo and PO3 Wilfredo Luna, Sir. young boy like that would be in a group selling drugs?
Q Can you describe to us the manner by which Sonny Zarraga was arrested by these police FISCAL:
officers? It calls for an opinion, Your Honor.
A Yes, Sir. ATTY. VERANO:
Q Please tell us. May I ask, Your Honor, if he did not further interrogate why or how this very young boy (sic)
A They introduced themselves as NARCOM operatives, Sir. selling 100 grams of shabu.
Q And after that, what happened? COURT:
A They recovered the money from Sonny Zarraga, Sir.[13] The witness may answer.
Q What happened to the shabu which was handed to you by the accused? WITNESS:
A It was brought by our office to the crime laboratory, Sir. A No more, Sir, because I know that young boys are being used by pushers.[15]
Q Who made the request for its examination? Even on cross-examination, the public prosecutor failed to elicit from the petitioner facts and
circumstances showing his capacity to discern right from wrong. We quote the questions of the
A SPO3 Edgar Groyon, Sir.
public prosecutor on cross-examination and the petitioners answers thereto:
Q Earlier, you said that the shabu was handed to you. What did you do with the shabu?
FISCAL:
A While we were at the area, I handed it to SPO1 William Manglo, Sir.
Cross, Your Honor. May I proceed.
Q Tell us, when this shabu was handed to you by the accused, in what container was it contained?
COURT:
A When it was handed to me by Sonny Zarraga it was wrapped in a plastic and white soft paper,
Please proceed.
Sir.[14]
FISCAL:
It was accused Zarraga who drove the car and transacted with the poseur-buyer relative to the
sale of shabu. It was also accused Zarraga who received the buy-money from the poseur-buyer. Q Mr. Witness, you started your narration that it started on November 13, 1995 and did I hear it
Aside from bringing out and handing over the plastic bag to accused Zarraga, the petitioner right that you went to Manuela at 5 oclock in the afternoon?
merely sat inside the car and had no other participation whatsoever in the transaction between WITNESS:
the accused Zarraga and the poseur-buyer. There is no evidence that the petitioner knew what A Yes, Sir.
was inside the plastic and soft white paper before and at the time he handed over the same to his
Q Now, when you went to Manuela, you came from Filinvest, Quezon City? You left Filinvest,
cousin. Indeed, the poseur-buyer did not bother to ask the petitioner his age because he knew
Quezon City, at 12 oclock?
that pushers used young boys in their transactions for illegal drugs. We quote the testimony of
the poseur-buyer: A No, Sir.
ATTY. VERANO: Q What time did you leave?
Q Did you try to find out if they were friends of your informant? A After lunch, Sir.
A No, Sir. Q Now, on the second day which you claimed that you were in the custody of the police, you said
that at one occasion on that day, you have (sic) a chance to be with your cousin in a [L]ancer car
Q Did you find out also the age of this Mr. Alvin Yamson?
and it was inside that [L]ancer car when your cousin saw his own cellular phone on one of the
A I dont know the exact age, what I know is that he is a minor, Sir. seats of the car, is that correct?
Q Eventually, you find (sic) out how old he is (sic)? A Yes, Sir.
A I dont know, Sir.
Q Did your cousin tell you that that was his first opportunity to make a call to anybody since the
day that you were arrested?
A He did not say anything, he just get (sic) the cellular phone.
Q Did you come to know the reason how that cellular phone appeared inside that [L]ancer car?
A No, Sir.
Q Now, going back to the first day of your arrest. You said that you were accosted by a male
person at the workshop and then you went out of Megamall and when you went outside, this
man saw the key of the car dangling at the waist. At whose waist?
A From my cousin.
Q And at that time, that person did not have any knowledge where your car was?
A No, Sir.
Q And your cousin told him that your car was parked at the third level parking area of SM
Megamall, is that correct?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And at that time, that man did not make any radio call to anybody?
A No, Sir.
Q Until the time that you reached the third level parking of Megamall, he had not made any call?
A No, Sir.
Q And yet when you reach (sic) the third level parking of the Megamall, you claimed that there
was already this group which met you?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And this group were the policemen who are the companions of the male person who arrested
you?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Are you willing to submit a sample of your urine to this Court?
A Yes, Sir.
COURT:
The witness is discharged.[16]
The claim of the OSG that the prosecution was able to prove that the petitioner conspired with his
co-accused to sell shabu to the poseur-buyer, and thereby proved the capacity of the petitioner to
discern right from wrong, is untenable. Conspiracy is defined as an agreement between two or
more persons to commit a crime and decide to commit it. Conspiracy presupposes capacity of the
parties to such conspiracy to discern what is right from what is wrong. Since the prosecution failed
to prove that the petitioner acted with discernment, it cannot thereby be concluded that he
conspired with his co-accused. Indeed, in People v. Estepano,[17] we held that:
Clearly, the prosecution did not endeavor to establish Renes mental capacity to fully appreciate
the consequences of his unlawful act. Moreover, its cross-examination of Rene did not, in any
way, attempt to show his discernment. He was merely asked about what he knew of the incident
that transpired on 16 April 1991 and whether he participated therein. Accordingly, even if he was,
indeed, a co-conspirator, he would still be exempt from criminal liability as the prosecution failed
to rebut the presumption of non-discernment on his part by virtue of his age. The cross-
examination of Rene could have provided the prosecution a good occasion to extract from him
positive indicators of his capacity to discern. But, in this regard, the government miserably
squandered the opportunity to incriminate him.[18]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 22289 which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba,
Laguna, Branch 36, is SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime charged for
insufficiency of evidence.[19]

A Yes, Sir. No costs.

Q Do you know the reason why they were there at that time? SO ORDERED.

A No, Sir.
Q These people do not know your car? G.R. No. 166040 April 26, 2006

A No, Sir. NIEL F. LLAVE, Petitioner,

vs.
FISCAL: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
No further question, Your Honor. DECISION
ATTY. VERANO: CALLEJO, SR., J.:
No re-direct, Your Honor. Before the Court is a Petition for Review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
COURT: CR No. 26962 affirming, with modification, the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay
Q Mr. Witness, earlier you stated that you are not a drug user nor have you seen any shabu. In City, Branch 109, in Criminal Case No. 02-1779 convicting Petitioner Neil F. Llave of rape.
support of your claim, are you willing to submit yourself to an examination? On September 27, 2002, an Information charging petitioner (then only 12 years old) with rape was
WITNESS: filed with the RTC of Pasay City. The inculpatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 24th day of September 2002, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, NEIL LLAVE Y FLORES,
aka NIEL F. LLAVE, a minor over nine (9) years of age and under fifteen (15) but acting with
discernment, by means of force threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant, DEBBIELYN SANTOS y QUITALES, a minor,
seven (7) years of age, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.3
The Case for the Prosecution
The spouses Domingo and Marilou Santos were residents of Pasay City. 4 One of their children,
Debbielyn, was born on December 8, 1994.5 In 2002, she was a Grade II student at the Villamor Air
Base Elementary School in Pasay City6 and attended classes from 12:00 noon to 6:00 p.m.7
Domingo eked out a living as a jeepney driver, while Marilou sold quail eggs at a nearby church. 8
Adjacent to their house was that of Teofisto Bucud, a barbecue vendor who would usually start
selling at 6:30 p.m.9 Next to Teofisto’s residence was a vacant house.10
Debbielyn testified that on September 24, 2002, she arrived home at past 6:00 p.m. She changed
her clothes and proceeded to her mother’s store. Marilou asked her daughter to bring home the
container with the unsold quail eggs.11 Debbielyn did as told and went on her way. As she neared
the vacant house, she saw petitioner, who suddenly pulled her behind a pile of hollow blocks
which was in front of the vacant house. There was a little light from the lamp post. 12 She resisted
to no avail.13 Petitioner ordered her to lie down on the cement. Petrified, she complied. He
removed her shorts and underwear then removed his own. He got on top of her.14 She felt his
penis being inserted into her vagina. He kissed her. 15 She felt pain and cried.16 She was sure there
were passersby on the street near the vacant house at the time.
It was then that Teofisto came out of their house and heard the girl’s cries. He rushed to the place
and saw petitioner on top of Debbielyn, naked from the waist down. Teofisto shouted at
petitioner, and the latter fled from the scene. Teofisto told Debbielyn to inform her parents about
what happened.17 She told her father about the incident.18 Her parents later reported what
happened to the police authorities.19 Debbielyn told the police that petitioner was a bad boy
because he was a rapist.20
Teofisto testified that at about 6:25 p.m. on September 24, 2002, he went out of their house to
get his barbecue grill. He heard someone moaning from within the adjacent vacant house.21 He
rushed to the place and saw petitioner, naked from waist down, on top of Debbielyn, making
pumping motions on her anus.22 The girl was crying. He shouted at petitioner, "Hoy, bakit ginawa
mo ’yan?"23 Petitioner hurriedly put his shorts on and fled.24 Neighbors who had heard Teofisto
shouting arrived.25 Later, Teofisto gave a written statement to the police investigator regarding
the incident.26
Domingo Santos testified that at about 6:30 p.m. that day, he was inside their house. His
daughter, Kimberly Rose, suddenly told him that Debbielyn had been raped near the vacant house
by petitioner.27 He rushed to the place and found her daughter crying. When he asked her what
happened, she replied that she had been abused. He brought Debbielyn to their house and then
left.28 He then looked for petitioner and found him at his grandmother’s house. A barangay tanod
brought petitioner to the barangay hall.29 On September 25, 2002, he brought her daughter to the
Philippine General Hospital Child Protection Unit at Taft Avenue, Manila where she was examined
by Dr. Mariella S. Castillo.
Dr. Castillo declared on the witness stand that she was a physician at the Child Protection Unit of
the Philippine General Hospital. On September 25, 2002, she interviewed the victim who told her
"Masakit ang pepe ko," "Ni-rape ako."30 Dr. Castillo also conducted a genital examination on the
child, and found no injury on the hymen and perineum, but found scanty yellowish discharge
between the labia minora.31 There was also a fresh abrasion of the perineal skin at 1 o’clock
position near the anal opening.32 She declared that the findings support the theory that blunt
force or penetrating trauma (such as an erect penis, finger, or any other foreign body 33) was
applied to the perineal area34 not more than six or seven days before.35 The abrasion could have
been caused on September 24, 2002. She found no spermatozoa in the vaginal area or injury at
the external genitalia;36 neither did she find any other injury or abrasion on the other parts of the
victim’s body.37 She concluded that her findings were consistent with the victim’s claim that she
was sexually abused by petitioner.
Barangay Tanod Jorge Dominguez, for his part, testified that on September 24, 2002, Marilou
Santos arrived at the barangay hall and reported that her daughter had been raped by petitioner
who was then in his aunt’s house at Cadena de Amor Street. Barangay Captain Greg Florante
ordered him and Barangay Tanod Efren Gonzales to proceed to Cadena de Amor Street and take
the boy into custody, and they did as they were told.38
The Case for the Accused
Petitioner, through counsel, presented Dr. Castillo as witness. She declared that the abrasions in
the perineal area could have been caused while the offender was on top of the victim. 39 She
explained that the distance between the anus and the genital area is between 2.5 to 3
centimeters.40 The abrasion was located at ¼ of an inch from the anal orifice.
Petitioner testified and declared that he was a freshman at the Pasay City South High School. 41 He
had been one of the three outstanding students in grade school and received awards such as Best
in Mathematics.42 He also finished a computer course and received a Certificate of Completion
from the Philippine Air Force Management Information Center.43 He denied having raped the
private complainant. He declared that at 6:30 p.m. on September 24, 2002, he was outside of
their house to buy rice in the carinderia44 and he saw her on his way back.45 He also met his
father, who asked him what he had done to their neighbor. He was also told that the victim’s
father was so angry that the latter wanted to kill him.46 He did not ask his father for the name of
the angry neighbor. He was also told to pass by Cadena de Amor Street in going to his aunt’s
house. Petitioner also declared that his mother prodded him to go to his aunt’s house. 47 Later,
Domingo and Barangay Tanod Jorge Dominguez arrived at his aunt’s house and brought him to
the barangay hall. He did not know of any reason why Debbielyn and her parents would charge
him with rape.48
Petitioner also declared that he played cards with Debbielyn.49 While confined at the Pasay City
Youth Home during trial, he had a crush on "Issa," a young female inmate. Using a piece of broken
glass (bubog) about half-an-inch long, he inscribed her name on his right thigh, left leg and left
arm.50
Nida Llave testified and identified her son’s Certificate of Live Birth, in which it appears that he
was born on March 6, 1990.51 She declared that at about 6:30 p.m. on September 24, 2000,
Marilou Santos and Marilyn Bucud arrived in their house looking for her son. According to
Marilyn, her son had raped the private complainant. She went to their house to look for her son
and came across Domingo Santos who threatened to kill her son. She and her husband proceeded
to the house of his sister Josefina at Cadena de Amor Street where petitioner had hidden for a
while.52
At the conclusion of the trial, the court rendered judgment convicting Neil of the crime charged.
The decretal portion of the decision reads:
FROM ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court opines that the prosecution has proven the guilt of the xxx
Niel Llave y Flores beyond reasonable doubt when he forcibly pulled the complainant towards the
vacant lot, laid on top of her and had carnal knowledge with the [complainant] against her will
and consent who is only seven (7) years old (sic). Moreover, he being a minor, he cannot be
meted with the Death penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the CICL [Child in Conflict with the Law] Niel Llave y Flores guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, and crediting him with the special mitigating circumstance of minority,
this Court hereby sentences him to prision mayor minimum, Six (6) years and One (1) day to Eight
(8) years, and pay civil indemnity of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00).53
The trial court declared that based on the evidence of the prosecution that petitioner pushed the
victim towards the vacant house and sexually abused her, petitioner acted with discernment. It
also considered petitioner’s declaration that he had been a consistent honor student.54
Petitioner appealed the decision to the CA, where he averred the following in his Brief as
appellant therein:
I WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER, WHO WAS A MINOR ABOVE 9 YEARS BUT BELOW 15 YEARS OF
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES OF THE
TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINING WITNESS WITH THAT OF THE MEDICAL REPORT ON THE FACTUAL
ALLEGATION OF BLEEDING.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT GAVE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESS TEOFISTO BUCUD WHO HAS REASON TO FABRICATE A SCENARIO AGAINST ACCUSED-
APPELLANT BECAUSE HE HAS PERSONAL VENDETTA AGAINST THE LATTER’S FAMILY/RELATIVES.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE THEORY OF THE PROSECUTION OF RAPE BY
HAVING CARNAL KNOWLEDGE, BEING CONTRARY TO THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE.55
The CA rendered judgment affirming the decision with modification as to the penalty meted on
him.
WHEREFORE, the decision subject of the instant appeal is hereby MODIFIED in that the accused-
appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional medium as the minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium
as the maximum. Additionally, the accused-appellant is ordered to pay the complaining witness
the amount of ₱50,000 by way of moral damages and ₱20,000 by way of exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.56
Petitioner filed a Motion for the Reconsideration,57contending that the prosecution failed to
adduce proof that he acted with discernment; hence, he should be acquitted. The appellate court
denied the motion in a Resolution58 dated November 12, 2004 on the following finding:
As regards the issue of whether the accused-appellant acted with discernment, his conduct during
and after the "crime" betrays the theory that as a minor, the accused-appellant does not have the
mental faculty to grasp the propriety and consequences of the act he made. As correctly pointed
out by the prosecution, the fact that forthrightly upon discovery, the accused-appellant fled the
scene and hid in his grandmother’s house intimates that he knew that he did something that
merits punishment.
Contrary to the urgings of the defense, the fact that the accused-appellant is a recipient of several
academic awards and is an honor student further reinforces the finding that he [is] possessed [of]
intelligence well beyond his years and is thus poised to distinguish, better at least than other
minors his age could, which conduct is right and which is morally reprehensible.59
Petitioner now raises the following issues and arguments in the instant petition before this Court:
ISSUES
I
WHETHER OR NOT EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT PETITIONER BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
II
AGE AT THE TIME OF THE CRIME, ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT.
III
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
ARGUMENTS
I
THE MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN THE TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINING WITNESS WITH
THE MEDICAL REPORT BELIE THE FINDING OF RAPE.
II
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT IS NOT A CREDIBLE WITNESS.
III
PETITIONER ACTED WITHOUT DISCERNMENT.
IV
THE TESTIMONY RELIED UPON BY THE PROSECUTION IS HEARSAY.
V
 THE COMPLAINT IS FABRICATED.
VI
PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW.60
The issues raised by the petitioner in this case may be summarized as follows: (1) whether he was
deprived of his right to a preliminary investigation; (2) whether he had carnal knowledge of the
private complainant, and if in the affirmative, whether he acted with discernment in perpetrating
the crime; (3) whether the penalty imposed by the appellate court is correct; and (4) whether he
is liable to pay moral damages to the private complainant.
On the first issue, petitioner avers that he was deprived of his right to a preliminary investigation
before the Information against him was filed.
On the second issue, petitioner claims that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that he had carnal knowledge of Debbielyn. He insists that her testimony is inconsistent on
material points. He points out that she claimed to have felt pain in her vagina when petitioner
inserted his penis to the point that she cried; this, however, is negated by Dr. Castillo’s report
stating that there was no evidence of injury on the victim’s external genitalia. Petitioner maintains
that as against the victim’s testimony and that of Dr. Castillo’s report, the latter should prevail.
According to petitioner, mere touching of the female organ will not suffice as factual basis of
conviction for consummated rape. Moreover, the victim’s testimony lacks credibility in view of her
admission that, while she was being allegedly ravished by him, there were passersby along the
street. Besides, petitioner avers, an abrasion may be caused by an invasion of the body through
the protective covering of the skin. Petitioner insists that the prosecution failed to prove the
cause of the abrasion.
Petitioner also claims that the victim was tutored or coached by her parents on her testimony
before the trial court. Dr. Castillo testified that when she interviewed Debbielyn, the latter
admitted to her that she did not understand the meaning of the word "rape" and its Filipino
translation, "hinalay," and that the genital examination of the girl was at the insistence of the
latter’s parents.
Petitioner avers that Teofisto Bucud’s testimony has no probative weight because and had an ill-
motive to testify against him. Petitioner stated, on cross-examination, that his uncle, Boy, had the
house rented by Teofisto demolished. Petitioner avers that the witness persuaded the victim’s
parents to complain against him, as gleaned from the testimony of Police Investigator Milagros
Carroso.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) avers that petitioner was subjected to an
inquest investigation under Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
gleaned from the Certification of the City Prosecutor incorporated in the Information. It avers that
the absence of external injuries does not negate rape; neither is it necessary that lacerations be
found on the hymen of a victim. Rape is consummated if there is some degree of penetration
within the vaginal surface. Corroborative evidence is not necessary to prove rape. As long as the
testimony of the victim is credible, such testimony will suffice for conviction of consummated
rape. When the victim testified that she was raped, she was, in effect, saying all that is necessary
to prove that rape was consummated. Petitioner’s evidence to prove ill-motive on the part of
Teofisto Bucud in testifying against him is at best flimsy. Moreover, it is incredible that the victim
and her parents would charge petitioner with rape solely on Teofisto’s proddings.
The OSG insists that the petitioner acted with discernment before, during, and after the rape
based on the undisputed facts. The submission of the OSG follows:
Petitioner argues that since he was only 12 years old at the time of the alleged rape incident, he is
presumed to have acted without discernment under paragraph 3 of Article 12 of the Revised
Penal Code. Under said provision, the prosecution has the burden of proving that he acted with
discernment. In the instant case, petitioner insists that there was no evidence presented by the
prosecution to show that he acted with discernment. Hence, he should be exempt from criminal
liability.
Petitioner’s arguments are bereft of merit.
Discernment, as used in Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code is defined as follows: "the
discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor
under fifteen (15) years of age but over nine (9), who commits an act prohibited by law, is his
mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong" (People v. Doquena, 68
Phil. 580 [1939]). For a minor above nine but below fifteen years of age, he must discern the
rightness or wrongness of the effects of his act (Guevarra v. Almodova, G.R. No. 75256, January
26, 1989).
Professor Ambrocio Padilla, in his annotation of Criminal Law (p. 375, 1998 Ed.), writes that
"discernment is more than the mere understanding between right and wrong. Rather, it means
the mental capacity of a minor between 9 and 15 years of age to fully appreciate the
consequences of his unlawful act" (People v. Navarro, [CA] [51 O.G. 4062]). Hence, in judging
whether a minor accused acted with discernment, his mental capacity to understand the
difference between right and wrong, which may be known and should be determined by
considering all the circumstances disclosed by the record of the case, his appearance, his attitude
and his behavior and conduct, not only before and during the commission of the act, but also after
and even during the trial should be taken into consideration (People v. Doquena, supra).
In the instant case, petitioner’s actuations during and after the rape incident, as well as his
behavior during the trial showed that he acted with discernment.
The fact appears undisputed that immediately after being discovered by the prosecution’s
witness, Teofisto Bucud, petitioner immediately stood up and ran away. Shortly thereafter, when
his parents became aware of the charges against him and that private complainant’s father was
looking for him, petitioner went into hiding. It was not until the Barangay Tanod came to arrest
him in his grandmother’s house that petitioner came out in the open to face the charges against
him. His flight as well as his act of going into hiding clearly conveys the idea that he was fully
aware of the moral depravity of his act and that he knew he committed something wrong.
Otherwise, if he was indeed innocent or if he was not least aware of the moral consequences of
his acts, he would have immediately confronted private complainant and her parents and denied
having sexually abused their daughter.
During the trial, petitioner submitted documentary evidence to show that he was a consistent
honor student and has, in fact, garnered several academic awards. This allegation further
bolstered that he acted with discernment, with full knowledge and intelligence. The fact that
petitioner was a recipient of several academic awards and was an honor student further
reinforces the finding that he was possessed of intelligence well beyond his years and thus was
able to distinguish, better than other minors of his age could, which conduct is right and which is
morally reprehensible. Hence, although appellant was still a minor of twelve years of age, he
possessed intelligence far beyond his age. It cannot then be denied that he had the mental
capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong. This is important in cases where
the accused is minor. It is worthy to note that the basic reason behind the enactment of the
exempting circumstances under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code is the complete absence of
intelligence, freedom of action, or intent on the part of the accused. In expounding on intelligence
as the second element of dolus, the Supreme Court has stated: "The second element of dolus is
intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish
a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because … the infant has no intelligence, the law
exempts (him) from criminal liability" (Guevarra v. Aldomovar, 169 SCRA 476 [1989], at page 482).
The foregoing circumstances, from the time the incident up to the time the petitioner was being
held for trial, sufficiently satisfied the trial court that petitioner acted with discernment before,
during and after the rape incident. For a boy wanting in discernment would simply be gripped
with fear or keep mum. In this case, petitioner was fully aware of the nature and illegality of his
wrongful act. He should not, therefore, be exempted from criminal liability. The prosecution has
sufficiently proved that petitioner acted with discernment.61
In reply, petitioner asserts that the only abrasion found by Dr. Castillo was on the peri-anal skin
and not in the labia of the hymen. He further insists that there can be no consummated rape
absent a slight penetration on the female organ. It was incumbent on the prosecution to prove
that the accused acted with discernment but failed. The mere fact that he was an honor student is
not enough evidence to prove that he acted with discernment.
The petition is not meritorious.
On the first issue, petitioner’s contention that he was deprived of his right to a regular preliminary
investigation is barren of factual and legal basis. The record shows that petitioner was lawfully
arrested without a warrant. Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides:
SEC. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. – When a person is lawfully arrested
without a warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary investigation, the complaint
or information may be filed by a prosecutor without need of such investigation provided an
inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing rules. In the absence or unavailability of
an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the offended party or a peace officer directly
with the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or
person.
Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary
investigation in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of his counsel. Notwithstanding the
waiver, he may apply for bail and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days
from its inception.
After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary investigation, the
accused may, within five (5) days from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary
investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his defense as provided for in this Rule.
As gleaned from the Certification62 of the City Prosecutor which was incorporated in the
Information, petitioner did not execute any waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code before the Information was filed. He was arraigned with the assistance of counsel on
October 10, 2002, and thereafter filed a petition for bail.63 Petitioner’s failure to file a motion for a
preliminary investigation within five days from finding out that an Information had been filed
against him effectively operates as a waiver of his right to such preliminary investigation. 64
On the second issue, a careful review of the records shows that the prosecution adduced evidence
to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner had carnal knowledge of the private
complainant as charged in the Information. In People v. Morata65 the Court ruled that
penetration, no matter how slight, or the mere introduction of the male organ into the labia of
the pudendum, constitutes carnal knowledge. Hence, even if the penetration is only slight, the
fact that the private complainant felt pains, points to the conclusion that the rape was
consummated.66
From the victim’s testimony, it can be logically concluded that petitioner’s penis touched the
middle part of her vagina and penetrated the labia of the pudendum. She may not have had
knowledge of the extent of the penetration; however, her straightforward testimony shows that
the rape passed the stage of consummation.67 She testified that petitioner dragged her behind a
pile of hollow blocks near the vacant house and ordered her to lie down. He then removed her
shorts and panty and spread her legs. He then mounted her and inserted his penis into her vagina:
Fiscal Barrera:
Q: From what time up to what time?
A: From 12:00 o’clock noon up to 6:00 p.m.
Q: September 24, 2002 and going over the calendar, it was Tuesday. Did you go to school from
12:00 o’clock noon up to 6:00 p.m.?
A: Yes, Sir, on the same date I went to school.
Q: At about 6:00 p.m., Sept. 24, 2002, where were you?
A: I went home.
Q: And by whom you are referring to your house at 1-C Carnation St., R. Higgins, Maricaban, Pasay
City?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And what did you do after you went home?
A: I changed my clothes and then I proceeded to the store of my mother.
Q: And where is that store of your mother where you went?
A: It is near our house, walking distance.
Q: What is your mother selling in that store?
A: She sells quail eggs. Q: What happened after you cried and when somebody heard you crying?
Q: And were you able to immediately go to the store of your mother where she was selling quail A: Totoy ran away.
eggs? Q: After Totoy ran away, what happened next?
A: Yes, sir. A: When Totoy ran away, I was left and Kuya Teofe told me to tell the matter to my parents.
Q: And that was past 6:00 p.m. already? Q: Did you tell your parents what Totoy did to you?
A: Yes, sir. A: Yes, Sir.68
Q: And what happened when you went to the store where your mother is selling quail eggs past On cross-examination, the victim was steadfast in her declarations:
6:00 p.m.?
ATTY. BALIAD:
A: My mother asked me to bring home something.
Q: Again, in what particular position were you placed by Totoy when he inserted his penis inside
Q: What were these things you were asked by your mother to bring home? your vagina?
A: The things she used in selling. A: I was lying down.
Q: And did you obey what your mother told you to bring home something? Q: Aside from lying down, how was your body positioned at that time?
A: Yes, Sir. A: He placed on top of me.
Q: And what happened to you in going to your house? Q: After he placed on top of you, what else did he do to you, if any?
A: Totoy pulled me. A: He started to kiss me and then he inserted his penis inside my vagina.
Q: Pulled you where? Q: Did you feel his penis coming in into your vagina?
A: Totoy pulled me towards an uninhabited house. A: Yes, Sir.
Q: What happened after Totoy pulled you in an uninhabited house? Q: Are you sure that his penis was inserted inside your vagina?
A: He told me to lie down on the cement. A: Yes, Sir.69
Q: What happened after he laid you down on the cement? When questioned on cross-examination whether she could distinguish a vagina from an anus, the
A: He removed my shorts and panty. He also removed his shorts. victim declared that she could and proceeded to demonstrate. She reiterated that the penis of
Q: After Totoy removed your shorts and panty and he also removed his shorts, what happened petitioner penetrated her vagina, thus, consummating the crime charged:
next? Atty. Baliad:
A: He inserted his penis inside my vagina. Q: Do you recall having stated during the last hearing that the accused, Neil Llave or "Totoy"
Q: What did you feel when Totoy inserted his penis inside your vagina? inserted his penis in your vagina, do you recall that?
A: It was painful. A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Aside from inserting his penis inside your vagina, what else did you do to you? Q: And likewise, you testified that you feel that the penis of Neil entered your vagina?
A: He kissed me on my lips. A: Yes, Sir.
Q: After Totoy inserted his penis inside your vagina and kissed you on your lips, what did you do? Q: Could you distinguish vagina from your anus?
A: I cried. A: Yes, Sir.
Q: What happened when you were crying when he inserted his penis inside your vagina and Q: Where is your "pepe"?
kissed you on your lips. What happened next? A: (Witness pointing to her vagina.)
A: Somebody heard me crying. Q: Where is your anus?
Q: Who heard you crying? A: (Witness pointing at her back, at the anus.)
A: Kuya Teofe, Sir.
Q: In your statement, am I correct to say that Neil, the accused in this case penetrated only in with the allegation if the minor victim that she was sexually abused on September 24. 2002 at
your vagina and not in your anus? around 6:00 p.m.?
A: Yes, Sir. Atty. Baliad:
Q: So that, your anus was not even touched by the accused neither by his penis touched any part Objection, Your Honor. The one who narrated the incident is the mother.
of your anus? Court:
A: He did not insert anything on my anus, Sir.70 What is your objection?
While it is true that Dr. Castillo did not find any abrasion or laceration in the private complainant’s Atty. Baliad:
genitalia, such fact does not negate the latter’s testimony the petitioner had carnal knowledge of
The objection, Your Honor, is the question propounded is that it was the minor who made the
her. The absence of abrasions and lacerations does not disprove sexual abuses, especially when
complaint regarding the allegation.
the victim is a young girl as in this case.71 According to Dr. Castillo, the hymen is elastic and is
capable of stretching and reverting to its original form.72 The doctor testified that her report is Fiscal Barrera:
compatible with the victim’s testimony that she was sexually assaulted by petitioner: The answer were provided…..
Atty. Baliad: Court:
Q: Do you recall having stated during the last hearing that the accused, Neil Llave or "Totoy" The doctor is being asked whether or not her findings is compatible with the complaint of the
inserted his penis in your vagina, do you recall that? minor. Overruled. Answer.
A: Yes, Sir. Witness:
Q: And likewise, you testified that you feel (sic) that the penis of Neil entered your vagina? A It is compatible with the allegation of the minor.
A: Yes, Sir. Fiscal Barrera:
Q: Could you distinguish vagina from your anus? Confronting you again with your two (2) medico-genital documents, the Provincial and Final
A: Yes, Sir. Report mark[ed] in evidence as Exhs. B and C, at the lower portion of these two exhibits there
appears to be a signature above the typewritten word, Mariella Castillo, M.D., whose signature is
Q: Where is your "pepe"?
that doctor?
A: (Witness pointing to her vagina.)
A Both are my signatures, Sir.73
Q: Where is your anus?
Dr. Castillo even testified that the abrasion near the private complainant’s anal orifice could have
A: (Witness pointing at her back, at the anus.) been caused by petitioner while consummating the crime charged:
Q: In your statement, am I correct to say that Neil, the accused in this case penetrated only in Fiscal Barrera:
your vagina and not in your anus?
Q: With your answer, would it be possible doctor that in the process of the male person inserting
A: Yes, Sir. his erect penis inside the vagina, in the process, would it be possible that this abrasion could have
Q: So that, your anus was not even touched by the accused neither by his penis touched any part been caused while in the process of inserting the penis into the vagina touch the portion of the
of your anus? anus where you find the abrasion?
A: He did not insert anything on my anus, Sir. A: It is possible, Sir.
xxxx Q: Now, are you aware, in the course of your examination, that the alleged perpetrator is a 12-
Fiscal Barrera: year-old minor?
Q: Based on your testimony doctor, and the medico genital examination propounded on the A: I only fount it out, Sir, when I testified.
report that the victim here, Debbielyn Santos is complaining that around 6:00 in the evening of Q: Do you still recall your answer that a 12-year-old boy could cause an erection of his penis?
September 24, 2002, she was sexually abused and that on the following day, September 25, you A: Yes, sir.
interviewed her and stated to you that her genitalia was hurting and in binocular (sic) "masakit
Q: To enlight[en] us doctor, we, not being a physician, at what age could a male person can have
ang pepe ko, ni-rape ako," would your findings as contained in this Exh. B and C be compatible
erection?
A: Even infants have an erection.74
Petitioner’s contention that the private complainant was coached by her parents into testifying is
barren of merit. It bears stressing that the private complainant testified in a straightforward and
spontaneous manner and remained steadfast despite rigorous and intensive cross-examination by
the indefatigable counsel of the petitioner. She spontaneously pointed to and identified the
petitioner as the perpetrator.
It is inconceivable that the private complainant, then only a seven- year old Grade II pupil, could
have woven an intricate story of defloration unless her plaint was true.75 The Presiding Judge of
the trial court observed and monitored the private complainant at close range as she testified and
found her testimony credible. Case law is that the calibration by the trial court of the evidence on
record and its assessment of the credibility of witnesses, as well as its findings of facts and the
conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded conclusive effect by this Court unless facts
and circumstances of substance were overlooked, misconstrued or misinterpreted, which, if
considered would merit a nullification or reversal of the decision. We have held that when the
offended party is young and immature, from the age of thirteen to sixteen, courts are inclined to
give credence to their account of what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability
but also the shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed if the matter to which
they testified is not true.76
Neither do we lend credence to petitioner’s claim that the charge against him is but a fabrication
and concoction of the private complainant’s parents. Indeed, petitioner admitted in no uncertain
terms that the spouses had no ill-motive against him. Thus, Neil testified as follows:
Fiscal Barrera:
Q: As you testified earlier that you have played post cards with Debbielyn Santos alias Lyn-lyn and
you have no quarrel or misunderstanding with Lyn-lyn. Do you know of any reason why Lyn-lyn
complaint (sic) against you for sexual abuse?
A: I don’t know of any reason, Sir.
Q: You also testified that you do not have any quarrel or misunderstanding with Lyn-lyn’s parents,
spouses Domingo Santos, Jr. and Marilou Santos, do you think of any reason as to why they would
file a complaint against you for molesting their 7-year-old daughter?
A: I do not know of any reason why they filed a complaint against me, Sir.
Fiscal Barrera:
That would be all, Your Honor.77
There is no evidence that the parents of the offended party coached their daughter before she
testified. No mother or father would stoop so low as to subject their daughter to the tribulations
and the embarrassment of a public trial knowing that such a traumatic experience would damage
their daughter’s psyche and mar her life if the charge is not true.78
On the other hand, when the parents learned that their daughter had been assaulted by
petitioner, Domingo tried to locate the offender and when he failed, he and his wife reported the
matter to the barangay authorities. This manifested their ardent desire to have petitioner indicted
and punished for his delictual acts.
That petitioner ravished the victim not far from the street where residents passed by does not
negate the act of rape committed by petitioner. Rape is not a respecter of time and place. The
crime may be committed by the roadside and even in occupied premises. 79 The presence of
people nearby does not deter rapists from committing the odious act.80 In this case, petitioner
was so daring that he ravished the private complainant near the house of Teofisto even as
commuters passed by, impervious to the fact that a crime was being committed in their midst.
Case law has it that in view of the intrinsic nature of rape, the only evidence that can be offered to
prove the guilt of the offender is the testimony of the offended party. Even absent a medical
certificate, her testimony, standing alone, can be made the basis of conviction if such testimony is
credible. Corroborative testimony is not essential to warrant a conviction of the perpetrator.81
Thus, even without the testimony of Teofisto Bucud, the testimonies of the offended party and
Dr. Castillo constitute evidence beyond reasonable doubt warranting the conviction of petitioner.
Teofisto’s testimony cannot be discredited by petitioner simply because his uncle caused the
demolition of the house where Teofisto and his family were residing. It bears stressing that
Teofisto gave a sworn statement to the police investigator on the very day that the petitioner
raped Debbielyn and narrated how he witnessed the crime being committed by the petitioner. 82
In the absence of proof of improper motive, the presumption is that Teofisto had no ill-motive to
so testify, hence, his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.83
The trial court correctly ruled that the petitioner acted with discernment when he had carnal
knowledge of the offended party; hence, the CA cannot be faulted for affirming the trial court’s
ruling.1âwphi1
Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person over nine years of age
and under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability, unless he acted with discernment. The basic
reason behind the exempting circumstance is complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action
of the offender which is an essential element of a felony either by dolus or by culpa. Intelligence is
the power necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit
act.84 On the other hand, discernment is the mental capacity to understand the difference
between right and wrong. The prosecution is burdened to prove that the accused acted with
discernment by evidence of physical appearance, attitude or deportment not only before and
during the commission of the act, but also after and during the trial.85 The surrounding
circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong.
Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minor’s cunning and
shrewdness.
In the present case, the petitioner, with methodical fashion, dragged the resisting victim behind
the pile of hollow blocks near the vacant house to insure that passersby would not be able to
discover his dastardly acts. When he was discovered by Teofisto Bucud who shouted at him, the
petitioner hastily fled from the scene to escape arrest. Upon the prodding of his father and her
mother, he hid in his grandmother’s house to avoid being arrested by policemen and remained
thereat until barangay tanods arrived and took him into custody.
The petitioner also testified that he had been an outstanding grade school student and even
received awards. While in Grade I, he was the best in his class in his academic subjects. He
represented his class in a quiz bee contest.86 At his the age of 12, he finished a computer course.
In People v. Doqueña,87 the Court held that the accused-appellant therein acted with discernment
in raping the victim under the following facts:
Taking into account the fact that when the accused Valentin Doqueña committed the crime in
question, he was a 7th grade pupil in the intermediate school of the municipality of Sual,
Pangasinan, and as such pupil, he was one of the brightest in said school and was a captain of a
company of the cadet corps thereof, and during the time he was studying therein he always
obtain excellent marks, this court is convinced that the accused, in committing the crime, acted
with discernment and was conscious of the nature and consequences of his act, and so also has
this court observed at the time said accused was testifying in his behalf during the trial of this
case.88
The CA ordered petitioner to pay ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱20,000.00 as exemplary
damages. There is no factual basis for the award of exemplary damages. Under Article 2231, of
the New Civil Code, exemplary damages may be awarded if the crime was committed with one or
more aggravating circumstances. In this case, no aggravating circumstance was alleged in the
Information and proved by the People; hence, the award must be deleted.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26962 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that the award of
exemplary damages is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 158057 September 24, 2004
NOE TOLEDO y TAMBOONG, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23742
affirming on appeal, the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Odiongan, Romblon, Branch
82, in Criminal Case No. OD-861, convicting the petitioner of homicide.
In an Information filed in the RTC of Romblon, the petitioner was charged with homicide allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of September 1995, at around 9:30 o’clock in the evening, in
Barangay Libertad, municipality of Odiongan, province of Romblon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with a bolo, one RICKY F. GUARTE,
which causes (sic) his untimely death.
Contrary to law.3
In due course, the prosecution adduced evidence against the petitioner which was synthesized by
the appellate court as follows:
On September 16, 1995, appellant went to a black-smith who made the design of his bolo. When
he went home to Tuburan, Odiongan, Romblon late in the afternoon (TSN, September 4, 1998, p.
2), appellant saw the group of Lani Famero, Michael Fosana, Rex Cortez and Ricky Guarte drinking
gin at the house of the Spouses Manuel and Eliza Guarte, Ricky’s parents. Appellant’s house is
about five (5) meters away from the house of Spouses Guarte. Appellant requested the group of
Ricky to refrain from making any noise. Thereupon, appellant proceeded inside his house and
went to sleep (ibid., p. 3). Around 9:00 p.m., Gerardo Faminia, Eliza Guarte’s brother arrived at the
Guarte house and asked for any left-over food (TSN, August 5, 1998, p. 3). Eliza prepared dinner
for him and after Gerardo finished eating, he went home accompanied by Ricky (TSN, April 26,
1996, p. 5). Gerardo’s home is about twelve (12) meters away from the Guarte home (TSN,
February 17, 1997, p. 11). Minutes later, Ricky came back and together with Lani, Rex and
Michael, went to sleep at the Guarte house. They had not laid down for long when they heard
stones being hurled at the roof of the house. The stoning was made three (3) times (TSN, August
5, 1998, pp. 2-3). Ricky rose from bed and peeped through a window. He saw appellant stoning
their house. Ricky went out of the house and proceeded to appellant’s house. Ricky asked
appellant, his uncle, why he was stoning their house. Appellant did not answer but met Ricky at
the doorstep of his (appellant’s) house (TSN, April 26, 1996, p. 6; August 5, 1998, pp. 4-5) and,
without any warning, stabbed Ricky on the abdomen with a bolo (TSN, August 5, 1998, p. 8). Eliza
had followed his son Ricky and upon seeing that Ricky was stabbed, shouted for help (TSN,
February 17, 1997, p. 13). Lani heard Eliza’s cry for help and immediately rushed outside the
house. Lani saw Ricky leaning on the ground and supporting his body with his hands. Lani helped
Ricky stand up and brought him to the main road. Lani asked Ricky who stabbed him and Ricky
replied that it was appellant who stabbed him. Then Docloy Cortez arrived at the scene on board
his tricycle. Accordingly, Ricky was put on the tricycle and taken to the Romblon Provincial
Hospital (TSN, January 19, 1998, pp. 4-6).
At the Romblon Provincial Hospital, Dr. Noralie Fetalvero operated on Ricky that very night. Ricky
had sustained one (1) stab wound but due to massive blood loss, he died while being operated on
(TSN, November 24, 1997, pp. 2, 6-7). Dr. Fetalvero issued a Medico-Legal Certificate showing the
injuries sustained by Ricky, thus:
Stab wound, left chest with gastric & transverse colon evisceration measuring 6 cms. long,
irregular-edged at 8th ICS, left penetrating (operative findings):
(1) abdominal cavity perforating the stomach (thru & thru) and the left lobe of the liver
(2) thoracic cavity thru the left dome of the diaphragm perforating the lower lobe of the left lung.
…
(Exhibit C)
The Certificate of Death issued by Dr. Fetalvero stated the cause of Ricky’s death as:
CAUSES OF DEATH:
Immediate cause : a. Cardiorespiratory Arrest
Antecedent cause : b. Hypovolemic shock
Underlying cause : c. Multiple thoraco-abdominal
injury 2º to stab wound
(Exhibit B)4
The Evidence of the Petitioner
The petitioner adduced evidence that at around 5:00 p.m. on September 16, 1995, he was on his
way home at Tuburan, Odiongan, Romblon. He saw his nephew, Ricky Guarte, and the latter’s
friends, Michael Fosana, Rex Cortez, and Lani Famero, about five meters away from his house,
having a drinking spree. He ordered them not to make loud noises, and they obliged. He then
went to his house, locked the door with a nail, and went to sleep. However, he was awakened at
around 9:30 p.m. by loud noises coming from Ricky and his three companions. He peeped through
the window grills of his house and admonished them not to make any loud noises. Ricky, who was
then already inebriated, was incensed; he pulled out a balisong, pushed the door, and threatened
to stab the petitioner. The petitioner pushed their sala set against the door to block the entry of
Ricky, but the latter continued to push the door open with his hands and body. The petitioner ran
to the upper portion of their house and got his bolo.5 He returned to the door and pushed it with
all his might using his left hand. He then pointed his bolo, which was in his right hand, towards
Ricky. The bolo accidentally hit Ricky on the stomach, and the latter lost his balance and fell to the
floor. The petitioner, thereafter, surrendered to the barangay captain at 11:00 a.m. on September
17, 1995.
After trial, the court rendered judgment finding the petitioner guilty as charged. The fallo of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, NOE TOLEDO is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of homicide with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and is meted the
indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor minimum, as
minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum.
Accused is condemned to pay the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil liability to the heirs of the victim.6
The trial court did not give credence and probative weight to the testimony of the petitioner that
his bolo accidentally hit the victim on the stomach.
On appeal in the CA, the petitioner raised the following issue in his brief as appellant:
WHETHER OR NOT ACCUSED-APPELLANT CAN BE CRIMINALLY HELD LIABLE FOR THE ACCIDENTAL
DEATH OF RICKY GUARTE7
Invoking Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, the petitioner claimed that he stabbed
the victim by accident; hence, he is exempt from criminal liability for the death of the victim.
The CA rendered judgment affirming the assailed decision with modifications. The CA also denied
the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration thereof. The appellate court ruled that the petitioner
failed to prove that he acted in self-defense.
Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the instant petition for review, contending that the CA erred in not
finding that he acted in self-defense when he stabbed the victim by accident and prays that he be
acquitted of the crime charged.
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
homicide based on the evidence on record.
The petitioner contends that the CA committed a reversible error when it affirmed the decision of
the RTC convicting him of homicide, on its finding that he failed to prove that he acted in
complete self-defense when the victim was hit by his bolo. The petitioner insists that he acted in
complete self-defense when his bolo accidentally hit the victim on the stomach.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General asserts that the petitioner failed to prove self-
defense with clear and convincing evidence. Hence, the decision of the CA affirming, on appeal,
the decision of the RTC is correct.
The contention of the petitioner has no merit.
The petitioner testified that his bolo hit the victim accidentally. He asserted in the RTC and in the
CA that he is exempt from criminal liability for the death of the victim under Article 12, paragraph
4 of the Revised Penal Code which reads:
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident
without fault or intention of causing it.
In his brief in the CA, the petitioner argued that:
In the case at bar, with all due respect, contrary to the findings of the lower court, it is our humble
submission that the death of Ricky Guarte was merely a sad and unwanted result of an accident
without fault or intention of causing it on the part of accused-appellant. We submit, there were
clear and indubitable factual indicators overlooked by the lower court, bolstering the theory of
the defense on accidental death.8
However, the petitioner changed gear, so to speak, and now alleges that he acted in self-defense
when he stabbed the victim. As such, he contends, he is not criminally liable under Article 11,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code which reads:
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. – The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances
concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it:
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
The petitioner avers that he was able to prove the essential elements of complete self-defense,
thus:
A close scrutiny of the records of the case would show that the petitioner acted in self-defense.
The essential requisites of self-defense are: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2)
reasonable scrutiny of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself (People vs. Silvano, 350 SCRA 650)9
However, the petitioner also claims that his bolo accidentally hit the stomach of the victim.
It is a matter of law that when a party adopts a particular theory and the case is tried and decided
upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal. The
case will be reviewed and decided on that theory and not approached and resolved from a
different point of view. To permit a party to change his theory on appeal will be unfair to the 2. With due care;
adverse party.10 3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident;
The petitioner is proscribed from changing in this Court, his theory of defense which he adopted 4. Without fault or intention of causing it.
in the trial court and foisted in the CA – by claiming that he stabbed and killed the victim in
To prove his affirmative defense, the petitioner relied solely on his testimony, thus:
complete self-defense. The petitioner relied on Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code
in the trial and appellate courts, but adopted in this Court two divergent theories – (1) that he Q What happened next when Ricky Guarte was able to push through the door and you ran away?
killed the victim to defend himself against his unlawful aggression; hence, is justified under Article A When Ricky Guarte was able to push the door, that is the time I go (sic) downstairs and got my
11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code; (2) that his bolo accidentally hit the victim and is, thus, bolo and at that time the body of Ricky Guarte was at the entrance of the door and accidentally
exempt from criminal liability under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code. the bolo reached him.
It is an aberration for the petitioner to invoke the two defenses at the same time because the said Q Where did you get the bolo?
defenses are intrinsically antithetical.11 There is no such defense as accidental self-defense in the A I got the bolo in the post or wall of our house.
realm of criminal law.
Q Was Ricky Guarte hit the first time you boloed him?
Self-defense under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code necessarily implies a
A Not hacking but accidentally.
deliberate and positive overt act of the accused to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression of
another with the use of reasonable means. The accused has freedom of action. He is aware of the Q What do you mean by accidentally?
consequences of his deliberate acts. The defense is based on necessity which is the supreme and A Because when Ricky Guarte pushed the door and unbalance himself (sic) the bolo which I was
irresistible master of men of all human affairs, and of the law. From necessity, and limited by it, carrying hit him accidentally.
proceeds the right of self-defense. The right begins when necessity does, and ends where it Q Where was he hit by the bolo you were carrying?
ends.12 Although the accused, in fact, injures or kills the victim, however, his act is in accordance
with law so much so that the accused is deemed not to have transgressed the law and is free from A In the stomach.17
both criminal and civil liabilities.13 On the other hand, the basis of exempting circumstances under …
Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code is the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or Q And since you were at the left side of the door, your right hand was at the center part of the
intent, or the absence of negligence on the part of the accused.14 The basis of the exemption in door, correct?
Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code is lack of negligence and intent. The accused
A No, Sir.
does not commit either an intentional or culpable felony. The accused commits a crime but there
is no criminal liability because of the complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute Q Where was your right hand?
free will or voluntariness of the act.15 An accident is a fortuitous circumstance, event or A Holding a bolo.
happening; an event happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the Q Where, in what part of the door?
circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens.16
A Right side.
Self-defense, under Article 11, paragraph 1, and accident, under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the
Q When Ricky Guarte was pushing the door, the door was not opened?
Revised Penal Code, are affirmative defenses which the accused is burdened to prove, with clear
and convincing evidence. Such affirmative defenses involve questions of facts adduced to the trial A It was opened.
and appellate courts for resolution. By admitting killing the victim in self-defense or by accident Q It was opened because you opened the door, correct?
without fault or without intention of causing it, the burden is shifted to the accused to prove such A No, Sir.
affirmative defenses. He should rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness
Q Now, why was it opened?
of that of the prosecution. If the accused fails to prove his affirmative defense, he can no longer
be acquitted. A Because he was pushing it.
The petitioner failed to prove that the victim was killed by accident, without fault or intention on Q With his left hand?
his part to cause it. The petitioner was burdened to prove with clear and convincing evidence, the A With his both hands and body.
essential requisites for the exempting circumstance under Article 12, paragraph 4, viz: Q Now, when he fell down because, according to you, he losses (sic) his balance, the left side of
1. A person is performing a lawful act; the body was the first to fell (sic) down, correct?
A Yes, Sir.
Q You are sure of your answer now Mr. Toledo?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Now, and while holding that bolo, you are doing that in [an] upward position, correct?
A No, Sir, pointing the door.
Q Yes, you are pointing the tip of your bolo to the door upward, correct?
A No, Sir, steady pointing to the door.
Q Now, when the door was opened, your bolo did not hit any part of that door, correct?
A "Ginaiwas ko ang sunrang," meaning I was able to get away from hitting any part of the door.
Q The question Mr. Toledo is simple, while the door was opened and while you were pointing
directly your bolo at the door, not any part of the door hit the bolo (sic), correct?
ATTY. FORMILLEZA:
It was a valid answer, it did not hit any part of the door.
COURT:
Q Whose door did he push?
A My own door.
Q Where were you when he pushed the door?
A Inside our house.19
We find the testimony of the petitioner incredible and barren of probative weight.
First. If the testimony of the petitioner is to be believed, the force of the struggle between him
and the victim would have caused the door to fall on the petitioner. However, the petitioner failed
to adduce real evidence that the door of his house was destroyed and that he sustained any
physical injuries,20 considering that he was only five inches away from the door.
Second. If the door fell to the sala of the house of the petitioner, the victim must have fallen on
top of the door. It is incredible that the bolo of the petitioner could have hit the stomach of the
victim. The claim of the petitioner that he managed to step aside and avoid being crushed by the
door belies his claim that the bolo accidentally hit the victim on the stomach.
Third. When he surrendered to the barangay captain and to the policemen, he failed to relate to
them that his bolo accidentally hit the stomach of the victim:

Answer. Q Now, that very night when you said Ricky Guarte was accidentally hit by your bolo, you did not
surrender to the police, correct?
A No, Sir.
A I surrendered to the barangay captain at one o’clock in Panique, in the afternoon.
PROS. FRADEJAS continuing:
Q Now, you only surrendered to the police when a certain person advised you to surrender,
Q You were only about five inches away from your door while pushing it, correct?
correct?
A Yes, Sir.
A On my own volition, I surrendered to the barangay captain.
Q Now, when the door was pushed already by Ricky Guarte, not any part of your body hit the
Q You did not narrate the incident to the barangay captain whom you have surrendered, correct?
door, correct?
A No, Sir.
A No, Sir.18
Q When you were brought to the municipal jail, you did not also narrate to the police what
The petitioner also testified that the victim was armed with a balisong and threatened to kill him
happened, correct?
as the said victim pushed, with his body and hands, the fragile door of his house:
A No, Sir.
Q Where were you when you saw Ricky went out?
Q You just remained silent thinking of an excuse that happened that evening of September 16,
A I was at the door.
1995, correct?
Q Did Ricky proceed to the door where you were?
A No, Sir.21
A Yes, Sir.
Fourth. There is no evidence that the petitioner surrendered either the bolo that accidentally hit
Q What did he do, if any? the victim or the balisong held by the deceased to the barangay captain or the police authorities.
A He drew his fan knife or balisong and asked me what do you like, I will stab you? Such failure of the petitioner negates his claim that his bolo accidentally hit the stomach of the
Q What did you do? victim and that he acted in self-defense.22

A I told him I have not done you anything wrong, I am only scolding you or telling you not to make Fifth. To prove self-defense, the petitioner was burdened to prove the essential elements thereof,
noise. namely: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the petitioner; (3) employment by him of reasonable means to prevent or repel the
Q What, if any, did Ricky Guarte do to you? aggression. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstances of
A He pushed the door. self-defense, whether complete or incomplete.23 Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual,
sudden, and unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or
intimidating attitude.24 We agree with the ruling of the CA that the petitioner failed to prove self-
defense, whether complete or incomplete:
The evidence on record revealed that there is no unlawful aggression on the part of Ricky. While it
was established that Ricky was stabbed at the doorstep of appellant’s house which would give a
semblance of verity to appellant’s version of the incident, such view, however, is belied by the fact
that Ricky arrived at appellant’s house unarmed and had only one purpose in mind, that is, to ask
appellant why he threw stones at his (Ricky’s) house. With no weapon to attack appellant, or
defend himself, no sign of hostility may be deduced from Ricky’s arrival at appellant’s doorstep.
Ricky was not threatening to attack nor in any manner did he manifest any aggressive act that
may have imperiled appellant’s well-being. Ricky’s want of any weapon when he arrived at
appellant’s doorstep is supported by the fact that only one weapon was presented in court, and
that weapon was the bolo belonging to appellant which he used in stabbing Ricky. Thus,
appellant’s version of the events does not support a finding of unlawful aggression. In People vs.
Pletado, the Supreme Court held:
"xxx (F) or aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden, [un]expected attack or
imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude (People vs. Pasco,
Jr., supra, People vs. Rey, 172 SCRA 149 [1989]) and the accused must present proof of positively
strong act of real aggression (Pacificar vs. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA 716 [1983]). Unlawful
aggression must be such as to put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending
himself or of a relative sought to be defended and not an imagined threat."
Appellant was not justified in stabbing Ricky. There was no imminent threat to appellant’s life
necessitating his assault on Ricky. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the
justifying circumstance of self-defense. For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be
an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or
intimidating attitude. In the absence of such element, appellant’s claim of self-defense must fail.
Further, appellant’s plea of self-defense is not corroborated by competent evidence. The plea of
self-defense cannot be justifiably entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate
competent evidence but is in itself extremely doubtful.25
Sixth. With the failure of the petitioner to prove self-defense, the inescapable conclusion is that
he is guilty of homicide as found by the trial court and the CA. He cannot even invoke Article 12,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code.26
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 136844 August 1, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SPO1 RODOLFO CONCEPCION y PERALTA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Appellant seeks the reversal of the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Branch 65, in
Criminal Case No. 9776, finding him guilty of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
On January 22, 1998, an information2 for murder was filed with the trial court charging him with
murder allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about November 24, 1997 between 10:00 and 11:00 o’clock in the evening, in Brgy.
Cut-Cut II, Municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court the said accused, with intent to kill and with treachery, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot with his Armalite rifle Lorenzo Galang hitting him at the
different parts of his body and as a result of which said Lorenzo Galang died instantly.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge, and thereafter trial commenced.
The prosecution relied mainly on the eyewitnesses Maximo Sison, Jr., an employee of Hacienda
Luisita, and Arturo Yarte, a tricycle driver, both of Barangay Cut-cut II, Tarlac City. Other
prosecution witnesses were Orlando Galang, brother of the victim Lorenzo Galang, and Concordia
Galang, his mother.
Both MAXIMO SISON, JR. and ARTURO YARTE testified3 that between 10:00 and 11:00 in the
evening of November 24, 1997, Lorenzo Galang, a resident of their barangay, got involved in a
quarrel at the town plaza. He was brought to the barangay hall for questioning by Barangay
Captain Remigio Capitli.
Shortly after, appellant Rodolfo Concepcion arrived and fired his rifle twice or thrice past the ears
of Lorenzo, who was then sitting, but without injuring him. After that, however, appellant thrust
the barrel of the gun against the abdomen of Lorenzo. Then there was an explosion. Lorenzo was
shot in the thigh. At least three more shots were fired, hitting Lorenzo in the chest. According to
Sison and Yarte, appellant shot Lorenzo deliberately. Lorenzo died instantly.
ORLANDO GALANG, the victim’s brother, recalled that he arrived at the scene of the crime after
Lorenzo was slain.4 According to him, his brother was not brought to the hospital.5 Orlando
testified on the anguish he suffered for having lost his brother. 6
CONCORDIA GALANG, mother of the victim, testified that Lorenzo worked at the Hacienda Luisita
and was earning P1,000 more or less a week.7 According to her, Lorenzo was 27 years old when
he died. He was married and had two children.8 As a result of Lorenzo’s death, the Galang’s
incurred expenses amounting to approximately half a million pesos.9 Concordia Galang presented
a list of these expenses amounting to P257,259,10 but without supporting receipts.
In his defense, appellant RODOLFO CONCEPCION claimed that the shooting was only accidental.
According to him, he was investigating Lorenzo for the latter’s disorderly behavior at the town
plaza when it happened. He said Lorenzo appeared drunk and unruly, and even verbally
challenged him to fight. At this juncture, according to appellant, he fired two shots in the air, but
Lorenzo grabbed the barrel of his gun. The gun accidentally fired and Lorenzo was hit.11
Defense witnesses ESTELITA BALUYOT and MILAGROS VILLEGAS corroborated appellant’s story.
They said they witnessed the incident because they were among the bystanders who saw the
event happen from the time Lorenzo was brought to the barangay hall for investigation until he
was shot.
Estelita and Milagros testified that Lorenzo was seated while being questioned and pacified by
appellant. Appellant was then standing. All of a sudden, according to the lady-witnesses, appellant
fired two warning shots in the air. Lorenzo stood up and grabbed the barrel of the gun which was
then pointed upwards. When it fired, Lorenzo was hit.12
On November 10, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision finding appellant guilty of the crime
of murder. Its fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder punished
and defined by Article 248 in relation to RA 7659, accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of
P50,000.00 for his loss of life; P120,000.00 as expected income; P100,000.00 as moral damages;
and P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees.13
Seasonably, appellant filed his notice of appeal. In his brief, he makes but one assignment of
error:
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE INJURIES SUSTAINED BY THE
DECEASED WERE UNINTENTIONALLY INFLICTED WHILE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS IN THE COURSE
OF PERFORMING HIS LAWFUL DUTY AS A POLICE OFFICER.14
The sole issue in this case is whether appellant is exempt from criminal liability. Under Article 12
(4) of the Revised Penal Code, among those exempted from criminal liability is:
Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident
without fault or intention of causing it.
Well settled is the rule in criminal cases, that the prosecution has the burden of proof to establish
the guilt of the accused.15 However, once the defendant admits the commission of the offense
charged, but raises an exempting circumstance as a defense, the burden of proof is shifted to him.
By invoking mere accident as a defense, appellant now has the burden of proving that he is
entitled to that exempting circumstance under Article 12 (4) of the Code.
The existence of accident must be proved by the appellant to the satisfaction of the court. For this
to be properly appreciated in appellant’s favor, the following requisites must concur: (1) that the
accused was performing a lawful act with due care; (2) that the injury is caused by mere accident;
and (3) that there was no fault or intent on his part to cause the injury.16 Appellant must
convincingly prove the presence of these elements in order to benefit from the exempting
circumstance of accident. However, his defense utterly failed to discharge this burden. Thus, we
find no reversible error in the judgment of the trial court.
By appellant’s own testimony, the victim was unarmed. In contrast, appellant had an armalite and
a handgun. It is highly inconceivable that an unarmed man could pose bodily harm to another who
is heavily armed.
We note, that appellant’s gun discharged several shots that hit vital parts of the victim’s body.
Was the discharge purely accidental? We don’t think so. As observed by the trial court, recklessly
appellant had put his finger on the trigger of his cocked and loaded rifle. In that state, with the
slightest movement of his finger,17 the rifle would fire readily. And it did not just once but several
fires.
Appellant claims that the victim Lorenzo, who was drunk at the time, was brought to the barangay
hall for investigation. Lorenzo became unruly while being questioned, so appellant was
constrained to fire two warning shots in the air to frighten him. However, the latter stood up and
immediately grabbed the nozzle of the gun and pulled it towards him. The gun accidentally went
off and hit Lorenzo in the body. To buttress his claim, appellant rationalizes that he could have
killed Lorenzo immediately while creating trouble at the plaza, if that was indeed his intention.
Since he did not, appellant posits that there was no intent on his part to kill Lorenzo.
But we note patent inconsistencies in his claims. He testified on query by the trial court that when
he was pacifying the victim, his rifle was hanging on his shoulder on a swivel, with its barrel
pointed to the floor. At that instance, the victim grabbed the barrel of the gun which accidentally
fired.18 However, on direct examination by his defense counsel, he testified that the victim
grabbed his rifle only after he had fired the two shots in the air.
His claims do not square with and could not overcome the testimony of prosecution witnesses on
this score. Note that Maximo Sison, Jr., an eyewitness, categorically declared that he saw
appellant shoot the victim with an M-16 armalite.19 On direct examination, Sison testified as
follows:
Q: Earlier, you stated at the time you arrived at the barangay hall, Rodolfo Concepcion was eight
(8) meters away from Lorenzo, at that time Rodolfo Concepcion shot Lorenzo Galang, how far is
Rodolfo Concepcion from Lorenzo Galang?
A: He was near him because he approached him, sir. He was very near.
xxx
Q: How many times did Rodolfo Concepcion shot (sic) Lorenzo Galang?
A: The first firing were two (2) shots, sir.
Q: Was Lorenzo Galang hit?
A: No sir.
Q: At the time Rodolfo Concepcion fired these two (2) shots, according to you, it was near his left
ear?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How far is the barrel from the ear of Lorenzo Galang when he fired those two shots? Will you
indicate by pointing your left ear?
A: Less than a foot, sir.
Q: When you are referring to the barrel of the gun which was pointed at the left ear of Lorenzo,
how far is the barrel of the gun from the ears of Lorenzo?
A: The barrel was "lampas tainga" so Lorenzo was not hit, sir.
Q: What happened after that?
A: He put down and thrust the barrel of the gun toward the stomach of Lorenzo Galang, sir.
Q: After Rodolfo Concepcion thrust the barrel of his gun towards the abdomen of Lorenzo Galang
what else transpired?
A: Because he was hurt he tried to push the barrel of the gun, sir.
Q: What did Lorenzo Galang use in pushing the barrel when Rodolfo Concepcion thrust it towards
the stomach?
A: He just pushed a little bit to remove the barrel of the gun from his abdomen, sir.
Q: After that what happened?
A: After pushing the barrel of the gun simultaneously the firing and hitting Lorenzo at his right
thigh, sir.
Q: What did Lorenzo Galang do after he was hit on the right thigh?
A: Because Lorenzo was seated, he was lifted from his seat, sir.
Q: Incidentally at that time when Rodolfo Concepcion placed the barrel of his gun about a
distance away from the ear of Lorenzo, how far was Lorenzo Galang positioned that time?
A: He was leaning on the chair sir.
Q: What about Rodolfo Concepcion how was he positioned when he fired those first two shots?
A: He was standing, sir.
Q: Now after the right thigh of Lorenzo Galang was hit by third shot what else transpired?
A: He again thrust the barrel of his gun on the chest or towards the chest of Lorenzo and
simultaneously fired the gun.20
The autopsy report corroborates Sison’s testimony that the victim had three gunshot wounds: one
at the right nipple, another at the mid-femur (thighbone), and another above the knee.21
Likewise, Sison’s declaration on material details coincide with those narrated by Arturo Yarte, a
barangay tanod who also witnessed the shooting incident. There is no proof of ill motive on the
part of Sison and Yarte that could have impelled them to falsely testify against appellant. In fact,
Sison was appellant’s childhood friend.22
The trial court found that treachery attended the commission of the crime. As hereafter
explained, however, in this case treachery is only an aggravating and not a qualifying
circumstance.
To constitute treachery (alevosia), two conditions must be present: (1) the employment of means
of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and
(2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.23 Here, treachery was
clearly present considering that the victim was totally unprepared for the barrage of gunshots
made by appellant. It was undisputed that the victim was brought to the barangay hall for
questioning. He had submitted himself to the authority of the barangay officials and to the police
authorities. He was seated, thereby excluding any insinuation that he was violent and unruly. He
was weak from drinking at the time so that he had very little physical ability to cause harm to
anyone, more so in the presence of the barangay captain, barangay tanod and a police officer in
the person of appellant.24
From the circumstances of the case, the Court agrees with the prosecution that appellant
consciously and purposely adopted the means of attack to insure the execution of the crime
without risk to himself.
However, we note that treachery, though stated in the information, was not alleged with
specificity as qualifying the killing to murder. Following People vs. Alba, G.R. No. 130523, January
29, 2002, the information should state not only the designation of the offense and the acts and
omissions constituting it, but should also specify the qualifying and aggravating circumstances.
Since the information in this case failed to specify treachery as a circumstance qualifying the
killing to murder, under the present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,25 treachery has to be
considered a generic aggravating circumstance only. Consequently, the crime committed by
appellant is homicide and not murder.
Further, we find that the trial court misappreciated as an aggravating circumstance the fact that
appellant was a policeman on duty at the time of the killing. The information charging appellant
bears no mention of this aggravating circumstance.1âwphi1 Pursuant to the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure that took effect on December 1, 2000, every complaint or information must
state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances.26 This provision may be
given retroactive effect in the light of the well-settled rule that statutes regulating the procedure
of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage.27 The aggravating circumstance of abuse of official position, not having been
alleged in the information, could thus not be appreciated to increase appellant’s liability.
At any rate, appellant’s immediate surrender to police authorities after the shooting should be
credited in his favor as a mitigating circumstance, pursuant to Article 13 (7) of the Revised Penal
Code.28
In sum, we find appellant guilty of homicide. The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. There being one mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender and one aggravating circumstance of treachery, the penalty should be imposed in its
medium period.1âwphi1 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant’s sentence should
be within the range of prision mayor as minimum, and the medium period of reclusion temporal
as maximum.
As to the award of damages, the trial court offered no explanation for the award of P120,000 as
expected income. This figure is without basis. The victim’s lost earnings are to be computed
according to the formula adopted by the Court in several decided cases, to wit:
Net earning capacity = 2/3 x (80-age of the a reasonable portion
victim at the time of x of the annual net
his death) income which would
have been received by
the heirs for support29
Lorenzo was 27 years old at the time of his death. His mother testified that he was earning P1,000
a week during his lifetime or an annual income of P48,000. In the absence of proof of his living
expenses, his net income is deemed to be 50 percent of his gross income.30 Using the above
formula, we fix the indemnity for loss of earning capacity of Lorenzo at P848,000, thus:
2 (80-27)
Net earning capacity = x [P48,000 - P24,000]
3 were killed; that Roberto Baculi was not a member of the group who killed the Americans, but the
2 (53)
= x P24,000
3 bury the corpses.
= 35.33 x P24,000
= P848,000
We find the award of P50,000 as death indemnity to the heirs of the deceased to be in accordance
with existing jurisprudence.31 This civil indemnity is automatically granted to the heirs of the
victim without need of any evidence other than the fact of the commission of the crime.32 As for
moral damages, the amount should be reduced to P50,000 also in accordance with existing
jurisprudence.33 The award of P10,000 as attorney’s fees is sufficient and justified.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Tarlac, Branch 65, in Criminal Case No.
9776, convicting appellant Rodolfo Concepcion of the crime of murder, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Appellant is found guilty of the crime of homicide and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum and
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. He is
also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as
moral damages, P848,000 as lost earnings, P10,000 as attorney’s fees, and the costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 1352 March 29, 1905
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appelle,
vs.
APOLONIO CABALLEROS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Hipolito Magsalin for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.
MAPA, J.:
The defendants have been sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Cebu to the penalty of
seven years of presidio mayor as accessories after the fact in the crime of assassination or murder
perpetrated on the persons of the American school-teachers Louis A. Thomas, Clyde O. France,
John E. Wells, and Ernest Eger, because, without having taken part in the said crime as principals
or as accomplices, they took part in the burial of the corpses of the victims in order to conceal the
crime.
The evidence does not justify, in our opinion, this sentence. As regards Roberto Baculi, although
he confessed to having assisted in the burial of the corpses, it appears that he did so because he
was compelled to do so by the murderers of the four teachers. And not only does the defendant
affirm this, but he is corroborated by the only eyewitness to the crime, Teodoro Sabate, who, by
the way, is a witness for the prosecution. This witness says he was present when the Americans
he was in a banana plantation on his property gathering some bananas; that when he heard the
shots he began to run; that he was, however, seen by Damaso and Isidoro, the leaders of the
band; that the latter called to him and striking him with the butts of their guns they forced him to
The Penal Code exempts from liability any person who performs the act by reason of irresistible
force (par. 9, art. 8). Baculi acted, doubtless, under such circumstances when he executed the acts
which are charged against him.
As regards the other defendant, Apolonio Caballeros, there is no proof that he took any part in
any way in the execution of the crime with which he has been charged; there is conclusive proof
to the contrary, since Baculi, as well as one of the witnesses for the prosecution, Teodoro Sabate,
expressly declare that he, Caballeros, did not take any part in the burial of the aforesaid corpses,
nor was he even in the place of the occurrence when the burial took place. The confession of his
supposed liability and guilt, made before an official of the division of information of the
Constabulary, Enrique Calderon, as the latter states when testifying as a witness, can not be
considered as legal proof, because the same witness says that Roberto Baculi was the only one of
the defendants who made a confession to him voluntarily. It appears besides, from the
statements of another witness for the prosecution, Meliton Covarrubias, that the confession of
Apolonio Caballeros was made through the promise made to him and to the other defendants
that nothing would be done to them. Confessions which do not appear to have been made freely
and voluntarily, without force, intimidation, or promise of pardon, can not be accepted as proof
on a trial. (Sec. 4, Act No. 619 of the Philippine Commission).
The fact of the defendants not reporting to the authorities the perpetration of the crime, which
seems to be one of the motives for the conviction and which the court below takes into
consideration in his judgment, is not punished by the Penal Code and therefore that can not
render the defendants criminally liable according to law.
By virtue, then, of the above considerations, and with a reversal of the judgment appealed from,
we acquit the defendants, appellants, with the costs de oficio in both instances. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-54414 July 9, 1984
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EUSTAQUIO LORENO y MALAGA and JIMMY MARANTAL y LONDETE, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Reynaldo Herrera for accused-appellants.
CONCEPCION JR., J.:
In an information filed before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, accused Eustaquio
Loreno y Malaga and Jimmy Marantal y Londete were charged with tile crime of Robbery with
Double Rape, committed as follows:
That on or about the 7th of January, 1978, in the Barangay of Magsaysay, Municipality of
Libmanan, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, together with John Doe, Jose Doe, Richard Doe, Peter Doe,
Charlie Doe, and Ricky Doe, who are still at large, armed with firearms, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain and rob, taking
advantage of nighttime to better accomplish their purpose, did then and there were Ifully
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and use violence and intimidation upon the person of
Elias Monge by tying his two hands and the hands of the members of his fully and on the occasion
hereof, while they were made lying flat on the floor, the herein accused take, rob and carry away,
without the consent of said Elias Monge, owner thereof, of the following properties, to wit:
One camera with trademark Olympus worth P400.00
Two birthstones rings worth 700.00
One wedding ring with name MONDING 100.00
One pair of earrings heartshape 100.00
Two pieces of necklace solid worth 400.00
Two pieces of mosquito net 110.00
Three pieces of blankets color orange and spotted 200.00
Three men pants and also one cut of cloth 235.50
One beach towel, with decoration 35.00
One aluminum Reynold kettle 30.00
One One caserola 15.00
Two pieces of pillow case 12.00
Two cans of rice 70.00
One flashlight Eveready two batteries 30.00
TOTAL P10,619.50
all in the total amount of TEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED NINETEEN PESOS and FIFTY CENTAVOS
(P10,619.50), Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof in the
aforementioned amount. That on the occasion thereof, the abovenamed accused with lewd
design, and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously commit sexual intercourse with Monica Monge, a virgin of 16 years old, and with
Cristina Monge, all against their will. 1
Upon arraignment, both accused Eustaquio Loreno y Malaga and Jimmy Marantal y Londete
entered a plea of not guilty to the crime charged.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment adverse to the accused, the dispositive portion of
which read:
ACCORDINGLY, we find the guilt of the accused Eustaquio Loreno has been established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt and hereby find him GUILTY of Robbery with Double Rape, penalized by
Par. 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. There being present aggravating circumstances in
the commission of the offense, Eustaquio Loreno is hereby sentenced to LIFE IMPRISONMENT, the
maximum penalty provided by law.
Likewise, the Court finds that the guilt of the accused Jimmy Marantal has been established
beyond reasonable doubt and hereby finds him GUILTY of the crime of ROBBERY penalized under
Par. 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. Jimmy Marantal is sentenced to indeterminate
penalty ranging from TWO (2) YEARS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS of prision correccional as minimum to
EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, in view of the aggravating circumstances
present.
Said accused Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal shall indemnify jointly and severally Elias
Monge in the sum of P10,619.50 without subsidiary imprisonment, In addition, Eustaquio Loreno
shall indemnify Monica Monge and Cristina Monge in the sum of P10,000.00 each or a total of
P20,000.00 as damages, without subsidiary imprisonment.
The accused herein shall pay one-half of the costs each. 2
The facts of the case as stated by the Solicitor General in his Brief, areas follows:
In the evening of January 7, 1978, Barangay Captain Elias Monge was at his house located at
barrio Magsaysay, Libmanan, Camarines Sur. He and his two young daughters, namely: Monica
Monge, single, then 14 years old, and Cristina Monge, married, then 22 years old, were preparing
to attend the dance to be held in the barrio proper that evening. But they had to wait for a while
because his wife, Beata Monge, was still changing the diaper of baby Rachel Baybayon, four-
month old daughter of Cristina Monge. The other occupants present in the house that evening
were his sons, Mario, then 11 years old, and Nilo, then 13 years old, and their farm helper, also
staying with them, by the name of Francisco Fable. Cristina was then vacationing at her parents'
house. Her husband, Raymundo Baybayon, was in Manila (pp. 2-5, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM: pp, 2-3,
tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM: pp. 2-4, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM: pp. 2-3, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM: pp. 2-3, tsn,
Oct. 29, 1979 AM).
At about 7:40 o'clock that same evening, while he was at the balcony of said house, Francisco
Fable saw at first four men with flashlights approaching. When they came near, he heard one of
them call Elias Monge saving that there was a letter from the chief hepe). Fable called Elias Monge
who was in the sala, informing him that there was a letter from the chief. Two of the visitors, one
wearing red clothes and the other in dark sweater. came up the house. When Elias Monge went
out to the balcony the man in dark sweater handed to him the letter. Because it was dark to read
it, Elias Monge invited the man in dark sweater to come inside the sala. The other man in red
clothes posted himself near the post of the balcony (pp. 4-5, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM: pp. 6-7, tsn,
Oct. 18, 1979 AM: pp. 4-9, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AMOUNT pp. 4-7, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM: pp. 4, 12-
13, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
When be and the man in dark sweater were inside the sala Elias Monge asked his daughter,
Monica to fetch his reading glasses. On reading the letter, Elias Monge and Monica read the
following: "Kami mga NPA", which caused Monica to run to her mother, seized with fear,
informing her what she came to know about camme visitors. Cristina Morgagor came attempted
to run to the kitchen to get a bolo but she was held back by the man in dark sweater who then
announced to all those inside not to make any scandal. kitchen Elias Monge turned to look at him
the man in dark sweater poked his gun at him, and ordered all those inside the on the floor (pp.
13-14, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 Pvl p. 7, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 4 4, 12-13, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM pp. 4,
13, 16, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM)
In the meantime outside at the balcony the man in red clothe asked Fable for a glass of water arid
the latter asked Mario Monge to get the glass of later, but Mario did not obey and instead went to
the sala Hence, fabie himself outside inside the house to the the glass of water. But, as he went
inside the sala, he noticed the man in red clothes following him. As Fabie reached the door to the
sala, the man in red clothes poked his gun on Fabie's back and pointed a sharp instrument on his
neck and then he wish pushed to go inside the sala. Once inside the sala, which Aras lighted, Fable
saw and recognized the man in red clothes these to Estaquio loreno. Also Elias Monge and his two
daughters, Monica and Cristina, saw and recognized Eustaquio Loreno as he entered the sala as
one of the companions of the man in dark sweater. All tile occupants of the house were ordered
by the man in dark sweater and Loreno to remain lying flat on their stomachs on the floor (pp. 5-
6, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM: pp. 10-12, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM pp. 1-8, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 21-
22, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM pp. 5, 17-18, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM p. 5, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM).
Thereafter, the man in dark sweater instructed loreno to tie all their victims on the floor. Loreno
tied them with rattan. The man in dark sweater cut the baby's hammock (duyan) and got the
ropes with which he and Loreno used to reinforce in tying the victim's hands together behind their
backs. Thereafter, the man in dark sweater instructed Loreno to go downstairs and drive the
barking dog away. Loreno held Fable and brought him downstairs to drive the barking dog away
(pp, 8-9, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM p. 6, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM).
On reaching the corner of the house below the flashlight used by Loreno happened to focus on
the person of Jimmy Marantal. Fable immediately recognized Jimmy Marantal as one of the
visitors who remained on the ground as lookouts. Jimmy Marantal beamed his flashlight on the
face of Fable, and seeing the latter, he kicked him (Fabie) on the right side of his rib which caused
him to fall on the ground. Marantal kicked Fable who managed to roll on his side and was hit on
his left thigh. After a while, Loreno lifted Fable bodily from the ground, and brought am back
upstairs (pp. 6-7, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM pp. 13-14, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM).
After Loreno and Fable returned to the sala, the man in dark sweater got hold of Monica Monge
and dragged her up to a room located above the balcony. She tried to resist but she was then still
tied, Inside the room, Monica was asked to reveal the whereabouts of her piggy bank savings. She
said there was none. He ransacked the room but found none. The man in dark sweater then
seized Monica and forcibly removed her pants. Monica resisted and shouted at her parents for
help. He boxed and slapped her. Despite her struggle, he was able to remove her panty and then
made her he on the floor near the bed. After undressing himself, he forcibly went on top of her.
She kept on struggling and shouting for help, but he succeeded in inserting his organ into her
vagina. She felt pain. He proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her. She could not do anything
to stop him from consummating his lust as she was still tied. When he was through with her, she
noticed blood in her private part (p. 9, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM p. 7, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM pp. 5, 14,
tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM pp. 5-6, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM).
Below in the sala, Monica Monge's parents and others heard her shouts for help and the struggle
she put up inside the room. Hearing her shouts for help, Loreno menacingly pointed his gun at
them, telling them not to rise if they wanted to live, Then Loreno brought Beata Monge first to the
masters room and then to the teacher's room. During these two occasions, he forced Beata
Monge to open the aparador and the trunk respectively, with her keys, and he got their contents,
which he brought to the sala, holding on to Beata Monge who remained tied. All the things he got
from the two rooms were poured on the floor of the sala (pp. 7, 9, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM pp. 10-1
1, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 7-13, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM pp. 5-6, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM pp. 17-19,
tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM).
Thereafter, the man in dark sweater returned to the sala, dragging along Monica Monge whose
hair was dishevelled and was crying, and he made her joined the others on the floor of the sala.
He reached for a can of pineapple j nice from the aparador and the sala and drank its contents.
Not long thereafter, he turned his attention to Cristina Monge, and he dragged her to the room
which was then rented by school teacher Miss Olitoquit (who was then in Naga City). Inside the
room, the man in dark sweater forced his lewd designs on her but she resisted and struggled
although her hands were still tied behind her back. He boxed her, hitting her on her right eye
which caused her to lose consciousness. He then proceeded to satisfy his lust on her. When she
regained consciousness, the man in dark sweater returned her shorts. She then realized that he
had succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her (p. 6, 17-19, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM pp. 7-8,
tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM pp. 11-12, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 6, 14-15, 18, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
While the man in dark sweater and Cristina Monge were still inside the teacher's room, a third
man entered the sala, and he told Loreno to cover their victims on the floor with a mat. Loreno
found instead a piece of lawanit with which they covered their victims. The third man proceeded
to the kitchen, and when he returned to the sala, he was bringing along some rice. Then, a fourth
man entered the sala and he asked from Elias Monge for a cigarette. Elias Monge stood up and
told him to get it from his pocket as he was still tied. Reacting to Monge's reply, the fourth man
boxed him, hitting him on his breast and solar plexus which caused him to fall on the floor. Then
Loreno asked Elias Monge to accompany him to the house of a nearby neighbor. On reaching the
balcony, Elias Monge protested and refused to accompany Loreno who then held Elias Monge by
the neck, pointing his gun at him. Beata Monge protested, telling her husband not to go along.
loreno desisted from his plan to go to the nearby neighbor's house, Elias Monge did not recognize
the Identities of both the third and fourth men (pp. 12-15, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 16-17, 25-26,
tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM pp. 12-13, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM pp. 7, 14-15, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM).
Thereafter Loreno entered the room where Cristina Monge was earlier brought by the man in
dark sweater, and he found her still lying on the floor. Loreno embraced her trying to kiss her and
touch her private parts. One of the malefactors on the ground called those upstairs to hurry
because a man was approaching. Loreno then released Cristina Monge and told her to return to
the sala to breastfeed her daughter who was continuously crying. Thereafter, the malefactors
went down from the house one by one, bringing along all the things they robbed from their
victims. The man in dark sweater returned to the sala and touched the thighs of Cristina Monge,
who was already wearing her shorts, and he told them not to tell anybody what happened to
them, otherwise he will kill them. And then all the malefactors left the place (pp. 15-16, tsn, Oct.
18, 1979 AM pp. 16, 18, 19-20, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
Soon thereafter, Elias Monge heard Sixto Agapito who was On the ground near the fence of the
house calling him, asking if he was going to the dancehall Elias Monge replied from upstairs that
he was not feeling well, and Agapito left. EUSTAQUIO Monge was able to untie himself, and then
he also untied the others. Fable then revealed to him that earlier when he had gone down with
Loreno, he (Fabie) saw and recognized Jimmy Marantal as among those left on the ground as
lookout for the group that had just robbed them. Cristina and Monica Monge also told their father
that they were abused by the man in dark sweater when they were brought inside the rooms. For
the rest of the night, they remained on guard and could hardly sleep (pp. 15-16, 17, tsn, Oct. 18,
1979 AM pp. 10-11, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM p. 7, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
Elias Monge and his family later discovered that they were robbed of their following personal
properties: jewelry valued at Pl,000.00' two mosquito nets, P70.00; three bets, P200.00; one
caldero of rice, P30.00; one reversible jacket, P40.00; three chickens, P30.00; one camera,
P400.00; one beach towel, P35.00; cash in the amount of P6,500,00; and several others, all in the
total of P10,305.00, more or less (pp. 4-6, 8, 14-17, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979; pp. 16-17, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979
AM).
Fabie had often seen and had known Loreno because the latter's daughter married a member of
the youth organization in the barrio when he (Fabie) was its president. Elias Monge had already
known Loreno whose occupation was catching wild pigs, and the latter used to place bobby traps
in his (Monge's) place to catch pigs, during which occasions Loreno usually slept in his house,
Monica Monge and Cristina Monge also had already known Loreno because his daughter married
a neighbor near their house. Monica often saw Loreno traverse the playground of the Magsaysay
Elementary School where he was studying. Fable had also known Jimmy Marantal because the
latter often attended dances held by the barrio youth organization, and he (Marantal) even
married one of its members, He had engaged Marantal in conversations many times p. 3, tsn, Oct.
19, 1979 AM pp. 2-3, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM pp. 2-3, 8-9, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM pp. 2-3, 7-8, tsn,
Oct. 18-1979 AM pp. 2-3, 21-22, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM pp. 2, 8-10, 17-18, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
Despite the revelation of her daughters to him that they were sexually abused that fateful
evening, Elias Monge forced himself to report the following day, Sunday the robbery-rape incident
at the PC detachment in Sipocot, but there was no one to talk there. So he proceeded to the PC
headquarters at Camp Tara, bringing along the ropes and rattan which were used by the
malefactors in tying him and his family during the robbery-rape incident. He was given a written
recommendation from the PC to the hospital with instructions to have himself and his daughter
Monica be physically examined. Cristina Monge was informed that there was no need for her to
submit for physical examination because she was already married. (pp. 18-19, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979
AM p. 18; tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM p. 8, tsn., Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
Sgt. Victoriano del Socorro, the chief of the investigation section of the 243rd PC Company,
stationed at Tara, Camarines Sur, investigated on January 10, 1978 the robbery-rape incident. He
was informed by Barangay Captain Elias Monge that his house was robbed and his two daughters
were raped by the robbers in the evening of January 7, 1978 in their house and that he (Monge)
was able to Identify two of the robbers, mentioning their names as Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy
Marantal of Barrio Calabnigan, Libmanan, Camarines Sur. After Sgt. del Socorro and his team
made an ocular inspection of the place on that same day, they proceeded to barrio Calabnigan
where they picked up Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal and brought them to the PC camp.
At the PC camp on January 17, 1978, the two suspects were duly Identified upon confrontation as
two of the robbers by the above-mentioned barrio captain, his daughters Monica and Cristina
Monge, and their helper Fable. During the investigation, the two suspects refused to give their
written statements. Thus, Sgt. del Socorro was able to secure the written statements of Elias
Monge, Francisco Fable, Monica Monge, and Cristina Monge about the robbery-rape incident.
Upon being Identified both said suspects told their victims ff they could just talk and settle the
matter, but Elias Monge replied that what they did that evening was an oppression (kaapihan)
against him and his family, The two suspects retorted that it was up to him (pp. 19-21, tsn, Oct.
18, 1979 AM pp. 18-20, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM pp. 1-5, 6, 8- 12, tsn, Oct. 30, 1979 AM).
Dr. Jesus H. Miraflores, resident physician of the Camarines Sur Provincial Hospital at Naga City,
examined Elias Monge on January 10, 1978. The X-Ray examination's result was negative. But the
doctor found him to have sustained an external injury which he classified as "resolving hematoma,
right cestal region" a close wound, already spread out but and the process of healing, located on
the right side of the middle portion of the thorax. He gave Elias Monge a prescription for anti-
infection to stop the bleeding as there was still slight bleeding and to subside the swelling.
Afterwards he gave the corresponding medical certificate to Elias Monge (Exhibit "A"; pp. 22-26,
tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM p. 19, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM
Dr. Erlie S. Cabral, another resident physician of the same provincial hospital examined Monica
Monge on January 10, 1978. The doctor did not find any fresh wound on her body, but examining
her hymen, she found fresh and incomplete lacerations of said hymen at 3:00 and 9:00 o'clock
locations and, inserting her index finger inside her patient's sex orifice, lt easily admitted her
forefinger. She had the patient's vagina smeared for spermatozoa but none was found after
laboratory examination The doctor observed that the lacerations did not reach the base of the
hymen but the edges of the lacerated portions were still reddish and slightly swollen. The doctor
opined that the lacerations could have been caused by the forcible penetration of a male's penis
into the patient's vagina. The doctor further expeled that the laceration of the hymen heals after
five days. She also expeled that male spermatozoa stays inside the female vagina at the most for
72 hours. She stated that, admitting there was orgasm during the forcible sexual intercourse, any
sperm must have already disappeared when she examined Monica Monge on January 10, 1978
which was already beyond 72 hours since she was raped in the evening of January 7, 1978 (pp. 26-
28, 31, 33-34, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM; Exhibit "B"). 3
Appellants Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal claimed that they acted under the compulsion
of an irresistible force and/or under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury.
They admitted that they were in the house of Elias Monge on the night of January 7, 1978, 4 but
they were only forced by a man wearing black sweater and his five companions who claimed to be
members of the New People's Army (NPA), operating in the locality, with the threat that if they
did not obey, appellants and their families would be killed. We, however, find the contention
untenable.
A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the
impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury is exempt from criminal liability because
he does not act with freedom. The force must be irresistible to reduce him to a mere instrument
who acts not only without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be
present, imminent and impending and of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded
apprehension of Appellee's Brief. death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A threat of
future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of Such a character as to leave no
opportunity to the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat. 5
A perusal of the appellants' statement of the robbery-rape incident as summarized in their joint
brief (pp. 3-10), showed that they admitted their participation in the commission of the crimes of
robbery and rape against Elias Monge and his family on January 7, 1978. Further established were
facts inconsistent with appellant's claim of having acted under the compulsion of an irresistible
force and/or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, to wit:
1. Appellant Eustaquio Loreno was armed with a short firearm when he and the man in dark
sweater went up the house of Elias Monge. While inside the house, Loreno pointed the gun to the
victims which enabled the malefactors to ransack the house (p. 38, tsn, Oct. 30, 1979 PM
2. When Eustaquio Loreno and the man in dark sweater reached the balcony, Loreno positioned
himself next to the post in the balcony, while the man in dark sweater delivered the letter to Elias
Monge. Loreno admitted that, without prior instructions, he immediately positioned himself near
the post of the balcony (p. 10, tsn, Id.), an act which showed his voluntary participation in the
criminal acts.
3. Eustaquio Loreno himself tied the victim with rattan and thereafter, with ropes of the
hammock. Loreno in fact admitted that he was the one who furnished the rattan which he got
from inside the house (pp. 14-15, tsn, Id.).
4. When Monica Monge was struggling and shouting for help from inside the room where she was
earlier dragged by the man in dark sweater, Loreno's immediate reaction was to point his gun to
the victims who were then lying on the floor, telling them not to rise if they wanted to live (p. 38,
tsn., Id.).
The records likewise revealed that on the two occasions Eustaquio Loreno brought Beata Monge
to the master's room and the teacher's room where he made her open the trunk and the
"aparador" with her keys and got the contents which he brought and poured on the floor of the
sala, appellant Loreno acted alone, without the threat and assistance of the man in dark sweater.
And after the man in dark sweater consummated his lust on Cristina Monge in the teacher's room
and seeing Cristina Monge still lying on the floor, Loreno embraced her and tried to kiss and touch
her private parts.
When Eustaquio Loreno and Francisco Fable went downstairs to drive the barking dog away, the
flashlight of Loreno happened to be focused on the face of Jimmy Marantal who in turn beamed
his flashlight on the approaching Fable. Upon seeing Fable, Jimmy Marantal kicked the former
twice causing him (Fabie) to fall to the ground. Marantal's reaction towards Fable was due to the
fact that Fable had recognized him and the blows which he gave to Fable who was still tied at the
moment was to serve as a warning to Fable not to report his presence and participation in the
robbery-rape incident to the authorities.
Jimmy Marantal, who was standing at the gate of the house below, must have heard the shouts of
Monica Monge for help and must have known by then that Monica Monge was being abused by
his two companions who earlier went up the house. As a "lookout" or guard, Jimmy Marantal gave
his companions effective means and encouragement to commit the crimes of robbery and rape.
There was no showing that Jimmy Marantal raised a voice of protest or did an act to prevent the
commission of the crimes.
All these demonstrated the voluntary participation and the conspiracy of the appellants. The
foregoing acts, though separately performed from those of their unidentified companions, clearly
showed their community of interest and concert of criminal design with their unidentified
companions which constituted conspiracy without the need of direct proof of the conspiracy
itself. 6 Conspiracy may be inferred and proven by the acts of the accused themselves and when
said acts point to joint purpose and concert of action and community of interest, which unity of
purpose and concert of action serve to establish the existence of conspiracy, 7 and the degree of
actual participation petition by each of the conspirators is immaterial. 8 Conspiracy having been
establish, all the conspirators are liable as co-penpals regardless of the extent and character of
their participation because in contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all. 9
The foregoing crime of robbery with double rape was combat muted on January 7, 1978, by more
than three persons, all armed, 10 in conspiracy with each other, attended by the aggravating
circumstances of band, nighttime and dwelling and is, under P.D. 767, promulgated on August 15,
1975, punishable by death. But, for lack of the required number of votes, the accused should
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, AFFIRMED, with the
modification that the accused cused JIMMY MARANTAL is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. With costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 149275 September 27, 2004
VICKY C. TY, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Petitioner Vicky C. Ty ("Ty") filed the instant Petition for Review under Rule 45, seeking to set aside
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals Eighth Division in CA-G.R. CR No. 20995, promulgated on 31
July 2001. The Decision affirmed with modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila, Branch 19, dated 21 April 1997, finding her guilty of seven (7) counts of violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 222 (B.P. 22), otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
This case stemmed from the filing of seven (7) Informations for violation of B.P. 22 against Ty the demand letters were not heeded, complainant filed the seven (7) Informations subject of the
before the RTC of Manila. The Informations were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 93-130459 to instant case.10
No. 93-130465. The accusatory portion of the Information in Criminal Case No. 93-130465 reads For her defense, Ty claimed that she issued the checks because of "an uncontrollable fear of a
as follows: greater injury." She averred that she was forced to issue the checks to obtain release for her
That on or about May 30, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and mother whom the hospital inhumanely and harshly treated and would not discharge unless the
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Manila Doctors’ Hospital to hospital bills are paid. She alleged that her mother was deprived of room facilities, such as the air-
apply on account or for value to Editha L. Vecino Check No. Metrobank 487712 dated May 30, condition unit, refrigerator and television set, and subject to inconveniences such as the cutting
1993 payable to Manila Doctors Hospital in the amount of ₱30,000.00, said accused well knowing off of the telephone line, late delivery of her mother’s food and refusal to change the latter’s
that at the time of issue she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for gown and bedsheets. She also bewailed the hospital’s suspending medical treatment of her
payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check when presented for payment mother. The "debasing treatment," she pointed out, so affected her mother’s mental,
within ninety (90) days from the date hereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank psychological and physical health that the latter contemplated suicide if she would not be
for "Account Closed" and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay discharged from the hospital. Fearing the worst for her mother, and to comply with the demands
said Manila Doctors Hospital the amount of the check or to make arrangement for full payment of of the hospital, Ty was compelled to sign a promissory note, open an account with Metrobank and
the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice. issue the checks to effect her mother’s immediate discharge.11
Contrary to law.3 Giving full faith and credence to the evidence offered by the prosecution, the trial court found
The other Informations are similarly worded except for the number of the checks and dates of that Ty issued the checks subject of the case in payment of the hospital bills of her mother and
issue. The data are hereunder itemized as follows: rejected the theory of the defense.12 Thus, on 21 April 1997, the trial court rendered a Decision
finding Ty guilty of seven (7) counts of violation of B.P. 22 and sentencing her to a prison term.
Criminal Case No. Check No. Postdated Amount The dispositive part of the Decision reads:
93-130459 487710 30 March 1993 ₱30,000.00 CONSEQUENTLY, the accused Vicky C. Ty, for her acts of issuing seven (7) checks in payment of a
93-130460 487711 30 April 1993 ₱30,000.00 valid obligation, which turned unfounded on their respective dates of maturity, is found guilty of
seven (7) counts of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
93-130461 487709 01 March 1993 ₱30,000.00
penalty of imprisonment of SIX MONTHS per count or a total of forty-two (42) months.
93-130462 487707 30 December 1992 ₱30,000.00 SO ORDERED.13
93-130463 487706 30 November 1992 ₱30,000.00 Ty interposed an appeal from the Decision of the trial court. Before the Court of Appeals, Ty
93-130464 487708 30 January 1993 ₱30,000.00 reiterated her defense that she issued the checks "under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of
a greater injury or in avoidance of a greater evil or injury." She also argued that the trial court
93-130465 487712 30 May 1993 ₱30,000.004 erred in finding her guilty when evidence showed there was absence of valuable consideration for
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. At her arraignment, Ty pleaded not guilty.5 the issuance of the checks and the payee had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds in the
The evidence for the prosecution shows that Ty’s mother Chua Lao So Un was confined at the account. She protested that the trial court should not have applied the law mechanically, without
Manila Doctors’ Hospital (hospital) from 30 October 1990 until 4 June 1992. Being the patient’s due regard to the principles of justice and equity.14
daughter, Ty signed the "Acknowledgment of Responsibility for Payment" in the Contract of In its Decision dated 31 July 2001, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with
Admission dated 30 October 1990.6 As of 4 June 1992, the Statement of Account7 shows the total modification. It set aside the penalty of imprisonment and instead sentenced Ty "to pay a fine of
liability of the mother in the amount of ₱657,182.40. Ty’s sister, Judy Chua, was also confined at sixty thousand pesos (₱60,000.00) equivalent to double the amount of the check, in each case." 15
the hospital from 13 May 1991 until 2 May 1992, incurring hospital bills in the amount of In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals rejected Ty’s defenses of involuntariness in the
₱418,410.55.8 The total hospital bills of the two patients amounted to ₱1,075,592.95. On 5 June issuance of the checks and the hospital’s knowledge of her checking account’s lack of funds. It
1992, Ty executed a promissory note wherein she assumed payment of the obligation in held that B.P. 22 makes the mere act of issuing a worthless check punishable as a special offense,
installments.9 To assure payment of the obligation, she drew several postdated checks against it being a malum prohibitum. What the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not
Metrobank payable to the hospital. The seven (7) checks, each covering the amount of the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. 16
₱30,000.00, were all deposited on their due dates. But they were all dishonored by the drawee
Neither was the Court of Appeals convinced that there was no valuable consideration for the
bank and returned unpaid to the hospital due to insufficiency of funds, with the "Account Closed"
issuance of the checks as they were issued in payment of the hospital bills of Ty’s mother.17
advice. Soon thereafter, the complainant hospital sent demand letters to Ty by registered mail. As
In sentencing Ty to pay a fine instead of a prison term, the appellate court applied the case of
Vaca v. Court of Appeals18 wherein this Court declared that in determining the penalty imposed
for violation of B.P. 22, the philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law should be
observed, i.e., redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of
personal liberty and economic usefulness, with due regard to the protection of the social order. 19
Petitioner now comes to this Court basically alleging the same issues raised before the Court of
Appeals. More specifically, she ascribed errors to the appellate court based on the following
grounds:
A. THERE IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONER WAS FORCED TO OR
COMPELLED IN THE OPENING OF THE ACCOUNT AND THE ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS.
B. THE CHECKS WERE ISSUED UNDER THE IMPULSE OF AN UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF A GREATER
INJURY OR IN AVOIDANCE OF A GREATER EVIL OR INJURY.
C. THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD PATENTLY SHOW[S] ABSENCE OF VALUABLE CONSIDERATION IN
THE ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS.
D. IT IS AN UNDISPUTED FACT THAT THE PAYEE OF THE CHECKS WAS FULLY AWARE OF THE LACK
OF FUNDS IN THE ACCOUNT.
E. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AS WELL AS THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT [,] SHOULD
NOT HAVE APPLIED CRIMINAL LAW MECHANICALLY, WITHOUT DUE REGARD TO THE PRINCIPLES
OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
In its Memorandum,20 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), citing jurisprudence, contends that
a check issued as an evidence of debt, though not intended to be presented for payment, has the
same effect as an ordinary check; hence, it falls within the ambit of B.P. 22. And when a check is
presented for payment, the drawee bank will generally accept the same, regardless of whether it
was issued in payment of an obligation or merely to guarantee said obligation. What the law
punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor the
terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum
prohibitum.21
We find the petition to be without merit and accordingly sustain Ty’s conviction.
Well-settled is the rule that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals are entitled to great weight and respect, and will not be disturbed on appeal in the
absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked certain facts or circumstances which
would substantially affect the disposition of the case.22 Jurisdiction of this Court over cases
elevated from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing or revising errors of law ascribed to the
Court of Appeals whose factual findings are conclusive, and carry even more weight when said
court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid
of support in the record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of
discretion.23
In the instant case, the Court discerns no compelling reason to reverse the factual findings arrived
at by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Ty does not deny having issued the seven (7) checks subject of this case. She, however, claims that
the issuance of the checks was under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in
avoidance of a greater evil or injury. She would also have the Court believe that there was no
valuable consideration in the issuance of the checks.
However, except for the defense’s claim of uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or avoidance of
a greater evil or injury, all the grounds raised involve factual issues which are best determined by
the trial court. And, as previously intimated, the trial court had in fact discarded the theory of the
defense and rendered judgment accordingly.
Moreover, these arguments are a mere rehash of arguments unsuccessfully raised before the trial
court and the Court of Appeals. They likewise put to issue factual questions already passed upon
twice below, rather than questions of law appropriate for review under a Rule 45 petition.
The only question of law raised--whether the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant
her exemption from criminal liability--has to be resolved in the negative. For this exempting
circumstance to be invoked successfully, the following requisites must concur: (1) existence of an
uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater
than or at least equal to that committed.24
It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of such gravity and
imminence that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it.25 It should be based on a real,
imminent or reasonable fear for one’s life or limb.26 A mere threat of a future injury is not enough.
It should not be speculative, fanciful, or remote.27 A person invoking uncontrollable fear must
show therefore that the compulsion was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not
only without will but against his will as well.28 It must be of such character as to leave no
opportunity to the accused for escape.29
In this case, far from it, the fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not real and imminent. Ty claims that
she was compelled to issue the checks--a condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her before
her mother could be discharged--for fear that her mother’s health might deteriorate further due
to the inhumane treatment of the hospital or worse, her mother might commit suicide. This is
speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable fear contemplated by law.
To begin with, there was no showing that the mother’s illness was so life-threatening such that
her continued stay in the hospital suffering all its alleged unethical treatment would induce a well-
grounded apprehension of her death. Secondly, it is not the law’s intent to say that any fear
exempts one from criminal liability much less petitioner’s flimsy fear that her mother might
commit suicide. In other words, the fear she invokes was not impending or insuperable as to
deprive her of all volition and to make her a mere instrument without will, moved exclusively by
the hospital’s threats or demands.
Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left with no choice but to commit a crime.
She did not take advantage of the many opportunities available to her to avoid committing one.
By her very own words, she admitted that the collateral or security the hospital required prior to
the discharge of her mother may be in the form of postdated checks or jewelry. 30 And if indeed
she was coerced to open an account with the bank and issue the checks, she had all the
opportunity to leave the scene to avoid involvement.
Moreover, petitioner had sufficient knowledge that the issuance of checks without funds may
result in a violation of B.P. 22. She even testified that her counsel advised her not to open a
current account nor issue postdated checks "because the moment I will not have funds it will be a
big problem."31 Besides, apart from petitioner’s bare assertion, the record is bereft of any
evidence to corroborate and bolster her claim that she was compelled or coerced to cooperate
with and give in to the hospital’s demands.
Ty likewise suggests in the prefatory statement of her Petition and Memorandum that the
justifying circumstance of state of necessity under par. 4, Art. 11 of the Revised Penal Code may
find application in this case.
We do not agree. The law prescribes the presence of three requisites to exempt the actor from
liability under this paragraph: (1) that the evil sought to be avoided actually exists; (2) that the
injury feared be greater than the one done to avoid it; (3) that there be no other practical and less
harmful means of preventing it.32
In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated. If the evil
sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the future, this defense
is not applicable.33 Ty could have taken advantage of an available option to avoid committing a
crime. By her own admission, she had the choice to give jewelry or other forms of security instead
of postdated checks to secure her obligation.
Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the greater injury feared should not
have been brought about by the negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the
actor.34 In this case, the issuance of the bounced checks was brought about by Ty’s own failure to
pay her mother’s hospital bills.
The Court also thinks it rather odd that Ty has chosen the exempting circumstance of
uncontrollable fear and the justifying circumstance of state of necessity to absolve her of liability.
It would not have been half as bizarre had Ty been able to prove that the issuance of the bounced
checks was done without her full volition. Under the circumstances, however, it is quite clear that
neither uncontrollable fear nor avoidance of a greater evil or injury prompted the issuance of the
bounced checks.
Parenthetically, the findings of fact in the Decision of the trial court in the Civil Case35 for damages
filed by Ty’s mother against the hospital is wholly irrelevant for purposes of disposing the case at
bench. While the findings therein may establish a claim for damages which, we may add, need
only be supported by a preponderance of evidence, it does not necessarily engender reasonable
doubt as to free Ty from liability.
As to the issue of consideration, it is presumed, upon issuance of the checks, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that the same was issued for valuable consideration. 36 Section 2437 of
the Negotiable Instruments Law creates a presumption that every party to an instrument acquired
the same for a consideration38 or for value.39 In alleging otherwise, Ty has the onus to prove that
the checks were issued without consideration. She must present convincing evidence to
overthrow the presumption.
A scrutiny of the records reveals that petitioner failed to discharge her burden of proof. "Valuable
consideration may in general terms, be said to consist either in some right, interest, profit, or
benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or
some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the other aide.
Simply defined, valuable consideration means an obligation to give, to do, or not to do in favor of
the party who makes the contract, such as the maker or indorser."40
In this case, Ty’s mother and sister availed of the services and the facilities of the hospital. For the
care given to her kin, Ty had a legitimate obligation to pay the hospital by virtue of her
relationship with them and by force of her signature on her mother’s Contract of Admission
acknowledging responsibility for payment, and on the promissory note she executed in favor of
the hospital.
Anent Ty’s claim that the obligation to pay the hospital bills was not her personal obligation
because she was not the patient, and therefore there was no consideration for the checks, the
case of Bridges v. Vann, et al.41 tells us that "it is no defense to an action on a promissory note for
the maker to say that there was no consideration which was beneficial to him personally; it is
sufficient if the consideration was a benefit conferred upon a third person, or a detriment
suffered by the promisee, at the instance of the promissor. It is enough if the obligee foregoes
some right or privilege or suffers some detriment and the release and extinguishment of the
original obligation of George Vann, Sr., for that of appellants meets the requirement. Appellee
accepted one debtor in place of another and gave up a valid, subsisting obligation for the note
executed by the appellants. This, of itself, is sufficient consideration for the new notes."
At any rate, the law punishes the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for which
it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance.42 B.P. 22 does not make any
distinction as to whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an
obligation or to merely guarantee the obligation.43 The thrust of the law is to prohibit the making
of worthless checks and putting them into circulation.44 As this Court held in Lim v. People of the
Philippines,45 "what is primordial is that such issued checks were worthless and the fact of its
worthlessness is known to the appellant at the time of their issuance, a required element under
B.P. Blg. 22."
The law itself creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. Section 2
of B.P. 22 provides:
Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. - The making, drawing and issuance of a
check payment of which is refused by the drawee bank because of insufficient funds in or credit
with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima
facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer
pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by
the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has
not been paid by the drawee.
Such knowledge is legally presumed from the dishonor of the checks for insufficiency of funds.46 If
not rebutted, it suffices to sustain a conviction.47
Petitioner likewise opines that the payee was aware of the fact that she did not have sufficient
funds with the drawee bank and such knowledge necessarily exonerates her liability.
The knowledge of the payee of the insufficiency or lack of funds of the drawer with the drawee
bank is immaterial as deceit is not an essential element of an offense penalized by B.P. 22. The
gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a bad check, hence, malice and intent in the issuance
thereof is inconsequential.48
In addition, Ty invokes our ruling in Magno v. Court of Appeals49 wherein this Court inquired into
the true nature of transaction between the drawer and the payee and finally acquitted the
accused, to persuade the Court that the circumstances surrounding her case deserve special
attention and do not warrant a strict and mechanical application of the law.
Petitioner’s reliance on the case is misplaced. The material operative facts therein obtaining are
different from those established in the instant petition. In the 1992 case, the bounced checks
were issued to cover a "warranty deposit" in a lease contract, where the lessor-supplier was also
the financier of the deposit. It was a modus operandi whereby the supplier was able to sell or
lease the goods while privately financing those in desperate need so they may be accommodated.
The maker of the check thus became an unwilling victim of a lease agreement under the guise of a
lease-purchase agreement. The maker did not benefit at all from the deposit, since the checks
were used as collateral for an accommodation and not to cover the receipt of an actual account or
credit for value.
In the case at bar, the checks were issued to cover the receipt of an actual "account or for value."
Substantial evidence, as found by the trial court and Court of Appeals, has established that the
checks were issued in payment of the hospital bills of Ty’s mother.
Finally, we agree with the Court of Appeals in deleting the penalty of imprisonment, absent any
proof that petitioner was not a first-time offender nor that she acted in bad faith. Administrative
Circular 12-2000,50 adopting the rulings in Vaca v. Court of Appeals51 and Lim v. People,52
authorizes the non-imposition of the penalty of imprisonment in B.P. 22 cases subject to certain
conditions. However, the Court resolves to modify the penalty in view of Administrative Circular
13-200153 which clarified Administrative 12-2000. It is stated therein:
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove
imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of
the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22.
Thus, Administrative Circular 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the
penal provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the
offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the
imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say,
the determination of whether circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely
upon the Judge. Should the judge decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty,
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not be deemed a hindrance.
It is therefore understood that: (1) Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove
imprisonment as an alternative penalty for violations of B.P. 22; (2) the judges concerned may, in
the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each
case, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of justice,
or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense,
work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice; (3)
should only a fine be imposed and the accused unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to
the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.54
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated 31 July 2001, finding petitioner Vicky C. Ty GUILTY of violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Petitioner Vicky C. Ty is ORDERED to pay a FINE equivalent to
double the amount of each dishonored check subject of the seven cases at bar with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency in accordance with Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code. She is
also ordered to pay private complainant, Manila Doctors’ Hospital, the amount of Two Hundred
Ten Thousand Pesos (₱210,000.00) representing the total amount of the dishonored checks. Costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 1481 February 17, 1904
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,
vs.
LIBERATO EXALTACION, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Alberto Barretto for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
March 26, 1903, the provincial fiscal of Bulacan presented to the court of that province an
information charging Liberato Exaltacion and Buenaventura Tanchinco with the crime of rebellion,
in that they, subsequently to the 4th day of November, 1901, willfully and illegally bound
themselves to take part in a rebellion against the Government of the United States in these
Islands, swearing allegiance to the Katipunan Society, the purpose of which was to overthrow the
said Government by force of arms, this against the statute in the case made and provided.
In the course of the trial Don Pablo Tecson, the provincial governor of Bulacan, testified under
oath that the two defendants were arrested in the month of March, 1903, the police some days
before having captured a number of documents in the encampment of one Contreras, as so-called
general of bandits, situated at a place called Langca, of the town of Meycauayan, among which
documents appeared the papers now on pages 2 and 3 of the record, signed by the said Exaltacion
and Tanchinco, who recognized the said documents when they were exhibited to them; that the
said defendants stated to the witness that they had signed the said documents under compulsion;
that the purpose of the Katipunan Society was to obtain the independence of the Philippines; that
this statement was made in the house of the parish priest of Meycauayan in the presence of
Exequiel Casas and Fernando Nieto. The latter, upon their examination as witnesses, testified to
the same facts, stating that the defendants told Governor Tecson that they had signed the said
documents under fear of death at the hands of the thieves by whom they had been captured. The
witness Casas, the municipal president of Meycauayan, testified that he held office as such in
place of the former president, Don Tomas Testa, who was kidnapped in the month of October,
1902.
The said documents, the first of which was dated July 4 and the second July 17, 1902, were
written in Tagalog, and contain an oath taken in the name of God, and a covenant on the part of
the subscribers to carry out the superior orders of the Katipunan, and never disobey them until
their death in the defense of the mother country. The two accused, under oath, testified to having
signed the said documents and alleged that they did so under compulsion and force while they
were held as captives by the thieves; that the defendant Tanchinco was captured in the fields one
day when he was going to work on his farm by three armed men, unknown to him, who asked him
if he was an agent or friend of President Testa, and upon his replying in the negative they
compelled him in view of his denial to sign a document, now on page 3 of the record.
The defendant Tanchinco cited Lazaro Yusay to testify to the fact that he was captured at a place
called Kaibiga in the township of Novaliches, and that on the day following his release, having
been unable to pay the $300 which was demanded of him, he reported to the president, Tomas
Testa. The defendant Liberato Exaltacion under oath testified that he was captured near
Meycauayan by five persons, unknown, dressed as policemen and armed with guns or revolvers;
that these men bound him and took him into the forest and there compelled him by threats of
death to sign the documents now on page 2 of the record; that thereupon they allowed him to go
upon promise to return. This defendant testified that Antero Villano and Tomas Rivera saw him
while on the road in the hands of the thieves. Both the accused testified that as soon as they were
released they presented themselves to the president, Don Tomas Testa, in the presence of
witnesses, and subsequently went to Bonifacio Morales, a lieutenant of volunteers, and reported
to him the fact that they had been captured.
The witnesses Morales, Lazaro Yusay, Antero Villano, Dalmacio Ferrer, and Hipolito de Leon — of
whom the last two were present when Tanchinco appeared before Senor Testa, the president of
Meycauayan, and reported to him what had happened to him — all testified to the same fact and
corroborated the statements of the accused with respect to their capture and their subsequent
report to President Testa and to the witness Morales.
The evidence for the prosecution, and especially the two documents above referred to, signed by
the accused, is not sufficient to prove the guilt of the latter or to justify the imposition upon them
of the penalty inflicted by the judgment of the court below.
The facts, established by the evidence, that the defendants were kidnapped by brigands who
belonged to the Contreras band, and that they signed the said documents under compulsion and
while in captivity, relieve them from all criminal liability from the crime of rebellion of which they
are charged. The conduct of the defendants in presenting themselves first to the local president of
Meycauayan and subsequently to Lieut. Bonifacio Morales, of the Bulacan Government
Volunteers, as soon as they were released by the bandits is corroborative of their testimony, and
is the best demonstration of their innocence. This conclusion is not overcome by the trifling
discrepancy between the testimony of the witness Yusay and that of the defendant Tanchinco nor
the fact the Exaltacion was unable to determine the date when he was captured or that on which
he appeared before President Testa.
The guilt of the defendants of the crime defined and punished by Act No. 292 not having been
established at the trial beyond a reasonable doubt, we are of the opinion that the judgment
below must be reversed and the defendants acquitted with the costs de oficio. The judge below
will be informed of this decision and a copy of the judgment entered herein will be furnished him
for his information and guidance. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-22947 July 12, 1979
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO BORJA, PEDRO FUSTIGO, INOCENCIO DEMEN , RUFINO PAVIA, FELIPE BENAVIDES,
DOMINADOR DE LOS SANTOS, JOHN DOE, and RICHARD DOE, defendants-appellants.
Manuel M. Antonio for appellant Borja.
Isidro T. Bangayan (Counsel de Oficio) for other appellants.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:1äwphï1.ñët
This is an appeal from the consolidated decision of September 8, 1960, by the Court of First
Instance of Albay, in Criminal Case No. 2578 for murder, and Criminal Case No. 2590 for frustrated
murder, both bearing the Identical titles, PP. vs. Pedro Borja, Pedro Fustigo, Inocencio Demen,
Rufino Pavia, Felipe Benavides, Dominador de los Santos, John Doe and Richard Doe.
The decision convicted the accused, as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£
In Criminal Case No. 2590, the Court, fully convinced that Pedro Borja, Pedro Fustigo, Inocencio
Demen, Rufino Pavia, Felipe Benavides and Dominador de los Santos, are guilty beyond the
peradventure of reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated murder, as principals, hereby
sentences each of them to undergo imprisonment ranging from six (6) years, one (1) month, and
eleven (11) days of prision mayor, as the minimum, to fourteen (14) years, ten (10) months, and
twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as the maximum; to suffer inherent accessory
penalties; to indemnify the offended party, Salustiano Isorena, in the sum of P5,000.00, as moral
and exemplary damages, severally and jointly, but not to undergo subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency, by reason of the nature of the penalty imposed; and to pay the costs of this
proceeding on equal basis.
In Criminal Case No. 2578, the Court after having been convinced beyond the realm of reasonable
doubt of the guilt of Pedro Borja, Pedro Fustigo, Inocencio Demen, Rufino Pavia, Felipe Benavides
and Dominador de los Santos, of the crime of murder, as principals, deeply hurting as it is, hereby
sentences each of them to the maximum penalty of death; to suffer inherent accessory penalties;
to indemnify the offended parties, Mercedes Chuidian Vda. de Gancayco and her children in the
sum of P6,000.00 for the death of Santiago Gancayco, Jr., as a matter of law and practice, and
another amount in the sum of P30,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, both severally and
jointly, but not to undergo subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, by reason of the nature
of the penalty imposed; and to pay the costs of this proceeding on equal basis.
In the decision, the trial court — pursuant to the Revised Penal Code, Article 5 — recommended
to the President, through the Secretary of Justice, with respect to the accused Dominador de los
Santos, "that executive clemency be extended to him, or that at least his death penalty be
minimized or commuted to life imprisonment." The court so recommended because "the
testimony of this accused had contributed in a large measure to the Court in its pursuit of truth
and justice in these cases." It should be stated here that by resolution of January 24, 1966, the
Court noted the contents of de los Santos' motion withdrawing his appeal in this case.
It appears that on December 18, 1958, the Anderson Fil-American Guerrillas (AFAG) held a general
meeting at the bahay-pulungan of the religious sect known as Watawat Ng Lahi at Barrio
Buragwis, Legaspi City. The locale of the meeting was so chosen because many AFAG members
are also Watawat members. One of the accused, Pedro Borja, presided over the meeting, which
was attended by more than a hundred members. Borja, who has the rank of a full colonel, is the
AFAG head for the entire Bicol region, which is said to have 36,000 members. He had good news
for the members: he announced that their backpay was forthcoming at the rate of P36,000.00 for
a ranking officer, and a lesser amount for those of lower rank.
When the meeting ended, Borja called an exclusive conference among selected officers and
members, including the other accused Rufino Pavia, Inocencio Demen, Pedro Fustigo, Felipe
Benavides, Dominador de los Santos, Alejo Balimbing, and Tito Oljina (The last two, now
deceased, are referred to in the title of this case as John Doe and Richard Doe). At the secret
meeting, Balimbing proposed to Borja that they conduct a raid the following morning at the
Hacienda San Miguel, located at San Miguel Island, across the bay from Tabaco, Albay. That same
evening, Demen cleaned a .45 caliber pistol. The conference over, all eight men slept in the
bahay-pulungan.
When they woke up the next day, December 19, 1958, the eight men held an early-morning
conference. Balimbing aired to Borja his grievances against Santiago GAncayco, Jr. the manager of
the hacienda. Balimbing charged that it was Gancayco who killed Balimbing's cousin at Rawis,
Tabaco, Albay. Balimbing further complained that it was Gancayco who ordered that the camote
plantations of the hacienda squatters — who were related to Balimbing — should be bulldozed. It
appears that Balimbing was only rehashing what he had already related to Borja several months
before, at the AFAG regional headquarters at Pili, Camarines Sur.
That same morning, the eight men left by bus for Tabaco, via Legaspi City. They were armed as
follows: Borja had two pistols tucked in a shoulder holster; Pavia had a .45 caliber pistol;
Balimbing had a hunting knife with a scabbard; and Fustigo had a pistol. They were attired as
follows: Borja wore a khaki suit, black jacket, buri hat, and sunglasses; Demen wore a khaki suit;
Fustigo wore a blue shirt and khaki pants; de los Santos wore a red T-shirt, brown jacket, and
maong pants; Benavides wore denim pants and printed polo shirt; Pavia wore white pants; and
Oljina wore a brown polo shirt and khaki pants.
In Tabaco, the group went to Barrio San Jose, where they ate breakfast at the house of de los
Santos' brother. Upon Borja's instruction, Balimbing hired a motorboat operated by Mariano
Burac, who observed at the trial that the eight men acted suspiciously and conferred sotto voce
among themselves. They crossed the bay, and the group disembarked at the hacienda. At a
seashore conference, they agreed to pose as members of the Philippine Constabulary, ostensibly
on a mission to inspect the firearms of the hacienda. At this time, Borja started to wear a pair of
white gloves. They proceeded on their way, and Balimbing tried to open the bamboo gate of the
fence surrounding the manager's house. He was accosted by Emilio Lanon, a security guard and
barrio lieutenant of the hacienda, who was later one of the principal eyewitnesses for the
prosecution. Balimbing and Lanon knew each other. Balimbing introduced his companions as PC
soldiers, Identifying Borja as a major and Pavia as a sergeant.
On Lanon's advice, Balimbing proceeded to the office and emerged with Salustiano Isorena, the
hacienda overseer. Isorena told Lanon to inform Gancayco about the presence of the visitors.
Then, on Pavia's advice, he and Isorena went to the house, where Isorena informed Mrs.
Gancayco about the visitors. On Mrs. Gancayco's suggestion, the group went to the office to await
for Gancayco, who arrived later.
Gancayco shook hands with Borja and Pavia. He offered Borja a pack of cigarettes, from which
took one stick. Informed of the group's alleged mission, Gancayco instructed Isorena to present
the license of the firearms. But Isorena failed to find the license in the office, so Gancayco went to
the house to look for it there. While in the house, he instructed his wife to prepare a meal for the
guests.
Gancayco returned to the office, gave the license to Isorena, and then left. Isorena presented the
license to Borja, who remarked that the license listed only five firearms, as against reports
received at the headquarters in Albay that there were ten firearms in the hacienda. Borja then
ordered Isorena to produce the firearms for inspection; Isorena, in turn, instructed Lanon to get
the firearms. Lanon went to the house and obtained a carbine, the magazine of which he
removed; as well as shotgun.
On his way back to the office, he met de los Santos and Oljina, who took the firearms and the
magazine from him. Isorena again instructed Lanon to get the other firearms. In compliance,
Lanon sent Jaime Rawit to get the grease-gun from Lanon's house, while Lanon himself went to
Gancayco's house to get another grease-gun which had no magazine. Rawit and Lanon met at
Gancayco's house and from there, while Lanon was carrying the two grease-guns, he met Demen
and Benavides, who took them away.
The group had now succeeded in obtaining possession of four of the five firearms, and they were
not able to get the one remaining firearm only because it was with an hacienda employee
guarding cattle some kilometers away. An atmosphere of menace descended on the hacienda as
the men loaded the firearms and took a hostile stance. An apprehensive Isorena asked the equally
perturbed Gancayco for instructions, but was only cautioned to remain calm and deal courteously
with the group, as Gancayco had already sent someone to Tabaco to request police assistance.
During this time, Balimbing was investigating Lanon inside the bodega. Lanon was surrounded by
Balimbing with a hunting knife, Pavia with a .45 caliber pistol, and Benavides with a grease-gun. In
the course of his interrogation, Balimbing told Lanon that they were going to kill Gancayco,
Isorena, Lanon and one Pablo Balimbing, chief herder of the hacienda, because these employees
were boothlickers to the Gancaycos. Then Balimbing pushed Lanon out of the bodega.
Gancayco and Isorena were talking at the balcony of the house. They were approached by Demen,
who had a grease-gun, and Oljina who had a shotgun. De los Santos with a carbine posted himself
under the citrus tree near the water tank in front of the house. Gancayco asked to see a search
warrant from Demen, and Oljina who referred him to Borja. So Gancayco and Isorena descended
and inquired for the warrant from Borja, who was standing in front of the house. Instead of
replying, Borja talked to Pavia, who was near the guardhouse. Borja then called Balimbing and,
referring to Gancayco and Isorena, ordered him to "fix them up" since it was already getting on
towards noon. Borja herded the other men of the hacienda inside the bodega, where they were
guarded by Benavides who was armed with a grease-gun, and Fustigo, with a pistol. Borja faced
the hacienda personnel, holding in readiness his two pistols. Lanon stood in front of him, facing
out of the bodega.
In the meantime, Balimbing, Pavia, Demen, de los Santos, and Oljina escorted Gancayco and
Isorena towards the office. Isorena went up the stairs and turned around when he reached the
top; behind him, de los Santos held a carbine in a ready position. Benavides asked Gancayco for
the magazine of the grease-gun he was holding. When Gancayco answered that it had no
magazine, Benavides accused him of lying and sideswiped him with the grease-gun. Then
Benavides left for the bodega.
Now the men surrounded Gancayco in front of the office. Facing him was Balimbing, who was
swinging his hunting knife. Also facing him, to Balimbing's right, was Pavia whose jacket, draped
over his left arm, concealed his right hand which held a .45 caliber pistol. To Pavia's right was
Demen, who was aiming the grease-gun at Gancayco. Slightly behind Demen, Oljina aimed the
shotgun at Gancayco.
Balimbing accused Gancayco of killing Balimbing's cousin, and demanded that Gancayco produce
the .45 caliber pistol which he claimed was used to perpetrate the death. Gancayco explained that
it was not he but Solon Demetrio who accidentally shot Balimbing's cousin, and that Gancayco
had no such pistol. Pavia interjected that it was unbelievable for Gancayco, as manager of the
hacienda, not to have such a pistol. But Gancayco insisted that there was none.
While this exchange was taking place, Gancayco, who was unarmed, stood with his back towards
the foot of the stairs. He was surrounded by Balimbing who held a hunting knife; Pavia who held a
.45 caliber pistol concealed beneath his jacket; Demen, who held the grease-gun with his arms
down and the muzzle of the gun pointed slightly upward; and Oljina who held a shotgun. The four
men were about two meters away from Gancayco. Up in the balcony, de los Santos stood guard
with a carbine in ready position, standing slightly back of Isorena. Gancayco and the four men
were about four meters away from Isorena and de los Santos.
Gancayco had insisted that he had no .45 caliber pistol. At this fateful moment, Pavia suddenly
jerked his right hand upward and fired point-blank with his .45 caliber pistol at Gancayco. Hit,
Gancayco stooped to holed the pit of his stomach and cried, "Aray ko po." Instinctively, he
stepped backward and was turning around when Demen, fired at him with a grease-gun. He ran
away in a crouching position towards the citrus plantation, while Demen, continued firing at him.
Then Demen, aimed rapid fire at Isorena, who fell flat on the balcony floor. Demen's line of fire
accidentaly caught de los Santos in the forehead.
At the outburst of gunfire, Borja rushed out of the bodega. He saw Gancayco running towards the
citrus plantation and he shouted: "Habulin! Habulin!" The men carrying their firearms gave chase;
they were led by Demen, and included de los Santos. They ran along the road towards a cluster of
houses in the northern part of the hacienda, but they stopped in front of the house of Estrella
Cortezano. Balimbing asked Cortezano whether she saw where Gancayco went, but he got a
negative answer. As the men ran in pursuit, Gancayco traversed the citrus plantation and reached
the cluster of, houses. Although he was bleeding profusely, he managed to cross the road and to
open the gate by removing one of the bamboo railings. He then turned towards the trail that
wound through the abaca plantation at the left side of the road.
While the pursuers tracked their prey, Lanon left the bodega by the back door and went to
Gancayco's house. Mrs. Gancayco told him to close all the windows and take the children
downstairs, and he complied. Then he left the house and looked for Gancayco whom he found in
the abaca plantation, climbing a small hill towards another cluster of houses at the hilltop. Lanon
found Gancayco bleeding profusely in the breast.
Gancayco, his wife, and children, Isorena, and some other personnel of the hacienda, were able to
rendezvous at the seashore. They got into a waiting motorboat and sped away towards Tabaco, in
the hope of taking the wounded men to the hospital there. But this was not to be; for en route,
Gancayco died in the arms of his wife. His body was brought to Manila, where it was examined
and autopsied by the National Bureau of Investigation. Although seriously wounded, Isorena
survived. He received first-aid treatment at the Tabaco Hospital and was air lifted the next day to
Manila where he was confined, first at the North General Hospital, and then at the National
Orthopedic Hospital. Dr. Casiano Flaviano, a resident Physician at the National Orthopedic
Hospital who treated Isorena testified that the latter would have died from his injuries had he not
received immediate medical attention.
While events unfolded on Tabaco Bay, the group of eight men reached the seashore and chanced
upon a motorboat anchored there. Balimbing wrapped the four firearms in some anahaw leaves.
When the men discovered that the motorboat did not have enough gasoline, they looked for
another and dragooned Bienvenido Taller into transporting them. Taller observed that the eight
men were excited and apprehensive. Balimbing told him, with some braggadocio that they had
just killed Gancayco and Isorena. The men alighted at the lighthouse at Malinao and immediately
afterwards, Taller reported to the police authorities of the town. However, he was advised to
report to the police authorities of Tabaco, who had jurisdiction over the case.
The eight men reached the poblacion of Malinao. On Borjas orders, they bought a jute sack where
they placed the firearms. Borja instructed Pavia and Demen, to make their separate way towards
Barrio Buragwis. Before he left with Demen, Pavia left his .45 pistol with Balimbing. The remainder
of the group boarded a passenger bus going to Tiwi.
As the bus stopped near the market at Tiwi another car overtook it and policemen from Tabaco,
headed by Chief of Police Ceferino Firaza, alighted and surrounded the bus. Firaza in a loud voice
called for the surrender of all those in the bus responsible for the killing at the Hacienda San
Miguel. He was suddenly fired upon by Borja and then by Balimbing. The fusillade hit him on the
right cheek, and he ordered his men to return fire. The encounter resulted in the death of
Balimbing and Oljina the capture of Benavides and de los Santos; and the escape of Borja and
Fustigo, Lt. Melanio Rey of the Tabaco police confiscated the firearms, magazines, and
ammunition taken from the hacienda; the .45 caliber pistol and its shell; the hunting knife and its
scabbard from the dead body of Balimbing; and other paraphernalia from the dead bodies of
Balimbing and Oljina.
The encounter in Tiwi took place in the afternoon of December 19, 1958. Subsequently, the rest
of the band fell one by one into the hands of the law. Pavia, Demen, Fustigo, were arrested, and
Borja, the last one to fall, was captured on February 27, 1959 after a nationwide manhunt.
The trial judge characterized this narration of the shooting of Gancayco and Isorena as both water
tight and airtight. He found that the tenor of the evidence presented — consisting in the main of
the testimony Isorena, an eyewitness; and of the accused de los Santos, who testified for the state
during Borja's separate trial — was confirmed by the testimonies of the medico-legal expert and
the ballistician. He noted that the five accused who were separately tried from Borja admitted all
the facts leading to the shooting, but interposed the common defense of fear of Borja, who, they
claimed, had threatened disobedient AFAG members with death. The trial judge was not
persuaded and he discounted this common defense, characterizing it as "an after-thought to save
their respective skins in the face of the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution pointing to
their voluntary participation in the commission of the crimes of murder and frustrated murder."
Instead, the trial judge found that the five men participated in the killing "because they were
inspired by the juicy thought or promise of an enormous amount of backpay for each."
Borja, who was still at large at the time the five accused were being tried, had a separate trial. The
trial court found that he "has a version entirely distinct and separate from that of the five
accused, which version in turn is astronomically far from the evidence presented by the
prosecution." Borja washed his hands of any complicity in the killing which he sought to lay at
Balimbing's door. Conveniently for Borja, Balimbing is dead and cannot tell his tale. But like his
colleagues, Borja failed to convince the trial judge. Noting that Borja was the commanding officer
of eight AFAG regiments in the entire Bicol region, while Balimbing was just a sergeant, the trial
court refused to believe that Balimbing openly defied Borja by instigating the sanguinary episode
at the hacienda. Instead, the trial court declared: "The contrary was the real and painful truth.
Pedro Borja was the leader of the group that raided Hacienda San Miguel, and he was the very
one who ordered the liquidation of Santiago Gancayco Jr. and Salustiano Isorena."
The trial court found that conspiracy was "conclusively established" and that "the guilt of all the
accused has been established by proof above the shadow of doubt." It found that the killing of
Gancayco constitutes murder, while the shooting of Isorena constitutes frustrated murder. The
trial court held that either evident premeditation or treachery qualifies the crimes to murder and
frustrated murder; since the law requires only one qualifying circumstance, the other should be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.
The trial court found five aggravating circumstances against Fustigo, Demen, Pavia, Benavides,
and de los Santos, to wit: têñ.£îhqwâ£
(1) the crimes of murder and frustrated murder were committed by a band, or with the aid of
armed men;
(2) means were employed to weaken the defense, wherein is included taking advantage of
superior strength;
(3) craft, fraud and/or disguise were employed;
(4) there was promise of backpay in the commission of the crimes; and
(5) there was treachery or evident premeditation, depending upon whatever is used to qualify the
crimes to murder and frustrated murder.
With respect to Pedro Borja in both cases the trial court considered against him four aggravating
circumstances, consisting of the five above-mentioned, but excluding the promise of backpay. It
found another aggravating circumstance in the case of frustrated murder, i.e. dwelling. Hence, in
the case of frustrated murder, it found six aggravating circumstances against Fustigo, Demen,
Pavia, Benavides, and de los Santos; and five aggravating circumstances against Borja.
All the five accused in the first trial admitted practically all the evidence for the prosecution in
their testimonies in their own behalf, and additionally in their respective affidavits narrating their
individual participation in the commission of the two crimes. Moreover, they freely and
voluntarily re-enacted the crime at the hacienda, in the presence of the trial judge. The re-
enactment proceedings were photographed and tape recorded, and bore out the version testified
to by Isorena and Lanon eyewitnesses for the prosecution.
In the Brief for all accused-appellants except Pedro Borja, John Doe, and Richard Doe (John Doe
and Richard Doe refer to Alejo Balimbing and Tito Oljina who were killed during the encounter at
Tiwi), the five accused — Fustigo, Demen, Pavia, Benavides, and de los Santos — do not deny their
culpability for the offenses charged. In their Brief, they prayed for the reduction of the penalty
from death and its accessory penalties, to reclusion temporal and its accessory penalties. They
admitted with candor: "The finding of facts in the decision of the trial court having been found to
be a faithful narration of the incident as related during the trial of the case and given in the two
ocular inspections of the premises where the shooting happened, it would seem a useless
endeavor to reiterate said findings of facts, ..." (Brief for the Accused-Appellants, except Pedro
Borja, pages 6-7).
The five accused controverted the findings of the trial court that there were five aggravating
circumstances in the case for murder. Instead, they contended that the trial court should have
appreciated only three aggravating circumstances. They reasoned that any of the alleged
aggravating circumstances should necessarily be absorbed to qualify the crime of murder, thereby
leaving only four aggravating circumstances. Moreover, they argued that the aggravating
circumstance of promise of backpay was not alleged in the information, and consequently should
not be taken as an aggravating circumstance.
We find that the trial court correctly considered that either treachery or evident premeditation
qualifies the crime to murder, and hence the other alternative circumstance should be considered
as aggravating. We reject the contention of the five accused; for while it is true that the
aggravating circumstance of promise or reward was not alleged in the information, nevertheless,
it was proven during the trial, and therefore can be considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance, though not a qualifying circumstance. (People of the Philippines vs. Navarro, et al.,
L-20860, November 28, 1964, 12 SCRA 530). On the other hand, as Borja contends, infra, the other
aggravating circumstances are absorbed by alevosia or treachery. Hence, if it is treachery which is
considered as the qualifying circumstance, there remain two generic aggravating circumstances
which attended the commission of the two crimes with respect to the five accused: evident
premeditation; and promise or reward (which does not apply with respect to Borja.)
The five accused contended that there were three mitigating circumstances in their favor: lack of
instruction; fear of Pedro Borja; and lack of motive. We find no merit in this contention. The
argument of lack of instruction is based on the allegation that the five accused did not finish
primary education. But the defense adduced no proof to establish the existence of this
circumstance, leaving in full force the holding that extenuating circumstances must be proven
positively and cannot be based on mere deduction or inference. (PP. vs. Sakam, et al., 41566,
December 7, 1934, 61 Phil. 27). If by "lack of instruction" the defense refers to illiteracy, it is not
sufficient to constitute a mitigating circumstance, for there must also be lack of intelligence. (PP.
vs. Gorospe, L-10644-45, February 19, 1959, 105 Phil. 184; PP. vs. Ripas, L-6246, May 26, 1954, 95
Phil. 63; PP. vs. Semanada, L-11361, May 26, 1958, 103 Phil. 790; PP. vs. Tengyao, L-14675,
November 29, 1961, 113 Phil. 465).
The second mitigating circumstance advanced by the five accused is "awe and fear of Pedro
Borja." But the element of fear is not one of those enumerated as a mitigating circumstance under
the Revised Penal Code, Article 13. If the defense refers to the element of "uncontrollable fear or
duress" which is an exempting circumstance under the Revised Penal Code, Article 12, the
argument is still invalid, for it has been held that the element of duress should be based on real,
imminent or reasonable fear for one's life or limb and should not be speculative, fanciful, or
remote fear. (PP. vs. Quilloy No. L-2313, January 10, 1951, 88 Phil. 53). We find no evidence to
support the claim that Borja threatened any or all of the other accused.
The third alleged mitigating circumstance is lack of motive. We are hard put to discuss this
contention because the Revised Penal Code, Article 13 does not include "lack of motive" as one of
the mitigating circumstances. Finally, the defense argues that "the undiplomatic attitude of
Gancayco and Isorena, bordering on provocation" should be considered as another mitigating
circumstance. This contention is not borne out by the evidence; on the contrary, it appears that
instead of being "undiplomatic", Gancayco was pacific, and he counselled Isorena that "the best
thing for us to do is to talk to them peacefully and follow them, whatever they want." (T.s.n. p.
1466). This leaves as the only remaining assertion of the five accused the claim that "the alleged
premeditated conspiracy to kill Gancayco was not clearly revealed in the records of the case." We
shall discuss this assertion in dealing with the defense of Borja.
In the Brief for the defendant-appellant Pedro Borja, the defense contended that since a separate
trial was held for Borja, the trial court erred in rendering a single decision on which the findings of
facts respecting Borja, based on evidence adduced during his separate trial, are not distinctively
set forth, thereby prejudicially impairing Borja's substantial rights. We find no such impairment of
the rights of the accused. The evidence shows that the prosecution established the same facts in
the two separate trials. Isorena and Lanon testified as eyewitnesses to the incident of December
19, 1958; de los Santos testified as an eyewitness not only to the same incident, but also to events
before and after the shooting, showing conspiracy among the accused. Other persons testified in
both trials to supply corroborating evidence.
Borja also contended that the trial court erred in not according credence to Borja's defense and in
finding him guilty on the basis in part of what is alleged to be incompetent evidence adduced not
at his separate trial but at that of his co-accused, and in not acquitting him upon the ground that
his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. This is a blanket allegation which can be dealt
with summarily, because the testimonies of common witnesses in both trials clearly establish facts
incriminatory to Borja. More specifically, Borja contended that the trial court erred in finding that
a conspiracy existed between Borja and his co-accused. We find this contention to be an excursion
outside the perimeters of credibility. Borja was the AFAG commander for the Bicol region. After
the second secret conference, he donned spurious armed forces get-up, complete with uniform
and two guns. When he was introduced to the hacienda personnel as a PC major in command of
the group, it does not appear that he raised any protest. Instead, the evidence shows that he
issued the order to Balimbing to "fix them up" referring to Gancayco and Isorena and he also
issued the order "Habulin! Habulin!" when Gancayco ran for his life. Borja consistently acted the
leader as he led the dash for illicit freedom. He led the group in fleeing the island; instructed that
the firearms should be secreted away in a jute sack; and ordered his men to separate into two
groups when his group was surrounded by Tabaco policemen near Tiwi, where Borja led the
gunfight.
He eluded his trackers for more than two months until his capture. To flee the fold of the law is to
admit that one has transgressed that law. (PP. vs. Wilson, et al., 30012-15, March 7, 1929, 52 Phil.
907). Borja's uncontested actions would be gratuitous and illogical, unless located within the
frame of conspiracy, which is their only reasonable context. The evidence shows that Borja acted
in concert with the other accused in pursuance of the same objective. Hence, conspiracy attaches
and it is no longer necessary to obtain proof as to the previous agreement or decision to commit
the crime. (PP vs Cadag, L-13830, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 388; PP. vs. Peralta, L-19069, October 29,
1968, 25 SCRA 759; PP. vs. Alcantara, L-26867, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 812).
Borja further contended that assuming his criminal liability, the trial court erred in appreciating
the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation; and the generic aggravating
circumstances of band or aid of armed men; use of means to weaken the defense; craft, fraud,
and/or disguise. This contention for the first part flies in the face of the evidence. Treachery was
present because Gancayco was killed while he was unarmed, and surrounded by enemies with
firearms, including two grease-guns. Thus, Gancayco was deprived of any means of defense while
his enemies were exposed to no risk arising from the defense which the offended party might
have made. True, Borja was inside the bodega when the shooting took place; but his physical
absence does not exonerate him, for it was he who ordered the execution. Moreover, where
there is conspiracy, treachery is considered against all the offenders. (PP. vs. Carandang, et al.,
32039, February 26, 1930, 54 Phil. 503). The aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation
was sufficiently proved, for prior to the shooting on December 19, 1958, the accused met in two
secret conferences and discussed the raid on the hacienda in order to avenge themselves by
exacting redress from Gancayco for allegedly killing Balimbing's cousin and bulldozing the camote
plantations of Balimbing's relatives.
However, Borja's contention for the second part is well taken. The defense argues that the
circumstance of band and aid of armed men, cannot be taken separately from the circumstance of
use of means to weaken the defense, and advantage of superior strength. It was correctly pointed
out that all these circumstances are absorbed in treachery and may not be considered
independently. (U.S. vs. Estopia, et al., No. 9411, September 29, 1914, 28 Phil. 97; U.S. vs. Oro, No.
5781, August 14, 1911, 19 Phil. 548; U.S. vs. Vitug, et al., No. 5430, September 8, 1910, 17 Phil. 1;
PP vs. Sespene No. L-9346, October 30, 1957, 102 Phil. 199; PP. vs. Lumantas, L-28355, July 17,
1969, 28 SCRA 764; PP. vs. Agustin, L-18368, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 467; PP. vs. Layson, L-
25177, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 32). It was also correctly pointed out that treachery absorbs
the circumstance of craft, fraud and disguise. (PP. vs. Malig, et al., L-2083, May 30, 1949, 83 Phil.
803). Nonetheless, this leaves the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, which
applies to all the accused; and the aggravating circumstance of promise of backpay, which applies
to all the accused, except Borja.
Lastly, Borja contended that, assuming he is criminally liable, the trial court erred in not according
him the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. We do not view this as
error. It appears that Borja did not surrender but was captured on February 27, 1959. His own
witness, Captain Eliseo Farol of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, testified that he received a
report that Borja was holed up at Barrio Sumakap, Cavinte, Laguna. Accordingly, he sent a ranger
team which located the house and called on Borja to come down. As the house was surrounded
by soldiers, Borja offered no resistance. Capt. Farol also testified that while Borja was at large, he
killed a PC soldier in an armed encounter at Catanauan, Quezon, as a result of which he was
indicted for murder in the court of first instance in that province. Capt. Farol also declared that a
prize of P2,000.00 was put on Borja's head for being a dangerous fugitive. These are not indicia of
the personality seeking voluntary surrender.
Mr. Santiago Gancayco, Jr., manager of a 1,700-hectare hacienda and scion of a prominent family,
is dead. His demise when he was only in his early thirties was rendered more tragic in that he
breathed his last in the bosom of his grieving family, consisting of his wife and six small children, in
the course of his flight from ostensible visitors who had suddenly been transformed into cold-
blooded killers. Dr. Rizalino Reyes, Chief of the Medico-Legal Division of the National Bureau of
Investigation who performed an autopsy on the body of Santiago Gancayco, Jr. testified that his
death was due to hemorrhage, severe, secondary to multiple gunshot wounds of the body and
that shock, traumatic was contributory. It was abundantly established in the trial court that his
killing was attended by treachery, which qualifies the crime committed by the perpetrators into
murder.
Five of the accused, namely: Pedro Fustigo, Inocencio Demen, Rufino Pavia, Felipe Benavides and
Dominador de los Santos have been in custody since December 19, 1958, or shortly thereafter;
while Pedro Borja was apprehended on February 27, 1959. It can thus be seen that all of them
have been under detention for over twenty years.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court in Criminal Case No. 2590 is hereby affirmed in
toto; that in Criminal Case No. 2578 is modified in respect of the principal penalty from death to
reclusion perpetua for lack of necessary votes, and in respect of the civil indemnity from P6,000 to
P12,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-6082 March 18, 1911
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ISIDRO VICENTILLO, defendant-appellant.
C.W. Ney for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The defendant in this case was found guilty in the court below of the crime of "illegal and arbitrary
detention" of the complaining witness for a period of three days, and sentenced to pay a fine of
625 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of the trial.
We are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case there can be no doubt of the
lawful authority of the defendant, in the exercise of his functions as municipal president, to make
arrest of the complaining witness which resulted in his alleged unlawful detention. As we
understand the evidence, the alleged offense with which the complaining witness in this case was
charged was committed by him in the presence of the municipal president, who must be held to
have had all the usual powers of a police officer for the making of arrest without warrant, under
the doctrine laid down in the case of U.S. vs. Fortaleza (12 Phil. Rep., 472).
The judgment of conviction of the court below must therefore be reversed, unless the evidence
discloses that having made the arrest, the defendant arbitrarily and without legal authority, as it is
alleged, cause the complaining witness to be detained for a period of three days without having
him brought before the proper judicial authority for the investigation and trial of the charge on
which he was arrested. But so far as we can gather from the extremely meagre record in this case
the arrested man was in fact brought before a justice of the peace as soon as "practicable" after
his arrest. True, three days were expended in doing, so, but it was conclusively proven at the trial
that at the time of the arrest neither the local justice of the peace nor his auxiliary were in the
municipality, and to reach the justice of the peace of either of the two adjoining municipalities, it
was necessary to take a long journey by boat. The evidence discloses, moreover, that with all
practicable dispatch, the prisoner was forwarded first to one and then to the other of the
adjoining municipalities for trial, the failure to secure trial on the first occasion being due to the
fact that the written complaint, which was intrusted to the policeman in charge of the prisoner,
was either lost or stolen. It does not appear why the prisoner was not sent to the same
municipality on both occasions, but in the absence of proof we must assume that in this respect
the officers in charge were controlled by local conditions, changes in the weather, or the like,
which, as appears from the uncontradicted evidence of record, made the journey by boats safer
and more commodious sometimes to one and sometimes to the other of the two adjoining
municipalities.
It may be that the defendant was not friendly to the arrested man, and that he was not sorry to
see him exposed to considerable inconvenience and delay in the proceedings incident to his trial,
but there is nothing in this record upon which to base a finding that his defendant caused the
arrest and the subsequent detention of the prisoner otherwise than in the due performance of his
official duties; and there can be no doubt of his lawfully authority in the premises. The trial judge
lays great stress upon the trivial nature of the offense for which the arrest was made, but keeping
in mind the fact that there was no judicial officer in the remote community where the incident
occurred at the time of the arrest, and no certainty of the early return of the absent justice of the
peace, or his auxiliary, we are not prepared to hold, in the absence of all the evidence on this
point that in a particular case of a defiance of local authority by the willful violation of a local
ordinance, it was not necessary, or at least expedient, to make an arrest and send the offender
forthwith to the justice of the peace of a neighboring municipality, if only to convince all would-be
offenders that the forces of law and order were supreme, even in the absence of the local
municipal judicial officers.
The judgment of the lower court convicting and sentencing the defendant must be reversed and
he is hereby acquitted of the offense with which he is charged, with the costs in both instances de
oficio. So ordered.
G.R. No. 45186 September 30, 1936
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSEFINA BANDIAN, defendant-appellant.
Jose Rivera Yap for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
DIAZ, J.:
Charged with the crime of infanticide, convicted thereof and sentenced to reclusion perpetua and
the corresponding accessory penalties, with the costs of the suit, Josefina Bandian appealed from
said sentence alleging that the trial court erred:
I. In taking into consideration, to convict her, her alleged admission to Dr. Nepomuceno that she
had thrown away her newborn babe, and
II. In holding her guilty of infanticide, beyond reasonable doubt, and in sentencing her to reclusion
perpetua, with costs.
The facts of record ma be summarized as follows:
At about 7 o'clock in the morning of January 31, 1936, Valentin Aguilar, the appellant's neighbor,
saw the appellant go to a thicket about four or five brazas from her house, apparently to respond
to a call of nature because it was there that the people of the place used to go for that purpose. A
few minutes later, he again saw her emerge from the thicket with her clothes stained with blood
both in the front and back, staggering and visibly showing signs of not being able to support
herself. He ran to her aid and, having noted that she was very weak and dizzy, he supported and
helped her go up to her house and placed her in her own bed. Upon being asked before Aguilar
brought her to her house, what happened to her, the appellant merely answered that she was
very dizzy. Not wishing to be alone with the appellant in such circumstances, Valentin Aguilar
called Adriano Comcom, who lived nearby, to help them, and later requested him to take bamboo
leaves to stop the hemorrhage which had come upon the appellant. Comcom had scarcely gone
about five brazas when he saw the body of a newborn babe near a path adjoining the thicket
where the appellant had gone a few moments before. Comcom informed Aguilar of it and latter
told him to bring the body to the appellant's house. Upon being asked whether the baby which
had just been shown to her was hers or not, the appellant answered in the affirmative.
Upon being notified of the incident at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of said day, Dr. Emilio
Nepomuceno, president of the sanitary division of Talisayan, Oriental Misamis, went to the
appellant's house and found her lying in bed still bleeding. Her bed, the floor of her house and
beneath it, directly under the bed, were full of blood. Basing his opinion upon said facts, the
physician in question declared that the appellant gave birth in her house and in her own bed; that
after giving birth she threw her child into the thicket to kill it for the purpose of concealing her
dishonor from the man, Luis Kirol, with whom she had theretofore been living maritally, because
the child was not his but of another man with whom she had previously had amorous relations. To
give force to his conclusions, he testified that the appellant had admitted to him that she had
killed her child, when he went to her house at the time and on the date above-stated.
The prosecuting attorney and the lower court giving absolute credit to Dr. Nepomuceno whose
testimony was not corroborated but, on the contrary, was contradicted by the very witnesses for
the prosecution and by the appellant, as will be stated later, they were of the opinion and the
lower court furthermore held, that the appellant was an infanticide. The Solicitor-General,
however, does not agree with both. On the contrary, he maintains that the appellant may be
guilty only of abandoning a minor under subsection 2 of article 276 of the Revised Penal Code, the
abandonment having resulted in the death of the minor allegedly abandoned.
By the way, it should be stated that there is no evidence showing how the child in question died.
Dr. Nepomuceno himself affirmed that the wounds found in the body of the child were not caused
by the hand of man but by bites animals, the pigs that usually roamed through the thicket where
it was found.
Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be committed wilfully or
consciously, or at least it must be result of a voluntary, conscious and free act or omission. Even in
cases where said crimes are committed through mere imprudence, the person who commits
them, under said circumstances, must be in the full enjoyment of his mental faculties, or must be
conscious of his acts, in order that he may be held liable.
The evidence certainly does not show that the appellant, in causing her child's death in one way
or another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did so wilfully, consciously or imprudently. She had
no cause to kill or abandon it, to expose it to death, because her affair with a former lover, which
was not unknown to her second lover, Luis Kirol, took place three years before the incident; her
married life with Kirol — she considers him her husband as he considers her his wife — began a
year ago; as he so testified at the trial, he knew that the appellant was pregnant and he believed
from the beginning, affirming such belief when he testified at the trial, that the child carried by
the appellant in her womb was his, and he testified that he and she had been eagerly waiting for
the birth of the child. The appellant, therefore, had no cause to be ashamed of her pregnancy to
Kirol.
If to the foregoing facts is added the testimony of the witnesses Valentin Aguilar and Adriano
Comcom that the child was taken from the thicket and carried already dead to the appellant's
house after the appellant had left the place, staggering, without strength to remain on her feet
and very dizzy, to the extent of having to be as in fact she was helped to go up to her house and to
lie in bed, it will clearly appear how far from the truth were Dr. Nepomuceno's affirmation and
conclusions. Also add to all these the fact that the appellant denied having made any admission to
said physician and that from the time she became pregnant she continuously had fever. This
illness and her extreme debility undoubtedly caused by her long illness as well as the hemorrhage
which she had upon giving birth, coupled with the circumstances that she is a primipara, being
then only 23 years of age, and therefore inexperienced as to childbirth and as to the
inconvenience or difficulties usually attending such event; and the fact that she, like her lover Luis
Kirol — a mere laborer earning only twenty-five centavos a day — is uneducated and could
supplant with what she had read or learned from books what experience itself could teach her,
undoubtedly were the reasons why she was not aware of her childbirth, or if she was, it did not
occur to her or she was unable, due to her debility or dizziness, which causes may be considered
lawful or insuperable to constitute the seventh exempting circumstance (art. 12, Revised Penal
Code), to take her child from the thicket where she had given it birth, so as not to leave it
abandoned and exposed to the danger of losing its life.
The act performed by the appellant in the morning in question, by going into the thicket,
according to her, to respond to call of nature, notwithstanding the fact that she had fever for a
long time, was perfectly lawful. If by doing so she caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her
child in that same place and later abandoning it, not because of imprudence or any other reason
than that she was overcome by strong dizziness and extreme debility, she should not be blamed
therefor because it all happened by mere accident, from liability any person who so acts and
behaves under such circumstances (art. 12, subsection 4, Revised Penal Code).
In conclusion, taking into account the foregoing facts and considerations, and granting that the
appellant was aware of her involuntary childbirth in the thicket and that she later failed to take
her child therefrom, having been so prevented by reason of causes entirely independent of her
will, it should be held that the alleged errors attributed to the lower court by the appellant are
true; and it appearing that under such circumstances said appellant has the fourth and seventh
exempting circumstances in her favor, is hereby acquitted of the crime of which she had bee
accused and convicted, with costs de oficio, and she is actually confined in jail in connection with
this case, it is ordered that she be released immediately. So ordered.